- # Intending to Speak: A Critique of Ronald Hall's *Word and Spirit*
- # *« L'intention de parler: une critique de l'ouvrage de Ronald Hall, Par la Parole et par L'Esprit »*
- # *'In der Absicht, zu reden: Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Ronald Halls* Word and Spirit'

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RÉSUMÉ

Dans son ouvrage intitulé Par la Parole et par l'Esprit, une critique kierkegaardienne de l'âge moderne, *Ronald Hall tente de montrer que la conception de l'usage du langage chez Kierkegaard annonçait la théorie de la parole comme acte et qu'elle peut servir de tremplin à une critique, à la fois de l'épistémologie moderniste et de la théorie postmoderne de Jacques Derrida. Ce, parce que Kierkegaard attribue à l'acte de parole une efficacité ontologique pour la réalisation de soi d'une manière historiquement concrète dans le cours du temps. L'entreprise de Hall est vouée à l'échec parce qu'il se concentre outre mesure sur les énoncés oraux. La critique contre Derrida ne porte pas et la pensée de Kierkegaard se comprend bien mieux à partir des notions d'intentionnalité et de propositions considérées comme des actes illocutionnaires. Le projet de Hall montre que l'acte de parole est un facteur important (une condition formelle nécessaire) de la constitution de la subjectivité humaine, même s'il ne constitue pas une condition suffisante pour le plein développement de soi.*

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Ronald L. Hall stellt in Word and Spirit: A Kierkegaardian Critique of the Modern Age *die These auf, daß Kierkegaards Sprachverständnis der Sprechakttheorie vorgreife und somit als Kritik sowohl der modernen Epistemologie als auch der postmodernen Theorie Jacques Derridas fungiere, indem sie den Akt des Sprechens mit der ontologischen Fähigkeit versieht, ein konkretes historisches menschliches Selbst inmitten des Flusses der Zeit zu realisieren. Halls Projekt scheitert jedoch an seiner Betonung des lokutionären Aspekts von Sprache. Derrida ist gegen Halls Kritik immun, Kierkegaard versteht man besser im Sinne einer Intentionalität, und Propositionen sollten als illokutionäre Akte aufgefaßt werden. Halls Werk hebt den Sprechakt als einen bedeutenden Aspekt (eine notwendige formale Kondition) für die Konstitution der menschlichen Subjektivität hervor, obwohl dieser nicht imstande ist, sowohl eine notwendige als auch zugleich ausreichende Bedingung für ein entwickeltes Selbst darzustellen.*

Introduction[1]

In this paper I seek to address the innovative attempt to wed certain features of Søren Kierkegaard's thought to the speech-act theory of J. L. Austin and John R. Searle by Ronald Hall in his book, *Word and Spirit: A Kierkegaardian Critique of the Modern Age*.[2] It is my contention that Hall over-extends his thesis and that, despite a deep agreement with his project, and despite his rigorous analysis, there are some serious problems with his argument. These problems notwithstanding, I find that there is much value in Hall's study and his work is an invaluable resource for Kierkegaardian scholarship, especially in relationship to postmodernism and the philosophy of Jacques Derrida. Although one-sided, Hall's principal thesis is an important step towards constructive dialogue with Derridean deconstruction. What is needed is some sorting. An exhaustive treatment of Hall's project is not possible in a paper this size and what is more, many of Hall's points are difficult and obscure. I will not concern myself here with some of the more abstruse and tenuous points in his argument but will focus my attention on what I deem the gravamen of Hall's thesis.

I. Word and spirit: Hall's principal thesis

Word and Spirit is Ronald Hall's very-ambitious attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of the history of philosophy, ancient to present, as well as a phenomenological analysis of the human perceptual phenomena of sight and sound, an epistemic theory, a philosophical anthropology, and a theory of linguistics. However, Hall's chief purpose is to articulate an ontology of human persons in which human personhood emerges from our linguistic modes of being in the world.

Hall relies primarily upon two sources for inspiration. First, the general theoretical context of his argument is, as the title of his book connotes, the nineteenth century Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard's philosophical and theologi-

cal work. One of Kierkegaard's central preoccupations is human subjectivity and the teleological development of the self through its expression of three distinct existence-spheres: the aesthetic, ethical and religious spheres.[3] Hall performs a startling permutation in Kierkegaard studies by interpreting Kierkegaard's account of human subjectivity in light of the recent innovations in the philosophy of language by 'speech act theory.' Hall appropriates the speech act theory approach to language, which attempts to explain exactly what happens when humans speak to each other by focusing on a descriptive analysis of speaking as a distinct act performed by humans with intended goals, as a means of explaining how Kierkegaard understands the human self to emerge and become established as an historically concrete entity through the stages of existence. This second emphasis of Hall's places him in the debt of such 'ordinary language' philosophers as Ludwig Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin, and John R. Searle.

The *principal thesis*[4] (hereafter PT) of *Word and Spirit* is the claim that there is an essential connection between speaking and personal unity such that it is *only* in the felicitous speech-act, defined as the act by which we 'own our words and own up to our words' (*Word and Spirit*, 51), that the human self achieves the necessary historical continuity it needs to emerge through the flux of temporal existence and achieve existential concretion. Hall claims that, 'Our task as humans is to thematize this incipiently present self to a self-understanding that will enable us to actualize its incipient actuality' (*Word and Spirit*, 10). This is able to happen only when we grant the human speech-act (characterised as first-person speaking) its rights as an ontologically efficacious human act which 'bonds us in responsibility to the given actuality of the world and others' (*Word and Spirit*, 88). Hall repeatedly claims to be articulating Kierkegaard's own position and argues, by delving into the subsequent pseudonymous literature, that this is Kierkegaard's final understanding on the matter (*Word and Spirit*, 10).

Let us begin our discussion by briefly looking at the basic argument in which Hall develops PT. Typically speech-act theory understands speaking to be an indispensable instrument which is used by humans to perform specific actions (*Word and Spirit*, 48).[5] The premise from which it begins is that humans regularly use language to communicate with each other and that generally these attempts at communication are successful to a relatively high degree. The aspect of speech-act analysis that Hall seizes upon is the inherently intentional structure of language entailed by this view—although, as we will see later, Hall does not adequately account for intentionality in his own theory. One who performs a given speech-act *intends* to accomplish some particular end. Hall extends this implicit intentional structure to include the speaker's own actuality, emphasising that 'every speech-act is a form of giving one's word to some other' (*Word and Spirit*, 10), and that this ability to speak in the first-person entails treating ourselves as a 'concrete "I"'. However, as Hall sees it, this 'I' present in our speech-acts 'is only incipiently present' as a 'merely human possibility' that awaits proper thematisation and appropriation to become a fully actualised actuality (*Word and Spirit*, 10).

This last point Hall claims to be getting directly from Kierkegaard. When the pseudonym A (known to us only as the aesthete) declares in *Either/Or* that 'language is absolutely qualified by spirit and therefore the medium for expressing the idea, namely, [the human person's] essential idea', Hall argues that this gives evidence that Kierkegaard believed that 'the self that is given in a relation, is *given* within the first-person speech-act' (*Word and Spirit*, 10).[6] To be successful in the everyday act of using language to do something (for example, promising) one must not only enter the relation established by the act, but one must also relate that relation back to themselves.

In turn, Hall continues, this cannot happen unless I have a adequate world-picture in which I have conceived of the world as historical and of myself as free and responsible. Once again Hall finds himself to be continuing in Kierkegaard's voice by purporting to elaborate A's claims in *Either/Or* that Christianity introduced sensuousness into the world by bringing spirit into the world (*Word and Spirit*, 15–16). When Christianity was inaugurated as a world-picture, it broke the pagan (Classical Greek) picture of the self/world relation as a static, Platonic, synthesis where the self was viewed as fundamentally bonded to the world.

The difference between these two world-pictures revolves around how they model the world and consequently the self/world relation. The Greeks (so A and Hall tell us) were 'psychical' and represented the world in terms of visual images and metaphors (*Word and Spirit*, 19–29). The psychical world-picture sees the self locked in closed, static relationship with a pre-determined cosmos whose source of order is an eternal, impersonal *logos* principle. Christianity on the other hand, is 'pneumatic' and has an Hebraic focus on the '*spoken word (dabhar)* of Yahweh at the very center of reality', which is necessarily dynamic and personal (*Word and Spirit*, 29). This world picture is '*dabhar*-centric' and listens for the pneuma in creation, 'breath of speech', the spirit of God and other persons. However, Hall finds that the Hebrews were existentially challenged with respect to a genuine 'I-consciousness' because of the Hebraic preoccupation of itself as the people of God; that is, a ' "we are" caused them not to attend fully to the development of . . . a consciousness of themselves as individuals who speak before God as God himself speaks, that is, in the first-person' (*Word and Spirit*, 30). This possibility for full existential concretion had to wait for the advent of Christianity.

All of this comes together for Hall in the felicitous speech-act,' the genuine positing of spirit as spirit in the medium speech. Hall finds the speech-act to be 'the paradigmatic expression of radical historical novelty and openness' (*Word and Spirit*, 47). Historical novelty (the environ for existential concretion) occurs only in significantly free human action. Hall

observes that the speech-act, because of its confessional nature, must always be couched in a particular tense and this forces me to be present in my words. It is in performing the intentional speech-act, where one lives up to one's words and owns one's words, that the *telos* of the human person is fully realized; that is, that one becomes historically concertized in existential immediacy (*Word and Spirit*, 68–72). Imaging the world in terms of the first-person address of God allows for the self to break from its pagan orientation to the 'sensuous' embodiment in the world. The self is then free ('sundered' from the world) to take responsibility for its words by binding itself to itself. Hall argues that in the end, Word actualizes Spirit as historically incarnate.

With the positing of positive spirit (in the form of human personhood) by Christianity came the possibility of negative spirit, which Hall (and Kierkegaard) refer to as 'demonic'. In Hall's words, the person of 'spirit' has achieved a 'sundered/bonded' relation to her/himself and the world which is expressed as a fundamental irony (*Word and Spirit*, 121–123). Hall understands Kierkegaard's concept of irony to 'designate a relation a speaker bears to his[/her] own words' when one has achieved an awareness or spirit's disarticulation from the physical, phenomenal, world and its subsequent, radical freedom. This irony can be positive or negative—a healthiness or a sickness. Irony is a healthiness in so far as it provides the communicative space in which subjectivity can appear by, as Hall argues, making it 'impossible to understand the full irony of a speech-act without meeting the subject who is behind it as the ground of its meaning' (*Word and Spirit*, 122). This positive form of irony is what Hall describes as 'mastered irony' (*Word and Spirit*, 204–206). Demonic irony, which Hall finds lays 'at the very center of the modern sensibility', is a 'deadly sickness' that takes the liberating resources of the speech-act and uses them 'to express spirit in complete disengagement from the historical continuity of the given actuality' (*Word and Spirit*, 120).

II. The great divorce

An integral part of Hall's critique of Derrida and postmodernism revolves around his understanding of how the act of self-relation becomes demonic. Let us first address how Hall handles the difference between the two aesthetic-communicative media of language and music. The key to understanding how these are different lies in grasping how the performance of each of these two media facilitates the 'radical historical novelty and openness'—in short, freedom—of human action (*Word and Spirit*, 47). It is easy to guess that for Hall, whichever one of these two can be demonstrated to possess the greatest potential to empower the human individual with this freedom will be the superior art form. Radical freedom engenders radical responsibility; and this radical responsibility in turn provides the environment for existential concretion, which is the goal of humans *qua* potential selves.

In *Either/Or* Kierkegaard (through A) describes music and language as sensuous media; that is, they involve the sense of hearing and receiving sonic sense-data. They also have in common a 'spirituality' stemming from their movement in time, which is a kind of negation of the sensuous. Hall elaborates further: 'When the sensuous is so qualified by temporality then it perpetually slips away, annuls itself for the sake of the idea' (*Word and Spirit*, 42). Music and speech are constantly 'outrunning themselves' as they express ideas through actual movement in time. Both music and language involve a negation of the sensuous—a sundering—of the idea (spirit) from the sound (*Word and Spirit*, 42). In this sense they are both spiritually qualified and pneumatically qualified.

But for A, language and music are also fundamentally different. Where they differ is how relate to spirit and the sensual. Hall finds this difference in the fact that when music negates the sensuous it is merely an 'aesthetic nullification' (*Word and Spirit*, 43). This is performed directly by relativizing everything, including the

self/spirit—the performer, the audience, the composer and their collective relations to the medium—by music having within itself its own time, necessarily detached from existential concretion. It is only within the time-space of the piece that anything is immediate; and this musical continuum is a pre-determined cosmos, determined by the notes on the page (*Word and Spirit*, 44–47). In the end this is merely an abstraction from spirit, a 'demonic sensuality' not a positing of it; a new kind of bondage, not a radical freedom. It is '*discarnrate* spirit' and therefore a demonic perversion of the positive sense of spirit as historically incarnate (*Word and Spirit*, 43).

Music simply lacks the resources available to the speech-act as described in the previous section. For Hall, the speech-act embodies the self and makes spirit an historically concrete entity by the necessary first-person self-representation. It creates the vacuum for a sundered/bonded self-world relation to fill, whereas music essentially performs only the first half of the disjunct. The most that music may accomplish with the resources Hall has attributed to it is a 'great divorce'[8] of the spirit-as-self from worldly embodiment—a perpetual abstraction from self. This may perhaps point the way to the existential concretion[9] but if this world-picture is stayed, it is inescapably demonic. Hall understands the demonic to be present when the act of self-relation remains abstracted from or discontinuous with historical concretion; that is, if the self-relation is understood as a fractured multiplicity with no temporally unified expression.

III. The demonical Derrida

The above discussion is precisely the point at which Hall takes issue with the 'postmodern' deconstructive philosophy of Jacques Derrida. Hall submits Derrida's contention that language is reducible to writing to a 'Kierkegaardian' analysis from within the framework of his preceding analysis of speech-acts and music. As Hall himself admits, it is fairly easy to

anticipate where he is going to have problems accepting Derrida's thesis.

There are two major problems Hall has with Derrida's deconstructive thesis that writing is the fundamental expression of language. First, as a medium, writing is essentially visual and static. This does not square well with Hall's psychical/pneumatic and sensual/spiritual distinctions. Derrida's deconstruction is based on a fundamental rejection of Western logocentrism. While this would seem to endear him to Hall, it is quickly pointed out that Derrida is more anti-photocentrism than genuinely anti-logocentrism (*Word and Spirit*, 170–72). What is more, Hall proceeds to argue that Derrida, while in defiance of the Western philosophical tradition, merely jumps from a Platonic photocentric picture of the universe where *logos* = reading, to a writing = music world-picture which maintains a certain affinity with modernism (*Word and Spirit*, 173). The shift from reading (i.e., what Derrida calls the logocentric tradition and its incumbent metaphysics of 'presence' of Plato and his progeny) to writing by Derrida is a conjuring trick. Hall contends that Derrida remains inherently bound to a modernist, *logos*-imaging of the world, in some apposite sense. The 'postmodern' shift effected by Derrida's deconstructive move to writing is a genuine shift, but is not a complete break with logocentrism.[10] Books and other written works remain visual and ahistorical with 'a kind of eternal *logos*' behind them (*Word and Spirit*, 172–73). All that Hall finds happening in Derrida is a reconfiguring of logocentrism in pneumatic, dynamic terms, versus the traditional psychical, static terms.

To add to his woes, Derrida's reduction of language to writing fares even worse when examined under the spiritual categories of (for lack of better terms in Hall) positive-spirit/demonical-spirit. This second problem reveals Derrida's true demonical self as Hall makes explicit the musical affinities in writing already alluded to above (*Word and Spirit*, 173). Writing has a movement through time and requires a context of possibility and

contingency, but it has a sense of time all its own—like a piece of music.

In Derrida's conception of writing it entails an endless inter-play of signification, or what Derrida refers to as 'différance.' The telling move is Derrida's shift from intentionality to iterability. As Hall understands Derrida on this point, iterability refers to the break between idea and medium; that is, a sundering of spirit and sensuous world. Derrida insists that he is not doing away with intentionality but is undermining its authoritarian strangle-hold on the 'entire scene and system of utterance.'[11] Writing is now musical because it is adrift in a demonical ocean of play, abstracted from historically concrete existential immediacy. Derrida's concept of iterability performs the first half of the disjunct of Hall's sundered/bonded schemata. The sign is radically divorced from both the signifier and the human subject iterating the signifier. Hall believes this leaves the human subject demonically abstracted from the sensuous, constantly shifting, perpetually in motion with no place of rest.

Ultimately Hall's argument is a pragmatic one. His conclusion is that Derrida and like-minded postmodern theorists leave us with no way of genuinely coping with the very real flux of time and reality.[12] It is possible (and he would argue, necessary) to find stability in the middle of flux (*Word and Spirit*, 196). Hall sees no other way through the horns of the dilemma of a nihilism on one hand or a glib fideism on the other, if we accept Derrida's construal of the world (*Word and Spirit*, 198). What is labeled as 'postmodernism' is for Hall, simply 'modernity brought to its final demonic conclusion' (*Word and Spirit*, 198).

The way forward is through a juxtaposition of felicitous speech-acts and Kierkegaard's mastered irony (*Word and Spirit*, 203–04). Hall defines irony as the 'negative power of withdrawal' (*Word and Spirit*, 203). In the freedom of the relationship (the positive spiritual power) of individual persons opposed in the playing field of speech-acts, the bond which holds them together, the felicity conditions,

may be broken; any of the persons involved may withdraw. Irony is saying the opposite of what I mean and mis-presenting myself in my words; that is, the words I present to the other cease to be my own. This negative expression of spiritual power 'is essential for the positive determination of spirit' (*Word and Spirit*, 203). Without it the bonds of relationship risk turning into bondage in a deontological oppression of 'moral heaviness.' As Hall notes, the irony in all of this is that the *telos* of this withdrawal from the other and the ethical demands inherent in the speech-act is ultimately itself an ethical concern. This is a healthy form of irony, a mastered irony, when my dis-owning of my words serves as the sign of my radical freedom (and responsibility) to own them; that is, my withdrawal from my ethical duty 'bears witness to a higher, positive determination of subjectivity, namely, subjectivity as spirit, as self' (*Word and Spirit*, 204). Mastered irony reminds us of and preserves our transcendence and freedom, thereby facilitating the actualizing of our actual selves.

IV. Hall's Kierkegaardian theory of speech-acts

Hall has provided us with a very complex analysis of both Kierkegaard's *Either/Or*, and the philosophy of language. His bringing of Kierkegaard into discussion with speech-act theory is especially illuminating for our understanding of both areas of inquiry. Admiration for his argument is tempered however, by some reservation. I now want to explore some questions I have about the Kierkegaardian context and the substance of his principal thesis.[13] My two main criticisms of PT are that on the one hand it is not as Kierkegaardian (strictly speaking) as Hall thinks, and on the other hand its account of speech-act theory involves a limited conception of communication.[14]

Hall and Kierkegaard
My first criticism of PT is that it is not so obviously Kierkegaard's own view. Hall's claim to be Kierkegaardian depends on a

strong view of the link between A and Kierkegaard—that we can be fairly assured that A's theory of aesthetics is Kierkegaard's. PT is certainly 'Kierkegaardian' in that it shares some of Kierkegaard's central concerns and is oriented to the philosophical issue in a way that he would himself approach it; indeed, PT is taken right from the pages of Kierkegaard's literature. However, I find a strong link between PT and Kierkegaard's own personal position tenuous at best.

There is always a problem exegeting Kierkegaard because of his extensive use of pseudonyms. This has particular pertinence for PT in that Hall almost exclusively draws on Kierkegaard's pseudonymous *Either/Or*, or other pseudonymous works in the formulation of his thesis. Hall is aware of the danger in dealing with pseudonyms and acknowledging that Kierkegaard speaks indirectly through pseudonyms states, 'While I agree that we must always be careful not to identify Kierkegaard with his pseudonyms, it is just as much of a mistake to think that Kierkegaard himself is completely absent from his pseudonymous works' (*Word and Spirit*, 4–5). So far I am in full agreement.

Having realized this, Hall's task now is admittedly to try to 'ferret out Kierkegaard's own voice' with respect to the issues at hand—namely PT (*Word and Spirit*, 5). This task is virtually impossible to perform on Kierkegaard without taking into account his entire authorship. The primary reason for this is that each of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms are like pieces in the puzzle of Kierkegaard's global authorship. In order to grasp the voice of Kierkegaard in the pseudonymous fragment, one must have some significant conception of what it is that Kierkegaard is doing (perhaps 'performing' is a better word) in and through the body of his literary corpus.[15] Why is it this particular pseudonym that he uses? What aspect of the overall puzzle is this pseudonym highlighting/representing? And, how does this pseudonym fit in with, or contribute a greater understanding of,

all the other pseudonyms (puzzle-pieces) and their respective roles in the grander scheme of the authorship?[16] These are essential questions that must be asked (including others like them) in completing the task Hall has set out for himself and it is precisely at this point that Hall fails. If we accept PT *carte blanche* we fail to give justice to the central focus of Kierkegaard's authorship, his answer to the question of how one may become a Christian within Christendom.[17] Hall seems to think Kierkegaard's answer is: through felicitous speech by the mastery of the ironic. These, however, are mere epiphenomena of what Kierkegaard provides as the answer. But this is getting ahead of myself. Let us first look at the pseudonymous A.

A's authorship is one of the least straightforward of all Kierkegaard's authorship. Kierkegaard is doubly removed from his words: not only is Kierkegaard not using his own voice to pen A's words but he also employs an intermediate pseudonym, Victor Eremita,[18] who is the 'editor' of *Either/Or*, and thus is the one who takes credit for presenting us with A's words collected together in book-form. Unlike some of the other pseudonymous texts, Kierkegaard does not appear at all, in either a preface or a postscript, to discuss the text. It is always Eremita speaking and providing exegetical advice. This is not to remove all possible access to Kierkegaard's voice in the text. It is rather to demonstrate that we cannot approach A and his authorship in a simple, prosaic manner, and naively quote from Kierkegaard's other pseudonyms (or even from non-pseudonymous works) where they speak on the same issues as A to support the claim that A's opinions represent Kierkegaard's personal understanding. *Prima facie* we may not, for example, attribute the editor (Eremita) of *Either/Or*'s homily to hearing as his 'most precious sense' (*Either/Or*, 4–5) directly to Kierkegaard. We may legitimately note that Kierkegaard finds it worthwhile to have his pseudonym challenge the Western tradition of privileging sight as the superior sense[19] with a

more Judaic privileging of hearing.[20] On inspection we may find that Kierkegaard had several reasons for introducing this concept.[21]

There are two factors that militate against the thesis that A's aesthetic theory of communication in *Either/Or* is completely Kierkegaard's own. The first is that A is himself an expression of the demonic, delighting in flux, with no fixed 'self', and his entire chapter, 'The Immediate Stages of the Erotic or The Musical-Erotic' is best seen as a parody of Hegel's aesthetics.[22] Kierkegaard may well hold to some of A's opinions,[23] but most likely A is a foil to vilify Hegel and elucidate the aesthetic view of life. To be true to the aesthetic, Kierkegaard must have A accomplish this picture by embodying the aesthetic, not propositionally communicating its foundational principles (like, for example, in an essay on the stages of the erotic)—for that would destroy the aesthetic quality of A's writing and make the communication into its opposite. 'A' cannot speak for the other pseudonyms, or Kierkegaard himself.

The second reason for my scepticism about Hall's strong notion of the A-Kierkegaard link is that this reading seems to require a naiveté with respect to Kierkegaard's theory of the stages (better rendered as 'existence-spheres') and what the other pseudonyms represent in their own right as members of the complete authorship. Hall would have us believe that Kierkegaard's stages 'are modalities of *saying*' and not merely existential modalities (*Word and Spirit*, 74). This is problematic when we apply this to Kierkegaard's personal view. The question that immediately comes to mind is, 'Why did he not just say so?' It is not enough to simply assert that Kierkegaard already did say this via A. Even if we grant this tenuous point, Hall must still account for the fact that almost everything that is in *Either/Or* with respect to the stages is amplified in the later works. If it is truly that the case that the stages are modalities of saying, Kierkegaard's subsequent silence on this point is odd. Furthermore, there are the problems

already pointed out with respect to the reliability of A's assertions.

The issue here (in *Either/Or*) is a radical disjunct between living one's life as art as A does, and living life ethically, as Judge William recommends. We must choose how we arbitrate the choices that present themselves to us—*either* in a criterionless pluralism, which is a *de facto* embracing of all values, *or* in a choosing to make good and evil the categories by which we define our existence.[24] This is not a matter for a purely rational investigation into the most reasonable form of life; it is an existential investigation. The movement from one stage to the next is not an annihilation of the previous stage. The stages themselves are less assertions of propositional fact about the world as they are life-forms, or ways of being-in-the-world.[25] And it is especially true of the aesthetic and ethical in *Either/Or* that the move from one to the other is not made by reason but by a choosing, a willing to accept a way of being-in-the-world. To do otherwise is to have already made the move from one to the other; to think that there is a better or worse way of being is to already be in the ethical, to think that there is no difference is to already be an aesthete and therefore all attempts by an ethicist to impinge on one's moral sensibilities is futile and at best makes life more interesting—that is, more aesthetically pleasing. The shift from one way of being-in-the-world to another involves an *Aufhebung*—that is, recontextualized into a wider frame of reference—of the former such that it is 'caught-up' in the latter. This shift is primarily a matter of faith.

In his later pseudonymous works, Kierkegaard works out his initial theory in a much more thorough and complex way, particularly through his pseudonym 'Johannes Climacus.'[26] Climacus and Johannes de Silentio in *Fear and Trembling*[27] work out respectively Kierkegaard's intellectual and existential notions of faith. Neither of these authors mention that 'the mark or test of this life of faith is *faithful speech* or *reflexive integrity*' (*Word and Spirit*, 76). What is more, even if we grant Hall that this is in fact the case,

that for these pseudonyms and for Kierkegaard it really is the case that the mark of the life of faith is reflexive integrity in our speech, it still does not follow that this life of faith *is* the speech-act for Kierkegaard.[28] The act of faith for Climacus is conditioned by inwardness, rooted in interest, and enacted by decision.[29] That this faith entails, as a sort of epiphenomenon, my inhabiting my speech-acts, my reflexively integral speech, is perfectly consistent with Climacus —one might even say that faithful speech or realizing the ultimate *telos* of speech-acts is necessary for the life of faith. But Hall wants more; he argues that faithful speech is both *necessary and sufficient* for Kierkegaardian faith. To say that this is the essence of faith for Kierkegaard is to put the cart before the horse. A far more suitable substitute as a substrate for the life of faith seems to be passionate belief or a 'life-view.'[30]

Hall tries to immunize himself to this sort of objection by arguing that 'Kierkegaard's analysis of faith, self, and spirit relies, in ways not always clear even to Kierkegaard to himself, on the biblical model of faithfulness' (defined as PT), 'Yahweh as the paradigmatic self, the one who speaks with words' (*Word and Spirit*, 101). Hall sees himself as making explicit Kierkegaard's operative biblical basis. There are at least three things that need to be true for Hall's defense to work. First, Yahweh has to be seen in Scripture to be the paradigmatic self-as-speaker. Hall has no argument from me here, this is abundantly clear. Second, Hall's analysis must fit in the whole of Kierkegaard's authorship. I have argued that it does, but must be reconceived and nuanced differently. Lastly, Hall's concept of speech-act must be robust enough to accomplish all he vests it with. I think that Hall's concept of the speech-act is the point at which his theory is weakest.

Hall and speech-acts
The main point J. L. Austin's book, *How to Do Things With Words*,[31] is the revolutionary claim that humans use language in order to perform specific actions. In this

seminal work Austin outlines three different aspects to each instance of our speaking that comprise the total force of our attempt at communication: (1) the locutionary act: the physical aspect to our communication, typically the act of performing an utterance of some words in some language (e.g., saying 'Go to the store'); (2) the illocutionary act: the aspect of our communication which pertains to the action we are using the linguistic utterance to perform (e.g., commanding, promising, asking, etc.); (3) the perlocutionary act: the aspect of our communication which pertains to the effect the our linguistic act has on our audience. These three aspects are definitive of speech act theory's approach to language and it is the notion of illocution that is particularly important. As Kevin J. Vanhoozer notes, 'The notion of the illocutionary act allows Austin to distinguish the content of what we say (e.g., the sense and reference of our sentence) and its force (i.e., what we are using the content of our sentence to do)'.[32]

My main concern with Hall's version of speech-acts is that he leaves us with a crucial ambiguity regarding what counts as a speech-act. In his clearest statement on the matter, Hall follows Austin in taking the 'paradigmatic speech-act to be enacted in the first-person singular active voice, indicative mood', which amounts to taking the speech act 'to be something like "I promise" ' (*Word and Spirit*, 10). This is virtually the scope of Hall's discussion on the nature of speech-acts and is not very informative. He spends a lot of time telling us what speech-acts do and how they do it, but very little telling us what they are.

In another important section he elaborates on 'the speech-act as a normative or intentional phenomenon' (*Word and Spirit*, 68–72). Here we catch glimpses of Hall's grander vision of the speech-act as he emphasizes (correctly in my view) in Austinian fashion that speaking is acting (*ergo* intrinsically intentional) and that, 'To realize the *telos* of the speech-act is to realize the *telos* of human being, that is, to be human in the fullest sense' (*Word and Spirit*, 68). Two things Hall does not

seem to realise is that first, the introduction of intentionality has made illocutionary acts an important feature of his theory; nor does he seem to see that his above point may be the case (i.e., the identity of the *teloi* of human speech-acts and human subjectivity) and yet the performance of individual speech-acts may remain only one aspect (and that not foundational) in the process of the establishment of human subjectivity.

When we look elsewhere in *Word and Spirit*, Hall has limited the communication of a speech-act to the locutionary utterances of words in a token sentence.[33] In a departure from Austin and his own previous emphasis on intentionality, Hall focuses on the speaking of words and the locution of token sentences in his discussions of speech-acts. His paradigm of the speech-act is the God-who-owns-his-words, and felicitous speech-acts are those whose words are owned by their speakers, and so on. But here we already encounter a difficulty. Hall's very claim that we must 'own our words' reveals the ambiguity to which I refer. If we can own the words of our speech-act, we may (as Hall notes well) disown them. It seems obvious then, that while speech-acts may be comprised of particular words, they are not primordially so and their sense is not essentially those particular words (spoken, on a page, etc.). In fact, it appears that one can perform a speech-act without uttering a word—as well as the opposite, utter words without performing a speech-act.

I am pointing to the difference between locutionary utterances of token sentences and illocutionary communication propositions—what I take the later Wittgenstein to mean by the 'sense of a sentence.'[34] With the exception of the above noted passage on intentionality, Hall always refers to speech-acts as their constituent words and not once as the illocutions, propositions, or propositional attitudes they express. As I am inclined to view propositions they are not the literal words in a token sentence of any given language, but more like the idea communicated by a sentence, the cognitive content of the sentence. On an Aristotelian view, propositions have actual existence as aspects of propositional attitudes and illocutionary acts.[35] If Hall is committed to the view that speech-acts are inherently verbal communications as those words which comprise the locution of a token sentence in a language, not propositions (in the above sense) uttered in a particular context as an illocution, then there are further complications with his view.[36]

A defender of Hall may try and beg off at this point, saying that this is only a minor conceptual ambiguity, forced on him by the constraints of his situation (time, space, editor, etc.), and that it really makes no difference to his overall project, but this simply is not the case. The way it is possible to have his discussion of the demonic, whether in music or speech-acts, is only because he has limited the speech-act to its locutionary act of being enunciated as a particular sentence in a particular language. Hall must have the link between the auditory medium, the sensuous act of enunciation with its passage through time, and the corresponding disjunct with the idea communicated. This is the basis for his claim that music (as a communicative medium) does not possess the formal semantic resources of the speech-act to self-reflexively 'express even the simplest asseveration: "I love you."' (*Word and Spirit*, 50). But this seems patently false and contrary to the fundamental intuition of speech-act theory: that language is a tool that is used by humans to perform illocutionary acts. I am sure that any serenaded lover would contest Hall's argument against the resources of music (or poetry) to make asseverations of the kind in question. Music and poetry are in fact used regularly to perform the illocutionary act of saying, 'I love you'. What is more, Hall's view seems to conflict directly with A's argument that 'since music is qualified in relation to spirit, *it is legitimately called a language*', and that 'understood in a certain way, *music is a language*'.[37] Kierkegaard is making the point (through A) that what qualifies something as a language in its most basic

form is that it communicates an idea through a medium in which the sensuous aspect (we may say 'locutions' for our purposes) of the communication 'reduced to a mere instrument and is thus annulled'.[38] If the concept of language and communication is broadened to include illocutionary acts of a non-verbal sort, as I (and Kierkegaard) suggest, Hall's argument about the demonic disappears.

This alternative way of conceiving speech-acts opens up further ambiguities in PT. To begin with, Hall's negative assessment of demonic speech is difficult to reconcile with his positive assessment of ironic speech given his association of the speech-act with literal words or token sentences. The misuse of speech is demonic. Hall identifies two ways to do this. First, speech can be demonic either by uttering words in which the speaker appears to present himself as a dynamic historical presence but in actuality undertakes a conscious attempt to deceive, and thereby retreats from the world and other humans by hiding behind his words. Second, one can remain demonically silent like, for example, a mime. In the first instance words are demonic because 'words are at the very center of the real,' but yet they are being used in a 'demonically and ironically perverted way' (*Word and Spirit*, 113). Here the speaker is alleged to misrepresent himself by his words. The other way that one may be demonic is by fleeing from the speech-act by either remaining silent from any meaningful speech or simply remaining silent as the mime does (*Word and Spirit*, 107–08). Hall contends that demonic speech is 'silent,' but not necessarily wordless. 'This demonic silence implies not the absence of sound but rather only the absence of speech' (*Word and Spirit*, 109).

The master ironist, however, is one who 'disowns his words before some other in order to provide himself with a *temporary* easy way out of the ethical demands of commitment and responsibility implied in reflexively integral speech' (*Word and Spirit*, 203). This is the supremely virtuous act of human speakers because in this context the disowning of one's words provides a defense against our words becoming bondage—it is a preservation of the individual's freedom. What is never clear in Hall is exactly why in the one case withdrawal from commitment is demonic and in the other it is seraphic—or, why one form of silence is treacherous and the other felicitous.

Another ambiguity in Hall presents itself when we view the content of a speech-act in terms of propositions and illocutionary acts. Yahweh is the paradigm of speech-acts, and speech-acts are conceived of in terms of their locutionary force, yet Hall never explains just how it is that God speaks. Hall's formula: *dabhar*-as-speaking = the paradigmatic speech-act, which in turn is expressed verbally by token sentences in some language, seems to run glibly over the philosophical problems associated with God's linguistic communication. There are distinct philosophical problems associated with construing God's speaking in a verbal, locutionary way. As Nicholas Wolterstorff points out, 'it is at once obvious that when we talk of God speaking, it is illocutionary acts that we want to be attributing to God.'[39] Wolterstorff has in mind the fact that these illocutionary acts include performances which are not straight forward locutions of sentences in a human language. This provides a lot of promise as a way of overcoming the inherent (and incorrigible) difficulties in trying to explicate how it is that Yahweh is the God-who-speaks.

Hall should be making more of intentionality in our speech-acts as determinative, as opposed to our specific words. Intentionality refers generally to a (mental) act by which our consciousness selects its object, often described as the mind's 'ofness' or 'aboutness.' This would solve both of his problems and land him in the propositionalist camp. Hall's idea of a speech-act is too limited because he restricts the meaning of a sentence to its locutionary act, caught up in its sentential expressions, where he should be looking at speech-acts as communicating propositions through illocutionary acts. If

I am correct in asserting that propositions have real existence as aspects of our propositional attitudes and illocutionary acts, then propositions are intimately connected to our intentions.

This is closest to the kind of situation about which Kierkegaard could be properly be said to be urging us to inhabit, be true to, own, etc.; that is, that we reduplicate in existence what is thought. It also makes sense of Kierkegaard's assertion that consciousness is distinguished from mere reflection by the fact that consciousness is 'interested.'[40] This interestedness corresponds to what Climacus in *Postscript* calls a 'passion.'[41] This intentionality-as-passion performs precisely that function for Climacus which speaking does for Hall: 'Insofar as existence is movement it holds that there still is a continuity which underlies the movement, otherwise there is no movement. . . . The difficulty for the exister is to give his/[her] existence that continuity without which everything disappears . . . *passion* is the momentary continuity, which at one time holds fast, and is the impulse of the movement.'[42] Here passion is the bedrock of the constitution of human subjectivity. A notion of a speech-act that expresses this Kierkegaardian notion of passion-intentionality would be a speech-act capable of accomplishing all that Hall hopes to with his version.

V. Revisiting the demonical Derrida

I have argued in the preceding section that Hall's speech-act theory involved a limited conception of the nature of a speech-act and that this skewed his rendition of the demonic. In our earlier discussion we saw that Hall's salient criticism of Derrida is that he is demonic; Derrida (allegedly) sunders the self from its words, leaving it in a diaspora of endless interplay between signs and their unctuous signifieds. If we have to revise our understanding of the demonic in the wake of my criticism of Hall, we may have to change the verdict on Derrida. Hall has perhaps not done Derrida justice in this judgment.

Hall appears to misunderstand Derrida and his 'deconstruction' at a deep level.[43] In a summary statement on deconstruction Hall tells us that, 'The project that Derrida calls deconstruction, I take to be a project designed to invade, attack and destroy the legitimacy, efficacy and authority of the speech-act' (*Word and Spirit*, 168). The basis of this attack is Hall's rejection of Derrida's privileging of writing over speaking which is based on what Hall finds to be a wrongheaded reaction to logocentrism. I have three reservations about Hall's reading of Derrida. On closer analysis, Hall actually shares some fundamental points with Derrida, as will become evident below.

First, I do not think that Hall has properly discerned the nuances of Derrida's shift from language-as-speaking, to privileging language-as-writing. When Derrida speaks of the 'voice' privileged in modernity, I understand him to be referring not to the locutions we utter as Hall does, but the phenomenological voice of Husserl, which is the inner voice, the pure voice, free from the contaminations of bodily expression; the voice of pure consciousness if you will.[44] This is also the same 'voice' to which the Cartesian refers in her self-reification. 'Voice' in this instance for Derrida is (and can only be) a metaphor; not a literal reference to words on a page. Hall shares with Derrida this rejection of the voice, only he cannot hear it as a voice because of his analysis of logocentrism as photocentrism (*Word and Spirit*, 146–157). If this is the case, the argument levied against Derrida disappears.

Second, Hall has characterized the nature of deconstruction falsely. I do not think that Derrida is ultimately trying to destroy truth or meaning. Derrida and Hall (and Kierkegaard) actually are not so far apart—especially not as far apart as Hall would like them to be. Hall shares agreement with Derrida on several issues including a belief that human thought/existence/rationality is deeply embedded in language,[45] and the belief that language is drawn out of me by the other.[46] Derrida feels that there is some truth out there of some sort and he is attempting to

reconfigure a post-metaphysical way of working it out.[47] Derrida's own belief about deconstruction is that it is 'not an enclosure in nothingness but an openness towards the other' and that deconstruction 'does not amount to saying that there is nothing beyond language.'[48] In fact, Derrida elsewhere asserts that there is an intimate and necessary link between deconstruction and justice.[49] Derrida's point here is that the Western tradition of metaphysics contains within itself the impulse to deconstruct itself before the ethical demands of and responsibility to the other.[50]

This is particularly illuminating in light of Hall's analysis of the demonic and the master of irony. As we noted earlier, Hall's distinction between the two was essentially ethical, because the demonic individual and the master of irony both do the same external act—they assert words they do not mean. If Derrida is really deconstructing in the name of an ethical responsibility to the truth imposed on him by the other then he appears far more the master ironist than the devil dis/incarnate. To critics it may seem disingenuous of Derrida to claim to be in the service of truth and given some of his early claims a certain degree of scepticism is warranted. But even if he may be said ultimately to fail in achieving what he is attempting to do through deconstruction, this does not make Derrida demonic, merely wrong.

Given this understanding of Derrida (and Hall's noted kindredness with him, albeit unwitting) I do not think that Hall has much to say to Derrida. This is not to say, however, that nothing can be said to Derrida. As I have already stated, I think that Hall's project is salvageable, and in fact I see it as important. If PT is reconstructed in light of propositional communication and intentionality, I think there is much we can say to put Kierkegaard to work against/with Derrida to rework truth in a post-metaphysical climate.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Hall's thesis would be more Kierkegaardian and consistent if he talked about the illocutionary use of propositions, not the locutionary uttering of words. In his attempt to support PT by placing a premium locutionary utterances of words, Hall ends up in ambiguities and ultimately loses his critique of Derrida. This comes from forcing A's words into Kierkegaard's mouth. Kierkegaard makes more sense when understood in terms of intentionality and propositions as illocutionary acts—not mere locutionary utterances. The benefit of Hall's project is that it brings the speech-act into prominence as an important feature (necessary formal condition) of the establishment and constitution of human subjectivity, even if it will not do the work of both a necessary and sufficient condition for a developed self. In the end, Hall has provided an illuminating way of understanding both Kierkegaard and speech-act theory, but he has left us some room to continue the project.

Notes

2 Hall, *Word and Spirit* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994).

3 See Søren Kierkegaard, *Stages On Life's Way: Studies By Various Persons*, trans. and eds. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 476–77.

4 I am calling this Hall's 'principal thesis' because it is basal to the variety of theses presented in his ambitious project as noted in the opening of this paragraph. Hall's global intentions are too far-reaching to be analyzed in all their particularity here but it is fair to say that the above 'principal thesis' is the nub of his argument. And in my estimation it is this thesis which is most meritorious Hall's points (as opposed to some of his more extravagant claims). One claim in particular that I will not address, in praise or rebuttal, is his contention that the world was waiting

for Christianity to give it an existentially concrete self that could 'own its words.' I will also leave alone Hall's analysis of *Either/Or*'s two case studies of Don Giovanni and Faust.

5 While this is Hall's point about speech act philosophy, he has correctly interpreted the tradition. We return to this discussion later in the paper.

6 In case a careful reader is a bit confused at this point, let me point to what seems to be a fundamental ambiguity in Hall. He unreflectively accepts that when A refers to 'language', this is a reference to speech in the proper sense, and that this idea of language is at least compatible with a theory of speech-acts. This may well be the case but it is by no means obvious or necessary. For example, why can't A be referring in the abstract to the universal linguistic capacity in humans? A doesn't seem (at least to me) to clearly indicate his position on the matter and Hall doesn't provide an argument compelling us to read A this way. Nonetheless, Hall's assumption may stand as a potential reading of A and so I think this to be only a slight oversight on his part.

7 Hall, *Word and Spirit*, 201; see also pp. 74–89, 98, 169, 179, 200–206. Hall speaks much about the 'reflexively integral speech-act,' and our need for 'reflexive integrity' in our speaking, 'speaking faithfully,' the 'felicity conditions' on our speech-acts, etc.

8 I borrow this term for C. S. Lewis who used as a title to one of his books. He uses the term in reference to the divide between heaven and hell.

9 Hall's own position is actually never clear on this, only that he does not feel that music must always be demonic (*Word and Spirit*, 8). He is also aware of the fact that speech may be demonic (*Word and Spirit*, 113). However, whether or not Hall thinks music is useful as a (necessary) pointer towards existential concretion is ambiguous, but his derision of music as 'the quintessential medium for expressing the demonic' leaves us with a less than positive account of music (*Word and Spirit*, 43). See for example his statement, 'music lacks anything equivalent to these resources [of speech]; in music there is no way for the musician to own or own up to what is expressed in the music she performs or composes' (*Word and Spirit*, 53).

10 Again, Hall is ambiguous. Here Hall contends that as a work to be read, '*contra* Derrida, writing is not the dynamic, phonocentric act of speaking, [and] seems to be essentially a logocentric phenomenon,' (*Word and Spirit*, 172). Later Hall states that, 'Derrida is correct that writing is not a logocentric enterprise,' (*Word and Spirit*, 175). What Hall appears to be bringing out is that writing has a double, sensuous-spiritual aspect (much like music). It can refer to a written work to be read (inherently logocentric, visually sensuous), or it can be the act of writing (inherently novel, dynamic, historically concrete and spiritual). What I conclude is that Hall is criticizing Derrida for not breaking completely with logocentrism. The paradigm of language as writing is not radical enough. I say more regarding writing as music in my following discussion.

11 Derrida, Jacques, *Limited, Inc.* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 105.

12 Hall, *Word and Spirit*, 189–199, cf. 196.

13 For Hall's principal thesis see my opening discussion.

14 I am not as much attacking speech-act theory per se as I am attacking Hall's implementation of it as flawed. This will become more clear in the following discussion.

15 This point will be important in the critique Hall's rendition of speech-act theory.

16 Lest the reader think that I am creating a picture of Kierkegaard made in my own image note Kierkegaard's own vision of his authorship: 'Thus the whole literary activity turns upon the problem becoming a Christian within Christendom' ['The Point of View For My Work As An Author,' in *A Kierkegaard Anthology*, ed. Robert Bretall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), 335]. This indicates an overall unity in his thought.

17 See note 7.

18 That is, 'Victor the Hermit' or 'The Victorious Hermit.'

19 We see this in Plato (as brought out by Hall), but also in Aristotle through Augustine's innovations (divine illumination), Aquinas (sight as 'the most spiritual sense'), Descartes ('the natural light'), Locke (luminosity), etc.

20 Cf. the apostle Paul, 'Faith comes by hearing' (Romans 10:17).

21 The reader will notice that I am not arguing for or against any particular interpre-

tation of Kierkegaard on this point. In fact, I think that in this case Eremita's preface indicates some version of PT as being intimately connected to Kierkegaard's personal view. The point is that any interpretation must be carefully argued to and not simply assumed.

22 See Ronald J. Manheimer, *Kierkegaard as Educator* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 178–184.

23 Kierkegaard no doubt shares much with A—it would require a superhuman effort (demonic?) for a finite human to create a pseudonym of A's sophistication with whom she had nothing in common.

24 See Steven L. Ross 'Editor's Introduction,' in *Either/Or*, xiv–xv; and Merold Westphal, *Becoming a Self: A Reading of Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1996), 23–24.

25 Westphal, *Becoming A Self*, 22.

26 The two books I especially have in mind are Climacus' *Philosophical Fragments, Johannes Climacus*, trans. & eds. Edna and Howard Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) and *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments*, trans. & eds. Edna and Howard Hong (2 vols.; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

27 Kierkgaard, *Fear and Trembling and The Sickness Unto Death*.

28 Hall has an excellent discussion of Kierkegaard's concept of faith in *Word and Spirit*, 2–3. He is exactly correct when he claims here that for Kierkegaard 'to exist in faith is to exist within a radical convental bonding to God *and* to exist within a dialectical sundered/bonded relationship with the world.' My argument with Hall is that I think he later on confuses this sundered/bonded relationship as being necessarily and essentially predicated upon the speech-act. I have already noted I think that this is a reversal of the situation for Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard is saying that we speak faithfully because we have faith, or maybe even that when we have faith we will speak faithfully; but he is not saying that we have faith because we speak faithfully. This will become more clear in my following discussion of Hall and speech-acts.

29 Kierkegaard, *Postscript*, 22–34.

30 See Kierkegaard's statement [*Early Polemical Writings*, trans. and ed. J. Watkins (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 76], 'A life-view is more than a quintessence or a sum of propositions maintained in its abstract neutrality; it is more than experience [*Erfaring*], which as such is always fragmentary. It is, namely, the transubstantiation of experience [*Erfaringens Transubstantiation*]; *it is an unshakable certainty in oneself won from all lived experience.' See also his statement [in The Journals of Søren Kierkegaard*, trans. and ed. Alexander Dru (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1958), 44–5], 'The thing is to understand myself, to see what God really wishes *me* to do; the thing is to find a truth which is *true for me*, to find *the idea for which I can live and die.* . . . That was what I lacked in order *to lead a complete human life* . . . something which grows together with the deepest roots of my life, through which I am so to speak, grafted upon the divine . . . It is the divine side of [a human], his [or her] inward action which means everything.'

31 J. L. Austin, *How To Do Things With Words* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).

32 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, *Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, The Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge* (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1998), 208.

33 I am here accusing Hall of not accounting for Searle's very important distinction [in John R. Searle, 'Literary Theory and It's Discontents', in *New Literary History* 25 (1994): 660] between linguistic types and linguistic tokens. By 'token sentence' I simply mean to refer to any sentence uttered by a particular person in a particular context (which includes all the circumstances relevant to the utterance; the time, place, etc.) For example, I, sitting in my study in Edinburgh, Scotland, at 11:00 am, December 5, 1998, may utter the token sentence, 'There is snow outside.' Thus by definition any token sentence may be only uttered once. The 'type' of a sentence refers to its form and may be repeated by different speakers on different occasions. For example, every time 'There is snow outside' is spoken, it is the utterance of a different token sentence with the same type. For further discussion of this see Richard Swinburne, *Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 9–10; and Kevin J. Vanhoozer, *Is There a Meaning in This Text?*, 212.