

authors who persist in presenting the hard-nosed, law-bound Calvin of caricature are now entirely 'without excuse', and we shall wait with interest to see if some may even feel moved publicly to repent.

The work opens with an expression of surprise that notwithstanding the ever-expanding Calvin industry, relatively little detailed study of the reformer's concept of the law has been undertaken. Now this important lacuna is filled; justice is done to Calvin; and any who would probe to the heart of his teaching will need to reckon with this book. The chapter titles indicate the scope of the work: Prolegomena; Creation and the Law; The Covenant and the Decalog; Law and Gospel; The End and Use of the Law; Conclusion: Calvin's Dynamic Understanding of the Law.

Though especially concerned with Calvin's 'third use of the law,' the author is thorough on the other uses too. He demonstrates his argument by ample reference not only to the *Institutes*, but also to the Geneva Catechism, the commentaries, and to Calvin's liturgical and pastoral objectives. He graciously yet firmly adjusts himself to the views of others, dissenting where necessary alike from Lutherans and Reformed, both classical and contemporary. Moreover, this being no hagiography, Dr. Hesselink adverts to the blind spots of Calvin himself.

Among the strengths of this work are (1) the way in which Calvin is related to his medieval forebears; (2) the judicious discussion of natural law; (3) the presentation of Calvin as much more the practical theologian than the logic-chopper; and (4) the way in which the relation between the law and the work of the Holy Spirit is clarified.

The following random assertions, albeit shorn of the provided supportive argumentation, will exemplify Dr. Hesselink's style and indicate his position: '[I]t is not true to say that [Duns Scotus] identified God's absolute power with the purely arbitrary (21) ... Calvin's concept of God—or the law—should not be prejudged by one's evaluation of his doctrine of predestination (25) ... It must be conceded that ... in his treatment of reprobation Calvin sometimes seems to speak of a God who operates apart from Jesus Christ (32) ... [T]he killing, terrorizing work of the law is the consequence of sin and hence 'accidental' (55) ... Separated from the Holy Spirit, the law has either a negative effect—rebellion, hardness of heart, greater guilt—or none at all ... If the law is separated from Christ and does not lead to him, it is horribly perverted (96–97) ... The law functions in different ways according to time and circumstances (112) ... [I]f Christ is the substance and soul of the law ... then Christ's 'faithful interpretation' of the law is nothing other than a self-witness (163) ... [W]hat separates the law from the gospel like fire and water is the matter of justification (196) ... [D]espite Calvin's hermeneutical principles

and presuppositions he did not choose to develop his *Institutes* in an explicitly and systematically Christological manner (224) ... When theologians of a later generation developed a systematic *ordo salutis*, they moved beyond the reformers (235) ... The law has not been rendered obsolete with the advent of Christ ... Calvin does not have two norms for the Christian life but one (280).'

This admirable work is furnished with full notes, a bibliography and an index.

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Ethics in an Age of Technology: The Gifford Lectures 1989–91, Volume 2

Ian G. Barbour

London: SCM Press, 1992, pp. 312 + xix pp., £17.50, pb.

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RÉSUMÉ

C'est le tome 2 des conférences Gifford de Barbour (le premier a été recensé dans EJTh III, 1 1994). Il traite des problèmes soulevés en éthique par les derniers développements de la technique et des sciences appliquées. La technologie peut être libératrice, menaçante ou oppressive. Barbour y voit un instrument humain au service de valeurs humaines et écologiques dérivées de la science, la philosophie et la religion. Après avoir énuméré ces valeurs, il se penche sur les technologies de l'agriculture, des sources d'énergie et de l'informatique en analysant les valeurs et les politiques qui y ont trait. L'ouvrage est solide au point de vue descriptif, mais le cadre éthique est trop général et l'argumentation n'est pas rigoureuse. Les jugements qui y sont portés peuvent être rapides et peu nuancés. L'ouvrage est intéressant pour l'ampleur du champ d'étude mais manque de profondeur.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Dies ist der zweite Band von Barbours 'Gifford Lectures' (Band 1 wurde in ETZ III:1, 1994 besprochen). Er befaßt sich mit den Herausforderungen, die moderne Entwicklungen in Technologie und angewandten Wissenschaften an die Ethik stellen. Technologie kann ein Befreier sein, eine Bedrohung oder ein Machtinstrument; für Barbour ist sie ein Instrument menschlicher Zwecke, das benutzt werden soll, um menschliche und umweltbezogene Werte zu erkennen, die aus den Naturwissenschaften, der Philosophie und der Religion abgeleitet werden können. Nach einer Aufzählung dieser Werte erwägt

der Verfasser zuerst die wesentlichen Technologien der Landwirtschaft, der Energie und der Computer und analysiert dann Werte und Grundsätze im Verhältnis zu ihnen. Diese Arbeit ist in ihrem deskriptiven Teil stark; diesen Bereich hat der Autor gut im Griff. Der ethische Rahmen, den sie zum Einsatz bringt, ist jedoch schwach, da er allgemein gehalten bleibt und keineswegs stringent konstruiert wird. Einzelurteile sind gelegentlich knapp und nichtssagend. Die Arbeit ist daher eher wegen ihrer Bandbreite als wegen ihrer Tiefe wertvoll.

This comprises the second series of Ian Barbour's 1989–91 Clifford Lectures, the first having appeared under the title, *Religion in an Age of Science*.^{*} Whereas the first volume dealt with the challenges posed to religion by scientific methods and theories this deals with the challenges to ethics raised by modern developments in technology and the applied sciences.

Professor Barbour begins by laying out a wide range of views of technology, classified in terms of three types: technology as liberator, as threat, and as an instrument of power. He wisely identifies his own view as a species of the third type: technology is neither simply good (*pace* the early Harvey Cox and Teilhard de Chardin), nor simply bad (*pace* Jacques Ellul), but an instrument of human purposes that may be directed to realize human and environmental values.

And what are these? According to Barbour, the relevant human values are food and health, meaningful work, personal fulfilment, social justice (as conceived by John Rawls), participatory freedom, and economic development; and the relevant environmental values are resource sustainability, environmental protection, and respect for all forms of life. These he claims to have drawn from science, philosophy, and religion, and of them he reckons justice, participation, and sustainability to be the most often at stake.

In Part II Barbour proceeds to consider three 'critical' or 'crucial' technologies—agriculture, energy, and computers—in terms of their relations to the human and environmental values identified in Part I. Under 'Agriculture' he discusses these topics: food and hunger, Western agriculture, agriculture in the Third World, and food and global justice. Under 'Energy': fossil fuels, nuclear power, renewable sources, and conservation. And under 'Computers': computers and work, computers and citizens, computers for war and peace, and artificial intelligence.

Part III moves beyond analysis of particular technologies to address more general questions. It opens by considering some of the unprecedented threats posed to the human environment, and therefore to the human race itself, partly by the normal operations

of current technologies; and by considering two unprecedented technological powers—genetic engineering and nuclear weapons.

Next Barbour examines how technology can be controlled in a democracy—in particular, how citizens and legislators can avoid being entirely dependent on experts from industry and government agencies, who often have a vested interest in promoting particular technologies.

In pursuit of this end, he evaluates two formal techniques widely used by government agencies in formulating policies for technology and in setting standards for the protection of health and the environment: Cost Benefit Analysis and Risk Assessment. Although he maintains that both of these have a useful part to play in making policy decisions, Barbour contends that they need to be supplemented by a technique that is able to take into account a broader and less partial set of human and environmental consequences. This is known as Technology Assessment, and it employs an interdisciplinary team of sociologists, economists, and other social scientists, as well as biologists, physicists, and engineers, to analyse the indirect, unquantifiable, and long-term consequences of various policy options, as well as the direct, quantifiable, and short-term ones. The Office of Technology Assessment established by the US Congress in 1972, is cited as an institutional model of this technique.

Finally, Barbour explores what kind of production technology would contribute to a more just, participatory, and sustainable world; what social policies and individual life-styles would encourage more just and sustainable patterns of consumption; and what changes in values and institutions would be needed to effect such policies.

Ethics in an Age of Technology comprises a masterful survey of ethical issues raised by current technologies. Barbour's erudition in the field, manifest in the 10-page index of names cited, is impressive. The lack of a subject index is largely compensated for by the detailed Table of Contents and by the admirably clear organisation of the book, whose accessibility is much enhanced by the summary-conclusions that close all but the final of its 9 chapters.

This reviewer's main complaint has to do with the fragmentary account given of the ethical apparatus that is brought to bear on the issues. Barbour (correctly, in my view) draws on a wide range of ethical sources to establish his set of values—secular philosophy, non-Christian religions, and Christianity; and within Christianity he draws both from the Bible and from post-biblical tradition. But he does not make it clear how these different sources elate to one another. Nor does he explain by what criteria particular elements are selected from each of them.

The complaint is not that Barbour's ethic is insuf-

ficiently Christian. Not all Christian values are distinctively so; and very few are absolutely distinctive. On the whole, Barbour makes the case that his 'common' values are also Christian; and where distinctive (Judaean-)Christian beliefs do make a significant ethical difference, he points it out (e.g. the doctrine of the goodness of material creation underlying the value of bodily health; and compassion for the poor qualifying social justice as equality).

No, the complaint here is rather that his ethic is insufficiently coherent; or, at least, that its coherence is insufficiently revealed. So, although he (correctly) bases his ethic on a set of given values or goods, he goes on to assert that he will employ a form of moral reasoning that involves both 'a broad evaluation of consequences' and 'a defense of rights and duties that avoids absolutism' (p. 36), without explaining how the consequentialist and deontological elements are to be integrated.

The vagueness that attends the nature and structure of Barbour's ethic, together with the vastness of the territory he attempts to cover and his shyness of specific moral rules (which he mistakenly supposes to be necessarily 'static and not readily adaptable to changing circumstances or problems' [p. 43]), combine to render many of his moral judgements frustratingly bland. One of the worst examples of this is his treatment of the ethical issues raised by nuclear weapons (pp. 205–7). Of the nine paragraphs he devotes to this, eight are spent presenting, with barely a critical comment, the views of a variety of individuals and schools of thought, one of which ('the process view') he weakly endorses. The only normative judgement he derives from this is that we should exercise responsibility in averting the possibility of human self-destruction.

Ethics in an Age of Technology is a valuable piece of work—but more for its breadth than its depth.

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Gelovend Denken: Inleiding tot een christelijke filosofie (Verantwoording, No. 7)

R. van Woudenberg

Amsterdam : Buijten & Schipperheijn/
Kampen: Kok, 1992, pp. 232, f.40

RÉSUMÉ

La 'philosophie réformée' est une école de philosophie chrétienne qui s'est développée au sein du mouvement hollandais néo-calviniste inauguré par A. Kuiper. Son représentant le plus connu est Herman

Dooyeweerd. Cette école a produit un impact considérable aux Pays-Bas. Il a favorisé la réflexion chrétienne dans plusieurs disciplines et dans divers pays. Van Woudenberg nous aide à mieux comprendre et mieux situer cette école de pensée. Son style est clair et sa perspective large. Il embrasse toute la question de la philosophie en général, de la philosophie et de la foi chrétiennes, de la 'critique transcendantale de la pensée théorique' de Dooyeweerd et des thèmes philosophiques principaux qui s'y rapportent. L'exploration philosophique de la réalité créée se fonde sur une théologie biblique et sur la conviction calvinienne que la création est le théâtre de la gloire de Dieu. C'est la meilleure introduction à la 'philosophie réformée' qui ait paru à ce jour. Ce n'est, il est vrai, qu'une introduction et certains lecteurs se trouveront frustrés du fait que la recherche thématique y est limitée. Mais l'auteur nous promet un second volume. Nous espérons que le présent volume sera traduit.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Reformierte Philosophie war eine eigenständige Bewegung christlich-philosophischen Denkens, die sich aus dem holländischen Neo-Calvinismus Abraham Kuipers entwickelte. Ihr bekanntester Vertreter ist Herman Dooyeweerd. Sie hat in den Niederlanden bedeutende Wirkung ausgeübt und hat in verschiedenen Disziplinen und Ländern außerhalb der Niederlande Beiträge zur christlichen Forschung hervorgebracht. Van Woudenbergs Arbeit sollte uns helfen, diese Bewegung besser zu verstehen und zu bewerten. Sie ist in klarem Stil und mit umfassender Perspektive verfaßt. Sie betrachtet die gesamte Frage der Philosophie, der christlichen Philosophie und des Glaubens, Dooyeweerds 'transzendente Kritik des theoretischen Denkens' und die wesentlichen philosophischen Hauptthemen. Die philosophische Erforschung der geschaffenen Wirklichkeit ist in einer biblischen Theologie und kalvinischen Überzeugung von der Schöpfung als dem 'Schauplatz des Ruhmes Gottes' verwurzelt. Dies ist die beste Einführung in die reformierte Philosophie, die bisher veröffentlicht wurde. Sie ist in der Tat eine Einführung, und daher werden manche Leser von den Begrenzungen der thematischen Untersuchungen enttäuscht sein. Es ist allerdings ein zweiter Band geplant, und es ist zu hoffen, daß der vorliegende Band übersetzt wird.

This book is an introduction to 'reformational philosophy', the distinctive movement of Christian philosophical thought which emerged in the 1930s and 1940s from the Free University of Amsterdam, and whose best-known representative remains Herman Dooyeweerd. The movement has also been