EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

JOURNAL EUROPÉEN DE THÉOLOGIE

EUROPÄISCHE THEOLOGISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT

VIII(1999):1
ISSN 0960–2720

Typeset by WestKey Ltd.,
Falmouth, Cornwall.
Printed in Great Britain for
Paternoster Periodicals,
P.O. Box 300, Carlisle,
Cumbria, CA3 0QS U.K.
by Nottingham Alpha Graphics

ISSN 0960-2720

European journal of theology

CONTENTS/TABLE DES MATIÈRES/ INHALT

Articles/Articles/Artikel

Book Reviews/Recensions/Buchbesprechungen

ISSN 0960–2720

Availability and Subscription Rates / Diffusion et abonnements / Erscheinungsweise und Abonnement

The *European Journal of Theology* is published by Paternoster Periodicals twice annually.

Le *Journal Européen* est publié par Paternoster Periodicals deux fois par an.

Die *ETZ* erscheint zweimal jährlich bei Paternoster Periodicals.

Great Britain and countries not listed below

Period	UK	Elsewhere Overseas	USA and Canada	
			Institutions	Individuals
One Year	£20.90	£21.80	$54.50	$35.40
Two/Three Years, Per Year	£18.80	£19.60	$49.00	$31.90

2/3rds world, individuals and institutions:
50% discount on the overseas sterling (£) rates (*) listed above.

All subscriptions to:
Paternoster Periodicals. PO Box 300, Carlisle, Cumbria, UK, CA3 0QR
Tel: +44(0) 1228-512 512: Fax: +44 (0) 1228-51 49 49: Email: pp@stl.org
www,paternoster-publishing.com

Important Note to all Postal Subscribers
When contacting our Subscription Office in Carlisle for any reason
Always quote your Subscriber Reference Number.
This appears on the address label used to send your copies to you.

Pour la Grande Bretagne et les pays qui ne sont pas mentionnés ci-dessous

Grossbritannien und andere Länder, die unten nicht erwähnt sind

Deutschland

Brunnen Verlag GmbH, Gottlieb-Daimler-Str. 22, D-35398 Giessen, Germany

Jahresbezugspreis: DM 42,00
Für Studenten: DM 32,00

National Correspondents / Correspondants nationaux / Nationale Kontaktadressen

National correspondents are actively being sought in countries not listed below.
On recherche des correspondants locaux pour les pays qui ne sont pas mentionnés ci-dessous.
Nationale Kontaktadressen für weitere Länder werden gesucht.

Belgique / België (B)
Claude Vilain, 60 Clos de Chenes, B1170, Bruxelles

Croatia / Hrvatska (HR)
Davorin Peterlin, S. Krautzeka 76, HR-51000 Rijeka

Danmark (DK)
Carsten Vang, Menighedsfakultet, Katrine bjergvej 75, DK-8200 Århus N

Finland / Suomi (FIN)
Leif Nummela, Finnish Lutheran Mission, Kansanlähetys R.Y., FIN-12310 Ryttlyä

Hellas (GR)
John P. Kremides, c/o Emmaus, P.O. Box 1133, GR-261 10 Patras

Magyarország (H)
Peter Balla, H-1054 Budapest, Hungary Szabad_sag tér 2. IV/3

Ireland (IRL)
Trevor Morrow, 19 Chalet Gardens, Lucan, Co. Dublin

Nederland (NL)
Pieter Lalleman, Schuttevaer 37, NL-7908 DB Hogeveen

Norge / Noreg (N)
Hans Kvalbein, Oskar Braatens vei 2A, N-1412 Sofiemyr

Polska (PL)
Edward Czajko, ul. Sienna 68/70, PL-00825 Warsawa

Portugal (P)
Alan Pallister, Rua Capitao Dorio, No. 9, P-2500 Caldas da Rainha

România (RO)
Sandor Fazakas, RO3700 Oradea, Str. Arany Janos, 4 AP 11

Slovensko (SK)
Ludovit Fazekas, Hviedoslavova 25, SK-934 01 Levice

Suisse / Schweiz / Svizzera (CH)
J. Heinrich Schmid, Junkerstrasse 16 CH-9500 Wil.

EuroJTh (1999) **8:1**, 3–12 0960–2720

• The Cross of Christ 1
• Why Did Christ Die? Romans 3:9–20
• *La mort de Christ, pourquoi? (Romains 3:9–20)*
• *Warum mußte Christus sterben? (Römer 3:9–20)*

David Searle, Edinburgh

RÉSUMÉ

De nos jours, peu de gens savent pourquoi Christ est mort. Il est donc important d'aborder cette question.

Il y a plusieurs réponses possibles: i. Parce que Ponce Pilate l'a condamné à mort. ii. Parce que le sanhédrin juif l'a condamné. iii. Parce que Judas l'a trahi. Bien que chacune de ces explications de la mort de Christ ait sa part de validité, la réponse que le Nouveau Testament donne à notre question est que Christ est mort pour nos péchés.

Dans notre monde postmoderne, cependant, les gens n'ont pas conscience du « péché ». On considère couramment que le péché consiste en crimes horribles tels que l'incitation à s'adonner aux stupéfiants ou le meurtre. Pour cette raison, nos contemporains ne peuvent saisir en quoi ils auraient besoin que Christ soit mort pour eux. L'incarnation ajoute encore à la difficulté, car la gloire de Christ a été voilée par son humanité. En outre, sa mort fut un supplice infamant et repoussant. Tandis que la croix constituait pour les Juifs une pierre d'achoppement, pour la plupart de nos contemporains, la croix est folie. Mais il est mort pour les péchés du fait que nous nous trouvons tous condamnés comme pécheurs devant Dieu.

La thèse principale de Paul est la suivante: Nous sommes tous « sous l'empire du péché » (v. 9).

J'aimerais subdiviser notre texte en cinq parties:

1. Nous sommes tous « sous l'empire du péché » (v. 9).
Chacun de nous appartient à l'une des deux catégories suivantes: nous sommes, ou bien « sous l'empire du péché », ou bien « sous la grâce ». Les gens aujourd'hui ont du mal à distinguer ces deux conditions. Ils s'imaginent que s'ils mènent une vie suffisamment correcte, tout va bien pour eux. Ce n'est pas ce que la Bible enseigne.

2. Une description de la nature humaine (v. 10–12).
L'apôtre écrit tout d'abord: « Il n'y a pas un seul juste, pas même un seul ». Il reprend ici avant tout le Psaume 14, mais aussi le texte d'Écclésiaste 7,20. Il agence ses citations en fonction du message qu'il veut communiquer. Le mot « juste » est en général un terme relationnel dans l'Écriture. Mais il est aussi utilisé dans un sens forensique, ou légal, lorsqu'il se réfère à notre statut devant le Dieu saint. Paul cite divers textes de l'Ancien Testament pour démontrer que, devant Dieu, nous sommes tous condamnés car toutes nos relations sont déficientes. On peut se rapporter à cet égard aux textes de Ps 14,1 et Ép 4,18. Ceci ne peut être compris par les seules capacités de l'intelligence humaine. Paul passe en effet de l'affirmation que nul n'est juste, à celle que nul n'a d'intelligence, puis à celle que nul ne se tourne vers Dieu. Beaucoup de gens font leurs prières par habitude, mais sans véritablement se tourner vers Dieu.

Nous sommes tous profondément égocentriques (v. 12). Nous sommes par conséquents corrompus.

3. Le péché en action (v. 13–17).
L'apôtre Paul considère maintenant la nature humaine en activité. Il utilise tout d'abord une image parlante: « Leur

gosier est un sépulcre ouvert ». Ce que Dieu voit est aussi repoussant que des cadavres en décomposition dans une tombe. Voilà ce qu'est le péché en action! « Ils usent de tromperie avec leur langue » (une citation de Ps. 5,10). Malgré toutes leurs belles paroles, les gens sont profondément malhonnêtes. « Ils ont sous les lèvres un venin d'aspic » (cf. Ps. 140,4). Il suffit de penser à tant de films et de cassettes vidéo pour s'en convaincre. Paul parle de malédiction. Nous blâmons Dieu pour tant de choses.

Les versets 15 et 16 (cf. És. 59,7) n'impliquent pas que chacun de nous soit un meurtrier. C'est simplement là un commentaire d'ordre général pour souligner que la nature humaine est capable de sombrer dans les abîmes les plus profonds quant à sa manière de traiter les autres êtres humains. Que l'on pense à l'exemple de certaines belles-mères en Inde.

« Ils ne connaissent pas le chemin de la paix » (v. 17; cf. És. 59,8). Ceux qui se trouvent « sous l'empire du péché » ne connaissent pas la paix, le shalom, *le bien-être et la santé qui découlent d'une juste relation avec Dieu.*

4. La raison de la corruption humaine.

« Ils n'ont pour Dieu aucune crainte » (cf. Ps. 36,2). L'homme postmoderne n'a pas la crainte de Dieu. Il peut respecter Christ en le tenant pour un maître important, mais sans la crainte de Dieu, il ne peut concevoir de raisons nécessitant une expiation. Nous craignons Dieu parce que:

- *nous ne sommes que cendres et poussière devant Dieu,*
- *nous sommes ses créatures ayant pour vocation de lui rendre un culte,*
- *nous avons la vie, le mouvement et l'être par sa grâce,*
- *et il est notre juge.*

Mais les incroyants n'ont aucune crainte de Dieu et la vision du monde que donne la Bible leur est étrangère.

5. Un verdict dévastateur.
En conclusion de cette section, Paul déclare: « Toute bouche est fermée et tout le monde est reconnu coupable devant Dieu ». Il n'y a pas d'excuses devant Dieu. Devant Dieu, le pécheur n'aura rien à répliquer. Il doit être déclaré coupable.

Voilà pourquoi il fallait que Christ meure. Voilà pourquoi nous devons crier: « Ô Dieu, aie pitié de moi, car je suis pécheur! »

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Da im Schottland von heute nur wenige wissen, warum Christus sterben mußte, ist es wichtig, sich diesem Thema zuzuwenden. Drei mögliche Antworten auf die oben gestellte Frage seien an dieser Stelle genannt:

- *weil Pontius Pilatus ihn zum Tod verurteilt hat;*
- *weil ihn der jüdische Hohe Rat verworfen hat;*
- *weil Judas ihn verraten hat.*

Obwohl wir jeden dieser drei Gründe für den Tod Christi zu einem gewissen Grad anerkennen, gilt es, auf die Antwort des NT hinzuweisen, wonach er für unsere Sünden gestorben ist. Die Menschen unserer postmodernen Welt jedoch kennen kein Sündenbewußtsein. Der Begriff 'Sünde' wird vielmehr lediglich auf verabscheuenswerte Straftaten wie z.B. Drogenhandel oder Mord bezogen. Folglich ist es ihnen verwehrt, die Relevanz von Christi Tod für ihr Leben zu erfassen.

Die Inkarnation ihrerseits vertieft das Problem, da Christi Herrlichkeit durch sein Menschsein verhüllt war. Darüber hinaus handelte es sich bei seinem Tod um ein überaus schändliches und abstoßendes Ende. Während den Juden das Kreuz Christi ein Ärgernis (skandalon) ist, stellt es für die Mehrheit der Menschen von heute eine Torheit dar. Und dennoch gilt, daß er aufgrund der Sünde starb und wir alle somit vor Gott als verurteilte Sünder dastehen. Ich möchte den Abschnitt aus Römer 3 unter fünf Überschriften betrachten.

1. Die Hauptaussage des Paulus: Wir alle sind 'unter der Sünde' (V. 9). Jeder einzelne von uns gehört in eine der beiden folgenden Kategorien: wir sind entweder 'unter der Sünde' oder aber 'unter der Gnade'. Die Menschen von heute können diese Unterscheidung nicht erfassen, da sie denken, daß sie, wenn sie einigermaßen rechtschaffen leben, aus dem Schneider sind. Aus der Sicht der Bibel jedoch ist dies eine Illusion.

2. Beschreibung der menschlichen Natur (V. 10–12). Paulus beginnt mit den Worten 'da ist keiner, der gerecht ist, auch nicht einer'. Hierbei handelt es sich in erster Linie um ein Zitat aus Psalm 14, doch die Worte enthalten zugleich auch eine Anspielung an Prediger 7,20 (Paulus verwendet Zitate auf eine Weise, die seiner Absicht zustatten kommt). Der Begriff 'gerecht' hat in der Schrift grundsätzlich eine relationale Dimension. Doch abgesehen davon wird er auch auf forensische bzw. juristische Weise verwendet, dann nämlich, wenn er sich auf unsere Stellung im Angesicht eines heiligen Gottes bezieht. Paulus verwendet alttestamentliche Zitate um aufzuzeigen, daß wir vor Gott als Verurteilte dastehen, da alle unsere Beziehungen unvollkommen sind (siehe Ps. 14,2 und Eph. 4,18). Dies ist rein menschlich gesehen unverständlich. Doch der Gedankengang des Paulus verläuft folgendermaßen: 'da ist keiner, der gerecht ist'—'da ist keiner, der verständig ist'—'da ist keiner, der nach Gott fragt'. Viele beten zwar aus Gewohnheit, doch suchen sie dabei nicht Gott. v. 12: wir alle sind von Natur aus egozentrisch und sind infolgedessen 'verdorben'.

3. Sünde in Aktion (V. 13–17). Paulus wendet sich nun der menschlichen Natur in Aktion zu und beginnt mit einem einprägsamen Bild: 'ihr Rachen ist ein offenes Grab'. Was Gott sieht, ist so widerlich wie eine verrottende Leiche in einem Grab. Das ist Sünde in Aktion.

'Mit ihren Zungen betrügen sie' (zitiert nach Ps. 5,9). Ungeachtet all ihrer schönen Worte sind die Menschen doch von Natur aus betrügerisch. 'Otterngift ist unter ihren Lippen' (Ps. 140,3). Man vergleiche viele Videos und Filme. Paulus spricht von 'Fluch und Bitterkeit'—für wie vieles machen wir nicht Gott verantwortlich. V. 15f. (vgl. Jes. 59,7) besagen nicht, daß jeder einzelne von uns ein Mörder ist—vielmehr handelt es sich hier um eine grundsätzliche Bemerkung die Fähigkeit der menschlichen Natur betreffend, im Umgang mit anderen menschlichen Wesen bis in die tiefsten Tiefen vorzudringen. V. 17: 'den Weg des Friedens kennen sie nicht' (Jes. 59,8). Frieden, Schalom, Ganzheit und Gesundheit als Folge einer rechten Beziehung zu Gott sind denen, die 'unter der Sünde' sind, unbekannt.

4. Der Grund der menschlichen Verdorbenheit. 'Es ist keine Gottesfurcht bei ihnen' (Ps. 36,1). Der postmoderne Mensch kennt keine Gottesfurcht. Er mag Christus als einen großen Lehrer respektieren, doch, der Gottesfurcht ermangelnd, sieht er keine Notwendigkeit für Sühne und Wiedergutmachung. Wir hingegen fürchten Gott, denn

- *vor ihm wir sind nur Staub und Asche;*
- *wir sind, als seine Geschöpfe, dazu geschaffen, ihn anzubeten;*
- *in seiner Gnade leben, weben und sind wir;*
- *er ist unser Richter.*

Diejenigen jedoch, die noch nicht zu einem neuen Leben erweckt worden sind, haben weder Gottesfurcht noch ein biblisches Weltbild.

5. Das vernichtende Urteil. Paulus beendet den Abschnitt mit den Worten 'damit allen der Mund gestopft werde und alle Welt vor Gott schuldig sei'. Vor Gott gibt es keine Ausreden; jeder Sünder wird im Angesicht Gottes verstummen. Schuldig! Das ist der Grund, weshalb Christus sterben mußte. Das ist der Grund, weshalb wir nur flehen können: 'Gott, sei mir Sünder gnädig'.

I was brought up and educated in Scotland, a small country which lies to the north of England. Many people don't even know Scotland exists (especially Americans who tend to call the United Kingdom 'England'). In my boyhood, most people in Scotland would have been very theologically aware. They had inherited, after all, the tradition of John Knox's teaching. So if you had asked the average Scot fifty years ago, 'Why did Christ die?' you would have received a moderately competent answer. Not so today. In my country, very few people would have any idea at all as to why Christ died. I want to devote this first address, therefore, to considering this question.

When we turn to the accounts in the NT of the crucifixion of Jesus, we can identify several different answers to the question, 'Why did Christ die?' The *first* one would be that he was crucified by Pontius Pilate. Pilate knew perfectly well that Jesus was innocent[1] But he did not want to decide either for or against Jesus. He wanted to release him, but he also wanted to satisfy the crowd. Failing to solve his dilemma, he took water and washed his hands to try and demonstrate his innocence.[2] But the truth was he was a coward, and so his action is remembered in the Creeds, *Suffered under Pontius Pilate*.

A *second* answer to the question would be to say that Caiaphas and the Sanhedrin killed Jesus. When Jesus said to Pilate, 'the one who handed me over to you is guilty of a greater sin' (Jn. 19:11), he was perhaps referring to Caiaphas since he used the singular. The people of Jerusalem were also implicated as Peter made very clear in his early sermons.[3] Christ was threatening the priests' authority and making claims for himself which they deeply resented. So they tried to get rid of him.

Yet a *third* answer to our question might be that it was Judas Iscariot who had Jesus killed when he betrayed him out of covetousness. While it is true to say that he was prompted to betray Jesus by Satan, and did so after Satan 'entered into him',[4] nonetheless his action was 'wickedness'.[5] He therefore carries heavy responsibility for the death of Jesus.

While there is clear biblical evidence to support all of these three answers, I want us to consider a *fourth* answer to the question, 'Why did Christ die?' **He died for our sins**. We could consider this statement as amply illustrated by the first three answers already given: Pilate's cowardice is shared by everyone of us, for we too have all tried to appease the enemies of Christ and have failed to take our stand for him; we too have acted in resentment of his imperial claims which threaten our self-reliance and self-righteousness; we too are motivated by covetousness and all of us have acted in our own material interests to the detriment of his claims upon us. The case against us is clear as sharers of the sins of those who had him killed.

However, our concern must be for men and women today who appear to have little or no awareness either of the fact of their sin or of the need of the death of Christ for their sin. In our postmodern society, sin is apparently restricted to paedophiles, murderers, rapists, terrorists, drug pushers, those who mug defenceless old ladies and those who swindle banks out of millions of pounds. Ordinary people are seemingly OK. They please themselves and do their own thing on the widely held assumption that anything and everything about their lives is quite acceptable as long as they are not paedophiles, murderers, rapists, terrorists, drug pushers, muggers of old ladies or embezzlers. It seems to me that we Christians have seriously failed in presenting to our generation the reason why Christ died.

It might be argued that part of the problem why people do not consider the death of Christ with any seriousness is the Incarnation itself. After all, our Lord made himself nothing and took upon himself the nature of a servant.[6] As Isaiah expresses it, 'He had no beauty or majesty to attract us to him, nothing in his appearance that we should desire him' (53:2). It is not therefore immediately obvious to people that this Nazarene carpenter turned teacher might be very God!

The manner of his death increases the problem. While it has become fashionable to sentimentalise Christ's death, the reality was very different. He hung in shame, his nakedness exposed to public gaze. Scholars tell us that those who were crucified could not control their bodily functions, but urinated and defecated down their legs. Little wonder then that our modern man and woman fail to see anything of value or relevance in the death of Christ. It was truly a disgusting death. There have been plenty of deaths which have impressed the world far more by their heroism and nobility.

'The message of the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing . . . a stumbling-block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles' (1 Cor. 1:18,23). Our postmodern person sees the foolishness of Christ's death. It takes a Jew to recognise in the cross 'a stumbling-block' (σανδαλον) because the Jew is far more aware than most of the nature and holiness of God. The Jew has been trained to know something at least of what constitutes sin and guilt. The Jew knows that God claims total authority over us as his creatures. He knows that God has laid down laws for human behaviour and strict regulations about the way to approach himself. The stumbling-block for the Jew is that only by this hideous, cursed death can he be justified before a righteous God.

The dominant reason for Christ's death was that Jew and Gentile alike stand condemned as sinners. In Paul's words in Romans 3:19, Every mouth is silenced and the whole world is accountable before God. We have been separated from God by our sin. Let's consider all too briefly these words we read together.

1. Paul's main proposition: *We are 'all under sin'* v. 9.

I want to divide Romans 3:9–20 into five main parts. The first is his statement in verse 9. In these words, he is summarising his argument from 1:18, but also anticipating his statement in vs. 19–20. After making certain categorical statements in ch. 1 about non-Jews, he has discussed at length the position of the Jews. His conclusion is unequivocal: Jews and Gentiles alike are 'all under sin'. In v. 19, he uses a similar phrase, 'under the law'. For our purposes just now, we can take these two phrases as approximately synonymous. So what does he mean by this phrase, 'under sin'?

In the Bible, there are two conditions that people may be in, and only two: You are I are either 'under sin' or 'under grace'. The Bible doesn't ask whether or not we are good people, kind to our neighbours, pleasant in our temperaments, well thought of in our communities. It asks, Are we under sin or under grace? Are we citizens of the kingdom of this world, or are we citizens of the heavenly city whose architect and builder is God?

This is precisely where people go wrong today in our postmodern society. Their concern is entirely about pleasing themselves, appreciating the good in others, being tolerant of various cultures and beliefs and having mutual respect for any and everyone whatever their creed. There is of course much to be commended in that kind of tolerance. But the postmodern tolerance fails to diagnose and recognise the truth about our relationship with the Lord God. It fails to see that we all stand condemned because we are under sin. We are born that way. In Paul's phrase elsewhere, we are 'in Adam'.[7] We are born with sin in us, our humanity contaminated by sin.

That, then, is the apostle's proposition, that as a result of the Fall, the condition of every single man and woman in this world is that all are 'under sin'. Let's hurry on to the next stage of his argument:

2. A description of human nature vs. 10–12.

He begins, 'There is no one righteous, not even one.' Here Paul is quoting mainly from Psalm 14, but also alluding to Ecclesiastes 7:20. He arranges his quotations to suit his purpose.

The word 'righteous' is complex as you well know. I hold that it generally carries a relational meaning. The person is

righteous who is in a good relationship with others. Scripture is concerned with two great relationships and possibly a third. The first is that vertical relationship between each one of us and God. The second is the horizontal relationship between ourselves and others, whether wife or husband or children or neighbours or employer or colleagues at work. The possible third relationship is the inward relationship we have with ourselves.[8]

But this whole word group is also used in the Bible in a legal or forensic sense. It then refers to our status or standing before a holy God. While I myself incline to the view that throughout this chapter the relational meaning of righteousness obtains, for reasons which will become apparent as we proceed, the arguments for a forensic connotation also are overwhelming. So the apostle uses the OT quotations to declare that before the Judge of all the earth, those under sin cannot stand before God for their relationships are all in some way deficient, most all their relationship with him.

This may seem to our postmodern person to be too sweeping a statement. But the plumb-line of the divine standards leaves us without any argument. We are to love the Lord our God with all our soul and heart and mind and strength, and we are to love our neighbours as ourselves![9] And however men and women may *feel* about it—and what an emphasis today on 'feelings'!—the divine standard cannot be gainsaid.

Paul continues with his remorseless logic: 'There is no one who understands, there is none who seeks God . . .' (Ps. 14:2 = Ps. 53:2.) Elsewhere he states, 'They are darkened in their understanding and separated from the life of God because of the ignorance that is in them due to the hardening of their hearts' (Eph. 4:18). He is saying that sin has affected our mental capacity to grasp the truth of God. This condition of having a darkened mind, that is, a mind clouded over so that the simplest truths of the Gospel are completely meaningless, leads to separation from God, flowing as it does from ignorance about him because the heart has been hardened.

Have you on occasion tried to explain the truths of the Gospel to people of exceptionally high intelligence? But no matter how much you try, the simplest facts of the Gospel are beyond their understanding. Truths which little children can understand are apparently beyond the grasp of highly intellectual people.[10]

But that is not all. This general condition of those under sin means also that men and women do not even seek God. They neither know him nor *want* to know him. See the way in which the apostle's mind is working, and the way in which he orders his quotations from the OT. There is an inexorable logic about his thought. First, there is none *righteous*. Then, sinners are unrighteous because they do not *understand* these things. Now, sinners have no understanding because they do not *seek* God.

Those who have been pastors will know that there are many good people in the world who have been taught to pray regularly. They attend their churches conscientiously. They are very religious. But they are not seeking God. Not, that is, in the way the Psalmist was seeking God when he said, 'As the deer pants for streams of water, so my soul longs for you, O God. My soul thirsts for God, for the living God' (Ps. 42:1). There are many looking for peace of mind, or for self-justification. But by nature none of us seek God. Men and women do not set their hearts to enter his presence, to find him, to come before him in worship, longing for him above everything else. I believe it would be true to say that to approach the living God and bow down in his presence is about the last thing that those outside of Christ ever want to do.

By nature we resent him. By nature we say, 'Get out of my life and leave me to run my affairs the way I want. Keep away from me, God. I want no interference from you.' So that when someone does begin to seek after God, there has been a complete change in direction and that can only be accomplished by the work of the Holy Spirit. But now on to verse 12.

At this point, Paul follows almost exactly the LXX in quoting from Psalm 14:2.

Look at what the Psalmist says. First that we have all gone out of the way. It follows, does it not, that if we do not seek God or understand him we are going to go in the opposite direction to that in which he commands us to go. God's way in matters of morality points along a narrow road, yet a safe road designed for our blessing. But we deliberately take a different road devoted to self-satisfaction irrespective of the effect on others. My way, my will, my opinions, me, my, mine.

The next statement is that as a consequence of this self-seeking and going our own way we have become worthless. NIV in Psalm 14 translates the Greek as 'have become corrupt', whereas here it translates the same word 'have become worthless'. In secular Greek, this word was used of food or milk that had gone off. Have you ever left something in the back of the fridge at home and forgotten all about it. Weeks later, you notice it and see it has become mouldy and foul. That's one way in which the word was used. Another way it was used was of a dog's barking when there is absolutely no reason for the dog to bark—you know how some dogs bark for barking's sake: they are a public nuisance, barking at the moon, or at shadows, or at a passing bird.

It's a strong word, amounting to a devastating comment on our human condition. However, we must not do the apostle or the Psalmist an injustice. They are not saying that people cannot perform some useful or good or noble deeds. They are not saying that those 'under sin' cannot compose beautiful music, or write fine books, or paint skilful portraits. Their concern is to speak about our standing before God. They are saying that in the sight of our Creator we are morally useless, altogether rotten and corrupt-every single one of us, without exception. No matter what handsome, pleasant, well-intentioned people we are-all we are and all we do is worthless before God.

3. Sin in action vv. 13–17

Paul now moves in his thought from his description of fallen human nature to that fallen human nature *in action*. One commentator writes that Paul now 'holds before [us] the most terrifying mirror that [we] have ever looked into in [our] lives.'[11] Just brief comments on each of these devastating statements.

'Their throats are open graves . . .' (Ps. 5:9). Some years ago, some young people in my church were away for a week-end in the hills. A group of them were walking on the moors, when they stumbled on a human body that was in an advanced state of decomposition. A man had been out walking in the hills alone when he had taken a heart attack and fallen down and died. That had been many months before. Those young people, all of them still at school, were shocked and nauseated to see this rotting human corpse lying across their pathway. The smell was foul.

This little phrase says that if we look into the mouth of a man or woman and see what God sees, the sight is as revolting and nauseating as the rotting remains of some corpse. It is out of the overflow of the heart that the mouth speaks.[12] That is sin in action! Those who do not understand or seek God but go their own way and have become worthless. Their hearts are like open graves with all the putrefaction they contain.

'Their tongues practise deceit' (still from Ps. 5:9). We haven't time to bring out the tragic truth of these words. But we all know how deceitful human nature is, how we say one thing and mean another, how people seem to be so charming when in their hearts they are cursing the moment they met you! High society is the same. Lovely words of warm friendship, but as soon as the other's back is turned, the most biting, vicious comments! And oh! how we twist our explanation of events to show ourselves up in the best possible light! We are unable to help ourselves as our tongues practise deceit.

'The poison of vipers is on their lips' (Ps. 140:3). 'Their mouths are full of cursing and bitterness' (Ps. 10:7). One thinks of the media, of the magazines produced for adolescents and the tv and cinema films. What venom is injected into those whom the fangs of the media bite! This modern

serpent is as cunning as the old serpent that seduced Eve. The message seems reasonable, the suggestions attractive, but hidden under the lips is deadly venom which will ultimately kill the victim.

What about the cursing and bitterness to which Paul refers? Note that we are not to understand that he is saying that those under sin constantly use foul language. Not that. Let me remind you again that his concern is our relationship to God. Here he saying that the natural man or woman does not submit to God. When something goes wrong, some disaster or illness strikes, if men's thoughts turn to God at all, it is to curse him bitterly. This is part of that resentment against God which lurks in every human soul. We blame him for our mistakes. We blame him for the suffering in the world. 'How can there be a God when the people of Sudan suffer so much?' we ask.

Verses 15 and 16 (Is. 59:7), do not mean that every one of us is a murderer. Rather it is a general reflection and comment on the capability human nature has to sink to the deepest depths of depravity and shame in our treatment of other human beings. One has only to turn on the tv news to see intense suffering in a score of places across this world as those who have the power of life and death over others inflict suffering on them. Last year I visited India and was shocked to read each week in the *Indian Times* of mothers-in-law who murdered their daughters-in-law in order to find for their sons another bride who would bring a fresh dowry with her. These were not vicious, hardened criminals, these mothers-in-law. Rather were they fallen human beings who saw the opportunity of riches by killing defenceless young women who were in their power. I understand that Indian prisons hold astonishingly high numbers of such women who have been convicted of such murders. And they are only the ones who have been caught! More recently, we have seen the devastation in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam.

The last sentence in this section: v. 17, 'The way of peace they do not know' (Is 59:8). Peace, *shalom*, that wholeness and health which flows from a right relationship with God and permeates every level of our living and thinking—such peace is unknown to those 'under sin'. How could they have *shalom*? They do not understand the ways of God; they do not seek him; they do not know him. Rather, they resent him and are hell-bent on going their own way. How could they have peace when they are far from him?

4. The reason for this human corruption

'There is no fear of God before their eyes.' The full quotation from Psalm 36:1 reads: 'A burden is within my heart concerning the sinfulness of the wicked: there is no fear of God before his eyes.' Now this is a most significant statement of Scripture. We must not lightly pass over it. It is at this point we come to the heart of the problem in bringing the Christian message to postmodern society. Your postmodern person has no fear of God. He may respect Jesus as a great teacher. He may be interested in attending a Christian service to hear about Jesus Christ. She may even attend a home Bible Study Group to investigate the Christian faith. I have known many who have done this and have found themselves deeply impressed by the teaching of the Gospels. But there is still as yet 'no fear of God before their eyes'. And until they begin to know the fear of God, there is no reason for the Cross of Christ. Let me explain why.

'The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.'[13] You recall how when Adam and Eve first sinned, they hid themselves because they were afraid. You remember how when they were expelled from God's presence that an angel with a flaming sword which turned every way stood at the entrance to the Garden. You remember how when Abraham prayed for the two cities of the plain, he said, 'I have been so bold to speak to the Lord, I who am nothing but dust and ashes.' You remember how when Jacob awoke from his dream he was afraid and said, 'How awesome is this place. This is none other

than the house of God, the gate of heaven.' You remember how when God spoke to Moses from the burning bush, he hid his face for he was afraid to look on God. So we could go on. Why this fear of God? Why?

I would suggest four reasons. *First*, because God is God and we are but dust of the earth. We are mere worms compared to his incomparable glory and majesty. *Second*, because we his creatures are made to worship him. And remember the meaning of that word worship is 'serve'. Some Christians order God about as if he were a kind of genie of Aladdin's lamp who is there to be brought up on demand and told what to do for their comfort. How false and how wrong. He has made us for himself. Our proper posture before him is to bow low at his feet, to hide our faces and say, 'Lord, what do you want me to do?' *Third*, our lives are sustained by God and all our days are numbered in his book. If he was to withdraw from us his hand of providence for just one moment, we would cease to exist. We live and move and have our being by his grace. And *fourth*, he is the Judge of all the earth who will demand an account of how we steward our days and years and those gifts with which he has endowed us.

But unregenerate men and women have no fear of God. They may believe in him in an intellectual kind of way, assenting to the possibility or probability of his existence in some form or another. But they do not bow before him as their Creator and Lord, ever to be worshipped and adored in holy fear. And herein lies the root of sin. Whether that sin be selfishness, rebellion against the laws of God, deceit, crookedness, failure, or unbelief—whatever expression sin may take, at the root of it lies this absence of fear of God.

I was speaking to a friend recently whose parents had worked for many years in China. He told me that his father discovered there were two Bible books which when read by Chinese led them to faith in Christ—Genesis and Romans. Why these two books? Because they both present a Biblical world view. That is what our postmodern society has lost. And that is why there is no fear of God before their eyes.

5. The devastating verdict

In conclusion, see how Paul ends this section: 'Every mouth is silenced and the whole world is held accountable to God.' There will be no excuses or arguments before the Judge of all the earth. There will be no discussion of our sins. No blaming someone else as Adam did in the Garden, and then Eve did. No protestations of innocence. Sinner man, sinner woman, standing before Almighty God will not have a word to utter. Before that sea of crystal that surrounds the throne, encircled by the heavenly beings adoring and praising God, the sinner will be utterly lost for words. Speechless, like the man without the wedding clothes.

Guilty before God! Brunner has written, 'Guilt is that element in sin by which it belongs unalterably to the past, and as this unalterable element determines the present destiny of each soul.'[14] Guilt means that our past can never be made good. Indeed, we only truly conceive our lives as a whole when we see them in this dark shadow of guilt.

And that is why that terrible, hideous, shameful death of Christ had to be. That is why the Lord of Glory broke into time and history, and carried on his spotless soul all my sin, all my rebellion, my ignorance and darkness, my rebellion, my perversity, my deceit, my pride, my uncleanness, my failure, the poison and venom in my heart. He died for our sins.

Let us then prostrate ourselves before him in dust and ashes. Let us fall before him and cry, 'God be merciful to me a sinner!'

> Approach, my soul, the mercy seat, where
> Jesus answers prayer,
>
> There humbly fall before his feet, for
> none can perish there.
>
> Thy promise is my only plea; with this I
> venture nigh:

Thou callest burdened souls to thee,
and such, O Lord, am I.

Bowed down beneath a load of sin, by
Satan sorely pressed,

By war without and fears within, I
come to thee for rest.

Be thou my Shield and Hiding-place,
that, sheltered near thy side,

I may my fierce accuser face, and tell
him thou hast died.

O wondrous love! to bleed and die, to
bear the cross and shame,

That guilty sinners such as I, might
plead thy gracious Name!

John Newton, 1725–1807

Notes

1 Jn. 18:38.
2 Mt. 27:24.
3 Acts 3:12ff.
4 Jn. 13:2,27.
5 Acts 1:18.
6 Phil. 2:
7 Rom. 5:12ff, 17ff; 1 Cor. 15:22.
8 Acts of righteousness in Matt. 6:1 are evidently in these three areas: the horizontal, i.e., giving to the needy, the verticle, i.e., prayer, and the inward, i.e., fasting. See vs. 2–18.
9 Matt. 22:36–39.
10 Matt. 11:25–27.
11 D. M. Lloyd-Jones, *Romans, An Exposition of Chapters* 2:1–3:20, Banner of Truth, Edinburgh, 1989, p. 210.
12 Matt. 12:34.
13 Prov. 1:7.
14 Brunner, *The Mediator*, Lutterworth, London, 1934, p. 443.

EuroJTh (1999) **8:1**, 13–22 0960–2720

• The Cross of Christ 2
• The Righteousness of God Romans 3:21–22
• *La croix de Christ et la justice de Dieu (Romains 3:21–22)*
• *Das Kreuz Christi und die Gerechtigkeit Gottes (Römer 3:21–22)*

RÉSUMÉ

Il arrive qu'un médecin émette un diagnostic incorrect et cela peut avoir de graves conséquences. Ce n'est pas le cas de l'apôtre Paul. Il ne se presse pas pour nous amener à la question de la foi en Christ, mais il pose des fondements solides et sûrs. Nous avons là quelque chose à apprendre de lui.

« Mais maintenant » (3.21) . . . Après avoir parlé de notre corruption et de notre culpabilité devant Dieu, Paul dit avec soulagement: « Mais maintenant . . . », Christ est venu! La croix représente le grand tournant de l'histoire humaine. Remarquez l'indication temporelle véhiculée par ces mots: « Mais maintenant ». L'œuvre de Christ est un fait historique et non une pure théorie.

1. L'Évangile est théocentrique.
Nous sommes en train de devenir de plus en plus centrés sur nous-mêmes, y compris dans les Églises évangéliques: la grande relation je-tu tend à être remplacée par la relation je-moi. Il n'en est pas ainsi avec Paul. Il écrit: « Mais maintenant, la justice de Dieu a été manifestée ». Il place Dieu au centre. Le salut commence avec Dieu.

Je pense que l'expression « justice de Dieu » se réfère à la fois à l'attribut de Dieu qu'est la justice et à la justice qui nous est imputée. L'attribut de Dieu qu'est sa justice comporte à la fois une justice passive et une justice active: il concerne à la fois les relations divines au sein de sa Personne et ses relations avec nous, son peuple. Cependant, le mot 'justice' est aussi employé dans un sens forensique ou légal. Paul vient de parler de notre culpabilité devant le juge, en considérant que le monde entier a des comptes à lui rendre. Maintenant, il parle d'un Dieu qui acquitte le coupable. Le salut est trinitaire et théocentrique.

2. Le but de la loi.
Paul écrit: « sans la loi a été manifestée la justice de Dieu, attestée dans la loi et les prophètes ». On peut d'abord définir la loi comme tout le système judaïque d'observances cérémonielles et cultuelles tel qu'il est institué dans l'Ancien Testament. Il s'agit de la loi vue comme un ensemble de commandements ou comme exigeant la production d'œuvres.

Calvin a défini trois usages de la loi. Premièrement, elle convainc de péché, deuxièmement, elle réfrène le mal chez l'incroyant, troisièmement, et c'est là son usage principal, elle fait connaître au croyant la pensée et la volonté de Dieu. Il est important de réaffirmer ces choses à l'heure actuelle, pour éviter deux erreurs, d'une part l'antinomisme, et, de l'autre, l'idée selon laquelle la première alliance aurait été une alliance des œuvres qui aurait échoué. Dans les deux cas, on perd de vue le but principal de la loi.

La loi annonçait prophétiquement la venue de la grâce en Jésus-Christ. Jean parle littéralement d'une grâce à la place d'une grâce (1.16). En effet, lorsqu'on comprend bien la loi en tenant compte de sa fonction prophétique, on la voit comme une grâce donnée au travers de la loi divine. La grâce plus grande qui est venue par Jésus-Christ a remplacé la grâce de la loi. Il y a trop

peu de prédicateurs de nos jours qui connaissent l'enseignement de la loi dans l'Ancien Testament. Cela est pourtant nécessaire à la compréhension de l'œuvre de Christ.

3. Le salut est plus que le pardon.
Le message du pardon est glorieux et merveilleux, mais la portée de la croix ne se réduit pas à cela. Il y a aussi la justice de Dieu et cette justice imputée par Dieu. Cet enseignement est source d'encouragement et de force: notre relation avec lui est rétablie et notre statut en sa présence est celui d'hommes et de femmes qui sont, non seulement acceptés, mais aussi accueillis favorablement, à bras ouverts.

4. Par la foi en Jésus-Christ pour tous ceux qui croient.
Il nous faut définir la foi, car la confusion règne à ce propos. Je conçois la foi comme comportant trois éléments. Premièrement, la foi implique la compréhension de la vérité. En Ép 4.17–24, Paul utilise de nombreux vocables appartenant au domaine cognitif. La foi comporte le savoir de certaines choses au sujet de Jésus-Christ. Deuxièmement, la foi est soumission à cette vérité. On se souvient de la manière dont Saül de Tarse s'est soumis à Christ: « Qui es-tu, Seigneur ? » Troisièmement, la foi est confiance: elle consiste à s'en remettre à la miséricorde et à la compassion de Dieu en Christ.

La foi selon ces trois aspects est produite en nous par le Saint-Esprit de Dieu, car, sans lui, nous sommes morts dans nos péchés.

5. Le péché et la gloire divine (v. 23).
Alors que la forme verbale « tous ont péché » est un aoriste, le verbe suivant « et sont privés » est un présent, ce qui implique que nous demeurons dans cet état. On peut remarquer le lien établi ici entre la gloire de Dieu et le péché. J'ai rencontré au moins huit façons de rendre compte de cette connexion unique. Leon Morris écrit: « Les commentateurs tendent à importer leur propre compréhension dans ce texte ». J'ai ma suggestion personnelle. Le langage que Paul va employer est celui du sacrifice, qui nous oriente indubitablement vers la pensée de la croix. Or Jean, dans son Évangile, considère la mort de Christ—avec tout ce qu'elle a d'infamant—, comme une glorification! Voilà qui constitue pour les Juifs une pierre d'achoppement, et qui est une folie pour les païens: la gloire est que Dieu était en Christ pour réconcilier le monde avec lui-même, le Dieu juste était à l'œuvre pour obtenir la justice pour les coupables.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Ärzte stellen von Zeit zu Zeit falsche Diagnosen, die tragische Konsequenzen nach sich ziehen können. Auf Paulus trifft dies nicht zu! Er ist keineswegs übereilt in seinem Anliegen, uns zum Glauben an Christus zu führen, sondern legt zunächst eine solide und sichere Grundlage. Wir sollten von seinem Beispiel lernen.

Römer 3,21: 'nun aber . . .' Auf die furchtbare Bloßstellung unserer Niederträchtigkeit und Schuld vor Gott folgt der befreiende Aufruf 'nun aber . . .'. Christus ist gekommen! Das Kreuz ist der Wendepunkt der Menschheits geschichte. Die Worte 'nun aber . . .' implizieren ein zeitliches Geschehen, d.h. das Werk Christi ist eine historische Tatsache, nicht eine Theorie.

1. Das Evangelium ist theozentrisch.
Wir alle, die evangelikalen Gemeinden eingeschlossen, werden immer egozentrischer; es geht uns nicht mehr in erster Linie um die Ich-Gott-Beziehung, sondern nur noch um uns selbst. Paulus jedoch beginnt mit den Worten 'nun aber ist . . . die Gerechtigkeit Gottes offenbart'. Gott steht im Mittelpunkt; die Erlösung geht von ihm aus. Der griechische Text liest wörtlich 'die Gerechtigkeit Gottes' (Luther übersetzte dies mit 'die Gerechtigkeit, die vor Gott

gilt'). M. E. meint der Begriff beides, die göttliche Gerechtigkeit als Eigenschaft Gottes als auch die Gerechtigkeit, die, von Gott kommend, uns zugerechnet wird. Die Gerechtigkeit Gottes als göttliche Eigenschaft bezieht sich sowohl auf die 'iustitia passiva' als auch auf die 'iustitia activa' und verweist somit auf die Beziehungen innerhalb der Gottheit als auch auf Gottes Beziehung zu seinem Volk. Darüber hinaus jedoch wird der Begriff Gerechtigkeit auch in einem forensischen (juristischen) Sinne gebraucht. Paulus hatte aufgezeigt, daß wir vor dem göttlichen Richter schuldig sind—die gesamte Welt ist Gott verantwortlich. An dieser Stelle nun verweist Paulus auf einen Gott, der die Schuldigen freispricht. Obwohl die Erlösung eine trinitarische ist, ist sie doch auch zugleich theozentrisch.

2. Der Zweck des Gesetzes.
'Nun aber ist ohne Zutun des Gesetzes die Gerechtigkeit Gottes offenbart, bezeugt durch das Gesetz und die Propheten.' Mit dem Gesetz ist zunächst einmal das System des jüdischen Zeremonialgesetzes gemeint, wie wir es in den Schriften des AT finden. Calvin unterschied drei Anliegen des Gesetzes: erstens, von Sünde zu überführen, zweitens, die Nichtwiedergeborenen vor Sünde zu bewahren, und drittens, die Gläubigen über den Willen Gottes zu informieren. Diese Einsichten sind auch heute noch von Bedeutung, indem sie uns vor zwei Irrtümern bewahren können, nämlich den des Antinomismus einerseits sowie der Auffassung, wonach der erste Bund ein Bund der Werke war und als solcher versagt hat, andererseits. Beide Irrtümer vermögen nicht den bedeutendsten Zweck des Gesetzes zu erkennen, nämlich den, auf prophetische Weise auf die zukünftige Gnade in Christus hingewiesen zu haben. In Joh 1,16 heißt es wörtlich 'Gnade anstelle von Gnade' (charin anti charitos). Das Gesetz, richtig verstanden (einschließlich seiner prophetischen Funktion), war Gnade, und zwar eine durch das göttliche Gesetz vermittelte Gnade. Die größere Gnade aber, die durch Christus kam, ersetzte die Gnade des Gesetzes. Nur wenige Prediger von heute sind mit dem alttestamentlichen Verständniss des Gesetzes vertraut. Dies jedoch ist erforderlich, wenn wir Christus und sein Werk verstehen wollen.

3. Erlösung beinhaltet mehr als nur Vergebung.
So großartig und wunderbar die Botschaft von der Vergebung ist, das Kreuz verweist auf mehr noch, nämlich sowohl auf die Gerechtigkeit Gottes als auch auf die Gerechtigkeit, die, von Gott kommend, uns zugerechnet wird. Diese Botschaft ist eine Quelle der Ermutigung und Stärkung: unsere Beziehung zu Gott ist wiederhergestellt worden und unser Status vor ihm ist nun der von Männern und Frauen, die nicht nur angenommen, sondern willkommen geheißen und von Gott liebevoll in die Arme geschlossen worden sind.

4. Durch den Glauben an Christus gilt sie allen, die glauben.
Es ist notwendig, den Begriff 'Glauben' zu definieren, da er oft mißverstanden wird. M. E. vollzieht er sich in drei Schritten. Erstens ist Glaube ein Verstehen der Wahrheit, wie die in Eph. 4,17–24 verwendeten kognitiven Begriffe deutlich machen. Wir müssen bestimmte Fakten über Jesus Christus wissen, bevor wir glauben können. Zweitens bedeutet Glaube, sich dieser Wahrheit zu unterwerfen. Man erinnere sich, wie Saulus von Tarsus sich Christus unterwarf: 'wer bist du, Herr?' Drittens beinhaltet Glaube Vertrauen. Vertrauen bedeutet, sich ganz auf das Erbarmen und Mitleid Gottes in Christus zu werfen. Alle drei Stadien des Glaubens werden vom Heiligen Geist Gottes initiiert. Ohne ihn sind wir tot in unseren Sünden.

5. Sünde und die Herrlichkeit Gottes (V. 23).
Die Zeitform des Verbs 'ermangeln'

drückt aus, daß wir fortgesetzt der Herrlichkeit Gottes ermangeln. Auffallend ist hier die verblüffende und einzigartige Kombination von Herrlichkeit und Sünde, für die mir mindestens acht Erklärungen begegnet sind. Leon Morris bemerkt in diesem Zusammenhang, daß 'die Ausleger dazu tendieren, jeweils ihre eigene Bedeutung in die Passage hineinzulesen.' Ich möchte hier einen eigenen Vorschlag anbringen. Paulus wird im Anschluß an unsere Stelle Opferterminologie verwenden und uns unzweideutig zum Kreuz weisen. Johannes seinerseits in seinem Evangelium verstand den Tod Christi—all seiner Schande ungeachtet—als Herrlichkeit. Den Juden ein Ärgernis und den Heiden eine Torheit, besteht die Herrlichkeit darin, daß Gott in Christus die Welt mit sich versöhnt hat; der gerechte Gott handelte in Gerechtigkeit, somit Gerechtigkeit für die Ungerechten erwirkend.

I have a close friend who just two weeks ago received very bad news from his doctor. A young man with two sons still at school, for ten years he has been treated for an illness he didn't have—through a wrong diagnosis. The truth was he had a brain tumour which has now been discovered but which is now inoperable. How would you feel if your doctors made that kind of wrong diagnosis? Not so Paul. He has been demonstrating to us beyond any possible argument that we stand in the presence of the Judge of all the earth as guilty sinners, our mouths shut, all our words silenced, deserving nothing but eternal punishment. However, unlike my friend's doctors, Paul has exciting news of how we guilty sinners may be saved from condemnation!

Now I am speaking to you as one who has been in the pastoral ministry for over thirty years. I have become persuaded that too many preachers can be in too much of a hurry to bring people to the point of commitment to Jesus Christ. Any building is only as good as the foundation on which it is built. Likewise, we need a solid foundation when we are seeking to build the life of God in the souls of men and women. Paul has been preparing that foundation by cutting away those false ideas we have about ourselves until he is down to the bedrock of the reality of our condition in the sight of God.

Some of you may train those who are going to be preachers. Teach them to observe the apostle's method and to learn from it. Teach them to prepare the ground well and in their preaching to demonstrate from the Word of God that we are all accountable to God, and that we have no means of repaying our massive debt! Teach them to be thorough and to follow closely the great apostle's method.

Romans 3:21 begins: 'But now . . .' From that devastating verdict of our guilt before God, Paul turns to the passion of his life and work: *Jesus Christ has come.* Jesus Christ has lived and has died and his Cross is all Paul's boasting. He is now turning our minds to the meaning of the Cross and the work accomplished there. So with immense relief, having been broken by his exposure of our vileness before God we hear him cry, 'But now!' There is a shining hope! There is a way! The way of the Cross. The Cross is nothing less than the turning point in human history. 'But now!'There is another implication here which we should not miss. It is a point the apostle never tires of making in his exposition of the Gospel. He is implying in these two little words that what he is setting out is not some theory he has dreamed up. This is not a new philosophy, a new school of thought he is propounding. 'But now' means he is referring to historical fact. Jesus Christ has been born a Man, has lived and has died and been raised from the dead. The Cross stands as an historical event! We must not miss that implication of the temporal force of the words 'But now'.[1] So we come to the main burden of the verses for today.

1. The Gospel is theocentric

Recently I spent an evening with good friends who wanted to tell me about the

exciting things happening in their church. As I listened, my heart sank, as it became increasingly apparent to me that this lively congregation was wandering further and further away from the teaching of Scripture. As gently as I could, I suggested certain things they were saying were distorting and changing the meaning of the NT. They brushed my comments to one side and said, 'We don't bother about things like that. We're not purists like you!'

I can only speak for Scotland and Ireland, the two countries in which I have ministered. I have to say that thinking and worship and singing and preaching are becoming less and less theocentric. Instead of the 'I-Thou' relationship, we have the 'I-me' relationship: how *I* feel, whether *I* am comfortable with what's going on, whether it appeals to *me*, whether it suits *my* needs at this moment. Not so Paul's theology of the Cross! He begins, 'But now a righteousness from God . . . has been made known.' God is at the centre. Salvation begins with God. The Saviour is the Mediator between *God* and man. Christ brings us to *God*. It was God who so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son. And now, in the Cross of Christ, it is the righteousness of God which has been made known.

Think about this phrase translated in the NIV as 'a righteousness from God'. You will know that many of the commentators want to translate it as the NIV does, 'a righteousness *from* God', understanding the phrase here to refer to a righteousness God imputes to sinners. Personally, I prefer to understand this phrase with those commentators who read it as referring *both* to the attribute of God's righteousness, and then, on the grounds of that attribute, to the righteousness which he imputes to sinners.[2]

I don't want to enter into the debate that has been going on for some years now about the relationship of righteousness to law and whether here Paul is referring to the means of 'getting in' to the covenant (as E. P. Sanders has argued[3]). That is not my purpose. Rather I will restrict myself to a brief comment on the meaning of the word 'righteousness' which I understand Paul here uses with a dual connotation: first referring to *our relationship with God and his relationship with us*.

I hold that δικαιοσυνη is predominantly a term of relationships.[4] Our God is righteous towards himself and therefore in his activity is righteous. (We may distinguish these two as 'iustitia passiva' and 'iustitia activa'.) This means he is also righteous towards us his wayward creatures. On the one hand, in his righteousness he must deal justly and severely with the guilty. On the other hand, because of his righteousness, he has provided in his mercy—also an aspect of his righteousness—a righteousness which is available to the unrighteous! That is, he has provided us with the means by which unrighteousness can be put away so that we enter into a right *relationship* with him.

However, righteousness—complex concept that it is—has a second meaning for it cannot only be understood of restored relationships. It is also used in a legal sense in this passage of *our standing before a holy God*. Paul's argument requires it to be so. He has spoken of our guilt before the Judge—the whole world is accountable to God. Now he speaks of a God who acquits the guilty!

Salvation, then, is theocentric. Trinitarian, yes—how could it not be? But nonetheless, essentially theocentric. It is *God* with whom we have to do. It is *God* the first Person of the Trinity who initiates our salvation. The great theme of this whole discourse of Romans is 'the righteousness of God'. In our thinking, our writing, our preaching, our worship and praise, let us never forget that, and let us maintain this biblical emphasis of theocentricity.

2. The purpose of the law

Paul writes that 'the righteousness of God, apart from law, has been made known, to which the Law and Prophets testify'. We must first define law. I take it Paul uses the word in the sense of the whole Judaistic system of ceremonial

observances and worship laid down in the OT Scriptures, law therefore 'as commandment or as constraining to and producing works'.[5] This is clearly Paul's meaning, following as it does on his comments on law in the previous verse where he has stated that 'no one will be declared righteous by observing the law'. However Paul qualifies this comment by hastening to remind us the Law testified to this righteousness of God. It is necessary, therefore, to remind ourselves of the purpose of the Law.

According to Calvin, the Law had a threefold purpose. First, 'while it shows the righteousness alone acceptable to God, it warns, informs, convicts, and lastly condemns, every man of his own unrighteousness . . . The law is like a mirror. In it we contemplate our weakness, then the iniquity arising from this, and finally the curse coming from both. . . .' Thus it constrains us to seek for grace.

'The second function of the law is this: at least by fear of punishment to restrain certain men who are untouched by any care for what is just and right unless compelled by hearing the dire threats of the law.' The unregenerate need 'a bridle to restrain them from so slackening the reins on the lust of the flesh as to fall clean away from all pursuit of righteousness.'

'The third and principal use, which pertains more closely to the proper use of the law, finds its place among believers in whose hearts the Spirit of God already lives and reigns.' It will enable them to learn the nature of God's will for them and confirm their understanding of that will. It will also rouse them to obedience and draw them back from the slippery paths of transgression.[6]

Calvin gives us a good start in seeking to understand how the Law (and Prophets) testify to the righteousness of God. If we accept Calvin's comments then here is a powerful incentive to Christians to continue to study and to teach the Law. Men and women need it to warn, inform, convict, and condemn them. The profligate need it to restrain them. Believers need it to reveal the will of God to them.

Such insights into the purpose of the law are as important today as they have ever been on account of two common errors which are being widely taught in many churches. First we have a re-emergence of antinomianism so that in many pulpits a cavalier and uninformed attitude to the holy law of God is being conveyed to Christian people. The argument goes that because Christ is the end of the law[7] (and 'end' is understood solely as 'termination' and not as 'fulfilment'), the only remaining law is love—and of course, as with much erroneous teaching, there is an element of truth there. But without the restraints and clear teaching of the will and mind of God contained in the law, this law of love tends to have few boundaries and can lead to an acceptance of standards which are far removed from biblical teaching.

A second error is the teaching which says that the first covenant was a covenant of works intended to provide righteousness before God for those who kept it. However, that first means of righteousness failed, though apparently, in theory at least, it might have succeeded if only men and women had been more obedient. Its failure was why God sent his Son to make a second (and this time a successful) attempt to provide a means of attaining righteousness.

Not only are both strands of teaching woefully wrong, but both fail to grasp the purpose of the law. Both fail to recognise in what ways the law is still 'holy, righteous and good' (Rom. 7:12). Perhaps, however, the most serious flaw in such teaching is the failure to grasp the prophetic function of the law in pointing to the promised righteousness of God in Christ crucified and risen. It is to that prophetic aspect of the law that Paul is pointing us here—'to which the Law and the Prophets testify'.

The law fulfils a prophetic function in that it contains the promise of our redemption in Christ. The moral law can be taken as a portrait of Christ, for he fulfilled it perfectly. The ceremonial law is most certainly foreshadowing Christ through the whole sacrificial system and

the approach to God in the worship of the Tent of Meeting. Recall how Moses was instructed to make everything in the Tent of Meeting according to the divine instructions,[8] for all the gifts, sacrifices and worship offered in the earthly sanctuary were 'a copy and shadow of what is in heaven' (Heb. 8:5). Even the civil law holds the promise of the divine righteousness to be made available through Christ the King and Head of the Church, for when it was given the inescapable implication was that Israel was a theocracy ruled by God as King.

Our English NIV—probably one of the most widely used among Christian people in the English speaking world—has some passages which are unfortunate in their translation, to say the least. Perhaps the worst of these is in John 1:16: 'From the fullness of his grace we have all received one blessing after another.' It really does make the fullness of Christ's salvation sound rather like an American tele-evangelist's appeal. The Greek phrase '*charin anti charitos*' is literally 'a grace in place of a grace'. Because the law, rightly understood along with its prophetic function, was grace through the divine law. The greater grace that came by Christ replaced the grace of law.

So Calvin writes of the law and its sacrificial system: 'For what is more vain or absurd for men to offer a loathsome stench from the fat of cattle in order to reconcile themselves to God? Or to have recourse to the sprinkling of water and blood to cleanse away their filth? In short, the whole cultus of the law, taken literally and not as shadows and figures corresponding to the truth, will be utterly ridiculous. . . . God did not command sacrifices in order to busy his worshippers with earthly exercises. Rather he did so that he might lift their minds higher."[9]

My disappointment in my work among pastors and preachers is to find that over 90% of them know little or nothing of the law and therefore understand little or nothing of how the law bears witness to Christ. I am indebted to a godly mother who would spend at least an hour every Sunday afternoon in concentrated Bible Study with her children, taking us painstakingly through the books of Moses and faithfully relating them to the NT and especially to the Epistle to the Hebrews. How much richer and fuller my own reading and appreciation of the grace of God in Christ has been on account of that early training. So do not neglect your study of the Books of Moses. Remember that on the Emmaus road, the Risen Christ began with Moses to expound to Cleopas and his companion those things concerning himself. How I long for the reality of such exposition to be heard in our churches.

3. Salvation is more than forgiveness

We have in English a great classic on the Christian life, *The Pilgrim's Progress*, by John Bunyan. In it, he depicts the sinner under deep conviction, dressed in rags and with a huge burden on his back, slowly toiling his way up the hill called Calvary. At the top of the hill, Pilgrim reaches a Cross and he stands and gazes on the One hanging there in shame and suffering. As he comes to the realisation that this Jesus is there for him, his burden is suddenly loosed from his back and rolls down into the empty tomb and he sees it no more. Pilgrim cries, 'Blest Cross, blest sepulchre, blest rather be the Man who there was put to shame for me.'

Forgiveness! What a glorious message we have to proclaim, that guilty sinners, weighed down with the burden of their guilt, can be washed and made clean; that through the death of Christ God forgives not only past sins, but present and even future sins, for the effects of the Cross are not just retrospective but also prospective. So many of our hymns exult in this cleansing of the blood of Christ.

> There is a fountain filled with blood
> drawn from Emmanuel's veins,
> And sinners plunged beneath that flood
> lose all their guilty stains.

God's forgiveness is so remarkable that he does not even remember any longer the offences we have committed against him![10]

But there is more to our salvation than forgiveness, glorious and wonderful though that forgiveness is. And when preachers and evangelists expound salvation and the Cross only in terms of forgiveness, they are missing out an important and strengthening aspect of the Gospel. They are neglecting the righteousness of God and that imputed righteousness from God. Nor is this merely a matter of semantics, a splitting of hairs, the pursuit of minutiae. Here is an aspect of our salvation which is surely one of the most immense comforts and encouragements that any child of God can ever be offered.

Think of it. God in his righteousness confers his righteousness upon guilty sinners. The omnipotent, almighty, faithful, ever blessed, eternal God, before whom the heavenly creatures veil their faces and fall down in adoration and worship, this God acts on our behalf and in perfect righteousness declares that those who have faith in his Son are also righteous. Our relationship with him is restored and our status in his presence is that of men and women who are not merely accepted, but are welcomed and embraced. As we stand before the holy God, surrounded by that sea of crystal, not a trace of sin or deceit or rebellion or pride or uncleanness is reflected in it. We have our place eternally as sons and daughters of our heavenly Father.

4. Through faith in Jesus Christ to all who believe

There are many definitions of faith. As a young man, I listened to preachers trying to describe faith and I often found myself perplexed. Perhaps the most vivid memory I have in this connection is hearing Billy Graham, the American evangelist, describing faith in Christ as being like trusting your weight to a chair and sitting on it. Some years later, I came across Brunner's definition of faith which I found the most helpful I had come across to that point in my spiritual life.[11] However, I shall attempt a definition now which will also serve to make several points I regard as important for preaching in our day. My definition of faith sees it as consisting in three stages.

First, faith is an understanding of the truth. Recently I heard a radio broadcast service by a well-known British evangelical organisation. It was a wonderful opportunity to say something significant to the listening millions about the Cross of Christ and its meaning for sinners. But I was deeply disappointed in what I heard. As far as I can remember, the listeners were simply urged to say a prayer and promised they would find Jesus there to help and answer. Little or no truth of the Gospel, far less of Christ's death, was conveyed during the 40 minute broadcast. But yet, without some understanding of the Gospel, there cannot be any faith—at least not in the biblical sense of faith.

Let me illustrate this to you from the NT. In our first study, I pointed out that in Ephesians 4:17–24 Paul speaks about the condition of those outside of Christ. He then deals with the condition of those in Christ. I want you to notice how many words he uses which have a clear cognitive reference. He speaks in verse 17 about the futility of unbelievers' thinking. In verse 18, he goes on to say that they are darkened in their understanding and this is because of the ignorance that is in them. True, he covers more than the darkened state of their minds in those three verses, for he refers also to their hardness of heart, their separation from the life of God and the free rein which their passions have in rushing headlong further and further away from God. But we cannot fail to notice his clear references to darkened minds and ignorance of God.

In verses 20–21, the mood changes as he turns to those who are in Christ and he says this: 'You however did not come to know Christ that way. Surely you heard of him and were taught of him in accordance with the truth that is in Jesus.' Hearing implies listening to knowledge being imparted. Being 'taught' explicitly states that. What were they taught? 'The truth that is in Jesus.' Their faith had begun with knowledge of the Gospel being imparted to them.

The verb 'know' in verse 20 refers primarily to coming to know with the mind. Its reference is to learning as a disciple, a pupil, because an indispensable prerequisite of entering into that relationship is some knowledge of the truth.

The second stage of faith is submission to that truth. Recall how on the Damascus road, Saul of Tarsus was confronted by the risen Lord, who told him that he was finding it hard to kick against the goads. Saul knew much of the teaching of Christ and his death. The probability of his being a student in Jerusalem during Jesus' earthly ministry has been established.[12] He could well have listened to Jesus and the debates of his fellow Pharisees about this Nazarene. But though he undoubtedly had some knowledge of the truth, he was refusing to submit to it. He was desperately resisting it. Now Christ confronts him and he asks, 'Who are you, Lord?' 'Lord!'-that first admission of surrender to the imperious claims of Jesus Christ on his life. And then he obeys the instructions Christ gives him.

We have an English hymn which goes like this as it speaks eloquently of this surrender of faith:

> Make me a captive Lord, and then I shall be free;
> Force me to render up my sword, and I shall conqueror be.
> I sink in life's alarms when by myself I stand;
> Imprison me within Thine arms, and strong shall be my hand.[13]

The third stage of faith is trust. And by trust we mean a throwing of ourselves upon the mercy and compassion of God in Christ. We cast away every crutch on which we have leaned in our spiritual lameness and we rest all our weight on Christ alone. Again, we have so many hymns which express this so clearly:

> Other refuge have I none; hangs my helpless soul on Thee;
> Leave, ah! leave me not alone; still support and comfort me.
> All my trust on Thee is stayed; all my help from Thee I bring;
> Cover my defenceless head with the shadow of Thy wing.[14]

Of course, all three stages of faith are initiated and inspired by the Holy Spirit of God. It cannot be otherwise. Until he works within us, we are dead to God, resentful of his claims and even enemies and hostile towards him. The Spirit must therefore do his creative work in us, and it is a creative work as David says in Psalm 51:10, 'Create ("bara", ex nihilo) in me a pure heart, O God and renew a steadfast spirit within me.'

Those who win souls are wise. Alas, it seems not many of us have that wisdom. But surely the wisdom to win souls for Christ must come from some understanding of faith and the necessary components of faith which God asks us to establish in people as we co-operate with the Spirit in his work of grace in their lives.

5. Sin and the divine glory

We come to the final verse we consider this morning. It's a verse I learned as a child (along with Romans 6.23). 'For all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God.' There are two points we should notice about these words.

The first is that Paul uses the aorist when he says, 'all have sinned', clearly meaning that our sinful actions are in the past and are in a sense complete in earning us that awful verdict of guilty! However, his next verb is in the present tense and should be read with the sense, 'we are falling short of the glory of God', or 'we continue to fall short of the glory of God'.

The second point to notice here is the intriguing connection the apostle makes between our sin and the divine glory. As far as I can ascertain, such a connection is not made anywhere else in the NT. I have found at least eight suggestions in various commentators as to precisely what Paul here means by God's glory. Leon Morris writes: 'Commentators tend to read their own meaning into the passage.'[15] That being so, I am tempted to be so bold as to offer yet another suggestion as to why Paul should make this

connection between our sin and the divine glory.

Of course it is self-evident that since God is of purer eyes than to look on sin, we fall short of his radiant glory. That goes without saying. But remember that the apostle's great theme is the righteousness of God and that he is going to show how the righteous God has acted decisively to confer righteousness on guilty sinners through the Cross of Christ. The language he is about to use is the language of sacrifice and is pointing us unerringly to the Cross.

How did our Lord describe his shame and degradation when he was to hang in anguish in his darkest hour on that Cross? To our amazement and wonder, he described it as his glory! It was the moment when God would glorify him. At the last supper, as Judas took the bread and went out into the night, what did the Lord Jesus say? 'Now is the Son of Man glorified and God is glorified in him' (Jn. 13:31).[16] What is this we have, that glory shines from the blackness and horror of the Cross of Christ—to the Jews a stumbling-block and to the Gentiles foolishness? Surely the glory is that God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself, the righteous God acting in righteousness, providing a righteousness for the unrighteous. The divine glory is that in his righteousness he justifies the wicked![17]

And so with yet another of our hymn writers, we sing,

> And can it be that I should gain an interest
> in the Saviour's blood?
> Died He for me who caused His pain—for
> me, who Him to death pursued?
> Amazing love! How can it be that Thou
> my God shouldst die for me?

Notes

1 On the temporal force of 'νυνιδε', see C. E. B. Cranfield, *Romans*, ICC, T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1975, p. 199.

2 Many commentators take δικαιοσυνη θεου here as referring only to the righteousness which God confers on sinners through the death of Christ. So Luther (following Augustine), Robert Haldane, Wm. Hendricksen, D. M. Lloyd-Jones, Leon Morris, John Murray, *et al.* Understanding the phrase both as an essential attribute of God and, consequent upon that attribute, as the standing he confers through the death of Christ are Barth, C. K. Barrett, F. F. Bruce, Sanday & Headlam, *et al.* Note however that C. K. Barrett understands the righteousness which God confers upon sinners as essentially eschatological, Comm. *in loc.*

3 E. P. Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism*, SCM, London, 1977, p. 544. See also, *Paul, the Law and the Jewish People*, SCM, London, 1985. Also, N. T. Wright, *The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology*, T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1991.

4 Leon Morris argues 'righteousness' is essentially a forensic term: *The Apostolic Teaching of the Cross*, Tyndale Press, London, 1955, ch. 7; see also *The Epistle to the Romans*, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1988, Additional Note A, p. 100ff. For examples of those who hold 'righteousness' to be essentially (though not exclusively) a relational term, see: David Hill, *Greek Words and Hebrew Meanings*, CUP, 1967, p. 83; Alister McGrath, *Justification by Faith*, Marshall Pickering, Basingstoke, 1988, p. 24, and also his *Iustitia Dei*, CUP, 1986, Vol. 1, pp. 1–36ff.

5 John Murray, *The Epistle to the Romans*, Marshall, Morgan & Scott, London, 1967, p. 110.

6 Calvin, *Institutes*, 2.7.6–12.

7 Rom. 10:4

8 Heb. 8:5, cf. Exod. 25:40.

9 *Idem*, 2.7.1.

10 Jer. 31:34.

11 Emil Brunner, *Dogmatics*, Vol. III, pp. 162ff., etc.

12 See W. C. van Unnik, *Tarsus or Jerusalem: The City of Paul's Youth*, London 1962, quoted by J. Jeremias in *The Expository Times*, The Key to Pauline Theology, Vol. LXXVI No. 1, October 1964, p. 27.

13 George Matheson, 1842–1906.

14 Charles Wesley, 1707–88.

15 *Idem*, p. 177, Note 111.

16 See also, Jn. 1:14; 11:4; 12:23, 28; 13:32; 17:1,24 etc.

17 Rom. 4:5.

EuroJTh (1999) **8:1**, 23–36 0960–2720

• The Sacrifice of Jesus Christ: The Current Theological Situation
• *Le sacrifice de Jésus Christ: la situation théologique actuelle*
• *Das Opfer Jesu Christi: Eine aktuelle theologische Bestandsaufnahme*

Henri Blocher, Vaux-sur-Seine

RÉSUMÉ

Au début du XX^e siècle, la situation était assez simple: les évangéliques, dans toutes les dénominations, défendaient avec vigueur la proclamation de la Croix comme sacrifice expiatoire, comprise comme substitution pénale (dans la ligne de Calvin et Warfield). Dans un contexte dogmatique et spirituel fort différent, les catholiques romains s'accordaient avec eux, sans en tirer les mêmes conséquences. Les libéraux s'opposaient avec véhémence.

La réaction antilibérale (Barth, Brunner) a remis en honneur le langage pénal et substitutif, mais sans véritable retour à la doctrine. Les tendances théologiques plus récentes se sont, au contraire, éloignées des positions évangéliques orthodoxes (sauf une aile plus positive en Allemagne, avec des biblistes comme M. Hengel ou P. Stuhlmacher, et l'évolution de W. Pannenberg). Les théologies de la libération, en particulier féministe, les dénoncent brutalement. Les catholiques (le jésuite B. Sesboüé serait représentatif) semblent avoir tous abandonné le schème pénal. Aux marges du mouvement évangélique, quelques-uns s'en détournent et reprennent nombre des critiques libérales classiques (celles, déjà, de Faust Socin); en témoigne l'ouvrage collectif, sous la direction de John Goldingay, Atonement Today, *Londres, S.P.C.K., 1995.*

Le motif principal, chez ceux qui rejettent l'expiation substitutive, ressort clairement: elle paraît inadmissible à la sensibilité contemporaine, elle n'appartient pas au « croyable disponible ». L'argument principal met en avant la nature métaphorique *du langage biblique correspondant et la pluralité, plus ou moins divergente, des schèmes de représentation—double relativisation. On note aussi l'importance stratégique de* disjonctions *qui jouent le rôle de présupposés, comme celle du juridique et du relationnel.*

L'article analyse les facteurs culturels qui jouent contre la doctrine évangélique traditionnelle, y compris la diffusion des « herméneutiques du soupçon ». Puis il examine les arguments eux-mêmes, en esquissant une thèse sur le langage métaphorique qui revalorise la portée cognitive et l'intention explicative-systématique des représentations bibliques. Il démasque le caractère arbitraire de plusieurs disjonctions dont on se sert contre l'idée de substitution pénale; il cite des textes probants sur l'union intime et indissociable de notions qu'on veut opposer. Il conclut donc à la nécessité, à partir de l'exégèse et de la réflexion théologique, de maintenir la doctrine en cause, non sans tenir compte, pour la manière *pédagogique et apologétique, des dispositions contraires dans l'esprit de nos contemporains.*

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts war die Situation denkbar einfach: die Protestanten aller Denominationen verteidigten mit aller Kraft die Verkündigung des Kreuzes als Sühnopfer, verstanden als stellvertretende Strafe (im Sinne von Calvin und Warfield). Vor einem dogmatisch und geistlich vollkommen andersartigen Hintergrund stimmten die Katholiken mit ihnen überein, ohne allerdings dieselben Konsequenzen daraus zu ziehen. Die Liberalen hingegen widersetzten sich vehement.

*Die antiliberale Reaktion (Barth, Brunner) hielt die Sprache von Strafe und Stellvertretung in Ehre, ohne jedoch wirklich zur damit verbundenen Lehre zurückzukehren. Die neueren theologischen Richtungen haben sich dagegen von den orthodoxen evangelischen Positionen entfernt (abgesehen von einem positiveren Flügel in Deutschland, der Bibelwissenschaftler wie M. Hengel oder P. Stuhlmacher sowie die Weiterentwicklung W. Pannenbergs umfaßt). Von den Befreiungstheologien, vor allem der feministischen, werden sie erbarmungslos denunziert. Die Katholiken (der Jesuit B. Sesboüe sei hierfür stellvertretend genannt) scheinen das Strafmodell vollständig aufgegeben zu haben. Am Rande der evangelischen Bewegung schwenken einige um und akzeptieren eine Reihe der klassischen liberalen Kritiken (wie sie bereits von Fausto Sozzini vertreten worden waren). Als Beleg dafür das sei kollektive Werk unter der Leitung von John Goldingay (*Atonement Today, *London, SPCK, 1995) genannt.*

Das Hauptmotiv derjenigen, die die stellvertretende Sühne ablehnen, ist eindeutig: sie erscheint ihnen unvereinbar mit der zeitgenössischen Sensibilität, sie gehört nicht zu dem, was als glaubhaft gelten kann. Das Hauptargument betrifft die metaphorische Natur der biblischen Sprache sowie die Vielfalt der mehr oder weniger stark voneinander abweichenden Darstellungen. Der biblische Befund erfährt somit eine doppelte Relativierung. Zudem fällt die strategische Bedeutung der Aufspaltung, z.B. in einen juristischen und einen relationalen Aspekt, auf, der eine Rolle als Prämisse zukommt.

Der Artikel analysiert die kulturellen Faktoren, die der traditionellen evangelischen Lehre entgegenwirken, wie z.B. die Ausbreitung der 'Hermeneutiken des Verdachts'. Außerdem untersucht er die Argumente an sich, indem er eine Theorie der metaphorischen Sprache entwirft, die die kognitive Tragweite und erläuternd-systematische Absicht der biblischen Darstellungen würdigt. Er entlarvt den willkürlichen Charakter der vielfältigen Aufspaltungen, derer man sich in Auseinandersetzung mit der Idee der stellvertretenden Strafe bedient. Er zitiert beweiskräftige Texte über die verbürgte und untrennbare Einheit der Begriffe, der man sich widersetzen will. Er betont abschließend die aus Exegese und theologischer Reflexion sich ergebende Notwendigkeit, die hier behandelte Lehre aufrechtzuerhalten, wobei jedoch abweichende Sichtweisen des zeitgenössischen Geistes aus pädagogischen und apologetischen Gründen berücksichtigt werden sollten.

'Is it any wonder that there is so much abuse in the modern society when the predominant image of the culture is of "divine child abuse"—God the Father demanding and carrying out the suffering death of his own son? If Christianity is to be liberating for the oppressed, it must itself be liberated from this theology. We must do away with the atonement, this idea of a blood sin upon the whole human race which can be washed away only by the blood of the lamb.'[1] Such an explicit evaluation of traditional doctrine, by two representative feminist theologians, not

only unveils one side of the current theological situation but also suggests the *stakes* of our debates: between those who view Jesus' death on the cross as an expiatory sacrifice on our behalf and in our stead (and often cherish this doctrine as the dearest truth of their faith) and those who judge the same to be the most offensive and damaging of all fantasies of sick minds, mild compromises will not do. In every epoch, however, one can find many 'seekers of *h^{a}lāqôth*' . . .

Our survey makes no claim of being exhaustive. We shall draw a rough picture of main tendencies, without rehearsing and documenting in detail the variety of opinions. But we shall try to analyze the arguments, and the factors at work, while focusing on theologians who are nearest to us—acknowledged brothers and sisters in the fellowship of the Gospel—and, yet, have moved to the other side of the great divide. We shall then sketch a possible reply.

Of roots and moves and countermoves

Seen from afar, at least, the situation at the beginning of the XXth century looked fairly simple. Evangelicals, in all denominations, were strongly attached to the proclamation of the cross as the atoning sacrifice, understood as penal substitution; they were heirs to the Reformers, especially Calvin, and to the further elaboration by orthodox divines, whose work Revival movements had taken over; Benjamin B. Warfield (1851–1921) was offering masterly contributions in defence of the doctrine (collected in *The Person and Work of Christ*). Roman Catholics, almost unanimously, would also teach the same interpretation of Christ's death, which Bossuet had preached with powerful eloquence; they would not draw the same conclusions as Protestants, they would relax the *ephapax* to allow for the sacramental 'repetition' of the sacrifice in Holy Mass and for the extension of meritorious satisfaction to the sufferings of the faithful, but they would maintain expiation by the blood of the Lamb; as late as 1938 the *Supplément au Dictionnaire de la Bible* published a learned synthesis of that stripe by the biblical scholar A. Médebielle.[2] Liberal Protestants or Anglicans already felt outraged at the doctrine and complained about a 'blood' theology, in their eyes an ugly relic of primitive stages in man's religious evolution. The British scene, only, had staged attempts at a refashioned orthodoxy, with R. W. Dale (who simply refurbished Grotius' 'rectoral' theory), J. McLeod Campbell (vicarious confession), R. C. Moberly (vicarious repentance), and, most vigorous of all, P. T. Forsyth (the justification of God).

The vehement reaction against liberal optimism in the 'theology of crisis' brought back penal substitutionary language among mainline Protestants. Noteworthy were Emil Brunner's *The Mediator* and, later, Karl Barth's volume IV/1 of the *Church Dogmatics*; however, Barth's discourse of 'the Judge judged in our stead' made it clear that it meant no return to the orthodox theory—closer scrutiny shows it is a matter of Jesus Christ being the man we cannot be and not any satisfaction of justice[3]; Brunner's *Dogmatics* (vol. II) also revealed the chasm that yawns between his positions and, say, Warfield's. Other leaders of theological thought were even farther removed from the latter. Gustav Aulen branded the same under the name of the 'Latin theory' and claimed the polemic scheme, *Christus Victor*, as the 'classical' doctrine. Bultmann had lucidly perceived that the NT interpretation of the cross 'combines representations of sacrifice and a juridical theory of satisfaction'[4] but he would retain nothing of this mythological husk of the true message—a false scandal that hinders the working of the true scandal of the cross. Some biblical scholars, with a more conservative approach to biblical trustworthiness, still clung to Isaiah 53 as a witness to atonement by vicarious punishment; one may name Oscar Cullmann and Joachim Jeremias.

The following generations, down to the present, have not flocked back to the sacrificial fold. Liberationist theologies,

including feminist ones, have tended to distrust the model of sacrificial expiation and even to charge it with 'people's opium' effects: it induces submissiveness and resignation among the oppressed, whom they call to take arms and fight for freedom; in any case, these theologies show heavy preference for exemplary models in Christology and soteriology. More philosophically inclined trends (with the influence of Paul Ricœur weighing on many[5]) look in Scripture for a network of symbols, a set of figures to use as a grid for interpreting human existence and make the world a 'live-able' dwelling-place. Even moderates prefer to keep away from the old doctrine of sacrifice[6]. Jürgen Moltmann has rejected the sacrificial understanding of Jesus' death, with the argument that the victim of sacrifice does not rise again to life; however, his opposition, as he aims irenically at the widest possible ecumenical embrace, has grown less vocal recently[7]. Wolfhart Pannenberg could not be claimed for the orthodox position at the time of his *Grundzüge der Christologie*: despite strong statements (he confessed proximity to Barth), he rejected satisfaction, against Melanchthon and Calvin,[8] and argued that Jesus really broke the Law—with an interpretation of Galatians 3.13 strangely involved[9]. But he too has come much closer to traditional Evangelical tenets; his section entitled *Expiation as Vicarious Penal Suffering* appears to confess them now: he tells of the 'change of place between the innocent and the guilty' and he comments: 'This vicarious penal suffering, which is rightly described as the vicarious suffering of the wrath of God at sin, rests on the fellowship that Jesus Christ accepted with us as sinners and with our fate as such. This link is the basis on which the death of Jesus can count as expiation for us.'[10] Germany may be the only area today where a number of noted biblical-*critical* scholars, such as Martin Hengel or Peter Stuhlmacher,[11] clearly defend penal substitution.

On the Roman Catholic side, a gradual but spectacular reversal has taken place. Although the new universal Catechism does retain biblical and traditional language, 'Through his obedience unto death, Jesus fulfilled the substitution of the Suffering Servant who "offers his life as a *sacrifice of expiation*" "while he was bearing the sin of multitudes" "whom he justifies in taking upon himself their offenses" (Is. 53.10–12). Jesus made reparation for our offences and satisfaction to the Father for our sins' (no. 615, cf. 623; the penal dimension is not spelled out, cf. no. 1008f), one could hardly find today a single theologian of renown and influence who would uphold the doctrine of penal substitution[12]. Scholars were convinced by renewed patristic and medieval studies that it is not essential to Catholic faith; a more mystical mood and Teilhard's influence worked together (Teilhard de Chardin had a violent distaste of juristic ways of thought); the 'anthropological turn' (and the influence of Anthropology) re-inforced the trend. One can point to the work of systematic theologians like Gustave Martelet[13] and Bernard Sesboüé,[14] and to symposia like *Mort pour nos péchés*[15] and *Le Sacrifice dans les religions*.[16] Catholic writers emphasize sacrifice but without any penal implication, as homage and thanksgiving (*tôdâh*), consecration of life, and, more technically, as 'symbolic exchange' with a subversion of the relationship between gift and counter-gift in *Christian sacrifice*.[17] They put forward the 'initiation scheme', death as the door to life, according to the grain of wheat parable (Jn. 12.24).[18]

One may observe a renewal of interest in the adventurous ideas of the French scholar (in the U.S.) René Girard.[19] Though his theses met with a distinct disdain on the part of specialists, many have found space to discuss them—an indication of influence.[20]

In the meanwhile, Evangelical theologians have strengthened the case for the Calvinian and Warfieldian view, especially in its biblical foundations. The 'lion' in the academic jungle has been the Australian Anglican Leon Morris, whose several contributions on the topic, since *The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross* are

an invaluable treasure. Among exegetes, one should mention too I. Howard Marshall (*The Work of Christ*, 1969; *Jesus the Saviour*, 1990) and our colleague Samuel Bénétreau.[21] Systematic theologians include G. C. Berkouwer, who stood firm on *The Work of Christ*, John Murray (*Redemption Accomplished and Applied*), Roger Nicole (who joined L. Morris against the watering down of 'propitiation' in C. H. Dodd's interpretation), and James I. Packer with his exceedingly fine lecture 'What Did the Cross Achieve? The Logic of Penal Substitution,' *Tyndale Bulletin* 25 (1974) 3–45. And, of course, we may not forget the preacher-exegete-systematician of the century: John R. W. Stott, and his *The Cross of Christ*.

On the edges, the left edges, however, of the Evangelical movement one may observe a growing uneasiness with that traditional hallmark of Evangelical faith. The most significant expression of a deep change in this respect seems to be the symposium held at St John's College, Nottingham, which generated the important book *Atonement Today*. All contributors sound anxious to distance themselves from expiation through substitutive punishment[22]. Their reasons for so doing deserve our closest scrutiny.

Arguments & strategies

The first consideration that is often put forward is the change in our cultural situation. Preaching penal substitution no longer makes 'living contact with real people and the real issues that concern them'; actually, we no longer preach it, but rather Moltmann's 'empathizing God.'[23] L.-M. Chauvet similarly stresses that the doctrine smacks of a masochistic piety, with a God who hampers life, who obeys a mercantile logic, who acts from the outside: these traits are uncongenial to our culture, they do not belong to 'what is available for belief.'[24] These thoughts already underlie earlier treatments.[25]

The main argument, then, stresses the *metaphorical* nature of the Scriptural language of sacrifice. It is found in almost every critic of the traditional doctrine of Evangelicals. *They*, reads the charge, are guilty of the 'sin' of reading 'that metaphor literally and merely personalistically [sic].'[26] Atonement theories have not respected the distance between the sacrificial and legal images and the reality of Jesus' death.[27] One should stress the symbolic status of that language.[28]

The force of the argument is 'multiplied' by the emphasis on plurality. The judicial imagery is only one among many, a fact that further relativizes its doctrinal import.[29] The other 'sin' according to Gunton's accusation is 'to treat one metaphor of atonement, the legal, in isolation from the others.'[30] The implication is that the various metaphorical models achieve no unity among themselves[31]: *divide et impera*!

Many critics will not even grant that the penal scheme is, at least, *one* valid model for approaching the mystery of our salvation. John Goldingay flatly denies that Isaiah 53.5–6 and 10–12 implies 'a punitive understanding of sacrifice.'[32] In sacrifices, he claims, no punishment is implied: 'By laying hands on the offering, the offerers identify with it and pass on to it not their guilt but their stain. The offering is then not vicariously punished but vicariously cleansed.'[33] Denial of the penal character of sacrificial death is very common (unlike Goldingay's opinion on Is. 53). Goldingay adds that it is 'questionable whether the Old Testament sees sacrifices as propitiating God's wrath,' and that 'the languages of atonement-propitiation-expiation and of anger do not come together.'[34]

When one considers method, one is struck by the role of disjunctive presuppositions. Stephen H. Travis starts off defining retribution as a 'penalty which is inflicted on the offender *from outside*, not intrinsically "built into" the acts to which it is attached.'[35] He considers that 'divine judgement is also expressed there [the end part of Deut] in non-retributive terms of God's "hiding his face". . .'[36] Even more decisively, he argues that wrath 'is not the retributive inflicting of punishment from outside,' as Romans 1.24,26,28 shows, and, therefore, 'as *hilastērion* Christ does

not suffer punishment from God and thereby avert his wrath.'[37] Similarly, C. Greene contrasts, as 'the best framework for understanding the cross,' on the one hand 'universal moral law or retributive justice,' and on the other 'eschatological crisis, judgement and transformation.'[38] Another common separation or opposition is the one made between 'legal imputation' and 'real and costly identification'[39]; (with singular reverence for divine decrees) Smail writes: Christ's 'solidarity with us in our sinfulness came about, not by some legal fiction or external divine decree, but by entering our sinful situation and taking upon himself our fallen humanity.'[40] A related disjunction, an all-pervasive one in *Atonement Today*, is the disjunction made between the legal or forensic and the 'relational.'[41] Michael Alsford, in his sympathetic treatment of post-modernism, insists that the 'normative mode of existence' is 'a relational one' and he promotes the word 'coadunacy' better to express it.[42] The antithesis of law and person leads to the major objection against penal expiation: sin, being a most personal thing, *cannot* be transferred. T. Smail is fully aware of the Socinian origin and modern-humanistic roots of that objection; yet he 'cannot but assent' to it.[43] As to the disjunction between love and justice, it is trite and hardly needs to be mentioned (though it is still operative).

Motives & factors

Before dealing with arguments, it may be helpful briefly to glance at the conditions and forces that have made the penal-sacrificial view, who once had such a powerful grip on consciences, so unbelievable and so unpalatable today.

The secular mindset seems to be the first and foremost factor. In a world which looks increasingly like a man-made world (for better and for worse), the sense of the Numinous loses its edge; the awe of the sacred, the fear of the Lord, mean almost nothing. God's only excuse, if he/she is allowed to exist, is his/her powerlessness before human free-will and his/her usefulness in providing me with fulfilment. Maybe he/she can represent the ideal of the self. The image of a wrath of God is utterly shocking! Paul Tillich's analysis of the forms of anxiety (*Angst*) is true to fact: whereas in the XVIth century, the dominant form was the dread of damnation, our modern anxiety (and even more post-modern anxiety, under the guise of fun) is that of meaninglessness. Penal substitution does not 'speak' to it.

One may add that the way our consumer society functions, with omnipresent advertisement (and mass production requires it), fosters hedonistic tendencies. The target of advertisement, the prospective customer, is seated upon the throne, to be propitiated in order that his/her pleasure may be the choice of this or that commodity. This affects even evangelism . . .

Social conditions encourage individualism, and so does the 'ground-motive' of humanistic thought. It is intertwined with the democratic (egalitarian) ideal. Both features contribute to the erosion of objective standards. 'The major difficulty in the context of secular Western culture,' Colin Greene discerns, 'is the almost complete dissolution of the framework of universal moral law. This constitutes part of the "crisis of modernity" (cf. Newbigin 1989).'[44] Moral law and judicial law, ultimately, stand or fall together. It is no surprise, therefore, if the rationale of judgment and penalty seem to decompose under our eyes. The whole judicial system undergoes a severe crisis, as Pierre Burney's analysis convincingly shows.[45] All this produces inimical reactions to the idea of objective guilt and guilt-transfer.

The brightest of our artists and thinkers, for generations and with increased efficacy in our media explosion, have rebelled against institutional norms, social and moral order (far more bitterly, on average, than the general public has done). From William Blake to Michel Foucault . . . We suggest that this stance was born of the *resentment* of gifted people as they have seen that power was and remains in other hands, whom they despise (in ancient times, they had to flatter the princes and the wealthy, just to get

their living; now it pays more to flatter the streak of rebelliousness in all individuals).

The effect of the younger sciences of human behaviour has been an important factor, especially as it provided the *hermeneutics of suspicion* with their tools. Sociology, mostly of the Marxist stripe, has unmasked under the 'superstructures' of Ethics, Religion, Law, the play of class interests—oppressors' weapons in the class struggle, to be denounced and destroyed. The Sociology of Knowledge has imbibed much of this spirit and currently exerts a strong influence. Psychology, and Freudian Psychoanalysis as the most luminous kind, has also dismantled the prestige of moral judgement and suggested a reduction to unconscious drives. Contrary to popular misconception, Freud never unloosed the lusts he discovered in the hidden depths of the *psuchè*; he realized their destructive potential; he maintained an ethic of reason and moderation; but the way his stated theory rooted in the Œdipus complex both Ethics and Religion did contribute to undermining the sense of objective guilt and of divine wrath (a rather obvious neurotic fantasy).

Answers & questions

Constraints of space and competence preclude any treatment of the cultural forces that 'blow' against older Christian orthodox convictions. We shall be content with pointing to a dazzling (enlightening) interpretation of Sociology of Knowledge approaches,[46] and to a vigorous demonstration that Freud's second period no longer deals with guilt as with a symptom to be dissolved in terms of unconscious mechanics but as an irreducible factor of human life, also a positive factor of personal growth and cultural progress.[47] Psychoanalytical efforts at deconstructing sacrifice in the Bible did not pass without an answer on their own ground.[48] If we sift 'hard' facts and rigorous reasoning from matters of taste and ideology, we observe that there is little of weight left against penal-sacrificial views of atonement.

Regarding the drift or change in public opinion and sensitivities, wisdom expresses itself through a complex attitude. On the one hand, we may not ignore the fact, neither in the choice of language, nor in the rythm of pedagogy; we should make contact with our neighbours at the place of their preoccupations (e.g. the anxiety of meaninglessness) and not force upon them schemes that are alien to them. Luke's discretion is a model here: though it is by no means absent from Luke-Acts, the sacrificial meaning of the death of Christ is diplomatically or pedagogically left in the background, since the work was aimed at a predominantly Gentile audience. On the other hand, we should be wary of letting the fact surrreptiously become the *norm*. Public opinion does not make truth (if we wish to avoid the quagmire of relativism). Pragmatic considerations should not shape the economy of faith. Christina Baxter puts her finger on the decisive point: 'Does salvation have to be *experienced* as salvation for it to be considered salvation? (. . .) There may be biblical warrant for arguing that it is not necessarily the case that we have to feel saved, or feel better, for salvation to have occurred.'[49] In other words, felt needs are not necessarily true needs, or the truest needs. Our contemporaries' concern is to find a gracious neighbour, no longer to find a gracious God, but they do need to find the gracious God on whose grace their eternal destiny still depends. This means that the category 'what is available for belief' induces treacherous thoughts; we should not receive it! And the question is: do our fellow-theologians who argue against penal substitution guard themselves enough on that side? The force of cultural winds should render us *the more* vigilant against the danger that they carry us away from biblical truth.

The topic of metaphors would deserve a full-scale treatment, which, unfortunately, we cannot offer here.[50] Although most current words still bear the mark of a metaphorical origin, it would be false, in our opinion, to make the essence of language only and exclusively metaphori-

cal. Metaphors presuppose a distance (*metapherein*) from a non-metaphorical use which must also have its place; nomination is first (cf. Gn. 2.19f) and there are *concepts* attached to linguistic signs.[51] This entails, we suggest, that metaphorical language (within the total linguistic web) knows a whole gamut of differentiated levels, with various degrees of cognitive relevance. It is not enough to say: metaphors! We should distinguish between occasional, 'live,' metaphors and regular, systematic, metaphors which may no longer be perceived as metaphors and come near to concept-status. We should acknowledge varying distances: some metaphors merely point to one item of likeness in two utterly foreign, unrelated, objects; others almost identify the two . . . We fail to see such preliminary reflections among those who deprive the legal and sacrificial metaphors of any precise cognitive import. They seem to imply that metaphors cannot yield determinate knowledge, or, else, they praise metaphors for giving what rational discourse cannot give—a typically romantic, irrationalistic, theme.[52]

The legal and sacrificial metaphors in Scripture have such a frequency and regularity, they constitute such a stable network, with predictable use, they are so *insistent*, that they may not be dealt with as 'mere' metaphors. The intimation that goes with them is that they convey some *intelligence* of the way the death of Jesus accomplished our salvation. Noteworthy is the fact that they are drawn from privileged realms, not from any realm in reality. Human judges are instituted, according to Scriptural views, as *'elôhîm*, as the representatives and delegates of God (Rm. 13.1ff; Ex. 21.6; 22.8f; Ps. 82, etc.); the sphere of law is intended to mirror God's dealings with men—indeed, not only to mirror but to be the instrument of *his* judgments (Rm. 13.4). It is an exercise of transcendence: the transcendent norm of justice applied to creatures who transcend earthly horizons, 'images of God.'[53] Metaphorical distance is greater with the animal sacrifices of Levitical law—and this easily disposes of Moltmann's objection that a sacrificial victim does not rise again (one cannot avoid *some* dissimilarity)[54]—but the whole system was designed by God to forecast Christ's atonement, as 'shadows' of the 'real thing' (*sôma*, Col. 2.17) in him. We may presume it is the source of eminently proper metaphors.

The charge that the classic Evangelical doctrine *isolates* the legal metaphor sounds strange indeed. We should say: on the contrary! The opponents isolate the various metaphorical strands and play them off against one another, to show that none of them should be taken literally. We strive to distinguish the main sets or 'cycles'—we count five of them, of sacrifice, punishment, ransom, victory and passover, with due attention paid to each specific angle and contribution—*and* to show how a unified picture emerges from them all.[55] Actually, we often find two of them, even three, in the same verses, and it is difficult to disentangle them (e.g. Rm. 3.24–26 mixes forensic language [just, justice, justify, leaving unpunished], ransom-language [redemption] and sacrificial language [means of propitiation, blood]). The phenomenon is easily explained when we realize how easily we can translate one 'language' into the other: the sacrificial term *kippēr* (atone, expiate) is related to the 'commercial' word *kôfer* (ransom), while Exodus 21.29f shows that in forensic situations the *kôfer* may be the penalty inflicted on the guilty party (in substitution for his life). The key-phrase *bearing the sin / offense*, which is not even discussed in the book *Atonement Today*, belongs both to the penal and to the sacrificial languages. It has the technical meaning of 'undergoing the penalty incurred' (Gn. 4.13; Ex. 28.43; Lv 5.1.17; 19.8; 22.9, etc.). It is prominent in Isaiah 53 where John Goldingay unexpectedly, but peremptorily, denies any thought of punishment; we consider J. Alec Motyer's commentary to be a sufficient refutation.[56]

Given the perfect unity of Ethics and Religion in biblical perspective, 'holiness' in cultic language will be translated 'righteousness, justice' in ethical-juristic

language. 'Uncleanness' similarly will be translated 'guilt' in moral-forensic categories. When J. Goldingay claims that offerers 'pass on to [the victim] not their guilt but their stain,'[57] we ask: what *is* the spiritual stain of sin if not their guilt before God? If the awful energy of the sacred strikes dead presumptuous mortals like Nadab, Abihu, or Uzzah (Lv. 10.2; 2 S 6.7, with the word wrath; cf. the axiom 'No one can see the Lord and live'), hence the need for priesthood and propitiatory sacrifice, the legal 'translation' is the demand that crime be punished, and justice satisfied. (The notion of satisfaction is biblical, expressed by the verb *rātsah*, Lv. 26.41,43, cf. Is. 40.2.) The other 'languages' do not diverge: the *Christus Victor* scheme depends on the forensic one as soon as one realizes that the Devil's weapon is *accusation*, that the satisfaction of justice deprives him of his hold (Rv. 12.10f); if one argues that the Passover sacrifice was no atonement, a ready answer is that Jews considered that the eschatological Passover would make expiation for sins. We are not *reducing* the variety of biblical representations but we affirm the *organic unity* of their whole field, with the penal-sacrificial understanding at the centre (so it is in apostolic explicitation): a firm basis for doctrine.

Critics of penal substitution do not appear to stress the metaphorical status of other languages that please them more: the language of friendship or of married intimacy is no less metaphorical than that of judgement! They often put forward metaphors that tell of the *effects* of Christ's work as if they were substitutes of expiation-language, such as 'liberation'; but they are not alternative ways of speaking; they are complementary, and shed no light on the *how* of the saving efficacy. Even more distressing, we notice a strong liking for vague language and rudimentary metaphors. Stephen Travis sums up the teaching of 2 Corinthians 5.21 in these terms: 'The essential point is that Christ has experienced the sinner's estrangement from God, he has absorbed and thereby taken away sin, so that we might be brought into a right relationship with God.'[58] Why 'experience' when Paul's says 'death' (v. 14f)? Why 'estrangement' when Paul thinks in terms of 'imputation' (*logizomenos*, v. 19)? Why that verb 'absorb' that suggests a material substance to be destroyed by physical or chemical means? How did Christ 'absorb' sin? How did that supposed 'absorption' cancel the spiritual reality of sin? It is striking that this crude metaphor occurs no fewer than seven times in *Atonement Today*.[59] And *it is not even biblical!*

Isaiah's Servant prophecy combines penal language and sacrificial terms ('he shall sprinkle,' 52.15, 'guilt-offering', *'āshām*, 53.10), but it does not mention God's wrath. Is it the case, as Goldingay, again, advances, that 'the languages of atonement-propitiation-expiation and of anger do not come together'[60]? It is approximately the case in Leviticus—with the exception of chapter 10 (the ritual protects from divine wrath, v. 6, and it implies bearing sin, making expiation, v. 17). But this may be due to literary genre. Not seldom, elsewhere in Scripture, do we find both languages coming indeed together in the same passages. Deuteronomy 32 combines the languages of wrath (v. 22), retribution (v. 35), vengeance (if we distinguish it from retribution, vv. 35,41ff) and expiation (*kippēr*, v. 43). Isaiah 27.7–9 evokes the severe *rûah* which led Israel into exile ('anger' belongs to the semantic field of *rûah*!) and it is closely linked to the expiation of iniquity and the removal of sin (v. 9); 34.2ff tells terribly of God's wrath (which is also a retributive action, v. 8) under the simile of sacrifice (v. 6). For Jeremiah 18.23, expiation is the thing that would avert God's anger. In Ps. 78.38, making expiation is also parallel to refraining from exercizing wrath. Two passages are very impressive: 2 Samuel 21 and 24; they similarly conclude that the Lord 'was entreated' (21.14 and 24.25), a term that implies propitiation; the Vulgate rendered *repropitiatus est Deus*. In the first case, it was through the infliction of the death penalty upon the guilty family (Saul's), the way for David to atone/expiate (21.3, *'akappēr*). In the second

case, God's wrath being mentioned (24.1), it was through the offering of sacrifices (burnt-offerings also have the expiatory role, Lv. 1.4). This is more than enough to prove the connection between wrath and atonement in biblical thought. The same data expose the inadequacy of the view of sacrifice which several, especially Roman Catholic, theologians would prefer, that of life being born of death. It is based on a projection of alien ideas into the Bible. C. S. Lewis wrote of his experience: 'I myself, who first seriously read the New Testament when I was, imaginatively and poetically, all agog for the Death and Rebirth pattern and anxious to meet a corn-king, was chilled and puzzled by the almost total absence of such ideas in the Christian documents.'[61]

Other disjunctions fare little better under biblical scrutiny. There is no need to oppose retribution and the consequences that a man reaps from his evil acts. When the latter is stressed, it is not rare that the thought of retribution be also present. Galatians 6.7 states the law of harvest, but it means that 'God is not mocked'—it is not a matter of mere immanent causality. We shall receive back the things done through the body (literally, 2 Co. 5.10), but at Christ's judgment-seat. Those who perish by their own corruption (in their own *phthora*, 2 P 2.12b.13a) receive the retribution (*misthon*) of their injustice. Those who debase their own bodies in the practice of homosexuality receive the retribution (*antimisthian*) of their sinful choices (Rm. 1.27). Defining retribution as inflicted 'from the outside' disregards the fact that the biblical God is not simply and merely 'outside.' He who fills heaven and earth works through the processes of nature, which are never independent of his free and righteous decrees.

Stephen Travis, as we have seen, also creates an opposition between wrath and retribution.[62] He refers to Romans 1.24,26,28, 'God gave them up . . .' He does not notice, however, *the antimisthian* of v. 27 (which we just quoted), and he does not read on to chapter 2! In Romans 2.5 the day of wrath is the day of judgement (*dikaiokrisias*), further defined in v. 6 as retribution (NEB: 'He will pay every man . . .'); 12.19 is equally clear: God's wrath (whose agents, to bring punishment, magistrates are to be seen, 13.4.) is explained as retribution (Vg: *ego retribuam*). The same association is found in the OT: Isaiah 34.2ff,8, already cited, 35.4 and 66.6.15f (Vg: *reddentis retributionem*); in Jeremiah 51.45 (*ira furoris*), 56 (*ultor, reddens retribuet*). Scripture plainly 'translates' numinous wrath as just retribution. Regarding deeper philosophical deconstructions of the retributive principle, we may simply refer to our brief and critical analysis of Ricœur's attempt.[63]

The foregoing examples warn us against accepting criticisms which belong to the system of thought as the disjunctions we have found wanting in biblical legitimacy. The basic antinomy between the legal and the personal is also radically foreign to Scripture: there is nothing more personal than in-law relationships—marriage itself is first of all a legal reality (and the notion of *persona* is first juridical). The lack of this perception leads one to ignore the classical distinction between *reatus culpœ* and *reatus pœnœ* (to use the commonest phrases, which were introduced by Peter Lombard, although they are open to criticism), the key to the issue of guilt-transfer. No distance may be created between the idea of transfer and that of substitution, abundantly witnessed to in Scripture: they are two sides of the same coin. When Tom Smail asks (rather movingly), as he rejects the transfer of our guilt upon Christ: 'Am I just conniving with the Socinians in the individualistic prejudices of the culture to which we both belong . . .?'[64] we are bound to answer him: 'Yes, brother, exactly so!'

Further exposition of the grounds and justifications of the classical Evangelical view would include the radical questions other theories do *not* answer. But tackling these questions would exceed the bounds of this paper. A quotation from another reader of *Atonement Today* will provide us with a sufficient summary and a fitting conclusion: '. . . Once we move out of relationships of mutual love and trust, inevitably the issue of obligations, and

the sanctions that go with the neglect of them, must arise. In other words the relationship necessarily takes on a legal, and therefore penal, character. (. . .) Indeed without this, the wrath of God loses its moral content, and could take on the character of mere petulance. If we may not think of the Cross as dealing with that penal dimension, then it is unresolved; we are forgiven, cleansed, accepted, loved, but *still liable*.'[65]

Thanks be to God—who delivers us from all such liability, from all condemnation, through Jesus Christ our Lord!

Notes

1 Joanne Carlson Brown & Rebecca Parker, 'For God So Loved the World,' in *Christianity, Patriarchy, and Abuse: A Feminist Critique*, ed. Joanne Carlson Brown & Carole R. Bohn (New York: Pilgrim, 1989) 26, as quoted by Charles B. Cousar, 'Paul and the Death of Jesus,' *Interpretation*, 52 (1998) 39.

2 Art. 'Expiation', *Supplément au Dictionnaire de la Bible*, vol. III, ed. Louis Pirot (Paris: Letouzey & Ané, 1938) 1–262.

3 Barth expressly disowns the traditional understanding of Evangelicals in *Dogmatique*, IV/1*, trans. Fernand Ryser (Geneva: Labor & Fides, 1966) 267 (§ 59/2.2; p. 253 in the *Church Dogmatics*, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley), cf. 268 ('not by undergoing our punishment as such'), 290 (no satisfaction in the orthodox sense). His summary: 'Because he is God, he [Christ] acts in his omnipotence in order to be in our stead and for our benefit the man whom we are not' is found p. 12 (§ 57/1.6); salvation is defined on p. 7 (§ 57/1.3) as the perfection of being, the participation in the being of God. The ontological meaning of Barth's judicial language surfaces when he deals with sin as *das Nichtige*, when he claims that, in the person of Christ, both sinner and sin are destroyed, annihilated, destined to non-being. The (dialectical) substitution in being entails also the theme of vicarious repentance and confession (p. 273; § 59/2.4).

4 In his famous lecture 'Neues Testament und Mythologie,' trans. Odette Laffoucrière, *L'Interprétation du Nouveau Testament* (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1955) 174.

5 Ricœur mainly unfolds and argues his antipathy towards the orthodox doctrine of sacrifice in 'Démythiser l'accusation' and 'Interprétation du mythe de la peine,' *Le Conflit des interprétations. Essais d'herméneutique* (Paris: Seuil, 1969) 330–347 and 348–362. But see also his comments on divine wrath, 'Sur le tragique,' Lectures 3. *Aux frontières de la philosophie* (Paris: Cerf, 1992) 197 (with n. 1).

6 As a recent issue of *Interpretation* 52/1 (Jan. 1998), 'Atonement and Scripture,' evidences; Joel B. Green's brilliant contribution, 'The Death of Jesus and the Ways of God. Jesus and the Gospels on Messianic Status and Shameful Suffering,' 24–37, is careful not to discard penal substitution but it avoids squarely affirming it either.

7 In 'The Passion of Christ and the suffering of God,' *Asbury Theological Journal* 48 (1993) 26, Moltmann writes: 'God transforms human sin into his suffering by "carrying" human sin . . . Christ is not only the Brother of the victims but also the expiation for the culprits,' as quoted by John G. Kelly, 'The Cross, the Church, and the Jewish People,' in *Atonement Today*, ed. John Goldingay (London: SPCK, 1995) 183. The last statement strongly suggests sacrificial penal substitution but the context (to which we had no access) may qualify or correct that impression.

8 *Esquisse d'une christologie*, trans. A. Liefooghe (Paris: Cerf, 1971) 355 (356 near to Barth).

9 *Ibid.*, 321ff.

10 *Systematic Theology*, II, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans/ Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1994) 427.

11 We may mention the French translation of his art. 'Pourquoi Jésus a-t-il dû mourir?', trans. B. Bolay, S. & S. Carrel, *Hokhma* 40 (1989) 17–36.

12 The only partial exception we have found is Roch Kereszty (not very famous), 'Toward a Contemporary Christology,' ed. Jonathan Leach, in *Crisis in Christology: Essays in Quest of Resolution*, ed. William R. Farmer (Livonia, Mich.: Truth/Dove Booksellers, 1995) 340ff, who insists on the connection between sin and punishment, and substitution in sacrifice, but falls back on solidarity and example (344–6).

13 See, e.g., his *Libre Réponse à un scandale. La faute originelle, la souffrance et la mort* (Paris: Cerf, 1986) esp. 160n. Martelet is avowedly anti-Augustinian, in the name of Irenæus.

14 *Jésus-Christ, l'unique Médiateur. Essai sur la rédemption et le salut* (Paris: Desclée, 1988).
15 Xavier Léon-Dufour *et al., Mort pour nos péchés. Recherche pluridisciplinaire sur la signification rédemptrice de la mort du Christ* (Brussels: Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, 1976).
16 Marcel Neusch, ed., *Le Sacrifice dans les religions* (Institut de Science et de Théologie des Religions; Paris: Beauchesne, 1994).
17 In *ibid.*, see Marcel Neusch, 'Une conception chrétienne du sacrifice. Le modèle de saint Augustin,' 117ff, and Louis-Marie Chauvet, 'Le Sacrifice comme échange symbolique,' 277–304.
18 In *ibid.*, Chauvet, 'Le Sacrifice en christianisme. Une notion ambiguë,' 147 (referring to A. Vergote) and 'Le Sacrifice comme échange symbolique,' 289.
19 See *Ichthus* no. 90 (March 1980) with the art. by Gérard Kuntz, 'René Girard, Des choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde: Une relecture de la Bible,' 2–5 and our 'Christ, agneau de Dieu: La mort de Jésus selon René Girard et selon le Nouveau Testament,' 6–10 (bibliog. in notes).
20 Pierre Gisel, 'Du sacrifice. L'avènement de la personne face à la peur de la vie et à la fascination de la mort,' *Foi & Vie* 83/4 (July 1984) 32–37; Christophe Desplanque, 'Pourquoi Jésus a-t-il dû mourir? La réponse de René Girard,' *Hokhma* no. 39 (1988) 48–62; Marcel Neusch, 'Une conception . . ., *op. cit.*, 135ff; John Goldingay, "Old Testament Sacrifice and the Death of Christ," in *Atonement Today*, *op. cit.*, 15ff; Christoph Schroeder, "Standing in the Breach." Turning Away the Wrath of God,' *Interpretation* 52 (1998) 17f.
21 Before he wrote his two-volume commentary on Hebrews, he penned an important 'La Mort du Christ selon l'épître aux Hébreux,' *Hokhma* no. 39 (1988) 25–47.
22 With the exception of Christina A. Baxter, whose highly competent treatment of historical issues is exceptionally independent and fair (we deplore a weakness on punishment towards the end of her 'The Cursed Beloved: A Reconsideration of Penal Substitution,' 70f, where the danger of a confusing mixture of retribution, retaliation, reparation or restitution lies too near for us to rest in peace). Christopher Cocksworth, 'The Cross, Our Worship and Our Living,' 111–147, hardly touches the most sensitive issues; he offers fine comments on Hebrews.
23 Tom Smail, 'Can One Man Die for the People?,' in *Atonement Today*, *op. cit.*, 75; in his foreword, J. Goldingay indicates that T. Smail's reaction prompted the convening of the symposium (p. xi). John Goldingay had formerly pushed forward the same argument in his 'Expounding the New Testament,' in New Testament Interpretation. *Essays on Principles and Methods*, ed. I. Howard Marshall (Exeter: Paternoster/Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977) 358f.
24 Chauvet, 'Le Sacrifice en christianisme . . .,' *op. cit.*, 139. The last phrase is 'croyable disponible,' it was coined by Ricœur.
25 See the issue of *Lumière & Vie* 20/101 (Jan.-March 1971), 'La Mort du Christ.'
26 Colin Gunton, as quoted (approvingly) by Colin Greene, 'Is the Message of the Cross Good News for the Twentieth Century?' in *Atonement Today*, *op. cit.*, 231.
27 Charles B. Cousar, 'Paul and the Death of Jesus,' *op. cit.*, 42 (together with reassuring words about the value of metaphors.
28 Chauvet, 'Le "Sacrifice" en christianisme,' *op. cit.*, 145f, 148.
29 E.g., Sally Alsford, 'Sin and Atonement in Feminist Perspective,' in *Atonement Today*, *op. cit.*, 162.
30 Gunton, as quoted by Greene, *op. cit.*, 231.
31 We dealt with that proposition, as found in R. W. Dale, E. Brunner, St. Lyonnet in our *La Doctrine du péché et de la rédemption* (Vaux-sur-Seine: Edifac, 1997^2) I,143–145.
32 Goldingay, 'OT Sacrifice . . .,' *op. cit.*, 8.
33 *Ibid.*, 10.
34 'Your Iniquities Have Made a Separation between You and Your God,' in *Atonement Today*, *op. cit.*, 50.
35 'Christ as Bearer of Divine Judgement in Paul's Thought about the Atonement,' in *ibid.*, 22.
36 *Ibid.*, 25.
37 *Ibid.*, 28f.
38 *Op. cit.*, 237.
39 Tom Smail, *op. cit.*, 81.
40 *Ibid.*, 81f.
41 Tom Smail, *op. cit.*, 89, quoting Gunton to the same effect. Cf. Goldingay, 'OT Sacrifice . . .,' 6.
42 'The Atonement and the Post-Modern Deconstruction of the Self,' in *Atonement Today*, *op. cit.*, 214. On the same page, he stresses, after Levinas, the need immediately to 'unsay' what is being said; however we fail to see him intent upon

unsaying his statements on relationality/coadunacy.

43 *Op. cit.*, 77f, cf. 85 'absolutely unthinkable.' The Socinian flavour of the whole position is undisputable; the Socinians had anticipated most of the arguments; cf. Jean-Pierre Osier, *Faust Socin ou le christianisme sans sacrifice* (Paris: Cerf, 1996) 53–99.

44 *Op. cit.*, 228.

45 'La Théologie et l'évolution sociale: rédemption, damnation et justice,' *Lumière & Vie* 20/101 (Jan.–March 1971) 60–77.

46 Craig M. Gay, 'The Sociology of Knowledge and the Art of Suspicion (A Sociological Interpretation of Interpretation),' in *The Act of Bible Reading. A Multi-disciplinary Approach to Biblical Interpretation*, ed. Elmer Dyck (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity P., 1996) 88–113.

47 Jacques Gagey, *Freud et le christianisme. Existence chrétienne et pratique de l'inconscient* (Paris: Desclée, 1982). On the primal murder, also Jacques Gagey's interview by Jacky Rigaux, 'Religion: Au risque de la psychanalyse,' *Le Journal des Psychologues* no. 87 (May 1991) 14–18. Cf. also (no reference to Gagey), Bernard Locoge, 'Psychanalyse et substitution sacrificielle. Quels apports, quelles limites?' *Hokhma* no. 39 (1988) 63–82.

48 We are thinking of Marie Balmary, *Le Sacrifice interdit. Freud et la Bible* (Paris: Grasset & Fasquelle, 1986), with Dominique Stein's reply, 'Une lecture psychanalytique de la Bible, "le sacrifice interdit" de Marie Balmary,' *Lumière & Vie* 39/198 (October 1990), 'Bible et psychanalyse. Fragments,' 47–61.

49 'Jesus the Man and Women's Salvation,' in *Atonement Today*, *op. cit.*, 135.

50 We made a few remarks (altogether too brief) in our *Original Sin. Illuminating the Riddle* (New Studies in Biblical Theology no. 5, series ed. D. A. Carson; Leicester: Apollos, 1997) 109ff, focusing on metaphors of original sin.

51 Or *meaning* as defined by Eugene A. Nida, *Componential Analysis of Meaning: An Introduction to Semantic Structures* (The Hague: Mouton, 1975) 26: 'Meaning consists of that particular structured bundle of cognitive features, associated with the lexical unit, which makes possible the designation of all the denotata by the lexical unit in question,' as quoted by Moisés Silva, *Biblical Words and their Meaning. An Introduction to Lexical Semantics* (Academie Books; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1983) 134.

52 So Gunton, according to Charles B. Cousar, *op. cit.*, 42.

53 Goldingay's clever humour, in 'Your Iniquities . . .', *op. cit.*, 40, when he compares the Lord to 'the mafia Godfather' (à propos the verb *pàqad*) may betray too weak a sense of the divine calling of magistrates, never to be assimilated to *mafiosi*, if one talks seriously.

54 We are led to a new consideration: we should view, in expiatory sacrifices, not the victim only, but the couple of *priest and victim* as 'bearing sin' together (Ex. 28.28; Lv. 10.17; the fact that the priest eats the flesh of the sin-offering may be a symbol of their solidarity). The high-priest's returning from his service in the Holiest Place—which Israelites watched for with eager expectation—could be considered as a figure of the resurrection (some have suggested the thought in He. 9.28 for the parousia; the resurrection is the parousia anticipated).

55 In our *La Doctrine du péché et de la rédemption, op. cit.*, 133–148.

56 *The Prophecy of Isaiah* (Leicester: InterVarsity P., 1993) 422–443; see 437f n. 1: 'To say, as Whybray does, that the phrase "bear iniquity" (*nāsā 'āwôn*) does not occur in the poem is an unworthy quibble, for the equivalents to "shoulder iniquity" (*sābal 'āwôn*) and "bear sin" (*nāsā' hēt') do. To say that even if nāsā' 'āwôn* occurred it could not refer to "vicarious punishment and suffering" ignores the use of *nāsā'* in Nu. 18:1–2 and of *sābal* in La. 5:7. Cheyne was correct to understand verse 11 as "an emphatic assertion of the vicarious atonement as the foundation of his righteous-making work".'

57 'OT Sacrifice . . .,' *op. cit.*, 10 (see above n. 33).

58 *Op. cit.*, 26.

59 In Travis, *ibid.*, 26, 37, 38 (3 times), and in Goldingay, 'OT Sacrifice,' *op. cit.*, 18 (twice).

60 'Your Iniquities . . .,' *op. cit.*, 50.

61 *Miracles, a preliminary Study* (New York: MacMillan, 1947) 118. In *The Problem of Pain* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1940), however, he had not yet come to that sharp discernment.

62 *Op. cit.*, 28f. We also mentioned that he claimed that God's 'hiding his face' was non-retributive (25); we fail to see on what

grounds, when this hiding happens on account of sin: it is a terrible deprivation 'inflicted fom outside' if you will! Ez 39.23f equates the hiding of God's face with his dealing with the people according to their offenses, a formula of retribution.

63 *La Doctrine du péché et de la rédemption, op. cit.*, 40–43.
64 *Op. cit.*, 78.
65 John Peck, 'Review of John Goldingay, ed., *Atonement Today*,' *The Evangelical Quarterly* 70/2 (April 1998) 186.

EuroJTh (1999) **8:1**, 37–48 0960–2720

• The Atonement in Reformation Theology
• *L'expiation dans la théologie de la réformation*
• *Die Sühne in reformatorischer Theologie*

David Wright, Edinburgh

RÉSUMÉ

L'expiation ne constituait pas un sujet de discussion dans la controverse de la Réformation, à la différence de la justification. Son traitement théologique est dispersé, il apparaît, lorsqu'il est abordé, en liaison avec d'autres sujets, tels que le sacrifice, la messe ou la christologie. L'approche caractéristique de la théologie dans la Réformation est l'exposition de l'Écriture plutôt que la systématique. Ainsi cette étude se base sur le commentaire de Calvin sur 2 Corinthiens 5.18–21, tout en tenant compte d'autres expositions de ce texte au XVI^e siècle. Non seulement Calvin voit le ministère de l'Église comme une mise en œuvre du ministère de réconciliation, c'est à dire de l'expiation, mais aussi, en comprenant l'exhortation « soyez réconciliés » . . . (v. 20) comme étant adressé aux croyants, il envisage une expiation quotidienne de nos péchés dans une repentance toujours renouvelée. De plus, il s'attaque à la question de savoir quand Dieu a commencé de nous aimer. Enfin, Calvin lit le passage comme présentant Christ coupable et pécheur « en notre personne ». Tous les éléments de la doctrine de l'expiation élaborée par la réformation sont virtuellement présents ici.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Die Sühne war, ganz im Gegensatz zur Rechtfertigung, zur Zeit der Reformation keine kontroverse Angelegenheit. Ihre Abhandlung erfolgte, wenn sie denn erfolgte, unzusammenhängend unter verschiedenen Überschriften wie z.B. 'Opfer und die Messe', 'Christologie' etc. Die charakteristische Methode der reformatorischen Theologie ist die Schriftauslegung und nicht die systematische Theologie. Aus diesem Grund beschäftigt sich die folgende Abhandlung vor allem mit Calvins Kommentar zu 2. Kor. 5,18–21, zieht aber auch andere Auslegungen des 16. Jahrhunderts zu Rate. Calvin versteht die geistliche Rolle der Kirche in erster Linie als einen 'Dienst der Versöhnung' (d.h. der Sühne). Mehr noch, die Worte 'laßt euch versöhnen . . .' (V. 20) als an Gläubige gerichtet verstehend, steht ihm ein tägliches 'Sühnen' unserer Sünden in ständig erneuerter Buße vor Augen. Darüber hinaus ringt er mit der Frage, wann Gott anfing, uns zu lieben. Die Korintherstelle versteht Calvin so, daß sie Christus darstellt als jemanden, der schuldig ist, ja ein Sünder ist, 'in uns'. Sie vereinigt also im Grunde alle Bestandteile der reformatorischen Sühnelehre.

Where does one find a doctrine of the atonement in Reformation theology? It was, I believe, the subject of no major controversy, whether between the Old Church and the new evangelicals or between evangelicals themselves. If one looks to the Decrees of the Council of Trent—a reliable indicator of what the Old Church's establishment thought had gone wrong in Protestantism—justification receives lengthy and important attention, original sin a few pages and the sacrifice of the mass is declared to be truly propitiatory:

> The victim is one and the same, the same now offering by the ministry of priests who then offered himself on the cross, the manner alone of offering being different. The fruits of that bloody sacrifice . . . are received most abundantly through this unbloody one.[1]

But atonement proper is barely visible.

If we turn to the confessions and catechisms of the Reformation movements—their official presentations of doctrine, as it were—the treatment is remarkably variable. The Augsburg Confession of 1530 has articles on original sin and justification, and also on the Son of God, which affirms that he was 'truly born, suffered, was crucified, died, and was buried in order to be a sacrifice not only for original sin but also for all other sins and to propitiate God's wrath'. Moreover, prominent among the corruptions of the mass in article 24 is 'the abominable error' of the sacrificial role of the mass 'by means of which sin was taken away and God was reconciled'. The corrective teaching from Scripture is then set forth. The Catholic Confutation of the Confession and Melanchthon's Apology pick up all three topics at length—original sin, justification and the mass. On the last the Apology provides an extended discussion of sacrifice, distinguishing two main types, propitiatory and eucharistic. The former 'reconciles God or placates his wrath or merits the forgiveness of sins for others'; by the latter 'those who have been reconciled give thanks'. The only real propitiatory sacrifice in the world is the death of Christ. The context determines that, as far as atonement is concerned, Christ's sacrifice is said only to reconcile God.[2]

The early Genevan Confession of 1536 has brief articles on 'Salvation in Jesus' and 'Righteousness in Jesus'. The former declares that 'it is Jesus Christ who is given to us by the Father, in order that in him we should recover all of which in ourselves we are deficient'. The latter mentions the reconciliation of 'enemies of God and subjects of his wrath and judgement'.[3]

The distinctive Scots Confession (1560) deals with the sacrifice of Christ in article 9, 'Christ's Death, Passion, and Burial', which ends with a reference to 'the everlasting purgation and satisfaction' purchased for us thereby. In a widely available modern rendering the two nouns have been collapsed into 'atonement'. The two words of the sixteenth-century version precisely reflect the Latin.[4]

More interesting in this Confession is the preceding article on 'Election', in which the mediation of Christ is set in the frame of the 'maist holie fraternitie' between Christ our brother and ourselves. By the Father's appointment before the foundation of the world, his Son took 'a bodie of our bodie, flesh of our flesh, and bone of our bones'.

If now we are not afraid to call God our Father (John 20:17), it is because he has given his only Son to be our brother. There follows an account of the suffering of the God-man for human salvation.[5] The Scots Confession reminds us how variable are the forms and expressions of what we too readily sum up as 'the Reformation'.

Another product of the 1560s, a fruitful decade for confession-writing, was the Belgic Confession of 1561. This has two articles on justification, one of which quotes Paul as saying that 'we are justified by faith alone', and two others which present what we might call the work of Christ. The first of these views it as the manifestation of God's justice and mercy in Christ, and the second in terms of satisfaction. Our everlasting High Priest 'presented himself in our behalf before his Father in order to appease his wrath by his full satisfaction'. As a consequence no other means of being reconciled to God is needed.[6]

The Second Helvetic Confession of 1566 is widely appreciated as the most mature of the Reformed confessions of the century. It is certainly the longest, but it is scarcely more satisfying to those in quest of an explicit statement on atonement. Much is to be found under justification (with a clear echo of 2 Corinthians 5:21), and some in the full article 11 'Of

Jesus Christ, True God and Man, the Only Saviour of the World', which is primarily Christological. Here a paragraph on the passion and all that Christ did and endured for our sake by coming in the flesh presents Christ as thereby reconciling the heavenly Father to all the faithful, expiating sin, disarming death and shattering condemnation and hell. I note that a modern translation has reversed the terms of the reconciliation—believers to the Father instead of vice versa.[7]

If one consults handy one-volume introductions to the theology of the Reformers, the result is little different. Wilhelm Niesel's *Reformed Symbolics* (1962) has chapters on 'Union with Christ', 'Justification and Sanctification' and 'Christology'. Timothy George's *Theology of the Reformers* (1988) devotes a few pages to a comparison of Calvin's and Anselm's presentations of the atonement, but otherwise barely mentions the topic—although he concurs with Ian Siggins' judgement that Luther followed no one consistent or dominant theory of the atonement, drawing instead on the range of historic approaches.[8] Edmund Schlink's *Theology of the Lutheran Confessions* (1961) subsumes a few mentions of atonement under justification.

This selective survey leads to the conclusion that theologising about the atonement in sixteenth-century Protestant reform is diffused rather than concentrated. It emerges in varied contexts of engagement with Catholicism, or with competing expressions of Protestantism. As for the former, it was the fact that the mass had been turned into a sacrifice usurping the place of Christ's unique self-offering that above all else persuaded Calvin to regard it not as a corruption of the Lord's supper but as a diabolical rejection of it, ripe not for reformation but for replacement. And so this controversy invited exposition of a biblical understanding of Christ's sacrifice.

Or again the supper-strife between Lutherans and Swiss/Reformed became the catalyst for Christological elaboration, especially on the Lutheran side. Such developed Christology instinctively related the union of divinity and humanity in Christ to his reconciling work and delighted to quote Luther himself, here from his work on *The Councils and the Church*:

> We Christians must know that unless God is in the balance and throws in weight as a counterbalance, we shall sink to the bottom with our scale. I mean that this way: If it is not true that God died for us, but only a man died, we are lost. But if God's death and God dead lie in the opposite scale, then his side goes down and we go upward like a light and empty pan. Of course, he can also go up again or jump out of his pan. But he could never have sat in the pan unless he had become a man like us, so that it could be said: God dead, God's passion, God's blood, God's death. According to his nature God cannot die, but since God and man are united in one person, it is correct to talk about God's death when that man dies who is one thing or one person with God.[9]

In fact, it is not merely that the doctrine of the atonement appears dispersed in Reformation theological writings. The central Reformation decades witnessed little in the way of systematic theology. Melanchthon's *Loci Communes* and Calvin's *Institutio* are not representative of the literary endeavours of the leading Reformers. Peter Martyr Vermigli's *Loci Communes* were compiled from his works after his death. Wolfgang Musculus, the learned Augsburg Reformer, issued his *Loci Communes* in 1560 not long before his death, after impressive productivity in translating the Fathers and commenting massively on major parts of the Bible.

A significant proportion of the Reformers' theological writings were expositions of Scripture in one form or another. (Calvin used four forms in Geneva—sermon, lecture, pastors' corporate Bible study (French 'congrégation') and remonstrance or admonition.) Perhaps the most characteristic mode of Reformation theology is exegetical or expository. *Loci* commonly appeared appended to the appropriate passage of Scripture; on the papacy, to Matthew 16:17–19, on church

and state, to Romans 13:1–7, etc. It was Calvin's intention to ensure that his commentaries were not cluttered up by *loci*, and so he put them into the *Institutio* from the 1539 edition onwards.

And so the rest of this paper will revolve around perhaps the *locus classicus* for the atonement in the Bible, 2 Corinthians 5:18–21 (on the assumption that atonement focusses specifically on the theme of reconciliation). I will take as the platform for our consideration the commentary by John Calvin published in 1547 in French and in 1548 in Latin. As I pick up points in his exposition I will refer to other sixteenth-century commentators, both Protestant and occasionally Catholic. But first I present an abridged text of Calvin's comments on what he calls here 'a quite remarkably important passage'.[10] I have sought to omit nothing of substance. Musculus likewise held it to be 'a passage always to be valued most highly by all believers, to be instilled deeply in our minds with special care'.[11]

John Calvin on 2 Corinthians 5:18–21

18. Moroever, all things are of God, who has reconciled us to himself through Jesus Christ: and has given us the ministry of reconciliation.

19. Because God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself, by not imputing to them their sins; and he entrusted to us the word of reconciliation.

20. Therefore we act as ambassadors on behalf of Christ, as though God were exhorting through us: we beg on behalf of Christ, Be reconciled to God.

21. Him who knew no sin, he made sin on our behalf, so that we might be made the righteousness of God in him.

18. *All things are of God.* He means all things that belong to Christ's kingdom, as if he had said, 'If we wish to be Christ's we must be regenerated by God, but this is no ordinary gift.' . . .

Who reconciled us. There are two main points here, one concerning the reconciliation of men and women with God and the other concerning the means by which we may obtain the benefit of it . . .

The first is that *God has reconciled us to himself through Christ.* There follows immediately the explanation that *God was in Christ* and in his person has brought about reconciliation. The way in which he did it is next added, *by not imputing to them their sins.* And this also is explained by showing how Christ made a guilt-offering for our sins and procured righteousness for us. The second main point is that the grace of reconciliation is applied to us by the gospel, so that we may share in it. Here, if anywhere in Paul's writings, we have a quite remarkably important passage and we must carefully examine the words one by one.

The ministry of reconciliation. This is a most remarkable description of the Gospel as a message delivered through an ambassador to reconcile men and women to God. It is the singular dignity of ministers of the gospel to be sent by God to us with a mandate to be the messengers and in a manner the pledges of his good will towards us. But this is said not so much to glorify ministers as to comfort the godly so that, whenever they hear the gospel, they may know that God is dealing with them and, as it were, negotiating an agreement with them about their return to his grace. What blessing could be more desirable than this! Thus let us remember that this is the main purpose of the gospel, that, although we are by nature children of wrath, the quarrel between God and us can be resolved and we can be received by him into his grace. Ministers are given authority to declare this good news to us and to increase our assurance of God's fatherly love towards us. It is true that any other person can also bear witness to us of God's grace, but Paul teaches that this duty is laid specially upon ministers. Thus when a duly ordained minister declares from the gospel that God has been made propitious (*propitiatum*) to us he should be heard as God's ambassador, carrying out a public duty as God's representative, and endowed with rightful authority to make this declaration to us.

19. *God was in Christ.* Some take this to mean simply 'God was reconciling the world to himself in Christ', but the meaning is fuller and richer than that, for he is saying, first, that God was in Christ and then that by this intervention he was reconciling the world to himself. This is said of the Father, since it would be unnatural to say that the divine nature of Christ was in Christ. Thus he is saying that the Father was in the Son, in agreement with John 10.38, 'I am in the Father and the Father in me.' Thus he who has the Son has the Father also. Paul expresses himself in this way so that we may learn to be satisfied with Christ because in him we find God the Father also, as he communicates himself to us by his Son . . .

The second clause deals with the work of Christ, which is to be our propitiation, since apart from him God is displeased with us all because we have departed from righteousness. Why has God appeared to humankind in Christ? For reconciliation, in order that the hostility might be ended and we who were strangers might be adopted as sons. Although Christ's coming had its source in the overflowing love of God for us, yet, until human beings know that God has been propitiated by a mediator, there cannot but be on their side a separation which prevents them from having access to God. But of this more soon.

By not imputing to them. Notice how human beings return to God's favour—by being regarded as righteous, by obtaining remission of their sins. As long as God imputes our sins to us, he cannot but regard us with abhorrence, for he cannot look with friendship or favour upon sinners. But this may appear to contradict what is said elsewhere, that 'we were loved by him before the foundation of the world' (Eph. 1.4), and to contradict still more John 3.16, where he says that his love for us was the reason why he expiated our sins by Christ, for the cause must always precede the effect. My answer is that we were loved from before the foundation of the world, but not apart from Christ. But I do agree that the love of God was first in time and in order also as regards God; but, as regards us, his love has its foundation in the sacrifice of Christ. For when we think of God apart from a mediator, we can conceive of him only as being angry with us, but when a mediator is interposed between us, we know that he is pacified towards us. But since it is also needful for us to know that Christ came forth to us from the fountain of God's free mercy, Scripture explicitly teaches both; the Father's wrath has been placated by the Son's sacrifice and thus the Son was offered for the expiation of human sins, because God has had mercy upon them and has made this sacrifice the pledge of his receiving them into his favour. To sum up: wherever there is sin there is also God's wrath for God is not propitious towards us until he has blotted out our sins by not imputing them. Since our consciences cannot grasp this blessing apart from the intervention of Christ's sacrifice, Paul is right to make it the foundation and cause of reconciliation as far as we are concerned.

Having entrusted to us. He says again that a commission to offer this reconciliation to us has been given to ministers of the gospel. For an objection could be raised. It might be asked, 'Where is Christ the peacemaker between God and humanity now? How far from us does he dwell?' He says that as he once suffered, so now every day he offers the fruit of his suffering to us through the gospel which he has given to the world as a sure and certain record of his completed work of reconciliation. Thus the duty of ministers is to apply to us the fruit of Christ's death.

But in case anyone should imagine this application in some such magical manner as the papists have invented, we should note carefully what he says next and how for him the application consists entirely of the preaching of the gospel. For the pope and his priests use this as a pretext to provide some shadow of warrant for the altogether ungodly and execrable traffic they conduct over the salvation of souls. 'The Lord', they say, 'has given us commission and authority to forgive sins.' I

accept this, provided that they carry out the work of ambassadors as Paul here describes it . . . The ministers of the church restore us to God's favour in a right and orderly manner by bearing witness to us through the gospel of how God has been reconciled to us by his grace. . . .

20. *As though God were exhorting*. This is of the greatest importance and indeed absolutely necessary to give authority to our ministry. For who would allow a question that that involves his eternal salvation to depend merely upon human testimony? . . .

We beg on behalf of Christ . . .

Be reconciled. We should note that here Paul is dealing with believers and he declares that he has to execute his commission to them every day. Christ did not suffer just to expiate our sins once, nor was the gospel instituted only in order that the sins we committed before baptism should be forgiven us, but rather, since we sin every day, so by a daily forgiveness God receives us into his favour. The work of the gospel ambassadors is perpetual, for the gospel must be proclaimed ceaselessly in the church to the end of the world and it cannot be preached without a promise of the forgiveness of sins. We have here an explicit and relevant passage to refute the ungodly teaching of the papists which requires men to seek the forgiveness of post-baptismal sins elsewhere than in the expiation accomplished in Christ's death . . . He recalls us, as much after baptism as before it, to that one expiation made by Christ, that we may know that we always receive forgiveness by free unmerited grace.

21. *Him who knew no sin*. Note well how in all Paul's writings there is no other way of returning into God's favour than that which is founded exclusively upon Christ's sacrifice. Let us learn then always to look to him, when we wish to be absolved from guilt. It is commonly taught that here 'sin' means an expiatory sacrifice for sin, so that it is rendered *piaculum* in Latin. In this and other passages Paul has borrowed this expression from the Hebrew in which *āshām* means both an expiatory sacrifice and a fault or a crime. But the meaning of this word and of the entire sentence will be better understood if we compare the two sides of the antithesis contained in it. Sin is opposed to righteousness for Paul teaches that we were made the righteousness of God as a result of Christ's having been made sin. Here righteousness means not a quality or habit but something imputed to us, since we are said to have received the righteousness of Christ. What then is meant by 'sin'? It is the guilt on account of which we are accused before the judgement of God. As a man's curse used to be cast upon the sacrificial victim, so Christ's condemnation was our absolution and with his stripes we are healed.

The righteousness of God in him. First, the righteousness of God means here not the righteousness that is given to us by God, but rather the righteousness that is approved by him, just as in John 12.43 the glory of God means that which God approves and the glory of men that which wins the vain approval of the world. So in Rom. 3.23 when he says that 'we have come short of the glory of God' he means that in ourselves we have nothing in which to glory before God. To appear to be righteous before men is not difficult, but that is only a false semblance of righteousness, which finally brings about our ruin, for the only true righteousness is that which is accepted of God.

We may now return to the contrast drawn in this verse between righteousness and sin. How can we become righteous before God? In the same way as Christ became a sinner. For he took, as it were, our person, that he might be the offender in our name and thus might be reckoned a sinner, not because of his own offences but because of those of others, since he himself was pure and free from every fault and bore the penalty that was our due and not his own. Now in the same way we are righteous in him, not because we have satisfied God's judgement by our own works, but because we are judged in relation to Christ's righteousness which we have put on by faith, that it may become our own. That is why I have chosen

to retain the preposition 'in' rather than replace it by *per*, 'through', since this gives a meaning more in line with Paul's intention.

1. Why reconciliation?

Calvin lets his answer to this question emerge as the exposition proceeds: 'by nature children of wrath'; God is *infensus*, hostile to us (here translated weakly, 'displeased'); 'regards us with abhorrence' (*exosos*, hated); enmity, anger of God, etc. Some points of translation suggest a nervous translator! The reference (v. 19) to 'a separation on their side', on the side of human beings, should perhaps be 'affecting them' (*eorum respectu*); 'quarrel . . . resolved' (v. 18) is weak for 'division . . . abolished' (*dissidio . . . abolito*).

We need not delay over this question. Calvin makes it clear that while our sins are still counted against us there can be no peace between God and ourselves. Musculus brings this out more explicitly, but no commentator reveals a need for a direct address to the question 'why?' at the outset.[12]

2. God's initiative

Calvin leaves this largely unnoticed until v. 19 is reached, but Musculus's more expansive exposition highlights it most effectively: 'God did not wait for us until we pursued reconciliation as suppliants, but he reconciled us when we were ignorant of his purpose, indeed alienated and dead in sins, and did so of his own free initiative and mercy through his Son. . . . Offended majesty takes the lead in reconciling its enemies.' We are sampling here the commentaries of pastor-theologians, for whom it was the most natural thing to lace their works with worship, exhortation, rebuke and consolation. The age of the restrictedly academic commentary had not arrived.

3. The ministry of reconciliation

This deserves more than routine attention, for Calvin is not the only expositor to treat this ministry almost as part of the effecting of reconciliation. 'It is the illustrious title of the gospel that it is an embassy to reconcile men and women to God.' When we hear the gospel, we may know that God is engaged with us (*tractare*) and, as it were, negotiating (*pacisci*) about our return to his favour. It is God entreating, beseeching, begging us through his servants (v. 20). Calvin properly stresses that this ministry is one of declaration—that God has been made propitious to sinners—and he can combine both emphases as follows (on v. 19): 'The church's ministers in due order restore us to God's favour when through the gospel they are witnesses to us of God's favour having been reconciled to us.' (The Latin is bolder than Smail's translation: *de reconciliata nobis Dei gratia.*)

Musculus nicely complements Calvin from a more anthropological angle. 'Reconciliation cannot take place between the unwilling, but requires the assent and will of both parties. Our reconciliation as far as God is concerned, is indeed completed (*perfecta*) in the death of the mediator Christ, but from our side it is not completed (*perfecta*) unless we genuinely accommodate ourselves to its terms (*conditionibus*) so that we can be receptive (*capaces*) of it. These terms are repentance and faith in Christ.'

The metaphor of the ambassador lends itself to imaginative development in more than one commentator, especially Musculus and Thomas Cajetan de Vio (before whom Luther was summoned at Augsburg in 1518). Both Calvin and Musculus on v. 19 ('entrusted to us the word of reconciliation') go out of their way to find fault with the multiplication of means of reconciliation under the papacy —masses, private confessions, papal indulgences, absolutions, what Calvin calls 'that whole godless and execrable traffic that they exercise in the salvation of souls'. Ministers have warrant in Scripture to be ambassadors of the gospel—no more and no less.

Paul's phrase has accustomed us to speaking of 'the ministry of reconciliation' as a task to be undertaken, or at least

shared, by human agents. Why do we not so comfortably talk of our engaging in 'the ministry of atonement'? Or even in 'the ministry of salvation/redemption/etc.'? Calvin wants to emphasize, and Musculus even more clearly, that human ministry is almost part of the atonement. To paraphrase Cyprian (and many after him, including Calvin), 'No atonement without the church's ministry.'

The difference between Catholicism and Protestantism may be expressed in the following terms: whereas the former sacramentalises 'the ministry of reconciliation' (or atonement), the latter homiletises it.

4. God was in Christ

Here dogma and exegesis meet, with no agreement among expositors and sometimes confusion. Calvin divides the statement, making 'God's being in Christ' the intervention which effects 'the reconciling of the world'. He has no doubt that 'God' here means the Father, for it would be awkward to say that 'the divine nature of Christ was in him'. Musculus agrees with this reading, but very briefly—'God himself indwelling Christ his Son'. Erasmus's *Paraphrases* put it neatly, 'God the Father was in him.'[13] But for Bullinger the text speaks unquestioningly of two-nature Christology, to which, in a relatively short treatment of these verses, he gives disproportionate and fairly technical attention.[14] Both Bullinger and Calvin cite John 10:38 ('I am in the Father . . .'), but with divergent interpretations. Conrad Pellican, Reformer in Basel and Zurich and able Hebrew scholar, presented both, apparently without discerning their incompatibility—i.e. both 'God the Father was in him' and 'Truly Christ was God', and there was no salvation or life for us unless he were so. The explanation for this lies, I think, in the derivative character of Pellican's material.[15]

Others make no comment at all or too briefly to be of much help. Cajetan gives three possible constructions (and then combines them all), one being simply 'God was in Christ *personaliter*'. Another understands God as active 'through Christ reconciling the world'. Although there is an obvious difference between the latter, more instrumental role for Christ and other interpretations which stress the coming or presence of God in Christ, the way Calvin develops his comment on this clause—Christ as Immanuel, for example—shows that conceptual sharpness was elusive.

5. How was reconciliation effected?

'By not imputing their sins to them' is Calvin's distinctive version of the Pauline text—*non imputando* instead of the nominative participle (*imputans*) of the Greek, the Vulgate and Erasmus, but he leaves his readers to discover his reason. His exposition of what he calls the *officium Christi* draws upon a variety of concepts—propitiation, placation, pacification, removal of hostility, expiation, remission, adoption (a distinctive Calvinian note), sacrifice, mediation. He pursues no narrow exegetical path in presenting the import of 'not imputing'. What becomes crystal-clear (and this may be why Calvin opted for the instrumental gerundive) is the total absence from his mind—and from every sixteenth-century commentator I have looked at—of the notion that God's presence in Christ of itself reconciles and non-imputes. The profusion of metaphors emphasises that reconciliation, i.e. the pacifying of wrath, is not achieved without remission of sins, that is, the non-imputing of sins, which requires the mediation of Christ's sacrifice.

6. Which 'world' is reconciled?

Calvin omits any mention. Musculus, however, aware that some in his day from this and similar passages attempted to revive the error of universal salvation, faces the question. 'As far as the work of reconciliation goes, it is ready (*paratum*) and sufficient for the reconciling of the whole human race.' But, as we noted above, for Musculus there can be no reconciliation with the unwilling. But if, in response to 'the ministry of reconcili-

ation', all the world embraced it, then no mortal would perish. Since this is not the case, Musculus concludes that only those share in 'this universal (*generalis*) grace' who embrace it in repentance and faith. What could be neater?

It was left to Catholic Cajetan to show a concern to limit 'the world' to God's people, suggesting that the phrase be construed differently—'reconciling the world-in-Christ', that is, not the world in its entirety but as it is yoked to Christ, all from any nation who are members of Christ, the elect. This construal, he believes, squares both with the truth and with the *ratio* of the ministry of reconciliation.

7. When did God start loving us?

Calvin raises a momentous issue, which emerges as much from his exposition as from Paul's text. He has said, on 'by not imputing . . .', 'As long as God imputes our sins to us, it is necessary that he regard us with abhorrence (*exosos*), for he cannot be friendly or propitious to sinners.' But were we not loved before the foundation of the world? Was not God's love the cause of the expiation of sins? Calvin concludes that Scripture teaches two apparently contradictory things: 'I admit that the love of God is prior in time and also in order as regards God (*quantum ad Deum*), but from our point of view (*respectu nostri*) the beginning of love is placed in Christ's sacrifice.' (Not the least interesting feature of this sentence is that Calvin uses two words for love, *dilectio* and *amor*.)

One of the things Calvin wants to say is clear enough: we sinners cannot be persuaded that God is merciful to us until we see that mercy embodied in the sacrifice of the mediator. Hence Paul is right to make this sacrifice the beginning and cause of reconciliation *nostri respectu*. But Calvin does not appeal to his well-known theme of accommodation in order to resolve the difficulty, which in reality persists. One might deduce from this paragraph that, according to Calvin, God both loves and hates us (sinners, the elect) from eternity. (It is interesting that neither does Calvin resort to the time-eternity difference.)

The Reformer confronts the same problem at greater length in *Institutio* 2:16:2–4, where he displays a sharper touch but ends up with a long quotation from Augustine, which includes the following: 'In a marvellous and divine way God loved us even when he hated us . . . He knew how, at the same time, to hate in each one of us what we had made and to love what he had made.' This invokes a distinction not between sinner and sin but between sinner and creature, which in turn may raise some eyebrows. It is not the glory of the gospel to set forth God's love for sinners? Yet this is how Calvin himself put it: 'All of us have in ourselves something deserving of God's hatred . . . But because the Lord wills not to lose what is his in us, out of his own kindness he still finds something to love. However much we may be sinners by our own fault, we nevertheless remain his creatures.'

This is indeed a fascinating section of the *Institutio*. At one stage Calvin seems to be adapting a more Lutheran law-gospel model (unless we are overwhelmed by fear of God's wrath, we will not fully grasp the divine mercy). At another point he asserts that, although his explanation is geared 'to the weakness of our capacity' (*captus*), i.e. accommodated, 'it is not said falsely'. In fact what Calvin exposes here is the difficulty of propounding propitiation and penal substitution without setting divine justice over against divine mercy, and Father over against Son. In wrestling with it here we observe Calvin the biblical theologian as much as the systematician. Propitiation is sometimes criticised for dividing the Trinity. One reply might be that we must follow Scripture, in the light of which the Trinity too is to be construed.

8. Being reconciled every day

Musculus drew attention to the absence of an object 'you' in v. 20: 'as though God were exhorting through us, we beg on behalf of Christ . . .' Consequently 'Be reconciled' need not be viewed as

addressed to the Corinthians but as illustrative of the general proclamation God has entrusted to his servants. Or perhaps there were some among the Corinthians who had not responded in repentance and faith and still needed to be reconciled.

Calvin had no problem in treating 'Be reconciled' as spoken to believers, to whom Paul has to execute his commission (the ministry of reconciliation) every day. He then takes our breath away: 'Christ did not suffer in order once only to expiate our sins . . . Just as we sin daily, so also by a daily remission are we received by God into favour (*gratiam*).' The voice of the gospel ambassador is to resound in the church to the end of the world. What surprises here is the use of 'expiate' of the ever-repeated divine forgiveness of our ever-repeated sinning. It reminds one immediately of the Lutheran formula *simul iustus, simul peccator, simul penitens*. But in the context in this commentary, Calvin applies it to a condemnation of Catholic teaching which requires people 'to seek remission of sins after baptism elsewhere than from the expiation accomplished (*peracta*!) in the death of Christ'. He rejects the distinction between pre-baptismal and post-baptismal sins, which had had enormously far-reaching effects on the shape of medieval religion in the West. So here we observe an example of what I earlier characterised as the dispersion of the doctrine of atonement in the Reformers. In a myriad passages like this the once-for-all reconciliation accomplished in Christ's sacrifice is turned by Reformers to a sharp critique of central elements in papal religion.

9. The great exchange

In what sense was Christ 'made sin'? The common explanation, found in Erasmus,[16] Pellican, Musculus and in Catholic writers like Cajetan, cites Hebrew usage of 'sin' in the sense of 'sacrifice (*hostia*) for sin' (Exod. 30:10, Levit. 4:21, Hosea 4:8). Calvin mentions this interpretation, but prefers one that does greater justice to the parallelism of the verse. Just as the righteousness we are said to be made is not a *qualitas* or a *habitus* but given by imputation, so the converse is guilt, and Calvin can talk of 'Christ's condemnation'. We become righteous before God 'in the way in which Christ became a sinner. He adopted, as it were, our *personam*, so as to become guilty under our name and be judged as a sinner, not by his own offences but by others'.

Melanchthon comes close to this: as 'made sin' Christ was *quiddam reum coram Deo*, 'something guilty (neuter) before God, whereby he felt the horrendous wrath of the eternal Father against all sins, as though he had polluted himself with your sins and mine and everybody's.' Erasmus's *Annotationes*, on the other hand, reflect a concern (which he ascribes also to Lefèvre d'Etaples) that Christ should not from this text be called 'a sinner'.

Yet however 'made sin' is exegeted, all commentators stress that in this character Christ bore the penalty for our sins. He is called redeemer, says Melanchthon, because he paid the price for us. More than other writers Melanchthon dwells on the dread awfulness of the transaction. Musculus in turn emphasises God as the agent: 'God himself laid on his innocent Son all our sins, to be expiated on the cross, outside the gate.'

An illustration how exegesis may reflect dogma rather than determine it is provided by the Dominican Ambrosius Catharinus (Politi). 'God made him sin' is a figure common to scripture (though no other instances are given), meaning that God placed all our sins, especially original sin, on him. In his body, crucified and dead, sin is at the same time crucified and dead. This prepares the ground for Politi to link the next clause, 'that we might become the righteousness of God in him', to Christ's resurrection. 'Righteousness' here means 'righteous people', on the analogy of circumcision—or simply, 'the righteous'.[17]

It is with this final clause of the chapter that less of a consensus becomes evident among our commentators. Politi's leaning towards the righteousness of 'the new creature' comes through in Cajetan. He

first speaks of righteousness communicated to us 'from the merit, the sanctification, the reconciliation of Christ', but then of our being transformed gradually into that righteousness, so that we progressively become righteous in understanding, motive, action and endurance.

For Calvin, on the other hand, righteousness here is a matter solely of imputation, not given to us but acceptable to God (*illi probata*). He backs this up with some comparative exegesis. By the great exchange, as Christ became a sinner, 'so we are now righteous in him, . . . and are assessed (*censemur*) by reference to Christ's righteousness, which we put on by faith so that it becomes ours'. 'In Christ' rather than 'through Christ' (so Erasmus, although originally in 1516 he translated *in illo*) is a significant difference for Calvin.

Musculus explicitly sets v. 21 in the framework of an 'exchange' (*commutatio*), and forcefully parallels the two movements. By bearing our sins Christ no more became a sinner like us than we, by receiving his righteousness by imputation, become righteous like him. Melanchthon, on the contrary, wants to go further. 'We are pronounced not guilty but righteous, God justifying, that is, accepting us and at the same time renewing and vivifying us . . . He covers me with his righteousness like a coat; it is imputed to me and at the same time initiates in me new and eternal righteousness.' Calvin would not have disagreed, but he did not find it in this passage.

A study of this kind cannot produce a systematic or unified presentation of the atonement in Reformation eyes. That would have been possible, I submit, only by concentrating on one Reformer or one confession or catechism. Nevertheless, I doubt if any significant element of a doctrine of the atonement faithful to the main thrust of the Reformation has been omitted entirely. Furthermore we have reminded ourselves how the Reformers professed to do theology, out of the Scriptures in interaction with other scriptural expositors. And in 2 Corinthians 5 we have a passage that marvellously concentrates minds. We may end with Bullinger's commendation of it:

> In brief compass this chapter is full of saving doctrine, and I urge that it be often read and re-read. It has a wonderful warmth of the Holy Spirit, it reinforces hope beyond measure, its comfort is of the highest. It presents the liveliest depiction of the gospel and the most exalted praise of the ministry of the Word. You can scarcely read a more vivid passage elsewhere in Paul. Pay heed, therefore, believing soul, to what the Lord is telling you.

Summary

The atonement was not an issue in Reformation controversy, unlike justification. Its theological treatment is dispersed, appearing under other heads, such as sacrifice and the mass or Christology, if at all. The characteristic mode of Reformation theology is scriptural exposition rather than systematics. So this paper centres on Calvin's comments on 2 Corinthians 5:18–21, taking note of other sixteenth-century expositions. Not only does Calvin subsume the church's ministerial role within 'the ministry of reconciliation', i.e. atonement, but also, through taking 'Be reconciled . . .' (v. 20) as addressed to believers, he envisages a daily 'expiating' of our sins in ever-renewed repentance. Moreover, he grapples with the question when God started loving us. No less frankly, Calvin reads the passage as presenting Christ as guilty and a sinner 'in our person'. Virtually all the ingredients of a Reformation doctrine of atonement are here.

Notes

1 *Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent*, tr. H. J. Schroeder (Rockford, IL, 1978), 146.
2 *The Book of Concord. The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church*, tr. T. G. Tappert (Philadelphia, 1959), 29–30, 58, 252–3.
3 *Reformed Confessions of the 16th Century*, ed. A. C. Cochrane (London, 1966), 121.
4 Cochrane, *Reformed*, 170; Philip Schaff,

The Creeds of Christendom, 3 vols, 6th edit. (New York, 1931), III, 447.

5 Schaff, *Creeds* III, 444–6.

6 *Ibid.* III, 406–8.

7 Cochrane, *Reformed*, 246 (his own work, 222–3). See instead Schaff, *Creeds* III, 257, 853.

8 George, *Theology of the Reformers* (Nashville, TN, 1988), 220–23, 59, referring to Ian D. K. Siggins, *Martin Luther's Doctrine of Christ* (New Haven, CT, and London, 1970).

9 Cited in the *Formula of Concord*, Solid Declaration VIII, ed. Tappert, *Book of Concord*, 599; for the original, *Luthers Werke* (Weimarer Ausgabe), 50, 590.

10 *Calvin's Commentaries: The Second Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians* . . ., tr. T. A. Smail (Edinburgh 1964), 77. The text of Calvin's comments that follows is largely from Smail, except that I have provided a fresh translation of the Pauline verses and lightly revised some of the commentary. There is a modest essay on 'Epochs in the History of Interpretation of 2 Corinthians 5:14–21', by Richard T. Mead in J. P. Lewis (ed.), *Interpreting 2 Corinthians 5:14–21: An Exercise in Hermeneutics* (Lewiston, NY, 1989), 65–86. Its brief treatment of Calvin (82–6) is not wholly accurate.

11 *In Apostoli Pauli Ambas Epistolas ad Corinthios* . . . (Basel, 1611), 392. The commentary was first published in 1559.

12 Melanchthon speaks of 'the evil' of sin, 'with which God is horribly angry and which has been horribly condemned by God': *Preface* to his incomplete commentary on 2 Corinthians (it did not reach ch. 5), *Corpus Reformatorum* 15, 1198–9.

13 *Paraphrases*, *ad loc.*, in *Opera Omnia*, ed. J. LeClerc (Leiden, 1703–6), VII, 925.

14 *In Omnes Apostolicas Epistolas* . . . *Commentarii* . . . (Zurich, 1549), 290. The first edition of the commentary on 2 Corinthians appeared in 1535.

15 *In Omnes Apostolicas Epistolas, Pauli* . . . *Commentarii* . . . (Zurich, 1539), 300–301.

16. *Erasmus' Annotations on the New Testament: Acts–Romans—I and II Corinthians*, ed. Anne Reeve and M. A. Screech (*Studies in the History of Christian Thought* XLII; Leiden, 1990), *ad loc.*

17 *Commentaria* . . . *in Omnes Divi Pauli* . . . *Epistolas* . . . (Venice, 1551), 233–4.

EuroJTh (1999) **8:1**, 49–59 0960–2720

• The Cross and the Eucharist: the doctrine of the atonement according to the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*
• *La croix et l'eucharistie: la doctrine de l'expiation dans le* « catéchisme de l'Église Catholique »
• *Das Kreuz und die Eucharistie: Die Sühnelehre des* Katechismus der Katholischen Kirche

Leonardo De Chirico, Rome

RÉSUMÉ

Dans le « Catéchisme de l'Église Catholique » de 1992, la doctrine de l'expiation est traitée sur un mode quelque peu « mineur ».

Le point de vue catholique sur l'expiation est présenté dans le contexte du commentaire de l'article IV de la profession de la Foi Chrétienne (c'est à dire le symbole des Apôtres) qui déclare: « Jésus-Christ a souffert sous Ponce Pilate, il a été crucifié, il est mort et a été enseveli ». Le commentaire du magistère se trouve dans les paragraphes 595 à 623.

La portée du sacrifice du Christ pour le salut est précisée en termes de « réconciliation » (613, 614), « de rédemption et de réparation », « d'expiation et de satisfaction » (616), mais on ne rencontre aucune explication de ces termes. Le Catéchisme adopte le point de vue d'une expiation universelle et illimitée, en accord avec la tradition bien établie du concile de Trente.

Le bref exposé consacré à la portée rédemptrice de la passion et de la mort de Jésus-Christ ouvre la porte à la compréhension spécifiquement catholique des sacrements en général et de l'eucharistie en particulier (1322–1419). Une lecture, même rapide, du contenu du Catéchisme laissera percevoir un contraste frappant entre une théologie de la croix rapidement esquissée, et une théologie des sacrements largement développée. Le Catéchisme accorde beaucoup plus d'importance à la représentation eucharistique de l'expiation et à son actualisation sacramentelle, qu'à l'événement historique survenu une fois pour toutes et à sa portée rédemptrice. À la fin de la section sur la passion et la mort de Jésus-Christ, le Catéchisme parle de « notre participation au sacrifice du Christ » (618). La participation réelle de l'Église au sacrifice du Christ est parfaitement légitime, et est en fait un pur truisme, dans le cadre de la dogmatique catholique. L'implication de l'Église est si importante que l'eucharistie elle-même est présentée comme « le mémorial sacrificiel du Christ et de son corps l'Église » (1362). L'eucharistie est pour l'Église, mais aussi de l'Église et par l'Église (1118). Si nous examinons attentivement ce qui est explicitement affirmé ou implicitement admis dans le Catéchisme en ce qui concerne l'œuvre de la rédemption, il est clair que les lignes directrices fondamentales de la théologie sont en jeu dans les points que nous venons de voir brièvement. La notion de la re-présentation sacramentelle du sacrifice du Christ, alliée à celle de la participation de l'Église à ce sacrifice, touche au cœur du catholicisme. Dans sa manière d'aborder l'œuvre de la croix et l'eucharistie, le

Catéchisme réitère simplement l'ensemble de l'enseignement du concile de Trente tel qu'il a été réaffirmé par Vatican II, sans apporter d'élément nouveau qui pourrait le rapprocher d'une théologie de l'expiation plus évangélique.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Im Katechismus der Katholischen Kirche von 1992 wird der Sühnelehre nur eine Art Nebenrolle zugestanden. Die katholische Sicht der Sühne wird im Zusammenhang mit der Auslegung des vierten Artikels des Bekenntnisses des christlichen Glaubens (d. h. dem Apostolischen Glaubensbekenntnis) erläutert. Dort finden wir die Worte: 'Jesus Christus, gelitten unter Pontius Pilatus, gekreuzigt, gestorben und begraben'. Der maßgebliche Kommentar dazu findet sich in § 595–623.

Die Heilsdimension von Christi Opfer wird mittels der Konzepte 'Versöhnung' (§ 613–614), 'Erlösung und Wiedergutmachung' sowie 'Sühne und Genugtuung' (§ 616) beschrieben. Eine nähere Erläuterung der Begriffe findet sich jedoch nicht. Der Katechismus vertritt im Einklang mit der etablierten tridentinischen Tradition die universelle und unbegrenzte Dimension der Sühne.

Die knappe Erläuterung der soteriologischen Bedeutung des Leidens und Sterbens Jesu Christi bahnt den Weg zu einem spezifisch katholischen Verständnis der Sakramente im allgemeinen sowie der Eucharistie im besonderen (§ 1322–1419). Selbst ein flüchtiger Blick in das Inhaltsverzeichnis des Katechismus offenbart die gewaltige Diskrepanz zwischen der knapp umrissenen Theologie des Kreuzes und der ausführlich entwickelten Sakramentelehre. Der Katechismus hat scheinbar ein größeres Interesse daran, die Repräsentation der Sühne in der Eucharistie sowie deren Aktualisierung im Sakrament hervorzuheben als ihren historischen (als etwas ein für allemal Geschehenes) und heilschaffenden Charakter aufzuzeigen.

Am Ende des Abschnitts über das Leiden und Sterben Jesu Christi verweist der Katechismus auf 'unsere Teilhabe am Opfer Christi' (§ 618). Daß die Kirche tatsächlich Teil hat am Opfer Christi, erscheint im Rahmen der katholischen Dogmatik als vollkommen zulässig, ja als eine Binsenwahrheit. Die Rolle der Kirche ist so maßgebend, daß die Eucharistie als das 'Gedächtnis an das Opfer Christi und seinen Leib, die Kirche' erscheint (§ 1362). Die Eucharistie ist also ein Opfer für die Kirche von der Kirche und durch die Kirche (§ 1118). Wenn man die expliziten Behauptungen und impliziten Annahmen des Katechismus bezüglich des Versöhnungswerkes sorgfältig betrachtet, dann wird deutlich, daß in dem hier kurz Umrissenen das elementare Gedankengebäude des Katholizismus zutage tritt. Die Theologie der sakramentalen Repräsentation des Opfers Christi zusammen mit der Theologie der kirchlichen Teilhabe am Opfer Christi stellen das Herzstück des Katholizismus dar. In seiner Behandlung von Kreuzesthematik und Eucharistie wiederholt der Katechismus schlicht das Gros der tridentinischen Lehre in der Form, wie sie vom Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzil neu formuliert worden war. Neues im Sinne einer eventuellen Annäherung an eine stärker evangelisch geprägte Theologie der Sühne findet sich hier nicht.

Generally speaking, Roman Catholic doctrinal statements, both creedal formulations and catechistic tools show a high degree of theological sophistication. The wisdom, depth, width of the sapiential tradition of the church is apparent in its official writings. Moreover, Catholic magisterial documents are usually articulated in a language so meditated, pondered and polished that they often require several readings in order to be grasped. It should be recognised that the Vatican, among many other things, also produces masterful pieces of theological elaboration. This is even truer with regard to the works of individual catholic theologians, think of Yves Congar, Karl Rahner, Avery Dulles. . . . However, there are two doctrinal areas in which this combination of richness of thought and expository ability is not so evident as one would expect: one is these is eschatology, the other is the doctrine of the atonement.

On eschatology and the atonement, just to name two very broad theological *loci*, Catholic magisterial teaching is rather sober, hardly resembling the unmistakable symphonic Catholic way of theologizing. On these doctrines, the *magisterium* usually echoes a scripture-borrowed language and quotes long passages reflecting early church tradition. What seems to be lacking—this is a first, perhaps misleading impression—is the attempt to construe a typically catholic piece of doctrine with all its consolidated features.

In the 1992 *Catechism of the Catholic Church*,[1] the somewhat 'low-key' treatment of the atonement is consistently pursued in line with the above mentioned theological moderation. From a merely quantitative point of view, this scant approach is shown, firstly, by the rather hurried exposition of the significance of Christ's death which covers less than 30 paragraphs (595–623)—approximately 1% of the whole *Catechism*.[2] Secondly, the *Catechism*'s discourse on the atonement adopts a merely descriptive line in dealing with the variety of ways in which the Bible speaks of the cross of Christ. In the text promulgated by pope John Paul II, different biblical images and models of the atonement are evoked in order to present its multifaceted meaning. According to a Catholic commentator, Robert Murray, this descriptive way of presenting the atonement stands in continuity with 'a wise tradition in the Church' whereby no model of the atonement is given 'dogmatic status'.[3] In this respect, it is interesting to note that Murray contrasts the alleged *super-partes* position endorsed by Catholic teaching with the marked evangelical tendency to favour the 'penal substitution theory' as the chief soteriological paradigm for coming to grips with Christ's saving work on the cross. The *Catechism* does not espouse any image of the atonement as the controlling-principle nor does it elevate any image to play the role of hermeneutical regulator of the doctrine itself. Therefore, in expounding magisterial teaching on the atonement, the *Catechism* is said to have simply restated 'the common themes which have always stimulated the Church's prayerful reflection'.[4]

These rather hasty considerations are sufficient to provide a general introduction to the understanding of the atonement as it is articulated in the *Catechism*. To deepen our appreciation of it, it seems necessary to explore the dynamics of the doctrinal exposition which entail the historical events related to Calvary and the sacramental corollary attached to the offering of the cross.

1. The sacrifice of Christ and its historico-salvific significance

The catholic view of the atonement is presented in the context of the exposition of the Fourth Article of the Profession of the Christian Faith (i.e. the Apostles' Creed) which states: 'Jesus Christ suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, died and was buried'. The magisterial comment can be found in paragraphs 595–623.

In the first part of the section, after recalling the trials of Jesus, attention is given to the fact that the responsibility for Jesus' death is not attributable to the Jews as a specific ethnic group, but to all

sinners as the whole of the human race (595–598). That is to say, on the one hand, Jews are not collectively responsible for Jesus' death and, on the other, all sinners were the authors of Christ's passion and death.

Subsequently, the *Catechism* unfolds the redemptive significance of the events related to the cross in God's plan of salvation. Christ's death was in accordance to God's will to make His love effective in that way (599–600); it was also the fulfilment of the Scriptures' foretelling which prefigured what was to happen, and, in this context, Isaiah's prophecy of the suffering Servant is mentioned (601). Moreover, it was 'for our sake' that Christ died, that is He experienced reprobation not because He himself had sinned but because God 'established him in solidarity with us sinners' (602–603). The reference to the clause 'for our sake' is explained in terms of Jesus assuming us in the state of our waywardness of sin thus establishing a solidarity with sinners. In line with the sobriety of the catholic treatment of the atonement already referred to, no further hints are given as to the way the nature of this 'solidarity' should be understood. To widen the picture, it should be noted that the substitutionary language is also evoked when, in the context of a reference to Isaiah 53,10–12, Jesus is said to have 'accomplished the substitution of the suffering Servant' (615) and thus 'atoned for our faults and made satisfaction for our sin' (615). Solidarity and substitution appear to be the two relevant hermeneutical keys to substantiate theologically the biblical expression 'for our sake'. What seems to be prevalent, however, is an interpretation of the 'for our sake' clause whereby Christ is thought of choosing to be near to sinners, alongside them, beside them. 'For our sake' takes a nuance of meaning underlining the fact of Jesus sympathizing with the fallen human race.

On the whole, these paragraphs stand out for their concentration on the salvific significance of Jesus' life and ministry which finds its climax at Calvary. The full story of Jesus is the core of the presentation as well as the proper context for understanding the events related to the cross. According to Wolfhart Pannenberg, this particular section 'forms a high point of the entire work because here finally attention is paid to modern exegesis in that the sacrifice of Jesus is not presented as an appeasement of the Father nor is it limited to the crucifixion'. In Pannenberg's opinion, the proper focus of this part of the *Catechism* is instead, and rightly so in his view, 'Jesus' entire life of commitment to the mission he received from his Father for the salvation of humanity'.[5]

This is not to say that there is no attempt to provide soteriological insights as far as the atoning meaning of the cross is concerned. As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, the *Catechism*, in its rather descriptive vein, employs different formulae and definitions with reference to Christ's death. The cross is seen, first, in the context of the relationship between the Son and the Father, then in relation to the Paschal theme and, lastly, in terms of what it accomplished redemptively. More specifically, Christ's death is referred to as a 'voluntary offering to the Father for the salvation of men' (610); 'an act of complete and free submission to the Father's will' (1008); 'the Paschal sacrifice that accomplishes the definitive redemption of men' (616); a 'redemptive sacrifice for all' (616); 'a mystery of universal redemption' (601). In an encompassing clause, the salvific apprehension of Christ's sacrifice is specified in terms of 'reconciliation' (613, 614), 'redemption and reparation', 'atonement and satisfaction' (616) but no further elucidation of these terms is provided. Their theological meaning is left loosely undefined and this semantic imprecision should be seen in relation to the rather descriptive purpose already referred to.

Concerning the nature of the sacrifice of Christ, the *Catechism* specifies that it is 'unique' in the sense that 'it completes and surpasses all other sacrifices' (614), that is Old Testament sacrifices. It is therefore a retroactive and retrospective uniqueness, a uniqueness in comparison with the sacrifices of the old covenant

which have ceased in the new dispensation. Whether or not the new covenant demands that the sacrifice of Christ be made present again and again is not mentioned at this point. It is true that earlier on the *Catechism* says that Christ's was a 'perfect and unique oblation on the cross' (529), even though the semantic contours of this perfection and uniqueness are not spelt out. As we will see later, the understanding of the finality of the cross is dealt with in the *Catechism* by inserting it in the wider sacramental system which calls for re-presentation and actualization of the sacrifice of Christ and participation in it.

One aspect which perhaps deserves consideration is related to the *vexata quaestio* concerning the extension of the atonement. In this respect, the *Catechism* espouses the universal, unlimited thrust of the atonement in line with the well-established tridentine tradition. Added to that, as we have seen from the paragraphs already quoted, in the *Catechism* there are numerous texts which point to a universal application of salvation without, of course, explicitly affirming it.

The statement 'Christ died for all men without exception' in his 'universal redeeming love' (605) epitomizes very clearly the catholic position on the matter. Later (616), we read that 'the existence in Christ of the divine person of the Son, who at once surpasses and embraces all human persons, and constitutes himself as the Head of all mankind, makes possible his redemptive sacrifice *for all*'. In order to support the unlimited interpretation of the death of Christ, the *Catechism* quotes the Council of Quiercy (853 AD), which in turn affirms that 'there is not, never has been, and never will be a single human being for whom Christ did not suffer' (605). This alleged conciliar confirmation of the view of a universal extension of the redemption achieved by the cross appears to be, to say the least, rather inappropriate. In actual fact, the full quotation of the Council of Quiercy is the following: 'as there is not, never has been, and never will be a single human being whose nature has not been assumed by Jesus Christ, our Lord, so there is not, never has been, and never will be a single human being for whom Christ did not suffer; however, not all are redeemed by the mystery of his suffering'.[6]

The appeal to this Council is not convincing for a number of reasons. Firstly, it should be recalled that Quiercy refers to Christ's *suffering*, not to his death as the context of paragraph 605 would instead clearly imply. Moreover, Quiercy thinks of Christ's suffering in analogy with the incarnation, not with his death as the *Catechism* maintains. Finally, whereas Quiercy upholds the reality of reprobation, paragraph 605 uses the quotation from the Council to stress God's universal redeeming love. As a matter of historical fact, the purpose and the focus of the council of Quiercy was the rejection of double predestination and not the endorsement of an unlimited view of the extension of the atonement. Perhaps, it is not unfair to say that, in this respect, the *Catechism* has made an unfortunate choice of a historic magisterial text which, though not incompatible with the general thrust of this section, does not in fact directly back up what has been argued in it.

On the whole, then, it is a concise exposition of the fourth article of the Creed which underlines the importance of Jesus' entire life on earth and recapitulates a wide range of fundamental images of the atonement without providing a distinct theological framework with regard to the shaping of an overall doctrinal interpretation. In the final paragraph of the section (618), however, a typically Catholic appreciation of the sacrifice of Christ begins to emerge when 'our participation in Christ's sacrifice' is evoked and the possibility 'of being made partners in the paschal mistery' is envisaged. This is just the anticipation of what constitutes a foundational tenet of the Catholic dogmatic system which is developed later in the *Catechism*.

2. The eucharist as the sacramental re-presentation of the sacrifice of Christ

The brief exposition of the soteriological significance of the passion and death of Jesus Christ does not represent all that the *Catechism* teaches on the accomplishment and application of redemption. It simply opens the door to the specifically Catholic understanding of the sacraments in general and of the eucharist in particular.

Even a quick perusal of the contents of the *Catechism* will show a striking contrast between a briefly sketched theology of the cross and a fully developed sacramentology. On the one hand, a sober presentation of the atonement of Christ and, on the other, a majestic depiction of the sacrament of the eucharist. This is evident even from a quantitative point of view: there is an outstanding disproportion in the economy of the whole *Catechism* between the brief way in which Christ's death is treated (less than 30 paragraphs), and the detailed exposition of the sacrament of the eucharist which covers almost 100 paragraphs (1322–1419). Theologically, this quantitative disproportion involves a shift of attributed importance from the definitive significance of Christ's sacrifice at Calvary to the eucharistic re-presentation of that sacrifice.

We are confronted here with a crucial point in Catholic magisterial teaching: the *Catechism* is far more interested in presenting the eucharistic re-presentation and the sacramental actualization of the atonement than in presenting its once and for all historical occurrence and salvific achievement. Of course, Catholicism does not perceive the distinction between the cross-offering and the mass-offering as a polarization or contraposition between two conflicting elements, as if one would imply the exclusion of the other and viceversa. The Catholic mindset is able to coniugate the two offerings so as to overcome their reciprocal exclusiveness. Having said that, the lasting impression is that the 'whenever' of the eucharist supersedes the 'once only' of Calvary, the altar absorbes the cross and the sacramental system encapsulates the redemptive event. In the light of this sustained emphasis, it is not at all surprising to read the *Catechism* stating in a rather doxological vein that 'the Eucharist is the source and summit of the Christian life' (which is actually a quotation from LG 11). No parallel statements, or at least comparable ones, are referred to the cross.

We are not interested here to follow the *Catechism* on the *why*, *how*, *when*, *where* and *by whom* the eucharist is celebrated, nor is this the occasion to formulate a theological analysis of the eucharist within the Catholic doctrinal system;[7] rather, we are concerned with the *what* is celebrated in the eucharist in terms of the nexus between the once-for-all event of Calvary and the continuing celebration of the sacrament.

First of all, it is important to highlight the language employed by the *Catechism* with regard to the relation between the eucharist and the cross. In providing a sort of basic definition, it argues that the eucharist 're-presents (makes present) the sacrifice of the cross, because it is its memorial and because it applies its fruit' (1366). Other expressions include the following: the eucharist 'perpetuates the sacrifice of the cross throughout the ages' (1323), it is the perpetuation of Jesus' offering (611), it 'makes present the one sacrifice of Christ the Saviour' (1330), it 'is the memorial of Christ's Passover, the making present and the sacramental offering of his unique sacrifice' (1362), in it (i.e. the eucharist) 'the sacrifice of Christ offered once for all on the cross remains ever present' (1364). If we widen the scope of the magisterial teaching to earlier documents, the eucharistic vocabulary becomes even richer. In the encyclical *Mediator Dei* (1947), for instance, pope Pius XII wrote that the eucharist 'represents', 're-enacts', 'symbolises', 'renews' and 'shows forth' the sacrifice of the cross.[8] Apart from the complex terminology adopted, here once again the *Catechism* does not fully delineate the

theological connotation of eucharistic vocabulary.

What is all-together clear is that, in the catholic understanding of the connection between Calvary and the eucharist, the cross-offering is inextricably related to the mass-offering. The latter is to be understood as a renewal and perpetuation of the former and is essentially linked to it. The eucharist 'is a memorial filled with the reality of that which it commemorates'[9] and, therefore, it 'neither merely recalls nor actually repeats the sacrifice of the cross, but renders it sacramentally present'.[10] In the eucharist, the reality signified—i.e. the body and blood of the Lord Jesus—which has its proper mode of existence elsewhere, is truly contained in its symbolic re-presentation. The eucharist is thought of not as being the completion nor the reduplication of the cross but its sacramental re-enactment within the liturgical gathering of the church. In this respect, it should be pointed out that the popular evangelical critique of Roman eucharistic teaching is simply wrong when attributes to Catholicism the view according to which the eucharist is a mere *repetition* of the cross. It is not a repetition, but something subtley different!

So interwoven is the eucharist with the cross that the two sacrifices are considered as 'one single sacrifice' (1367), though as we have already seen, the cross is also said to be a 'unique' sacrifice. Apparently, the *tetelestai* of John 19,30 ('it is finished') and the *ephapax* theme of the letters to the Hebrews and Jude ('once for all') are understood dynamically so as to include subsequent enactments of the same sacrifice. The Catholic concept of time allows such an elastic interpretation.[11]

Coming back to the relationship between the cross and the eucharist, the victim of the sacrifice is the same whereas the manner is different, bloody as for the former, unbloody as for the latter (1367). The unbloody sacrifice of the eucharist is the bloody sacrifice of Calvary made present in the mysterious presence of Christ in the consacrated host, in virtue of the heavenly priestly ministry of Jesus, and as a pledge of the Church's union with Him as His body. To show the continuity of the Catholic Church's teaching in this respect, the *Catechism* extensively quotes the Council of Trent[12] and various Vatican II documents.[13] It is throughout apparent that the axis Trent-Vatican II forms the strong backbone of the *Catechism* on the eucharist. The two councils which are considered so different in many respects stand nonetheless in linear continuity on this doctrine.

The eucharist is also a sacrifice, states paragraph 1365, not just an oblation. It is a sacrifice *because* it is the memorial of Christ's passover. The sacrifice of Christ is made present in the eucharist so that the sacramental act which makes it present shares the same sacrificial nature of the cross. In other words, the eucharist is a sacrifice *as* the cross is a sacrifice and *because* the cross is a sacrifice.

Because it is a single sacrifice with the cross, the eucharist has also redemptive value and effects. In fact, the *Catechism* maintains that 'as often as the sacrifice of the Cross by which "Christ our Pasch has been sacrificed" is celebrated on the altar, the work of redemption is carried out' (1364 quoting LG 3). The council of Trent spoke of the eucharist as being also 'truly propitiatory';[14] in the *Catechism*, this propitiatory connotation of the eucharist has been dropped out in the sense that it is not repeated explicitly. However, the tridentine theology of eucharistic propitiation remains basically unaltered in that the eucharist is recognised as having both a sacrificial status and a redemptive function.

3. The eucharist as the sacrifice of the body of Christ, the church

So far, we have seen that the *Catechism* focuses on the historical event of the atonement and, with a much more detailed theological construction, on the sacramental events which re-enact it. The link between the cross-offering and the eucharistic offering is one of the major tenets of the whole Catholic understanding of the nature of the atonement

and the way in which its redemptive achievements are communicated to mankind. There is yet another key element of extraordinary dogmatic weight which stems from the teaching of the *Catechism* and which belongs to the essential core of the Roman Catholic faith.

As already indicated, at the end of the section on the passion and death of Jesus Christ, the *Catechism* makes reference to 'our participation in Christ's sacrifice' (618), where 'our' stands for the collective participation of all who, by means of the incarnation, are somehow united with Christ (cf. GS 22,2). It should be noted that, for Catholicism, 'our participation' has a distinct ecclesial significance, meaning the church's participation. This clause—'our participation in Christ's sacrifice'—immediately sounds an alarm bell in Protestant ears inasmuch as the uniqueness, sufficiency, completeness and finality of the cross would not contemplate any sort of addition, supplementation or contribution on our part as individuals or as a church. If it is Christ's, it is not ours in the sense that we do not actively participate in it but only thankfully and undeservedly receive its gracious benefits by faith. Of course, the church's actual taking part in the sacrifice of Christ is instead perfectly legitimate, indeed a sheer truism, within the Catholic dogmatic framework. Where a Protestant sensitivity perceives an incompatibility, indeed an impossibility of any form of synergism between the perfect work of Christ and our response to it, the Catholic mindset allows, indeed requires that what is attributable to Christ somehow pertains to the church as well. According to the *Catechism* (which at this point quotes GS 22,5), the possibility of being partners in the paschal mystery is offered to everybody (618). This rather cryptic expression is not spelt out in this paragraph but is instead inserted prolectically anticipating what will follow in another section.

In order to receive clarification on the matter, we have to refer to the section on the ecclesial aspects of the eucharist, where the teaching on the way in which this participation in Christ's sacrifice is to be apprehended is unfolded. The *Catechism* envisages an ecclesial active participation in the sacramental enactment of the eucharist. Not only is the eucharist the sacramental re-presentation of Christ's sacrifice but it is also the sacramental enactment of the sacrifice of the church. The church's involvement is so prominent that the eucharist itself is said to be the 'memorial of the sacrifice of Christ and his body, the church' (1362). In the eucharist, 'the sacrifice of Christ becomes also the sacrifice of the members of the body' (1368) and therefore it 'includes the Church's offering' (1330). In the sacramental act, the church is the recipient of the benefits of the eucharist but it is also the active agent, the offering party and, because she is the body of Christ, the church is the content of the offering itself. The eucharist is something offered *for* the church but also *from* the church and *by* the church (1118). The church is so directly involved in what happens in the eucharist than what is offered in the eucharist is *her* offering, *her* sacrifice. It is also true that, according to the *Catechism*, the church's sacrifice is never isolated from its Head, as if it were *another* sacrifice, but, on the contrary, the church offers it *in* Christ, *with* Christ and *through* Christ (1368), thus it is the one and same sacrifice of Christ (1367).

Here, the Catholic understanding of the *unio mystica* between Christ and the church is fully in view and forms the theological background against which the whole discourse of the *Catechism* on the participation of the church in the sacrifice of Christ needs to be considered. In the eucharist, Christ and the church are so closely intertwined that, as Raymond Moloney has maintained, 'the one who offers is the one who is offered, namely the body of Christ, Head and members, now united in one great communion of worship'.[15] In the eucharist, the relationship between Christ and church is thought of as belonging to the categories of head and members forming together the whole Christ, the *totus Christus* (795). Head and members are united in the offering of the eucharist.

So, the mode of participation of the church in the sacrifice of Christ is sacramental; the sacramental event in which the participation takes place is the eucharist; the theological rationale which warrants participation is the mystical union between Christ and the church, head and members, who form one body (1119, 793); the content of the sacrifice includes the church herself in that the church, as the members of the mystical body, cannot be separated from the Head which is offered.

4. A brief and provisional evangelical evaluation

A brief summary of some of the prominent aspects of what the *Catechism* teaches on the cross and the eucharist could be helpful at this point. First, the sacrifice of Christ has to be made present and actualized in order for its benefits to be applied. Second, its re-enactment occurs in the eucharist. Third, the eucharist is the sacrament from the church and by the church. Lastly, the church is mystically united with Christ, forming a single body with Him.

If we look carefully at what is explicitly affirmed or implicitly assumed in the *Catechism* as far as the work of redemption is concerned, it becomes clear that the fundamental Catholic framework of thought is at stake in what we have briefly overviewed.

The theology of sacramental re-presentation of the sacrifice of Christ combined with the theology of ecclesial participation in the sacrifice of Christ go to the very heart of Catholicism. On the one hand, we are confronted with the sacramental principle of Catholic theology whereby divine grace, in order to be mediated to created nature, needs *ever-enacted provisions* (instantiations) *of grace* beyond the unique event of Calvary, even though not without Calvary, and passes through the *ecclesial apparatus and procedures as means of grace* beyond the sovereignty of grace and beyond the reception by faith, even though not without faith. On the other, the incarnational principle of Catholic theology whereby the church is seen as the *extension of the incarnation* of Christ, forming with Him a mystical body, and, by way of this mystical union, exchanging properties with Him and taking an active part in His redemptive work.

What is more foundational to Roman Catholicism than its over-arching sacramental structure and its magnificient ecclesiological self-apprehension? Having said that, there is perhaps the possibility of pushing the analysis further by underlining the typically Catholic epistemological framework in which these sacramental and incarnational principles operate and which governs them. I mean the kind of (theo-)logic which functions beneath the surface of the Catholic dogmatic discourse, i.e. the *both-and approach*, the *et-et*. In the Catholic *Catechism*, we have the cross *and* the eucharist, the once-for-all event *and* the sacramental re-presentation, the sacrifice of Christ *and* the sacrifice of the church, etc. This kind of stereoscopic epistemology enables Catholicism to join together two elements so as to form an integrated whole. According to it, maintaining something does not necessarily mean negating something else; on the contrary, two contrasting perspectives may bring different light to the same truth, the comprehensive truth, the Catholic truth.[16] As everybody knows, the Reformation endorsed a totally different mindset stemming from a radically different epistemology, the so-called *aut-aut* approach, the *either-or*. Not by chance, the Reformers saw that it was necessary to make fundamental choices involving not only the affirmation of the truth but also the rejection of what was perceived as incompatible with biblical teaching. Therefore, expressions like *solo Christo*, *sola gratia* and *sola fide* express very clearly the need for theological rigour and integrity. In the light of what has been said concerning the teaching of the *Catechism*, one wonders whether the old epistemological issue between Catholicism and Protestantism is still a neuralgic, strategic point of differentiation which impinges on many areas of their respective theological orientations.

In its dealing with the whole issue of the cross and the eucharist, the *Catechism* simply reiterates the bulk of the tridentine teaching as re-expressed by Vatican II, without breaking any new ground as to a possible rapprochement with a more evangelically shaped theology of the atonement. In this respect, I must confess that I find the recent document *The Gift of Salvation* released in the USA at the end of 1997 and subscribed to by some evangelicals and Catholics, at the very least puzzling if not misleading.[17] More than that, the possibility of engaging in constructive dialogue on the doctrine of the atonement is not promising, given the centrality within the Catholic framework of the related issues of the sacraments and the church which, in the *Catechism* at least, appear to be unquestioned and unquestionable.

Don Carson has recently written that 'at the risk of oversimplification, Catholicism elevates ecclesiology over soteriology' whereas 'evangelicalism does the reverse'.[18] I would rather prefer to say that Catholicism, unlike Evangelicalism, sacramentalizes and ecclesiasticizes soteriology. In fact, the acknowledgement that ecclesiology is elevated above soteriology actually means that, in Catholic theology, ecclesiology and sacramentology determine the doctrinal profile of soteriology. In the end, the sacramental and ecclesial attachments to the work of Christ, as found in the *Catechism*, deprive the atoning death of Christ of its finality because, though considered as paramount, the cross is not appreciated as efficacious *per se*. By ascribing to the eucharist the possibility of applying the fruits of the cross to man, the *Catechism* makes the response of faith necessary but not sufficient in order to be saved. Moreover, by assigning to the church a highly-christological status with *quasi*-ontological overtones, the *Catechism* makes it possible for the church to play a co-operative role in salvation. These are all controversial issues that Evangelicals have traditionally and critically dealt with in their attempts to evaluate Roman Catholic doctrine.[19] The difference on these constitutive matters is still with us and is as wide and fundamental as ever.

In closing, I find no more adequate words than those used by the World Evangelical Fellowship in its 1986 *Perspective on Roman Catholicism*. Chronologically, they were written prior to the publication of the *Catechism* but, nonetheless, they can be referred to the thrust of this new magisterial document: 'At bottom, our evangelical critique of Roman Catholic sacramentology points up the conflict between two opposing views of the Christian faith. Rome sees itself as an extension of the incarnation, thus divinizing human beings as they cooperate with God's grace that is conferred by the church. Over against this view stands our evangelical commitment to the free gift of righteousness, imputed solely by the grace of God, received by a true faith that answers to God's Word, and based fully upon the once-for-all expiation of guilt through the finished sacrifice of the perfect Substitute, Christ Jesus. This confession is for us the gospel'.[20]

Bibliography

John Armstrong (ed.), *Roman Catholicism. Evangelical Protestants Analyze What Divides and Unites Us* (Chicago: Moody Press 1994)

Gerrit C. Berkouwer, *De Sacramenten* (E.t.: *The Sacraments*, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans 1969)

Henri Blocher, 'Scripture and Tradition: an Evangelical Response', *Evangelical Review of Theology* 21:2 (1997), 121–127

Gerald L. Bray, *Sacraments & Ministry in Ecumenical Perspective* (Oxford: Latimer Studies n. 18, 1984)

Donald A. Carson, 'Reflections on Salvation and Justification in the New Testament', *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 40:4 (1997) 591–608

Herbert M. Carson, *The Faith of the Vatican. A Fresh Look at Roman Catholicism* (Darlington: Evangelical Press 1996)

Catechism of the Catholic Church (London: Geoffrey Chapman 1994)

Norman L. Geisler—Ralph E. MacKenzie, *Roman Catholics and Evangelicals. Agreements and Differences* (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House 1995)

E. J. Kilmartin, 'Eucharist' in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 5 (1967) 608–615
Hywel R. Jones, *Gospel & Church. An Evangelical Evaluation of Ecumenical Documents on Church Unity* (Bridgend: Evangelical Press of Wales 1989)
Berard L. Marthaler (ed.), *Introducing the Catechism of the Catholic Church* (London: SPCK 1994)
Michael J. McClymond, 'Further Along the Way: A Review of *Catechism of the Catholic Church*—A Review Essay', *Christian Scholar's Review (1996) 113–118*
Alister E. McGrath, 'Do We Still Need the Reformation? A review of the new Catholic catechism', *Christianity Today* (Dec 12, 1994) 28–33
Raymond Moloney SJ, *The Eucharist* (London: Geoffrey Chapman 1995)
Aidan Nichols, *The Splendour of Doctrine. The Catechism of the Catholic Church on Christian Believing* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1995)
Wolfhart Pannenberg, *'Catechism of the Catholic Church*. An Evangelical Viewpoint', *Pro Ecclesia* IV:1 (1995) 49–58
Leo Scheffczyk, 'Eucharist' in K. Rahner (ed.), *Sacramentum Mundi. An Encyclopedia of Theology*, vol. 2 (London: Burns & Oates 1968) 273–276
Paul G. Schrotenboer (ed.), *Roman Catholicism. A Contemporary Evangelical Perspective* (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House 1988)
Alan M. Stibbs, *The Finished Work of Christ* (London: Tyndale Press 1954).
John R. W. Stott, *The Cross of Christ* (Leicester: IVP 1986)
Vittorio Subilia, *Il problema del cattolicesimo* (E.t.: *The Problem of Catholicism*, London: SCM 1964)
Vittorio Subilia, *La nuova cattolicità del Cattolicesimo* (Torino: Claudiana 1967)
Michael J. Walsh (ed.), *Commentary on the Catechism of the Catholic Church* (London: Geoffrey Chapman 1994)

Notes

1 The *Catechism* was launched on October 11th 1992, though the English official translation was published only in 1994. Introductory reviews and commentaries on the *Catechism* are Walsh (1994), Marthaler (1994), McGrath (1994), Nichols (1995) and McClymond (1996). Evangelical works dealing with it are Geisler-MacKenzie (1995), H. Carson (1996) and occasionally Armstrong (1994).
2 The *Catechism* contains 2,865 paragraphs.
3 Robert Murray SJ, 'The Human Capacity for God, and God's initiative' in M. Walsh (1994) 6–33 (the quotation is from p. 31).
4 John McDade SJ, 'The Death of Christ, his Descent among the Dead, and his Resurrection' in M. Walsh (1994) 143–161 (the quotation is from p. 143).
5 Pannenberg (1995) 55–56.
6 Denz. 621–624.
7 In this respect, valuable material can be found in Kilmartin (1967), Scheffczyk (1968) and Moloney (1995).
8 Denz. 3840–3855. Cf. Stott (1986) 264–267.
9 Raymond Maloney SJ, 'The doctrine of the Eucharist' in M. Walsh (1994) 259–273 (the quotation is from p. 265).
10 Kilmartin (1967) 613.
11 I owe this point to Blocher (1997) 126.
12 1366: '. . . the bloody sacrifice which he (Christ) was to accomplish once for all on the cross would be re-presented, its memory perpetuated until the end of the world, and its salutary power be applied to the forgiveness of the sins we daily commit'. Other references to Trent are in §§ 1337, 1367, 1371, 1374, 1376, 1377, 1394.
13 e.g. §§ 1323, 1324, 1344, 1346, 1364, 1369, 1373, 1388, 1392, 1399, 1405.
14 Denz. 1743, 1753.
15 R. Moloney, 'The doctrine of the Eucharist' in M. Walsh (1994) 267.
16 These constitutive aspects of Catholic epistemology have been masterfully studied, though from a neo-orthodox point of view, in the works by Subilia (1964, 1967).
17 The text can be found in *Christianity Today* (Dec. 8, 1997) 34.
18 D. Carson (1997) 606.
19 Cf. Stibbs (1954), Berkouwer (1968) *passim*, Bray (1984), Stott (1986) 255–273, Jones (1989) 55–83 and H. Carson (1996) 151–168.
20 Schrotenboer (1988) 74.

EuroJTh (1999) **8:1**, 61–78 0960–2720

• An Ambivalent Disciple: Barth's Use of Calvin in the *Göttingen Dogmatics*[1]
• *Un disciple ambivalent : comment Barth utilise Calvin dans la dogmatique de Göttingen (1924–1925)*
• *Ein zwiespältiger Jünger: Barths Verwendung von Calvin in der Göttinger Dogmatik (1924–25)*

S. W. Chung, Oxford

RÉSUMÉ

La relation théologique de Karl Barth avec Jean Calvin est demeurée trop longtemps ignorée du monde académique, sans raison légitime. Considérant que Barth a affirmé à plusieurs reprises sa lourde dette à l'égard de la théologie de Calvin, il est essentiel de prendre en compte la relation de Barth à Calvin afin de comprendre correctement le caractère de la théologie de Barth. La Dogmatique de Göttingen constituait, à l'origine, le contenu des premiers cours de dogmatique donnés à l'université par Barth en 1924–1925. Elle montre que Barth a fait un usage très attentif des arguments théologiques de Calvin pour construire ses propres positions théologiques. Barth admirait Calvin tout en s'opposant à lui. Par certains côtés, Barth a développé d'une manière créative les apports théologiques de Calvin. Mais, sous d'autres aspects, il a critiqué et rejeté sans hésiter ses arguments. Ainsi, sa manière d'utiliser la sagesse théologique de Calvin peut être caractérisée comme étant à la fois élogieuse et critique, voire hostile. Dans ce sens, Barth peut être considéré comme ayant une attitude ambivalente vis-à-vis de Calvin. La raison de cette ambivalence tient au fait que Barth n'avait aucun désir de reproduire les idées de Calvin et qu'il avait ses propres préoccupations et objectifs, lesquels étaient conditionnés par ses présupposés philosophiques et théologiques.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Karl Barths theologische Beziehung zu Johannes Calvin ist von der Forschung viel zu lange ignoriert worden, noch dazu ohne ersichtlichen Grund. Berücksichtigt man, daß Barth den starken Einfluß von Calvins Theologie wiederholt bekräftigt hat, so scheint es geboten, seine Beziehung zu Calvin zu untersuchen, um so das Wesen von Barths Theologie besser verstehen zu können. Die Göttinger Dogmatik, die auf Barths erste Universitätsvorlesungen in den Jahren 1924–25 zurückgeht, zeigt, daß Barth Calvins theologische Argumentation auf sorgsame Weise zur Entwicklung seiner eigenen theologischen Positionen herangezogen hat. Barth war ein Bewunderer und doch auch zugleich ein Kritiker Calvins. Er hat manche seiner theologischen Einsichten auf kreative, im Grunde aber bejahende Weise weiterentwickelt. Andererseits hat sich Barth aber nie davor gescheut, Calvins Positionen zu kritisieren oder zurückzuweisen. Sein Umgang mit Calvins theologischen Einsichten ist einerseits anerkennend, doch zugleich auch kritisch und zuweilen gar ablehnend. Barths Einstellung zu Calvin ist also gespalten. Der Grund für diese Ambivalenz liegt darin, daß er keineswegs darum bemüht war, Calvins Gedanken zu läutern, sondern vielmehr

seine eigenen, von seinen philosophischen und theologischen Voraussetzungen bestimmten, Anliegen verfolgte.

1. Introduction

Karl Barth's *Göttingen Dogmatics* is a product of his first attempt to articulate his new vision of Christian dogmatics after his break with liberalism, and it was based on his lecture course on 'Instruction in the Christian Religion' titled after John Calvin's *Institutes of the Christian Religion* in the University of Göttingen in 1924/25. These Göttingen lectures on dogmatics were one of the three cycles of his whole lectures on dogmatics delivered in Göttingen and Münster (1924/6), Münster (1926/8), and Bonn and Basle (1931–61) respectively.[2] Ever since his inauguration as the honorary professor of Reformed Dogmatics in the University of Göttingen in 1921, Barth had been concentrating his energy on studying Calvin's theology, other Reformers' theology and Reformed theology embodied in Reformed catechisms and confessions including the Geneva Catechism and the Heidelberg Catechism.[3] For example, in his letter of January 22, 1922 to Edward Thurneysen, Barth talks about the progress of his study of Calvin and the Reformation:

> What do I do? I study. Chiefly the Reformation and everything connected with it. A voluminous card-index is coming into being in which everything of importance finds its place. The Calvin lecture for the summer gives me considerable trouble.[4]

Thus, it is arguable that the *Göttingen Dogmatics* demonstrates the consequences of his careful study of Reformed theology as well as his manner of incorporation and appropriation of the Reformers' theology including Calvin's.

In these lectures, Barth presents his own view of the prolegomena to dogmatics, addressing the doctrine of the Word of God as revelation (Chapter 1), Scripture (Chapter 2) and preaching (Chapter 3).[5] In addition, he provides an articulation of his understanding of the doctrinal substance of theology proper, dealing with the doctrine of God (Chapter 4) and the doctrine of humanity (Chapter 5). In his preparation for these lectures Barth obtained great assistance from Heinrich Heppe's *Reformed Dogmatics*[6] and H. Schmid's Lutheran dogmatics.[7] The lectures also display his new discovery of the importance and relevance of both the Reformation theology and the Protestant orthodox theology for his work of establishing a new foundation for the future Christian Reformed dogmatics:

> After much head shaking and astonishment, I agree with orthodoxy on almost all points and hear myself lecturing about things that I would never have dreamed could really be true when I was a student or when I was pastor in Safenwil. I am excitedly waiting how the whole will look to me when I can get some distance from it after it is finished.[8]

One of the most significant contributions, however, of the *Göttingen Dogmatics* is that it provides one with an excellent picture of Barth's manner in using Calvin's theology for the development of his own dogmatic arguments and Calvin's role in Barth's theological and dogmatic formulation and elaboration. Ever since his starting on the writing of *Romans* II (1920) Barth had studied seriously and carefully Calvin's theology by reading his *Institutes*, commentaries, catechism and confession.[9] As a result of this study, he gave a lecture course on Calvin's life, reforming work and theological thought in Göttingen in 1922.[10] Barth's knowledge of Calvin's theology obtained in the process of his study of and lecture on Calvin made a great impact on these first lectures on dogmatics. It is not difficult, therefore, to infer that the *Göttingen Dogmatics* demonstrates Barth's view of Calvin's theological ideas and reforming vision together with his manner of appropriation and incorporation of

them for his own dogmatic reflection. This paper aims to investigate such a theme in detail by focusing on Barth's specific mentions of Calvin's name and citations of Calvin's theological arguments in the *Göttingen Dogmatics*. In the process we would make a contribution to the issue of Calvin's crucial and indispensable role in the development of Barth's new theology.

Numerous scholars, primarily German and Scandinavian Lutherans, have concentrated their energy on examining the theological relationship of Martin Luther and Karl Barth.[11] As a result, the character of their relationship seems to be widely understood. Furthermore, many important scholarly works on the relationship between Karl Barth and Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1831) have been produced.[12] However, there is no comprehensive work dealing with the theological relationship between Calvin and Barth other than a few monographs and articles on several specific topics.[13] Moreover, there has been no scholarly work that deals with Calvin's impact and influence on the theological beginning of Barth, the origin of his theological break with liberalism and the subsequent theological development of his dogmatic thinking.

For example, in addressing the issue of Barth's theological beginnings[14], Eberhard Jüngel never mentions Calvin's significant role in Barth's determination to radically break with liberal theology and his stringent endeavor to establish a new model for Reformed theology. He writes as if Calvin's role was not worth mentioning. Furthermore, it is regrettable that even Bruce L. McCormack does not see Calvin's foundational importance in Barth's theological beginning and development in his, otherwise considerably insightful work, *Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology*. He only attributes a negligible and subsidiary role to Calvin in the genetic development of Barth's theology.[15] Thomas F. Torrance is no exception. Although elsewhere he acknowledges Calvin's influence, in his book, *Karl Barth: An Introduction to his Early Theology 1910–1931*,[16] he fails to examine deeply the significance of Calvin's role in Barth's theological development despite referring to the name of Calvin in several places along with other figures who made an impact upon Barth. Hans Urs von Balthasar's book reveals the same tendency in taking no account of Calvin's definitely critical role in the genesis and development of Barth's new theology.[17]

Barth's relationship to Calvin and Calvin's role in Barth's theology have been neglected and ignored for a long time without any legitimate reason. It is irrefutable that Barth held Calvin and his theology in high regard, and Calvin was one of the most frequent dialogue partners of Barth in his theological formulation and elaboration throughout his entire theological career from the early period of the 1910s—alone with a deep feeling of frustration for what he saw as Calvin's failures. It is true that Barth lived with Calvin's theology and paid the closest attention to Calvin for the entirety of his life. Hence, for a correct and deep understanding of Barth's theological thought, a comprehension of his relationship and indebtedness to Calvin and of Calvin's crucial role in Barth's theology is truly essential and fundamental. Barth's theological relationship with Calvin deserves much scholarly interest and attention and this paper attempts to fill the gap. It is high time that we should pay a markedly deserved attention to Calvin's prominent role in Barth' theology. In this sense, the major concern of this paper lies in endeavoring to answer the question as to how Barth used Calvin's theological arguments for his own purpose of pursuing a new paradigm of Reformed theology in the modern context of the 20th century. Through examining and investigating Calvin's role in Barth's *Göttingen Dogmatics*, a considerable light should be shed upon Barth's relationship to Calvin.

2. Theological analysis of Barth's use of Calvin

It is a significant feature of Barth's use of Calvin that he mentions the name of

Calvin along with the great theologians of the past such as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas:

> We are a generation that has to learn again, sometimes even by name, what are the presuppositions that a Thomas, an Augustine before him, and a **Calvin** after him could quietly take for granted.[18]

It may be feasible that this statement demonstrates a lucid example of Barth's regarding Calvin as one of the most important representatives of classical Protestant theology on the same level with Thomas Aquinas as the doctor of the Roman Catholic church as well as Augustine of Hippo as the founder of the theology of the whole Western and Latin church. One can also point out that Barth believed that he and his students should learn Calvin's theological presuppositions in order to establish his and their own theological assumptions and substantial arguments.

Barth mentions the name of Calvin to emphasize his and his students' different situation from Calvin's: 'I repeat, we are not Thomas and Calvin. We have to relearn the most rudimentary presuppositions that were needed to answer the question (speaking about God). We can take only the smallest steps.'[19] Exploring the dangers and questions in writing dogmatics, Barth seeks to put a great stress on the difficulties that each theological generation must confront when they embark on the task of dogmatic reflection. This implies that for Barth the difficulty of the task of dogmatic elaboration lies in the fact that every attempt at a new dogmatics for a new generation of people must begin with a creative starting point and a new foundation rather than a repristination of an old work. Hence, every theological beginner should learn her predecessors' presuppositions including Calvin's but he must not repeat and reproduce them slavishly because his situation and theological context are different from theirs.

Accepting the modern attempts to define dogmatics as a science, Barth defines 'dogmatics' as 'scientific reflection on the Word of God'[20] but criticizes modern definitions as invalid since 'all those other definitions speak more or less expressly of faith, religion, or the religious consciousness, sometimes with an explicit limitation to present-day faith'[21] not of the Word of God. In saying this, Barth shows evidently his antipathy to the overall approach of modern theology to dogmatics from the perspective of an individual human subject rather than the objective Word of God and reality of God's revelation. He appeals to Calvin to validate his definition of dogmatics:

> The tradition behind them does not date only from Schleiermacher. It goes back by way of pietism to Protestant orthodoxy. Not to Zwingli and **Calvin**, one must say, in spite of the bad impression that might be made by a first glimpse of titles like *Commentary on True and False Religion* or *Institutes of the Christian Religion*. We have only to read the first pages of these books to be convinced that we do not have here a theology of religious consciousness. . . . Calvin, too, will link the knowledge of God directly to self-knowledge only in so far as insight into our poverty, nakedness, and ruin through the fall compel us to ask after God. To this extent, but only to this extent, can human awareness of God be the object of theology for **Calvin**.[22]

It is noteworthy here that in the very beginning of his dogmatic reflection Barth is guided by Calvin's fundamental idea of the correlation of the knowledge of God and ourselves. This means that Barth completed his break with the anthropological starting point of the liberal school of Schleiermacher and Herrmann and began to endeavor to establish a new theocentric starting point and foundation for dogmatics through the help of the Reformers' theology including Calvin's. For him, the fact that God has spoken (*Deus dixit*) should be the only adequate foundation for and proper object of the entire theology and dogmatic reflection. Besides, the above passage demonstrates another critical point in terms of Barth's view of the relationship between the

Reformers including Calvin and later Protestant orthodoxy. Barth sees here Protestant orthodoxy's deviation from the Reformers' original concern in that Protestant orthodoxy was not strictly faithful to their essential insight into the appropriate and unique object of dogmatics, that is, the Word of God. By implication, Barth acknowledges the possibilities of later orthodoxy's departure from and betrayal against the fundamental. principles of dogmatics that the Reformers espoused. It is at this point that Barth's appreciative acknowledgment of a normative role of Calvin's theological ideas within his dogmatic formulation stands out.

And yet, however normative and helpful Calvin's theological insights may be, Barth does not forget the crucial fact that he and his students are not living in the same classical age of theology, that is, they are living in the modern age after the Enlightenment and Schleiermacherian anthropocentric revolution in theology. Thus, it implies that Calvin's theology might have some limitations and inadequacies that cannot be applied directly to the modern age. Discussing the necessity of 'prolegomena' to modern dogmatics, Barth states, 'Melanchthon, Zwingli, and Calvin acted similarly. They were so sure of their cause that they hardly thought it worth the effort to devote more than a few pages to the concept and method of their science.'[23] This statement implies that since Calvin lived in a different age when there was no desperate need for dogmatic prolegomena, Calvin might not provide one with any valuable example and framework for his articulation of modern prolegomena to dogmatics. However, it must be pointed out that Barth has no wish to attack Calvin for his scanty treatment of preliminary discussion of the concept, task and method of dogmatics because he understands well the historical and theological situation which made Calvin and other Reformers have so little interest in and concern with so-called prolegomena to theology. Rather, he criticizes the post-Reformation orthodoxy and Schleiermacher for their too hasty surrender to modern science's demand of an apologetic discussion of presuppositions of their dogmatic constructions:

> To the extent that theologians increasingly lost sight of their theme and became unsure of their cause, beginning the tragic retreat which in the theology of Schleiermacher ended with total capitulation, there flourished introductions, prolegomena, debates about scripture, inspiration, revelation, miracles, religion, and reason, and apologetic efforts to establish and justify the discipline and its theme.[24]

Nevertheless, Barth acknowledges the necessity of a prolegomena for his own dogmatics because his work is inevitably situated to the modern age. 'This is a situation that no one can escape. I myself neither can nor wish to do so. We can none of us simply reverse the change that came about in Protestant theology around 1600 and act like a Thomas or a Calvin. . . . This is my view.'[25] Such a statement demonstrates that Barth has no wish to simply return to the pre-modern classical theology of the Reformers although he feels free to gain help from and consult them for his task of reformulation of a new Reformed dogmatics. On account of Barth's firm conviction of the importance, value, and relevance of the classical dogmatics including Calvin's *Institutes*, he encourages his students to begin their study of dogmatics with classical writers:

> As regards your private study of dogmatics, I cannot advise you to begin with modern writers. Even though you may later decide to go along with the great Schleiermacherian revolution which characterizes almost all modern dogmatics, my urgent recommendation is that you should know what you are doing when you take this course, having first learned and considered the unreconstructed dogmatics of the older writers, for example, the medieval dogmatics of Bonaventura, the reformation dogmatics of Melanchthon, Zwingli, and **Calvin**, and the dogmatics of orthodoxy as collected by Schweizer or Heppe in the case of the Reformed, Hase or Heinrich Schmid in the case of the Lutherans.[26]

One of the most prominent features of Barth's *Göttingen Dogmatics* is that it sees 'preaching as the starting point and goal of dogmatics'. This means that for Barth dogmatics should serve the ministry of the proclamation of the Word of God in the Church. To legitimate his conviction about the equation between the Word of God and preaching, Barth appeals to the Reformed fathers including Zwingli, Calvin and Bullinger:

> On the contrary, the Reformation orientation which took precisely this direction the most sharply, the church of Zwingli and **Calvin**, maintained this equation loudly and definitely from the very outset. The preaching of God's Word is God's Word.[27]

Once again, this statement demonstrates that Calvin is one of the most important theological authorities to whom Barth appeals for the legitimation and validation of his dogmatic argument. It also implies that Barth began to appreciate refreshingly the significance of the Reformation theology for his task to establish and articulate a modern Reformed dogmatic theology. Furthermore, it may be pointed out that it is indeed the case that the Reformed fathers including Calvin take the central place in Barth's dogmatic reflection and theological construction at this stage of his theological development. In fact, this initial attitude and relationship of Barth's to the Reformed fathers in general and Calvin's theology in particular is not to change considerably but to continue to play a crucial role as a foundational asset and resource in the future work of dogmatic elaboration as his later attempts at reformulation of dogmatics including *Christliche Dogmatik in Entwurf* as well as *Kirchliche Dogmatik* illustrate indisputably. Barth's emphasis on preaching as the basis and goal of dogmatics is to determine the direction which he will take in reconstruction of a modern Reformed dogmatics crystallizing in the *Church Dogmatics*.

It may be relevant to stress that in spite of his high regard and deep respect for Calvin's theological thought, Barth is not reluctant, if necessary, to go beyond Calvin. One excellent example might be his understanding and application of the notion of 'preaching':

> But the question then arises: Why specifically is the church's preaching God's Word? Might not other human voices proclaim this Word too, and do they not do so by common experience? Does not God speak through nature too, through history, through Handel's Largo and all kinds of good art? And can we say that God does not speak directly to people today? No, we cannot, is the obvious answer. As **Calvin** says, God is not tied to such aids or such inferior means. . . . As we have already said, nothing stands in the way of taking the idea of preaching broadly, more broadly than Bullinger and **Calvin** did. The general breakup of the Christian body simply compels us to do so today.[28]

One can infer from the passage that Barth feels free to develop his own dogmatic argument even though he wishes to remain faithful to the original and profound insights of Calvin as staunchly as possible. In terms of theological principles, Barth intends to be faithful to the Reformers' deep and valuable thought, and in practical construction of his dogmatic system, he seeks to advance further their insights in a manner corresponding to his own characteristic theology. Thus, he attributes the reason for his going beyond Calvin in his reinterpretation of the idea of 'preaching' to 'the general breakup of the Christian body' in his day. On the basis of the above discussion, one can suggest that Barth's attitude and relationship to Calvin may be characterised by both reverential dependence and insightful critique, not by a slavish repetition and repristination without any significant endeavour for critical engagement.

Addressing the relationship between the fact of *Deus dixit* (God speaks) and Scripture as understood in the Reformed church in contrast to the Lutheran church in the sixteenth century, Barth makes a considerably appreciative comment on

Calvin's view of and attitude to Scripture:

> To a degree and with an intensity that are almost intolerable to us today, people had to speak again about God in the light of this historical datum as though it could be done and had never been attempted before. Read some of the sermons of **Calvin** with this in mind. How this man is grasped and stilled and claimed . . . in the first instance simply by the authority of the biblical books, which year by year he never tired of expounding systematically down to the very last verse! How this man, moving always along the uncrossable wall of this authority, copying down what he finds copied there, as if the living words of God were heard there (as he himself says in the *Institutes*), becomes himself wholly voice and speech and persuasion, and can never exhaust or empty himself, as though nothing were more self-evident than this torrential talk about God in spite of all the objections which might be urged against it, and which himself knew well enough! Why was this? In the first instance we can find no other reason than this: Because he heard Moses, Jeremiah, and Paul speak about God, because he heard there the trumpet that summoned him to battle.[29]

This lengthy statement shows convincingly that Barth is knowledgeable about Calvin's reverential attitude to Scripture, besides endorsing Calvin's way of theologizing, which is totally dependent on the conviction of the authority of Scripture as the Word of God. As Calvin heard God's command and permission to preach the Word of God and to speak about God in and through the Bible, Barth wants to proclaim the Word of God testified by Scripture in obedience to God's demand. Barth views the task of dogmatics as a service to this ministry of the proclamation of the Word of God. For this reason, he intends to maintain a high view of Scripture as a witness of the Word of God, that is, revelation. It is important, however, to point out that Barth retains a nuanced distinction between direct revelation (the original Word of God) and indirect revelation (Scripture). For this reason, it is arguable that Barth's view of Scripture has a different dimension from Calvin's. As Barth himself states, 'most forceful of all is Calvin, who finds the supreme proof of Scripture in the fact that God speaks in it personally.'[30] In other words, while Calvin appears to identify Scripture as the Word of God and revelation itself, Barth tries to maintain the Reformed and Lutheran consensus (from his perspective) which makes a distinction 'between the inner Word *to* the apostles and the outer Word *of* the apostles.'[31] For Barth, 'Scripture does indeed bear witness to revelation, but it is not revelation itself.'[32] Thus, it is plausible that while Calvin exerts an indelible impact upon Barth's theological argument for the authority and indispensability of Scripture for the task of dogmatics, Barth makes a critical use of Calvin's deep insights for the confirmation and validation of his own arguments. Though not accepting Calvin's view of Scripture as the Word of God itself he rather presents his peculiar view of Scripture as the human witness to revelation.

Another pressing issue worthy to be discussed in terms of Barth's theological use and incorporation of Calvin's doctrine of Scripture is that Barth seems to accept Calvin's stress upon the secret testimony of the Holy Spirit:

> Such a 'we are' without experience is what **Calvin** likes to recall and appeal to in this connection: the secret testimony of the Holy Spirit by which the witness of Scripture becomes God's self-witness to us . . . Yet the very reference to the Holy Spirit, that is, to God himself in the present, in the church, and in us, is also a reminder that we have here something neither to be experienced nor to be thought not to be asserted, that God himself bears witness to himself. That he does so, not the heart, is what makes a theologian.[33]

One may infer from this statement that Barth intends to legitimate and justify his theological thought by appealing to Calvin's insightful idea, and this shows the Calvinian character of Barth's theology. Nevertheless, one can notice that

Barth's basic attitude to Scripture is different from Calvin's in that Barth shows his conviction about Scripture as the witness to the Word of God by employing the actualistic and dynamic term 'becomes'. In other words, for Barth Scripture is originally not God's own self-witness to humanity but fallible human witness to revelation, and it 'becomes' the Word of God by the secret witness of the Holy Spirit. Thus, for Barth Scripture cannot convey the Word of God in a substantial and essential manner, but in a dialectical and paradoxical manner. There is no necessary and inherent relationship between revelation and Scripture. The relationship between the Word of God and Scripture is contingent, depending upon the Holy Spirit's sovereign work to make Scripture become the Word of God. In contrast to Barth's conviction, what is striking is that Calvin believed that Scripture can convey the Word of God in a substantial and essential manner and he used the notion of the secret and inner testimony of the Holy Spirit to explain the process in which human beings come to be assured and convinced of the already established fact that Scripture carries the Word of God inherently and essentially.[34] Accordingly, even though it is the case that Barth positively appreciates[35] and uses Calvin's theological notion of the secret testimony of the Holy Spirit, one should remember that he employs the idea in a different context, especially in accordance with his dialectical and actualistic assumptions. This seems to demonstrate that Barth's theology possesses a peculiar dimension fundamentally different from Calvin's.

Discussing the question of humanity in paragraph 4, chapter 1, Barth contends that the question of humanity should be resolved in the context of humanity's relation to God, and criticizes modern theology's failure to understand this truth. 'Modern theology cannot press on with a good conscience to the statement of Pascal that we could not seek God if we had not already found him.'[36] For Barth, Calvin gives a good example to understand humanity's place and significance in relation to God in that Calvin's Geneva Catechism begins with an affirmation that 'the end of human life' is 'to share His good things, to be His image, to learn to know and serve Him that He may be glorified in us.'[37] It is undeniable that Barth's reference to Calvin's Geneva Catechism is a further example of Barth's appreciative reception and positive endorsement of Calvin's theological insight.

Addressing the issue of 'God as the subject of revelation' Barth criticizes sharply the significant role which natural theology had played in Protestant theology from the end of the sixteenth century:

> The older Reformed theology in particular attached high importance to this preliminary structure. According to A. Schweizer one might even see in it one of the most valuable features of Reformed theology. It was given a place of honor in the 19th century both in the first part of Schleiermacher's *Christian Faith* and in Schweizer's own *Glaubenslehre*. For my part, although I am Reformed, I want no part of it.[38]

The salient point here is that Barth acknowledges quite affirmatively his being a Reformed theologian as an undeniable fact. Despite that, he does not endorse the old Reformed theology's advocacy of natural theology and revelation. This demonstrates Barth's spirit of freedom in doing theology by retaining both positive and critical relationship to the old Reformed theological tradition. It is also significant to point out that he bases his antithetical argument to natural theology, which had been advocated by both the old Reformed orthodoxy and modern liberal theology, upon Calvin's theological argument:

> **Calvin** at the end of the discussion in the first chapters of the *Institutes* was perspicacious enough to raise the whole question again, to oppose the Christian knowledge of God dialectically to natural knowledge, and to proceed as though there were only the former.[39]

However, it should not be overlooked that Barth's interpretation of Calvin's ar-

gument on the natural knowledge of God might be misleading in that he seems to overimpose his own theological presuppositions and interpretative grid upon Calvin's ideas, and consequently misinterpret them. Unlike Barth, Calvin never denied the existence and the limited validity of human natural knowledge of God. For Calvin the problem lies not in nature itself as the theatre of God's glory but in the noetic effect of sin on human mind. Whether Barth's interpretation of Calvin's thought on natural theology is correct or not, it may be irrefutable that Barth appeals to Calvin in order to make his crucial and central arguments valid, viable and legitimate. Thus, it may be concluded that Calvin's role in Barth's theological construction might be more or less formative, determinative and constitutive rather than simply confirmatory and instrumental in many areas of doctrines.

Defending the validity and justifiability of his treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity within dogmatic prolegomena in contrast to its traditional place within the context of the doctrine of God, Barth criticizes Schleiermacher for his negligent attitude to the doctrine of the Trinity and appeals again to Calvin's strong valuation of it:

> Again, it does not have any natural force, or at the most only decorative force, when after the manner of Schleiermacher it is put right at the end of dogmatics.[40] Is it not a remarkable thing that the doctrine of the Trinity was so basic for **Calvin** that he even had Servetus burned for obstinately deleting it, and yet one would never suspect his urgent interest in it from the position he give it in his train of thought in the *Institutes*.[41]

It is arguable from the statement that Barth's indebtedness to Calvin's theological argument is so heavy and foundational that Calvin could be regarded as one of the most influential figures in Barth's theological construction and development. In terms of almost all doctrines including the doctrine of the Trinity, Barth seeks the argumentative support from Calvin. However, in view of Barth's interpretation of the place of the doctrine of the Trinity in Calvin's *Institutes*, it must be remembered that Calvin does not address it within the exact context of dogmatic prolegomena, but rather treats it in the process of discussing the knowledge of God the Creator, that is, within the context of the doctrine of God. Hence it is arguable that the old Reformed orthodoxy's treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity in the context of the doctrine of God seems faithful to Calvin's original intention and concern, but Barth's treatment of it in the context of dogmatic prolegomena seems to be departing from Calvin's foundational insight.

Within the context of his discussion of 'the Reality of the Incarnation', Barth addresses the theme of the identity and similarity between the Old Testament and the New Testament, appealing to Calvin's fundamental and profound insight:

> What is true, for all the reservations that we may think necessary in detail, is what **Calvin** says about the matter in *Inst.* II, 10–11, which I simply ask you to read so that you will be persuaded that I am not just presenting a private view here.[42] Read **Calvin**, who tells us that the distinction between earlier and later is a distinction in the historical administration of revelation, of the covenant between God and us, but not a distinction in its substance. The nerve of the statement that Christ has come in the flesh does not lie in the little word 'has', in the chronological perfect, but in the words 'come in the flesh.' This is the fulfillment for which the fathers waited, but with the 'has' the waiting did not stop; it truly began at that point.[43]

The above passage gives clear evidence that Barth accepts Calvin's argument for the similarity and the ultimate unity of the two Testaments. For Barth, the Old Testament is a witness to Jesus Christ in expectation for his coming to the world as the Mediator and Incarnate God, the New Testament being similarly a witness to Jesus Christ in remembrance and cele-

bration of the fulfillment of the expectation of the people of God for the coming of Jesus Christ. In this sense, there is a fundamental and essential unity and identity rather than a mutual contrast and opposition between the two Testaments. Barth regards Calvin's insight into this fact as one of the most crucial theological contributions that Calvin made in the sixteenth century. It is noteworthy, however, that Barth advanced Calvin's foundational insight into and concern with the unity of God's covenants into a distinctly innovative and creative doctrine of the priority of the Gospel and grace over the law and command in his small pamphlet *Gospel and Law* as well as the *Church Dogmatics*, criticising both Luther's and Calvin's arguments on this point from his peculiar dogmatic perspective. In this connection, it is arguable that Barth's basic attitude to Calvin's theological thought can be characterized as both passionately appreciative and unhesitatingly critical. One can also point out that even when Barth endorses Calvin's theological arguments, so far from repeating or repristinating them slavishly, he develops and advances them further in an innovative and creative way in accordance with his own peculiar theological and philosophical presuppositions and beliefs. In this sense, Barth can be classified as a progressive Calvinian rather than a conservative Calvinist theologian.

Addressing the relationship between incarnation and revelation, Barth argues that 'in its humiliation as in its exaltation, the humanity of Christ, in contrast, is in a specific, prescribed place, for it remains finite, and the finite is not capable of the infinite.'[44] In arguing for the finite character of Christ's humanity, Barth raises a critical question about the Lutheran view of the humanity of Christ, which attributes the divine attribute of ubiquity to Christ's humanity on the basis of the belief that Christ's divinity and humanity can be appropriated and communicated to each other and thus be regarded as mingled in a way. As a Reformed theologian, Barth does not hold to the Lutheran view but appeals to Calvin's contention for the legitimation of his own position. He cites appreciatively Calvin's following argument:

> Wonderfully God's Son descended from heaven, yet without leaving heaven. Wonderfully he willed to be born in the virgin's womb, to go about the earth . . ., yet he continuously filled the world even as he had done from the beginning.[45]

It must be emphasized that the Lutheran theologians called this Reformed understanding of Christ's humanity as *extra Calvinisticum* in that the Reformed argue that outside (extra) Christ's flesh, the divine Logos is out there as omnipresent God. Since the Lutherans believed in the communication of the attributes (*communicatio idiomatum*) between Christ's humanity and divinity, they could not accept the Reformed denial of the omnipresence of Christ's humanity. Barth makes it clear that he is on the side of the Reformed argument, saying that 'the Lutherans, however, heard in all this only the word "outside" (*extra*), and they thus termed this doctrine the Calvinistic *extra*. I have three reasons for fully accepting this Calvinistic extra.'[46] It must not be overlooked that it is significant for Barth to accept the Reformed position of Christ's humanity at this stage because it is closely related to his interpretation of the importance and meaning of the sacraments, especially the Lord's supper. It is arguable thus that during this period of Göttingen, Barth agreed with the Reformed understanding of the sacraments[47] which was epitomized and systematized by Calvin more than anyone else. Furthermore, by agreeing with *extra Calvinisticum*, Barth leaves no doubt that he endeavors to inherit the valid arguments of Reformed theological tradition and he would take an opposite position against the Lutheran position even though he regards Luther as one of the most important teachers and dialogue partners in his theological elaboration. For this reason, Barth could argue that 'we understand Calvin, for example, very badly if we do not see what a wholly

co-decisive role the sacraments played in his theology, especially the Lord's Supper."[48]

Discussing the subjective possibility of revelation, Barth puts a great stress on the essentiality of human response of faith and the close correlation between faith and obedience. Once again, Barth appeals to Calvin's theological wisdom for the support of his own argument:

> In his 1545 Catechism **Calvin** could even distinguish four categories for what must take place on our part (naturally as the work of the Holy Spirit): faith, obedience, prayer, and thanksgiving. Yet only two persist: faith and obedience. This pair is so universal and distinctive that Reformed dogmatics cannot possibly fail to assert them.[49]

Barth claims here that when the revelation of God centered on the Incarnation of Jesus Christ comes to humanity as an event of God's encounter with humanity, it generates humanity's hearing of the Word of God, which is expressed by humanity's faith and obedience. In this connection, Barth evaluates highly Calvin's emphasis on the role of the Holy Spirit in the life of the Christians. For Barth, when the revelation of God occurs in a genuine sense, Christ dwells in humanity as the Holy Spirit:

> **Calvin** formulated the problem when he said 'as long as Christ remains outside of us, and we are separated from him, all that he has suffered and done for the salvation of the human race remains useless and of no value for us. Therefore, to share with us what he had received from the Father, he had to become ours and to dwell within us.' Or again, 'the Word of God is like the sun, shining on all those to whom it is proclaimed, but with no effect among the blind. Now, all of us are blind by nature in this respect. Accordingly, it cannot penetrate into our minds unless the Spirit, as the inner teacher, through his illumination makes entry for it.'[50]

It is here that Barth advances further Calvin's stress on and insight into the role of the Holy Spirit in the Christian understanding of divine revelation and establishes a Christian epistemology based on the theme of the permanent priority of the work of the Holy Spirit over human response of faith and obedience. It is also important to notice that Barth develops Calvin's ethical theme of faith and obedience into a noetic and epistemological theme in relation to the reality and possibility of God's revelation.

Discussing the inevitability of philosophical influence upon our understanding of Scripture and theological reflection in relation to the theme of Christian freedom, Barth argues that Calvin also had his own philosophy:

> Luther and **Calvin** had their philosophy. So far as I can see they were both Platonists, although of different schools. And to none of us in our understanding of scripture is it a matter of indifference where we come from in this sense or what presuppositions we bring with us. In one sense this is decisive, namely, for our fixing of the thoughts of scripture, of what is meant, or supposed to be said, with what is said in the text . . . It is true that we all seek our dogmas in the Bible and find them as seems best to ourselves.[51]

By saying this Barth expresses his fundamental conviction about the provisional character and limitation of human work of theological formulation and biblical interpretation. This seems one of the most prominent strengths of Barth's theological mind-set. On the basis of such a conviction he could retain a critical and free relationship to his theological predecessors and fathers including Calvin. For this reason, Barth could state as follows:

> What will protect us is a bit of the Apostle's Creed, a bit of Luther or **Calvin**, viewed not as thinkers or heroes but as authorities by which to orient ourselves. Free thinking with the help of authorities—this is the way. I am aware of the relativity of this formula, but we are now talking only about the relative conditions. Freedom and authority are not mutually exclusive once

one considers both are totalities operating on different levels.[52]

This statement demonstrates that Barth celebrates and cherishes the spirit of freedom as one of the most central principles in his theological elaboration. This means that Barth believes that except Scripture and the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit, there can never be absolute authorities to which Christian theologians should submit themselves and for which they surrender their freedom of thought. For Barth, 'Christian freedom, we hope, is a demand that must be made unconditionally.'[53] This attitude should be applied to Calvin as well. Although Barth respects Calvin and the profundity and greatness of his theological thought, Calvin may not be the absolute standard and criterion against which Barth's theological arguments must be judged and evaluated. Rather, for Barth, even Calvin's theology should be judged by the authority of Scripture and the result of its faithful exegesis. In fact, it is the case that this attitude and relationship of Barth's to Calvin must be regarded as utterly faithful to Calvin's foundational wisdom embodied and crystallized by the well-known Reformed slogan '*semper reformanda*' (always reforming), which has been overtly neglected and dismissed by some factions within the Reformed theological camp, especially by certain extreme groups of the so-called orthodox Calvinism.

Discussing the dogmatic norm in the Reformed dogmatic theology, Barth presents five decisive marks of the Reformed school, which he intends to accept and follow in his own dogmatics:

> 1. Formalism in the teaching on principles; the Word vouches for the content, not vice versa; 2. in the understanding of the relation to God, emphasis on the thought of God; our salvation is enclosed in the glorifying of God, not vice, versa; 3. in the thought of God, stress on God's subjectivity, freedom, and majesty; 4. in the concept of the objective possibility of revelation, a strictly dialectical christology; 5. in the concept of the subjective possibility of revelation, an equal presence of both the religious and the ethical elements, of both faith and obedience.[54]

Barth's choice of these five features as the determinative marks of the Reformed school appears to show not only the plausible principles of the Reformed dogmatics but also his own peculiar interpretation and understanding of the Reformed theology and the dogmatic visions and goals that he wants to accomplish through his work. For example, one can raise a serious question as to whether the Reformed Christology can be truthfully characterized as 'strictly dialectical'. It seems that the modern notion 'dialectical' may not be attributed to the traditional Christology of the Reformed theology. Rather, it could characterize Barth's own version of Christological reformulation which will be materialized in the *Church Dogmatics*.

Nevertheless, Barth appeals to Calvin for the legitimation of his position as follows:

> I hope that you will bear me witness that in some degree even here in the Prolegomena I have respected what I regard as the valid rules of my own school. By studying the symbols or the Reformed confessions or **Calvin**'s *Institutes* you may make sure for yourselves that these do in fact have to be the main rules of a Christian, Reformed dogmatics.[55]

This statement demonstrates one of the most important facts in Barth's relationship to Calvin, namely that it is through reading Calvin that Barth came to be a member of the Reformed school and he learned foundational wisdom and principles necessary for being a Christian Reformed dogmatic theologian. Thus, it is undeniable that Calvin's impact upon Barth's theological growth and development is determinative and constitutive. However, as we have discussed so far, it must be remembered that Barth's use of Calvin's theological argument cannot be identified as an effort of servile and slavish repetition and repristination, but rather as an endeavor of critical appropriation and incorporation, which

includes various procedures of argumentative advancement, substantial innovation, creative reapplication and critical readjustment to his own characteristic Reformed theology.

In this connection, it may be helpful to cite the following statement of Barth's:

> It is one thing to quote a document like the Nicene Creed as a contemporary source and quite another to read and understand it as an authority. Dogmaticians do the latter. They have a right and even a duty to do so. Do not expect that I will here present and expound **Calvin**. When I let **Calvin** speak, I let him do so in my own train of thought, certainly with as much regard as possible for the historical meaning of his words, but only in order to achieve the elucidation of a matter which a quotation from **Calvin** can give at this particular moment.[56]

One may construe from this statement that in the elaboration and articulation of his own dogmatic vision and arguments, Barth has no intention of slavishly expounding Calvin's theological contentions and imposing them upon his readers, but rather of using them for the elucidation and illumination of his own position. This is Barth's conclusive answer to the question as to how he utilises Calvin in the construction of his dogmatic system. It is indeed the case that Barth learns many valuable and crucial insights from Calvin's theological work, and the latter's theology makes a constitutive and formative impact upon the former's dogmatic work. On the other hand, it must be remembered that Barth makes use of Calvin for his own particular purpose and goal, which are to consolidate the whole wisdom of the past masters and to remold it into a dogmatic system suited for his peculiar philosophical and theological assumptions. Why does he do so? There may be many reasons for him to do so. And yet, one of the most conspicuous reasons may be the fact that Barth is keenly conscious of his and the church's living in an age of theological crisis after the failure of the project of the Enlightenment and modern liberal theology. For this very reason, he wishes to establish a new theology solidly founded upon the Word of God witnessed by Scripture. In an effort to do this, Barth endeavoured to obtain numerous helpful insights from Calvin's theology. Nonetheless, Barth came to hold an ambivalent attitude and relationship to Calvin because Barth also discerns many naïve assumptions and beliefs operating in Calvin's thought, which are not compatible with his own philosophical presuppositions and convictions.

Addressing the problem of God's knowability and conceivability, Barth reflects upon Calvin's Geneva Catechism of 1545, which accepts the knowability of God as an established fact following the medieval dogmaticians' argument:

> With various reservations they accepted God's knowability. For them knowing God was humanity's most central matter. We recall the introduction to the Geneva Catechism of 1545: The chief end of human life is that we should know God, by whom we were created.[57]

The above statement reveals that Barth is convinced of the possibility of human knowledge of God and this belief of Barth's is truly consistent with Calvin's thought. In this connection, it is of the utmost importance to remember that the doctrine of the knowledge of God was vital to both theologians, with the latter being heavily indebted to the former for his reformulation of the doctrine of the knowledge of God.[58] The above statement may be regarded as an outstanding example of this indebtedness.

Another important and unforgettable theme in the area of the doctrine of God is the election of Grace (das *Gnadenwahl*). First of all, it should be pointed out that Barth accepts the traditional Reformed orthodoxy's treatment of the doctrine of election within the sphere of the doctrine of God rather than in the realm of the doctrine of salvation of which Calvin shows an excellent example in his last edition of 1559 *Institutes*. It is arguable that Barth's discussion of the doctrine of election within the context of the doctrine

of God anticipates Barth's antipathy to Calvin's doctrine of double predestination, which will be made clear in his *Church Dogmatics*.

Nevertheless, in the *Göttingen Dogmatics* Barth begins his discussion of the doctrine of election with an affirmation of Calvin's theological axiom in regard to the relationship of God's election and human faith:

> We can still only turn up our noses at the helplessness of such a confession, yet we have to admit that where there is faith this is the only relevant answer that we can give to the question why one believes. God wills it. He willed our faith and awakened it.[59]

This statement demonstrates that during this period of Göttingen Barth accepted Calvin's theological insight into and stress upon the ultimate priority of the sovereignty of God over human faith and religious life. However, this appreciative attitude to Calvin disappears when he begins to address 'the shadow side of election: reprobation.'[60] Barth criticises the Reformed orthodoxy's tendency to focus on the question as to who are the certain reprobate people in addressing and discussing the doctrine of predestination.[61] For Barth, one can also find this tendency in Calvin, who nevertheless was more cautious in his presentation and teaching of the harsh ramifications of the doctrine:

> The 'certain people,' the perversion of the doctrine of predestination into a doctrine of predestined individuals, was the Trojan horse which was finally set up in the holy place in Ilion. If in truly classical proponents of the doctrine (e.g. **Calvin**) it appears only as an occasional logical deduction, this becomes increasingly central in those who followed, and with its crass mythological arbitrariness it quickly made the whole doctrine unbelievable and untenable even for its most zealous champions.[62]

Although Barth is reluctant to criticize directly what he sees as Calvin's failure and error, Barth acknowledges here that Calvin may be regarded as an originator of the Reformed orthodoxy's deplorable practice of rigid logical deduction about certain reprobate individuals. One can detect here the incipient seeds of Barth's serious challenge against Calvin and the whole Reformed theological tradition in terms of the doctrine of election and predestination. Barth is herewith showing manifestly the seeds of his anticipatory revolt against the traditional method and approach to treat the doctrine of election. He assigns Calvin to a group of supralapsarians[63] and this seems to signify that Barth retains his supralapsarian position throughout his theological career in spite of his trenchant critique of Calvin's doctrine of double predestination, which includes God's eternal decree of both election of some people and abandonment of others before the foundation of the world. This means that Barth wants to endorse and follow Calvin's supralapsarian insight as legitimate and valid. Nonetheless, it is questionable that Calvin is a supralapsarian in relation to the doctrine of election. In fact, he had no knowledge about the dispute between the Supralapsarians and the Infralapsarians, and it seems that his position might be closer to that of Infralapsarians.[64] In this connection, one can suggest that Barth sees his own face and image rather than Calvin's in the mirror of Calvin's text.

For Barth, one of the most important insights of Calvin's in relation to the doctrine of election may be the fact that Calvin seeks the believers' assurance of faith and election only in the face of Jesus Christ rather than their own grounds of religious experience and psychological condition as some later Reformed theologians did:

> **Calvin** in particular had only one answer: We shall not find assurance of election in ourselves, nor even in God the Father if we think of him apart from the Son. Christ, then, is the mirror in which we must contemplate our election, and may do so without self-deception. I know of no other reply to the question about certainty of God. This is first God's own certainty, and as ours it is to be sought in God's revealed,

written, and preached Word whose content is Christ. But with this answer **Calvin** and his followers were not merely setting forth the nature or source of their assurance of God but also the nature and source of their assurance of election, salvation, and faith.[65]

As a christocentric theologian, Barth might have been strongly attracted to Calvin's penetrating insight into the importance of the role of Jesus Christ as the ultimate foundation of our assurance of faith and election. Barth's later elaboration and articulation of his own doctrine of election of grace in his *Church Dogmatics* demonstrates his stringent effort to recapture Calvin's christocentric insight and advance it radically into a more accessible form of Christian doctrine from the actualistic and dialectical perspective. In this connection, one may argue that Calvin's impact upon Barth in relation to the doctrine of election might be more than simply confirmatory and instrumental. Even though Barth is skeptical about and opposed to Calvin's project of retrieving and reemphasizing Augustine's doctrine of double predestination in terms of God's double actions of election and reprobation of certain people in the pre-temporal world, Barth does not ignore Calvin's crucial and valuable insights into the christocentric ground of our asssurance of election and faith but recaptures them into a highly innovative and challenging reconstruction of the doctrine. This is a remarkable example of Barth's spirit of freedom in doing theology.

Conclusion

On the basis of the above discussion one may draw several important conclusions about Barth's use of Calvin in his *Göttingen Dogmatics*. First of all, as the initial attempt to lecture on dogmatics, the *Göttingen Dogmatics* is most helpful for one to observe the trajectory of Barth's dogmatic thinking and reflection. It is also important to note that in Barth's theological reflection and thought Calvin's role appears to be constitutive and formative in several crucial areas of discussion including the doctrine of the Word of God, the relationship of the Word and preaching, the authority of Scripture and the role of the Holy Spirit in revelation, the unity of the Old Testament and the New Testament, the christocentric nature of our assurance of election, and so on. However, it is also the case that Barth wishes to go beyond Calvin's theological arguments in several areas where he finds Calvin's anachronistic arguments to be incompatible with his own characteristic theological assumptions and beliefs.

Second, Barth does not simply expound and repeat Calvin's argument in a slavish manner in the *Göttingen Dogmatics*. Rather, he allows Calvin to speak in order to elucidate and explain his own theological and dogmatic arguments more effectively and persuasively. However, it does not mean that Calvin's role in Barth's argumentative endeavor is simply confirmatory and supportive. Although it is the case that Barth uses Calvin's argument and insight to verify and validate his own position in several important instances, it is also undeniably true that by reading and studying Calvin, Barth has obtained crucial wisdom and valuable intellectual assets both constitutive and formative for his peculiar attempt at reformulation and reconstruction of a new Christian Reformed dogmatics.

Third, it must be remembered that Barth's appropriation and interpretation of Calvin's theological thought is always checked and controlled by his own peculiar theological impulse and beliefs. He finds many of Calvin's arguments and assumptions not to be compatible with his theological and philosophical presuppositions and thus is inclined to dismiss and misinterpret Calvin's original theological intention and insight. Moreover, he sometimes misconstrues and misapplies Calvin's contentions and views to the degree that even when he uses the same language as Calvin's, his meaning is considerably different from Calvin's because he uses similar language in a very different context. Bruce McCormack appears to

agree with this point in stating, 'Barth displayed a marked tendency throughout his life to use borrowed categories in a way that was entirely peculiar to himself (and which often contradicted the intentions of those who originally coined them).'[66] Thus, one may conclude that his relationship to Calvin can be characterised as ambivalent although his ambivalence has justifiable reasons and grounds from his own perspective.

Notes

1 Karl Barth, 'Unterricht in der christlichen Religion', i. Prolegomena, 1924, ed. Hannelotte Reiffen (Zurich: 1985). ET *The Göttingen Dogmatics: Instruction in the Christian Religion*, vol. I, trans. Geoffrey Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1991); idem, 'Unterricht in der christlichen Religion', ii. Die Lehre von Gott/Die Lehre vom Menschen, 1924/5, ed. Hinrich Stoevesandt (Zurich: TVZ, 1990). ET *The Göttingen Dogmatics*, vol. I (contains the first third of the German edition).

2 Barth's Münster lectures were published in 1927 under the title *Die Christliche Dogmatik im Entwurf, I. Die Lehre vom Worte Gottes, Prolegomena zur Christlichen Dogmatik* and Bonn and Basle lectures were published as *Die Kirchliche Dogmatik (Church Dogmatics)*.

3 Matthias Freudenberg has recently published a significant work on Barth's engagement with Reformed theology in the Göttingen period. See, *Karl Barth und die reformierte Theologie: Die Auseinandersetzung mit Calvin, Zwingli, und den reformierten Bekenntnisschriften während seiner Göttinger Lehrtätigkeit* (Neukirchen, 1997). But he is concerned with Barth's Calvin lectures alone without analysing Barth's use of Calvin in the Göttingen Dogmatics.

4 *Revolutionary Theology in the Making: Barth-Thurneysen Correspondence*, 1914–1925, trans. James E. Smart (London: The Epworth Press, 1964), p. 81.

5 This theme of the threefold form of the Word of God is discussed extensively in Church Dogmatics I/1&2.

6 Heinrich Heppe, *Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformierten Kirche*, rev. and ed. E. Bizer (2nd ed. Neukirchen, 1958); ET *Reformed Dogmatics* (repr. Grand Rapids, 1978).

7 *Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche*, ed. H. Schmid (4th ed. Frankfurt a.M./Erlangen, 1858); ET *The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church* (Philadelphia, 1899).

8 Edward Thurneysen (ed.), *Karl Barth-Edward Thurneysen: Briefwechsel, II. 1921–1930* (Zurich: TVZ, 1974), pp. 328–9.

9 This does not mean that Barth did not study Calvin before 1918. In fact, Barth began to read Calvin from the period of his theological study in Bern in 1904–5 through participating in his father's lectures on the Reformation. Ever since his interest in Calvin had not decreased but increased gradually and considerably.

10 Karl Barth, *Die Theologie Calvins*, 1922, ed. Hans Scholl (Zurich: TVZ, 1993); ET *The Theology of John Calvin*, trans. G. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995).

11 H. Engler, 'Das Lutherverständnis Karl Barths' (Doctoral Dissertation: Tübingen, 1946); H. Diem, *Karl Barths Kritik am deutschen Luthertum* (1947); K. G. Steck, 'Zwischen Luther und Karl Barth: Stimme der Gemeinde zum kirchlichen Leben und zur Politik', in *Wirtschaft und Kultur* 18, May (1996); Hans Otto Tiefel, 'The Ethics of Gospel and Law: Aspects of Barth-Luther Debate', (Ph.D. Thesis: Yale University, 1968); W. Hölle, 'Die Theologie des frühen Karl Barth in ihrem Verhältnis zu der Theologie Martin Luthers', (Doctoral Dissertation: Bochum, 1969); B. Klappert, *Promissio und Bund: Gesetz und Evangelium bei Luther und Barth*, FS 34 (1976); idem, 'Erwägungen zum Thema: Gesetz und Evangelium bei Luther und Karl Barth', *Theologische Beiträge* 7 (1976), pp. 140–57; A. Siemens, 'Karl Barth der Vollender der lutherischen Reformation? Eine notwendige Replik zu B. Klappert', *Theologische Beiträge* 8 (1977), pp. 31–35; W. Joest, 'Karl Barth und das lutherishe Verständnis von Gesetz und Evangelium: Gedanken und Fragen zur Wiederaufnahme einer stehengebliebenen Diskussion', *KuD* 24 (1978), pp. 86–103; A. Peters, 'Karl Barth gegen Luther?', in his *Rechenschaft des Glaubens: Aufsätze* (1984), pp. 92–129; idem, 'Karl Barth und Martin Luther', *Luther* 57 (1986), pp. 113–9; E. Jüngel, 'Evangelium und Gesetz; Zugleich zum Verhältnis von Dogmatik

und Ethik', in his *Barth-Studien* (1982), pp. 180–209; O. Bayer, 'atliche Theologie des Kreuzes? Barmen zwischen Barth und Luther', *EK* 17 (1984), pp. 367–70; F. W. Marquardt, 'Martin Luther und Karl Barth', in *Tyrannos, Beliner Theologische Zeitschrift* 1 (1984), pp. 175–96; Gerhard Ebeling, 'Karl Barth's Ringen mit Luther', in his *Luther Studien* III (Zurich, 1985); idem, über die Reformation hinaus? Zur Luther-Kritik Karl Barths', *ZThK* 83 (1986), pp. 33–75; Rainer, 'Gesetz und Evangelium: Ein lutherisches Sonderthema?', *Catholica* 41 (1987), pp. 30–41; *Luther und Barth*, ed., Karl Hauschildt (Erlangen: Martin Luther Verlag, 1989). It is worthy to note that these German and English works on the relationship between Luther and Barth primarily focus on the theme of law and gospel.

12 Daryll Ward, 'The Doctrine of Election in the theologies of Friedrich Schleiermacher and Karl Barth' (Ph.D. Thesis: the University of Chicago, 1989); Dietmar Lutz, *Homo viator: Karl Barths Ringen mit Schleiermacher* (Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 1988); *Barth and Schleiermacher: beyond the impasse*?, ed., J. O. Duke & R. F. Streetman (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988).

13 Horton Davies, *The Vigilant God: Providence in the Thought of Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin and Barth* (N.Y.: Peter Lang, 1992); Eric Dean, 'Relation between Scripture and Tradition: Theoretical Statements by Calvin and Barth', *Encounter* 23 (1962), pp. 277–91; Walter Kreck, 'Johannes Calvin und Karl Barth', in *Kirche Konfession Ökumene*. FS. W. Niesel zum 70. Geburtstag (1973), pp. 77–84.

14 Eberhard Jüngel, 'Barth's Theological Beginnings' in *Karl Barth: A Theological Legacy*, trans Garrett E. Parl (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1986), pp. 53–104.

15 Bruce L. McCormack, *Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). Dealing with the Safenwil period from July 1911 to September 1921, McCormack mentions Calvin only twice! See pp. 78–290 (almost the half of the whole book). Even in his discussion of the *Göttingen Dogmatics* he does not acknowledge Calvin's crucial role in Barth's theological development. See pp. 327–74.

16 Thomas F. Torrance, *Karl Barth: An Introduction to his Early Theology*, 1910–31 (London, 1962).

17 Hans Urs von Balthasar, *The Theology of Karl Barth*, trans. E. T. Oakes (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992).

18 Karl Barth, *Göttingen Dogmatics*, op cit., p. 4.

19 Ibid., pp. 6–7.

20 Ibid., p. 8.

21 Ibid., p. 9.

22 Ibid., p. 9.

23 Ibid., p. 19.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid., pp. 21–2. It is worthy to note that Barth omits Luther in this list of classical dogmaticians. It seems because Barth saw him as an irregular dogmatician. See Gerhard Ebeling, 'Karl Barths Ringen mit Luther', in his *Luther Studien* III (Zurich: TVZ, 1985), p. 448.

27 Karl Barth, *Göttingen Dogmatics*, op cit., p. 32.

28 Ibid., p. 33.

29 Ibid., pp. 54–5.

30 Ibid., p. 57.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., p. 202.

33 Ibid., p. 68.

34 On Barth's view of Scripture, see Klaas Runia, *Karl Barth's Doctrine of Scripture* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962).

35 Barth states, 'Calvin brilliantly states what I have in mind when he says that the same Spirit who has spoken through the mouths of the prophets must find entry into our hearts and persuade us that they rendered faithfully what they had been told to say by God.' Ibid., p. 225.

36 Ibid., p. 83.

37 Ibid., pp. 83–4.

38 Ibid., p. 91.

39 Ibid., p. 92

40 Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Christian Faith*, ed. H. R. Mackintosh & J. S. Stewart (Edinburgh: T.& T. Clark, 1948), paras. 170–72.

41 Karl Barth, *Göttingen Dogmatics*, op cit., p. 96. See *Institutes*, I.13.

42 Ibid., p. 147.

43 Ibid., p. 148.

44 Ibid., p. 159.

45 Ibid.; the citation is from John Calvin, *Institutes*, II, 13, 4.

46 Ibid.

47 In the later period of his theological development, Barth abandons his endorsement of the Reformed understanding of the sacraments and denied baptism the status of sacrament.

48 Ibid., p. 169.
49 Ibid., p. 172.
50 Ibid., p. 191; citations from *Institutes*, III, 1,1; III, 2, 34.
51 Ibid., p. 259.
52 Ibid., p. 260.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., p. 294
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., p. 351.
58 The classical discussion on Calvin's doctrine of the knowledge of God is Benjamin B. Warfield, 'Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God', in *Calvin and Calvinism* (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1931) and also see Kenneth S. Kantzer, 'John Calvin's Theory of the Knowledge of God and the Word of God' (Ph.D. dissertation: Harvard University, 1950). On Barth's view, see Peter J. A. Cook, 'The Knowledge of God in the Theology of Karl Barth' (Ph.D. Thesis: The Queen's University of Belfast, 1981); John C. Lyden, 'Karl Barth's View on the Knowledge of God and its relation to the Philosophical Epistemology of Immanuel Kant' (Ph.D. Thesis: The University of Chicago, Divinity School, 1989); Sebastian A. Matczak, *Karl Barth on God: The Knowledge of Divine Existence* (N.Y.: St. Paul Publications, 1962); Eugene F. Rogers, *Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth: Sacred Doctrine and Natural Knowledge of God* (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995); Ned Wisnefske, *Our Natural Knowledge of God: A Prospect for Natural Theology after Kant and Barth* (N.Y.: Peter Lang, 1990); Henri Bouillard, *The Knowledge of God*, trans. Samuel Femiano (N.Y.: Herder & Herder, 1968).
59 Ibid., p. 451. Barth refers to Calvin's *Institutes* III, 23, 2.
60 Ibid.
61 Of course, one can raise a serious question as to whether Barth gives here an invalid caricature of the Reformed orthodoxy.
62 Ibid., p. 455. Barth refers to Calvin's *Institutes* III, 21–24.
63 Ibid., p. 467.
64 Cf. Fred Klooster, *Calvin's Doctrine of Predestination* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Calvin Theological Seminary, 1961).
65 Karl Barth, *Göttingen Dogmatics*, op cit., p. 470. Barth refers to Calvin's *Institutes* III, 24, 5.
66 Bruce L. McCormack, *Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology*, op cit., p. 217. George Hunsinger calls this practice of Barth's as 'the procedure of assimilating' in his *How to Read Karl Barth: The Shape of His Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 61–3.

EuroJTh (1999) **8:1**, 79–94 0960–2720

• Intending to Speak: A Critique of Ronald Hall's *Word and Spirit*
• *« L'intention de parler: une critique de l'ouvrage de Ronald Hall, Par la Parole et par L'Esprit »*
• *'In der Absicht, zu reden: Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Ronald Halls* Word and Spirit'

Myron Penner, Edinburgh

Word and Spirit: A Kierekegaardian Critique of the Modern Age
Ronald L. Hall
Bloomington, In: University of Indiana Press, 1993, xiii + 218 pp., £21.15, H/B, ISBN 0 253 32752 0

RÉSUMÉ

Dans son ouvrage intitulé Par la Parole et par l'Esprit, une critique kierkegaardienne de l'âge moderne, *Ronald Hall tente de montrer que la conception de l'usage du langage chez Kierkegaard annonçait la théorie de la parole comme acte et qu'elle peut servir de tremplin à une critique, à la fois de l'épistémologie moderniste et de la théorie postmoderne de Jacques Derrida. Ce, parce que Kierkegaard attribue à l'acte de parole une efficacité ontologique pour la réalisation de soi d'une manière historiquement concrète dans le cours du temps. L'entreprise de Hall est vouée à l'échec parce qu'il se concentre outre mesure sur les énoncés oraux. La critique contre Derrida ne porte pas et la pensée de Kierkegaard se comprend bien mieux à partir des notions d'intentionnalité et de propositions considérées comme des actes illocutionnaires. Le projet de Hall montre que l'acte de parole est un facteur important (une condition formelle nécessaire) de la constitution de la subjectivité humaine, même s'il ne constitue pas une condition suffisante pour le plein développement de soi.*

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Ronald L. Hall stellt in Word and Spirit: A Kierkegaardian Critique of the Modern Age *die These auf, daß Kierkegaards Sprachverständnis der Sprechakttheorie vorgreife und somit als Kritik sowohl der modernen Epistemologie als auch der postmodernen Theorie Jacques Derridas fungiere, indem sie den Akt des Sprechens mit der ontologischen Fähigkeit versieht, ein konkretes historisches menschliches Selbst inmitten des Flusses der Zeit zu realisieren. Halls Projekt scheitert jedoch an seiner Betonung des lokutionären Aspekts von Sprache. Derrida ist gegen Halls Kritik immun, Kierkegaard versteht man besser im Sinne einer Intentionalität, und Propositionen sollten als illokutionäre Akte aufgefaßt werden. Halls Werk hebt den Sprechakt als einen bedeutenden Aspekt (eine notwendige formale Kondition) für die Konstitution der menschlichen Subjektivität hervor, obwohl dieser nicht imstande ist, sowohl eine notwendige als auch zugleich ausreichende Bedingung für ein entwickeltes Selbst darzustellen.*

Introduction[1]

In this paper I seek to address the innovative attempt to wed certain features of Søren Kierkegaard's thought to the speech-act theory of J. L. Austin and John R. Searle by Ronald Hall in his book, *Word and Spirit: A Kierkegaardian Critique of the Modern Age*.[2] It is my contention that Hall over-extends his thesis and that, despite a deep agreement with his project, and despite his rigorous analysis, there are some serious problems with his argument. These problems notwithstanding, I find that there is much value in Hall's study and his work is an invaluable resource for Kierkegaardian scholarship, especially in relationship to postmodernism and the philosophy of Jacques Derrida. Although one-sided, Hall's principal thesis is an important step towards constructive dialogue with Derridean deconstruction. What is needed is some sorting. An exhaustive treatment of Hall's project is not possible in a paper this size and what is more, many of Hall's points are difficult and obscure. I will not concern myself here with some of the more abstruse and tenuous points in his argument but will focus my attention on what I deem the gravamen of Hall's thesis.

I. Word and spirit: Hall's principal thesis

Word and Spirit is Ronald Hall's very-ambitious attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of the history of philosophy, ancient to present, as well as a phenomenological analysis of the human perceptual phenomena of sight and sound, an epistemic theory, a philosophical anthropology, and a theory of linguistics. However, Hall's chief purpose is to articulate an ontology of human persons in which human personhood emerges from our linguistic modes of being in the world.

Hall relies primarily upon two sources for inspiration. First, the general theoretical context of his argument is, as the title of his book connotes, the nineteenth century Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard's philosophical and theological work. One of Kierkegaard's central preoccupations is human subjectivity and the teleological development of the self through its expression of three distinct existence-spheres: the aesthetic, ethical and religious spheres.[3] Hall performs a startling permutation in Kierkegaard studies by interpreting Kierkegaard's account of human subjectivity in light of the recent innovations in the philosophy of language by 'speech act theory.' Hall appropriates the speech act theory approach to language, which attempts to explain exactly what happens when humans speak to each other by focusing on a descriptive analysis of speaking as a distinct act performed by humans with intended goals, as a means of explaining how Kierkegaard understands the human self to emerge and become established as an historically concrete entity through the stages of existence. This second emphasis of Hall's places him in the debt of such 'ordinary language' philosophers as Ludwig Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin, and John R. Searle.

The *principal thesis*[4] (hereafter PT) of *Word and Spirit* is the claim that there is an essential connection between speaking and personal unity such that it is *only* in the felicitous speech-act, defined as the act by which we 'own our words and own up to our words' (*Word and Spirit*, 51), that the human self achieves the necessary historical continuity it needs to emerge through the flux of temporal existence and achieve existential concretion. Hall claims that, 'Our task as humans is to thematize this incipiently present self to a self-understanding that will enable us to actualize its incipient actuality' (*Word and Spirit*, 10). This is able to happen only when we grant the human speech-act (characterised as first-person speaking) its rights as an ontologically efficacious human act which 'bonds us in responsibility to the given actuality of the world and others' (*Word and Spirit*, 88). Hall repeatedly claims to be articulating Kierkegaard's own position and argues, by delving into the subsequent pseudonymous literature, that this is Kierkegaard's final understanding on the matter (*Word and Spirit*, 10).

Let us begin our discussion by briefly looking at the basic argument in which Hall develops PT. Typically speech-act theory understands speaking to be an indispensable instrument which is used by humans to perform specific actions (*Word and Spirit*, 48).[5] The premise from which it begins is that humans regularly use language to communicate with each other and that generally these attempts at communication are successful to a relatively high degree. The aspect of speech-act analysis that Hall seizes upon is the inherently intentional structure of language entailed by this view—although, as we will see later, Hall does not adequately account for intentionality in his own theory. One who performs a given speech-act *intends* to accomplish some particular end. Hall extends this implicit intentional structure to include the speaker's own actuality, emphasising that 'every speech-act is a form of giving one's word to some other' (*Word and Spirit*, 10), and that this ability to speak in the first-person entails treating ourselves as a 'concrete "I" '. However, as Hall sees it, this 'I' present in our speech-acts 'is only incipiently present' as a 'merely human possibility' that awaits proper thematisation and appropriation to become a fully actualised actuality (*Word and Spirit*, 10).

This last point Hall claims to be getting directly from Kierkegaard. When the pseudonym A (known to us only as the aesthete) declares in *Either/Or* that 'language is absolutely qualified by spirit and therefore the medium for expressing the idea, namely, [the human person's] essential idea', Hall argues that this gives evidence that Kierkegaard believed that 'the self that is given in a relation, is *given* within the first-person speech-act' (*Word and Spirit*, 10).[6] To be successful in the everyday act of using language to do something (for example, promising) one must not only enter the relation established by the act, but one must also relate that relation back to themselves.

In turn, Hall continues, this cannot happen unless I have a adequate world-picture in which I have conceived of the world as historical and of myself as free and responsible. Once again Hall finds himself to be continuing in Kierkegaard's voice by purporting to elaborate A's claims in *Either/Or* that Christianity introduced sensuousness into the world by bringing spirit into the world (*Word and Spirit*, 15–16). When Christianity was inaugurated as a world-picture, it broke the pagan (Classical Greek) picture of the self/world relation as a static, Platonic, synthesis where the self was viewed as fundamentally bonded to the world.

The difference between these two world-pictures revolves around how they model the world and consequently the self/world relation. The Greeks (so A and Hall tell us) were 'psychical' and represented the world in terms of visual images and metaphors (*Word and Spirit*, 19–29). The psychical world-picture sees the self locked in closed, static relationship with a pre-determined cosmos whose source of order is an eternal, impersonal *logos* principle. Christianity on the other hand, is 'pneumatic' and has an Hebraic focus on the '*spoken word (dabhar)* of Yahweh at the very center of reality', which is necessarily dynamic and personal (*Word and Spirit*, 29). This world picture is '*dabhar*-centric' and listens for the pneuma in creation, 'breath of speech', the spirit of God and other persons. However, Hall finds that the Hebrews were existentially challenged with respect to a genuine 'I-consciousness' because of the Hebraic preoccupation of itself as the people of God; that is, a ' "we are" caused them not to attend fully to the development of . . . a consciousness of themselves as individuals who speak before God as God himself speaks, that is, in the first-person' (*Word and Spirit*, 30). This possibility for full existential concretion had to wait for the advent of Christianity.

All of this comes together for Hall in the felicitous speech-act,' the genuine positing of spirit as spirit in the medium speech. Hall finds the speech-act to be 'the paradigmatic expression of radical historical novelty and openness' (*Word and Spirit*, 47). Historical novelty (the environ for existential concretion) occurs only in significantly free human action. Hall

observes that the speech-act, because of its confessional nature, must always be couched in a particular tense and this forces me to be present in my words. It is in performing the intentional speech-act, where one lives up to one's words and owns one's words, that the *telos* of the human person is fully realized; that is, that one becomes historically concertized in existential immediacy (*Word and Spirit*, 68–72). Imaging the world in terms of the first-person address of God allows for the self to break from its pagan orientation to the 'sensuous' embodiment in the world. The self is then free ('sundered' from the world) to take responsibility for its words by binding itself to itself. Hall argues that in the end, Word actualizes Spirit as historically incarnate.

With the positing of positive spirit (in the form of human personhood) by Christianity came the possibility of negative spirit, which Hall (and Kierkegaard) refer to as 'demonic'. In Hall's words, the person of 'spirit' has achieved a 'sundered/bonded' relation to her/himself and the world which is expressed as a fundamental irony (*Word and Spirit*, 121–123). Hall understands Kierkegaard's concept of irony to 'designate a relation a speaker bears to his[/her] own words' when one has achieved an awareness or spirit's disarticulation from the physical, phenomenal, world and its subsequent, radical freedom. This irony can be positive or negative—a healthiness or a sickness. Irony is a healthiness in so far as it provides the communicative space in which subjectivity can appear by, as Hall argues, making it 'impossible to understand the full irony of a speech-act without meeting the subject who is behind it as the ground of its meaning' (*Word and Spirit*, 122). This positive form of irony is what Hall describes as 'mastered irony' (*Word and Spirit*, 204–206). Demonic irony, which Hall finds lays 'at the very center of the modern sensibility', is a 'deadly sickness' that takes the liberating resources of the speech-act and uses them 'to express spirit in complete disengagement from the historical continuity of the given actuality' (*Word and Spirit*, 120).

II. The great divorce

An integral part of Hall's critique of Derrida and postmodernism revolves around his understanding of how the act of self-relation becomes demonic. Let us first address how Hall handles the difference between the two aesthetic-communicative media of language and music. The key to understanding how these are different lies in grasping how the performance of each of these two media facilitates the 'radical historical novelty and openness'—in short, freedom—of human action (*Word and Spirit*, 47). It is easy to guess that for Hall, whichever one of these two can be demonstrated to possess the greatest potential to empower the human individual with this freedom will be the superior art form. Radical freedom engenders radical responsibility; and this radical responsibility in turn provides the environment for existential concretion, which is the goal of humans *qua* potential selves.

In *Either/Or* Kierkegaard (through A) describes music and language as sensuous media; that is, they involve the sense of hearing and receiving sonic sense-data. They also have in common a 'spirituality' stemming from their movement in time, which is a kind of negation of the sensuous. Hall elaborates further: 'When the sensuous is so qualified by temporality then it perpetually slips away, annuls itself for the sake of the idea' (*Word and Spirit*, 42). Music and speech are constantly 'outrunning themselves' as they express ideas through actual movement in time. Both music and language involve a negation of the sensuous—a sundering—of the idea (spirit) from the sound (*Word and Spirit*, 42). In this sense they are both spiritually qualified and pneumatically qualified.

But for A, language and music are also fundamentally different. Where they differ is how relate to spirit and the sensual. Hall finds this difference in the fact that when music negates the sensuous it is merely an 'aesthetic nullification' (*Word and Spirit*, 43). This is performed directly by relativizing everything, including the

self/spirit—the performer, the audience, the composer and their collective relations to the medium—by music having within itself its own time, necessarily detached from existential concretion. It is only within the time-space of the piece that anything is immediate; and this musical continuum is a pre-determined cosmos, determined by the notes on the page (*Word and Spirit*, 44–47). In the end this is merely an abstraction from spirit, a 'demonic sensuality' not a positing of it; a new kind of bondage, not a radical freedom. It is '*discarnrate* spirit' and therefore a demonic perversion of the positive sense of spirit as historically incarnate (*Word and Spirit*, 43).

Music simply lacks the resources available to the speech-act as described in the previous section. For Hall, the speech-act embodies the self and makes spirit an historically concrete entity by the necessary first-person self-representation. It creates the vacuum for a sundered/bonded self-world relation to fill, whereas music essentially performs only the first half of the disjunct. The most that music may accomplish with the resources Hall has attributed to it is a 'great divorce'[8] of the spirit-as-self from worldly embodiment —a perpetual abstraction from self. This may perhaps point the way to the existential concretion[9] but if this world-picture is stayed, it is inescapably demonic. Hall understands the demonic to be present when the act of self-relation remains abstracted from or discontinuous with historical concretion; that is, if the self-relation is understood as a fractured multiplicity with no temporally unified expression.

III. The demonical Derrida

The above discussion is precisely the point at which Hall takes issue with the 'postmodern' deconstructive philosophy of Jacques Derrida. Hall submits Derrida's contention that language is reducible to writing to a 'Kierkegaardian' analysis from within the framework of his preceding analysis of speech-acts and music. As Hall himself admits, it is fairly easy to anticipate where he is going to have problems accepting Derrida's thesis.

There are two major problems Hall has with Derrida's deconstructive thesis that writing is the fundamental expression of language. First, as a medium, writing is essentially visual and static. This does not square well with Hall's psychical/pneumatic and sensual/spiritual distinctions. Derrida's deconstruction is based on a fundamental rejection of Western logocentrism. While this would seem to endear him to Hall, it is quickly pointed out that Derrida is more anti-photocentrism than genuinely anti-logocentrism (*Word and Spirit*, 170–72). What is more, Hall proceeds to argue that Derrida, while in defiance of the Western philosophical tradition, merely jumps from a Platonic photocentric picture of the universe where *logos* = reading, to a writing = music world-picture which maintains a certain affinity with modernism (*Word and Spirit*, 173). The shift from reading (i.e., what Derrida calls the logocentric tradition and its incumbent metaphysics of 'presence' of Plato and his progeny) to writing by Derrida is a conjuring trick. Hall contends that Derrida remains inherently bound to a modernist, *logos*-imaging of the world, in some apposite sense. The 'postmodern' shift effected by Derrida's deconstructive move to writing is a genuine shift, but is not a complete break with logocentrism.[10] Books and other written works remain visual and ahistorical with 'a kind of eternal *logos*' behind them (*Word and Spirit*, 172–73). All that Hall finds happening in Derrida is a reconfiguring of logocentrism in pneumatic, dynamic terms, versus the traditional psychical, static terms.

To add to his woes, Derrida's reduction of language to writing fares even worse when examined under the spiritual categories of (for lack of better terms in Hall) positive-spirit/demonical-spirit. This second problem reveals Derrida's true demonical self as Hall makes explicit the musical affinities in writing already alluded to above (*Word and Spirit*, 173). Writing has a movement through time and requires a context of possibility and

contingency, but it has a sense of time all its own—like a piece of music.

In Derrida's conception of writing it entails an endless inter-play of signification, or what Derrida refers to as 'différance.' The telling move is Derrida's shift from intentionality to iterability. As Hall understands Derrida on this point, iterability refers to the break between idea and medium; that is, a sundering of spirit and sensuous world. Derrida insists that he is not doing away with intentionality but is undermining its authoritarian strangle-hold on the 'entire scene and system of utterance.'[11] Writing is now musical because it is adrift in a demonical ocean of play, abstracted from historically concrete existential immediacy. Derrida's concept of iterability performs the first half of the disjunct of Hall's sundered/bonded schemata. The sign is radically divorced from both the signifier and the human subject iterating the signifier. Hall believes this leaves the human subject demonically abstracted from the sensuous, constantly shifting, perpetually in motion with no place of rest.

Ultimately Hall's argument is a pragmatic one. His conclusion is that Derrida and like-minded postmodern theorists leave us with no way of genuinely coping with the very real flux of time and reality.[12] It is possible (and he would argue, necessary) to find stability in the middle of flux (*Word and Spirit*, 196). Hall sees no other way through the horns of the dilemma of a nihilism on one hand or a glib fideism on the other, if we accept Derrida's construal of the world (*Word and Spirit*, 198). What is labeled as 'postmodernism' is for Hall, simply 'modernity brought to its final demonic conclusion' (*Word and Spirit*, 198).

The way forward is through a juxtaposition of felicitous speech-acts and Kierkegaard's mastered irony (*Word and Spirit*, 203–04). Hall defines irony as the 'negative power of withdrawal' (*Word and Spirit*, 203). In the freedom of the relationship (the positive spiritual power) of individual persons opposed in the playing field of speech-acts, the bond which holds them together, the felicity conditions, may be broken; any of the persons involved may withdraw. Irony is saying the opposite of what I mean and mis-presenting myself in my words; that is, the words I present to the other cease to be my own. This negative expression of spiritual power 'is essential for the positive determination of spirit' (*Word and Spirit*, 203). Without it the bonds of relationship risk turning into bondage in a deontological oppression of 'moral heaviness.' As Hall notes, the irony in all of this is that the *telos* of this withdrawal from the other and the ethical demands inherent in the speech-act is ultimately itself an ethical concern. This is a healthy form of irony, a mastered irony, when my dis-owning of my words serves as the sign of my radical freedom (and responsibility) to own them; that is, my withdrawal from my ethical duty 'bears witness to a higher, positive determination of subjectivity, namely, subjectivity as spirit, as self' (*Word and Spirit*, 204). Mastered irony reminds us of and preserves our transcendence and freedom, thereby facilitating the actualizing of our actual selves.

IV. Hall's Kierkegaardian theory of speech-acts

Hall has provided us with a very complex analysis of both Kierkegaard's *Either/Or*, and the philosophy of language. His bringing of Kierkegaard into discussion with speech-act theory is especially illuminating for our understanding of both areas of inquiry. Admiration for his argument is tempered however, by some reservation. I now want to explore some questions I have about the Kierkegaardian context and the substance of his principal thesis.[13] My two main criticisms of PT are that on the one hand it is not as Kierkegaardian (strictly speaking) as Hall thinks, and on the other hand its account of speech-act theory involves a limited conception of communication.[14]

Hall and Kierkegaard

My first criticism of PT is that it is not so obviously Kierkegaard's own view. Hall's claim to be Kierkegaardian depends on a

strong view of the link between A and Kierkegaard—that we can be fairly assured that A's theory of aesthetics is Kierkegaard's. PT is certainly 'Kierkegaardian' in that it shares some of Kierkegaard's central concerns and is oriented to the philosophical issue in a way that he would himself approach it; indeed, PT is taken right from the pages of Kierkegaard's literature. However, I find a strong link between PT and Kierkegaard's own personal position tenuous at best.

There is always a problem exegeting Kierkegaard because of his extensive use of pseudonyms. This has particular pertinence for PT in that Hall almost exclusively draws on Kierkegaard's pseudonymous *Either/Or*, or other pseudonymous works in the formulation of his thesis. Hall is aware of the danger in dealing with pseudonyms and acknowledging that Kierkegaard speaks indirectly through pseudonyms states, 'While I agree that we must always be careful not to identify Kierkegaard with his pseudonyms, it is just as much of a mistake to think that Kierkegaard himself is completely absent from his pseudonymous works' (*Word and Spirit*, 4–5). So far I am in full agreement.

Having realized this, Hall's task now is admittedly to try to 'ferret out Kierkegaard's own voice' with respect to the issues at hand—namely PT (*Word and Spirit*, 5). This task is virtually impossible to perform on Kierkegaard without taking into account his entire authorship. The primary reason for this is that each of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms are like pieces in the puzzle of Kierkegaard's global authorship. In order to grasp the voice of Kierkegaard in the pseudonymous fragment, one must have some significant conception of what it is that Kierkegaard is doing (perhaps 'performing' is a better word) in and through the body of his literary corpus.[15] Why is it this particular pseudonym that he uses? What aspect of the overall puzzle is this pseudonym highlighting/representing? And, how does this pseudonym fit in with, or contribute a greater understanding of, all the other pseudonyms (puzzle-pieces) and their respective roles in the grander scheme of the authorship?[16] These are essential questions that must be asked (including others like them) in completing the task Hall has set out for himself and it is precisely at this point that Hall fails. If we accept PT *carte blanche* we fail to give justice to the central focus of Kierkegaard's authorship, his answer to the question of how one may become a Christian within Christendom.[17] Hall seems to think Kierkegaard's answer is: through felicitous speech by the mastery of the ironic. These, however, are mere epiphenomena of what Kierkegaard provides as the answer. But this is getting ahead of myself. Let us first look at the pseudonymous A.

A's authorship is one of the least straightforward of all Kierkegaard's authorship. Kierkegaard is doubly removed from his words: not only is Kierkegaard not using his own voice to pen A's words but he also employs an intermediate pseudonym, Victor Eremita,[18] who is the 'editor' of *Either/Or*, and thus is the one who takes credit for presenting us with A's words collected together in book-form. Unlike some of the other pseudonymous texts, Kierkegaard does not appear at all, in either a preface or a postscript, to discuss the text. It is always Eremita speaking and providing exegetical advice. This is not to remove all possible access to Kierkegaard's voice in the text. It is rather to demonstrate that we cannot approach A and his authorship in a simple, prosaic manner, and naively quote from Kierkegaard's other pseudonyms (or even from non-pseudonymous works) where they speak on the same issues as A to support the claim that A's opinions represent Kierkegaard's personal understanding. *Prima facie* we may not, for example, attribute the editor (Eremita) of *Either/Or*'s homily to hearing as his 'most precious sense' (*Either/Or*, 4–5) directly to Kierkegaard. We may legitimately note that Kierkegaard finds it worthwhile to have his pseudonym challenge the Western tradition of privileging sight as the superior sense[19] with a

more Judaic privileging of hearing.[20] On inspection we may find that Kierkegaard had several reasons for introducing this concept.[21]

There are two factors that militate against the thesis that A's aesthetic theory of communication in *Either/Or* is completely Kierkegaard's own. The first is that A is himself an expression of the demonic, delighting in flux, with no fixed 'self', and his entire chapter, 'The Immediate Stages of the Erotic or The Musical-Erotic' is best seen as a parody of Hegel's aesthetics.[22] Kierkegaard may well hold to some of A's opinions,[23] but most likely A is a foil to vilify Hegel and elucidate the aesthetic view of life. To be true to the aesthetic, Kierkegaard must have A accomplish this picture by embodying the aesthetic, not propositionally communicating its foundational principles (like, for example, in an essay on the stages of the erotic)—for that would destroy the aesthetic quality of A's writing and make the communication into its opposite. 'A' cannot speak for the other pseudonyms, or Kierkegaard himself.

The second reason for my scepticism about Hall's strong notion of the A-Kierkegaard link is that this reading seems to require a naiveté with respect to Kierkegaard's theory of the stages (better rendered as 'existence-spheres') and what the other pseudonyms represent in their own right as members of the complete authorship. Hall would have us believe that Kierkegaard's stages 'are modalities of *saying*' and not merely existential modalities (*Word and Spirit*, 74). This is problematic when we apply this to Kierkegaard's personal view. The question that immediately comes to mind is, 'Why did he not just say so?' It is not enough to simply assert that Kierkegaard already did say this via A. Even if we grant this tenuous point, Hall must still account for the fact that almost everything that is in *Either/Or* with respect to the stages is amplified in the later works. If it is truly that the case that the stages are modalities of saying, Kierkegaard's subsequent silence on this point is odd. Furthermore, there are the problems already pointed out with respect to the reliability of A's assertions.

The issue here (in *Either/Or*) is a radical disjunct between living one's life as art as A does, and living life ethically, as Judge William recommends. We must choose how we arbitrate the choices that present themselves to us—*either* in a criterionless pluralism, which is a *de facto* embracing of all values, *or* in a choosing to make good and evil the categories by which we define our existence.[24] This is not a matter for a purely rational investigation into the most reasonable form of life; it is an existential investigation. The movement from one stage to the next is not an annihilation of the previous stage. The stages themselves are less assertions of propositional fact about the world as they are life-forms, or ways of being-in-the-world.[25] And it is especially true of the aesthetic and ethical in *Either/Or* that the move from one to the other is not made by reason but by a choosing, a willing to accept a way of being-in-the-world. To do otherwise is to have already made the move from one to the other; to think that there is a better or worse way of being is to already be in the ethical, to think that there is no difference is to already be an aesthete and therefore all attempts by an ethicist to impinge on one's moral sensibilities is futile and at best makes life more interesting—that is, more aesthetically pleasing. The shift from one way of being-in-the-world to another involves an *Aufhebung*—that is, recontextualized into a wider frame of reference—of the former such that it is 'caught-up' in the latter. This shift is primarily a matter of faith.

In his later pseudonymous works, Kierkegaard works out his initial theory in a much more thorough and complex way, particularly through his pseudonym 'Johannes Climacus.'[26] Climacus and Johannes de Silentio in *Fear and Trembling*[27] work out respectively Kierkegaard's intellectual and existential notions of faith. Neither of these authors mention that 'the mark or test of this life of faith is *faithful speech* or *reflexive integrity*' (*Word and Spirit*, 76). What is more, even if we grant Hall that this is in fact the case,

that for these pseudonyms and for Kierkegaard it really is the case that the mark of the life of faith is reflexive integrity in our speech, it still does not follow that this life of faith *is* the speech-act for Kierkegaard.[28] The act of faith for Climacus is conditioned by inwardness, rooted in interest, and enacted by decision.[29] That this faith entails, as a sort of epiphenomenon, my inhabiting my speech-acts, my reflexively integral speech, is perfectly consistent with Climacus —one might even say that faithful speech or realizing the ultimate *telos* of speech-acts is necessary for the life of faith. But Hall wants more; he argues that faithful speech is both *necessary and sufficient* for Kierkegaardian faith. To say that this is the essence of faith for Kierkegaard is to put the cart before the horse. A far more suitable substitute as a substrate for the life of faith seems to be passionate belief or a 'life-view.'[30]

Hall tries to immunize himself to this sort of objection by arguing that 'Kierkegaard's analysis of faith, self, and spirit relies, in ways not always clear even to Kierkegaard to himself, on the biblical model of faithfulness' (defined as PT), 'Yahweh as the paradigmatic self, the one who speaks with words' (*Word and Spirit*, 101). Hall sees himself as making explicit Kierkegaard's operative biblical basis. There are at least three things that need to be true for Hall's defense to work. First, Yahweh has to be seen in Scripture to be the paradigmatic self-as-speaker. Hall has no argument from me here, this is abundantly clear. Second, Hall's analysis must fit in the whole of Kierkegaard's authorship. I have argued that it does, but must be reconceived and nuanced differently. Lastly, Hall's concept of speech-act must be robust enough to accomplish all he vests it with. I think that Hall's concept of the speech-act is the point at which his theory is weakest.

Hall and speech-acts

The main point J. L. Austin's book, *How to Do Things With Words*,[31] is the revolutionary claim that humans use language in order to perform specific actions. In this seminal work Austin outlines three different aspects to each instance of our speaking that comprise the total force of our attempt at communication: (1) the locutionary act: the physical aspect to our communication, typically the act of performing an utterance of some words in some language (e.g., saying 'Go to the store'); (2) the illocutionary act: the aspect of our communication which pertains to the action we are using the linguistic utterance to perform (e.g., commanding, promising, asking, etc.); (3) the perlocutionary act: the aspect of our communication which pertains to the effect the our linguistic act has on our audience. These three aspects are definitive of speech act theory's approach to language and it is the notion of illocution that is particularly important. As Kevin J. Vanhoozer notes, 'The notion of the illocutionary act allows Austin to distinguish the content of what we say (e.g., the sense and reference of our sentence) and its force (i.e., what we are using the content of our sentence to do)'.[32]

My main concern with Hall's version of speech-acts is that he leaves us with a crucial ambiguity regarding what counts as a speech-act. In his clearest statement on the matter, Hall follows Austin in taking the 'paradigmatic speech-act to be enacted in the first-person singular active voice, indicative mood', which amounts to taking the speech act 'to be something like "I promise" ' (*Word and Spirit*, 10). This is virtually the scope of Hall's discussion on the nature of speech-acts and is not very informative. He spends a lot of time telling us what speech-acts do and how they do it, but very little telling us what they are.

In another important section he elaborates on 'the speech-act as a normative or intentional phenomenon' (*Word and Spirit*, 68–72). Here we catch glimpses of Hall's grander vision of the speech-act as he emphasizes (correctly in my view) in Austinian fashion that speaking is acting (*ergo* intrinsically intentional) and that, 'To realize the *telos* of the speech-act is to realize the *telos* of human being, that is, to be human in the fullest sense' (*Word and Spirit*, 68). Two things Hall does not

seem to realise is that first, the introduction of intentionality has made illocutionary acts an important feature of his theory; nor does he seem to see that his above point may be the case (i.e., the identity of the *teloi* of human speech-acts and human subjectivity) and yet the performance of individual speech-acts may remain only one aspect (and that not foundational) in the process of the establishment of human subjectivity.

When we look elsewhere in *Word and Spirit*, Hall has limited the communication of a speech-act to the locutionary utterances of words in a token sentence.[33] In a departure from Austin and his own previous emphasis on intentionality, Hall focuses on the speaking of words and the locution of token sentences in his discussions of speech-acts. His paradigm of the speech-act is the God-who-owns-his-words, and felicitous speech-acts are those whose words are owned by their speakers, and so on. But here we already encounter a difficulty. Hall's very claim that we must 'own our words' reveals the ambiguity to which I refer. If we can own the words of our speech-act, we may (as Hall notes well) disown them. It seems obvious then, that while speech-acts may be comprised of particular words, they are not primordially so and their sense is not essentially those particular words (spoken, on a page, etc.). In fact, it appears that one can perform a speech-act without uttering a word—as well as the opposite, utter words without performing a speech-act.

I am pointing to the difference between locutionary utterances of token sentences and illocutionary communication propositions—what I take the later Wittgenstein to mean by the 'sense of a sentence.'[34] With the exception of the above noted passage on intentionality, Hall always refers to speech-acts as their constituent words and not once as the illocutions, propositions, or propositional attitudes they express. As I am inclined to view propositions they are not the literal words in a token sentence of any given language, but more like the idea communicated by a sentence, the cognitive content of the sentence. On an Aristotelian view, propositions have actual existence as aspects of propositional attitudes and illocutionary acts.[35] If Hall is committed to the view that speech-acts are inherently verbal communications as those words which comprise the locution of a token sentence in a language, not propositions (in the above sense) uttered in a particular context as an illocution, then there are further complications with his view.[36]

A defender of Hall may try and beg off at this point, saying that this is only a minor conceptual ambiguity, forced on him by the constraints of his situation (time, space, editor, etc.), and that it really makes no difference to his overall project, but this simply is not the case. The way it is possible to have his discussion of the demonic, whether in music or speech-acts, is only because he has limited the speech-act to its locutionary act of being enunciated as a particular sentence in a particular language. Hall must have the link between the auditory medium, the sensuous act of enunciation with its passage through time, and the corresponding disjunct with the idea communicated. This is the basis for his claim that music (as a communicative medium) does not possess the formal semantic resources of the speech-act to self-reflexively 'express even the simplest asseveration: "I love you." ' (*Word and Spirit*, 50). But this seems patently false and contrary to the fundamental intuition of speech-act theory: that language is a tool that is used by humans to perform illocutionary acts. I am sure that any serenaded lover would contest Hall's argument against the resources of music (or poetry) to make asseverations of the kind in question. Music and poetry are in fact used regularly to perform the illocutionary act of saying, 'I love you'. What is more, Hall's view seems to conflict directly with A's argument that 'since music is qualified in relation to spirit, *it is legitimately called a language*', and that 'understood in a certain way, *music is a language*'.[37] Kierkegaard is making the point (through A) that what qualifies something as a language in its most basic

form is that it communicates an idea through a medium in which the sensuous aspect (we may say 'locutions' for our purposes) of the communication 'reduced to a mere instrument and is thus annulled'.[38] If the concept of language and communication is broadened to include illocutionary acts of a non-verbal sort, as I (and Kierkegaard) suggest, Hall's argument about the demonic disappears.

This alternative way of conceiving speech-acts opens up further ambiguities in PT. To begin with, Hall's negative assessment of demonic speech is difficult to reconcile with his positive assessment of ironic speech given his association of the speech-act with literal words or token sentences. The misuse of speech is demonic. Hall identifies two ways to do this. First, speech can be demonic either by uttering words in which the speaker appears to present himself as a dynamic historical presence but in actuality undertakes a conscious attempt to deceive, and thereby retreats from the world and other humans by hiding behind his words. Second, one can remain demonically silent like, for example, a mime. In the first instance words are demonic because 'words are at the very center of the real,' but yet they are being used in a 'demonically and ironically perverted way' (*Word and Spirit*, 113). Here the speaker is alleged to misrepresent himself by his words. The other way that one may be demonic is by fleeing from the speech-act by either remaining silent from any meaningful speech or simply remaining silent as the mime does (*Word and Spirit*, 107–08). Hall contends that demonic speech is 'silent,' but not necessarily wordless. 'This demonic silence implies not the absence of sound but rather only the absence of speech' (*Word and Spirit*, 109).

The master ironist, however, is one who 'disowns his words before some other in order to provide himself with a *temporary* easy way out of the ethical demands of commitment and responsibility implied in reflexively integral speech' (*Word and Spirit*, 203). This is the supremely virtuous act of human speakers because in this context the disowning of one's words provides a defense against our words becoming bondage—it is a preservation of the individual's freedom. What is never clear in Hall is exactly why in the one case withdrawal from commitment is demonic and in the other it is seraphic—or, why one form of silence is treacherous and the other felicitous.

Another ambiguity in Hall presents itself when we view the content of a speech-act in terms of propositions and illocutionary acts. Yahweh is the paradigm of speech-acts, and speech-acts are conceived of in terms of their locutionary force, yet Hall never explains just how it is that God speaks. Hall's formula: *dabhar*-as-speaking = the paradigmatic speech-act, which in turn is expressed verbally by token sentences in some language, seems to run glibly over the philosophical problems associated with God's linguistic communication. There are distinct philosophical problems associated with construing God's speaking in a verbal, locutionary way. As Nicholas Wolterstorff points out, 'it is at once obvious that when we talk of God speaking, it is illocutionary acts that we want to be attributing to God.'[39] Wolterstorff has in mind the fact that these illocutionary acts include performances which are not straight forward locutions of sentences in a human language. This provides a lot of promise as a way of overcoming the inherent (and incorrigible) difficulties in trying to explicate how it is that Yahweh is the God-who-speaks.

Hall should be making more of intentionality in our speech-acts as determinative, as opposed to our specific words. Intentionality refers generally to a (mental) act by which our consciousness selects its object, often described as the mind's 'ofness' or 'aboutness.' This would solve both of his problems and land him in the propositionalist camp. Hall's idea of a speech-act is too limited because he restricts the meaning of a sentence to its locutionary act, caught up in its sentential expressions, where he should be looking at speech-acts as communicating propositions through illocutionary acts. If

I am correct in asserting that propositions have real existence as aspects of our propositional attitudes and illocutionary acts, then propositions are intimately connected to our intentions.

This is closest to the kind of situation about which Kierkegaard could be properly be said to be urging us to inhabit, be true to, own, etc.; that is, that we reduplicate in existence what is thought. It also makes sense of Kierkegaard's assertion that consciousness is distinguished from mere reflection by the fact that consciousness is 'interested.'[40] This interestedness corresponds to what Climacus in *Postscript* calls a 'passion.'[41] This intentionality-as-passion performs precisely that function for Climacus which speaking does for Hall: 'Insofar as existence is movement it holds that there still is a continuity which underlies the movement, otherwise there is no movement. . . . The difficulty for the exister is to give his/[her] existence that continuity without which everything disappears . . . *passion* is the momentary continuity, which at one time holds fast, and is the impulse of the movement.'[42] Here passion is the bedrock of the constitution of human subjectivity. A notion of a speech-act that expresses this Kierkegaardian notion of passion-intentionality would be a speech-act capable of accomplishing all that Hall hopes to with his version.

V. Revisiting the demonical Derrida

I have argued in the preceding section that Hall's speech-act theory involved a limited conception of the nature of a speech-act and that this skewed his rendition of the demonic. In our earlier discussion we saw that Hall's salient criticism of Derrida is that he is demonic; Derrida (allegedly) sunders the self from its words, leaving it in a diaspora of endless interplay between signs and their unctuous signifieds. If we have to revise our understanding of the demonic in the wake of my criticism of Hall, we may have to change the verdict on Derrida. Hall has perhaps not done Derrida justice in this judgment.

Hall appears to misunderstand Derrida and his 'deconstruction' at a deep level.[43] In a summary statement on deconstruction Hall tells us that, 'The project that Derrida calls deconstruction, I take to be a project designed to invade, attack and destroy the legitimacy, efficacy and authority of the speech-act' (*Word and Spirit*, 168). The basis of this attack is Hall's rejection of Derrida's privileging of writing over speaking which is based on what Hall finds to be a wrongheaded reaction to logocentrism. I have three reservations about Hall's reading of Derrida. On closer analysis, Hall actually shares some fundamental points with Derrida, as will become evident below.

First, I do not think that Hall has properly discerned the nuances of Derrida's shift from language-as-speaking, to privileging language-as-writing. When Derrida speaks of the 'voice' privileged in modernity, I understand him to be referring not to the locutions we utter as Hall does, but the phenomenological voice of Husserl, which is the inner voice, the pure voice, free from the contaminations of bodily expression; the voice of pure consciousness if you will.[44] This is also the same 'voice' to which the Cartesian refers in her self-reification. 'Voice' in this instance for Derrida is (and can only be) a metaphor; not a literal reference to words on a page. Hall shares with Derrida this rejection of the voice, only he cannot hear it as a voice because of his analysis of logocentrism as photocentrism (*Word and Spirit*, 146–157). If this is the case, the argument levied against Derrida disappears.

Second, Hall has characterized the nature of deconstruction falsely. I do not think that Derrida is ultimately trying to destroy truth or meaning. Derrida and Hall (and Kierkegaard) actually are not so far apart—especially not as far apart as Hall would like them to be. Hall shares agreement with Derrida on several issues including a belief that human thought/existence/rationality is deeply embedded in language,[45] and the belief that language is drawn out of me by the other.[46] Derrida feels that there is some truth out there of some sort and he is attempting to

reconfigure a post-metaphysical way of working it out.[47] Derrida's own belief about deconstruction is that it is 'not an enclosure in nothingness but an openness towards the other' and that deconstruction 'does not amount to saying that there is nothing beyond language.'[48] In fact, Derrida elsewhere asserts that there is an intimate and necessary link between deconstruction and justice.[49] Derrida's point here is that the Western tradition of metaphysics contains within itself the impulse to deconstruct itself before the ethical demands of and responsibility to the other.[50]

This is particularly illuminating in light of Hall's analysis of the demonic and the master of irony. As we noted earlier, Hall's distinction between the two was essentially ethical, because the demonic individual and the master of irony both do the same external act—they assert words they do not mean. If Derrida is really deconstructing in the name of an ethical responsibility to the truth imposed on him by the other then he appears far more the master ironist than the devil dis/incarnate. To critics it may seem disingenuous of Derrida to claim to be in the service of truth and given some of his early claims a certain degree of scepticism is warranted. But even if he may be said ultimately to fail in achieving what he is attempting to do through deconstruction, this does not make Derrida demonic, merely wrong.

Given this understanding of Derrida (and Hall's noted kindredness with him, albeit unwitting) I do not think that Hall has much to say to Derrida. This is not to say, however, that nothing can be said to Derrida. As I have already stated, I think that Hall's project is salvageable, and in fact I see it as important. If PT is reconstructed in light of propositional communication and intentionality, I think there is much we can say to put Kierkegaard to work against/with Derrida to rework truth in a post-metaphysical climate.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Hall's thesis would be more Kierkegaardian and consistent if he talked about the illocutionary use of propositions, not the locutionary uttering of words. In his attempt to support PT by placing a premium locutionary utterances of words, Hall ends up in ambiguities and ultimately loses his critique of Derrida. This comes from forcing A's words into Kierkegaard's mouth. Kierkegaard makes more sense when understood in terms of intentionality and propositions as illocutionary acts—not mere locutionary utterances. The benefit of Hall's project is that it brings the speech-act into prominence as an important feature (necessary formal condition) of the establishment and constitution of human subjectivity, even if it will not do the work of both a necessary and sufficient condition for a developed self. In the end, Hall has provided an illuminating way of understanding both Kierkegaard and speech-act theory, but he has left us some room to continue the project.

Notes

1 I would like to thank Professor Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Dr. Gordon McConville—the General Editor of *European Journal of Theology*, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. They are, of course, in no way responsible for its shortcomings.

2 Hall, *Word and Spirit* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994).

3 See Søren Kierkegaard, *Stages On Life's Way: Studies By Various Persons*, trans. and eds. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 476–77.

4 I am calling this Hall's 'principal thesis' because it is basal to the variety of theses presented in his ambitious project as noted in the opening of this paragraph. Hall's global intentions are too far-reaching to be analyzed in all their particularity here but it is fair to say that the above 'principal thesis' is the nub of his argument. And in my estimation it is this thesis which is most meritorious Hall's points (as opposed to some of his more extravagant claims). One claim in particular that I will not address, in praise or rebuttal, is his contention that the world was waiting

for Christianity to give it an existentially concrete self that could 'own its words.' I will also leave alone Hall's analysis of *Either/Or*'s two case studies of Don Giovanni and Faust.

5 While this is Hall's point about speech act philosophy, he has correctly interpreted the tradition. We return to this discussion later in the paper.

6 In case a careful reader is a bit confused at this point, let me point to what seems to be a fundamental ambiguity in Hall. He unreflectively accepts that when A refers to 'language', this is a reference to speech in the proper sense, and that this idea of language is at least compatible with a theory of speech-acts. This may well be the case but it is by no means obvious or necessary. For example, why can't A be referring in the abstract to the universal linguistic capacity in humans? A doesn't seem (at least to me) to clearly indicate his position on the matter and Hall doesn't provide an argument compelling us to read A this way. Nonetheless, Hall's assumption may stand as a potential reading of A and so I think this to be only a slight oversight on his part.

7 Hall, *Word and Spirit*, 201; see also pp. 74–89, 98, 169, 179, 200–206. Hall speaks much about the 'reflexively integral speech-act,' and our need for 'reflexive integrity' in our speaking, 'speaking faithfully,' the 'felicity conditions' on our speech-acts, etc.

8 I borrow this term for C. S. Lewis who used as a title to one of his books. He uses the term in reference to the divide between heaven and hell.

9 Hall's own position is actually never clear on this, only that he does not feel that music must always be demonic (*Word and Spirit*, 8). He is also aware of the fact that speech may be demonic (*Word and Spirit*, 113). However, whether or not Hall thinks music is useful as a (necessary) pointer towards existential concretion is ambiguous, but his derision of music as 'the quintessential medium for expressing the demonic' leaves us with a less than positive account of music (*Word and Spirit*, 43). See for example his statement, 'music lacks anything equivalent to these resources [of speech]; in music there is no way for the musician to own or own up to what is expressed in the music she performs or composes' (*Word and Spirit*, 53).

10 Again, Hall is ambiguous. Here Hall contends that as a work to be read, '*contra* Derrida, writing is not the dynamic, phonocentric act of speaking, [and] seems to be essentially a logocentric phenomenon,' (*Word and Spirit*, 172). Later Hall states that, 'Derrida is correct that writing is not a logocentric enterprise,' (*Word and Spirit*, 175). What Hall appears to be bringing out is that writing has a double, sensuous-spiritual aspect (much like music). It can refer to a written work to be read (inherently logocentric, visually sensuous), or it can be the act of writing (inherently novel, dynamic, historically concrete and spiritual). What I conclude is that Hall is criticizing Derrida for not breaking completely with logocentrism. The paradigm of language as writing is not radical enough. I say more regarding writing as music in my following discussion.

11 Derrida, Jacques, *Limited, Inc.* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 105.

12 Hall, *Word and Spirit*, 189–199, cf. 196.

13 For Hall's principal thesis see my opening discussion.

14 I am not as much attacking speech-act theory per se as I am attacking Hall's implementation of it as flawed. This will become more clear in the following discussion.

15 This point will be important in the critique Hall's rendition of speech-act theory.

16 Lest the reader think that I am creating a picture of Kierkegaard made in my own image note Kierkegaard's own vision of his authorship: 'Thus the whole literary activity turns upon the problem becoming a Christian within Christendom' ['The Point of View For My Work As An Author,' in *A Kierkegaard Anthology*, ed. Robert Bretall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), 335]. This indicates an overall unity in his thought.

17 See note 7.

18 That is, 'Victor the Hermit' or 'The Victorious Hermit.'

19 We see this in Plato (as brought out by Hall), but also in Aristotle through Augustine's innovations (divine illumination), Aquinas (sight as 'the most spiritual sense'), Descartes ('the natural light'), Locke (luminosity), etc.

20 Cf. the apostle Paul, 'Faith comes by hearing' (Romans 10:17).

21 The reader will notice that I am not arguing for or against any particular interpre-

tation of Kierkegaard on this point. In fact, I think that in this case Eremita's preface indicates some version of PT as being intimately connected to Kierkegaard's personal view. The point is that any interpretation must be carefully argued to and not simply assumed.

22 See Ronald J. Manheimer, *Kierkegaard as Educator* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 178–184.

23 Kierkegaard no doubt shares much with A—it would require a superhuman effort (demonic?) for a finite human to create a pseudonym of A's sophistication with whom she had nothing in common.

24 See Steven L. Ross 'Editor's Introduction,' in *Either/Or*, xiv–xv; and Merold Westphal, *Becoming a Self: A Reading of Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1996), 23–24.

25 Westphal, *Becoming A Self*, 22.

26 The two books I especially have in mind are Climacus' *Philosophical Fragments, Johannes Climacus*, trans. & eds. Edna and Howard Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) and *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments*, trans. & eds. Edna and Howard Hong (2 vols.; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

27 Kierkgaard, *Fear and Trembling and The Sickness Unto Death*.

28 Hall has an excellent discussion of Kierkegaard's concept of faith in *Word and Spirit*, 2–3. He is exactly correct when he claims here that for Kierkegaard 'to exist in faith is to exist within a radical convental bonding to God *and* to exist within a dialectical sundered/bonded relationship with the world.' My argument with Hall is that I think he later on confuses this sundered/bonded relationship as being necessarily and essentially predicated upon the speech-act. I have already noted I think that this is a reversal of the situation for Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard is saying that we speak faithfully because we have faith, or maybe even that when we have faith we will speak faithfully; but he is not saying that we have faith because we speak faithfully. This will become more clear in my following discussion of Hall and speech-acts.

29 Kierkegaard, *Postscript*, 22–34.

30 See Kierkegaard's statement [*Early Polemical Writings*, trans. and ed. J. Watkins (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 76], 'A life-view is more than a quintessence or a sum of propositions maintained in its abstract neutrality; it is more than experience [*Erfaring*], which as such is always fragmentary. It is, namely, the transubstantiation of experience [*Erfaringens Transubstantiation]; it is an unshakable certainty in oneself won from all lived experience.' See also his statement [in The Journals of Søren Kierkegaard*, trans. and ed. Alexander Dru (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1958), 44–5], 'The thing is to understand myself, to see what God really wishes *me* to do; the thing is to find a truth which is *true for me*, to find *the idea for which I can live and die*. . . . That was what I lacked in order *to lead a complete human life* . . . something which grows together with the deepest roots of my life, through which I am so to speak, grafted upon the divine . . . It is the divine side of [a human], his [or her] inward action which means everything.'

31 J. L. Austin, *How To Do Things With Words* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).

32 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, *Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, The Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge* (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1998), 208.

33 I am here accusing Hall of not accounting for Searle's very important distinction [in John R. Searle, 'Literary Theory and It's Discontents', in *New Literary History* 25 (1994): 660] between linguistic types and linguistic tokens. By 'token sentence' I simply mean to refer to any sentence uttered by a particular person in a particular context (which includes all the circumstances relevant to the utterance; the time, place, etc.) For example, I, sitting in my study in Edinburgh, Scotland, at 11:00 am, December 5, 1998, may utter the token sentence, 'There is snow outside.' Thus by definition any token sentence may be only uttered once. The 'type' of a sentence refers to its form and may be repeated by different speakers on different occasions. For example, every time 'There is snow outside' is spoken, it is the utterance of a different token sentence with the same type. For further discussion of this see Richard Swinburne, *Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 9–10; and Kevin J. Vanhoozer, *Is There a Meaning in This Text?*, 212.

34 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), 99. By noting the affinity with Wittgenstein I mean to distance myself from a 'metaphysical' construal of intentionality in a substance dualist form or otherwise. I merely want to indicate that aspect of communication which is not sensuous (in Hall's sense).

35 This may be the case even if propositions do not exist except as instantiated in some act of state of an existing being.

36 I am arguing here that it is in the interests of speech-act (and *a fortiori* Hall) that we think of speech-act theory in terms of the illocutionary appropriation of propositions, not the utterance of token sentences or the semiotic arrangement of words. I will not provide arguments that demonstrates Hall's view to be fraught with problems (although these arguments do exist). I think it merely suffices that there is another, better way to think about speech-acts.

37 Søren Kierkegaard, *Either / Or, 2 Volumes* trans. and eds. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1.67; 1.68. The emphases in the quotations are mine.

38 Kierkegaard, *Either / Or* (Princeton), 1.67.

39 Nicholas Wolterstorff, 'The Importance of Hermeneutics for a Christian Worldview,' in *Disciplining Hermeneutics: Interpretation in Christian Perspective*, ed. Roger Lundin (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1997), 31.

40 Søren Kierkegaard, *Johannes Climacus or De Omnibus Dubitandum Est*, trans. T. H. Croxall (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), 148–149.

41 C. Stephen Evans, *Kierkegaard's "Fragments" and "Postscript": The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1983), 56–57.

42 Kierkegaard, *Postscript*, 277.

43 Some may object on principle that it is not possible to mis/understand Derrida because his own deconstructive theory, if right, prevents this from being possible. One might object saying Words to the effect, 'How can he object that I am reading him wrongly? Does he not claim that all we have are endless significations? Does he not leave open the possibility for an endless reading of texts? How may the pot now call the kettle black?' This is a crass wielding of the *tu quoque* fallacy. Derrida addresses this type of charge saying that 'this definition of deconstruction is *false* (that's right: false, not true) and feeble; it supposes a bad (that's right: bad, not good) and feeble reading of numerous texts, first of all mine, which therefore must finally be read or reread,' Jacques Derrida, *Limited, Inc.*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 146. I will say more about this subject in my following discussion of Derrida's ethical position.

44 Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*, trans. by David B. Allison and Newton Garver (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973, 22.

45 See Hall, *Word and Spirit*, 60; and Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, 40.

46 See Hall, *Word and Spirit*, 61; and Jacques Derrida, 'Circonfession,' in *Derrida* (Paris: Galilée, 1991), 123; cited by Richard Kearney in 'Derrida's Ethical Re-Turn,' in *Working Through Derrida*, 48.

47 For an argument of this sort see Brian D. Ingraffia, *Postmodern Theory and Biblical Theology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 187; and Andrew Gustafson, 'Apologetically Listening to Derrida,' *Philosophia Christi* 20 (Winter 1997), 15–42.

48 Derrida, 'Circonfession,' 124.

49 Derrida, 'Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice,' *Cardozo Law Review*, 11, (1990), 959.

50 Kearney, 'Derrida's Ethical Re-Turn,' 49.

EuroJTh (1999) **8:1**, 95–97 0960–2720

• A Report from the Theological Seminary in Slovakia
• *Ein Bericht vom Theologischen Seminar der Slowakei*
• *Rapport sur la faculté de théologie slovaque*

Ludovit Fazekas, Banska Bystrica

In June we celebrated a jubilee: the third time we had graduates with the BA Degree, after three years of study, and also the first graduates with the MA, after five years of study. At present we have over 100 students in full-time study and some sixty in extension studies. They are divided into three categories:

a. pastors studying 5 years for MA
b. catechetes, also studying 5 years for MA
c. missionaries, studying 3 years for BA.

For the catechetes it is possible to combine theology with other subjects (e.g. maths, Slovak language, music etc.) in the course of their regular studies or at postgraduate level, so that they can work as schoolteachers.

Of our eight full-time faculty, two are 'dozents', that is, assistant professors with PhD degrees, and six are assistants with MA degrees. These have been studying for PhD for five years, so we hope they will complete in one or two years time.

In 1996 the Accreditation Commission of the Ministry of Education renamed our seminary the 'Catheder (Chair) of the Pedagogical Faculty of Matej Bel University'. In two years there will be a further accreditation assessment, and we are doing all we can to be recognized as an independent Department of the University. For this we need at least one full professor and two 'dozents'. (One of our 'dozents' is quite likely to become a full professor within a year or so). If this should come about, it will create an excellent opportunity for students from Slovakia and neighbouring former Soviet countries to become workers in both established and newly formed churches (we already have students from former-Yugoslavia and other countries).

The Lord keeps us in a spirit of unity in the four Evangelical Churches (Apostolic, Baptist, Brethren and Methodist). We do not envy, but pray for each other, and indeed we are learning from each other. Where we recognize that another church has something better than ourselves we do not hesitate to take over the better and leave behind the 'good'.

The economic situation in our country is difficult, and it affects our seminary also. We had hoped to move to other, better premises, but this has had to be postponed for lack of funds.

Nevertheless, it is the Lord's work in which we continue, and he cares for his servants.

Im Juni 1998 feierten wir ein Jubiläum: zum dritten Mal entließen wir Absolventen, die ihr 3-jähriges Studium mit einem B.A. (Bachelor of Arts) abgeschlossen hatten. Daneben hatten wir zum ersten Mal Studenten, die nach Absolvierung ihrer 5-jährigen Studienzeit mit einem M.A. (Master of Arts, d.h. Magister) abschlossen.

Zur Zeit haben wir mehr als 100 ordentliche Studenten sowie mehr als 60 weitere Studenten, die ein Aufbaustudium absolvieren. Diese gliedern sich in drei Gruppen:

a. Pastoren, die in einem 5-jährigen Magisterstudium stehen
b. Katecheten (Religionslehrer), die

ebenfalls 5 Jahre für einen Magister studieren
c. Missionare, die ein 3-jähriges B.A.-Programm absolvieren.

Die Katecheten können das Studium der Theologie mit anderen Fächern (wie z.B. Mathematik, Slowakisch, Musik usw.) kombinieren. Für die Doktoranden ist es möglich, ihr Studium mit einer Arbeit als Lehrer an einer Schule zu kombinieren.

Zwei unserer Lehrkräfte haben einen Doktortitel und genießen den Status von Dozenten (außerordentlichen Professoren), sechs weitere verfügen über einen M.A. und stehen seit fünf Jahren in Doktoralstudien, so daß sie (hoffentlich) in 1–2 Jahren fertig sein werden. 1996 hat die Akkreditierungskommission des Erziehungsministeriums unserem Seminar den Rang eines 'Lehrstuhls der Pädagogischen Fakultät der Universität von Matej Bel' verliehen. In zwei Jahren wird ein erneutes Akkreditierungsverfahren stattfinden, und wir sind darum bemüht, dann als unabhängige Fakultät der Universität anerkannt zu werden. Dazu benötigen wir mindestens einen ordentlichen Professor und zwei Dozenten. (Einer der Dozenten hat gute Aussichten, im Laufe dieses oder des nächsten Jahres eine Professur zu erhalten). Sollte dies alles eintreten, dann ergäbe sich eine gute Möglichkeit für Studenten aus der Slowakei sowie den aus dem früheren Sowjetblock hervorgegangenen Nachbarstaaten (wir haben bereits Studenten aus Jugoslawien und anderen Ländern), in den bereits existierenden oder in neuen Kirchen zu arbeiten.

Der Herr bewahrt uns im Geist der Einheit, der alle vier evangelischen Kirchen (Apostolische Kirche, Baptisten, Brüdergemeinden und Methodisten) einigt. Wir neiden einander nichts, sondern beten füreinander. Mehr noch, wir lernen voneinander. Wenn wir feststellen, daß uns eine der anderen Kirchen etwas voraushat, beeilen wir uns, das Bessere zu übernehmen und das Gute zurückzulassen.

Die wirtschaftliche Situation in unserem Land ist problematisch und wirkt sich auch auf unser Seminar aus. Wir hatten eigentlich gehofft, in ein anderes Gebäude, das bessere Bedingungen bietet, umziehen zu können, was jedoch aufgrund von Geldmangel aufgeschoben werden mußte. Doch wir stehen in des Herrn Werk und er sorgt für seine Diener.

En juin 1998, nous avons célébré une belle fête : pour la troisième fois nous avons accordé des diplômes de licence, qui nécessitent trois ans d'études, et nous avons accordé les premiers diplômes de maîtrise, qui demandent cinq ans d'études.

Pour le moment, nous avons plus de cent étudiants à plein temps, et une soixantaine en prolongation d'études. Ils se répartissent en trois catégories :

a. Des pasteurs qui font cinq ans d'études en vue de la maîtrise.
b. Des catéchistes qui font aussi cinq ans d'études en vue de la maîtrise.
c. Des missionnaires qui font trois ans d'études en vue de la licence.

Les catéchistes ont la possibilité d'associer la théologie à d'autres matières (comme les mathématiques, le Slovaque, la musique, etc.), au cours de leurs études et même dans le cadre d'un troisième cycle, ce qui leur permet de travailler comme enseignants dans les écoles.

De nos huit professeurs à plein temps, deux ont leur doctorat et six, diplômés de la maîtrise, sont assistants. Mais ces derniers travaillent déjà depuis cinq ans à leur doctorat et on peut espérer les voir terminer d'ici un an ou deux.

En 1996, la Commission d'accréditation du ministère de l'éducation a donné un nouveau nom à notre faculté: La chaire du département pédagogique de l'Université Matej Bel. Dans deux ans, il y aura une nouvelle reconnaissance et nous faisons tout notre possible pour être reconnus comme un département indépendant de l'Université. Pour cela,

nous avons besoin d'au moins un professeur ayant l'habilitation, et de deux professeurs ayant le doctorat. Un professeur à de grandes chances de terminer son habilitation cette année ou l'année prochaine. Si cela se réalise, cela permettra aux étudiants de Slovaquie et des pays voisins de l'ancien bloc soviétique (nous avons déjà des étudiants de Yougoslavie et d'autres pays) de travailler dans les Églises existantes ou dans de nouvelles Églises.

Le Seigneur nous garde dans un esprit d'unité entre les quatre dénominations évangéliques (apostoliques, baptistes, frères et méthodistes). Nous ne nous faisons pas concurrence les uns aux autres, nous prions les uns pour les autres et, en outre, nous apprenons les uns des autres. Si nous voyons qu'une autre dénomination ou une autre Église a quelque chose de mieux que la nôtre, nous n'hésitons pas à prendre ce qui est mieux en abandonnant ce qui était seulement bon.

La situation économique de notre pays est difficile et cela affecte aussi notre faculté. Nous espérions déménager dans d'autres locaux et bénéficier ainsi de meilleures conditions de travail, mais, en raison de problèmes financiers, ce projet a dû être reporté. Néanmoins, nous restons fermes dans l'œuvre du Seigneur et il prend soin de ses serviteurs.

BIBLICAL AND THEOLOGICAL CLASSICS LIBRARY (BTCL)

The BTCL makes available new editions of classic titles by leading theologians.

Series Listing

Carl E. Armerding
The Old Testament and Criticism
0-85364-812-3 / 134pp / £3.99

G.R. Beasley-Murray
Baptism in the New Testament
0-85364-769-0 / 432pp / £4.99

John Bright
The Authority of the Old Testament
0-85364-807-7 / 272 pp / £4.99

D.A. Carson
Showing the Spirit
0-85364-636-8 / 229pp / £4.99

W.J. Dumbrell
Covenant and Creation
0-85364-771-2 / 224pp / £3.99

William Dyrness
Themes in Old Testament Theology
0-85364-883-2 / 252pp / £4.99

J. Ellul
The Meaning of the City
0-85364-424-1 / 432pp / £4.99

R. Newton Flew
Jesus and His Church
0-85364-877-8 / 272pp / £4.99

P. T. Forsyth
Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind
0-85364-876-X / 258pp / £4.99

John Goldingay
Theological Diversity and the Authority of the Old Testament
0-85364-654-6 / xii+308pp / £4.99

R. Goudzwaard
Capitalism and Progress
0-85364-770-4 / 304pp / £4.99

W.A. Heth and G. J. Wenham
Jesus and Divorce
0-85364-768-2 / 328pp /£4.99

George A. F. Knight
A Christian Theology of the Old Testament
0-85364-879-4 / 386pp / £4.99

Walter L. Liefeld
New Testament Exposition
0-85364-684-8 / xii+180pp / £3.99

Richard N. Longenecker
Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period
0-85364-708-9 / 256pp / £3.99

I. Howard Marshall
Biblical Inspiration
0-85364-709-7 / 125pp / £3.99

Kept by the Power of God
(Third Edition)
0-85364-643-2 / 302pp / £4.99
Last Supper and Lord's Supper
0-85364-856-5 / 192pp / £3.99
New Testament Interpretation
0-85364-841-7 / 432pp / £4.99

Leon Morris
The Cross in the New Testament
0-85364-637-6 / 454pp / £4.99

Waldron Scott
Bring Forth Justice
0-85364-789-5 / 318pp / £4.99

N.H. Snaith
The Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament
0-85364-790-9 / 208pp / £4.99

Willem VanGemeren
The Progress of Redemption
0-85364-719-0 / 544pp / £4.99

Christopher J.H. Wright
God's People in God's Land
0-85364-808-5 / 304pp / £4.99

'I am delighted that these important books are to enjoy a new lease of life'
JOHN STOTT

Paternoster Publishing
PO Box 300 Carlisle Cumbria CA3 0QS

• Book Reviews/Recensions/Buchbesprechungen

EuroJTh (1999) **8:1**, 99–100 0960–2720

The Claims of Truth: John Owen's Trinitarian Theology
C. R. Trueman
Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1998, xii + 267 pp., pb, ISBN 0 85364 798 4

RÉSUMÉ
Le livre de Carl Trueman est une vive réfutation des critiques courantes, en particulier celles du professeur Alan Clifford, dirigée contre la théologie de John Owen, qu'on a présentée comme étant influencée à l'excès par les idées téléologiques aristotéliciennes. Trueman montre au contraire que la théologie d'Owen tient compte de la théologie patristique, de la théologie médiévale et de celle de la réformation, avec lesquelles elle entre en dialogue, et qu'elle doit être aussi comprise en fonction du contexte des controverses de son époque—en particulier les idées de Grotius, de Baxter, des antinomiens et des sociniens. Parmi les aspects de la théologie d'Owen, il aborde les Prolégomènes, les attributs de Dieu et, surtout, la personne et l'œuvre de Christ. Selon Trueman, la théologie d'Owen est construite fondamentalement à partir d'une pensée trinitaire inébranlable plutôt que d'idées aristotéliciennes.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Carl Trumans Buch The Claims of Truth: John Owen's Trinitarian Theology ist eine entschiedene Zurückweisung zeitgenössischer Kritik (vor allem von Prof. Alan Clifford) an John Owens Theologie. Owens Kritiker sehen diese als zu sehr von aristotelisch-teleologischen Konzepten beeinflußt. Trueman weist jedoch demgegenüber darauf hin, daß Owens Theologie die patristische, mittelalterliche und reformatorische Theologie durchaus zur Kenntnis nimmt und sich mit ihr auseinandersetzt, und daß sie zudem vor dem Hintergrund der Kontroversen seiner eigenen Zeit (insbesondere den Vorstellungen von Grotius, Baxter, den Antinomianern und Sozinianern) verstanden werden muß. Trueman behandelt die folgenden Teilbereiche von Owens Theologie: die Prolegomena, den Abschnitt über die Eigenschaften Gottes sowie vor allem den über Person und Werk Christi. Laut Trueman ist Owens theologische Perspektive nicht so sehr von aristotelischen Konzepten als vielmehr von einem soliden Glauben an die Trinität geprägt.

One of the leading scholars in the field of post-reformation studies, R. A. Muller, observed in the Calvin Theological Journal in 1995 that '. . . the study of Protestant orthodoxy has received more attention in the last two decades than it received in the entire earlier part of the twentieth century.' Carl Trueman's book, The Claims of Truth, is the latest addition to the erudite studies that pour forth on the subject, and it is a worthy contribution.

Trueman's particular field is the work of John Owen, the leading Puritan theologian, and while the author has the positive aim of presenting Owen's work as being, *inter alia*, a natural theological development of the theology of the reformers of the sixteenth century, (and indeed of all that was best in the patristic and medieval church's theology), his presentation has a strong polemical note, opposing 'those . . . scholars . . . interested in Puritan theology [who] accept the "Calvin against the Calvinists" thesis,' (p. 7) notably A. C. Clifford, and to a lesser extent, R. T. Kendall. Clifford in particular sees Owen's work on the extent of the atonement, *The Death of Death in the Death of Christ* as being governed by Aristotelian teleological ideas rather than Scripture—'Owen's early regard for Aristotle perhaps explains his inability to be thoroughly and exclusively scriptural' (quoted on p. 34, n. 77), and it is this argument that Trueman is endeavouring to refute. All this means that Trueman's work is a tapestry with the expository and polemical threads interwoven. Surprisingly, the combination of these elements works well, and the result is a satisfying exposition of Owen's theology, together with a stimulating interaction with the author's opponents.

The preface to the work is important, because it alerts us to the approach adopted by the writer. 'I write' he says, 'as a historian of ideas, not as a systematic theologian. My interest is not to discover whether Owen was right or wrong, but to see what he said, why he said it . . . and how he fits into the theological context of his own times and of the western tradition as a whole.' (p. ix) In this reviewer's

opinion, Trueman has been faithful to his task.

A less happy note in the preface is the laboured protestation of a sincere struggle for objectivity, and the explanatory and almost apologetic note on the apparently 'value laden' terminology of the work. One has to ask whether such explanations are necessary—only fairness and honesty are required, and they are, in this case, clearly evident! The work itself begins by placing 'Owen in Context', and this chapter is masterly. An introductory section outlines the relatively limited theological interest in Owen, and within a few pages, Trueman's sword is unsheathed, and wielded against both the fundamentalists, whom the writer sees as interested in Owen as supporting their particular brand of orthodoxy rather than as a writer to be placed in his historical context, and the 'Calvin against the Calvinists' school mentioned above. As the latter school is more important to Trueman, he is at pains to show that any attempt to evaluate Owen in relation to Calvin must take into account the Genevan reformer's teaching as a whole, and not just one or two isolated areas of his thought. This leads him to point out further that the best seventeenth century theologians, including Owen, were interacting with the whole Western theological tradition, as indeed were the reformers themselves. Trueman then discusses the influence of the Reformed Orthodox movement as a whole, and the context of heretical views, whether Roman, Arminian or Socinian, on Owen's theological approach. Because Clifford places great emphasis on the supposed influence of Aristotle on Owen, Trueman devotes several pages to showing that the presence of Aristotelian thought in Owen's work does not determine whether he was indebted to Aristotle for his theological system—'Owen's Aristotelian language must be judged by how the words are used by him, not what they meant to Aristotle . . .' (p. 44).

The main body of Trueman's work uses the traditional theological loci of prolegomena, the doctrine of God, and the person and work of Christ, as these are dealt with by Owen, and the great Puritan is quoted extensively to show that in all these fields, he is indebted not to Aristotle, but to his deep commitment to an understanding of theology that is governed by a profound trinitarianism. This, Trueman affirms, with more than adequate support from the primary sources, is as true of Owen's *Doctrine of God* as of his *Principles of Theology* (See inter alia, pp. 98–99 and 149).

The crucial and climactic chapter is on 'The Nature of Satisfaction' (p. 199–226). As Trueman rightly points out: 'At the heart of Owen's discussion of Christ's priestly office, and at the heart of negative critiques of Owen's thought, lies the problem of Christ's satisfaction.' (p. 199) The value of Trueman's treatment is in the way in which he carefully places Owen's work in the context of Grotius, Baxter, and seventeenth century antinomians. His massive *Death of Death* is made more apposite, by the recognition that it is a response to inadequate, and even heretical, views of the atonement current among Owen's contemporaries. It is this context, not conscious embrace of Aristotelian teleological principles that explains Owen's approach and emphasis.

Perhaps the most controversial chapter is that entitled 'The Man Who Wasn't There', in which Trueman castigates 'modern British neo-Calvinists or fundamentalists who show no interest in the patristic or medieval theology upon which Owen himself drew so positively.' (p. 230) He is equally scathing about 'the scholarship [which] remains preoccupied with judging the seventeenth century by standards other than those which were set within its own day. If one is looking for a Barth, or a Calvin, one must look in the twentieth, or the sixteenth century, respectively; it is pointless to search for one in seventeenth-century England, and even more pointless to express dismay at, or even harsh criticism of, those theologians one does find there on the grounds that they do not measure up to standards which were irrelevant in their own day.' (ibid.) Tough talk, but, in this reviewer's opinion, justified by the evidence so carefully adduced and collated by (for all his protests!) this passionate defender of one whom many have regarded as England's premier theologian of the Puritan era. *The Claims of Truth* is a valuable corrective to the recent facile dismissals of the Cliffords and Kendalls of our time, and their polarised neo-Calvinists!

John Newby
Cape Town, South Africa

EuroJTh (1999) **8:1**, 101–102 0960–2720

The Incarnation of the Antithesis: An Introduction to the Educational Thought of Abraham Kuyper
R. E. L. Rodgers
Durham: Pentland, 1992, xvi + 89 pp., £7.50, pb, ISBN 1 872795 91 9

RÉSUMÉ
Ce livre traite essentiellement de la théorie éducative d'Abraham Kuyper, philosophe, théologien, journaliste et homme politique hollandais (1837–1920), dont les réalisations comprennent la fondation de l'Université Libre d'Amsterdam et du parti anti-révolutionnaire, et qui a exercé les fonctions de Premier Ministre des Pays-Bas. Rodgers montre comment la pensée et l'action de Kuyper étaient fondées sur les doctrines réformées de la souveraineté de Dieu et de la grâce commune. Dans le dernier chapitre, il cherche à déterminer quelle a été l'influence internationale de Kuyper, qui reste significative de nos jours. Le livre offre une présentation courte mais utile de la vie et de la pensée de Kuyper.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Das vorliegende Buch behandelt vor allem die erziehungswissenschaftlichen Anschauungen des holländischen Philosophen, Theologen, Journalisten und Politikers Abraham Kuyper (1837–1920), dessen Leistungen die Gründung der Freien Universität von Amsterdam sowie der Antirevolutionären Partei einschließen und der darüber hinaus Premierminister der Niederlande war. Rodgers zeigt auf, daß Kuypers Denken und Handeln zu einem Großteil auf den reformierten Lehren von der Souveränität Gottes und der allgemeinen Gnade basierte. Im letzten Kapitel verfolgt der Autor das Ziel, das Ausmaß von Kuypers internationalem Einfluß aufzuzeigen, der bis heute beachtlich ist. Das Buch bietet eine kurze aber durchaus brauchbare Einführung in Kuypers Leben und Denken.

Although this book is concerned primarily with Abraham Kuyper's ideas on education, it provides an interesting and readable introduction to the general scope of his life and thought. Kuyper was not only an educational, social and political philosopher but a theologian, journalist and politician. His activities and achievements are impressive, and included the establishment of the Free University of Amsterdam, committed to scholarship based on Reformed principles, and the founding of the Anti-Revolutionary Party, which laid an important basis for the emergence of the Christian Democratic tradition in the Netherlands. For nearly fifty years he was chief editor of both a daily newspaper and a religious weekly journal, and in 1901 he became Prime Minister, leading a coalition cabinet of Protestant and Catholic parties. Dr. Rodgers highlights the historical significance of these achievements and the theological foundations on which they were based. Chief amongst these are the sovereignty of God over the entire created order and the doctrine of common grace. Rodgers shows how such foundational beliefs provided Kuyper with a mandate for Christian activity in every area of human life and culture, and how he used them to encourage his followers to be involved in all levels of public life, and thus to express Christ's lordship over all creation. He aimed, Rodgers explains, to combine orthodox religious views with a progressive social programme.

Rodgers' final chapter discusses the transmission of Kuyper's influence, and is particularly useful to the international audience his book has already attracted. After sketching out Kuyper's influence amongst successive generations of Dutch philosophers, most notably Herman Dooyeweerd, Rodgers discusses Kuyper's American influence, with particular reference to Cornelius van Til, Louis Berkhof, and the Institute of Christian Studies in Toronto. Kuyper's influence in South Africa also receives attention, Rodgers proving himself well aware of the misapplication of Kuyper's doctrine of sphere-sovereignty in support of the *apartheid* system.

Given the extent of his intellectual legacy, particularly in Reformed and evangelical circles, and the breadth, clarity and practical significance of his thought, Kuyper is certainly a figure worthy of the increase in attention he is currently enjoying. Within this renewal of interest, Rodgers' book serves as a valuable prelude to the many publications appearing this year and next to mark the centenary of Kuyper's famous Stone Lectures on Calvinism, which were delivered at Princeton in 1898. It is not, however, based on original research or on a first-hand knowledge of Kuyper's Dutch-language works, and indeed its reliance on secondary material of a semi-popular nature produced by American Kuyper-devotees is largely responsible for its somewhat superficial analysis and racy tone. It remains useful, nonetheless, to those

seeking a short introduction in English to the core of Kuyper's intellectual legacy. It also supplies inspiration to those within the evangelical and Reformed tradition who seek to relate biblical principles to cultural and social engagement. In the words of the British politician Viscount Tonypandy, who writes the forward, 'It provides Christians in public life with an added incentive to proclaim the relevance of our faith to all aspects of human activity.'

Peter S Heslam
Huntingdon, England

EuroJTh (1999) **8:1**, 102–103 0960–2720

The Extent of the Atonement: A Dilemma for Reformed Theology from Calvin to the Consensus
G. M. Thomas
Carlisle: Paternoster, 1997, 277 pp.,
ISBN 85364 828 X

RÉSUMÉ
Le livre de Thomas tente de montrer que, dans la théologie réformée de 1536 à 1675, alors qu'il y avait un consensus sur la doctrine de l'élection inconditionnelle au salut, un consensus semblable n'a pas été atteint sur la question de l'étendue de l'expiation, et que la théologie réformée maintenait une tension entre une portée universelle et une portée particulière de l'œuvre de Christ, sans parvenir à résoudre la difficulté. La plus grande force de ce livre ne se situe pas dans sa présentation de l'histoire de la théologie, mais dans sa manière de nous introduire à la théologie systématique réformée, car Thomas lie la question de l'étendue de l'expiation à d'autres points de doctrine, en particulier à la doctrine de la prédestination. Comme tel, le livre est stimulant et utile.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Thomas weist in seinem Buch darauf hin, daß in der reformierten Theologie von 1536–1675, ungeachtet des Konsens bezüglich der nichtkonditionalen Erwählung zum Heil, kein Konsens bestand in der Frage des Ausmaßes der Sühne. Zudem war die reformierte Theologie laut Thomas von einer nicht zu vereinbarenden Spannung zwischen der universellen und der spezifischen Dimension des Werks Christi gekennzeichnet. Aus der Sicht des Rezensenten besteht die Stärke dieses Buches nicht so sehr in seinem Beitrag zur Kirchengeschichte als vielmehr darin, das Ausmaß der Sühne zu anderen Bereichen der Dogmatik, insbesondere der Prädestinationslehre, in Beziehung zu setzen. Dies macht das Buch stimulierend und relevant.

The question of the extent of the atonement has long been a theological shibboleth in the Reformed tradition and it seems commonplace to define Reformed theology in terms of its belief in limited atonement (note its place in T.U.L.I.P). This book, which is closely based on Thomas' doctoral thesis, seeks to refute two opposing camps in Reformed historical studies: the first and most prominent camp stating that from Calvin to the Swiss Consensus of 1675, there was, apart from the Amyraldian controversy, an unbroken Reformed consensus on the extent of the atonement (its extent being limited to the elect); the second camp in a variety of ways stating that there was a division between Calvin's teaching and that of his successors, and even that Amyraut's theology was a faithful re-interpretation of Calvin. Surveying a number of Reformed theologians and schools over a hundred and fifty year period, Thomas' conclusion is that from the beginning of the Reformed movement there were inherent and unresovable theological tensions over the universality and particularity of the atonement which can be clearly seen in the controversies and debates of the time. As such, the aim of Thomas' thesis appears to be one of problematization: to make the reader aware of the theological complexities and nuances surrounding the question of the extent of the atonement. The great strength of Thomas' work is his insistence not to treat the extent of the atonement as an isolated doctrine, but to relate it to other fundamental areas of Reformed doctrine (for example, the 'two wills' of God, covenant and the nature of God), most importantly the doctrine of predestination. Thomas argues that there *was* (*contra* Arminianism) a Reformed consensus on defining election as the eternal and unconditional selection of certain persons to be granted faith and salvation. He also believes that for some theologians, most noticeably Beza, the logic of such a belief inexorably led to a belief in limited atonement. However Thomas' contention is that there was a great deal of diversity in relating predestination to the work of Christ (is Christ subordinate to predestination or vice versa?), and that many prominent theologians including Bullinger and Ursinius upheld *both* a

particular doctrine of predestination *and* an unlimited view of atonement, and as such represented 'another Reformed tradition' (p. 81).

Thomas finds this tension in Calvin, arguing that his theology presents an unstable *complexio oppositorum* in that he held to a universal promise of the gospel-offer revealed in God's *voluntas signi* (revealed will), and a belief in God's individual election in his *voluntas secreta* (hidden will). While it is possible to detect a resolution of this tension towards the hidden side, Thomas argues that it was only with Beza's strongly supralapsarian theology that this tension was resolved adequately by Beza's denial of the universal promise of the gospel offer. Thomas argues that in the 17th century, the tension is more explicit in the various deputations of the Synod of Dort, and is most clearly seen in the Amyraldian controversy which Thomas credits as bringing all the latent inconsistencies of the Reformed system to the fore. Thomas concludes, I thought somewhat dissappointingly, with a single page on Barth and how his reformulation of election is a positive attempt to resolve these inherent tensions, and how Reformed theologians should give him careful consideration. Indeed it is apparent by the end of the book that because he believes these difficulties to be irreconcilable, Thomas wishes to leave this theological arena he has been surveying in search of a new departure in Reformed theology, Barth being the staring point for such a venture.

Thomas' book is lucid and highly stimulating and in a field which can sometimes seem rather removed and dry, this is a positive feature. Its wide scope is both an advantage and a disadvantage. Because he covers such a wide area, I am not sure whether he can substantiate his claims with the force he does, on this evidence alone, and for those already acquainted with this area of historical theology and with specific individuals in particular, one wonders whether they will be persuaded by a study of this length (for example, Thomas' exposition of Calvin only runs to 24 pages). However it is refreshing to see this whole historical period dealt with as whole, and one can gain a good overview of the characters involved and issues debated in this formative period. With this in mind and noting their close relationship, I found Thomas' book helpful not so much as a piece of historical theology, but as an excellent entry into Reformed systematics. Because he relates the question of the extent of the atonement to other areas of doctrine, one can discern all the areas of contention in Reformed theology, areas which are just as vigorously debated today as they were three hundred years ago. So often questions like the extent of the atonement are discussed in isolation from other areas. In his thesis Thomas presents a clear theological map of the connections and relationships which need to be made in discussing the extent of the atonement. For me, rather than demonstrating the lack of consensus regarding the extent of the atonement, Thomas' thesis highlights the constant struggle within Reformed theology over firstly, the relationship between limited atonement and the universal free-offer of the Gospel; secondly, the nature of and relationship between the 'two wills of God'; thirdly, the infralapsarian/supralapsarian debate; and fourthly, the relationship between logic/deduction and paradox /mystery in theology. One area which Thomas strangely does not mention and which would aid discussion in the above areas is the distinction between common grace and special grace and their relationship to the work of Christ and the nature of God. Ironically therefore, although Thomas' thesis is primarily centred on a specific question within a specific period of history (1536–1675), I would recommend this book to anyone interested in the complexities and nuances of Reformed theology not only around the time of the Reformation, but in Reformed theology today.

Daniel Strange
Southend-on-Sea, England

EuroJTh (1999) **8:1**, 103–104 0960–2720

Christianity and Politics in Doe's Liberia
P. Gifford
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, xvii + 349 pp., H/B, ISBN 0521420296

RÉSUMÉ
Cet ouvrage fait partie des « Études de Cambridge sur l'idéologie et la religion ». Elle examine comment la foi chrétienne a été reçue au Libéria, dans la période de 1980 à 1990, sous la dictature de Samuel Doe. L'auteur montre un fondamentalisme qui n'a rien fait pour s'opposer aux ravages d'un régime corrompu : cette sorte de christianisme n'a pas apporté grand-chose pour ce qui concerne le

renouvellement de la société. Il montre l'importance de l'implication américaine, caractérisée à la fois par des desseins impérialistes et une insensibilité de la part des missionnaires à la culture, à l'économie et à la justice. Une étude qui frappe fort et vaut la peine d'être lue.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Die vorliegende Studie, Teil der 'Cambridge Studies in Ideology and Religion', untersucht, welche Rolle der christliche Glaube in Liberia während der Diktatur von Samuel Doe in den Jahren 1980–1990 gespielt hat. Paul Gifford führt uns einen Fundamentalismus vor Augen, der weder dazu beigetragen hat, den Verwüstungen durch ein korruptes Regime entgegenzuwirken, noch die Erneuerung der Gesellschaft zu fördern. Gifford zeigt zudem das Ausmaß des amerikanischen Einflusses auf, der sich sowohl in einer imperialistischen Absicht als auch in einer missionarischen Unsensibilität gegenüber Kultur, Wirtschaft und Fragen der Gerechtigkeit äußerte. Die Studie trifft einen hart, ist aber auf jeden Fall lesenswert.

This book, in just under 350 pages, offers another significant study of how Christian faith is appropriated in the African context. The study also complements the works of South African theologians Charles Villa-Vicencio and John de Gruchy who have contributed to the same series. The work is an analysis and critique of the church's passivity in social politics and of American imperialism in Liberia.

The book consists of an introduction, six main chapters, a conclusion, a select bibliography and an index. Gifford marshals a variety of sources and his footnotes are extensive. Chapter one outlines the historical setting, sketching Liberia's beginnings, the rule of early leaders, especially Presidents Tubman (1944–71) and Tolbert (1971–80), who effectively set the scene for Sgt. Doe's *coup d'état* and his ten year reign of terror. The bulk of the chapter deals with Doe's activities during the period under review and various reactions to his rule. Gifford gives a host of fascinating facts and figures about Liberia and its life under Doe. Further, chapter one helps the reader to conceptualise the extent of American influence in Liberia—a major theme and point of criticism in the book.

The next four chapters (2–5) deal with the churches and their different emphases within Liberian society. Starting with a brief portrayal of the returned slave situation with a preponderance of Christians, Gifford also sensitises the reader to the various denominational bodies. Of all the mainline churches Gifford indicates that the Roman Catholic community, and particularly certain of its leaders, was the most active in opposing Doe's destructive policies. Gifford draws attention to the educational and social institutions the churches developed—some as joint ventures, others in opposition to one another, thus exacerbating the fragmentation of church communities and emphasising the individualism of western sentiment.

With few exceptions, Gifford portrays the evangelical churches as offshoots or manifestations of American fundamentalism. Due to evangelicalism's so-called antipathy to political involvement, Gifford's material indicates an almost total withdrawal from engaging in the political arena. Gifford, in fact, suggests evangelicalism's tacit support for the status quo, be it for Tubman and Tolbert earlier on, or for Doe during his rule between 1980–90 (see his conclusion on p. 145).

The final chapter, 'The Geopolitical Context' (p. 231–285) gives brief but pithy comments about various ideologies which have fed the religious mindsets discussed earlier in the book. Gifford observes that the 'biblical Christianity' espoused by so many Christians—both national and expatriate—in Liberia, 'was essentially an amalgam of Christian motifs and the values and ethos of Middle America' and that the Bible 'was being used to further economic and political ends' (p. 284–5).

While the title aptly describes the content it does not indicate the wider usefulness of the study and it is possible that the book could thus be overlooked. This would be unfortunate because Gifford's book needs to be read and it needs to be discussed at the widest levels, but especially in missions and evangelism study programmes—whether one ultimately agrees with him or not. It is not a book for the fainthearted or ultrasensitive, however. It is critical of the church in all its factions; it is damning in its critique of America's political involvement and its fundamentalism; it does not offer a positive strategy for the church's role in society. I am glad I read the book though, and I recommend it.

Jim Harris
Cape Town, South Africa

EuroJTh (1999) **8:1**, 105–106 0960–2720

Scripture in the Theologies of W. Pannenberg and D. G. Bloesch

F. Hasel

Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1996, 337 pp., DM36, pb, ISBN 3631492642.

RÉSUMÉ

Voici une étude utile des points de vue de Pannenberg et de Bloesch sur l'Écriture sainte. Après un exposé sur l'emploi de l'Écriture sainte dans l'histoire, Frank Hasel décrit et cherche à évaluer le point de vue de Pannenberg, puis celui de Bloesch, en s'intéressant à leurs présupposés.

L'ouvrage comporte une excellente bibliographie et de nombreuses notes. C'est une étude intéressante en ce que Hasel prend des exemples caractéristiques de l'herméneutique « d'en bas » et « de l'herméneutique d'en haut », l'un pas tout à fait « libéral » et l'autre « évangélique original ». Les bibliothèques théologiques devraient inclure ce livre dans leur collection.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Hasels Buch ist eine gute Studie zu Pannenbergs und Bloeschs Schriftverständnis. Im Anschluß an einen historischen Überblick über die theologische Verwendung der Schrift beschreibt und bewertet Frank Hasel zunächst Pannenbergs, dann Bloeschs Schriftverständnis sowie die diesem jeweils zugrundeliegenden Voraussetzungen. Die Studie enthält eine ausgezeichnete Bibliographie sowie umfangreiche Fußnoten. Sie ist interessant insofern als Hasel Repräsentanten der 'unteren' und 'oberen' Hermeneutik gewählt hat; der eine Vertreter ist nicht eigentlich 'liberal', der andere ein 'abweichender Evangelikaler'. Theologische Bibliotheken sollten das Buch in ihre Sammlung aufnehmen.

Those studying the doctrine of Scripture, especially its use in theology, whether engaging with Pannenberg or Bloesch or not, should read this book. The footnotes and bibliography alone are impressive and give an indication of the extent of Hasel's study. The text reads well and one is not having to struggle with the complicated exercise of including the references within the text. One needs to remember, however, that this book originated as a doctoral dissertation and is published without changes.

The first nine pages, typical of a dissertation, sets out the methodology and justification of the study. Hasel suggests that these two theologians 'exemplify a fundamental tension that exists in any understanding of Scripture'. This tension relates to the determining principle of 'from below' or 'from above' (p. 28 and re-iterated on p. 256).

Following this introduction is a sixty page overview of the way theologians have used Scripture in theology. This survey moves from the Reformation through the Enlightenment to the current day, so setting the scene to introduce Pannenberg and Bloesch. Hasel deals with Luther, Calvin and Zwingli, and then touches on Evangelicalism, as representatives of the 'from above' position. For the 'from below' view, Hasel offers the Enlightenment and Neo-Orthodox philosophies and theologies. According to Hasel, Enlightenment ideas, rooted in Kant and fine-tuned by Troeltsch, Semler, Gabler and Schleiermacher, prepared the way for Barth and neo-orthodoxy. Appreciating that the chapter is an introduction to the main thrust of the book, I cannot help but think that Hasel has done an injustice to Barth in the cursory way that he deals with Barth's use of Scripture; an 'investigation' (p. 86) it is not. Certainly Hasel does give a reasonable summary of the essence of Barth on Scripture. On most of these introductory pages the footnotes take as much space as the text. And this is where the voluminous footnotes become a problem: the mass of bibliographical information tends to obscure the description and critique. Drawing attention to the literature available is not the discussion itself.

Now to the main chapters on Pannenberg and Bloesch. Hasel begins each chapter by giving a brief introduction to the theologians themselves and their settings. Then, by an analysis, particularly of their systematic theologies, but also their other writings, Hasel describes their concept of Scripture, under the headings of origin, nature and use of Scripture. After this each theologian's theological and anthropological presuppositions are set forth.

Pannenberg, Hasel claims, does not formalise his view of Scripture in a prolegomena. Rather he uses texts throughout his works as 'historical sources' (p. 104 n. 4). The theological presuppositions influencing Pannenberg include his concept of God as 'a field of force' (p. 130) which is 'structured along trinitarian lines' (p. 132). Pannenberg's view of history is influenced by the philosophical insights of Hegel, Dilthey and Collingwood (p. 138).

Self-transcendence (p. 145), the divine 'eternal presence' (p. 148) and imagination related to feeling (cf. Schleiermacher) (p. 150) are included in Pannenberg's anthropological presuppositions.

For Bloesch, Hasel maintains, Scripture is inextricably linked to Christ, and is therefore 'sacramental' (p. 181). Bloesch's concept of God is that of 'transcendence' (p. 203) but includes 'a personal dimension' (p. 209), thus emphasising the role of Jesus in revelation. History, for Bloesch, is the 'vessel of eternity' (p. 206), but God is 'transhistorical'. Bloesch's anthropological views presuppose the 'qualitative difference between man and God' and the 'total depravity of humankind' (p. 210).

The final chapter is one of evaluation and conclusion. Here Hasel compares the strengths and weaknesses of the concepts of Scripture in the theologies of Pannenberg and Bloesch. Hasel majors more on the weaknesses than the strengths. For Hasel, both theologians have a 'functional use of Scripture' (p. 256), even though they start from different perspectives. Hasel believes that neither theologian has developed a 'consistent view of Scripture' (p. 259). Nor is he convinced that their understanding of Scripture's origin, nature and use is derived from Scripture itself (p. 257).

The book's usefulness for students of the doctrine of Scripture has been referred to already. Obviously the book has value for those studying either Pannenberg or Bloesch. Certainly theological libraries should include this in their collection.

I do, however, question whether a dissertation should be published 'as is' without editing.

James Harris
Cape Town, South Africa

EuroJTh (1999) **8:1**, 106–107 0960–2720

Christ and the Spirit
G. W. P. McFarlane

Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1996,
x + 204 pp., pb, ISBN XXX

RÉSUMÉ

L'ouvrage de Graham McFarlane est une étude de l'œuvre du théologien écossais du XIX^e siècle Edward Irving, pour nous aider à comprendre sa conception de la Trinité et de l'incarnation. McFarlane tente de montrer que la théologie d'Irving unit la théologie à l'anthropologie en ce que l'incarnation est vue comme le lieu où Dieu le Fils répare notre défaillance humaine dans l'obéissance à Dieu, en rendant une obéissance parfaite à Dieu le Père par la puissance du Saint-Esprit.

C'est une étude stimulante, qui non seulement fait progresser notre compréhension de la pensée d'Irving, mais aussi nous incite à réfléchir à nouveau à la signification de l'incarnation.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Bei Graham McFarlanes Werk handelt es sich um eine Untersuchung des Beitrags des schottischen Theologen Edward Irving (19. Jahrhundert) zu unserem Verständnis der Trinität und der Inkarnation. McFarlane weist darauf hin, daß Irvings Theologie eine Integration von Theologie und Anthropologie erreicht, indem sie die Inkarnation als den Moment auffaßt, da Gott, der Sohn, unser menschliches Versagen, Gott zu gehorchen, wiedergutmacht, indem er Gott, dem Vater, mittels der Kraft des Heiligen Geistes vollkommenen menschlichen Gehorsam leistet.

McFarlanes Buch ist eine anregende Untersuchung, die nicht nur zu einem besseren Verständnis von Irvings Denken beiträgt, sondern die uns darüber hinaus herausfordert, die Bedeutung der Inkarnation neu zu überdenken.

One of the encouraging signs in contemporary systematic theology is a great re-birth of interest in the traditional doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. Many theologians working in this field have shaken off the old liberal idea that these doctrines are simply the result of the imposition of Greek metaphysics upon the simple ethical unitarianism taught by Jesus Himself and have come to appreciate that these doctrines in fact lie at the very heart of the Christian faith and give it shape and coherence.

Among the leaders of this renaissance in Great Britain has been Professor Colin Gunton of King's College London and Graham McFarlane's work, which was originally a Doctoral thesis supervised by Professor Gunton, is an exploration of the contribution to our understanding of the Trinity and the Incarnation made by the 19th century Scottish theologian Edward Irvine.

Edward Irving has until quite recently been regarded as a Victorian ecclesiastical oddity, a promising Presbyterian preacher who went off the rails through his interest in

what we would now call charismatic renewal, his belief that Christ had a fallen human nature, and his conviction that the millennium was just around the corner. However, the importance of Irvine's thought has now been reassessed by a number of theologians including Karl Barth and Colin Gunton, and it has come to be realised that he was in fact an important theologian from whom we have much to learn.

According to Dr. McFarlane what makes Irving particularly significant is that his response to the fact that in his day the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation were: 'being increasingly deemed irrelevant and increasingly undermined' (p. 3) was not to abandon them but to produce instead a fresh and creative account of the relationship between them which gives a proper place to the Biblical teaching about the role of the Holy Spirit. As McFarlane puts it: 'Irving is of interest because he holds together his doctrine of the incarnation in such a way as to make sense of the Spirit's place in the redemptive narratives' (p. 4).

McFarlane's account of how Irving does this falls into three parts, looking successively at Irving's doctrine of God, his doctrine of human being, and then finally his doctrine of the person of Christ. The reason for this tri-partite structure is to demonstrate how Irving's understanding of the person of Christ draws upon his understanding of the nature of God and Man and of the relationship between them.

To be more specific, McFarlane's basic thesis is that according to Irving: '. . . we understand God and ourselves to the degree we understand the Son and the Spirit' (p. 5). This is because, like the mature Barth of the *Church Dogmatics*, Irving sets out a theology and an anthropology which is centred upon the truth about God that has been made known to us through the incarnation, and this truth concerns the relationship of the Son to the Father through the Holy Spirit.

In Irving's view what we learn from the revelation of God in Christ as witnessed to by the New Testament is that within the being of God Himself God the Son gives perfect expression to the will of God the Father through the activity of God the Holy Spirit who unites them both. Human beings, who are made in the image of the Son, are, he says, likewise intended to be obedient to the will of God through the power of the Spirit. Their failure to do so is made good in the incarnation in which God the Son enters into our fallen human condition and renders perfect human obedience to His Father through His relationship to Him in the Spirit.

In his exposition of Irving's theology McFarlane demonstrates the links between Irvine's thought and that of his mentor Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and also shows how it relates to a the thinking of a range of other theologians ancient and modern including the Cappadocian Fathers, Friederich Schleiermacher and John Macmurray. Although McFarlane's book is written in a very compressed style that is not always easy to follow it is worth persevering with because what he has to say is extremely important not simply because it contributes to our understanding of the theology of Edward Irvine, but, more importantly, because it presents us with a coherent and stimulating vision of how God and Man relate to each other in Christ through the power of the Holy Spirit, and how this fulfils God's original intention at creation. It challenges those within the Liberal tradition like the late G. W. H. Lampe who contrast the idea that Christ was a genuine human being empowered by the Spirit with the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation. On the hand it also challenges those within the Evangelical tradition who see the purpose of the incarnation within a legal paradigm and view the work of Christ primarily in terms of His bearing the legal penalties for sin, neglecting the Biblical teaching that Christ came to recreate fallen human nature from the inside by overcoming the disobedience of Adam through His own perfect obedience.

One thing that did strike me, however, was the absence in McFarlane's work of any interaction with the work of Biblical scholars. This is not a criticism of McFarlane since he obviously had to limit his work at some point, and it is perfectly legitimate simply to show how Irving relates to the Christian theological tradition. Nevertheless it does highlight the perennial danger that systematicians and Biblical scholars may inhabit different worlds and not engage with one another's work. From the evidence that McFarlane presents it is clear that Irving himself rooted much if not all of his theology in biblical exegesis and if his vision is to carry ultimate conviction his exegesis needs to be scrutinised in the light of current understandings of the texts upon which he draws. Perhaps Dr McFarlane might be persuaded to produce another book looking at this issue. . . .

Martin Davie
London, England

EuroJTh (1999) **8:1**, 108–109 0960–2720

John—Evangelist and Interpreter
S. Smalley
Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1998 (2nd ed.), xviii + 340 pp, ISBN 0 85364 823 9

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
20 Jahre nach dem Erscheinen der ersten Auflage präsentiert Smalley eine komplett überarbeitete Neuauflage seines weitverbreiteten Werkes. Der äußere Anschein (zehn anstelle von sechs Kapiteln, 340 anstelle von 285 Seiten, rund 175 neue bibliographische Einträge, ein in der ersten Auflage vermißtes detailliertes Inhaltsverzeichnis) täuscht darüber hinweg, daß substantiell nur die Einleitung und ein Drittel des siebten Kapitels neu sind, wobei dieses Drittel mit nur sieben Seiten zur Anwendung literarischer Methoden in der johanneischen Forschung diesem einflußreichen Forschungszweig schwerlich gerecht wird. Die zweite Auflage bleibt wie die erste eine gute konservative Einleitung ins Johannesevangelium mit deutlichem Schwerpunkt auf historischen Fragen und weniger ausführlichen Anmerkungen zu den wichtigsten theologischen Themen des Johannesevangeliums.

RÉSUMÉ
Vingt ans après la parution de cet ouvrage, qui s'est largement répandu, Smalley en a remanié l'ensemble pour réaliser une nouvelle édition. Le changement est d'abord formel: le livre comporte dix chapitres au lieu de six précédemment, 340 pages au lieu de 285, environ 175 références bibliographiques y ont été ajoutées, ainsi qu'une table des matières détaillées. Mais ceci cache le fait que seuls l'introduction et un tiers du septième chapitre sont substantiellement nouveaux. L'addition au septième chapitre (limitée à sept pages) ne rend guère justice à l'utilisation de méthodes littéraires qui joue de nos jours un rôle important dans la recherche johannique. Cette deuxième édition est, comme la première, une bonne introduction conservatrice à l'Évangile de Jean. L'auteur s'attache surtout à la discussion des questions historiques et à des remarques moins substantielles sur les thèmes théologiques les plus importants du quatrième Évangile.

Twenty years ago, the first edition of this book was generally positively received. No less than 16 journals published reviews of the book (according to the recent ATLA software). Assessments like 'the best introduction to the Fourth Gospel we have seen' (C. S. Rodd in *The Expository Times* 90 (1979), 98) and the subsequent reprints 1985, 1988, 1992 and 1994 reflect that the book has found an outstanding place among the vast literature on John's Gospel. However, additional quotations from previous reviewers may shed light on some of the problems already present in the first edition, problems which in this reviewers eyes remain in the new edition.

A problem zone of Johannine studies is the amount of recent literature and the question how to cope with it. Interestingly, Rodd in the above cited review said that 'Smalley has mastered a vast amount of recent literature and if for nothing else we should read the work to keep abreast of current thought on St. John.' Quite different is O'Grady's verdict: 'It seems to this reviewer that on those matters wherein agreement is almost unanimous, S. does well. On the areas of Johannine studies where there has been considerable development in the last five years, the author is weak. Provided the book is used with a series of more recent articles, it would be helpful to those beginning Johannine studies which perhaps would fulfill the purpose of this author. In future years S. might offer us his ability to present in clear form the results of the more recent work on the Fourth Gospel.' (J. F. O'Grady in *CBQ* 41 (1979), 499).

The new edition is a complete revision. About 175 additional titles in the bibliography (about 20 of which were published in 1976 or earlier) testify to the fact that Smalley has worked hard at the literature front. Another warmly welcomed formal feature that positively distinguishes the new edition from its predecessor is the detailed table of contents. A comparison of the new content with the old shows the following interesting feature: formally, the new book contains ten over against six chapters in the 1st ed. But only 1 ⅓ chapters contain additional material: the short first chapter which describes the full circle of Johannine studies drew in the question of John and the Synoptics (from John's dependence to independence, and back to different forms of dependence or openness in this area), and the short first part of chapter seven on the impact of literary methods in Johannine studies. It is at this point where the problem of recent trends in Johannine scholarship, already perceived in the 1978 edition, comes clearly into focus: whether one likes it or not, since Culpepper's *Anatomy of*

the Fourth Gospel narrative criticism has been the most important new influence in Johannine studies, and to spend merely seven pages on this area this reviewer can hardly regard as adequate.

All the other parts of the 2nd ed. present the same content as the first edition, although sometimes in a slightly different order (because of the lack of a detailed table of content in the 1st ed. one has to go through it page by page in order to find out which parts of the 1st ed. recur in which parts of the 2nd). One finds references to recent contributions in many footnotes of the 2nd ed., but Smalley's own approach remains basically unchanged: he argues for a three stage model which includes that (1.) the apostle John is the Beloved Disciple who moved from Jerusalem to Ephesus, where he was teaching about Jesus independently from the Synoptics, but according to common tradition supplemented by information from his own sources. (2.) These traditions were put into written form by disciples, and (3.) after John's death and the addition of the prologue and ch. 21 as an epilogue the Gospel was published by the Johannine church at Ephesus. As the title of the book says, Smalley sees John as both an evangelist and interpreter, who was both faithful to historical tradition and capable of profound theological interpretation. As in the 1st ed. the emphasis remains strongly on historical questions, although every important theological question is introduced in chapter 10 on 'John: Interpreter'. But critique from previous reviewers in this area remains valid (O'Grady, art. cit.: in tackling christological questions Smalley does not move beyond the christological titles; Kysar in *JBL* 99 (1980), 149: Smalley shows signs of reading back Chalcedonian problems into John's Gospel).

Another critique is worth mentioning briefly. In Barrett's view what Smalley is doing is 'a defense (!) of the soundness of the fourth evangelist'. He goes on: 'A defense, however, that leads to the proposition (p. 178) that "some parts of John's narrative are to be interpreted on a historical level, and others on a theological level" makes the worst of both worlds and does not do justice to the profundity of the evangelist' (Barrett in *JThSt* 30 (1979), 537). This serious critique is taken up in the 2nd ed. merely by altering the sentence in question in the following way: 'John's narrative may be interpreted at an historical, as well as theological, level.' (2nd ed., p. 217). This only shows that the relationship between history and theology is still looking forward to be described in a more profound way.

This reviewer concludes that students of John's Gospel who are looking for an introductory book from a conservative viewpoint with a clear emphasis on historical questions (and who do not already possess the 1st ed.) will find the 2nd ed. a helpful guide. An introduction which pays equal attention to literary and theological questions, and attempts to clarify further their special relation to history in John's Gospel, remains to be written.

Rainer Behrens
Cheltenham, England

EuroJTh (1999) **8:1**, 109–110 · 0960–2720

The Mark of the Spirit? A Charismatic Critique of the Toronto Blessing

L. Petersen (editor)

Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1998,
121 pp., ISBN 0 85364 861 1

RÉSUMÉ

Ce livre examine le phénomène qu'est la bénédiction de Toronto, une expérience charismatique partie de Toronto en 1995 et qui a ensuite fait le tour du monde. Les quatre auteurs apportent chacun sa contribution pour répondre à l'ouvrage de Mark Stibbe qui considère la Bénédiction de Toronto comme un prélude à ce qui peut devenir un réveil mondial.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Das vorliegende Buch untersucht das Phänomen des Toronto-Segens, einer charismatischen Erfahrung, die, ausgehend von Toronto im Jahr 1995, Verbreitung über die gesamte Welt erfahren hat. Jeder der vier Autoren steuert je einen Aufsatz bei zu einem Buch, das eine engagierte Reaktion ist auf das Werk von Mark Stibbe, der Toronto als Präludium zu einer möglichen weltweiten Erweckung auffaßt.

This book is a frontal assault on *Times of Refreshing* (Marshall Pickering, 1995), Mark Stibbe's defense of the Toronto phenomenon and his assertion that it is the first sign of a coming 'fourth wave' which will result in global revival. The four contributing essayists share Stibbe's association with Sheffield University's department of Biblical Studies

and his charismatic convictions. They do not however endorse his views on the Toronto Blessing (TB hereafter).

In the first essay Lloyd Petersen takes issue with Stibbe's contention that the 'ecstatic' phenomena associated with the TB is God's way of meeting an essentially ecstatic culture. In essence he argues that Paul did not propose ecstasy in the Corinthian church as the answer to the needs of the ecstatic culture in Corinth. In Petersen's view the ecstatic phenomena by and large occur in charismatic churches where the clientele have already been softened up to a point of responsiveness.

In the second essay Mark Smith questions Stibbe's 'This is That' hermeneutic. In particular he challenges Stibbe's prophetic interpretation of Ezekiel 47 as setting out a four staged pattern of revival of which the TB can be understood as stage 4 or the Fourth Wave (stage 1 = early Pentecostalism, stage 2 = early charismatic movement, stage 3 = John Wimber's Third Wave). Stibbe justifies his hermeneutic on the basis of the New Testament authors' midrashic use of Old Testament prophecies. Smith counters that because the New Testament writers are unconcerned with the original sense of the Old Testament this does not justify us in being unconcerned with Paul's original sense.

In the third essay Vivien Calver examines ecstatic laughter which Stibbe himself describes as 'extraordinary'. Calver scrutinises laughter as it occurred in the Great Awakening in New England and under Wesley. Neither, in his view, supported ecstatic laughter. The rest of his chapter is an extended discussion of laughter in the Old and New Testaments. Many of the references to laughter he demonstrates are to 'mocking laughter'. The only verse in the whole Bible, in his view, which predicates the laughter of Christians is Luke 6 verse 21.

The final contribution examines the validity of the 'Wait and See Gamaliel Principle' which Stibbe urges as a criterion for assessing the TB. Here John Lyons makes the point that Luke uses Gamaliel solely for the reason that he utters what he wants his readers of the Acts of the Apostles to hear, namely that the church will not be overthrown. This does not however, he contends, justify us in adopting this as a principle to scrutinise the validity of the TB or any other movement. Indeed, he shows that Luther and more recent theologians have eschewed this use of the Gamaliel principle as a valid test for assessing Christian movements and phenomena.

This book is a thoughtful piece and will cause devotees of the TB both to reflect on their experiences and to reconsider their apologetic for it. It should be said however that the authors don't really grapple with the Toronto experience beyond the level of the outward ecstatic phenomena which the Airport Vineyard Church regarded as merely human responses to the TB. Their endeavours also highlight the difficulties which scholars, clergy and laity alike find in attempting to analyse and authenticate Christian experience whether it be the TB, Rwanda, Keswick, Cursillo, Anglo-Catholic mysticism or the liberal Broad Church feel-good factor.

Nigel Scotland
Cheltenham, England

EuroJTh (1999) **8:1**, 110–111 0960–2720

John Newton and the Evangelical Tradition
D. B. Hindmarsh
Oxford: Clarendon, 1996, 366 pp., HB, ISBN 0 19 826379 1

RÉSUMÉ

Dans cet ouvrage, Bruce Hindmarsh étudie la vie et l'œuvre de John Newton, qui fut pasteur de l'Église Anglicane dans l'Angleterre du XVIII^e siècle. Il considère trois moments décisifs dans les jeunes années de Newton : sa conversion en 1748, son acceptation du calvinisme en 1754 et son ordination en 1757. Hindmarsh étudie le calvinisme de Newton de manière détaillée et le présente comme un théologien essentiellement pratique et pastoral. Il démontre que Newton a été un « évangélique inclusiviste » et que son ouverture a fait de lui une figure patriarcale. Il est ainsi devenu un ami et un conseiller de nombreux évangéliques de la cité de Londres et au-delà.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Bruce Hindmarsh untersucht in der vorliegenden Studie Leben und Werk John Newtons, dem anglikanischen Geistlichen des 18. Jahrhunderts. Er geht dabei auf drei bedeutende Wendepunkte aus Newtons frühem Mannesalter ein, nämlich seine Bekehrung von 1748, seine Annahme des Calvinismus von 1754 sowie seine Ordination von 1757. Hindmarsh bietet eine detaillierte Untersuchung von Newtons Calvinismus und stellt ihn als

einen im wesentlichen praktisch und pastoral veranlagten Theologen vor. Er zeigt auf, daß Newton ein 'inklusiver Evangelikaler' war, dessen Aufgeschlossenheit ihn zu einer patriarchalen Figur machte, die für viele Evangelikale in London und darüber hinaus zu einem Freund und Berater wurde.

Bruce Hindmarsh's study of John Newton is a scholarly but readable account of Newton's life with a strong emphasis on his theology. Drawn from his doctoral research the writer has drawn on rich veins of primary source material.

Hindmarsh examines three significant turning points in Newton's early manhood: his conversion in 1748, his acceptance of Calvinism in 1754 and his ordination in 1757. Newton came as a reluctant convert to Calvinism but his predestinarian convictions were strengthened through hearing Whitefield preach at the Tabernacle to 5,000 people. Before his ordination Newton was part of a circle of Baptist Calvinists, among them John Rylands junior whose supralapsarian views he contested. Newton was not a high Calvinist; indeed his preaching was evangelistic and often made use of exhortations to sinners. In fact Hindmarsh shows that for all his grappling with doctrinal volumes Newton was essentially a practical and pastoral theologian.

Hindmarsh gives us detailed insights into Newton's ministry at Olney and later at St. Mary Woolnoth in the city of London. In the former place where Newton enjoyed the most cordial of relationships with dissenters, his congregation was frequently more than two thousand people. He celebrated Holy Communion once a month which was more than many of his fellow clergy. On Sundays he catechised two hundred children and his Tuesday evening Prayer meeting attracted a hundred and thirty. Newton devoted his mornings to reading and study and his afternoons to visiting or holding cottage meetings. One of Newton's innovations at Olney was to establish hymn singing and Hindmarsh gives an incisive analysis of his Hymnology.

The writer demonstrates very well the way in which Newton became a kind of 'evangelicals patriarch'. This was due in part to his capacity to move easily among dissenters as well as the clergy of the established church. To Newton issues of church order and ministry were matters of expediency. The security of the church was to be found rather in salvation's walls which surrounded it. In short, Newton was an 'inclusive evangelical' who embraced all who shared the heart of evangelical doctrine. Hindmarsh makes a convincing case that one of Newton's great contributions was as 'an ideal of evangelical catholicity'.

This is a scholarly but lucid account which adds considerably to our knowledge of Newton and his impact on the earlier evangelical movement. The book will be of interest both to the serious student of eighteenth century ecclesiastical history and to those with a more general interest in the earlier evangelical movement.

Nigel Scotland
Cheltenham, England

EuroJTh (1999) **8:1**, 111–112 0960–2720

Dibdin and the English Establishment

E. S. S. Sunderland

Bishop Auckland: The Pentland Press Limited, 1995, 109 pp., £7.50,
ISBN 1 85821 304 5

RÉSUMÉ

Ce livre raconte la vie de Sir Lewis Dibdin qui fut Doyen de la cour suprême de l'Église Anglicane en Angleterre de 1903 à 1934. Il fut en fonction sous l'autorité des archevêques Benson, Davidson et Temple. Il considérait cette cour comme une partie importante de l'organisation de l'Église Anglicane, mais défendait le droit de la commission juridique du conseil privé de casser des décisions prises par la Cour de l'Église. Dans toutes les questions légales délicates de la période où il exerça sa fonction, par exemple celle du ritualisme et celle du nouveau livre de Prière de 1928, Dibdin s'est toujours montré comme un Protestant impartial mais ferme.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Das vorliegende Buch berichtet aus dem Leben Sir Lewis Dibdins, der von 1903–1934 Dekan des 'Court of Arches' war, dem höchsten Gericht der anglikanischen Kirche. Dibdin übte diese Aufgabe unter den Erzbischöfen Benson, Davidson und Temple aus. Er verstand die Kirchengerichte als einen bedeutenden Teil der anglikanischen Bestimmung, verteidigte aber dennoch das Recht des 'Judicial Committee of the Privy Council', die Entscheidungen des 'Court of Arches' zu

revidieren. In all den Wirren seiner Amtsperiode, einschließlich der Ritualismusdebatte sowie der 1928 erfolgten Revision des 'Prayer Book', tritt Dibdin als unparteiischer und doch zugleich solider Protestant hervor.

This book recounts the public life of Sir Lewis Dibdin who became Dean of the Court of Arches from 1903–1934. During his long career Dibdin held a wide range of other legal posts including chancellor of the diocese of Exeter 1888–1903, First Estates Commissioner from 1905 and Vicar General of the Province of Canterbury from 1924. Although of modest length this slim study is based on careful research and a very wide range of primary documents have been consulted.

The author, Edwin Sunderland, who is himself both a lawyer and an Anglican clergyman is well-placed to interpret the legal and the theological issues with which Dibdin grappled during his long career. Dibdin it should be noted had close dealings with archbishops Benson, Davidson and Temple. He emerges as a strong defender of the church's establishment of which he regarded the Church's courts and judicial system as an important part. He saw the Church's legal jurisdiction as derived from the state and he defended the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council's right to overturn decisions made by the Court of Arches.

Sunderland draws out Dibdin's staunch Protestant evangelical views very clearly. He also shows him to have been a very fair-minded individual who interpreted the law with scrupulous integrity and accuracy. Some might wonder at the designation of Dibdin as 'Protestant' in view of his advocacy of the Prayer Book revision of 1928 and his later support for the practice of reservation but Sunderland argues that there was a gradual 'mellowing' during his later years.

This book is a good read and will be of particular interest to anyone who is interested in the Church of England's battles over ritualism between 1870 and 1930. It also provides useful insights into the workings of the Consistory Courts and their relationship to the higher Court of Arches. Above all, Sunderland brings to life in a detailed way a conscientious and tireless ecclesiastical lawyer whose career spanned a crucial period of history.

Nigel Scotland
Cheltenham, England

CONTENTS/TABLE DES MATIÈRES/ INHALT

Articles/Articles/Artikel

Book Reviews/Recensions/Buchbesprechungen

ISSN 0960–2720

Availability and Subscription Rates / Diffusion et abonnements / Erscheinungsweise und Abonnement

The *European Journal of Theology* is published by Paternoster Periodicals twice annually.

Le *Journal Européen* est publié par Paternoster Periodicals deux fois par an.

Die *ETZ* erscheint zweimal jährlich bei Paternoster Periodicals.

Great Britain and countries not listed below

Subscription rates from January 2000

	Institutions			Individuals		
Period	UK	*USA and Canada	Elsewhere Overseas	UK	*USA and Canada	Elsewhere Overseas
One Year	£21.90	$57.00	£22.80	£21.90	$37.00	£22.80
Two/Three Years, per Year	£19.70	$51.30	£20.50	£19.70	$33.30	£20.50

2/3rds world, individuals and institutions:
50% discount on the overseas sterling (£) rates (*) listed above.

All subscriptions to:
Paternoster Periodicals, PO Box 300, Carlisle, Cumbria, CA3 0QR, UK
Tel: +44(0) 1228-512-512: Fax: +44(0) 1228-51 49 49: E-mail:pp@stl.org
www.paternoster-publishing.com

Important Note to all Postal Subscribers
When contacting our Subscription Office in Carlisle for any reason
always quote your Subscriber Reference Number.
This appears on the address label used to send your copies to you.

Pour la Grande Bretagne et les pays qui ne sont pas mentionnés ci-dessous

Grossbritannien und andere Länder, die unten nicht erwähnt sind

Deutschland

Brunnen Verlag GmbH, Gottlieb-Daimler-Str. 22, D-35398 Giessen, Germany

Jahresbezugspreis: DM 42,00
Für Studenten: DM 32,00

National Correspondents / Correspondants nationaux / Nationale Kontaktadressen

National correspondents are actively being sought in countries not listed below.
On recherche des correspondants locaux pour les pays qui ne sont pas mentionnés ci-dessous.
Nationale Kontaktadressen für weitere Länder werden gesucht.

Belgique / België (B)
Claude Vilain, 60 Clos de Chenes, B1170, Bruxelles

Croatia / Hrvatska (HR)
Davorin Peterlin, S. Krautzeka 76, HR-51000 Rijeka

Danmark (DK)
Carsten Vang, Menighedsfakultet, Katrine bjergvej 75, DK-8200 Århus N

Finland / Suomi (FIN)
Leif Nummela, Finnish Lutheran Mission, Kansanlähetys R.Y., FIN-12310 Ryttlyä

Hellas (GR)
John P. Kremides, c/o Emmaus, P.O. Box 1133, GR-261 10 Patras

Magyarország (H)
Peter Balla, H-1054 Budapest, Hungary Szabad_sag tér 2. IV/3

Ireland (IRL)
Trevor Morrow, 19 Chalet Gardens, Lucan, Co. Dublin

Nederland (NL)
Pieter Lalleman, Schuttevaer 37, NL-7908 DB Hogeveen

Norge / Noreg (N)
Hans Kvalbein, Oskar Braatens vei 2A, N-1412 Sofiemyr

Polska (PL)
Edward Czajko, ul. Sienna 68/70, PL-00825 Warsawa

Portugal (P)
Alan Pallister, Rua Capitao Dorio, No. 9, P-2500 Caldas da Rainha

România (RO)
Sandor Fazakas, RO3700 Oradea, Str. Arany Janos, 4 AP 11

Slovensko (SK)
Ludovit Fazekas, Hviedoslavova 25, SK-934 01 Levice

Suisse / Schweiz / Svizzera (CH)
J. Heinrich Schmid, Junkerstrasse 16 CH-9500 Wil.

EuroJTh (1999) **8:2**, 115–122 0960–2720

• The Cross of Christ 3
• Justified and Redeemed, Romans 3:24
• *Justifié et racheté (Romains 3.24)*
• *Gerechtfertigt und erlöst (Römer 3, 24)*

David Searle, Edinburgh

RÉSUMÉ

Les doctrines de la justification et de la rédemption sont inestimables et pourtant, beaucoup aujourd'hui ne savent pas les apprécier à leur juste valeur: ils ne se rendent pas compte de leurs implications pour la vie chrétienne.

1. Justifiés gratuitement par sa grâce
Après avoir examiné les implications grammaticales de l'expression «étant justifiés», il est rappelé comment la notion de justification a été comprise par Barth, C. K. Barrett, Leon Morris et Emil Brunner.

Lorsqu'on prêche la justification, on bute sur l'obstacle suivant: bien des gens ne reconnaissent pas leur besoin. Et même si nous les convainquons de leur besoin, ils ne veulent pas de la justification. Il est difficile de se soumettre à Dieu pour emprunter le chemin qu'il a tracé. Que l'on pense à ce propos à l'exemple de Luther. Paul souligne que nous ne pouvons apporter aucune contribution personnelle à cet acte du Dieu tout puissant. La justification est un «don», elle ne se mérite pas.

On peut comparer cela à l'amour que nous portons à nos enfants, gratuitement, même lorsqu'ils sont en révolte.

2. La rédemption qui est venue par Jésus-Christ
Le mot «rédemption» désigne une délivrance au moyen du paiement d'une rançon. De l'usage de ce terme, on peut retirer quatre enseignements:

i. Dieu est intervenu en Jésus-Christ pour nous délivrer de notre condition désespérée d'esclaves du péché: la puissance qui nous asservit doit être brisée.

ii. D'après l'apôtre Pierre, le prix qui a été payé est «le précieux sang de Christ». Le contexte suggère que le mot précieux a ici la nuance de coûteux. N'avons-nous pas tendance, parfois, à oublier la valeur de la rédemption par le sang de Christ?

iii. Ceux qui ont été rachetés sont maintenant esclaves de Jésus-Christ: «Vous ne vous appartenez plus, car vous avez été rachetés à grand prix». Qu'en est-il de nous?

iv. «La croix est le signe de la défaite du diable» (Brunner). Le diable, comme l'a dit Luther, «est tombé dans le piège que Dieu lui tendait» (cf. Col 1.13; Ac 26.18). Cette vérité peut s'illustrer à l'aide de trois images: celle d'un captif enchaîné attendant la délivrance, celle du fils prodigue loin de la maison paternelle, et celle de la conquête d'une épouse.

Les chrétiens doivent aujourd'hui lutter contre des forces démoniaques. La société qui nous entoure est mue par des puissances qui rendent les hommes et les femmes esclaves. La puissance qui jaillit de la rédemption accomplie par Jésus-Christ est-elle suffisante pour briser ces chaînes? L'Église n'est-elle pas en danger de se laisser prendre au piège par des forces qui lui feront virtuellement attribuer une grandeur divine à de simples choses?

Le message de la rédemption demeure une nécessité aujourd'hui.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Mit den Lehren von der Rechtfertigung und der Erlösung stehen uns zwei Schätze zur Verfügung, die heutzutage bedauerlicherweise von vielen weder richtig verstanden noch angemessen gewürdigt werden. Vor allem die Bedeutung dieser Lehren für das Leben als Christ wird dabei nicht erkannt.

1. Wir werden ohne Verdienst gerecht aus seiner Gnade
'Wir werden gerecht . . .' Ich gehe zuerst auf die Implikationen der grammatikalischen Konstruktion ein. Was bedeutet es, gerecht zu werden (vgl. in diesem Zusammenhang Karl Barth, C. K. Barrett, Leon Morris und Emil Brunner)? Wenn wir Rechtfertigung predigen, besteht das größte Problem darin, daß den Leuten nicht klar ist, daß sie der Rechtfertigung bedürfen. Und selbst wenn wir sie davon überzeugen können, haben sie noch immer kein Interesse an der Rechtfertigung. Sich Gottes Wegen zu unterwerfen ist nicht einfach, wie u. a. das Beispiel Martin Luthers verdeutlicht. Paulus betont, daß wir nichts zu der Gerecht-Erklärung durch den allmächtigen Gott beitragen. Sie ist ein unverdientes Geschenk (δωρεαν). Dem vergleichbar ist, daß wir unsere Kinder bedingungslos lieben, und zwar selbst dann, wenn sie widerspenstig sind.

2. Die Erlösung, die durch Christus Jesus geschehen ist
Erlösung bedeutet "Errettung durch Freikauf" (vgl. Morris, Cranfield und Barrett). An dieser Stelle wollen wir auf vier Aspekte der Erlösung eingehen:

(1.) Gott hat durch Christus eingegriffen, um uns aus unserer hilflosen Situation der Versklavung an die Sünde zu erretten: die Macht, die uns bindet, mußte gebrochen werden.

(2.) Die Schuld ist beglichen, wie Petrus deutlich macht, wenn er davon spricht, daß wir mit dem teuren Blut Christi erlöst worden sind. Vergessen wir aber nicht manchmal den Wert der Erlösung durch das Blut Christi?

(3.) Diejenigen, die erlöst worden sind, sind nun Sklaven Jesu Christi. 'Euer Leib gehört nicht Euch selbst. Ihr seid teuer erkauft'. Sind wir uns dessen bewußt?

(4.) 'Das Kreuz ist das Zeichen für die Niederlage des Teufels' (Brunner). Der Teufel 'ging Gott in die Falle', wie Luther betonte.

Christen sind dazu berufen, gegen dämonische Mächte zu kämpfen; denn die moderne Gesellschaft ist in der Gewalt von Mächten, die Mann wie Frau zu Sklaven machen. Haben wir als Folge der von Christus erwirkten Erlösung genügend Macht, um diese Ketten zu sprengen? Oder steht die Kirche in der Gefahr, von diesen Mächten, die bloßen Dingen einen nahezu 'göttlichen Status' beimessen, umgarnt zu werden? An diesen Fragen wird deutlich, wie dringend wir der Botschaft von der Erlösung bedürfen.

Some years ago I knew a very ordinary and uneducated man who had been astonishingly successful as a scrap merchant and had become extremely wealthy. His home was furnished lavishly and was littered (and I mean littered), with very expensive ornaments. Moreover, because he had been told they were a good investment for his money, he had bought and hung on the walls of his drawing room several extremely valuable paintings—they must have been worth hundreds of thousands of pounds. When he showed them to me, however, it was painfully obvious that he had absolutely no awareness of their beauty as art. His sole interest in them was their monetary worth and how much they had appreciated in value since he bought them. Worse still, beside them he had very bad paintings of race

horses—because gambling on horses had become the passion of his life.

We come this morning to two great aspects of the Cross of Christ. The first describes what took place on the Cross as 'justification' and the second describes it as 'redemption'. Here we have priceless treasures, worth infinitely more than the most costly of any earthly treasures. How few, it seems to me at times, have learned to appreciate the meaning and glory of these two aspects of the work of Christ. How many of God's people are like the scrap merchant, possessing priceless treasure but with little if any understanding either of its implications for their Christian living or of its eternal value.

1. Being justified freely by his grace

'Being justified . . .' is a present participle and grammatically we would expect it to go with 'all' in the previous verse, 'all have sinned'. However, there is a problem with that since while Paul undoubtedly means that all have sinned he doesn't mean that all are justified. John Murray takes it that v. 23 is parenthetical, therefore 'being justified' refers to 'all who believe' in v. 22.

But how are we to understand 'being justified' and what did the apostle Paul mean? There are so many eloquent descriptions of 'justification' by theologians, for example, by Barth, Brunner, C. K. Barrett, John Murray, Leon Morris, C. E. B. Cranfield, James Denney and many others—theologically trained minds struggling, wrestling with the challenge of describing in simple terms this majestic mystery, this act of God, whereby guilty sinners are declared to be righteous in his sight.

Barth, as we would expect, emphasises the divine declaration:

> '*God declares*. He declares his righteousness to be the Truth behind and beyond all human righteousness and unrighteousness. He declares that He has espoused our cause, and that we belong to Him. He declares that we His enemies are His beloved children. He declares His decision to erect His justice by the complete renewal of heaven and of earth. This declaration is creatio ex nihilo, creation out of nothing'.[2]

C. K. Barrett emphasises the eschatological aspect of justification: 'God's righteousness is an eschatological quantity . . . it implies the verdict of the last judgement', and the verb 'to justify means an anticipation of this verdict'. He goes on to argue that the verb means 'to make righteous' but only on the understanding that righteous 'does not mean "virtuous", but "right", "clear", "acquitted" in God's court . . . Far from being a legal fiction, this is a creative act in the field of divine–human relations'.[3]

Leon Morris, who has done much work on justification, insists on the forensic meaning of the word: 'There should be no doubt that δικαιοω means "to declare righteous", not "to make righteous". Usage is decisive. It is the ordinary word for "to acquit", "to declare not guilty". When the accused is acquitted he is not "made righteous" but declared to be righteous'.[4] It is because Barrett emphasises the relational meaning of 'righteous' he is able to maintain the verb means 'to make righteous'. On the other hand, because Morris is persuaded that 'righteous' is predominantly a forensic term, for him it must mean 'to declare righteous'. Cranfield makes a helpful distinction between 'what is signified' by the action of acquittal and 'the condition resulting from the action of acquittal'.[5] His distinction perhaps harmonises the forensic and relational views.

A final quotation from Brunner: 'Men lack the one thing which alone could make them righteous: the righteousness of God, the splendour, the glory of the divine life. That they are sinners and that they lack this glorious life of God is obviously one and the same thing. They just live "down in the dark", not in the divine sunshine. This has now been changed. God has done the thing whereby men come to share in what they lack; namely, God's righteousness. How does this impossible thing happen? It happens through God removing that which separates men from himself, that is, guilt, and acknowledging

those who were no longer his own as his own. He justifies the unrighteous, he grants to them what they do not have, which they have lost to all his eternity: his unconditioned love. He says to them the opposite of what he should have said to them had he wished to judge according to the Law. You are righteous in my sight. He receives them, the apostates, into his fellowship. Why? Because he wishes to. On what basis? Purely in the form of a gift, on the basis of his grace . . . This grace, which indeed costs man nothing, costs God his Son'.[6]

In our teaching and preaching, what is the great barrier which those of us who seek to bring this mighty doctrine home to the hearts of men and women must first overcome? It is the absence of a sense of guilt. Men and women say quite blandly, 'But I have no **need** of justification. I am perfectly happy as I am, thank-you very much'. The complacency which a materialistic, post-modern society engenders within the human heart is a colossal obstacle to surmount. We all have friends, good people, pleasant, friendly, kind citizens, who have absolutely no awareness of their need of God. Because they have no biblical world-view, they have no idea of a Creator God from whom they have turned and against whom they are in outright rebellion and whose laws they constantly violate. Of course that takes us back to the first part of this chapter and the verdict of universal guilt before God.

But just say we communicate to such people something of their **need** of God's mercy on that final day of judgement, and they begin to admit that they have sinned and are falling short of the divine glory—in Brunner's phrase, that 'they live "down in the dark", not in the divine sunshine'. We still have another major obstacle before us in bringing them to that faith in Jesus Christ through which the divine righteousness is conferred. It is that by nature they do not **want** to be justified by God. Saul of Tarsus, we have every reason to believe, knew very well of his **need** of that divine declaration which anticipates the verdict of the day of judgement. But he didn't **want** it—not if it was going to come through the shame of the Cross on which a Nazarene itinerant teacher had hung in hideous, disgusting nakedness. Paul could hardly conceive of a more repugnant way of receiving the divine acquittal and declaration of acceptance before God. In the same way, men and women do not want God's righteousness any more than Naaman wanted to bathe in the River Jordan to be cleansed of his leprosy.[7]

Isn't that close to the root of the problem we all have? We long to establish our own goodness, our own righteousness. We long to prove to others, and not least to ourselves, that we have reformed and are now being good Christians who are pleasing to God. We are even tempted to try and demonstrate our righteousness to God himself! What fools we are and how all pervasive is our self-deception! When we ultimately not only acknowledge our need of justification and at last with all our hearts long for it, then the final apparently insurmountable hurdle is that we are **unable** to submit to it in God's way, which is the only way!

History furnishes us with a dramatic example of that inability to find God's way of righteousness in the story of Martin Luther. He knew his need. He longed to be accepted by God. Not many have yearned for the divine righteousness with the intensity he did. But he could not see his way to attaining that righteousness. 'Look to the wounds of Christ', Staupitz told him. But when we are blinded by our resolve to establish our own righteousness, we simply cannot see how the wounds of Christ can bring us that divine declaration for which we long!

What a struggle you and I can have before at last we prostrate ourselves before the Lord God and lie in dust and ashes at the foot of the Cross, in submission to the crucified Christ, accepting the divine verdict: 'God justifies the wicked![8] He acquits the guilty! There is nothing to do. Christ has done it all! In him alone is the righteousness of God and the righteousness *from* God set forth!'

Paul hastens to say, 'by his grace as a gift' (RSV) or 'freely by his grace' (NIV). He is emphasising that we contribute nothing to this declaration by Almighty God. 'As a gift, δωρεαν'. The same word is used in John 15:25, where the Lord says he has been hated 'without a cause, δωρεαν', which brings out the meaning of the word as something to which we contribute absolutely nothing. 'Grace' of course is unmerited favour, kindness shown to one who is utterly undeserving. It comes to us not only when we do not deserve it, but when we hate God, resent him, are his enemies, struggling and fighting against him.

Some of us have had children who have gone through some very troublesome times. They have seen us, their parents, as little better than gullible nuisances who stand in the way of their progress and who have no understanding of the world with its demands and pressures. One young man recently said to me: 'There are two stages in growing up: the first when *children* are a severe trial to their parents; the second, when *parents* become a severe trial to their children!' We parents have been subjected to our children's tantrums, insults and rebellion. Yet all the time, they have had little or no idea of the hurt and grief they have brought to us. Nevertheless, we have loved them in spite of their aggression towards us. We have longed to take them in our arms to reassure and comfort them. We don't want them to bring us some gift or suddenly to become good sons and daughters before we will acknowledge they are our offspring! In spite of all their rebellion, we love them and love them and love them. May I adapt words of our Lord? 'If you, though you are evil, know how to love your children freely, how much more does your heavenly Father love you freely?' He justifies us freely by his grace.

2. The Redemption that came by Christ Jesus

We come then to the second great descriptive word in our text of what happened on the cross: 'through the *redemption* that came by Christ Jesus'. There is no need to go into the terminology of redemption, save to say that it has been established that the meaning is 'deliverance by payment of a price'. We are indebted to the likes of Leon Morris for his work on this concept. Although Cranfield states that here redemption may mean either 'deliverance through a ransom being paid', or merely 'deliverance' in the sense of 'emancipation', he holds that 'an absolutely confident assertion of either view cannot be justified'. C. K. Barrett, on the other hand, is of the opinion that 'the connection with blood and death suggests it has not lost its original sense of "ransoming", emancipation by the payment of a price'.

[i] Following those who take it that redemption means deliverance through payment of a price or ransom, I want to draw four implications for believers from Paul's statement that 'we are justified . . . through the redemption that came by Christ Jesus'. The first is this: God has intervened through Christ to deliver us from our helpless state of slavery to sin. We have just seen that at first we deny we need God's intervention. Then when we see our need for God, we do not want him—because we are in that state of apostasy which Brunner defines as wanting both to have our freedom and to be 'like God' but without any dependence on God.[12] Yet, even when our pride begins to be subdued and the hardness of our hearts broken, we are still unable to come to him, which is why the power that binds us must be broken so that we can be emancipated.

I recall a young woman called Joy who had only ever entered a church once in her life. But she had a friend who had recently become a Christian and who constantly invited her to attend church. For months, Joy refused—she neither needed, nor wanted God in her life. But though she saw the vibrant faith of her friend she remained obdurate until one day she called her friend and asked if she could attend Church with her the next Sunday. 'What has made you change your mind?' asked her friend. The strange story Joy

told was that she had had the same dream two successive nights: in her dream she had been standing in a church building all alone except for Christ who was there at the front calling her to come to him and find rest. But she couldn't move though she longed to respond and go to him. She woke from her dream deeply distressed that she had been quite unable to respond to his call even though in her dream she had wanted to respond. I should complete the story by telling you that she did go to church with her friend the next Sunday and had only been in the church building for a few minutes, when, before ever the service began, while bowed silently in prayer she responded to Christ's call and was soundly converted. A few months later she became a communicant of that congregation where at the time I was minister.

> He breaks the power of cancelled sin and sets the prisoner free!

That then is the first effect of the redemption Christ has secured for us. It truly is a deliverance from the thraldom of our sin which has so totally alienated us from God, separating us from the life and love of God and imprisoning us in its stranglehold. The chains that bind us are broken and we are released to respond and bow before the Lord in adoration and surrender.

[ii] The second implication arising from redemption is the price that has been paid. Peter writes that we have been redeemed from the futility of our former life, not with silver or gold, but with the precious blood of Christ. The word he uses (τιμιος) can mean either 'highly honoured' or 'costly'. However, since he contrasts the blood of Christ with silver and gold, it must surely be the *costliness* of Christ's blood which he wants to convey, especially as in an earlier verse in the same passage he has spoken of the believers' faith as more precious than gold.[13] Later in the same letter he speaks of Christ himself as being precious to God and precious to those who believe.[14]

I want to ask if we sometimes forget the infinite value of our Saviour and the incomprehensible cost to God of his Son's blood. Do we become so clinically professional in our handling of theology and the scriptures that the first ardent love we bore for Christ when we entered into the release from the bondage of our sins grows faint and even cold? Do we value him beyond all else and all others? Do we fear to grieve him because we love him so dearly. Is he still 'precious' to us as he was to the big fisherman who still wrote years later of the precious blood that had redeemed him? If not, then what has taken away our love of our Lord? Do we need again to know the power of that redeeming blood which breaks the chains that enslave us? It's all too easy again to become enslaved to those from which things his blood was shed to release us.

[iii] The third implication of Paul's words are that those who are redeemed are now slaves of Jesus Christ. It's an obvious corollary of redemption, isn't it? The Hebrew word used so often in the OT for 'worship' (*'abad*) means 'service', service as bond-slaves. The Hebrews were not released from slavery to Pharaoh in order to please themselves. Their release, their redemption at the cost of God's right hand stretched out in emancipating power, was a covenantal act. They were redeemed to belong to God, to bow down and serve him only and exclusively.[15] And Paul draws the same implication from our purchase by the blood of Christ: 'You are not your own; you are bought with a price. Therefore honour God with your body' (1 Cor. 6:19f.)

So how is it working out for us? How is it with our bodies? and with our minds and souls? Do we renew our vows day by day? Do we remember that rightly we are slaves of Jesus Christ? Do we love our Master and affirm that we will be his slaves forever? Or do we feel the pull of this lustful old world and all its enticements and long to shake off the light and easy yoke of Christ? Paul speaks of our 'deceitful lusts' (Eph. 4:22). How they deceive us with their false promises of satisfaction and pleasure if only we will yield ourselves to them. But we are slaves of Christ! Bought at an infinitely costly price! Therefore, glorify Christ in your bodies!

[iv] The fourth implication has been brought to my mind by Brunner: 'The Cross is the Sign of the Devil's defeat, and a continual reminder of Him who conquered him . . . because Satan is a supra-human reality, the work of redemption of Jesus Christ is a real conflict, and redemption is a real victory. The crucifixion of the Son of God . . . is the supreme point at which the abysmal hatred of the devil for God achieved its supreme and most direct manifestation; at the same time, it was the Event which secured his defeat. The devil, as Luther puts it, "fell into God's trap".'[16]

Paul makes a direct link between redemption and this deliverance from Satan's power in Colossians 1:13: 'For he has rescued us from the dominion of darkness, and brought us into the kingdom of the Son he loves, in whom we have redemption, the forgiveness of sins'.[17] The apostle relates in Acts 26:18 how his great commission from the Risen Christ was to turn men and women from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan to God. It is clear that the NT sees men and women as held in the powerful grip of a terrible tyrant whose power is that of death. And it is also from the stranglehold of this merciless devil that Christ has redeemed us.

James Philip, writing on this aspect of redemption, suggests three pictures evoked by the twofold deliverance of sinners from the power of sin and the power of Satan.[18] The first is that of a captive languishing in chains in a dark dungeon, longing for his freedom. The Holy Spirit has opened the prisoner's eyes and he now clearly sees what formerly he never saw—the chains that bind him. Until now he has been strangely bewitched with a blindness and deception of hearts that has been all pervasive. But at length redemption is applied and the chains fall off, the dungeon flames with light and he rises and follows the One who has set him free.

The second picture is of the prodigal son far from home, alienated and estranged from his father. Likewise, we sinners had drifted far from God until the Spirit brought to our hearts that divine restlessness and turned our thoughts to home. So by the Spirit's constraint, we left the swine's husks and in our rags limped back to the father's house, the power of our alienation at last broken.

Philip's third picture is the winning of a bride. Not only does Christ have to break down the barriers of our total indifference to him, even our resentment of his attentions, he must win us from the power of Satan and all his baubles and trash to which we have given our affections. And so the breaking of the devil's hold upon our souls leads at length to our love of our Redeemer and our betrothal to him. It is then that joy comes to the heart. This joy of which Paul speaks in Romans 5:11, 'We also rejoice in God through our Lord Jesus Christ', may well be described as nuptial joy:

> O the love that sought me! O the blood that bought me!
> O the grace that brought me to the fold!
> Wondrous grace that brought me to the fold!

Christians are called today, as much as they have ever been, to do battle with demonic forces. Who can deny that modern society is held in a vice-like grip by powers which make slaves of men and women. Colin Gunton has defined this modern battlefield of spiritual warfare in the following terms: 'Theologically, we must see the origins of the bondage in the idolatrous worship of that which is not God. When we give any part of the created world the value of God, we thus far come into the power of a reality which, because it is not divine, operates demonically'.[19] And again, 'The demonic is what happens when what is in itself good is corrupted into its opposite'.[20] We have the expression of something very near to what Gunton is describing in the UK in our National Lottery. The British Prime Minister, John Major, whose government introduced the national lottery, called it 'a bit of fun'. But when one watches the programmes reviewing the changed lifestyles of lottery winners, and when one evaluates the portrayal of the effects of

winning a vast fortune, one sees vividly illustrated that 'the demonic is the claim of something finite to infinity or to divine greatness'.[21]

Is there power enough in the redemption accomplished by Christ to break these chains which, along with so many evils of our modern materialistic society, hold so many in such powerful bondage? Or is the church herself in danger of being ensnared by forces which claim virtual 'divine greatness' for mere things which one day will all be burned up? Instead of holding forth the Redeemer in all his power, is our proclamation blunted and weakened by our own compromise with the demonic forces of our generation? Not that we are any different from those whom the apostle has described as 'exchanging the glory of the immortal God for images' and serving 'created things rather than the Creator' (Rom. 1:23, 25). Rather that we are too easily enticed into thinking and acting as worldly people and not as those whose eyes are on the City whose architect and builder is God.

The need for the message of redemption is as great today as it has ever been. But the messengers, you and I, must be those who are living in the rich blessing of the Redeemer and his deliverance from that idolatry which falsely gives to some aspect of creation the value of the divine. It comes down at the end of the day to the very personal questions, 'Who or what has the love of our hearts? Whom do we adore? What binds us and holds us?' Only when the answer to such questions is a humble acknowledgement of the daily Lordship of Christ in our lives will our message ring out with authenticity and conviction. So God help us all to an honesty with him and a surrender to him which is his gift to those whom he has redeemed by his own blood.

Notes

1 John Murray, *The Epistle to the Romans* (Marshall, Morgan & Scott, London 1967) 113f. Leon Morris suggests, 'The meaning appears to be that all who are justified are justified in this way . . . The use of the participle rather than the indicative links this closely with the foregoing: "being justified" in the way that follows is evidence that all are sinners and come short of God's glory'. *The Epistle to the Romans* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988) Note 113, 177.

2 Karl Barth, *The Epistle to the Romans* (London: OUP, 1933) 101f.

3 C. K. Barrett, *The Epistle to the Romans*, Harper, New York, 1957, 75f.

4 Leon Morris, *The Epistle to the Romans* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988) 145, Note 175.

5 C. E. B. Cranfield, *Romans, A Shorter Commentary* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1985) 21.

6 Emil Brunner, *The Letter to the Romans* (London: Lutterworth Press, 1959) 29f.

7 2 Kings 5:10 ff.

8 Rom. 4:5.

9 Leon Morris, *The Apostolic Meaning of the Cross* (Tyndale Press, 1955) ch. 1.

10 *Op. cit.*, 71.

11 *Op. cit.*, 76. Also holding that redemption here means deliverance by payment of a ransom price are, F. F. Bruce, *Romans*, Tyndale NT Commentaries (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994) 98; James D. G. Dunn, *Romans 1–8*, Word Bible Commentary (Dallas: Word Books, 1988) 169; D. M. Lloyd-Jones, *Atonement and Justification*, Banner of Truth (Edinburgh: 1970) 60; John Murray, *The Epistle to the Romans* (London: Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1967) 115f.; Sanday & Headlam, *Romans*, (ICC, T&T Clark, 1895) 86 *in loc., et al.*

12 Emil Brunner, *Dogmatics*, Vol. 2 (London: Lutterworth, 1966) 92f.

13 1 Peter 1:7, 18f.

14 1 Peter 2:4, 7.

15 See the First and Second Commandments, Ex. 20:3–4.

16 *Op. cit.*, 145. For a critique of Gustav Aulén's *Christus Victor*, see Colin Gunton, *The Actuality of the Atonement* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), ch. 2, 53ff.

17 See also, Jn. 12:31f., 2 Cor. 4:4; Eph. 1:21, 2:1f., 3:10; Phil. 2:10; 1 Jn. 3:8, etc.

18 James Philip, *The Death of Christ* (Aberdeen: Didasko Press, 1985) 46ff.

19 Colin Gunton, *The Actuality of the Atonement* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988) 70.

20 *Op. cit.*, 71.

21 Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology* (London: Nisbet, 1968) Vol. III, 109, quoted by Gunton

EuroJTh (1999) **8:2**, 123–132 0960–2720

• Cross of Christ 4
• *Satisfaction for Sin Romans 3:25–26*
• *La satisfaction pour le péché (Romains 3.25–26)*
• *Sühne (Römer 3, 25–26)*

David Searle, Edinburgh

RÉSUMÉ

«Dieu l'a présenté comme un sacrifice expiatoire par la foi en son sang. Il l'a fait pour démontrer sa justice . . . en sorte d'être juste tout en justifiant ceux qui ont la foi en Jésus». Voilà une affirmation qui suscite bien des problèmes! En outre, l'idée d'un sacrifice humain est choquante pour l'homme moderne.

1. «Dieu l'a présenté»
Le verbe grec utilisé ici a deux sens, celui de projeter ou faire des plans, et celui de présenter. Les avis des exégètes sont partagés. La croix apparaît comme une déclaration divine. Pourtant, combien peu nombreux sont les prédicateurs qui semblent consumés par la passion de présenter Jésus-Christ crucifié et ressuscité.

2. «Comme un sacrifice expiatoire»
Le terme grec employé ici signifie «propitiation». John Owen dégage quatre éléments essentiels à ce propos: une offense doit être effacée, une personne offensée doit être apaisée, celui qui a commis l'offense doit être pardonné, un moyen d'expiation doit être trouvé. Le deuxième élément pose problème à beaucoup. On a parfois présenté le sens du mot propitiation de manière malheureuse, mais le fond du problème réside dans le refus de l'enseignement biblique au sujet de la colère divine, et cela est dû à l'absence d'une vision du monde biblique.

Avec H. Blocher et C. S. Lewis, il faut insister sur le caractère mauvais du péché. Dans les Églises aujourd'hui, on rationalise le péché et on l'excuse. Si le péché ne met pas Dieu en colère, on n'a pas besoin de propitiation. De nombreuses traductions modernes évitent le terme pour la raison que les gens ne le comprennent plus. Mais nous devons plutôt enseigner le sens de ce terme.

La colère dirigée contre le mal n'exclut pas l'amour pour celui qui l'a commis. Ceux qui prêchent l'enfer devraient le faire dans les larmes.

3. «Par la foi en son sang»
La propitiation renvoie au jour de l'expiation. Les auteurs du Nouveau Testament utilisent le mot «sang» pour parler de la mort de Christ. Pourquoi? À cause de l'unité intrinsèque de la Bible, entre l'Ancien et le Nouveau Testament. Une solide connaissance de l'enseignement de l'Ancien Testament sur les sacrifices peut enrichir le culte du peuple de Dieu.

La notion de justification répond au problème de la transgression de la loi divine, la notion de rédemption répond à celui de notre esclavage du péché et de Satan. Mais la notion de sacrifice répond au besoin que nos péchés soient effacés.

4. «Il l'a fait pour démontrer sa justice . . . en sorte d'être juste tout en justifiant ceux qui ont la foi en Jésus».
On connaît la réponse d'Anselme à la question: «Pourquoi Dieu s'est-il fait homme?» Calvin avait la même conception de la satisfaction pour le péché. John Stott a répondu à des objections modernes soulevées contre cette doctrine.

Il faut souligner le sens relationnel du terme «justice».

Qu'est-ce que cela signifie pour notre vie aujourd'hui, dans notre Europe postmoderne? Prenons l'exemple des attentes de ceux qui entrent aujourd'hui dans le mariage. La vision du monde biblique a disparu. Le Dieu qui, tout en étant juste, justifie ceux qui ont foi en Jésus a été oublié.

En Romains 3, Paul conclut que le Dieu juste, en apportant par son Fils une justice de Dieu, accomplit et entérine la loi qu'il a lui-même donnée.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Römer 3,25f.: 'Den hat Gott für den Glauben hingestellt als Sühne in seinem Blut zum Erweis seiner Gerechtigkeit . . . daß er selbst gerecht ist und gerecht macht den, der da ist aus dem Glauben an Jesus'. Diese Aussage enthält eine Reihe von Problemen, auf die wir im vorliegenden Artikel eingehen wollen. Außerdem werden wir uns mit Einwänden beschäftigen, die gegen die Darbringung eines menschlichen Opfers vorgebracht worden sind.

1. Gott hat ihn hingestellt
Das Verb προεθετο hat zwei Bedeutungen, nämlich 'beabsichtigen, sich vornehmen' und 'bekanntmachen, öffentlich präsentieren' (vgl. Morris, Cranfield und Calvin). Das Kreuz war ein göttliches Statement, doch wie wenig Prediger haben heutzutage noch die Leidenschaft, Christus als den Gekreuzigten und Auferstandenen bekanntzumachen.

2. Als Sühne
Der Begriff ἱλαστηριον ('Versöhnung') umfaßt, wie John Owen aufgezeigt hat, vier wesentliche Elemente: (1.) die Straftat, die gesühnt werden muß; (2.) die Person, an der die Straftat begangen wurde und mit der man sich aussöhnen muß; (3.) den Straftäter und (4.) das Mittel der Sühne. Die Bedeutung der Versöhnung ist manchmal auf unbedachte Weise vermittelt worden, doch grundsätzlich stehen wir dem Problem gegenüber, daß Leute aus einem mangelnden Verständnis der biblischen Weltanschauung heraus die Lehre vom Zorn Gottes ablehnen. Der Artikel geht in diesem Zusammenhang auf die Sicht von Denney ein und erwähnt Henri Blochers und C. S. Lewis' Gedanken zur Sündhaftigkeit der Sünde.

Wir tendieren heutzutage oftmals dazu, unsere Sünden zu verdrängen oder zu entschuldigen, doch ohne den persönlichen Zorn Gottes gegen jegliche Sünde gäbe es keine Notwendigkeit für Versöhnung. Manche modernen Übersetzungen vermeiden den Begriff, da die Leute nicht mehr verstehen, was er bedeutet. Doch gerade deshalb ist es so wichtig, daß wir ihnen die Bedeutung des Begriffes erläutern.

3. Für den Glauben in seinem Blut
Die neutestamentlichen Autoren verwenden den Ausdruck 'Blut' als Kürzel für den Tod Christi. Wir gehen dem Grund für die Verwendung dieses Wortes nach, der mit der Einheit der Bibel, und zwar des Alten und Neuen Testaments, zu tun hat. Ein solides Verständnis der alttestamentlichen Lehre vom Opfer kann den Gottesdienst des Gottesvolkes vertiefen und bereichern.

Die Lehre von der Rechtfertigung zielt auf Vergehen gegen das Gesetz Gottes, während das Konzept der Erlösung unsere Versklavung an die Sünde und den Satan im Blick hat. Die Opferterminologie jedoch macht deutlich, daß wir es nötig haben, daß unsere Sünde weggewaschen wird.

4. Zum Erweis seiner Gerechtigkeit . . . daß er selbst gerecht ist und gerecht macht den, der da ist aus dem Glauben an Jesus
An dieser Stelle beschäftigen wir uns mit den Aussagen Anselms in Cur Deus Homo und gehen auf Calvin ein, der ein ähnliches Verständnis von der Sühne hatte. Außerdem soll John Stott zu Wort kommen, der sich mit modernen Einwänden gegen diese Lehre

auseinandergesetzt hat. Es ist darüber hinaus wichtig, die relationale Komponente von Gerechtigkeit zu betonen.

Doch was bedeutet dies für unsere Situation in einem postmodernen Europa? Wir wollen dies am Beispiel des modernen Verständnisses von der Ehe veranschaulichen, bei dem ebenfalls die biblische Weltanschauung keine Rolle mehr spielt. Den, der selbst gerecht ist und gerecht macht den, der da ist aus dem Glauben an Jesus, hat man vergessen.

Paulus zieht in Römer 3 die Schlußfolgerung, daß der Gott der Gerechtigkeit das Gesetz, das er selbst erlassen hat, erfüllt und bestätigt, indem er durch seinen Sohn eine Gerechtigkeit bereitstellt, die von Gott kommt.

We come this morning to Romans 3:25f: 'God presented him as a sacrifice of atonement through faith in his blood. He did this to demonstrate his justice . . . so as to be just and the justifier of those who have faith in Jesus'. Here is a statement which bristles with problems and has engendered perhaps as much discussion and controversy as any in the NT. J. S. Whale wrote in 1960, 'In our modern world, sacrifice has become a mere figure of speech. Parents sacrifice themselves for their children; a politician may sacrifice a career for a principle . . . But modern man finds the very idea [of human sacrifice] revolting'. However, I am not at all sure that is an accurate statement. There is something deeply innate in human nature which recognises in certain kinds of sacrifice something noble, almost godlike. Even though the word is predominantly used metaphorically in the 20th century, sacrifice, especially when it is motivated by the love of a man for his friends, strikes a deep cord within the human breast. We need not, therefore, be apologetic for, far less ashamed of, the kind of Gospel statement such as that in our text for today.

1. God presented him

The first verb of our text poses a small problem. The verb, translated by NIV as 'presented' ('put forward', RSV), προεθετο, has two meanings: (i) to purpose, to set before the mind, and it is used in this sense in both of its other two occurrences in the NT (1:13; Eph. 1:9); (ii) to set forth, to present. Leon Morris prefers the second meaning, as translated by NIV and RSV, along with Barrett, Bruce, Michel, Nygren and others. Cranfield opts for the first meaning, as translated by NEB ('God designed him'). Calvin states that for those who prefer the first meaning it harmonises well with John 3:16. But he continues, 'If we embrace this meaning, it will still remain true, that God has set him forth in due time, whom he had appointed as a Mediator'. Following Calvin therefore that, even if one prefers the sense of 'to purpose', the meaning of 'to set forth' or 'to present' cannot be far away, I want to comment briefly on the 'setting forth' of Christ as a sacrifice of atonement.

In the death of Christ, God was demonstrating his righteousness. On the Cross he was making a public statement, a public declaration. And what a public declaration it was and still is! Little did the soldiers and bypassers think that Jesus of Nazareth, hanging there in shame and agony, was a divine declaration that would sound down the centuries, echoing across continents and round the entire world for time and for eternity.

In my work as Warden of Rutherford House in Edinburgh, I conduct preaching workshops with ministers when maybe ten or a dozen men come together for a couple of days and in turn each preaches a sermon. We then together evaluate the sermon and try to make helpful comments on its exegesis, application and presentation of the message of the text. These men who bravely subject themselves to this painful experience of being chopped to pieces by their colleagues are all evangelicals. But yet again and again I have to ask, 'Where, my brother, was Christ in all of that? Where was the ray of sunlight streaming from the face of the Son of Righteousness? Where was the smile of God as his Son was set forth, presented to us?'

I don't mean that I am always looking for a statement on the love of God. My concern is how few preachers today seem to be consumed by love for the Lord, by a passion to set him forth crucified and risen, to present him as the sacrifice of atonement! They say many true things, and expound many sound biblical principles. But far too many congregations seldom have Christ crucified placarded before them. It is actually easier to reduce the Gospel to mere moralising than to preach the cross. We can avoid the cross and its demands and opt for good behaviour! Paul wrote to the Galatians, 'Before your very eyes Christ was portrayed as crucified' (Gal. 3:1). May all of us, in our studies, our praying and our pastoring of those we teach, strive and work to see preachers being sent out who will set forth Christ as crucified. Why? Because Almighty God himself has set forth his Son. And ours is now the unspeakable privilege of proclaiming the crucified and risen Lord!

2. As a sacrifice of atonement

I don't propose to rehearse the arguments surrounding the noun ἱλαστηριον. You will be aware of the literature on this subject and excellent summaries of it can be found in the commentaries on Romans by Cranfield and Morris. Following both of these, along with many of the older commentators, I am taking it that ἱλαστηριον means propitiation. The English Puritan, John Owen, has set out for us the four essential elements in any propitiation: 1st, there is an offence to be taken away; 2nd, there is a person offended who needs to be pacified; 3rd, there is an offending person, guilty of the offence; and 4th, there is some means of making atonement for the offence.

The first element causes us no problem—all will readily agree there is an offence to be taken away. The third and fourth elements cause no problem either for most—we are guilty of offences and there is therefore need for some means of making atonement. It is Owen's second element, the person offended who needs to be pacified, which has been a problem for so many.

We have to admit that there have been many unfortunate statements which have in turn led to many even more unfortunate caricatures of the meaning of 'propitiation' so that some theologians have been less than fair in their denunciation of the concept. It seems to me that the nub of the problem is an unwillingness to accept the Bible's teaching on the wrath of God. And it is at this point we come so near to the heart of the problem we all face today in communicating the truth of the Gospel. It is the lack of a biblical world-view in the mind of the postmodern society in which we live.

What today's postmodern person fails to realise is that each one of us is the personal property of God. He has created us for himself. He placed us in this world with all its resources and delights. He has given us his commands: 'You may . . . You may not . . .' But we are in revolt against him. Our rebellion and sin have put *us* in the wrong—we are the offenders. For his part, God is justly angry with us because of our rebellion—he is the offended one.

Let me quote a Scottish theologian, James Denney:

> In Paul's thought, and in the thought of the New Testament generally, sin introduces an alienation, an estrangement, between man and God, which is indubitably two-sided. There is something in God as well as something in man which has to be dealt with before there can be peace. Nay, the something on God's side is so incomparably more serious that in comparison with it, the something on man's side simply passes out of view . . . The serious thing which makes the gospel necessary, and the putting away of which constitutes the gospel, is God's condemnation of the world and its sin, it is God's wrath 'revealed from heaven against all unrighteousness of men' (Rom. 1:16, 18).'.[8]

While Denney writes that sin introduces an alienation which is two-sided and that the 'something on God's side is so incomparably more serious' than the something on our side, he would certainly

not want us to pass over lightly the heinousness of sin. We are driven back in the final analysis to the problem of evil. Those who deny the wrath of God are also by implication treating sin lightly as something God will overlook. Henri Blocher comments that the rational schemes which try to explain the *whence and why* 'bring evil back into harmony with the creation, and thus they open the road to the excusing, or justification, of what should excite unmitigated horror and indignation. They plead overtly for *theodicy*; they work covertly for *kakodicy*'.[9] It is this failure to recognise the exceeding sinfulness of sin which arises from the denial of the divine wrath against sin. Not so Scripture. In an essay on the imprecatory Psalms, C. S. Lewis points out that to the best of his (I would say, exceptionally wide) knowledge of literature, Scripture is unique in its abhorrence of evil and outright hatred of wickedness.[10]

Is it not true that so many of us try to rationalise and excuse our particular darling sins? We give them other names: if we lose our tempers we say we were provoked, if we covet we say we are just day-dreaming, if we lust we say it was our body chemistry at work. How many of us do a deal with our secret sins! We have a locked cellar hidden away in the depths of our souls and we guard the key so carefully. All unknown to our nearest and dearest, we unlock that cellar door and privately descend those unlit stairs to visit the sins with which we have done a deal. We guard jealously our darkest secret!

Why then is there so little conviction of sin in our churches? Why do so many of our young people behave behind their parents' backs (and sometimes, alas, quite openly and without any apparent shame, before their parents' faces), as if there were no Ten Commandments, no restraints, no moral parameters at all? Why at the open graveside do the friends and relatives who gather to offer comfort to those bereaved tell them that 'he was a good man and is now at rest', when the truth is he was a thoroughly godless man who now faces the Judge of all the earth? Why is pluralism so rampant, and why do so many believe that all religions lead to God? Why is the prevailing philosophy—'the modern pseudo-Christian creed'—that 'somehow or other everything must work out well for everybody... God will never condemn anybody'?[11] Surely it is that we have set the love of God against his holiness, and we have set the mercy of God against his judgement. We have presented a false impression of the revelation of God entrusted to us in the Scriptures. And where this thoroughly biblical teaching of 'the wrath of God is ignored, there will also be no understanding of the central conception of the gospel'.[12]

If then, there is no wrath of God, no personal anger of God against sin and the sinner, there is no need for propitiation for there is no 'offended person who needs to be pacified' (Owen's words). Hence so many translations here render ἱλαστηριον as 'sacrifice of atonement' (NIV) or as 'an expiation' (RSV, NEB) or as a 'sacrificial death by means of which people's sins could be forgiven' (GNB). I know translators struggle to make difficult biblical concepts accessible to theologically illiterate readers. But after thirty three years in the pastoral ministry, I am convinced that we have to bite this bullet and educate our people in the meanings of theological terms. Modern young people know a highly technical language needed for computers. They are perfectly capable of learning theological language needed to grasp the central truths of the gospel. We insult them, rather than help them, by simplifying these great truths so much that we evacuate them of their real meaning.

However, by no means all translations are endeavouring to make scripture more accessible. Many have been deliberately seeking to avoid any reference to the wrath of God and for my part I fail to understand why, when divine wrath has been the theme of the early part of this letter to the Romans. I suppose scholars like C. H. Dodd attempted to reach a compromise by explaining the wrath of God as a kind of impersonal reaction.[13] But C. S. Lewis has rightly pointed out the problem with an impersonal wrath: 'You say, "The

live wire does not feel angry with us, but if we blunder against it we get a shock." What do you suppose has been gained by substituting the image of a live wire for that of angered majesty? You have shut us all up in despair, for the angry can forgive, and electricity cannot'.[14]

Those of us who are parents have often been provoked to anger by some of our children's actions. Our anger has been mingled with grief that they could have acted in the way they have. But that does not mean we have ceased to love them. It is a serious fallacy to imagine that love can know no anger. True, there is a wrong kind of anger when our human judgement is distorted by our passion, which is probably why the Scripture exhorts us to be angry without sinning (Ps. 4:4=Eph. 4:26). But there is a righteous anger and there are times when manifestly it would be wrong not to experience anger.

One of our great Scottish saints of the 19th century, Robert Murray McCheyne, was told that a colleague had preached a sermon on hell. His comment was, 'Then did he preach with tears?' Our churches need to hear again of the sinfulness of sin, of the wrath of God against all ungodliness and wickedness, but they need to hear it preached with godly sorrow and even with tears, for the God who so hates sin is nevertheless the God of love.

3. Through faith in his blood

We are at once reminded that propitiation is by a sacrifice. While ἱλαστηριον does not here mean 'the mercyseat' in the Holy of Holies, it reminds us of the Day of Atonement when the blood was sprinkled on the mercy-seat as the high priest entered the presence of God with the golden censor.

It is interesting to note how often the NT writers refer to the death of Christ by using the word 'blood'. 'This is my blood of the covenant' (Mk. 14:24), 'he who drinks my blood has eternal life . . . my blood is drink indeed' (Jn. 6:54f), 'the church of God which he obtained with the blood of his own Son' (Acts 20:28), 'we have now been justified by his blood' (Rom. 5:9), 'we have redemption through his blood . . . you have been brought near through the blood of Christ' (Eph. 1:7; 2:13), 'we have confidence to enter the Most Holy Place by the blood of Jesus' (Heb. 10:19), 'the blood of Jesus his Son cleanses us from all sin' (1 Jn. 1:7), 'freed us from our sins by his blood . . . He is dressed in a robe dipped in blood and his name is the Word of God' (Rev. 1:9; 19:13), and so on. Why use the word 'blood' rather than speak of his death?

The answer is obvious, is it not? It is the inherent unity of the Bible and the way in which the NT writers have an inspired awareness that what they are setting down is the fulfilment of all that was foreshadowed in the OT. It brings us back to v. 21, 'the righteousness to which the Law and Prophets testify'. Christian congregations today need to be taught the OT scriptures. There is a serious lack of knowledge of the contents of the OT in many churches and as a result there is a shallowness of understanding of the meaning and implications of the Gospel. The inevitable result of a shallow understanding is a shallow commitment to Christ. And so believers in our generation are vulnerable to the lies and fallacies of our postmodern culture.

Why else did the Holy Spirit record and preserve for us the elaborate Levitical system of worship but to provide us with a whole theological framework of salvation? I so often hear Christians complaining about the hymns used in their churches. They make comments like this: 'The worship in our church is flat and lifeless. We need some contemporary hymns to pep it up'. Have you ever heard that? But I would submit that the real need is first for their understanding of Christian truth to be enlarged so that their minds can be inspired to praise God, and second for hymns to be used with real theological content. Simplistic ditties with catchy tunes are no antidote to lifeless singing! Let their preachers take them through the awesome ritual of the worship of the Tent of Meeting—the altar, the laver, the golden censer, the Day of Atonement, the mercy-seat, the high priestly office and garments—and relate all that through the

Letter to the Hebrews to the work of Christ, and then give them hymns to sing which adore the Christ of God and his work. I assure you that if the Spirit has been at work opening their minds to divine truth, then he will also work to open their hearts to praise their God and complaints about flat, lifeless worship will melt away.

Through faith in his blood! Justification focuses on our offences against the law of God; redemption focuses on our slavery to sin and Satan; but the language of sacrifice and the blood of Christ focuses on our uncleanness and our need for the washing away of the dark stains that defile us.

I recall a journey I made by motorcycle when I was a student. It was a night ride in winter with snow on the road and a great deal of dirt and slush around. I arrived home at about 2am, frozen to the marrow and absolutely filthy with mud and grit thrown up at me by other traffic. It was in my eyes, my hair, my face, down my neck, into my shoes—the filth had got everywhere! I recall standing for about half an hour under a hot shower and feeling the numbness gradually leaving me and the grime being washed away. I retired to bed at last warm and clean—so clean. 'Through faith in his blood': friends, God's wrath is turned away, our sins are covered, and we are clean, utterly pure, cleansed of all defilement. Nor is it some fictional cleansing which depends on a mind over matter attitude on our part. God has set forth Christ as a propitiation. He hung there for me and for you!

> Bearing shame and scoffing rude, In my place condemned he stood,
> Sealed my pardon with his blood—Hallelujah! what a Saviour!

4. He did this to demonstrate his justice . . . so as to be just and the justifier of those who have faith in Jesus

An early classical statement of the case for what has become known as 'satisfaction for sin' is given by Anselm in *Cur Deus Homo*. Boso, Anselm's imaginary interlocutor, asks: 'What man would not be judged worthy of condemnation if he were to condemn the innocent in order to let the guilty go free? . . . for if he could not save sinners otherwise than by condemning the just, where is his omnipotence? and if he could, but would not, how do we defend his wisdom and justice?' Anselm answers: 'God the Father . . . did not compel him to die, nor permit him to be slain, unwilling; but that One himself bore his death by his own free will that he might save mankind' (1.8). Anselm continues: 'Each sinner ought to repay the honour of which he has robbed God: and this is the satisfaction which every sinner ought to make to God' (1.11). Anselm sees the whole universe as having a pre-ordained order and symmetry so that God's dealing with sin maintains 'a beauty of order in the same universe'. Unless God exacted due satisfaction 'when perversity attempts to disturb the regular order of things, there would be caused in that universe, which God should rule, a certain deformity from this violated symmetry of its order, and God would seem to fail in his government' (1.15). Anselm has already defined sin as 'not rendering to God what is his due' (1.11). He now shows that we cannot make satisfaction by obedience or good works since these are required of us anyway. Therefore, 'man the sinner owes to God, on account of sin, what he cannot repay, and unless he repays it he cannot be saved' (1.25). He continues: 'There is no one who can make this satisfaction except God himself . . . But no one ought to make it except man; otherwise man does not make satisfaction'. Therefore, 'it is necessary that one who is Godman should make it' (2.6).

Calvin held a similar view of satisfaction for sin: 'Suppose this man learns, as Scripture teaches, that he was estranged from God through sin, is an heir of wrath, subject to the curse of eternal death . . . the slave of Satan, captive under the yoke of sin, destined finally for a dreadful destruction . . . and at this point Christ interceded as his advocate, took upon himself and suffered the punishment that, from God's

righteous judgement, threatened all sinners; that he purged with his blood those evils which had rendered sinners hateful to God; and that by this expiation he had made satisfaction and sacrifice duly to God the Father; that as intercessor he has appeased God's wrath; that on this foundation rests the peace of God with men; that by this bond his benevolence is maintained towards them. Will the man then not be the more even moved by these things . . . '[15] Again, Christ had 'to undergo the severity of God's vengeance, to appease his wrath and satisfy his just judgement'.[16]

We are all aware of the reservations many modern theologians have towards penal substitution and the satisfaction required by God before sin could be expiated.[17] We are grateful to John Stott for his masterly treatment of the subject in his book, *The Cross of Christ*.[18] Stott writes:

> The way God chooses to forgive sinners and reconcile them to himself must, first and foremost, be fully consistent with his own character. It is not only that he must overthrow and disarm the devil in order to rescue his captives. It is not even only that he must satisfy his law, his honour, his justice or the moral order: it is that he must satisfy himself.[19]

God's righteousness, then, has been demonstrated in that divine action of setting forth his Son as a propitiation, to turn away his just wrath against us hell-deserving sinners, to expiate our sin and to reconcile us to himself, having satisfied his holy nature that sin has been justly forgiven.

It is at this point that something of the importance of insisting on the relational meaning of 'righteousness' becomes apparent. While we have seen that 'righteousness' is used in this passage in a forensic sense, the relational meaning must be maintained because as it is used in the OT, righteousness is a covenantal word and as such is essentially about relationships.[20] The righteous God is the covenant God. The righteousness he sets forth is a covenantal righteousness. The covenant is concerned with that relationship he himself has initiated with his people. So that in the Cross of Christ we see the covenant God in action, the righteous God acting righteously, bringing into a right relationship with himself those who have faith in Jesus.

What for us is the meaning of this for life today in postmodern Europe? The objection is sometimes made against the Pauline concept of divine justice that it is inappropriate for the postmodern view of autonomy and freedom. Ever since the Renaissance, we have been focusing increasingly on human individuality and our growing emphasis does not readily co-exist with Paul's teaching as set out in Romans 3. Take one example of the way men and women think today. Our grandparents (and possibly our parents) viewed their marriage vows as a binding obligation and understood their duty to be fidelity to those vows 'for better or worse, richer or poorer, joy or sorrow, in sickness and in health'. Not so the Romeos and Juliets of the closing decade of this century. Their expectation of marriage is to find their own fulfilment, and if they do not, then they consider they should be free to look elsewhere. The whole basis of marriage (more commonly, of co-habitation) has radically changed with our postmodern view of human freedom. We have become more egotistical, more self-centred, more determined to put our personal needs and demands before those of our marriage partners. Anselm's order and symmetry of the divine creation has long since disappeared, and with it a biblical view of sin. In its place, we have legitimised and authorised the tyrannical rule of self!

The Biblical teaching of divine satisfaction, the holy love of God with its tension between his compassion and his 'fierce anger', has been lost. There is little or no conception of 'the compassionate and gracious God' who 'does not leave the guilty unpunished'.[21] Almost unknown is the God in whom 'love *and* faithfulness meet together; righteousness *and* peace

kiss each other'.[22] Today's generation knows little or nothing of a God in whom there is both 'kindness *and* sternness'.[23] The one who is both just *and* the justifier of those who have faith in Jesus has been forgotten.

Paul is fully aware of this unity and wholeness of all that God has made. His conclusion in Romans 3 is that the God of righteousness in providing through his Son a righteousness from God is fulfilling and upholding the law he himself has made. Nor is the creation neglected; eagerly it is longing for the promised redemption of the children of God.[24]

So we have then the mystery of the cross, the wonder of our salvation, unfolded to us by the Scriptures in a 'kaleidoscope of images which together constitute the NT characterisation of Jesus as sacrifice'.[25] The language of the law court, of the slave market, of the Levitical cultus, is all richly expressed and given to us by the Holy Spirit that we might understand dimly something of the meaning of those hours of darkness when our Saviour languished in bloody agony on the cross. This is the message we are exhorted to study, to incorporate into our thinking, living and loving, which we are to commit to faithful men who will be able to teach others also.[26] I close with the words of hymn which comes to us from the 6th century:

Sing my tongue, how glorious battle
glorious victory became;
And above the Cross, His trophy, tell the
triumph and the fame:
Tell how He, the earth's Redeemer, by His
death for man o'ercame.

Thirty years fulfilled among us—perfect
life in low estate—
Born for this, and self-surrendered, to His
passion dedicate,
On the Cross the Lamb is lifted, for His
people immolate.

His the nails, the spear, the spitting, reed
and vinegar and gall;
From his patient body piercèd blood and
water streaming fall:
Earth and sea and stars and mankind by
that stream are cleansed all.

Faithful Cross, above all other, one and
only noble Tree,
None in foliage, none in blossom, none in
fruit compares with thee:
Sweet the wood and sweet the iron, and
thy Load how sweet is He

Unto God be laud and honour: to the
Father, to the Son,
To the mighty Spirit, glory—ever Three
and ever One:
Power and glory in the highest while
eternal ages run.

Notes

1 J. S. Whale, *Victor and Victim, Christian Doctrine of Redemption* (CUP, 1960) 42.
2 Colin Gunton makes this point in, *The Actuality of Atonement* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988) 116ff.
3 Leon Morris, *The Epistle to the Romans* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988) 179f.
4 C. E. B. Cranfield, *Romans*, (ICC, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975) 208ff.
5 Calvin, Comm. *in loc.*
6 E.g., Calvin: 'God, without having regard to Christ, is always angry with us . . . God does not indeed hate in us his own workmanship, that is, as we are formed men; but he hates our uncleanness, which has extinguished the light of his image. When the washing of Christ cleanses this away, he then loves and embraces us as his own pure workmanship'. Comm. *in loc.* See also Institutes, 2, 15, 6; 16, 1–3.
7 Quoted by D. M. Lloyd-Jones, *Atonement and Justification* (Banner of Truth, 1970) 70.
8 James Denney, *2 Corinthians, Expositor's Bible* (London: Hodder, 1907) 211f.
9 *Universalism and the Doctrine of Hell*, ed. Nigel Cameron, (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1992) ch. 10, Everlasting Punishment and the Problem of Evil, Henri Blocher, 285. See also, Henri Blocher, *Evil and the Cross*, (Leicester: IVP, 1992).
10 C. S. Lewis, *Reflections of the Psalms* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1958) ch. 3, The Cursings.
11 Emil Brunner, *The Mediator* (London: Lutterworth, 1934) 489, footnote.
12 *Idem*, 152.

13 C. H. Dodd, *The Epistle to the Romans* (London: Hodder, 1932), 21ff. See also his discussion of propitiation in, *'Ιλασκεσθαι*, its cognates, derivatives and synonymns in the Septuagint, in *JTS* 32 (1931), 352–60 (reprinted in his *Bible and the Greeks*).
14 C. S. Lewis, *Letters to Malcolm*, quoted by J. Philip in *The Death of Christ* (Aberdeen: Didasko, 1986) 23f.
15 Calvin, *Institutes*, 2.16.2.
16 *Op. cit.*, 2.16.10. For a post-Calvin, 17th C. reformed statement on 'Satisfaction', see Francis Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, ET, Reformed & Presbyterian (1994) Vol. 2, 418ff.
17 For a full discussion and critique see Colin Gunton, *The Actuality of Atonement* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988) ch. 4, 83113.
18 John R. W. Stott, *The Cross of Christ*, (Leicester: IVP, 1986) ch. 5, 111–132.
19 *Op. cit.*, 129.
20 See Alister E. McGrath, *Iustitia Dei* (CUP, 1986) Vol. 1, 1–36; and *Justification by Faith* (Basingstoke: Marshall Pickering, 1988) 24.
21 Exodus 34:6f.
22 Psalm 85:10.
23 Romans 11:22.
24 Romans 8:19, 22.
25 Colin Gunton's phrase, *Idem*, 126, footnote 2.
26 2 Tim. 2:2, 15.

EuroJTh (1999) **8:2**, 133–144 0960–2720

• A New Look at the Synoptic Question
• *Un nouveau regard sur la question synoptique*
• *Eine neue Betrachtung der synoptischen Frage*

Philippe Rolland, Meaux

RÉSUMÉ

L'auteur présente ici un résumé en langue anglaise de ses publications sur la question synoptique, qui ne sont parues jusqu'ici qu'en français. Sa thèse fondamentale est une modification de la théorie des deux sources. En plus de Q, Matthieu grec et Luc grec dépendent, non du Marc actuel, mais des sources que celui-ci a fusionnées: le Pré-Matthieu et le Pré-Luc, deux versions indépendantes du Matthieu hébreu dont parle la Tradition. L'article montre la cohérence de ce schéma généalogique avec le récit des Actes des Apôtres et la tradition patristique. Il souligne l'intérêt historique et théologique de cette recherche.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Der Verfasser präsentiert eine Zusammenfassung seiner Veröffentlichungen zur synoptischen Frage, um sie der internationalen Gemeinschaft zugänglich zu machen. Bislang waren diese Veröffentlichungen nur auf Französisch erhältlich. Seine Kernthese läuft auf eine Modifikation der Zweiquellentheorie hinaus. Er geht dabei von der Annahme aus, daß der griechische Text von Matthäus und Lukas nicht auf die Endform des Markusevangeliums zurückgeht, sondern vielmehr auf Q und andere von Markus kombinierte Quellen, nämlich eine vormatthäische und eine vorlukanische Quelle, bei denen es sich um zwei unabhängige Versionen des in der Überlieferung attestierten hebräischen Texts des Matthäusevangeliums handelt. Der Artikel entfaltet die Übereinstimmung dieses Entstehungsentwurfs mit dem Bericht der Apostelgeschichte und der patristischen Tradition. Außerdem wird die historische und theologische Bedeutung der hier dargebotenen Forschung hervorgehoben.

In order to interpret the synoptic gospels, whether from a historical-critical or a theological perspective, it is important to try to reconstruct the sources used by the Greek texts of Matthew, Mark and Luke. The meaning of any part is largely determined by the context in which it is found, and it is necessary to look at the intention of each gospel writer when he deliberately puts an event in a context different from the context in the source. This is also true concerning the details of the account. It is instructive to assess the redactional work involved in each incident, that is, which words have been omitted, modified or added, because this redactional work is the visible expression of the theological thought that inspired it.

1. The Present Positions:

Most current scholars use the two-source theory as a starting point. Matthew and Luke used Mark, supposedly written some time before AD70, as well as another ancient source conventionally called Q, which many suppose was written down around AD50. However, apart from a few defenders of this strict schema[1], specialists consider this theory more as a



convenient way to teach students to observe the differences in events reported by Matthew, Mark and Luke rather than as a proven certainty. It is often taught that Matthew and Luke used a form of the gospel of Mark that has since disappeared, whether a 'Proto-Mark' or a 'Deutero-Mark'. This second solution is defended notably by Fuchs[2]. As a precaution, advocates of this view rarely attempt to reconstruct the exact contents of this document.

The 'two source' hypothesis can be summarised by the three diagrams above. An active, even vociferous, minority opposes this majority position. This minority, led by Farmer[3], is being won over to Griesbach's 'two gospel' hypothesis, which dispenses with the need for the Q source. These scholars assume that it is not scientific to postulate the existence of a source which has not been substantially proven. A very simple genealogy ((1) below) based on interesting observations of the gospel of Mark is suggested but could theoretically be replaced by a second ((2) below).

A third tendency is upheld especially by French speaking exegetes. This theory could be called 'multiple documentation'. The 'two-gospel' hypothesis is taken into consideration but dismissed as being excessively simplistic, incapable of giving an intelligent account of the three synoptic writings. The 'two source' hypothesis is given respectful consideration but is problematic when the details of its analyses are examined, the fundamental obstacle being the minor agreements between Matthew and Luke over against Mark.[4] The example opposite can be given.

In opposition to Griesbach's theory, the 'multiple documentation' adherents, as well as advocates of the 'two source' theory, emphasise that Matthew and Luke are independent of each other. Their accounts of Jesus' childhood and his Resurrection appearances are too different, to the point of making any reconciliation very difficult. Their distinctive parables are very different. It is thus difficult to find a satisfactory explanation of the minor agreements between Matthew and Luke as opposed to Mark. How can one maintain that Matthew and Luke each altered Mark's text in a nearly identical manner independently of each other? Resorting to a Proto-Mark or a Deutero-Mark thus becomes essential, but such a document exists in name only.

For this reason, some scholars engage in meticulous analyses in order to find out which hypothetical documents would allow a satisfactory explanation of all the observable facts. Boismard is the main representative of the multiple-documentation theory. His genealogical diagram is produced opposite (top) and compared with my own less complicated proposal.









Mt 9, 17:	and the wine	is spilled and	the wineskins are ruined
Mk 2, 22:	and the wine	is ruined, and also	the wineskins
Lk 5, 37:	and it will	be spilled and	the wineskins will be ruined

Boismard's schema was expounded in 1972[5]. After the publication of my own studies on the synoptic question[6], he decided to simplify his theory by 'enriching' mine in the manner below.[7]

The critical examination of the two different positions will not be undertaken here. Let it suffice to use examples to explain how our theory functions. It is more complex than the 'two gospel' and 'two source' hypotheses, but appears to be the simplest possible among those suggested by 'multiple documentation'.

2. The Distinction between the Markan Material and the Double Tradition

Agreeing with the two-source theory, it is essential to distinguish two types of material in Matthew and Luke; that which they share with Mark, often in parallel (Markan material), as well as that which is common to Matthew and Luke but does not appear in Mark (double tradition).

The first reason is the existence of several doublets i.e., sayings of Jesus, found on the one hand in Mark and in a similar manner in Matthew and Luke, and on the other hand in slightly different form in Matthew and Luke alone. Overleaf (top) is a list of five doublet accounts having five references.

A vast number of other examples where the same word is attested to four times instead of five could be added. Without being exhaustive, overleaf (bottom) are four other examples.

Secondly, as can be seen in both lists, the order of the sentences of the three evangelists is generally the same for the



	(Markan material)			(Double tradition)	
	Mk	Mt 1	Lk 1	Mt 2	Lk 2
It will be given to him who has	4.25	13.12	8.18	25.29	19.26
Carry one's cross	8.34	16.24	9.23	10.38	14.27
Lose one's life	8.35	16.25	9.24	10.39	17.33
Welcome in my name	9.37	18.5	9.48	10.40	10.16
Heaven and earth will pass away	13.31	25.35	21.33	5.18	16.17

Markan material. The exceptions are easily explained by Matthew's and Luke's editorial purposes. But in the other tradition the material is inserted in different places in comparison to Mark, which taken as a whole favours the two-source theory diagram. However, this assumes that there are numerous omissions either in Matthew or Luke, and does not resolve certain problems such as the next example at top of page 137.

A significant agreement exists between Matthew and Luke as opposed to Mark in that, independent of each other, the healings performed by Jesus are placed immediately before the feeding of the five thousand and not in the context of the visit to Nazareth. Moreover, John is familiar with the same motif in this passage (John 6.2b). It is therefore safe to suppose that the corroborating facts of Matthew, Luke and John are traditional, and that Mark displaced the healing motifs on the one hand in 6.5b and on the other hand in 6.13. It is therefore exaggerated to say that Matthew and Luke are never in agreement about the order of events as opposed to Mark. A few rare exceptions do exist (see also Matthew 21.12 = Luke 19.45).

3. The Real Existence of the Q Source

A number of exegetes question whether Matthew and Luke knew the double tradition from a single document. Instead they think that these two evangelists used small collections of short sayings independently.

In agreement with most advocates of the two-source theory it must be held that the double tradition was collected into one lengthy document for the most part, gathering together very few of Jesus' acts, but primarily catechetical maxims. In my opinion therefore, this document is not a true gospel. (Significantly, it did not contain any accounts of the Passion and the Resurrection.) This would explain why Mark, who probably knew it, did not use it.

The reason for my conviction is as follows: the order of numerous elements of the double tradition is common both to Matthew and Luke throughout these two gospels. This can be illustrated by the table opposite (bottom).

The doublet of Matthew 10.15 and 11.22 seems to show quite well that Matthew voluntarily displaced the long text that I have entitled 'Jesus and John the Baptist' (Matthew 11.2–19 = Luke 7.18–35) into a context where he brings together all sorts of controversy. As for the rest, which includes the greater part of the double tradition, the order of the events is identical.

Matthew's displacing of a number of important maxims can be understood in terms of his interest in regrouping Jesus' words thematically[8].(8) He places the

	(Markan material)			(Double Tradition)	
	Mk	Mt 1	Lk 1	Mt 2	Lk 2
The parable of the lamp	4.21	—	8.16	5.15	11.33
Nothing is hidden	4.22	—	8.17	10.26	12.2
No repudiation	10.11	19.9	—	5.32	16.18
The first will be last	10.31	19.30	—	20.16	13.3

	Matthew	Mark	Luke
Visit to Nazareth	13.54–58	6.1–6a	4.16.22.34
Healings by Jesus		6.5b	
Itinerant preaching	9.35	6.6b	8.1
Missionary sending	10.1–14	6.7–12	9.1–6
Healings by those sent		6.13	
Herod's judgement of Jesus	14.12	6.14–16	9.7–9
Execution of John the Baptist	14.3–12a	6.17–29	
Announcement made to Jesus	14.12b	6.30	9.10a
Withdrawal and welcoming the crowds	14.13–14a	6.31–34	9.10b-11a
Healings by Jesus	14.14b		9.11b
Feeding of the five thousand	14.15–21	6.35–44	9.12–17

Lord's Prayer (Mt 6.9–13 = Lk 11.2–4) in the heart of the evangelical discourse, which is the charter of God's true children. In the centre of the missionary discourse, in which the apostles are the plenipotentiaries of the one who sends them (cf. Mt 10.1; 10.40), Matthew defines their identity as follows: 'It is enough that the disciple be like his master' (Mt 10.24–25 = Lk 6.40). In the Parables discourse, which demonstrates the contrast between the knowledge of the true disciples and the hardness of the crowds (Mt 13.13–15), he inserts the saying, 'Blessed are your eyes because they see' (Mt 13.16–17). In contrast, he illustrates the Pharisee's blindness with an appropriate metaphor: 'If a blind man leads a blind man, both will fall into a pit'. Matthew is also fond of putting doublets together or even combining them (see, for example, Mt. 19.30 and 20.16; Mt. 12.31 and 12.32; Mt. 13.31–32 compared to Mk. 4.30–32 and Lk. 13.18–19.) Therefore, it is natural to suppose that Matthew broke up the Q source while Luke inserted lengthy passages into the midst of the Markan material (Lk. 6.20–7.35; Lk. 9.57–17.37).

It is remarkable that six dispersed double tradition maxims attested to in Luke should be found regrouped in exactly the

	Matthew A		Matthew B	Luke
Exhortations of John the Baptist	3.7–10			3.7–9
Three Temptations	4.1–11			4.1–13
Evangelical Discourse	5.3–7.27			6.20–49
The Capernaum centurion	8.5–13			7.1–10
Jesus and John the Baptist			11.2–19	7.18–35
Accounts of vocation	8.19–22			9.57–60
Missionary Discourse	10.9–16			10.3–12
Tyre and Sidon during judgement	10.15	=	11.22	10.14
Unconverted Cities			11.20–23	10.13–15
The gospel revealed to the simple-minded			11.25–27	10.21–22
The dumb demon			12.22–30	11.14–23
Jonah and the Queen of Sheba			12.39–42	11.29–32
The Hypocrisy of the Scribes and Pharisees			23.4–36	11.39–52
The Lamentations for Jerusalem			23.37–39	13.34–35
The day of the Son of Man			24.26–27	17.23–24
The flood			24.37–39	17.26–27
The one taken and the one left			24.40–41	17.34–36
The parable of the talents			25.14–30	19.12–27

	Luke	Matthew
The disciple and his master	6.40	10.24–25a
Beelzebub	11.15	10.25b
Nothing is hidden	12.2–9	10.26–33
Not peace, but a sword	12.51–53	10.34–36
Renounce everything	14.26–27	10.37–38
To lose one's life	17.33	10.39

same order in Matthew. See the list above.

It is highly improbable that these maxims were known by both Matthew and Luke in isolation from each other without this order being presented in a pre-existing document. Games of chance have their laws.

I agree, therefore, with one of the most contested theses of the two source theory, that the existence of the Q source is indispensable. The exegete's certainties are as reliable as any archaeologist's certainty of the existence of an ancient city discovered in the ruins of a tell. A well-reasoned argument has as much credibility as the discovery of a parchment in a desert cave.

4. Mark, the First Evangelical Harmony

The Markan material remains to be studied. It has been shown how difficult it is to assume that the canonical Mark was independently recopied by Matthew and Luke. Does another alternative exist?

The alternative is quite simple. There is evidence in Antiquity of a tendency to fuse the four gospels together into one account without losing the richness of any of them. Tatian wrote the *Diatessaron*, imitated today by the famous 'Quatre évangiles en un seul'. I propose the hypothesis that Mark already had this idea, not for the four gospels, but for two evangelical documents used in Rome; one being used in the Greek text by Matthew and the other by Luke?

Indeed, it is acknowledged that a phenomenon of duality exists throughout the text of Mark.[9] The best-known example is found in Mk. 1.32: 'That evening (= Mt. 8.16) after sunset (= Lk. 4.40)'. Mark uses repetitive expressions to say what Matthew and Luke say in a simple way with synonyms. Could not Mark have harmonised two parallel versions in Greek of an ancient Semitic document? Moreover, it must be observed that Luke expresses himself here in a manner that conforms to good Hebrew style, while Matthew employs a familiar expression from classical Greek. The concrete expression 'the setting of the sun' is attested to in Gen. 28.11, Lev. 22.7, Dt. 23.11, Jdg. 14.18, 2 Sa. 2.24, 3.35, 1 Ki. 22.36, 2 Ch 18.34, Ecc. 1.5, Am. 8.9, Mic. 3.6, Isa. 60.20, etc. But the abstract expression found in Matthew and in the first part of Mark's text, 'a late (hour) having come' (*opsias genomenès*), understood quite well in Greek, cannot be retranslated literally into Hebrew. In the primitive oral tradition, when the event was told for the first time in the language of the Judeo-Christians, Mark's redundancy did not yet exist. It was simply said as in Luke, 'the setting sun'.

The proposed solution to the synoptic problem merely consists of correcting the system of the two-source theory with respect to Mark's material. A comparison of the two genealogical diagrams appears opposite.

In this perspective, Matthew's and Luke's agreement in opposition to Mark causes no problem. It is simply the obverse of Mark's redactional work. See the example given at the beginning of this article (Mk 2.22 and parallels, shown opposite).

The fact that Matthew uses the present while Luke uses the future can be explained quite well by a Semitic background. In Hebrew, as in Aramaic, there is no distinction between the present and the future. The same form (the imperfect or incomplete) expresses either idea,





depending on the context; in one situation the wine is running out, and in the other situation the wineskins are ruined. In relation to the omission of the verb 'to run out' in Mark, an air of sadness is quite intelligently added to the traditional wording represented by Matthew and Luke. The wine not only 'runs out', but is completely 'lost'.

Another example (top of page 140) which explains how my solution works is Jesus' withdrawal to a solitary place (Mark 6.31–33 and parallels), before the feeding of the five thousand.[10]

It would be paradoxical indeed to maintain that the final version of Mark was the source which Matthew and Luke each copied independently. In Mark, *the disciples* were the ones who left while in Matthew and Luke, *Jesus* was the one who went away. Mark contains neither the subject 'the crowds' nor the verb 'followed him' which are used in the same manner both in Matthew and Luke. The common denominator of Matthew and Luke is not Mark, but the Semitic text that I have reconstructed.

This text is preserved almost intact in Luke who extracts from his source a detail about the location of the feeding of the five thousand; a remote place situated near Bethsaida (cf. Mk 6.45). In Matthew, the primitive tradition is embellished with details about how people moved from one place to another, on the one hand by Jesus and his disciples (by boat), and on the other hand by the crowds (on foot).

The redactional work of Mark is extensive, and intelligently done. He first uses the pre-Lukan tradition to emphasise that Jesus took his disciples with him. He introduces the Biblical theme of 'rest', towards which the Good Shepherd is leading his sheep (Psalm 23.2). He justifies this need to rest by the intense activity of Jesus and his disciples, a rationale he has already used in Mark 3.20. He then moves closer to the pre-Matthew tradition by specifying the different ways the disciples and the crowds moved from place to place.

The repetitive character of Mark, which harmonises the pre-Luke and pre-Matthew traditions, is quite visible in the synopsis. This can be presented in another way (top of page 141).

The rest of the synopsis is even more interesting because the intelligence of Mark's method is revealed by his harmonising of the two traditions (bottom of page 141).

By merging the two traditions, Mark explains the reaction of the crowds. Some (as in Pre-Mt.) saw the disciples leave, and saw to it that many others knew about it (as in Pre-Luke). With respect to the crowd's action, Mark could no longer use the stereotyped wording of the primitive tradition ('the crowds followed him') since he knew that Jesus had discovered when he got out of the boat that the crowds had arrived at the shore before him. He therefore described the people's race there (interpreting PreMt), and logically

Mt 9.17	and the wine is spilled,	and	the wineskins are ruined
Mk 2.22	and the wine is ruined,	and also	the wineskins
Lk 5.37	and it will be spilled,	and	the wineskins will be ruined

And he took them and went to a remote place in the desert.
And the crowds found out about it and followed him.

Version 1 (= Pre-Mt)

And taking them, he left
by boat
to a lonely place apart.
And, the crowds having seen him,
followed him
on foot from the towns.

Version 2 (= Pre-Luke)

But, taking them along, he withdrew

apart, to Bethsaida.
But the crowds, knowing it,
followed him.

Mt. 14.13
Now when Jesus
heard this,

(cf. Mk. 6.45)
(cf. Ps. 23.2)

(cf. Mk. 3.20)
Jesus withdrew
from there
in a boat **to a**
lonely place **apart**
But, when the
crowds heard it,
they followed him
on foot
from the towns.

Mk. 6.31–33

And he said to them,
'Come away
apart to a
lonely place
and rest awhile'.
For *many*
were coming and going,
and they had no
leisure even to eat.
and *they went away*

in the boat **to a**
lonely place **apart**.
Now, *they* saw them going,
and *many* knew them,
and they ran there
on foot
from all the towns.
and got there
ahead of them.

Lk. 9.10b-11a

And he took them
and withdraw
apart to a
city called Bethsaida

When the *crowds*

knew it,
they followed him.

concluded that they had arrived ahead of Jesus and his disciples.

A careful examination of the genealogical relationships between the synoptic gospels leads to a highly interesting conclusion about the redactional activity of their authors. This viewpoint seems much more interesting than that which is currently being taught, namely that Matthew and Luke removed all the

Lk 9.10b:

And he took them and withdrew
apart to a city called Bethsaida.

Mk 6.31a:

And he said to them, 'Come away by yourselves
apart, to a lonely place . . .'

Mk 6.32:

And they went away in the boat
to a lonely place apart.

Mt 14.13a:

And when Jesus heard this, he withdrew from there in a boat
to a lonely place apart.

picturesque qualities of Mark's text, replacing it, strangely enough, with an almost identical schematic presentation, while at the same time insisting that Matthew and Luke are not interdependently related!

5. The Historical Consequences:

Discarding 'the critical dogma' of the two-source theory is of great significance to the historian. Matthew and Luke are reinstated. They are not simple paraphrases of Mark. They had access to sources combined by Mark. By comparing them, the oral tradition which was taught to the Judeans and Galileans in their mother tongue at the beginning can be reconstructed fairly easily.

This does not mean to say that what is older is necessarily more exact in the historian's eyes. The primitive tradition was very schematic, and easily memorised. Details were added when it was written down. The primitive tradition stated that, 'The crowds knew about it, and they followed him'. Subsequently, a witness was able to clarify that Jesus travelled by boat while the crowds went on foot along the shore. Thirdly, Mark pointed out that people had to run, which is not at all unlikely.

The historian must take into account all of the ancient descriptions, or narrations, of the event. Each includes a part of the truth. But this truth must be assessed by evaluating the transformation of the text at each stage, looking for the reasons why the wording was changed. Such a process is the reverse of a fundamentalist approach, but does not put the global historicity of the gospels into doubt. It is the implementation of healthy criticism.

Lk 9.11a:

When the crowds learned it,
they followed him.

Mk 6.31b:

. . . For many were coming and going . . .

Mk 6.32:

And many saw them going, and knew them,
and on foot from all the towns,
they ran there
and got there ahead of them.

Mt 14.13b:

And when they heard it, the crowds
followed him on foot from the towns.

6. Consequences for Dating the Synoptic Gospels

The demonstration that the canonical text of Mark was not used by Matthew or Luke facilitates the freedom of research with respect to the date of the final redactions. It is generally recognised, on the basis of Irenaeus' witness, that Mark was written in Rome after the 'exodus' of Peter and Paul, which probably signifies their deaths (to judge by the usage in Lk 9.31 and 2 Pe 1.15). However, nothing forces us to believe that the Greek text of Matthew and Luke were later than that, since they were not inspired by the present day Mark but by more ancient sources. Other observations need to be taken into consideration in order to know whether Matthew and Luke were written before or after the fall of Jerusalem in 70.

This question was dealt with in a relatively recent work.[11] It seems that it would have been difficult to write the book of Acts after Nero's persecution of the Christians in 64–65. As long as my arguments are not refuted, I maintain that Luke's gospel should be dated slightly earlier. The Greek text of Matthew must have been written at the same period as Luke but in another geographical area. If it had been published later, for example around 80, it is difficult to understand why Jesus' childhood and his appearances after the Resurrection were presented in a way which is so difficult to reconcile with its precursor.

7. Consistency with the Data from the Acts of the Apostles

Even though Acts, like any ancient narrative, must be read from a critical point of view, especially in terms of chronology, one cannot doubt its overall presentation of the progressive diffusion of Christian ideas in the Mediterranean world.

The evangelical message was first proclaimed in Jerusalem, reaching those Israelites whose liturgical language was Hebrew. Others who spoke Greek also joined the Christian community. The message was received very early in remote regions, in the outskirts of Jerusalem (Lydda, Joppa), but also quite probably in Galilee, and even as far away as Damascus. The oral teaching of Jesus' witnesses had to be passed on to remote communities, and there is no reason to think that writing was not used for this purpose. The primitive tradition also had to be translated into Greek for the Greek-speaking believers, so once again writing must have been used, even if the oral tradition continued to play a role.

The death of Stephen led to the scattering of the Greek-speaking believers. Some preachers were welcomed in Samaria, Cyprus, Phoenicia and Antioch. The door was timidly left open to a few people from pagan roots who joined the faithful of Jewish origin. Roman soldiers were first evangelised in Caesarea, and would not have been satisfied with the Jewish documents typically used until then. A more universal catechism needed to be written for their benefit, one which highlighted those aspects of Jesus' teaching most easily within their grasp: confidence in the Creator who fed the birds and clothed the flowers of the field in beauty, the approval of the conversion of the people of Nineveh, and the Queen of Sheba's quest for wisdom, for example. This catechism, written in Greek, corresponds to the Q document which modern science has been able roughly to reconstruct.

The Antioch church became more important later on. It housed Peter for a certain time (Gal 2.11) and recorded his memories. The first collection, which we call Pre-Matthew, was probably put together in Antioch. Furthermore, one of the leaders of this church, Saul, also called Paul, undertook several voyages to remote lands, baptising the uncircumcised. From the very beginning he was accompanied by disciples, Barnabas and then Silas, who used a number of oral traditions in their preaching which were absent from the written texts up until then. The document which we call Pre-Luke was written in those regions of Macedonia, Achaia and Asia. Paul needed to leave a written form of the gospel once he left this mission territory (Rm 15.23).

It was only after Paul's coming to Rome that Luke, his companion, wrote, in the space of perhaps two years, two books on the 'History of Christian Origins' ending in 63 according to the chronology most currently accepted and based on earlier investigations. The Church Fathers link his gospel to Paul's preaching, of which an abstract is known to us as Pre-Luke. The gospel of Matthew was written around this same period in another place, probably Antioch. It was during the period in which the separation between Jews and Christians was symbolised by the stoning of James (AD62). Finally, after the fire in Rome in AD64 and the deaths of Peter and Paul in AD64 or 65, Mark was asked to harmonise the Pre-Matthew text from Antioch which was nurtured by Peter's tradition and the Pre-Luke text from Macedonia or Asia which was nurtured by Paul's tradition.

This history can be summarised by the diagram below which covers the genealogy presented earlier.

My research has hitherto been published only in French. I have provided a summary of it here, so as to bring it to the attention of a more international audience who can evaluate the various arguments put forth.



Notes

1 Specifically F. Neirynck and C. M. Tuckett.

2 A. Fuchs, *Sprachliche Untersuchungen zu Matthäus und Lukas. Ein Beitrag zur Quellenkritik* (Rome, 1971).

3 The abundant bibliography in W. R. Farmer, *The Gospel of Jesus. The Pastoral Relevance of the Synoptic Problem* (Louisville, Kentucky, 1994). Dom B. Orchard, another illustrious defender of the hypothesis of two gospels, orally confided in 1984 that he no longer believed in Mark's dependency on a written text from Matthew and Luke, but rather that his basis was a preMatthew and pre-Luke tradition. J. J. Griesbach theory was presented for the first time in 1783, but was not accepted by the scientific world. My solution closely approaches that of J. G. Eichhorn which was defended for the first time in 1794, and developed in *Einleitung in das Neue Testament* (1804). But Eichhorn complicated his schema by assuming that there was an Aramean original and Greek translation for each source document. This would explain why his theory has been forgotten.

4 Cf. F. Neirynck, *The Minor Agreements of Matthew and Luke againt Mark, with a Cumulative List* (Leuven, 1974).

5 P. Benoit and M. E. Boismard, *Synopse des quatre évangiles en français* (Paris, 1992) Tome II, 17.

6 P. Rolland, 'Les prédécesseurs de Marc (Mk. 2.18–22)', in *Revue Biblique* (1982) 370–405; 'Marc, première harmonie évangélique?', in *RB* (1983) 23–79; 'Les évangiles des premières communautés chrétiennes' in *RB* (1983) 161–201; *Les premiers évangiles. Un nouveau regard sur le problème synoptique*, Paris, 1984; 'L'arrière-fond sémitique des évangiles synoptiques', in *ETL* (1984) 358–362; 'Jésus connaissait leurs pensées', in *ETL* (1986) 118–121; 'Synoptique, Question', in *Dictionnaire Encyclopédique de la Bible* (Maredsous, 1988) 1227–1231; 'La question synoptique demande-t-elle une réponse compliquée?', in *Biblica* (1989) 217–223; 'Marc, lecteur de Pierre et de Paul', in *BETL C* (Leuven) 1992, 775–778; 'Lecture par couches rédactionnelles de l'épisode de l'épileptique', in *BETL CX* (Leuven, 1993) 451–458.

7 M. E. Boismard, *L'évangile de Marc, sa préhistoire* (Paris, 1994): 'My position is close to the theory developed by Philippe Rolland, stating that Mark combined texts, not from the final versions of Matthew and Luke, but rather from a Pre-Matthew and a Pre-Luke (cf. my Intermediate Matthew and my Proto-Luke). In my opinion, this theory is wrong in that is does away with any Markan tradition. If it is true that in certain cases the final version of Mark combined texts coming from Intermediate-Matthew and

Proto-Luke, most of these texts came from Intermediate-Matthew and Proto-Mark' (p. 9). The acceptance of this theory is even more evident in the revised edition of *La Bible de Jérusalem* (1998). 'The following hypothesis now becomes plausible: the relationship between the Synoptics must be considered not on the level of the Gospels as we presently have them, but on the level of older redactional material that can be called pre-Matthew, pre-Luke, and perhaps even pre-Mark. All these intermediate documents could be dependent on a common source which could only be the Aramaic version of Matthew and then translated into Greek in the different ways of which Papias spoke'. (*La Bible de Jérusalem*, édition révisée (1998) 1667)

8 Cf. P. Rolland, 'From the Genesis to the End of the World. The Plan of Matthew's Gospel', in *Biblical Theology Bulletin* (1972) 155–176.

9 Cf. F. Neirynck, *Duality in Mark. Contributions to the Study of the Markan Redaktion* (Leuven, 1972).

10 Part of my response to M. E. Boismard's 1994 book is summarized here: P. Rolland, 'La véritable préhistoire de Marc (MC 6, 30–34 et parrallèles)', in *RB* (1996) 244–256.

11 P. Rolland, *L'origine et la date des évangiles. Les témoins oculaires de Jésus* (Paris, 1994).

EuroJTh (1999) **8:2**, 145–154 0960–2720

• Reading Jesus' Parables According to J. D. Crossan and P. Ricoeur
• *La lecture des paraboles de Jésus d'après J. D. Crossan et P. Ricœur*
• *Interpretation der Gleichnisse Jesu nach J. D. Crossan und P. Ricoeur*

G. J. Laughery, Huemoz

RÉSUMÉ

Les paraboles de Jésus continuent à faire l'objet de débats importants parmi les théologiens, les exégètes et les critiques littéraires. Le présent article examine les tendances et les orientations herméneutiques de deux interprètes contemporains des paraboles du Nouveau Testament, J. D. Crossan et Paul Ricœur, qui ont exercé, au cours des vingt-cinq dernières années, une influence considérable sur la manière de lire les paraboles de Jésus. Dans le contexte actuel d'incertitude concernant le sens et la visée d'un référent dans le texte biblique, nous nous proposons d'examiner les résultats et les limites de la trajectoire herméneutique de chacun des deux interprètes. La position de Crossan, selon laquelle les paraboles auraient un simple but subversif, pour choquer et désorienter les auditeurs, suffit-elle à rendre compte et à expliquer de manière adéquate les parabole de Jésus? L'herméneutique ricœurienne offre-t-elle une réponse plausible à ceux qui affirment que les paraboles de Jésus sont incapables de porter un sens et de viser un référent?

Le présent article comporte quatre parties. Dans la première, nous traitons brièvement du contexte de l'interprétation des paraboles. La deuxième est un examen de l'herméneutique de Crossan appliquée à la lecture des paraboles de Jésus. Crossan soutient que les paraboles de Jésus aurait pour but de présenter Jésus comme un maître en subversion. Dieu les aurait utilisées pour s'opposer à la forme et au contenu du langage humain. Les paraboles seraient dénuées de sens. Dans la troisième partie, nous analysons l'herméneutique de Ricœur et sa manière de lire les paraboles. Selon Ricœur, les paraboles de Jésus, ont la capacité à la fois de communiquer un sens et d'atteindre un référent extra-linguistique. Elles sont porteuses de sens. Dans la dernière partie, nous tirons les conclusions de l'examen des deux types de lecture, en essayant d'en dégager les points forts et les faiblesses.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Die Gleichnisse Jesu lösen nach wie vor erhebliche Diskussionen aus unter Theologen, Exegeten und Literaturwissenschaftlern. Der vorliegende Artikel beschäftigt sich mit den hermeneutischen Tendenzen und Ausrichtungen von zwei zeitgenössischen Auslegern der biblischen Gleichnisse, nämlich John Dominic Crossan und Paul Ricoeur, die in den letzten 25 Jahren einen enormen Einfluß ausgeübt haben. Es ist beabsichtigt, in Anbetracht der momentanen Situation, die von einer ausgesprochenen Unsicherheit bezüglich der Bedeutung und des Referenten des biblischen Textes geprägt ist, die Auswirkungen und Beschränkungen der hermeneutischen Konzepte der beiden

Ausleger zu untersuchen. Handelt es sich bei Crossans Sichtweise, daß Gleichnisse grundsätzlich subversiv sind, daß sie schockieren und desorientieren, um ein angemessenes Verständnis und eine treffende Erklärung der Gleichnisse Jesu? Bietet Ricoeurs hermeneutischer Ansatz eine plausible Antwort auf die Annahme, daß die Gleichnisse Jesu weder eine Bedeutung noch einen Referenten haben?
Der Artikel gliedert sich in vier Teile. Zuerst werden wir kurz auf den Kontext der Gleichnisauslegung eingehen. Zweitens werden wir eine gründliche Untersuchung von Crossans hermeneutischem Ansatz vornehmen, wobei vor allem dessen Anwendung auf die Gleichnisse Jesu auf dem Prüfstand steht. Laut Crossan bekräftigen Jesu Gleichnisse, daß Jesus ein Meister der Subversion ist. Gott hat mittels der Gleichnisse Jesu eine unbarmherzige Attacke gegen die Form und den Inhalt der menschlichen Sprache entfesselt. Gleichnisse sind bedeutungs-los. Drittens wollen wir Ricoeurs hermeneutischen Ansatz und seinen Umgang mit den Gleichnissen erläutern. Aus der Sicht Ricoeurs sind Jesu Gleichnisse durchaus dazu in der Lage, sowohl eine Bedeutung als auch einen extra-linguistischen Referenten zu kommunizieren. Gleichnisse sind bedeutungs-voll. Viertens ziehen wir einige Schlußfolgerungen zu den beiden Ansätzen, wobei wir jeweils sowohl auf die Stärken als auch auf die Schwächen hinweisen wollen.

There has been a fair amount of lively discussion over the last twenty-five years concerning the interpretation of Jesus' parables. This study does not intend to cover the diversity of views proposed over this period, but is restricted to a more modest aim. We shall briefly examine the work of J. D. Crossan and Paul Ricoeur and their contribution to the interpretation of Jesus' parables. Our aim is to bring more sharply into focus some of the hermeneutical issues at stake in today's discussion. It is essential, in the light of new hermeneutical perspectives and arguments, that Biblical interpreters and exegetes become more familiar with the dynamics involved in recent interpretative efforts which influence the understanding and interpretation of Jesus' parables.

First, we shall very briefly introduce the question of parable interpretation in order to situate it in our contemporary context. Second, we explore the hermeneutical orientations in the work of Crossan. Third, Ricoeur's hermeneutical trajectory is succinctly examined. These recent interpreters (perhaps not frequently read in evangelical contexts) will serve as two examples of how Jesus' parables are now being read and how different hermeneutical orientations have influenced their conclusions. Fourth, we shall conclude with an evaluation.

1. Context

Much modern interpretation of Jesus' parables has been focused on the single idea–general principle theory that emanated from Aristotle's Rhetoric versus his Poetics and which is capably represented by A. Jülicher. In adopting Aristotle's classification's as a model for parable interpretation Jülicher rejected any allegorical dimensions, insisting that parables have one and only one point of comparison. While it is true that Jülicher brought a number of justifiable critiques to the allegorical method it remains questionable whether or not he was able to offer a better alternative.

We have more recently, in passing through C. H. Dodd and J. Jeremias[3] and their critique of Jülicher, arrived at a major change concerning the interpretation of parables. As there has already been a tremendous amount of attention given to the work of Jülicher and other modern interpreters of parables,[4] we have chosen to concentrate on what we have suggested to be our present interpretative context. Interpretation theories such as those

represented by Crossan and Ricoeur have had a marked influence on the study of parables and it is imperative to investigate their positions further in order to assess their impact.

2. Crossan's Reading of Jesus' Parables

We find, in the work of J. D. Crossan, one of the most significant commentators of Biblical parables over the last twenty-five years, an illuminating methodological, literary and theological analysis. Crossan focuses on a number of questions and issues related to the interpretation of parables. We shall limit ourselves, however, to two of Crossan's particular concerns: what is the purpose of parables and why are there such different and multiple interpretations of them?

Crossan harks back to the day when there was the illusion of stability, solutions, and a distinction between world-reality and our perception of it.[8] In Crossan's view, interpreters now find themselves in a world with no fixed center, hence a world which therefore can be described as something of a labyrinth. Such a labyrinth, Crossan proposes, not only relates to the world, but to the play of text interpretation. Parables, for example, can

> be played repeatedly and continuously. Since you cannot interpret absolutely, you can interpret forever.
>
> . . . we create the labyrinth ourselves, it has no center, it is infinitely expansible, we create it as play for play, and one can no more consider leaving it than one can envisage leaving one's skin.[9]

In the case of parabolic text interpretation Crossan takes up what he refers to as the metamodel of play.[10] Play, for Crossan is characterized as a totality that impinges on all interpretation. It is not to be thought of as played off against something stable or fixed, as if there was some standard or point of reference, but is to be understood as that which defines reality as a whole. Crossan argues that play is revealed in communication through signs and that semiosis (his terminology) is a restricted system of signs that endlessly refer to each other.[11] All referents disappear inside signs. There is no question here of a sign to external referent relation, but always a sign to sign system that is enclosed within itself. In this sense, we can align Crossan, to some degree, with structuralism. However, his views, as we shall now go on to further establish, are not merely those of an ideological structuralist.[12]

With regard to Jesus' parables Crossan affirms that one finds, and finds necessarily that parable is a permanence of paradox. Parable, in this sense is related to Crossan's metamodel of play as its literary counter-part.[13]

> Polyvalent narration, . . . that is, a paradox formed into narrative so that it precludes canonical interpretation and becomes a metaphor for the hermeneutical multiplicity it engenders. I would like to retain the term parable for this most profound and disturbing form of story.
>
> There is a small room in Vienna's Schönbrunn Palace walled with mirrors. Locate yourself in the middle and you will see corridors stretching in all directions as far as the eye can see . . . the corridors of hermeneutics stretch as far as the imagination can reach.[14]

Those modern interpreters who have argued that Jesus' parables are clear-cut moral messages are mistaken as there is nothing stable in parables. Crossan disputes any particular clarity in the parables and prefers to view Jesus as the greatest satirist and subverter, 'a master of paradox, and indeed of double paradox. He who finds the meaning loses it and he who loses it finds it'. In Crossan's view, the parables of Jesus are not timeless truths or a defence of a previous proclamation, but are to be understood as what identifies Jesus' historicity and experience of God which incorporates everything else within it.

Crossan, in his first book-length venture, already views parables in intra-linguistic terms.[17] The historical Jesus is to

be understood as the language of Jesus and most importantly the parables themselves.[18] Parables, within this framing, are not potential messages, but merely linguistic processes that have a structure, yet are lacking in content and referent.[19]

Parables aim to subvert and shatter, while leaving little room for reconstruction in the wake of the debris. According to Crossan, the subversiveness of parables moves readers into the Dark Interval leaving them with insecurity to face 'the dark night of story'.[20] As parables subvert, they also disorient, shock and surprise. Jesus' parables, for Crossan, destroy, overturn, and bring about reversal, but they are unable to disclose anything positive about new understanding in regards to the person of Jesus, the world, the Kingdom of God, or the hearer.[21] Crossan writes:

> 'Parable is an attack on the world, a raid on the articulate'.
>
> '. . . parable will establish the very principle of irreconciliation and non-mediation. Parable establishes the principle of doubt against all security. Like satire, parable as such has no programmatic content. Its function is negative and its creativity is that of via negativa'.[22]

In commenting on the short parable of hidden treasure in Matthew 13:44, Crossan briefly refers to a distinction between rabbinic parables and Jesus point of view.[23] In rabbinic parables the actions of selling, buying, and finding follow in sequence. All is done as it should be. However, Jesus reverses the succession making the movement of actions suspect from a virtuous perspective. Crossan argues that Jesus' parable suggests a present opportunity which remains imprecise. Purchasing the field alludes to a making room for detection, but the undetectable remains the substance. The parable is an affirmation of how language is not disclosive, but subversive and non-referential. Crossan writes:

> I will tell you, it says, what the Kingdom of God is like. Watch carefully how, and as I fail to do so and learn that it cannot be done . . . the more magnificent my failure, the greater my success.[24]

For Crossan, the answer to why there are multiple and differing interpretations of parables is because parables intend to subvert meaning. Crossan's primary focus remains on the negative. In his world, meaning is harder and harder to come by. As such, a lack of total meaning results in no orientation, no normativity, and no predication in the language of Jesus.[25] In the parables of Jesus, Crossan privileges discontinuity over continuity,[26] the negative over the positive, assuming that parabolic language is arbitrary, plurivalent, with a 'void of meaning at its core'.[27]

What Crossan seems to be arguing for is that the end result of a search for parabolic meaning culminates in the acknowledgment that there is none. This is because God has unleashed, through Jesus' parables, an unrelenting attack on the very form and content of human language.[28] With such a view of language as relativized, deficient of meaning and extra-linguistic reference, Crossan argues that parables are polyvalent. An indeterminacy or an opaqueness of meaning, for Crossan, is paradox and paradox is entirely negative.[29] Jesus' parables are about negation.

Crossan's hermeneutical orientation is entirely pessimistic. He seems driven by his affirmation that since there is no absolute interpretation, one must interpret forever. While the former half of his hermeneutical orientation may be substantiated, when it comes to the latter the conclusion is assumed, not argued or demonstrated. He appears to exchange the failure of one absolute interpretation theory for the supposed success of another. Crossan practices a hermeneutics of playful suspicion which results in leaving interpreters of Jesus' parables caught within the webbing of the text, a text which overtly means and refers to nothing. Hermeneutically speaking it is important to be aware that Crossan not only proposes to interpret the parables of Jesus, but he also wishes to use them as

an example of the only way to interpret the world. After having delineated Crossan's hermeneutics concerning the lack of meaning and extra-linguistic reference in Jesus' parables, we shall now turn to develop Ricoeur's position.

3. Ricoeur's Reading of Jesus' Parables

The difference between Ricoeur's and Crossan's hermeneutics will become clear in what follows. Such indeterminacy as argued for by Crossan, can be understood to some degree at least from Ricoeur's perspective, to be text-boundaried. In other words, Jesus' parabolic texts have the capacity to resist a total escape of meaning and extra-linguistic referent in order to disclose as well as subvert. While Ricoeur equally practices a hermeneutics of suspicion he refuses to stop here. His perspective of a hermeneutics of disclosure may indeed fit better with that of Jesus' parables themselves. In addition, there is the possibility that parabolic opaqueness is positive.

For Ricoeur, the failure to arrive at an absolute interpretation may also be understood as a surplus of meaning, rather than a wholesale negation of it.[30] In contrast to leaving their readers completely in the dark, in the concave of the tumultuous uncertainty that reigns in language and life, Jesus' parables as texts have the capacity to refigure reality and to bring about a transformative new understanding of God, world and self. Furthermore, Ricoeur argues that parabolic polyvalence is not entirely open to a gratuitous free play. Texts, even parabled ones, have interpretations that can be considered more or less probable, in spite of their not being absolute.[31] His affirmation of parabolic sense in the Biblical text is to be understood as a manifesto related to his unwillingness to abandon an original Biblical textual sense for either the subterfusion of absolute interpretation, non-sense, or even an exclusive readerly sense.

Ricoeur works with several parables, but for our purposes we shall focus again on the very short parable of Matthew 13:44.[32] For Ricoeur the parable is full of meaning. The implication that parabolic sense is found in the emplotted drama suggests three critical movements. Set in motion are: 1) finding the treasure, 2) selling everything, 3) buying the field. In Ricoeur's observation, as this motion percolates through the interpreter's imagination, thoughts, and feelings, there is a discovery that 'much more' is meant, than the parable's normal situational context delivers. Finding is a finding of something, albeit and importantly for Ricoeur, the something is something given, as opposed to acquired.[33] This expression can comprise a variety of encounters: encounter of people, encounter of death, or encounter of tragic situations, all of which affirm and disclose that our lives are not an achievement of ourselves. These various findings then point in the direction of time and a way of being in time. This mode, in Ricoeur's view, relates to 'Event par excellence' in the sense that something happens, and as such, we must be geared to and primed for the newness of the new.[34]

Parabolic sense, Ricoeur argues, is not so much to be found in the Kingdom of God, and what it is compared to, than in what happens in the story. In this case, we may infer that an interpreter is historico-critically informed as to the life setting of the parable, however, at the same time becomes aware that the sense of the parable is not entirely understood in these various situations, as various situations per se, but rather is parabolically turned towards the relevance of the plot, its dramatic structure, and its denouement, as producing meaning beyond the original context. Ricoeur clearly distances himself from the single idea–general principle theory, that emanated from a focus on Aristotle's Rhetoric versus his Poetics (Jülicher), and from Crossan's theory, which argues that parabolic texts in and of themselves lack the capacity to mean or refer extra-linguistically.

As we continue through the parable, its meaning-full art is subsequently asseverated in the two further critical movements which must be linked dialectically to

finding. These two movements, selling and buying, can also be referred to as Reversal and Decision. In reference to this Ricoeur remarks:

> . . . much has been invested in this word 'conversion', which means much more than making a new choice, but which implies a shift in the direction of the look, a reversal in the vision, in the imagination, in the heart, before all kinds of good intentions and all kinds of good decisions and good actions. Doing appears as the conclusive act, engendered by the Event (finding) and by the Reversal. First, encountering the Event, then changing one's heart, then doing accordingly. This succession is full of sense: the Kingdom of God is compared to the chain of these three acts: letting the Event blossom, looking in another direction, and doing with all one's strength in accordance with the new vision.[35]

While the finder–doing and Reversal and Decision are instructive and 'meaning-full' elements in the parable, perhaps Ricoeur's hermeneutics of suspicion and revelation are in danger of a theological under-reading of the parabolic Kingdom of God. The point however at this juncture, is that Ricoeur wants to stress that the parable is full of meaning. While it may shock, negate, and subvert, the parable has the ability to reorient its hearer in a meaning-full direction.

This leads us into the related dimension of Ricoeur's concern, as opposed to Crossan, regarding the status of parables in their capacity to refer. While Ricoeur has strongly argued for this dimension of the Biblical text, we must ask how it is to be accounted for in parables. We have seen that for Crossan the parables are referent-less, but if Ricoeur argues for referent, specifically what referent does he have in mind? Parabolic reference in one sense, Ricoeur has argued, is human experience. He states this in the following way:

> Could we not say that a poetic language, such as that of parables, proverbs, and proclamatory sayings, redescribes human reality according to the 'qualification' conveyed by the symbol Kingdom of God? This would indicate that the ultimate referent of parabolic (proverbial, proclamatory) language is human experience centered around the *limit-experiences* which would correspond to the *limit-expressions* of religious discourse.
>
> The referent, we could say, of the parable is human experience, conceived as the experience of the whole man and of all men, as it is interpreted in the light of the *mimetic* resources of some realistic *and* extravagant *fictions*, themselves embedded in specific narrative structures.[36]

We shall in one sense agree with Ricoeur concerning his argumentation that parabolic discourse refers to human experience and a redescription of human reality. However, in another sense, we should wish to discover if this is the limit of the referent of such discourse. In other words, are parabolic referents exclusively existential, or is it conceivable that they also include a theological element? How shall we read Ricoeur? Is it not possible that Ricoeur's sensitivity for the meaningful self engenders a potential conflict of referents or a seeming onedimensionalism in regards to parabolic reference and religious language in general? Some of Ricoeur's interpreters would argue this is indeed the case.[37] In their conception, Ricoeur reduces parabolic referents and religious language to selfhood, or a way of being in the world. While it is true, perhaps, that a more constricted reading of Ricoeur may produce such a conclusion, it is our opinion that Ricoeur's position resists such a critique in the following way.

It is important to note that Ricoeur argues that Biblical discourse proposes the referent of a new world, a new birth, the Kingdom of God, a new covenant, all of which can be said to have their genesis for us, neither in the given self, nor in the autonomous me, but in the Biblical text.[38] We shall suggest that Ricoeur goes even further. In our assessment, Ricoeur rightly affirms that the referent of the Biblical text, in addition to human experience and a world, is God, and that in fact, it is because God is the referent

that there can be a given self in opposition to an autonomous me.[39] If this is the case, then it is possible to refute this critique of Ricoeur. God, as Ricoeur has stated, is the central referent of Biblical discourse.

> Un des traits qui font la spécificité du discours biblique est, comme on sait, la place centrale qu'y tient le référent «Dieu».[40]

In Ricoeur's viewpoint, that God is the referred to, in the solidarity consisting of the multiple literary forms of Biblical discourse—narrative, hymn, prophecy, parable, etc.—is clearly affirmed. Parables, for example, in the contrast between their realism and extravagance, the extraordinary in the ordinary, arrowingly aim in the direction, through the plot and its point, of the Wholly Other. It is then, in regard to parables, through the combination of narrative structure, metaphorical process, and limit expression, that God is named and referred to. This works out in the following way: the narrative structure recalls the 'original rootedness' of the language of faith in narratives; a metaphorical process 'discloses' the poetic character of the language of faith; limit expression supplies the 'matrix' for theological language as this language unites analogy and negation 'God is like . . ., God is not . . .'

We contend, in drawing from a widened panorama of Ricoeur's texts,[43] that it is possible to affirm what we shall refer to as a triple Biblical referent: firstly, God; secondly, the proposed world of the text; and thirdly, human experience. Thus, human reality can be redescripted, as it were, because of the primacy of the first and second of this trinity of referents always preceding the self/me.[44] The fusing correspondence of these referents in no way eliminates their distinction, and as such, they can be understood as, 'to the limit', while at the same time, 'limited', in their capacity to give a totalizing perspective to that which is beyond 'limit'.

We have shown that Ricoeur's hermeneutics recognizes a textual meaning and reference in Biblical parables. Such a recognition engenders a valid critique of Crossan's hermeneutical theory of non-sense and non-reference. Ricoeur's hermeneutics then is able to affirm both a parabolic sense and reference, which credits the parable-story with making textual sense as opposed to non-sense, while liberating it from the constraints of an enclosed intralinguistic sign system, without referent and therefore without the mimetic power of 'redescribing' human existence. Ricoeur's efforts lead us far beyond the contours of Crossan's relentlessly negating parabolic scenario towards a vehement affirmation of a parabolic fullness of sense and extra-linguistic referent.

4. Conclusion

We shall conclude with the following points. The hermeneutical trajectory of Crossan is helpful to a degree. We can agree with some points: the polyvalence of parables, the emphasis on their subversion, shock and disorienting character. Crossan has done more than anyone to point out these traits. Nevertheless, we disagree with his ultimate conclusions. In our opinion, Crossan is over-negatively influenced by a contemporary hermeneutics of suspicion and a metamodel of play that is then too comprehensively read back into Jesus' parables. As a result of such a hermeneutical orientation, parables only seem to be able to confirm Crossan's views, rather than to be able to offer any positive resistance to an interpretative paradigm that is imposed upon them. Crossan's hermeneutics leaves interpreters with a 'world view' which in the end may be closer to his own than to that of Jesus.

A further point of difficulty in Crossan's analysis of the parables is his restricted centering on parables themselves. In our estimation, when Jesus' parables are too narrowly concentrated on there is an increased danger of a reductionistic distortion that tends to ignore the wider context of the stories. Not only do parables as parables militate against Crossan's own totalizing perspective, but when situated in their wider

narrative contexts it is unlikely that they so readily support his extreme hermeneutical assessments concerning language, meaning and referent.

Ricoeur's hermeneutic of revelation moves us closer to the parables of Jesus. While Ricoeur could be more clear theologically, on the level of sense and reference in parables his work is to be commended. In turning to the theological however, we would question the sufficiency of his rendering of Matthew 13:44 in regard to the theological component of the Kingdom of God. Ricoeur is likely, in our opinion, to be correct in his view of the Event as gift, but is this the limit capacity of the symbol, Kingdom of God, as used by Jesus?

In a Ricoeurian perspective, the response to this question is to point out that the Gospel says nothing about what the Kingdom of God is, only what it is like.[46] Jesus is not to be understood as a theologian who uses concepts, but as a teacher who taught by images.[47] While this is, in some sense accurate, and we are not entirely against Ricoeur's position, it is our contention that he could legitimately say more theologically.

We shall explain our position in the following way. The parabolic Kingdom of God, seems indeed to be 'like' many things, but is this the case, because it is first of all one symbol,[48] that then in turn, functions at a multiplicity of levels? It is entirely possible, in our opinion, that Jesus is able to use all the parabolic images he does, precisely because the 'sense' of the phrase is both conceptual and imagical, related to and invoking a complex constellation of thoughts, feelings, observations, and imaginary processes that God is King: God 'does' something and that something is to reign.[49] Jesus' proclamation of the good news of the Kingdom (Mt. 4:23), and that the Kingdom of Heaven (God) was near (Mt. 4:17), and to an even greater extent that it had arrived in his person, deeds, and miracles, at the very least points to the image-concept that God was King, and that this Kingship was manifesting itself in word, deed, and action (Mt. 12:22–29), which was to be equated with treasure.[50]

Despite our critique and preference for a 'saying more' in regard to Ricoeur's view on the Kingdom of God, it is evident that Ricoeur's hermeneutics, in opposition to Crossan's, argues that the parable is full of meaning (perhaps even more full than he acknowledges), recognizing its task is not merely that of subversion, but also that of disclosure. Since the configured parable is full of meaning and refers, it has the capacity to reveal and to refigure reality bringing about a new understanding of God, world and self.

Notes

1 A. Jülicher, *Die Gleichnisreden Jesu*, 2 Vols. (Tübingen, 1910).

2 D. O. Via, Jr. *The Parables: Their Literary and Existential Dimension* (Philadelphia, 1967) 2–22

3 C. H. Dodd, *The Parables of the Kingdom* (London, 1935). J. Jeremias, *The Parables of Jesus*, (London, 1963)

4 Among the many are B. B. Scott, *Hear Then the Parable*, (Minneapolis, 1989), and C. Blomberg, *Interpreting the Parables*, (Leicester, 1990).

5 Crossan refers, in many of his works to the influences of writers such as Stevens, Yeats, and Pound, philosophers such as Heidegger and Nietzsche, and critics such as Derrida and Barthes. One example of this is found in Crossan's book, *In Parables: The Challenge of the Historical Jesus*, (San Francisco, 1973), 81–82. 'Heidegger says: "Because it thinks Being, thought thinks Nothing." It is this nothing that is, this Nothing, this Nothingness, that Nietzsche warned about with such terrifying accuracy: "rather than want nothing, man even wants nothingness".' The frightening challenge, for Crossan, is to dwell in the dialectic between Being and Nothingness. Crossan states, 'We are frightened by the lonely silences within the parables'.

6 See F. B. Brown and E. S. Malbon, 'Parabling as a Via Negativa: A Critical Review of the Work of John Dominic Crossan', *Journal of Religion* 64 (1984), 530–538, esp. 530. 'Few can claim to have shed as much new light on any genre of biblical literature as Crossan has on parables'.

7 Crossan, 'A Metamodel for Polyvalent Narration', *Semeia* 9 (1977) 106.
8 Ibid., 107. Crossan argues that reality used to limit and prevent 'an immediately dangerous and vertiginous possibility of regressus ad infinitum', but those days are lost forever.
9 Ibid., 139 and 112.
10 Ibid., 113.
11 Ibid., 117. Crossan gives his readers two options here. He affirms the latter. 'Either semiosis is mimetic or it is ludic, it either reflects a reality without it or it creates a reality within it'. However, while not focalizing on these options per se, we would want to challenge Crossan on his attempt to offer an 'either-or' option with regards to semiosis in what he has already argued is a metamodel-world of play. Do not either or's relate to antithesis, rather than to infinite play?
12 Also Brown and Malbon, 'Parabling as a Via Negativa', 531–533, who argue that Crossan's ideas have undergone a perceptible evolution and one can detect the influence of literary theorists and philosophers who some would classify post-structuralist, deconstructionist.
13 Crossan, 'A Metamodel for Polyvalent Narration', 106.
14 Ibid., 140.
15 Ibid., 139.
16 Crossan, *In Parables*, 22, 32–33.
17 This means that there is no way that a parable can refer to anything outside itself.
18 Crossan, *In Parables*, xiii.
19 L. M. Poland, *Literary Criticism and Biblical Hermeneutics: A Critique of Formalist Approaches*, (Chico, 1985) AAR Academy Series, 111, argues that, 'Crossan is more interested in describing how parable becomes metaphor than he is in the parable narrative itself. Crossan focuses on the structure and function, at the expense of the content, of the meanings and beliefs embodied in the story. He does not seem to see that the content, as well as the function, of metaphor is also dependent on the concrete situation that the narrative depicts and the auditors recognize'.
20 See Crossan's next book, *The Dark Interval. Towards A Theology of Story* (Niles, 1975) 57–60.
21 Crossan, *In Parables*, 26–27. *Cliffs of Fall: Paradox and Polyvalence in the Parables of Jesus* (New York, 1980) 94, where parables are referred to as 'metaparables' which results in parable being a perfect mirror, not of the world or the kingdom, but of itself.
22 Crossan, 'The Good Samaritan: Towards a Generic Definition of Parable', *Semeia* 2 (1974) 82–107, esp. 98, 105.
23 Crossan, *Finding is the First Act: Trouve Folktales and Jesus' Treasure Parables* (Philadelphia, 1979) 104–106.
24 Ibid., 120.
25 A. N. Wilder, *The Bible and the Literary Critic* (Minneapolis, 1991) 122.
26 Ibid., 123. 'With respect to Jesus' sayings there must have been some substantial appropriation and continuation of the language of the past and its meaning. I myself see the continuity at the level of denotative symbol and conception which Jesus both exploited and revisioned'.
27 Crossan, *Cliffs of Fall*, 9–10.
28 Ibid., 20.
29 See Crossan, 'Stages in Imagination', in: *The Archaeology of the Imagination*, C. E. Winquist, ed., JAAR Thematic Studies 48/2, (Chico, 1981), 56, where he argues that 'paradox is the highest and final stage of imaginative development'. Paradox is defined purely negatively. Also, Brown and Malbon, 'Parabling as a Via Negativa', 537. 'In this (Crossan's) scheme, parable is judged to be of positive value only because it is negative in strategy. He gives priority to subversion' (parenthesis mine).
30 Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and The Surplus of Meaning* (Fort Worth, 1976) 45–46, 55–57.
31 Ibid., 79.
32 Ricoeur, 'Listening to the Parables', *Criterion* 13 (1974) 18–22, reprinted in: C. E. Reagan and D. Stewart (eds.), *The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of his Work* (Boston, 1978) 239–245, esp. 240–241.
33 This 'giveness' is important to note, as Ricoeur, in both his philosophical and Biblical writings emphasizes the original giftedness of the 'given', in contrast to the aquiring of the 'something'. 'Listening to the Parables', 241, The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur.
34 Ricoeur, 'Listening to the Parables', 241, The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur.
35 Ibid., 241.
36 Ricoeur, 'Biblical Hermeneutics', *Semeia* 4 (1975), 34–35. (*Italics his.*)
37 H. Frei, 'The "Literal Reading" of Biblical Narrative in The Christian Tradition:

Does It Stretch or Will It Break?', in: F. McConnell (ed.), *The Bible and the Narrative Tradition* (Oxford, 1986) 36–77, esp. 50; W. C. Placher, 'Paul Ricoeur and Postliberal Theology: A Conflict of Interpretations?', *Modern Theology* 4 (1988) 35–52, esp. 43; K. Vanhoozer, *Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: A Study in hermeneutics and theology* (Cambridge, 1990) 140–141.

38 Ricoeur, "Philosophy and Religious Language," *Journal of Religion* 54 (1974) 1, 81.

39 This is reminiscent of Ricoeur's well known critique of the self-positing subject.

40 Ricoeur, 'Herméneutique philosophique et herméneutique biblique', 128, *Du texte à l'action* (Paris, 1986), 'Philosophical and Biblical Hermeneutics', 97, *From Text to Action* (Evanston, 1991) ET.

41 Ricoeur, 'Nommer Dieu', *Etudes théologiques et religieuses* 52 (1977) 4, 489–508, reprinted in: *Lectures III* (Paris, 1994) 281–305, ('Naming God', reprinted in: Union Seminary Quarterly Review 34 (1979) 4, 215–228, Also, reprinted—cited in: M. I. Wallace (ed.), 'Naming God', *Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative and Imagination* (Minneapolis, 1995) 217–235, esp. 229, ET).

42 Ricoeur, 'Naming God', in: *Figuring the Sacred*, 230.

43 In our opinion, Ricoeur's interlocutors focus too narrowly on his *Semeia* 4 article.

44 This too, from our perspective, stands against those (Frei and others) who argue that Ricoeur's general hermeneutic reigns over his Biblical. It is however, not any or every text that refers to God, nor can human experience or reality be redescripted in precisely the same way as the world of the Biblical text proposes.

45 Brown and Malbon, 'Parabling as a Via Negativa', 536 point out, 'One experiences a tension between Crossan's expressed concern for interpreting the language of the historical Jesus and his concern for a certain philosophy he is predisposed to ascribe to the "linguistic" Jesus. To equate reality with language, to locate the metaphoric center of language as a semantic void, to see Jesus' parabling as self-concious, polyvalent linguistic play that reflects its own limits and thereby displays this void—to reason this way is in effect to come dangerously close to making Jesus out to be a first century structuralist/deconstructionist'.

46 Ricoeur, 'Le "Royaume" dans les paraboles de Jesus', *Etudes théologiques et religieuses* 51 (1976) 15–19, esp. 16. However, Ricoeur does seem to go beyond this in, 'From Proclamation to Narrative', *Journal of Religion* 64 (1984) 501–512, esp. 508, footnote 14, where he points out the Kingdom of Heaven is 'like', says what God does.

47 In our opinion, Ricoeur is in danger of succumbing to the same reductionistic tendencies he critiques in others. Why not concept and image? Ricoeur's penchant to minimize the significance of concept, in this context, relates to his bias aganist scientific language as opposed to poetic discourse. However, Ricoeur does, in another context, stress the discourse relevance of the concept and seeking its clarity in aiming to hold understanding and imagination together in the hermeneutical process. See Ricoeur, *La métaphore vive* (Paris, 1975) 383, *The Rule of Metaphor* (Toronto, 1977) 303, ET.

48 D. O. Via, Jr., 'The Parable of the Unjust Judge: A Metaphor of the Unrealized Self', in: D. Patte (ed.), *Semiology and Parables* (Pittsburgh, 1976) 26. Via writes of Jesus' narrative parables, as stories of God's reign. Also, R. T. France, 'The Church and the Kingdom of God: Some Hermeneutical Issues', in: D. A. Carson (ed.), *Biblical Interpretation and the Church: The Problem of Contextualization* (Nashville, 1985) 38. France convincingly points out that the Jewish background of the phrase, along with the variety of associated linguistic forms and areas of reference in Jesus' teaching, shows that the Kingdom of God does not conform to any single subject sphere and therefore functions as a symbol. The point is, the belief that God is King cannot be restricted, exhausted, or entirely expressed by any one referent. 'The phrase serves then not so much to define the subject-area of the statement in which it occurs as to establish the conceptual framework within which that statement is to be understood'.

49 This surely would have been conceived of, in some fashion, by a good percentage of Jesus opponents to whom many of the parables are performed and addressed.

50 G. E. Ladd, *The Presence of the Future* (Grand Rapids, 1974) 227–228. Also, N. Perrin, *Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus* (New York, 1967), 76–77.

EuroJTh (1999) **8:2**, 155–168 0960–2720

• Toward a Missiology of Western Culture
• *Vers une Missiologie de la Culture Occidentale*
• *Gedanken zu einer Missiologie der Westlichen Kultur*

Mike Goheen, Ancaster, Ontario

RÉSUMÉ

Pendant le grand siècle du mouvement missionnaire moderne, les études missiologiques ont vu surgir le thème de la bénédiction qui viendrait en retour de l'action missionnaire: la poussée missionnaire du XIX^e^ siècle rebondirait pour apporter un effet bénéfique à l'Église qui envoyait des missionnaires. Ce thème ne fut jamais approfondi et a graduellement disparu de la littérature. Aujourd'hui, nous voyons réapparaître cette dynamique, alors que la croissance de l'Église dans d'autres parties du monde permet à l'Église d'Occident de se reconsidérer avec les yeux de l'Église du monde en voie de développement. Cette nouvelle situation donne lieu à l'élaboration d'une missiologie de la culture occidentale.

Les mots «mission» et «missiologie» sont employés d'une manière nouvelle. La mission n'est plus vue comme une expansion géographique et la missiologie ne se rapporte plus à l'étude de cette entreprise. Dans les conférences mondiales du Conseil Missionnaire International, depuis celle de Tambaran en 1938 jusqu'à celle de Willingen en 1952, les deux postulats suivants qui avaient sous-tendu une vue colonialiste de la mission ont été abandonnés: 1. le monde est divisé en deux, entre un Occident chrétien et le reste du monde non chrétien; 2. La mission et l'Église sont deux entreprise différentes. Une nouvelle compréhension de ce que doit être la mission est apparue en 1952, avec l'émergence du concept de missio Dei, à Willingen. La mission est alors conçue comme la participation de l'Église à la mission du Dieu trine, qui vise à racheter la création tout entière. Il a fallu attendre les années 1980 pour qu'une missiologie de la culture occidentale se fasse jour. Le catalyseur de cette évolution fut Leslie Newbigin.

David Bosch reconnaît que Newbigin n'a pas suffisamment élaboré une missiologie de la culture occidentale dans son magnum opus qui s'intitule: Transformer la mission. *Cependant, dans un livre publié après sa mort, Newbigin a esquissé un programme pour une missiologie de la culture occidentale. Ce programme comprend les points suivants: la redécouverte de la nature missionnaire de l'Église et de la théologie, la recherche de la manière la plus adaptée pour aborder la vie publique dans la culture occidentale, la prise en compte de l'Église du monde en voie de développement qui a beaucoup à nous enseigner sur l'expérience missionnaire, un examen des manières authentiques de parler de Dieu, un défi lancé à l'autonomie de la raison humaine.*

L'une des questions au programme d'une missiologie de la culture occidentale est celle du lien culturel dont l'Église d'Occident est captive. Deux changements sont nécessaires pour libérer l'Église de son emprisonnement culturel: une réforme interne qui la conduise à retrouver une conscience missionnaire et l'adoption d'une démarche missionnaire vis-à-vis de la culture occidentale.

Une esquisse rapide de l'histoire de l'Église peut montrer comment l'Église d'Occident a perdu sa conscience missionnaire interne et a abandonné son effort missionnaire envers le monde

extérieur. On peut regarder cette histoire à travers deux types de lunettes. Les première sont celles de Richard Niebuhr: quand l'Église est jeune et minoritaire, elle se caractérise par un esprit missionnaire et une attitude critique à l'égard de la culture ambiante. Puis, lorsqu'elle s'est depuis longtemps installée dans la culture, la mission se trouve remplacée par le soin pastoral et le discours prophétique critique cède le pas devant une position bien établie. Il en résulte un emprisonnement culturel. À travers d'autres lunettes, on considère la tâche de l'Église à la fois de façon positive: c'est la participation au développement culturel, et négative: c'est l'opposition à l'idolâtrie croissante. L'Église primitive avait adopté la seconde démarche, tandis que l'Église de la chrétienté a opté pour la première.

Les chrétiens de l'Église primitive se considéraient comme des résidents étrangers. L'implication principale de ce point de vue était celle d'une tension rédemptrice entre l'Évangile et la culture. L'Église était une communauté autre, participant à une autre histoire que celle de la culture dominante. Comme elle incarnait une manière de vivre faisant contraste avec celle de la société ambiante, elle était à la fois attirante et subversive. Si on veut faire une évaluation, on dira, positivement, que l'Église primitive a maintenu une attitude d'opposition, et, négativement, qu'elle n'a pas toujours reconnu sa responsabilité culturelle.

Au IV^e^ siècle, l'Église a évolué de sa position marginale pour devenir une institution dominante, elle est passée d'une situation de faiblesse et d'infériorité à une situation de pouvoir et de supériorité, de pauvre elle est devenue riche, de minorité opprimée, elle est devenue majorité oppressive, elle est passé d'une religion illégale à une religion d'état, d'Église rassemblant des résidents étrangers, elle est devenue une Église établie. Comme telle, l'Église de la chrétienté a été une Église établie et non missionnaire. Pourtant, elle a pris une part active au développement culturel.

Depuis le siècle des Lumières, l'Église a été mise en marge et repoussée dans le secteur privé de la culture occidentale. Cette situation montre que l'Église est dans un état avancé de syncrétisme. Au lieu de résister à la foi idolâtre qui voue le monde occidental à la raison humaine, elle s'est doucement conformée à la structure de plausibilité de l'Occident. La mentalité de la chrétienté reste opérante dans la mesure où l'Église demeure partie intégrante du statu quo établi, se contentant d'un rôle réduit d'aumônier de la nation.

La postmodernité nous offre une occasion de retrouver une vision missionnaire de l'Église. Alors qu'elle se trouve dans une nouvelle posture dans la société, l'Église a besoin de réexaminer son identité. Si elle veut survivre dans une culture postmoderne, elle doit absolument retrouver son identité missionnaire.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Im großen Jahrhundert der modernen Missionsbewegung kam in missionswissenschaftlichen Studien die Rede vom 'gesegneten Reflex' bzw. von der 'reflexiven Aktion' auf. Der missionarische Impuls des 19. Jahrhunderts würde auf die sendende Kirche zurückfallen und ihr selbst zum Vorteil gereichen. Dieser Gedanke ist jedoch nie genauer untersucht worden, und er verschwindet allmählich aus der einschlägigen Literatur. Doch heutzutage sehen wir, daß sich eine entsprechende Dynamik entwickelt, indem das Wachstum der Kirche in anderen Teilen der Welt die westliche Kirche in die Lage versetzt, ein neues Verständnis ihrer selbst zu gewinnen, und zwar dadurch, daß sie sich durch die Augen der Kirche in der Dritten Welt sehen kann. In dieser neuen Situation entsteht nun eine Missiologie der westlichen Kultur.

Die Begriffe 'Mission' bzw. 'Missiologie' werden auf neue Art und

Weise verwendet. Bei Mission handelt es sich nicht mehr um geographische Expansion, und Missiologie ist nicht länger die Disziplin, die einen solchen Vorgang untersucht. Auf den Konferenzen des Internationalen Missionsrats von Tambaram (1938) bis Willingen (1952) sind zwei Annahmen, die dem kolonialistischen Verständnis von Mission zugrunde lagen, in sich zusammengefallen, nämlich daß die Welt aus einem christlichen Westen und einem nichtchristlichen 'Nicht-Westen' bestehe, und daß es sich bei Mission und Kirche um zwei verschiedene Unternehmungen handele. Mit dem Konzept der missio Dei entstand 1952 in Willingen ein neues Verständnis von Mission. Mission ist die Teilhabe der Kirche an der Mission des dreieinigen Gottes, welche die Erlösung der gesamten Schöpfung zum Ziel hat. Es dauerte jedoch bis zu den 80er Jahren, bis sich eine Missiologie der westlichen Kultur zu entwickeln begann. Der Anstoß für diese Entwicklung kam von Lesslie Newbigin.

David Bosch erkannte, daß er sich in seinem bedeutenden Werk Transforming Mission nicht ausreichend mit der Missiologie der westlichen Kultur beschäftigt hatte. Er schrieb daraufhin ein Buch, das nach seinem Tod erschien, und in dem er ein Programm für die Missiologie der westlichen Kultur aufstellte. Es umfaßt die Wiederentdeckung des missionarischen Wesens von Kirche und Theologie, die Ausarbeitung eines angemessenen Ansatzes für die Auseinandersetzung mit dem öffentlichen Leben, die Aufgeschlossenheit gegenüber der Kirche in der Dritten Welt, die uns einiges an missionarischer Erfahrung vermitteln kann, das Erarbeiten von authentischen Wegen, über Gott zu reden sowie das Infragestellen der Autonomie der menschlichen Vernunft.

Ein Aspekt des Programms für die Missiologie der westlichen Kultur betrifft die kulturelle Gefangenschaft der westlichen Kirche. Damit die Kirche von dieser kulturellen Gefangenschaft befreit werden kann, muß zweierlei geschehen: eine innerliche Reformation, die die Kirche ihr missionarisches Bewußtsein wiederfinden läßt, und die Wiederentdeckung der missionarischen Begegnung mit der westlichen Kultur.

Ein kurzer Abriß der Kirchengeschichte verdeutlicht, wie der westlichen Kirche das innere missionarische Bewußtsein und die äußere missionarische Begegnung abhanden gekommen sind. Diese historische Entwicklung läßt sich aus zwei Blickwinkeln betrachten. Beim ersten handelt es sich um die Sicht H. Richard Niebuhrs. Als die Kirche noch jung und in der Minderheit war, war sie missionarisch ausgerichtet und auf eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit der sie umgebenden Kultur bedacht. Sobald die Kirche jedoch zu einem Teil dieser Kultur geworden war, wurde Mission durch pastorale Fürsorge ersetzt, und die prophetisch-kritische Haltung wich der Institutionalisierung. Das Endergebnis war die kulturelle Gefangenschaft. Zweitens läßt sich die Aufgabe der Kirche in ihrer kulturellen Stellung entweder positiv, als Teilnahme an der kulturellen Entwicklung, oder negativ, als Stellungnahme gegen eine götzendienerische Entwicklung, definieren. Die frühe Kirche verkörperte den zweiten Typ, die Kirche der Christenheit den ersten.

Die frühe Kirche sah sich selbst als Gäste und Fremdlinge in dieser Welt. Mit diesem Verständnis war eine heilsame Spannung gegeben zwischen dem Evangelium und der Kultur. Die Kirche war eine alternative Gesellschaft, die innerhalb einer dominanten Kultur in einer anderen Story lebte. Indem sie einen alternativen Lebensstil verkörperte, war sie zugleich attraktiv als auch unverhohlen subversiv. Beurteilt man diesen Ansatz, so ist als positiv zu bewerten, daß die frühe Kirche eine klare Gegenposition einnahm. Als negativ hat jedoch zu gelten, daß sie sich ihrer kulturellen Verantwortung nicht immer bewußt war.

Im vierten Jahrhundert machte die Kirche einige Veränderungen durch: aus

einer Randerscheinung wurde eine dominante Institution, aus einer schwachen und unterlegenen Position stieg sie in eine Stellung der Stärke und der Überlegenheit auf, aus einer armen wurde eine reiche Kirche, aus einer verfolgten Minderheit wurde eine andere verfolgende Mehrheit, aus einer illegalen Religion eine Staatsreligion, aus den Gästen und Fremdlingen eine institutionalisierte Kirche. Diese institutionalisierte Kirche der Christenheit war eine Kirche, die jedes missionarische Engagement vermissen ließ. Es war aber auch eine Kirche, die Verantwortung für die kulturelle Entwicklung übernahm.

Seit der Aufklärung ist die Kirche an den Rand der Gesellschaft, d. h. in den privaten Bereich, verdrängt worden. Diese Lage ist ein Indiz dafür, daß sich die Kirche in einem fortgeschrittenen Stadium des Synkretismus befindet. Statt der götzendienerischen Glaubensbindung an die Vernunft zu widerstehen, hat die Kirche sich brav an die im Westen gültigen Glaubensstrukturen angepaßt. Die Geisteshaltung der Christenheit bleibt dieselbe, wie denn auch die Christenheit ein Teil des etablierten Status quo bleibt, wenn auch in einer geringeren Rolle, nämlich als geistlicher Diener der Nation.

Die Postmoderne bietet die Gelegenheit zu einer Wiederentdeckung des missionarischen Selbstverständnisses. Jetzt, da sich die Kirche in einer neuen gesellschaftlichen Position wiederfindet, ist es an der Zeit, daß sie ihre eigene Identität neu bestimmt. Wenn die Kirche in einer postmodernen Kultur überleben will, dann muß sie ihre missionarische Identität wiederfinden.

I. Introduction

A. 19th Century Missionary Impulse and Reflexive Action

Kenneth Scott Latourette, the great American missionary historian of the earlier part of this century, in his well-known history of the expansion of Christianity, has called the 19th century 'the great century' (Latourette 1941–1944). Missionary fervour spread throughout the west resulting in remarkable growth in both human and monetary resources for the cause of cross-cultural missions. Missions became the new orthodoxy of the era. One of the themes that arose in early 19th century mission thought was that of the 'blessed reflex' or 'reflexive action'. Mission advocates argued that the missionary impulse of the 19th century that was sending missionaries throughout the world would result in a reflex action that would benefit the sending church. In other words, the mission impulse would rebound back on the sending church in the west, and it would reap some of the benefits of this missionary activity. These benefits were never spelled out. This theme gradually disappears from the writing of missiology at the end of the 19th century as mission became more and more woven together with colonialism. In the latter part of this century mission has gradually extricated itself from the colonial framework. In this post-colonial period the dynamic of the 'reflexive action' is becoming increasingly evident. The missionary movement has come full circle and the church in the west is now beginning to experience a number of benefits.

Perhaps we can describe how this reflexive action might take place with the following hypothetical scenario.[1] A missionary is sent to India. He stands in the village street to proclaim Jesus Christ to a group of people for whom the name Jesus Christ is meaningless. How does he proceed? He must use the language of his hearers. However, that language is not neutral; it embodies the worldview and commitments of the people. What word does he choose to speak of Christ. Does he choose *swamy*—Lord? The trouble is that in India there are literally millions of lords in Hindu tradition. Is Jesus just one more? This is hardly good news! How about the word *avatar* the descent and embodiment of God? The trouble is—among others—that this idea is caught up in the cyclical

worldview of the Hindu and can hardly call for a final commitment. Should the missionary just begin to tell the historical story of Jesus? This would be to identify Jesus with *maya*, the world of passing, illusive reality. It would hardly hold interest. But the evangelist must choose one of these words if he is to communicate. This is a necessary process; he must use the language of the people. In this process of communicating the gospel, the missionary becomes increasingly aware of how the worldview of that local culture can reshape the gospel. But in this process, she begins also to see that this is true not simply in India. It is also true in the United States, Canada, or Western Europe—the place from which she has come. It is very easy to believe that the worldview in which you have been nurtured is simply the way things are. One is unaware of how profoundly one is shaped by their cultural story. However, serious involvement with another culture challenges this assumption. The way that the missionary understands the gospel is shaped by the culture of which she is part and this becomes increasingly evident as a result of a missionary encounter with a foreign culture. Through dialogue and interaction with the Indian church, the missionary comes to see that the gospel is shaped by the western worldview.

If we stopped there we would be left with cultural relativism—an Indian gospel absorbed into Hinduism or a Western gospel absorbed into modernity. But we are not. The third thing that must be brought into the picture is the meeting of cultures under the final authority of the Bible. The missionary brings the Bible or New Testament that has been translated into the local language. The people in India have in their hands a story which can provide a critique of both their culture and the culture from which the missionary has come. As the church in India reads the Bible they come to see the incompatibility of their worldview with the gospel. The Indian church also can provide for the missionary a fresh look at western culture through new eyes. They can enable him or her to begin to see how the Western worldview has compromised the message of the gospel.

This process is now taking place at a global level. The growth and maturing of the churches in the Majority World—the fruit of 19th and 20th century missions—now provides a challenge to the Western church to rethink their identity and stance toward their culture. Thus the missionary experience has come full circle. It now provides a critique of the sending church providing resources for a more faithful witness. This is what is meant by reflexive action.

B. Toward a Missiology of Western Culture: New Understanding of Mission in the 20 Century

As a result of this reflexive action there is now developing a missiology of western culture. To speak of a *missiology* of western culture means that the word 'mission' is being used in a new way. At the beginning of the 20th century, mission still denoted the idea of geographical expansion. Mission was considered to be an enterprise of Christian expansion that proceeds in one direction from the Christian West to other parts of the world. The world was divided into the Christian west and the non-Christian non-West. The West was the home base for mission and the non-West was the mission field. Church and mission were separated: *Mission* was an organization responsible for this expansionist enterprise; the Western *church* supported mission as one of its worthy causes while the third world *church* took its place as a parallel organization along side of western based missions as a container for converts of missionary work. Missiology was the discipline that studies the issues arising from this expansion. If a missiology of western culture was to develop, these foundational assumptions about mission would need to change.

Throughout the 20th century numerous factors have challenged this view of mission. Perhaps the two most important factors are the dramatic rise, growth, and vitality of the Majority World church with its various expressions of the gospel and the parallel marginalization of the church in the West. In the International

Missionary Council world conferences between Tambaram (1938) and Willingen (1952) each of the fundamental assumptions that undergirded a colonialist view of mission broke down. The separation of mission and church was challenged; it was advocated that the church is missionary by its very nature. The division of the world between the Christian west and the pagan third world dissolved; the west is as much a mission field as the third world—mission is in all six continents; Mission as geographical expansion gave way to an understanding of mission as the task of the whole church wherever it was to witness to the whole gospel in the whole world.

All these seminal insights remained unfruitful, however, because there was no theological framework in which to relate them systematically. The world missionary conference in Willingen, Germany in 1952 provided a beginning answer to this problem. The notion of the *missio Dei* brought together Christological, eschatological, and pneumatological insights from the theological guild in a way that opened the way for mission as a task of the church in all continents to emerge. The church's mission was a participation in the mission of God to redeem the creation. The Father sent the Son; the Father and Son sent the Spirit; the church is sent by the Son and taken up in the redeeming work of the Spirit. Mission is first of all a work of God and the church is the locus of mission before it becomes the agent. The church is sent to be a bearer of the Spirit and the mission of God. 'As the Father has sent me, I am sending you'. The sending is of the whole church by God into the world, not merely the sending of some individuals by mission boards to the third world.

The implications of these insights for western culture were not immediately recognized on a wide scale. It would not be until the 1980s that serious attention would be devoted to the development of a missiology of western culture. The catalyst for this development was British missionary, ecumenical leader, and author Lesslie Newbigin. He commented upon his return to Britain from India that he found western culture to be 'the most difficult missionary frontier in the contemporary world' and 'the one of which the Churches have been—on the whole—so little conscious' (Newbigin 1993:235). He tackled the issue with the insight of an outsider who could see the church in western culture with new eyes. His books have spawned a world wide interest in the subject and a number of organizational, scholarly, and publication initiatives to address the issue. We can see today the contours of a missiology of western culture beginning to emerge.

For the development of a missiology of western culture, the legacy of the 19th and 20th century missionary movement is invaluable. Its vast experience and tradition in dealing with missional issues provides a tremendous resource for the church in former sending lands.

C. Contours of a Missiology of Western Culture

In 1991 David Bosch's *Transforming Mission* appeared—perhaps the most significant missiological book to be published in this century. Before his tragic death in April 1992 he already had indicated that he recognized that he had not engaged the topic of mission in modern western culture sufficiently and that this must be a priority concern for our day. His little book *Believing in the Future: Toward a Missiology of Western Culture* was an attempt to begin to deal with this need. It was published posthumously in 1995.

In this book Bosch sets out the contours of a missiology of postmodern western culture. It included the following features: 1) In a missiology of western culture we must understand that the church is missionary by its very nature. Mission is not just one (maybe very important) task of the church; this redemptive era is characterized by mission and that this gives the church its very identity. Thus all theology is missionary as it brings the gospel to bear on various contemporary situations in an attempt to equip the church for its missionary task (Bosch 1995:27–32). 2) A missiology of western culture must

address the issue of engaging the public life of culture avoiding the temptations of either trying to create a Christian society (mistake in Christendom) or withdrawing from society into a spiritual realm (mistake in modernity) (pp. 33–35). 3) A missiology of western culture must take greater account of the churches in the third world and this for several reasons. First, we have much to learn from the missionary experience of these churches. Second, the west (including the church) shares the blame in the plight of the third world (pp. 35–40). 4) A missiology of western culture must struggle with the issue of how to speak of God in an authentic way in a culture where there is the dual threat of modern secularism that has eclipsed God and postmodern spirituality with much god-talk and its religious *smorgasbord* that trivializes and consumerizes religious experience (pp. 40–45). 5) A missiology of western culture must seek ways to challenge the autonomy of reason—our greatest idol—by communicating in our lives that all reasoning takes place in the context of committed belief (pp. 47–53).

It is these five ingredients that Bosch believes to be of primary importance in a missiology of western culture. He adds six more elements briefly at the end of the book that he believes also need to be addressed. They are: need to address ecological issues because of the west's complicity in creating this crisis (pp. 55f.), the need for a new counter-cultural stance of the church because of the domestication of the church in western culture (pp. 56f.), the need to address the ecumenical concern for the unity of the church because of the burgeoning denominationalism in the west (pp. 57f.), the need for contextualization of the gospel that avoids syncretism and irrelevance because of the illusion that the gospel is at home in western culture (pp. 58f.), the need to equip the lay members of the church for involvement in their public callings because the clergy/laity distinction has sidelined their ministry (p. 59), the need for a vital, worshipping congregation as the source of mission (pp. 55f.).

D. Cultural Captivity of the Western Church

In a developing missiology of western culture, one of the problems that has become clear and received growing attention in the last several decades, is the cultural captivity of the western church. In a recent article Konrad Raiser (1994:628f.), the general secretary of the World Council of Churches, distinguishes between two different forms of missionary witness. There is a difference between the missionary situation in Europe and North America, on the one hand, and Africa and Asia, for example, on the other. While the central missionary problem of the 'younger churches' is the experience of cultural estrangement—gospel is felt to be a foreign element that disturbs cultural traditions—the central missionary problem of the 'older churches' is the cultural captivity of the gospel. In other words, in Africa and Asia, the problem is for the gospel to be at home in culture. In the West the gospel has become absorbed and co-opted into culture.

If the church in the west is to be liberated from her cultural captivity its life and attitude must be transformed in two ways. First, there must be an inner reformation. That is, the church's self-understanding must be transformed from a non-missionary to a missionary self-image. In her own self-perception and selfidentity she must see and understand herself as existing to communicate the good news of the kingdom of God. She must recover the missionary nature of the church. Second —and very closely related—this missionary self-understanding will lead to a new understanding of her relationship to culture. Along with and closely aligned with an inner missionary consciousness there must be a recovery of an outer missionary encounter with her culture (Shenk 1995:87, 94). This involves a missiological analysis of culture that enables the church as a contrast society, called to witness to the gospel, to confront the idols of the reigning worldview. It is an analysis of the foundational assumptions of culture that will equip the church to resist the temptation to live in comfortable co-habitation

with powers that contradict the reign of God.

II. Cultural Captivity of the Western Church: A Brief History

How is it that this inner missionary consciousness and outer missionary encounter has been diminished in the western church? I will now sketch a brief history of what I am calling the cultural captivity of the western church.

The lens I want to use to view this history is the thesis of H. Richard Niebuhr (1935) in *Gospel Against the World*. In this little book with two other authors, he describes what takes place when the gospel is part of a culture for a long period of time. When a church is young and a minority its identity is defined by mission and a critical engagement with culture. This missional understanding issues in a community with a distinctive identity and a rigorous evangelization of the culture. As more and more embrace the faith, the church moves from being missionary to being pastoral. The church must now care for new converts. Gradually, a working arrangement with the powers and institutions of society develops. The gospel permeates more and more of culture. There is a lessening tension between church and culture since the culture is not as pagan as it once was. The final state is one of corruption—where the church is domesticated and absorbed into the culture. This end result is one of cultural captivity.

There is another lens that we can use to look at this history. The church has two responsibilities toward its host culture. First, it is part of the culture. Since the cultural development is a good part of creation that God has called humanity to participate in, the church must take its share of responsibility for that cultural development. Second, since the whole of culture is distorted by idolatrous faith commitments, the church is also called to take an antithetical stance.[2] Paraphrasing the words of Jesus in John 17, the believing community is in the world but not of it. In the first 300 years of church history, it takes an antithetical stance. But during this time the early church could not take her responsibility to participate in the development of Roman culture with sufficient seriousness. With the conversion of Constantine, the church is established as part of the culture. As such the church takes its responsibility for cultural development seriously. However, the antithetical stance is lost. This lead to the absorption of the church into its culture resulting in cultural captivity.

A. Early Church: Resident Aliens

The way the early church understood her identity and relation to culture can be seen in the way they referred to themselves. One of the most common self-designations of the early church was resident aliens (*paroikoi*). We can briefly enumerate four things about this word.

First, the primary sense of *paroikoi* is that of a redemptive tension between church/gospel and culture. In an article reviewing the use of this term *paroikoi* in the literature of the early church, Pierre de Labriolle concludes: 'The idea of heterogeneity of the Christians from their pagan neighbours and the society where they live is one of those which one finds most frequently in the texts' (1927:198). They understood themselves to be different from others in their culture. In fact, they also called themselves a third race along with the Jews and Gentiles.

Second, this distinctive sense of an alternative community was nourished by an alternative story—the story of the Bible. Everett Ferguson (1989) argues that this distinctive sense of identity developed as an alternative story was pressed on the catechumen in the process of catechism. The story of the Bible must supplant the story that gripped the public life of Roman culture. The whole catechetical process had a pastoral purpose to empower a distinctive people.

Third, this community with a distinctive identity shaped by Scripture was attractive. Alan Kreider argues that the church's '. . . rites and practices were designed to re-form those pagans who

joined the church into Christians, into a distinctive people that individually and corporately looked like Jesus Christ. As such, these people, reformed, would be attractive' [1994:5]. And so they were. A second or third century Christian remarks: 'Beauty of life causes strangers to join the ranks . . . We do not talk about great things; we live them' [quoted in Kreider 1994:12]. But we do not only have the testimony of the early church; we also hear from the enemies of the church as to the attractive power of their distinctive communal life. Celsus and Julian the Apostate both testify to the impact of the church as a result of its distinctive and attractive life.

What was the content of this exemplary life? In part it was that the early church broke down barriers erected in the Roman empire—rich/poor, male/female, slave/free, Greek/Barbarian. It was the love they exercised toward the poor, orphans, widows, sick, mine-workers, prisoners, slaves, travellers (hospitality). It was the exemplary moral lives of ordinary Christians over against the rampant immorality of the average Roman citizen. It was the hope and joy and confidence experience by Christians in a world of despair, anxiety, and uncertainty. It was their unity in a fragmented and pluralistic world. It was their chastity in a world dominated by sex. It was their generosity with money and simple lifestyles in a world dominated by accumulation and consumption (in A.D. 251 in Rome there were 154 ministers of one sort or another on the list for financial care and **1,500** widows and poor people!). It was their forgiving love of their enemies. Justin comments: 'We who once took pleasure in the means of increasing our wealth and property now bring what we have into a common fund and share with everyone in need; we who hated and killed one another and would not associate with people of different tribes . . . now after the manifestation of Christ live together and pray for our enemies' (quoted in Kreider 1994:9).

Thus, the lives of the believing community, nursed and shaped by a different story, living as resident aliens were lights in a dark world. The Canons of Hippolytus expressed the desire that the lives of Christians 'may shine with virtue, not before each other [only] but also before the Gentiles so they may imitate them and become Christians . . .' (quoted in Kreider 1994:12).

Fourth, this witness of the early church was publicly subversive. The early church did not allow themselves to be pushed into a private realm in the Roman empire. It quietly set aside and rejected the public doctrine of the Roman empire and lived out of the story of the Bible. Its confession that Jesus is Lord stood in stark opposition to the confession Caesar is Lord that bound the empire together.

In summary, in the early church, we see a community that understands her identity in terms of a witness to the kingdom of God. She lives in the story of the Bible and thus stands in redemptive tension with her culture. Her contrastive or alternative life is from the margins yet is attractive to many and publicly subversive of the reigning idolatry.

By way of evaluation, we can say, positively, that the early church maintained an antithetical stance toward culture. Hendrik Kraemer has rightly maintained:

> The deeper the consciousness of the tension and the urge to take this yoke upon itself are felt, the healthier the Church is. The more oblivious of this tension the Church is, the more well established and at home in this world it feels, the more it is in deadly danger of being the salt that has lost its savour (1956:36).

But negatively, her responsibility for and participation in the cultural development of the Roman empire suffered. This two-sided stance can be seen in the struggle the early church had with various occupations. Hendrik Kraemer comments a few pages later:

> It is worthwhile to have a look at the struggle with adaptation by paying attention for a moment to the conflicts of Christians in their professions. The great question was, How far is a Christian allowed to enter into

> the professional jobs of those days with their mores and customs, *without denying Christ and without becoming polluted by participation in idolatry?* (40; cf. Harnack 1961:303–311).

According to some in the early church, many occupations and professions were considered to be polluted by the idolatry of pagan culture and were therefore prohibited to Christians as a legitimate calling (cf. Harnack, *ibid*).

B. Christendom: Domestication

All of this changed in the fourth century. Constantine became a Christian and legalized the Christian religion. In 380 Theodosius made Christianity the religion of the empire. The Christian church grew sixfold. However, in this new era we call Christendom we move very far from the understanding and practice of mission of the early church.

The early church moves from a marginal position to a dominant institution in society; from being socially, politically, and intellectually inferior to a position of power and superiority; from being economically weak and poor to a position of immense wealth; from being an oppressed minority to being the oppressive majority; from being an illegal religion to becoming the only religion of the state; from being resident aliens to a territorial understanding of the faith whereby the Roman empire is considered Christian.

In this new position the church's self-understanding changed rather dramatically. We can say four things about the church in Christendom. First, it became an established church. The redemptive tension, the prophetic-critical, antithetical stance of the church in relation to culture diminishes. The church became part of the constellation of power within the state. It took its place alongside of the political, economic, military, social, and intellectual powers within the empire. Now the church's identity is shaped by society rather than the *missio Dei*. The church became an arm and instrument of state policy rather than an instrument for God's redemptive purposes. Its task was to contribute to the maintenance of the existing political and social order. It was to uphold and support the *status quo* rather than prophetically critique it. An established church is domesticated by the culture. The stories or worldviews of the church and the broader society become one. Critical engagement is lost. There is the assumption that the gospel and church are at home in a Christian culture. The Roman Catholic theologian Roger Haight describes the established church:

> The word established indicates a theological category which characterizes a church whose mission has ceased; an established church is at peace with society and content with and in its own forms and inner life. The term is negative for it implies the presumption that the missionary task has been completed so that the church is no longer a mission but simply a community. In terms of missionary and pastoral activity . . . an established church assumes only pastoral responsibilities (1980:10).

Second, the Christendom church becomes a non-missionary church. As Haight says, the mission of the established church has ceased. The assumption is that the whole society is now Christian and outside the empire is pagan. With this assumption work *within* the empire would change from missionary to pastoral maintenance. The church becomes preoccupied with its own welfare and maintenance. *Outside* the empire the initiative for Christianization of peoples is taken by the state as it extends its empire. The church participates as the religious arm of the empire. Mission often became coercive by means of religious wars.

Third, the church in the Christendom era becomes a powerful and privileged church. The church was now made up of the educated, powerful and rich. Christians were given privileged positions within the culture. The 'Christian empire' is powerful. Mission now is taken from a position of strength—from the superior to the inferior.

Finally, in contrast with the early church, during Christendom, the church takes on cultural responsibility. While the

antithetical stance of the church toward her culture diminishes, it takes responsibility for many dimensions of cultural development. Newbigin has correctly observed:

> Much has been written about the harm done to the cause of the gospel when Constantine accepted baptism, and it is not difficult to expatiate on this theme. But could any other choice have been made? When the ancient classical world . . . ran out of spiritual fuel and turned to the church as the one society that could hold a disintegrating world together, should the church have refused the appeal and washed its hands of responsibility for the political order? It could not do so if it was to be faithful to its origins in Israel and the ministry of Jesus. It is easy to see with hindsight how quickly the church fell into the temptations of worldly power. It is easy to point . . . to the glaring contradictions between the Jesus of the Gospels and his followers occupying the seats of power and wealth. And yet we have to ask, would God's purpose as it is revealed in Scripture have been better served, if the church had refused all political responsibility, if there had never been a 'Christian' Europe, if all the churches for the past two thousand years had lived as persecuted minorities . . .? I find it hard to think so (Newbigin 1986:100f.).

As Newbigin goes on to point out, however we evaluate this time, we are heirs of that Christendom experiment. We belong to a culture that has been shaped for a thousand years in a *corpus Christianum* in which the whole of public and cultural life was permeated by Christian revelation.

My own evaluation is to again look at the two sides of Christian cultural responsibility. In terms of taking responsibility for cultural development, the church of Christendom was faithful. In terms of an antithetical stance to the pagan classical and Germanic elements of that culture, its established position weakened her witness.

A number of historical factors converged to break down historical Christendom. However, many assumptions about the church and mission that were shaped during this era continue to shape the church's life to the present—a situation called by some missiologists of western culture a 'functional Christendom' (Van Gelder in Guder et al. 1998:46–62).

C. Church in Modernity: Privatization

With the breakdown of Christendom, the Enlightenment offered another vision of public life based on an autonomous, scientific rationalism. In this new situation, the Christian faith moves from the centre to the margins of the culture. Newbigin has made an important contribution to missiology here by offering us an analysis of the epistemological foundations of western culture that has moved the church to the private religious realm.

The vision of the Enlightenment appeared promising to that generation for two reasons. First, the religious wars were fragmenting all the countries of Europe. It seemed that the gospel or the Christian faith could not provide a centre for European society. Alongside, the success of the natural sciences in explaining the natural world gave hope that scientific reason could provide an alternate centre. At the heart of the Enlightenment worldview was a commitment to autonomous human reason as the sole arbiter of truth and primary instrument of social progress. Reason disciplined by the scientific method, applied to society and translated into technological power had the ability to transform out world into a materially and socially prosperous utopia. Methodological and neutral reason was to be the sole arbiter of truth. Tradition and authority were not to be trusted as guides to truth. Only human reason disciplined by the scientific method held such esteemed power.

Descartes has been called by many 'the father of modernity'. Descartes distinguished between the knowing subject and the object to be known. If the knowing subject was to have reliable knowledge s/he must disinfect him/herself of all subjective contaminations. The knower must reject all authority and tradition. It was

only through a rigorous application of method that truth could be found and validated. One built the temple of rational truth piece by piece by subjecting all truth claims to the dictates of a neutral and methodological rationality.

It was this Cartesian legacy that seized the imagination of the Enlightenment generation. *All* truth claims must be brought before the bar of scientific reason for ultimate judgement. Truth claims that could be validated by human rationality were accorded the high place of facts. Truth claims that could not be validated in this way were ushered into the lower epistemological realm of values. Thus the idolatrous commitment to human, methodological rationality created a fundamental dichotomy that lies at the heart of Western culture. A fundamental dichotomy between facts/values, knowing/believing, public/private, truth/opinion, science/religion was created in which the former is accorded a higher place and is trusted to shape public life. This dichotomy has become an unquestioned article of faith in western culture —a hidden assumption that gives shape to our culture. This foundational assumption, based on the faith of Western people, functions like a tectonic plate that is just below the earth's surface, unseen yet it gives shape to the social topography and geography above.

The claims of the gospel must also be submitted to the dictates of methodological reason. Since such claims cannot be proven by scientific method (although there has been no shortage of attempts in rationalistic apologetics) the claims of the gospel have been shunted to the netherworld of private values that are a matter of subjective opinion and personal preference. The gospel is not to be considered as public truth but mere private taste. One may find the gospel privately engaging but its truth claim is dismissed. It can have no place in shaping the public life of a nation.

Newbigin's indictment of the church is that instead of resisting this idolatrous faith-commitment to scientific reason, the church has been absorbed and domesticated into the culture (Newbigin 1983, 1986, 1989). It has quietly and meekly conformed itself to this alien faith-commitment. It has accepted its role in the private realm. The church may offer an otherworldly and entirely future salvation to interested individuals. The church may influence the morals of its members. It may meet the religious needs of its adherents. But woe to the church that dares to believe that the gospel is the true starting point for understanding all of human life. Newbigin is joined by many other voices who see both the ecumenical and evangelical tradition as two sides of the same modernist coin—churches that have been co-opted into the reigning plausibility structure of modernity.

Shenk argues that, paradoxically, the Christendom mentality remains very operative here (Shenk 1995:41). It is our Christendom heritage that has led us down this path of privatization. The church has been established as part of the status quo, as part of the constellation of powers for so long it knows of no other relationship to culture. As an arm of the state, the church still has its role to play. However, it has been greatly reduced since the Enlightenment to an institution that cares for the religious needs of its members and perhaps influences the individual morality of the nation.

In other words, the church has become in modernity a chaplain to society. A chaplain is a hired employee of a bigger organization. S/he is employed to meet the religious needs of those in a community with a higher and more comprehensive purpose. A chaplain contributes to the maintenance of the status quo; s/he does not challenge it.

D. Postmodernity: Recovery of Missionary Self-Understanding?

We live in a time when the modern worldview is breaking down. We live in a 'post-' society—post-modern, post-industrial, post-critical, post-liberal, post-Enlightenment, post-Christian, etc. For those churches who have hitched their wagon to some aspect of modernity the postmodern shift represents an enormous threat. And no doubt, the postmodern

worldview does represent a threat to the Christian faith as all worldviews do. But it seems that it also represents an opportunity. Kosuke Koyama tells us that the Japanese character for crisis is danger and opportunity. And perhaps that is just what postmodernity offers us—danger and opportunity.

In terms of the opportunity the church in postmodern society has been pushed to the margins. This provides an opportunity. This can be illustrated by employing the language of anthropologist Victor Turner. The church in western culture is at a point of liminality. Liminality is a condition of transition from one position or role in culture to another. For example, the movement from adolescence to adulthood is a point of liminality. At such times one struggles with identity. The church has lost its dominant position and is now at the margins. As it struggles with its identity, the opportunity is there to recover a missionary self-consciousness. And perhaps it is just there—at the margins—that the western church can learn again to become missionary. Maybe the postmodern condition offers the church the opportunity to recover the counter-cultural stance for which Bosch calls, the redemptive tension of the early church—hopefully a stance that will take seriously both cultural responsibility and antithetical critique.

Lesslie Newbigin said that the trip from India to Europe through the continent of Asia made a profound impact on him because he saw that the vital churches of the Middle East had disappeared without a trace (1993:226–228). The same threat looms in the West. A recovery of a missionary understanding of the church is a vital matter if the church in the West is to remain as a significant presence.

Works Cited

David Bosch, *Transforming Mission. Paradigm Shifts in Theology of Mission* (Maryknoll: Orbis 1991)

David Bosch, *Believing in the Future. Toward a Missiology of Western Culture* (Valley Forge: Trinity International Press 1995)

Pierre Delabriolle, 'Paroecia', *Bulletin du Cange (Achivum Latinitatus Medii Aevi)* 3 (1927) 196–199

Everett Ferguson, 'Irenaeus' Proof of the Apostolic Preaching and Early Catechetical Tradition', *Studia Patristica* 18:3 (1989) 119–140

Darrell Guder (ed.), *Missional Church: A Vision for the Sending of the Church in North America* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1998)

Roger Haight, 'The "Established" Church As Mission: The Relation of the Church to the Modern World', *The Jurist* (1980) 4–39

Adolf Harnack, *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries* (New York: Harper and Brothers 1961)

Hendrik Kraemer, *The Communication of the Christian Faith* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press 1956)

Alan Kreider, *Worship and Evangelism in Pre-Christendom* (The Laing Lecture, London Bible College, 22 February 1994)

Kenneth Scott Latourette, *A History of the Expansion of Christianity. The Great Century, 1800–1914*. Vol. 4–6. 7 Volumes (New York: Harper and Bros 1941–1944)

Stephen Neill, Lecture 2: 'The Missionary Dimension'. *The Church and Christian Union* (London: Oxford University Press 1968)

Lesslie Newbigin, 'Christ and Cultures', *Scottish Journal of Theology* 31 (1978) 1–22

Lesslie Newbigin, *The Other Side of 1984* (Geneva: World Council of Churches 1983)

Lesslie Newbigin, *Foolishness to the Greeks* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1986)

Lesslie Newbigin, *The Gospel in Pluralist Society* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1989)

Lesslie Newbigin, *Truth to Tell. The Gospel as Public Truth* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1991)

Lesslie Newbigin, *Unfinished Agenda. An Updated Autobiography* (Edinburgh: St. Andrews Press 1993)

H. Richard Niebuhr, Wilhelm Pauck and Francis Miller, *The Church Against the World* (Chicago, New York: Willet, Clark and Co. 1935)

Konrad Raiser, 'Gospel and Cultures', *International Review of Mission*. Vol. LXXXIII, No. 331 (October 1994) 623–629

Wilbert Shenk, *Write the Vision. The Church Renewed* (Valley Forge: Trinity International Press 1995)

F. J. Verstraelen, A. Camps, L. A. Hoedemaker, M. R. Spindler, *Missiology: An Ecumenical Introduction* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1995)

Notes

1 Perhaps this is more than a little hypothetical. I follow some of the thoughts of Lesslie Newbigin here (Newbigin 1978: 1–5). In fact, in Newbigin this reflexive action is illustrated *par excellence*. He returned from India where he spent 38 years and his writings bringing the missionary experience to bear on western culture have made international impact.

2 It is this side of cultural responsibility that is being increasingly stressed in American initiatives in the area of missiology of western culture. Gripped by the insight that the church is culturally captive, the answer proffered is an antithetical, prophetic-critical stance that renounces all power.

3 I owe many of the insights of the following section on the early church to the booklet by Alan Kreider (1994).

EuroJTh (1999) **8:2**, 169–176 0960–2720

• Walter Brueggemann—an Old Testament Theology for the New Millennium?[1]
• *Une théologie de l'Ancien Testament pour le nouveau millénaire?*
• *Walter Brueggemann—eine* Theologie des Alten Testaments *für das neue Jahrtausend?*

Gordon Wenham, Cheltenham

RÉSUMÉ

Walter Brueggemann nous livre une Théologie de l'Ancien Testament *impressionnante et originale. Il considère que la théologie de l'Ancien Testament doit se fonder sur les textes tels qu'ils se présentent à nous, et non pas sur des reconstructions critiques des sources. En même temps, il trouve inadaptée toute tentative de systématiser le témoignage de l'Ancien Testament ou de le lire christologiquement. Son ouvrage vise à mettre en lumière le pluralisme de l'Ancien Testament. On peut saluer l'enthousiasme avec lequel Brueggemann s'attache à montrer la pertinence de l'Ancien Testament pour aujourd'hui, mais il faut regretter certaines dissonances entre le programme qu'il s'est fixé et ce qu'il accomplit effectivement dans sa* Théologie.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Brueggemanns Theology of the Old Testament ist ein beeindruckendes und außergewöhnliches Werk. Der Verfasser betont nachdrücklich, daß eine Theologie des Alten Testaments mit der uns zur Verfügung stehenden Endform der Texte arbeiten muß, nicht mit rekonstruierten Quellen, und daß alle Versuche, das Zeugnis des Alten Testaments zu systematisieren bzw. christologisch zu interpretieren, verfehlt sind. Brueggemanns Werk ist so angelegt, daß es den Pluralismus des Alten Testaments hervorhebt, d.h. es ist unterteilt in 'Kernaussage', 'widersprechende Aussage' usw. Der vorliegende Artikel begrüßt Brueggemanns mit großem Enthusiasmus vorgetragenes Anliegen, die Relevanz des Alten Testaments für die heutige Zeit aufzuzeigen. Dennoch gilt es darauf hinzuweisen, daß zwischen Brueggemanns Vorhaben und der tatsächlichen Ausführung einige Diskrepanzen bestehen.

Since the great Old Testament theologies of Eichrodt and von Rad appeared in English translation in the 1960s there have been a number of shorter treatments of the subject, but no major work. At last with Brueggemann's 800-page work we have a study that will stand alongside Eichrodt and von Rad as one of the significant twentieth-century contributions to Old Testament theology. Brueggemann's work is not just big, it is exciting, refreshing, critically self-aware and provocative. The freshness of its ideas is matched by the vigour of its style, which prevents the reader tiring on the trek through the Old Testament's thirty-nine books.

The theology proper falls into five parts, but it is preceded by a long historical review of previous critical approaches to the writing of Old Testament theology culminating in Brueggemann's statement of his own programme. Brueggemann traces the origins of Old Testament theology to the Reformation. It developed in the

nineteenth century as an academic discipline unshackled by confessional or church constraints but blinkered by its appeal to Enlightenment rationalism, which prevented it taking seriously the Old Testament assertions about God (pp. 2–15).

In the wake of Barth's revolution Old Testament theologians such as Eichrodt and G. E. Wright once again took seriously the normativeness of its faith and endeavoured to show the distinctiveness of biblical faith against the background of the ancient Near East. This was the period of the Biblical Theology movement, which Brueggemann sees reaching its logical conclusion in Childs' insistence that Old Testament texts must be read canonically within a Christian frame of reference (pp. 17–45). However the arrival of sociological criticism with Gottwald and rhetorical criticism with Muilenburg showed that there is no innocent reading of biblical texts: every scholar brings his own agenda and presuppositions with him. The apparent unity of earlier historical-critical scholarship about how the Old Testament must be interpreted simply reflects their white middle-class positivist assumptions: now according to Brueggemann we must recognise we are all biased, and therefore we should adopt a pluralist approach to interpretation (pp. 49–60).

In his second chapter Brueggemann continues his methodological review by examining the contemporary situation, which like many others he terms post-modern. Post-modernism is characterised by pluralism, so there is no exclusively right interpretation. Canonical criticism would impose a unitary conservative interpretation on the text, whereas historical criticism would impose an atheistic sceptical one (pp. 62–63). A post-modern approach to Old Testament theology must recognise certain points. Firstly, we cannot penetrate behind the texts to the real historical situation or to the essence of God himself. We only know God through the biblical texts, so an Old Testament theology must stick to what the texts say (p. 65). Furthermore we must recognise the plurality of approaches within the Old Testament: some texts focus on worship, others on the word. Brueggemann confesses to being much more interested in the latter: 'the present writer is unflagging in his empathy toward that revolutionary propensity in the text' (p. 74). Modern critical study has emphasised how much of the Old Testament took its final shape in the exile or soon afterwards, and this ought to influence our understanding of its theology (pp. 74–80). This ought to make the Old Testament theologian particularly appreciative of Jewish approaches to theology and dialogue with it seriously (pp. 80–84). Brueggemann characterises his own approach as postliberal or non-foundational, by which he means 'an attempt to exposit the theological perspectives of the text itself, in all its odd particularity, without any attempt to accommodate to a larger rationality, either of modernity or of classical Christianity' (p. 86).

He then reviews briefly a number of other contemporary scholarly approaches to Old Testament theology (Childs, Levenson, Barr, Rendtorff, Trible, Pixley and Black Theology), before discussing four recurrent issues for the Old Testament theologian. These are historical criticism, church theology, the Jewishness of the Old Testament, and public possibilities.

While recognising that a historical appreciation of the setting of the Old Testament books is useful for interpretation, Brueggemann mounts a sustained attack on much historical criticism. It has focused on the incidentals and forgotten the central issues. The Old Testament is about God, but he is bracketed out if not denied by many critics.

> In principle, historical criticism runs the risk that the methods and assumptions to which it is committed may miss the primary intentionality of the text. Having missed that, the commentaries are filled with unhelpful philological comment, endless redactional explanations, and tedious comparisons with other materials. Because the

primal Subject of the text has been ruled out in principle, scholars are left to deal with these much less interesting questions (p. 104).

Very often historical criticism has been informed by a rationalistic disbelief in miracles and an antipathy to church tradition and authority (p. 103). He is scathing about the developmentalism inherent in Wellhausen's view of Israelite history, which he holds could only have arisen in an era of smug self-congratulation (p. 15). In particular Wellhausen's characterisation of post-exilic Judaism as 'decadent, degenerate, and legalistic' fostered the anti-semitism that ultimately led to the holocaust (pp. 94, 104, 653).

But to bounce back from sceptical historical criticism into a Christian reading of the Old Testament (*à la* Childs) would according to Brueggemann be just as serious a mistake. He criticises Childs as 'massively reductionist' (p. 92). Systematic theology cannot cope with the different voices in the text but seeks to harmonise them. It

> cannot tolerate the unsettled polyphonic character of the text... Thus, for example, if theology, in its metaphysical propensity, holds to an affirmation of God's omnipotence, an interpreter must disregard texts to the contrary . . . If it is claimed that God is morally perfect, the rather devious ways of the God of the Old Testament must either be disregarded or explained away (p. 106).

In fact the Old Testament does not agree with Christian doctrine or witness to Jesus Christ.

> The truth of the matter, on any careful reading and without any tendentiousness, is that *Old Testament theological articulation does not conform to established church faith*, either in its official declaration or in its more popular propensities It is clear on my reading that the Old Testament is not a witness to Jesus Christ, in any primary or direct sense, as Childs proposes, unless one is prepared to sacrifice more of the text than is credible (p. 107).

However Brueggemann treats Jewish approaches more kindly. He commends the insights of Jewish narrative critics like Sternberg, who are alert to the ambiguities and playfulness of the biblical text (p. 111). He observes that at many points Jews and Christians agree about the meaning of the text: indeed though they disagree about the identity of Jesus, they are both still looking for the messiah to come, either for the first or second time (p. 109). It is Christian supersessionism that is most to blame for the neglect by Christians of Jewish interpretation. Supersessionism holds that the church has replaced the Jews as the people of God, and therefore the Old Testament should be interpreted in a Christian way. But Brueggemann cites with approval John Paul II's comment that God's covenant with Israel 'has never been revoked by God' (p. 112).

By contrast with historical criticism, church and Jewish interpretation, Brueggemann discusses public possibilities much more briefly. He holds that the study of Old Testament theology should not just be the concern of the church or the Jews, but it should impact the whole world.

> It concerns the rise and fall of empires and the living and dying of human persons and communities . . . The Old Testament insists that there is a moral shape to the public process that curbs the raw exercise of power (p. 113).

So from time to time in his *Theology* Brueggemann contrasts the affirmations of the Old Testament with modern attitudes. He points to the hope the Old Testament offers over against the despair that issues from enlightenment thinking, its emphasis on community against modern autonomous individualism, and its Mosaic revolution of distributive justice as opposed to the dominant military consumerism of the West (pp. 561, 485, 735–41).

Having clarified his own theological stance by comparing it with others Brueggemann starts on his account of Old Testament theology. He holds that God in himself does not fit any preconceived categories, so we must focus on the

speech about God in the Old Testament. We must bracket out questions of historicity and ontology: it is what the text says that matters. Taking his cue from various law court scenes in the Old Testament Brueggemann suggests that the best way to describe this theological discourse is testimony. When testimony is presented in court, the judge and jury cannot go behind the testimony to the 'real events', rather they have to decide whether they can accept the testimony as true or not. So when the scriptural testimony is accepted it becomes revelation: 'when utterance in the Bible is taken as truthful, human testimony is taken as revelation that discloses the true reality of God' (p. 121).

Following Barr Brueggemann holds that this testimony is embedded not in individual words but in sentences. 'The sentence is the unit of testimony that most reliably is taken as revelation' (p. 123). His *Theology* therefore proceeds by classifying all sorts of statements about God, with verses or paragraphs of Scripture cited in full. His first major section, chapters 3–7, is entitled 'Israel's Core Testimony' and deals with the fundamental positive assertions about God and his character within the Old Testament.

Chapter 4, 'Testimony in Verbal Sentences', examines various things God is said to do in the Old Testament. He creates, promises, delivers, commands, and leads. The content here is quite familiar, but its presentation as testimony in a law court gives it an interesting spin. Among Brueggemann's more provocative assertions in this chapter are that the Old Testament does not assert creation *ex nihilo*, or the fall, and that it is male chauvinist to hold that Israel's faith is primarily about redemption not creation (pp. 158–60). Homosexual practice is banned in the Old Testament because it causes impurity, not for reasons of justice,[2] so the biblical views need not bind the modern church (pp. 194–6).

Chapter 5 on adjectives applied to God indicate fundamental abiding characteristics, such as his grace, mercy, steadfast love. Noting that the Old Testament has no adjectives for omniscient or omnipresent Brueggemann argues that it is uninterested in such ideas, unlike systematic theologians (p. 225).

Chapter 6 deals with nouns, which again reflect God's constancy. There are firstly metaphors of God's governance, God as judge, king, warrior, father, and secondly metaphors of sustenance, artist/potter, healer, gardener, mother, shepherd. He admits that 'the great preponderance of noun-metaphors for Yahweh are patriarchal' (p. 264), but he is not sure whether this represents deliberate polemic against Canaanite fertility religion or is just part of ancient patterns of speech. He thinks modern writers should make reparations for this patriarchal language, but he does not say how (pp. 265–6).

Chapter 7, 'Yahweh Fully Uttered', discusses how different Old Testament writers make use of these ideas. According to Brueggemann an Old Testament theology is concerned with thematisation not systematisation. In fact at the core of Israel's testimony about Yahweh is a fundamental contradiction, expressed most crisply in Exodus 34:6–7 where God is portrayed as sovereign, forgiving iniquity but by no means clearing the guilty. God's forgiveness and judgment are incompatible (p. 270), nevertheless the ideas recur in the Old Testament especially in the stories of the wilderness wanderings. Also in much of the Old Testament the covenant is fundamental. Though some scholars deny its antiquity, as Old Testament theologians we need not worry about this, but simply acknowledge it 'is pervasive and definitional for Yahweh' (p. 297).

Part 2, chapters 8–12, is entitled 'Israel's Countertestimony'. Here Brueggemann develops his law court analogy by comparing parts of the Old Testament to cross-examination. Objections to the claims about Yahweh made in the central texts are here raised. In the psalms of lament questions like 'How long, O Lord' or 'Why' are often asked. The exile produced its own crop of problems. Has God abandoned his people? Is he sovereign?

(pp. 319–23). Chapter 9 discusses the concept of God's hiddenness and providence as they are expressed in the wisdom books and biblical narrative.

Chapter 10 'Ambiguity and the Character of Yahweh' looks at those passages where God seems devious or ready to deceive. Jeremiah accuses the LORD of deceiving him (20:7), he changes his mind in Genesis (cf. 6:5 and 8:21) and about supporting Saul in 1 Samuel, while in 2 Samuel 24:1 the LORD is said to incite David to number the people, an act later condemned as sinful.

Chapter 11 'Yahweh and Negativity' discusses ideas that seem even more contrary to the positive image of Yahweh given in Israel's core testimony. These include the covenant curses, the commands to annihilate the Canaanites, the suffering inflicted on Job, and the hopeless pessimism of Ecclesiastes. In Chapter 12 Brueggemann insists that it is essential to maintain the positive and negative views within the Bible. 'This tension between the two belongs to the very character and substance of Old Testament faith' (p. 400). It is akin to the contrast between Good Friday and Easter in the New Testament.

Section 3, Chapters 13–18, entitled 'Israel's Unsolicited Testimony' deals with Old Testament teaching not directly about Yahweh but closely related issues, in particular God's partnership with Israel (ch. 14), with mankind (ch. 15), with the nations (ch. 16) and with creation (ch. 17). In chapter 13 Brueggemann reviews Israel's experience under the covenant from its cheerful beginning to the exile and restoration. He argues that the covenant is both conditional and unconditional and that Sanders characterization of first-century Judaism as 'covenantal nomism' fits the Old Testament as well (p. 419).

Under the rubric of 'The Human Person as Yahweh's Partner' Chapter 15 Brueggemann discusses traditional topics such as the image of God in man. As elsewhere in his *Theology* Brueggemann relies heavily on the Psalms and the prophets to construct his views. He argues that man is both answerable to God, yet God needs man's prayers, and that the Old Testament picture of man in community is better than modern day individualism (pp. 457, 485–6).

Chapter 16 reviews various texts that deal with Yahweh's relationship with the nations, from the destruction of the Canaanites to the oracles against the nations, from the negative picture of Babylon in Isaiah to the more positive outlook in Daniel. It ends with a plea that prophetic perspectives on the nations should influence modern thinking about international affairs (pp. 497, 502, 512–3, 526–7).

'Creation as Yahweh's Partner' (chapter 17) describes the threat to creation from chaos and death, and the counterbalancing hope that God is in control. In the last chapter of the section on Yahweh's partners Brueggemann draws parallels between the various relationships, which all begin well, suffer disruption and then are restored. Once again he denies that it is accurate to describe the disruption to the divine-human partnership as a fall (p. 553). He contrasts the hope of restoration that the Old Testament offers with the despair that must result from an Enlightenment view of human autonomy (p. 561).

Part 4, chapters 19–25, 'Israel's Embodied Testimony', deals with a variety of institutions that mediated God's presence in Old Testament times. Brueggemann picks out the Torah (ch. 20), kingship (ch. 21), prophecy (chapter 22), the cult (ch. 23) and wisdom (ch. 24) as mediators of God's presence. In so far as he focuses in this part on the historical institutions and their development rather on their witness to Yahweh, this part of his *Theology* feels more like part of a history of Israelite religion or de Vaux's *Ancient Israel* than an Old Testament theology. There are few surprises in this section, but in discussing the cult he again seizes the opportunity to berate Protestant scholarship, especially Wellhausen, for failing to appreciate its value (pp. 651–3).

The fifth and final section of the book (chapters 26–29), 'Prospects for Theologi-

cal Interpretation', match the introductory two chapters of the book in being essentially programmatic, developing once again Brueggemann's approach to Old Testament theology. He reiterates many of the points already made elsewhere in the book. He insists that in future Old Testament theology must be pluralist: it must break with the monopolistic interpretations of the church on the hand and academic scholarship (critical positivism) on the other. Hitherto interpretation has been in the hands of rich white Westerners: now we must recognise diverse voices within the Old Testament (e.g. priestly and Deuteronomic) and different interpretations of it (pp. 707–711). But though there may be variations within the Old Testament and between its interpreters, they do present a different construal of reality from the dominant metanarrative of our age termed by Brueggemann 'military consumerism'. 'Israel's testimony yields a world as deeply opposed to military consumerism as it is to every other alternative metanarrative that lacks the markings of the central Character' (p. 720).

Chapter 27 is a plea to recognise the authority of the Old Testament, and to avoid the distractions of historical criticism. He comments wryly: 'Utilization of historical research as an instance of theological scepticism seems to me evident in the current rage to date everything in the Old Testament late. Thus: "it is late, therefore it did not really happen, therefore it could hardly be authoritative" ' (p. 721).

Chapter 28, 'Some Pervasive Issues', reminds us of some of the continuing problems facing writers of Old Testament theology. Historical criticism must be congruent with the text and with the intellectual environment. In other words it must concentrate on historical issues, such as the dating of texts, without importing the rationalistic scepticism that has tended to characterise criticism since the Enlightenment. Second, Old Testament theology must avoid being too Christian. It is wrong to insist that the only way to read the Old Testament is in the light of the New. Childs' approach is 'inherently reductionist, because it reduces the polyphonic, elusive testimony of the Old Testament to one single, exclusivist construal . . . thereby violating the quality of generative openness that marks the Old Testament text' (p. 732). Third we must recognise the validity of Jewish interpretation of the Old Testament. 'Jewish imaginative construals of the Old Testament text are, in Christian purview, a legitimate theological activity' (p. 735). Fourth, we should note that the Mosaic revolution is central to the Old Testament and the starting point of its theology. Therefore its concerns for distributive justice should be ours. Our world is dominated by consumerism, which despite its name really puts power into the hands of wealthy elites, whether rich nations, rich companies, or rich individuals. 'Israel's testimony, with its uncompromising and irreducible commitment to justice, stands as the primary alternative to the deathly ideology of technological, military consumerism' (p. 741).

His final chapter, 'Moving toward True Speech' argues that Old Testament theology must be interpreted and mediated by a community committed to its values in its own life. Such a church would be characterised by five commitments: 1) to live by the economics of the Torah; 2) to exercise power benevolently like OT kings should have (Ps. 72); 3) to welcome prophets even when they are uncomfortable; 4) to bring all life into God's presence through worship; and 5) to use the Wisdom books to transform daily life (p. 745). When Joshua bade farewell to Israel, he invited them to put away the gods their fathers had served and to decide whether to serve the LORD or not. That, according to Brueggemann, is the challenge that Old Testament theology puts to the church today.

Reflections

Brueggemann's *Theology* is an enormously stimulating work. His engagement with the text and with modern life is deep and sincere, and his

passionate desire to communicate, indeed to sell, the Old Testament to the great American public comes over repeatedly in this work. Inside and outside the church today the Old Testament tends to be written off as out-of-date and irrelevant, and Brueggemann shows that such attitudes are quite misguided. Hence it will be read with profit not just by academics but by pastors and others engaged in Christian ministry. His insistence that interpretation should be carried out in community by those committed to living by the Old Testament is challenging and a powerful reminder that theology involves the whole being not just the head or the soul.

But what do we make of Brueggemann's theology, and does his performance fulfil the ideals he sets out at the beginning? The fullness with which I have set out his ideas indicates my profound sympathy with his work. In particular value his engagement with the Old Testament and his respect for its authority. I appreciate his insistence that we must focus on what the text says and not try to go behind it to what really happened or what God is really like. We are bound to see these facts through the lens of Scripture. His desire to let the different voices within the Old Testament speak is surely right too: his metaphors of Core Testimony and Countertestimony are very attractive. His appeal to rhetorical criticism and the exilic setting of much of the Old Testament is also valuable.

But in many of these areas Brueggemann could have gone further, or to put it another way, he could have been more consistent. He rightly affirms that we must understand what the text is saying, as opposed to investigating what it is referring to, whether historical event or God. And when we investigate its meaning we must focus on the sentence, not on individual words as the socalled biblical theology movement did. But though it is better to focus on sentences than on words, it would be even better to focus on the discourses in which the sentences are set. Even a sentence out of context can be a pretext, and for all Brueggemann's protestations that he wants to move away from systematisation, I sometimes felt his quotes from the Bible smacked of old-fashioned proof-texting. It would be have been better to have set these sentences within the context of the books from which they come and what they contribute to the message of each book rather than cite verses from a variety of books, just because, for example, they all describe God as judge.

This point could be developed another way. Brueggemann pays lip-service to the value of rhetorical criticism, admittedly the surface rhetorical criticism of Muilenburg and Trible, but in fact he makes little use of it. The deep rhetorical criticism of Perelman and practised by writers such as Sternberg, Duke, Amit and Renz[3] is not discussed by Brueggemann. This criticism sees each work of literature as a message from an author to a reader and aims to explicate the argument of the work and how the author seeks to persuade his reader to accept and act on his message. So far this approach has been applied only to a limited number of biblical books. But if Brueggemann is serious about focusing on what the texts themselves are trying to say, the sentences which he quotes need to be understood within the framework of each biblical book.

Communication takes place in historical contexts, so that reconstruction of the communicative situation is very useful to the rhetorical critic. Reacting against the excesses of historical criticism Brueggemann does not pay much attention to the historical contexts in which the biblical text was written, though this can helpfully focus the intention of the text. For example, many of the biblical books appear to have been edited or reached their final form during or soon after the exile, and this illuminates the way in which they must have been understood at the time. The account of Nathan's oracle when retold by Chronicles seems to underline the fact that the promise to David is 'for ever', which in the absence of a Davidic king in Jerusalem when Chronicles was written surely invites a messianic reading. In a similar way the book of Psalms was presumably put together as an anthology

in post-exilic times, yet it has been noted that the pre-exilic royal psalms are put in prominent places within this collection again suggesting hopes for a new king were not dead[4]. But Brueggemann does not discuss this: maybe because it tells against his dislike of closed readings and Christian readings in particular.

Allied to his neglect of the historical setting of the texts is Brueggemann's surprising inattention to the historical books as a source of Old Testament theology. Von Rad's first volume was entitled 'The Theology of Israel's Historical Traditions', but Brueggemann hardly mentions the books of judges to Kings as theological works and gives surprisingly short shrift to the story line of the Pentateuch. (In his *Theology* Brueggemann quotes most often from the Psalms and the prophets.) This is particularly odd in a scholar so alive to the post-modern turn, which has made us aware of metanarratives, the grand stories into which we fit all of our thinking. The modern metanarrative is the theory of evolution with its vision of a long slow ascent of life culminating in the achievements of human technological culture. But the traditional metanarrative of Western Christendom is the biblical story from creation to the second coming, yet for all his profession of post-modernist principle Brueggemann ignores it.

Finally despite his appeal to the authority of the Old Testament and his claim that it alone offers hope to a despairing society, Brueggemann is quite eclectic in his commendation of its ethics. Like many preachers he realises it is easier to commend those points that do not touch the hearer too directly. To advocate morality in foreign policy or redistribution of wealth sounds good, but your average reader is not likely to be disturbed by it. But touch on personal morality, which the Bible speaks often about, or green issues and perhaps suggest we might alter our life-styles or drive cars less and a preacher or author will upset a lot of people. I fear consciously or subconsciously Brueggemann may have drawn attention to those features of Old Testament theology that play easiest to liberal middle-class Americans, and denied or left out aspects that they would find objectionable.

To conclude, I find Brueggemann's aims in writing his *Theology* splendid and its performance exhilarating, but at the end I am left a little disappointed. I suppose my ideal Old Testament theology would be a cross between von Rad and Brueggemann. I believe with Brueggemann that an Old Testament theology should focus on the final form of the text, not on its putative sources, but with von Rad that we should listen to what these texts say as wholes, not to individual sentences within them. Finally, I think that taking more account of the exilic or post-exilic setting of the biblical books edited in that era would make a christological reading of them more plausible than Brueggemann is ready to grant.

Notes

1 Walter Brueggemann, *Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997) ISBN 08006-3087-4 pp. xxi + 777.

2 An odd assertion since the ban on homosexual practice occurs within sections of case law or moral exhortation e.g. Leviticus 20:13; Deuteronomy 23:18.

3 M. Sternberg, *The Poetics of Biblical Narrative* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1984. R. K. Duke, *The Persuasive Appeal of the Chronicler* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1990). Y. Amit, *The Book of Judges: The Art of Editing*. (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Bialik, 1992). T. Renz, *The Rhetorical Function of the Book of Ezekiel* (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming).

4 J. C. McCann, *A Theological Introduction to the Book of the Psalms* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1993)

• Book Reviews/Recensions/Buchbesprechungen

EuroJTh (1999) **8:2**, 177–178 0960–2720

Lebensspuren. Was wir über den historischen Jesus wissen
Stefan Lämmer
Metzingen, Ernst-Franz-Verlag 1997, 171 Seiten.

SUMMARY

This is an excellent short book on the historical Jesus, well written for the lay person. It covers extra-biblical traces of Jesus, his life and times, and issues surrounding his death and resurrection. The writer is a pastor, well versed in the subject, and a special merit is that he avoids extravagant claims and theses, following essentially the work of Stuhlmacher and Hengel. He accepts the gospels as trustworthy. A weakness is his use of authenticity criteria that are also used by radically sceptical scholars to come to opposite results. He also adopts uncritically a doctrine of the atonement which allows no place for judgment.

RÉSUMÉ

Voici un livre court, mais excellent, et bien écrit, sur le Jésus historique, qui s'adresse aux laïcs. Il présente les données extra-bibliques sur Jésus, traite de sa vie et de son temps et aborde diverses questions relatives à sa mort et à sa résurrection. L'auteur est un pasteur, bien informé sur le sujet, et il a le grand mérite d'éviter des affirmations ou des thèses excessives, ceci en se fondant principalement sur les travaux de Stuhlmacher et de Hengel. Il regarde les Évangiles comme dignes de foi. Son usage des critères d'authenticité employés par des spécialistes radicalement sceptiques pour arriver à des résultats opposés constitue une faiblesse. Il adopte aussi sans aucun sens critique une doctrine de l'expiation qui ne laisse plus aucune place au jugement.

In der Flut der Jesusbücher, die seit Jahren auf den Markt geworfen werden, bildet dieses Werk ein Kleinod—und zwar in mehrfacher Hinsicht. Einmal bietet es auf 138 Seiten (der Rest besteht aus Anmerkungen) einen kurzen und doch instruktiven Überblick über das Thema. Das Buch ist flüssig zu lesen. Bei Satzbau und Wortwahl spürt man die Hand des Gemeindepfarrers, der um den Laien und seine Lektüreansprüche weiß. Dieser Umstand ermöglicht es dem interessierten Gemeindeglied sich in kurzer Zeit in die entscheidenden Fragestellungen des Themas einzuarbeiten. Angefangen bei außerbiblischen Spuren von Jesus über eine Darstellung des zeitgeschichtlichen Hintergrundes des Auftretens Jesu bis zu einer Schilderung seiner Lehre und seines Wirkens, sowie einer Behandlung der Fragen um Tod und Auferstehung durchstreift der Verfasser die wichtigsten Fragenkreise des Themas.

Ein Kleinod ist das Buch auch deshalb, weil es von einem Gemeindepfarrer geschrieben wurde, der die wesentlichen Forschungsergebnisse über Jesus der Gemeinde erschließen möchte. Stefan Lämmer zeichnet sich dabei durch eine umfassende Belesenheit in der einschlägigen wissenschaftlichen Literatur einerseits und souveräne Zusammenfassung und Darstellung andererseits aus.

Zum Dritten kann das Buch auch deshalb als Kleinod gelten, weil es auf moderne, schrille und extravagante Thesen über Jesus verzichtet. Anstatt sich in den großen Chor spekulierender und phantasierender Jesus-Romanautoren einzureihen, möchte der Verfasser die wissenschaftlich belegbaren Fakten darstellen. Er schließt sich dabei im Wesentlichen seinen Tübinger Lehrern Peter Stuhlmacher und Martin Hengel an.

So gelangt Stefan Lämmer zu einem umfassenden Bild des Lebens und Wirkens Jesu, das auf der Vertrauenswürdigkeit der (synoptischen) Evangelien beruht. Lämmer begründet diese Vertrauenswürdigkeit mit Hilfe der historisch-kritischen Echtheitskriterien. Mit ihrer Hilfe gelingt es ihm, die von ihm dargestellten Fakten als historisch wahrscheinlich zu erweisen.

Freilich taucht an dieser Stelle auch eine Grenze dieses Buches auf. Während äußerst kritische Forscher (angefangen von Bultmann bis hin zu Lüdemann) mit Hilfe derselben Echtheitskriterien zu einem weithin negativen Gesamturteil über die Glaubwürdigkeit der Evangelien kommen, belegt Lämmer mit den selben Kriterien das Gegenteil. Ein negatives Echtheitsurteil innerhalb der synoptischen Evangelien fällt Lämmer fast nirgends. So aber bleibt der Wert dieser Kriterien (und ihre ausführliche

Darstellung in Kapitel V) ebenso fragwürdig wie bei den liberalen Kontrahenten des Verfassers.

Eine zweite kritische Frage betrifft die vom Autor kritiklos übernommene Tübinger Sühnetheologie. Auch ihm gelang es nicht, die im Wesentlichen von Hartmut Gese entwickelte Deutung der Sühne verständlich zu machen. Vielmehr übernimmt er die moderne Polemik gegen eine wechselseitige Versöhnung Gottes und der Welt durch das von Gott gestiftete und an Gott gerichtete Sühneopfer Jesu. Das Ergebnis ist eine rein positiv-heilvolle Deutung des Kreuzes, in welcher der Zorn und das Gericht Gottes keinen Platz mehr haben.

Diese beiden Anfragen können aber das positive Gesamturteil nicht mehr trüben. Stefan Lämmer ist mit diesem kleinen Buch eine große Leistung geglückt. Hier hat ein Gemeindepfarrer vorgeführt, wie man wissenschaftliche Forschung für die Gemeinde fruchtbar machen kann. Von daher kann ich dem Buch nur eine große Leserschaft wünschen.

Volker Gäckle
Tübingen

EuroJTh (1999) **8:2**, 178–179 0960–2720

Christian Gottlob Barth: Studien zu Leben und Werk

Werner Raupp

QuF 16, Stuttgart: Calwer, 1998. 294 pp., DM 98,- Pb., ISBN 3-7668-3579-3

SUMMARY

The Wurttemberg revival preacher, missionary and writer on spirituality, Christian Gottlob Barth (1799–1862) is much less well known than his contemporaries Blumhardt and Hofacker. Werner Raupp collects, in the second half of his 1996 Tübingen dissertation, a comprehensive bibliography of the Barth's writings. These were also translated into several European languages, as well as languages of numerous mission regions of the nineteenth century. The first part of the work consists of a critical biography of Barth in the years 1799–1824, when he took his first ministerial position, as Blumhardt's predecessor in Mottlingen. Of Barth's comprehensive correspondence with revivalists and missionaries throughout the world 3200 letters to him or from him are still in existence.

RÉSUMÉ

Christian Gottlob Barth, prédicateur revivaliste du Wurtemberg, missionnaire et auteur d'ouvrages sur la spiritualité (1799–1862), est beaucoup moins connu que ses contemporains Blumhardt et Hofacker. Werner Raupp rassemble, dans la seconde moitié de sa thèse soutenue à Tubingue en 1996, une importante bibliographie des écrits de Barth. Ceux-ci ont été traduits en plusieurs langues européennes, ainsi qu'en des langues de plusieurs pays de mission du XIX^e siècle. La première partie de l'ouvrage consiste en une biographie critique de Barth, qui va de 1799 à 1824, la période de son premier ministère qui fit de lui le prédécesseur de Blumhardt à Mottlingen. De l'importante correspondance échangée par Barth avec des revivalistes et des missionnaires à travers le monde, il reste 3200 lettres qui ont été écrites de sa main ou qui lui ont été adressées.

Werner Raupp legt mit dieser Tübinger Dissertation einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Erforschung des württembergischen Pietismus im 19. Jahrhundert vor. Raupps Untersuchung des Missionsförderers Christian Gottlob Barth (1799–1862) gliedert sich in fünf Teile: nach einer Einführung (1–6) zeichnet er das Barth-Bild in der bisherigen Literatur und Forschung nach (722). Barths geistige Heimat im württembergischen Pietismus (23–52) ist die Grundlage des Hauptteils über seine frühe Biographie bis 1824 (53–142). Eine Zusammenfassung und ein Ausblick (143–176) überblicken die Jahre 1824 bis 1862 und bündeln den Ertrag des Werkes, das mit einer umfangreichen Bibliographie der gedruckten und handschriftlichen Quellen sowie der Sekundärliteratur schließt (177–294). Der Umfang des Quellenmaterials begründete die Beschränkung von Raupps Darstellung auf die erste Lebenshälfte von C. G. Barth. Obwohl Raupp 3200 erhaltene Barth-Briefe nachweisen konnte, war ihm eine adäquate Bearbeitung der zweite Lebenshälfte Barths auch deshalb nicht möglich, weil ihm die 1010 Briefe Johann Christoph Blumhardts an Barth zwischen 1837 und 1862 nicht zugänglich waren (vgl. 4, Anm. 16), vermutlich weil eine kritische Edition geplant ist.

Raupps Überblick über die bisherigen Barth-Biographien und die Barth-Rezeption in der Geschichtsschreibung ergibt, daß eine adäquate und kritische Darstellung dieses in seiner Zeit bedeutenden Mannes aus den Originalquellen bisher fehlt. Nicht nur als Volksschriftsteller, sondern auch als früher

Sammler von naturkundlichen und ethnischen Gegenständen aus den Missionsländern, die heute im Basler Museum der Kulturen aufbewahrt werden, besitzt Barth einen besonderen Rang in seiner Zeit. C. G. Barth war in der Jugend von Jung-Stilling geprägt (80); theologisch kommt er besonders von F. C. Oetinger her. Sein theologisches Erbe verband er mit Impulsen aus der württembergischen Missions- und Erweckungsbewegung des 19. Jahrhunderts. Aus Württemberg kamen maßgebliche Impulse für die Basler Missionsgesellschaft; aber auch die anderen, schon länger bestehenden, deutschen und englischen Missionswerke wurden gebührend gefördert (43–50).

C. G. Barth stammt aus einer pietistischen Handerwerkerfamilie der Schwabenmetropole Stuttgart, die um 1800 etwa 20000 Einwohner hatte (68). Im Vergleich mit dieser Großstadt muß man Tübingen, wo er von 1817 bis 1821 studierte, mit damals 7000 Einwohnern, als kleines Städtchen charakterisieren (89). Während seines Studiums an der Universität nahm Barth als Mitglied des Stifts auch an dem pietistischen Theologiestudentenkreis 'Pia' und am Tübinger Missionshilfsverein teil, predigte erstmals und schrieb kleinere Schriften zur Verteidigung der 1819 gegründeten Korntaler Brüdergemeine (115–125); diese waren nicht seine ersten Veröffentlichungen, denn er war schon als Schüler publizistisch aktiv geworden (83–89).

Raupp widmet den dritten Abschnitt seiner Barth-Biographie dessen Vikariatszeit in den Jahren 1821 bis 1824. Barths feurige Predigten fanden in seinem kurzen Vikariat in verschiedenen kleinen Ortschaften Württembergs bald großen Zulauf; es wird von bis zu 2000 Besuchern und von einer kleinen Erweckung berichtet (129–132). Eine Bildungsreise zu Freunden im Umkreis der Lokalvereine der Christentumsgesellschaft und anderen Erweckten durch Norddeutschland, Holland, Frankreich und die Schweiz im Jahr 1824 rundet Barths erste Lebenshälfte ab. Im Dezember desselben Jahres tritt er seine erste Pfarrstelle in Möttlingen an (141). Barths Zeit im Möttlinger Pfarramt (1824–1838) ist von vielfältigem Engagement in Reichs-Gottes-Projekten geprägt, das ihn schließlich dazu bewegte, das Pfarramt aufzugeben, um ausschließlich für sein Missionsanliegen publizistisch und (nebenamtlich) verkündigend tätig zu sein (1838–1862). Abschließend gibt Raupp auf zwanzig Seiten (155–174) einen Überblick über Barths Theologie, die von der 'ganzen Bibel' ausgehend das Reich Gottes als Zielpunkt hat, aber von einem spekulativen Biblizismus und aufklärerischem Gedankengut beeinflußt ist.

Man kann an Raupps Darstellung ablesen, daß er Sympathien für seinen imposanten 'Kämpfer und Stürmer' (175) hat. Er beurteilt ihn überwiegend positiv, während er dessen pietistisch-erweckliches Milieu hin und wieder mit negativen Werturteilen erstaunlich scharf abqualifiziert. Dennoch ist es sehr verdienstvoll, den ersten Teil des Lebenswerkes dieser herausragenden Gestalt der Erweckungsbewegung neu vor Augen gestellt zu bekommen. Eine ausführliche Darstellung der zweiten Lebenshälfte von C. G. Barth ist dringend erforderlich.

Jochen Eber
Basel/Bettingen, Schweiz

EuroJTh (1999) **8:2**, 179–181 0960–2720

Evangelisation als Aufgabe der Kirche: Theologische Grundlegung kirchlicher Evangelisation

Risto Ahonen

Forschungen zur Praktischen Theologie 15. Übs. Klaus-Jürgen Trabant. Bern; Frankfurt am Main etc.: Lang, 1996 174 pp., Pb., DM 49,-

SUMMARY

This study, originally written in Finland, concerns evangelism in the context of the Protestant-Lutheran church. The first part of the work gives an outline of the most recent evangelistic enterprises in relation to the most important evangelical, Catholic and ecumenical conferences. The reviewer criticizes the main theological section of the book for not sufficiently establishing biblical foundations. In the author's view, the diaconate takes a central role in the proces of church evangelism. Evangelism should be integrated into the regular worship services.

RÉSUMÉ

Cette étude, rédigée à l'origine en Finlande, porte sur l'évangélisation dans le contexte de l'Église Protestante Luthérienne. La première partie de l'ouvrage expose à grands traits les efforts d'évangélisation les plus récents dans le cadre des conférences évangéliques, catholiques et œcuméniques les plus importantes. On peut reprocher à la principale section théologique du livre de ne pas donner une

présentation suffisante des fondements bibliques. Aux yeux de l'auteur, le diaconat joue un rôle central dans la tâche de l'Église qu'est l'évangélisation. L'évangélisation devrait faire partie intégrante des cultes réguliers.

Unmittelbarer Anlaß für die vorliegende Arbeit war die Bitte der Synode der finnischen evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche, eine Untersuchung über die Evangelisationsarbeit zu verfassen.

Ahonen verfolgt zunächst in einem historischen Abriß (bis S. 68) die Diskussion von ca. 1895 bis ca. 1991 über die Begriffe Evangelisation und Mission, und zwar nicht anhand von Berichten über die praktische Durchführung von Evangelisationen, sondern anhand der großen Konferenzen, die den ökumenischen, evangelikalen und katholischen Auffassungen Ausdruck gaben.

Man kann diese Diskussion auch an anderen Stellen nachlesen; von bleibendem Interesse schienen dem Rezensenten jedoch folgende Punkte:

1. Wenn eine Arbeitsgruppe der Synode der berlinbrandenburgischen ev.-luth. Kirche sagt, nichts sei so normal wie die Mission (idea-spektrum 19/1998, 8), so ist dies eine Erkenntnis, die nach Ahonen weithin erst nach 1945 gewachsen ist (S. 125).

2. Die Lausanner Bewegung spielte bei der Klärung der Frage nach der Kontexualität eine Vorreiterrolle (Ahonen nach David J. Bosch). Ihre Konferenz in Willowbank (Bermuda) 1978 empfahl als Modell für Inkulturation das von E. Nida und Ch. Kraft entwickelte Prinzip der 'dynamischen Entsprechung', bei dem gegenüber einer wortwörtlichen sprachlichen Entsprechung als wichtiger angesehen wird, daß der Leser der Bibel die Bedeutung und den Inhalt eines Textes so versteht, wie er ursprünglich gemeint war (S. 54f.).

3. Nach Ahonen erinnert die innerkatholische Diskussion auffallend an das ökumenische Gespräch, Lausanne eingeschlossen: a) Mission ist die wesentliche Aufgabe der Kirche; b) Verkündigung und gesellschaftliche Verantwortung der Kirche sind grundsätzlich verflochten; c) Ziel der Mission ist eine authentische Begegnung von Evangelium und Kultur im Dialog.

Zu fragen ist aber, wie weit der Begriff 'Dialog' für die Lausanner Bewegung angemessen ist. Ahonen selbst relativiert die Gemeinsamkeiten in anderer Hinsicht: 'Es ist jedoch auch zu beobachten, daß das an sich positive Gespräch über Kontextualität Faktoren enthält, die, gewönnen sie an Gewicht, den bereits erreichten theologischen Konsens böse auseinanderreißen könnten. Etwa, wenn der religiöse Relativismus in Kreisen der Kirchen stärker als bisher Fuß fassen würde. Zeichen für eine solche "Entwicklung" lassen sich in überraschender Vielzahl ausmachen' (68).

4. Der wesentliche Unterschied zwischen der Lausanner im Vergleich zur ökumenischen Bewegung liegt, wie Ahonen richtig konstatiert, im Bibelverständnis. Gerade dieser Punkt wäre aber mehr als einen Absatz wert gewesen (55).

Analog stellt sich dem Rezensenten auch das Problem der folgenden Teile (vgl. die Gesamtanlage als theologiegeschichtlichen Aufriß), in denen Ahonen sein Verständnis von Evangelisation als Aufgabe der Kirche entfaltet. Der Schriftbezug ist zu schwach, zum Teil fehlt er (z.B. Predigten der Apostelgeschichte). Ahonen geht zwar von durchaus richtigen theologischen Gedanken aus, aber eben von Gedanken und Diskussionsbeiträgen, statt von der Schrift als Quelle und Werkzeug unserer Urteile. Diese allgemeine Schwäche findet ihren speziellen Ausdruck in einzelnen exegetischen Fehlern, etwa wenn in Anspielung auf 2. Kor 3 vom 'toten Buchstaben' gesprochen wird (94) oder in dem Satz, die Annahme des Evangeliums werde 'dadurch erschwert, daß die Entstehung des Glaubens nicht in der Macht des Menschen liegt' (104). Läge sie in der Macht des Menschen, würde niemand glauben—Ahonen hätte das als bewußt lutherischer Theologe genau umgekehrt formulieren müssen.

In seinem Verständnis von Evangelisation nimmt die Diakonie eine zentrale Stellung ein. Die Diakonie wird in die Nähe der notae ecclesiae gerückt (106). Evangelisation darf nicht bloßes Reden sein (109. 147) und nicht nur den einzelnen ansprechen (112). Sie ist wegen ihres Zeugnischarakters von allgemeiner Philanthropie deutlich zu unterscheiden (122f.). 'Aber wie Lesslie Newbigin festgestellt hat, ist es absurd, Wort und Werk als Gegensätze oder Konkurrenten gegeneinander zu stellen, weil weder Predigt noch Dienst allein eine neue Wirklichkeit schaffen, sondern der Heilige Geist . . . Die Mission des Dreieinigen Gottes, die Missio Dei, setzt die Arbeitsschwerpunkte nach Situation und Bedarf' (123). 'Christus ist das Subjekt des Aufbaus der Gemeinde' (140). Demgegenüber läßt ein 'handlungsorientierter Blickwinkel . . . außer acht, was Erneuerung der Gemeinde im

Innersten bedeutet. Jede Erneuerung hängt letztlich am Wort, denn Quelle der Kraft und des Lebens der Gemeinde ist Gottes Wort' (143). Unter 'Gottes Wort' wird nicht nur 'Evangelium' verstanden, sondern auch die Rolle der Gesetzespredigt für die Evangelisation reflektiert (79ff.).

Daraus ergeben sich einige praktische Grundsätze, die für die Evangelisation immer entscheidend seien: Die Gemeinde kommt unter Wort und Sakrament zusammen. 'Das Herz der Kirche schlägt in der Hauptsache beim Wort und Sakrament. Die wesentlichsten Funktionen der Kirche sind auf das Gottesdienstleben konzentriert' (154). Die besten Ergebnisse können in der Evangelisation dann erzielt werden, wenn sie in die regelmäßige Aktivität einer Gemeinde eingebunden ist (142). Die Verkündigung eines mit der Gnadengabe des Evangelisten ausgestatteten Menschen sollte die Gemeindearbeit immer unterstützen (138f.). 'Evangelisation zielt auf die Weckung des Glaubens und die Öffnung für die Gemeinschaft in der Gemeinde (157). In ihr hat die mündliche Verkündigung und das fröhliche Bekenntnis (137) eine zentrale Stellung, weil Christus im verkündigten Wort gegenwärtig ist (die "missionarische Intention", Unterscheidung nach L. Newbigin und H.-W. Gensichen)', während 'Mission' noch umfassender zu verstehen ist als die ganze Bewegungsrichtung der Kirche, d.h. alles, was das Wort Gottes bewirkt ('missionarische Dimension'; 129f. 155). Evangelisation ist der zentrale Inhalt der Mission (131–133).

Für volkskirchliche Gemeinden wären diese guten Grundsätze sehr fruchtbar. (Demgegenüber zweitrangig sind die vielen Fehler, die inkonsequente Zitierweise und fehlende Querverweise bei Wiederholungen.) Der Band schließt mit einem ausführlichen Quellen- und Literaturverzeichnis sowie einem Personenregister.

Stefan Felber
Lichteneiche, Deutschland

EuroJTh (1999) **8:2**, 181–182 0960–2720

Der einfältige Glaube: Luthers Entwicklung von 1521 bis 1525.
Walter Bodenstein
Theologische Beiträge und Forschungen, 7. Tübingen: Katzmann, 1998. 404 pp., Pb., DM 58,- ISBN 3-7805-0457-X

SUMMARY
Bodenstein's study is concerned with Luther's transformation to renewer of an entire church in the years 1521–1525. He shows how Luther increasingly rejected scholastic theology and developed his own theology, in order to make possible the simple faith of the simple people. Bodenstein documents this thoroughly especially bymeans of the sermons of the young Luther in these years. The doctrine of purgatory, and thus the basis of the Catholic eschatology of the time, was also reformulated. In this way the protestant faith could become a concrete reality for the Christian. The monograph also engages with existing interpretations of Luther, old and new, Lutheran and Reformed. Because of its central theme, however, it is to be commended to a wide audience.

RÉSUMÉ
L'auteur analyse comment Luther s'est transformé en rénovateur de toute une église dans les années 1521 à 1525. Il montre comment Luther a rejeté de plus en plus la théologie scolastique pour élaborer sa propre théologie, afin de faire toute sa place à la foi simple des gens simples. Bodenstein étaye soigneusement sa présentation, essentiellement par des sermons du jeune Luther pendant ces années. La doctrine du purgatoire, qui faisait la base de l'eschatologie catholique de l'époque, fut aussi reformulée. De cette façon, la foi protestante pouvait devenir une réalité concrète pour le chrétien. La monographie entre également en dialogue avec différentes interprétations de l'enseignement de Luther, anciennes et nouvelles, luthériennes et réformées. Son thème central la recommande à un large public.

Walter Bodenstein hat mit dieser Untersuchung zu Luthers Theologie einen auch für Pfarrer äußerst interessanten Beitrag zur Lutherforschung vorgelegt. Es scheint sich bei der Monographie, über deren Entstehen man nichts weiteres erfährt, um ein Alterswerk des Verfassers zu halten, weil es auf Anregung des schon 1945 pensionierten und 1972 verstorbenen Lutherkenners Emanuel Hirsch entstanden ist (17). Bodenstein will die wissenschaftliche Arbeit von Hirsch und Karl Holl fortführen (ebd., vgl. 80–90).

Bodenstein will mit seinem Forschungsbeitrag eine Antwort auf die Frage geben, wie Luther in den Jahren 1521 bis 1525 zum Reformator des Christentums wurde. Er will

aufzeigen, wie Luther zu einem neuen Gesamtverständnis des Christentums durchbrach. Durch das Evangelium sollen die Menschen gewonnen werden, der Glaube muß dem Volk vermittelt werden können (9). Ein neues Laienchristentum, ein neuer Frömmigkeitstyp und eine neue Kirche müssen aufgrund der veränderten theologischen Ausgangslage entstehen (9–10). Dazu war es nötig, dem einfachen Menschen der damaligen Zeit Theologie zugänglich und verständlich zu machen. Ihr Adressatenkreis mußte erweitert werden.

Im ersten Teil seiner Untersuchung weist Bodenstein nach, wie Luther seine Theologie vereinfachte und einen 'einfältigen Glauben' lehrte (18–52). Die Lehre von der Rechtfertigung benötigte eine schlichte Form, damit Glaube entstehen konnte. Auf diese Art und Weise tat er, der Wittenberger Professor, eine äußerst praktische und seelsorgerlich relevante pastorale und volkspädagogische Arbeit. Luthers gegenüber der Scholastik vereinfachter Glaubensbegriff wird im Vergleich mit drei Haupttheologen des Mittelalters (Petrus Lombardus, Thomas von Aquin und Occam) herausgestellt. Luther ist der 'revolutionären Überzeugung', daß 'die scholastische Theologie durch eine *biblische Theologie* ersetzt werden muß' (40). Aus dieser soll ein neues, auf die Bibel begründetes Laienchristentum entstehen (52).

An Luthers früher Predigtsammlung, der Kirchenpostille, weist der Verfasser nach, wie der Reformator den Rechtfertigungsglauben durch die Predigt unters Volk streuen wollte (2. Teil, 53–168). Luther begann diesen Predigtband auf der Wartburg und hat ihn 1522 in Druck gegeben. Der Glaube als persönliche Erfahrung tritt an die Stelle der bisherigen kirchlichen Rechtsgemeinschaft mit ihrem gottesdienstlichen Sakramentalismus und ihrer sichtbaren Hierarchie (90–97). Diese Erfahrung zeigt sich auch in Luthers Predigten, wenn er den Menschen unter dem Anspruch von Gesetz und Evangelium schildert. Aus Luthers Predigtweise zieht der Verfasser durchaus auch kritische Folgerungen für die gegenwärte kirchliche Situation: 'Denn diese predigt die Werkgerechtigkeit mit Eifer und Leidenschaft' (143, vgl. 339).

Weiter stellt Bodenstein in zwei Teilen dar, wie Luther durch Gottesdienst und Predigt in den Jahren 1522 bis 1524 den Alltag und das Berufsverständnis der entstehenden Kirche vom Evangelium her prägte (169–297). Dabei werden auch die Invokavitpredigten und ihre Volkspädagogik analysiert (178184). Auf weitere Einzelheiten dieses umfangreichen Teils kann an dieser Stelle aus Platzgründen nicht eingegangen werden.

Auch in der Eschatologie wird Luthers Wende durch seine Kritik an der überkommenen Fegfeuerlehre deutlich (5. Teil, 298–339). Das Fegfeuer wird in Luthers Frühzeit als die Erfahrung des angefochtenen Gewissens gedeutet, 1530 wird es von der Heiligen Schrift her völlig abgelehnt (330). Bodensteins Buch schließt mit umfangreichen Anmerkungen (340–396), in denen er die Diskussion mit der wissenschaftlichen Lutherforschung aufnimmt.

Es ist das Verdienst des Verfassers, altbekannte Quellen im Licht seiner Fragestellung neu gelesen und damit eine bisher unterbeleuchtete Seite der Biographie des Reformators erhellt zu haben. Er hat Luthers Lebensgeschichte nicht von den Ergebnissen her gelesen, sondern von vorne, in ihrer genetischen Entwicklung. Damit hat er einen bedeutenden Beitrag zur Erforschung des jungen Luther geleistet, besonders zu dessen Homiletik, auch wenn Bodensteins Auseinandersetzung mit G. Ebeling, Karl Barth, Emil Brunner und anderen einige Leser zum Widerspruch reizen wird. Alle lateinischen Zitate sind in der Untersuchung übersetzt. So kann auch ein Laie, dem Luthers theologische Entwicklung ja galt, das Buch mit Gewinn lesen. Die Monographie sollte nicht nur in deutschen und in nordischen lutherischen Gelehrtenkreisen gelesen werden!

Jochen Eber
Basel/Bettingen, Schweiz

EuroJTh (1999) **8:2**, 182–184 0960–2720

Auferstehungsmorgen: Heinrich A. Chr. Hävernick; Erweckung zwischen Reformation, Reaktion und Revolution
Karsten Ernst
TVG Monographien und Studienbücher 420. Gießen: Brunnen, 1997, XII, 487 S., DM 59.-, Pb. ISBN 3-7655-9420-2

SUMMARY
This Tübingen dissertation portrays the life and work of the Old Testament scholar Heinrich A. C. Hävernick (1810–1845). Hävernick taught at the universities in Geneva, Rostock

and Königsberg. He was influenced by Friedrich A. G. Tholuck and in theology he followed a Lutheran-revivalist line, represented also by C. F. Keil, wjo was better known because of his Old Testament commentaries. Ernst particularly examines the milieu in which the theologian Hävernick lived and worked. The study gives considerable attention to the revivalist movement of the nineteenth century in various regions of Europe.

RÉSUMÉ

Cette thèse, soutenue à Tubingue, présente la vie et l'œuvre de Heinrich A. C. Hävernick, qui fut un spécialiste de l'Ancien Testament (1810–1845). Hävernick a enseigné aux universités de Genève, de Rostock et de Königsberg. Il fut influencé par Friedrich A. G. Tholuck et sa théologie suivit la ligne revivaliste luthérienne, représentée aussi par C. F. Keil, essentiellement connu pour ses commentaires sur l'Ancien Testament. Ernst étudie spécialement le milieu dans lequel le théologien Hävernick a vécu et travaillé. Il porte beaucoup d'attention au mouvement revivaliste du XIX^e siècle en différentes régions d'Europe.

Nach einem kurzen Vorwort (S. IX-XII) und einer 'Historischen Einführung' (S. 1–65), in der es besonders um 'Die Erforschung der Erweckungsbewegung des 19. Jahrhunderts' und 'Die angelsächsische Idee einer Erweckung' geht, behandelt Karsten Ernst, 'Pastor einer Freikirche in Stuttgart', im Hauptteil (S. 66–379) Leben und Umfeld des Alttestamentlers Heinrich Andreas Christoph Hävernick (1810–1845) anhand seiner lebensgeschichtlichen Stationen (Kindheit und Jugend, Studium in Halle und Berlin, Lehrer in Genf, Rostock und Königsberg). Es folgen ein Anhang (S. 380–391) sowie ein Literaturverzeichnis (S. 392–475, samt Index zum Literaturverzeichnis) und ein 'Personen-, Orts- und Sachregister' (S. 475–487).

Der Haupttitel dieser 1995 in Tübingen eingereichten Dissertation ist nach einem bei August Gottreu Tholuck wiedergegebenen Zitat Ernst von Kottwitz' gewählt (S. 83), steht jedoch mit der 'Hauptperson' des Buches, Hävernick, in keinem direkten Zusammenhang. Dies spiegelt leider den Grundtenor des ganzen Werkes wieder: Es geht kaum um die Person Hävernicks und ihre eigentlichen Leistungen, sondern um verschiedenste, v.a. (kirchen-) politische Begebenheiten, die sich in seinem Umfeld ereigneten und mit ihm meist nur in mehr oder weniger direkter Beziehung stehen. Die 'Historische Einführung' geht zwar kenntnisreich, detailliert und mit einem fundierten Urteil den Begriffen 'Erweckung' und 'Erweckungsbewegung(en)' nach, doch mit einem deutlichen Schwerpunkt auf dem angelsächsischen Raum. Zusammenhänge zur vielgestaltigen Erweckungsbewegung in Deutschland werden kaum, zu Hävernick so gut wie überhaupt nicht erkennbar, so daß dann auch die doch recht ausführliche Darstellung der 'Erweckungsbewegung in Berlin' (S. 71–84) und in Halle (S. 8495) eine Darstellung ihres historischen Ursprungs sowie nähere Zusammenhänge mit Hävernick vermissen läßt. Die kenntnisreiche und äußerst umfangreiche Darstellung des hallischen Streits und seiner Bedeutung (S. 96–166), in dem Hävernick nur eine marginale Rolle spielte (er erscheint in diesem Zusammenhang nur auf etwa zehn Seiten), bietet dafür dann genaue Ausführungen über die Erweckungsbewegung (v.a. im Raum Berlin und Halle), über die Bezeichnungen für ihre Anhänger, ihre wesentlichen Lehren und Richtungen (samt ihrem Verhältnis zu den Bekenntnisschriften) sowie ihre differenzierte Auseinandersetzung mit dem Rationalismus. Es folgen einige weitere interessante Abschnitte, die zwar in Beziehung zu Hävernick stehen, aber doch zu breit angelegt sind und für das Leben und Wirken Hävernicks selbst nur wenig Bedeutung haben bzw. erkennen lassen; so z.B. zu 'Hävernicks Lehrer Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenberg' (S. 168–195, Hävernick erscheint nur zweimal am Rande); 'Der Réveil in Genf' (S. 197–207), 'Die Gründung der Société Évangélique' (S. 207–212) und 'Die Gründung der École de théologie' (S. 212–217); 'Die geistige und politische Lage in Preußen um das Jahr 1840' (S. 237–240), 'Friedrich Wilhelm IV'. (S. 240–247) und 'Die Berufung Eichhorns zum Kultusminister' (S. 247–251). Erst ab 'Hävernicks Berufung nach Königsberg' läßt sich durchgehend ein Zusammenhang mit Hävernick erkennen, doch wird m.E. auch hier dem 'Boykott der Studenten' (S. 265–303) zu viel Umfang eingeräumt, obwohl Hävernick dabei doch fast nur eine passive Rolle spielte. Abgesehen von seiner Rolle in der 'Reform der theologischen Fakultät' (S. 314–324) in Königsberg (Ostpreußen) werden kaum direkte Aktivitäten Hävernicks oder unmittelbar mit ihm in Zusammenhang stehende Begebenheiten aufgezeigt: Man vermißt eine klare Darstellung der

theologischen (Grund-) Position(en) Hävernicks selbst (insbesondere sein Verhältnis zu theologischen Anliegen der Erweckungsbewegung und seine Auslegung des Alten Testaments), möglichst anhand seiner eigenen (zahlreichen) Werke (siehe S. 402–407), oder zumindest eine nähere Vorstellung seiner Schriften. Eine relativ ausführliche Darstellung der theologischen Anschauungen Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenbergs und der Berliner Erweckungsbewegung (S. 76, 78–84 und 168–195) und die Aussage 'Hävernick identifizierte sich völlig mit Hengstenbergs kirchlichen und exegetischen Grundanschauungen' (S. 168) wiegt dieses Desiderat m.E. nicht auf. Lediglich auf S. 329f. geht Ernst knapp auf Hävernicks unterschiedliche Sicht über die 'Ausbreitung des Evangeliums' sowie auf Grundzüge von Hävernicks Eschatologie anhand von Hes 33–48 und Apk 20–22 ein. Auch wünschte man sich nähere Informationen zu seiner geistigen bzw. geistlichen Prägung (z.B. im Studium) und zur persönlichen Biographie Hävernicks, seiner Familie und seinen Nachkommen—es erscheinen nicht einmal die Namen seiner beiden Kinder (vgl. S. 262f. und 377–379). Auch fehlt leider eine das Wesentliche hervorhebende und die Bedeutung der Person Hävernicks würdigende (abschließende) Zusammenfassung; das Register ist äußerst defizitär, eine Aufnahme der im Buch erwähnten Personen, die ja gerade für die wissenschaftliche Arbeit mit diesem Buch interessant ist, erfolgt nur in äußerster—und m.E. recht willkürlicher Auswahl. Für eine Buchveröffentlichung finden sich in diesem Werk doch noch erstaunlich viele Tipp- und Rechtsschreibfehler sowie 'unglückliche Formulierungen' (vgl. z.B. S. 45 ['. . . des Vereinigten Königreichs und Irlands'] und S. 164 ['Socianismus' statt richtig 'Sozinianismus']),

Daß es in dieser Arbeit v.a. um das Umfeld von Hävernick und um Geschehnisse in seiner Umgebung geht, macht auch ein Zahlenbeispiel deutlich: Von den 383 Seiten der eigentlichen Arbeit (Vorwort, Historische Einführung, Hauptteil) wird auf etwa 175 Seiten Hävernick erwähnt, und auch hier häufig nur ganz knapp in den Anmerkungen oder in marginalem Zusammenhang. Wenn es deshalb im Klappentext heißt, Hävernicks 'tragischer Lebensweg wird [. . .] nicht nur nachgezeichnet, sondern auch in Beziehung gesetzt zu den zahlreichen theologischen, kirchenpolitischen und politischen Entwicklungen seiner Zeit', so sind m.E. nur die 'Umrisse' Hävernicks 'nachgezeichnet' und diese 'Beziehung(en)' leider oft nur 'dünn', insbesondere die zu den 'theologischen [. . .] Entwicklungen'.

Äußerst positiv—und damit ist das besprochene Werk (insbesondere bei einer Beschäftigung mit der Erweckungsbewegung des 19. Jahrhunderts) insgesamt recht lesenswert—sind die gut verständlichen zahlreichen o.g. Einzelausführungen bzw. thematischen Darstellungen, die ein gründliches Quellenstudium, tiefgehende Kenntnisse über die Erweckungsbewegung (v.a. im angelsächsischen Raum) und eine gute und kritische Durchdringung der Materie erkennen lassen; übersichtliche graphische Darstellungen (Tabellen) bieten dabei gute Verstehenshilfen. Insofern stößt man immer wieder auf Informationen, die neue Perspektiven in der Beurteilung der Erweckungsbewegung und ihres Umfeldes aufzeigen.

Wolfgang Layh
Bamberg, Deutschland

EuroJTh (1999) **8:2**, 184–186 0960–2720

Challenges to New Testament Theology

Peter Balla

Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997, 279 pp.,
Pb. ISBN 3-16-146752-3

SUMMARY

Balla's main concern is neither exegetical nor theological. he asks rather if it is possible and legitimate to construct a New Testament Theology. After an introductory chapter on the relationship between historical and theological interpretation, he examines the main questions that need to be resolved in order to undertake such a work, namely the diversity of the writings about the origins of Christianity, the problem of the canon and the theological diversity in the New Testament. His final and most important chapter examines the approaches to the subject taken by Childs, Morgan, Hübner and Stuhlmacher. Balla concludes that it is both possible and legitimate to work towards a theology of the New Testament. His contribution is certainly necessary as well as theologically encouraging, and it tries to be honest. The book's main weaknesses are the neglect of several important academic works on the subject and the superficiality of some sections.

RÉSUMÉ

Le principal souci de Balla n'est ni exégétique, ni théologique. Il se demande plutôt s'il est possible et légitime de construire une théologie du Nouveau Testament. Après un chapitre d'introduction sur la relation entre l'interprétation historique et l'interprétation théologique, il examine les principales questions à résoudre en vue d'un tel travail: la diversité des écrits du début du christianisme, le problème du canon et la présence d'une diversité théologique dans le Nouveau Testament. Son chapitre final, le plus important, examine les approches réservées au sujet par Childs, Morgan, Hübner et Stuhlmacher. Balla conclut qu'il est à la fois possible et légitime de travailler à une théologie du Nouveau Testament. Sa contribution est bien nécessaire, théologiquement encourageante et elle s'efforce d'être honnête. La méconnaissance de plusieurs contributions académiques importantes et la superficialité de certaines parties constituent les faiblesses majeures de cet ouvrage.

Bei dieser Monographie geht es um Grundsatzfragen und nicht primär um exegetisches oder theologisches Detail. Das ist insofern eine Stärke, als Ballas Argumentation jederzeit offenliegt, also nicht im Urwald theologischer Kleinarbeit untergeht. Es ist aber auch eine Schwäche und zwar weil manchmal der Eindruck entsteht, daß gewisse Fragestellungen nur relativ oberflächlich behandelt werden. Worum geht es dem Verfasser?

Zunächst stellt Balla die Frage nach dem Verhältnis zwischen historischer und theologischer Interpretation des Neuen Testaments. Ist es überhaupt möglich, das Neue Testament historisch zu begreifen? Inwieweit kann man überhaupt davon ausgehen, Gott wirke in der Geschichte? Auf beide Fragen antwortet Balla zu Recht affirmativ. Es sei nicht nur ein Kennzeichen, sondern Hauptaufgabe der neutestamentlichen Theologie, historisch deskriptiv, also nicht apologetisch, zu arbeiten. Dabei fällt aber auf, daß er sich stark auf die ältere Forschung beschränkt. Man sucht beispielsweise vergeblich nach Interaktion mit den entsprechenden Monographien Streckers, oder auch (von englischer Seite) Cairds. Stattdessen wird man mit der Argumentation Gablers, Strauss', Baurs, Wredes, Overbecks, Troeltsch' etc. vertraut gemacht. Das ist durchaus aufschlußreich, mutet aber etwas antiquiert an, zumal man selbst in den Fußnoten nicht annähernd 'up-to-date' gebracht wird. Möglicherweise war das auch gar nicht Teil von Ballas Vorhaben. Aber dann stellt sich die Frage, ob der weiträumige Buchtitel nicht falsche Erwartungen weckt.

Sodann liegt dem Verfasser daran, die Legitimität des Vorhabens im Blick auf die Kanonfrage zu demonstrieren. Hier setzt sich Balla kritisch mit Koester auseinander, aber auch mit Bauers These, im Frühchristentum könne man schwerlich zwischen orthodoxem und heterodoxem unterscheiden. Dem stellt Balla gegenüber, daß es sehr wohl Gründe gäbe, im Frühchristentum eine theologische Einheit, sowie ein Drängen zum Kanon hin zu konstatieren. Im übrigen sei der Kanon eine geschichtliche Tatsache, der als solcher Rechnung getragen werden sollte. Der Kanon sei nicht nur das Produkt einer relativ späten kirchlichen Entscheidung, sondern ist das Resultat eines 'Zusammendenkens', das als historischer Prozess schon relativ früh anzusetzen sei und möglicherweise in Analogie zur zeitgleichen Kanonisierung einiger alttestamentlicher Bücher geschah. Auch sei der Kanon nicht nur als Antwort auf Häresien zu begreifen, vielmehr hätten häretische Tendenzen sein Zustandekommen lediglich beschleunigt.

In einem weiteren Hauptteil thematisiert Balla die vielerorts postulierte Inkompatibilität neutestamentlicher Theologien. Man denke z. B. an Paulus und Jakobus im Blick auf das Gesetz, Jesus und Paulus bezüglich der Gemeinde, das Johannesevangelium und die Offenbarung in Bezug auf Eschatologie etc. Hier finden sich viele gute Denkanstöße, auch wenn man gelegentlich eine zu starke Vereinfachung der Thematik konstatieren muß. Da hilft es auch wenig, wenn der Verfasser darauf hinweist, daß eine eingehendere Untersuchung den Rahmen der Studie sprengen würde. Das eine oder andere Mal geht er zu Recht ins Detail (z. B. bei der Frage nach dem Ende des Gesetzes in Christus—welche er verneint—die sich in Bezug auf Eph. 2.15 und Röm. 10.4 stellt). Zwar wählt Balla in beiden Fällen eine m. E. exegetisch eher unwahrscheinliche Lösung, aber seine Diskussion zeigt mit Erfolg, daß die Frage nach den Herausforderungen einer neutestamentlichen Theologie um eine Läuterung im exegetischen Feuer nicht herumkommt.

Schließlich wendet sich die Studie noch der Problematik zu, die Aufgabe der neutestamentlichen Theologie angemessen zu bestimmen. Balla betont wiederholt, das frühe Christentum habe schon vor der kanonischen

Zusammenstellung der neutestamentlichen Schriften einen einheitlichen theologischen Kern gehabt, und es gelte, diesen näher zu beschreiben. In der Beschreibung selbst sieht Balla nicht seine Aufgabe. Stattdessen wendet er sich kurz einigen Einzelfragen zu (z.B. der Rolle des Glaubens oder auch der Frage des legitimen Standortes der neutestamentlichen Theologie: In der Kirche? Außerhalb?). Es folgt eine Diskussion von vier Entwürfen, nämlich derer Childs, Morgans, Hübners und Stuhlmachers. Ballas Fazit: Grundsätzlich ist das Unterfangen, eine neutestamentliche Theologie zu verfassen, legitim, auch wenn viele Detailfragen noch offen sind (z.B. ob eine Engführung auf Jesus, Paulus und Johannes gerechtfertigt sei, oder auch ob man zwischen den Autoritätsansprüchen der Stimme Jesu und der redaktionellen Bearbeitung der Evangelisten unterscheiden müsse).

Ballas Studie ist interessant, wichtig und übersichtlich. Manchmal fragt sich der Leser, wieso einige äußerst wichtige Beiträge zu Teilaspekten unberücksichtigt bleiben (Beckwith bez. der Kanonfrage; Riesner im Blick auf Jesusüberlieferungen; Dodd und Koch in Bezug auf die Benutzung des AT im NT, um nur einige wenige zu nennen). Außerdem ist festzuhalten, daß die Diskussion zu oft aus Platzmangel auf relativ oberflächlichem Niveau beendet wird und weiterführende Fußnoten nur sehr spärlich vorhanden sind. Theologisch ist diese Studie durchaus willkommen. Sie zeichnet sich auch durch Fairneß Andersdenkenden gegenüber aus. Aufgrund der erwähnten Mängel kann sie aber nicht als Meilenstein gesehen werden, sondern eher als gut brauchbare Einführung in die Problematik.

Thorsten Moritz
Cheltenham, England

EuroJTh (1999) **8:2**, 186–188 0960–2720

Die Christologie der Pastoralbriefe
Hanna Stettler
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998, xiii + 397 pp., pb, ISBN 3-16147056-7

RÉSUMÉ
Ce livre contient une exégèse détaillée de tous les passages ayant trait à la christologie dans les épîtres pastorales, ainsi qu'une synthèse des résultats obtenus. L'auteur démontre que le Pasteur était sous l'influence des épîtres de Paul, des traditions sur le Fils de l'homme et de la pensée johannique. Sa christologie se développe selon les lignes de la préexistence et de l'incarnation et s'exprime dans le langage de l'épiphanie. Sa pensée a un arrière-plan profondément hellénistique juif et chrétien, et se développe en opposition au docétisme gnostique. La thèse est remarquable par son apport sur de nombreux points d'exégèse, ainsi que par sa large perspective. Elle appelle une étude plus approfondie sur la relation littéraire des Pastorales avec les Épîtres de Paul, et sur la question de la nature de l'opposition.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Das vorliegende Buch bietet eine ausführliche Exegese aller für die Christologie relevanten Passagen der Pastoralbriefe gefolgt von einer Synthese der hierbei gewonnenen Einsichten. Der Autor zeigt auf, daß der Verfasser der Pastoralbriefe Anleihen an die paulinischen Briefe, die Traditionen vom Menschensohn sowie das johanneische Denken macht. Seine Christologie baut auf den Konzepten von der Präexistenz und der Inkarnation auf und bedient sich der Sprache der Epiphanie. Das Denken des Verfassers ist durch und durch im hellenistischen Judentum bzw. Christentum beheimatet, und es richtet sich gegen einen doketischen Gnostizismus. Die Studie enthält ausgezeichnete exegetische Einzelbeobachtungen und ist auch hinsichtlich ihrer Gesamtperspektive hervorzuheben. Einige Aspekte, wie z.B. die Fragen der literarischen Beziehung der Pastoralbriefe zu den paulinischen Briefen sowie die des Wesens der Gegner, gegen die sie gerichtet sind, bedürfen jedoch weiterer Erörterung.

This is the third of the monographs on the christology of the Pastoral Epistles which have appeared in the past three years (A. Lau, *Manifest in Flesh: The Epiphany Christology of the Pastoral Epistles* Tübingen, 1996; K. Läger, *Die Christologie der Pastoralbriefe* [Münster, 1996]). One might wonder what more there was to be said, but here is a thesis with typical German thoroughness (they are sadly getting longer and longer, while in the UK ever tighter word-limits are encouraging students to a welcome succinctness and concentration on what is most significant!). Where Lau's work concentrated on the concept of epiphany and the use of tradition, and Läger emphasised the Pastor's virtual incorporation of Paul, his conversion and his preaching in the saving event itself, Stettler has undertaken a broader task. After brief history of recent research the thesis has two main sections in which she gives a

careful exegesis of all the relevant passages (with excellent summaries at each stage) and then attempts a synthesis of the exegetical material; this combination of approaches enables her to do justice to each text in its immediate context and then in the context of the Pastoral Epistles as a whole. The result is an outstanding contribution to the subject, notable alike for the fresh insights on individual passages and for the masterly grasp of the total picture.

Over against attempts to deny that the Pastor held a christology of pre-existence and incarnation Stettler argues that this is precisely what he taught, although he has expressed it using fresh forms of language. In response to attempts to show that the Pastor has hellenised Christian theology and drawn up his christology in terms of contrast with the worship of pagan deities, she shows that his thinking is thoroughly grounded in Hellenistic Judaism, and with this tool he is able to formulate his teaching so that it will get across to the Hellenistic world. The christology itself is shown to be thoroughly Pauline in its essential structure despite the differences in expression. Here Stettler argues that the Epistles display a considerable degree of dependence on the authentic Pauline Epistles, taking phraseology and teaching and re-expressing it to meet new situations. She argues that the opposition represents an early form of Gnosticism with a Docetic emphasis, and the Pastor responds to this with his emphasis on the manhood of Jesus Christ and the fleshly reality of his resurrection. But she also argues that the Pastor makes use of other christological traditions in the early church, and in particular she traces the use of Son of man traditions (linked to the concept of the suffering Servant) and also of some Johannine strands of expression. The Pastor has thus drawn much more widely on early Christian traditions than has previously been detected; yet he is not a eclectic collector of material, but rather he takes up traditions and moulds them to his own purpose. It emerges that the Pastor generally does not cite traditions, which might be separated by analysis from his own material, but rather is himself responsible for most of the material which has a traditional flavour, and this flavour is due to his own creative use of the traditions. The stature of the Pastor as a theologian is correspondingly enhanced by this analysis of his methods. Throughout the book there is constant interaction with the work of Lau, with which she is in broad agreement, but it is a pity that she was not able to interact similarly to any extent with the work of Läger and her emphasis on the place of Paul in the saving process.

I cannot praise this book too highly for the quality of its scholarship and the way in which it contributes to a sound understanding of the content of the Pastor's christology. I can only regret that it appeared too late for me to refer to its insights in my own forthcoming work on the Pastoral Epistles.

One or two points that may be singled out for discussion. First, the author has rightly raised the question of the relationship of the Pastor to the Pauline Epistles. Assuming, as she does, that the Epistles are by a disciple of Paul, this question is unavoidable. There is a case that the similarities between the Pauline Epistles and the Pastoral Epistles cannot be used to *prove* that the author of the latter was somebody other than Paul himself but knew his work, but if it be held to be probable that the author was not Paul, the question of his knowledge and use of the Pauline Epistles does arise, and echoes which individually may be insubstantial become more likely in the context of the total impression; there remains, of course, the alternative that the author was thoroughly immersed in Paul's own teaching through personal knowledge and contact, in which case the echoes may be based on a broader acquaintance with Paul's teaching than simply a literary acquaintance with the Epistles. This is a point for further discussion.

Second, the author makes out a judicious case that the opposition reflected in the Epistles is Docetic-Gnostic. There is also a good case that the opposition is rather a combination of a mistaken understanding of Paul's own teaching coupled with a strong Jewish-Christian element that majored on speculative exegesis of the Old Testament associated with ascetical practices; on this view it is not so obvious that there was a heretical or skewed understanding of the person of Jesus. Despite Stettler's attempts to 'mirror-read' the Epistles for evidence of a false understanding of Jesus, it is not clear to me that she has succeeded in defending the presence of Docetism in the church.

Third, the author is to be commended for her detailed discussion of numerous significant points. I mention her demonstration that the Pastor's use of 'in Christ' is fully in harmony with that of Paul (even if the phrase is not used in such a wide manner). There is also her insistence that the doctrine of justification is essentially that of Paul. The author does not know of W. D. Mounce's detailed thesis on

palingenesia (the fruits of which will doubtless be more widely available in his forthcoming Word Commentary), and it would reinforce her arguments against the derivation of this concept from the Mystery Religions. But she appears to have read pretty well everything else that is relevant to her topic!

There is much more that could be said if space allowed on the interpretation of individual passages, but hopefully sufficient has been said to demonstrate that this book is a 'must' for students alike of the Pastoral Epistles and of New Testament christology.

Howard Marshall
Aberdeen, Scotland

EuroJTh (1999) **8:2**, 188–189 0960–2720

Reading Ecclesiastes: Old Testament Exegesis and Hermeneutical Theory
G. Bartholomew
Rome: Editrice Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 1998, *Analecta Biblica* 139, 319 pp., 45 000 lira, pb, ISBN 88-7653-139-4.

RÉSUMÉ
Cet article a pour affirmation centrale que la vision du monde de chacun influe de manière significative sur son travail scientifique. À partir de là, Bartholomew cherche à articuler une herméneutique qui soit à la fois pleinement chrétienne et en dialogue avec l'histoire de l'herméneutique, passée et présente. Le livre de l'Écclésiaste sert de cas d'école permettant de tester une variété de modèles herméneutiques. Bartholomew examine les approches herméneutiques postérieures au siècle des Lumières, en prêtant une attention particulière à leurs racines sociales et philosophiques. Il vise à 'tester toutes choses pour retenir ce qui est bon et rejeter ce qui est mauvais' dans les diverses approches. Il privilégie l'étude de la forme finale du texte, ainsi qu'un modèle de la communication pour l'interprétation. Prenant le contre-pied du point de vue majoritaire, il montre que l'épilogue doit être lu comme faisant partie du livre de l'Écclésiaste. Il fait la proposition séduisante d'une lecture considérant l'épilogue comme une partie essentielle du texte.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Die Kernthese des Buches lautet, daß die persönliche wissenschaftliche Tätigkeit in nicht zu unterschätzendem Maße von der eigenen Weltanschauung beeinflußt ist. Bartholomew ist nun darauf bedacht, eine Hermeneutik zu entwerfen, die zum einen bewußt christlich und zum anderen um einen Dialog mit früheren und zeitgenössischen hermeneutischen Ansätzen bemüht ist. Das Predigerbuch wird in diesem Zusammenhang als Fallbeispiel verwendet, um eine Reihe von hermeneutischen Modellen zu testen. Bartholomew untersucht vor allem nachaufklärerische hermeneutische Ansätze, wobei er sein Augenmerk besonders auf die sozialen und philosophischen Wurzeln dieser Methoden richtet. Er ist darum bemüht, alles zu prüfen, um das Gute zu behalten und das Schlechte zu verwerfen. Der Arbeit mit der Endform des Textes wird Vorrang eingeräumt, und als Interpretationsansatz wird ein Kommunikationsmodell vorgeschlagen. Entgegen der mehrheitlichen Meinung vertritt Bartholomew die Ansicht, daß der Epilog als wesentlicher Bestandteil des Predigerbuches verstanden werden muß. Er entwickelt ein faszinierendes Interpretationsmodell, das mit der Endform des Textes arbeitet und den Epilog als einen integralen Bestandteil des Buches ernst nimmt.

The basic contention of this book is that one's worldview significantly shapes one's scholarship. Bartholomew argues that biblical scholars are often unaware of the 'subterranean' philosophical assumptions that guide their work. There is no neutral, Archimedian point from which to view the world so we need to be honest about where we are looking from. As a Christian he argues that Christian scholars ought to think very carefully about how a biblical worldview should shape their work.

Chapter One is a brief overview of modern and post-modern (Bartholomew prefers 'late modern') philosophical hermeneutics. The key shift from the 'modern' to the 'late modern' is the realisation that the reader of the text, no less than the text itself, stands in an historical context and tradition. This prompts us to ask to what extent the work of biblical scholars is shaped by their, often unrecognised, traditions.

Ecclesiastes provides a test case for Bartholomew's claims so chapter two provides samplings from the history of the interpretation of the book from the inter-testamental period through to late modernity. The Enlightenment proved to be a catalyist for a radical shift in biblical hermeneutics in general and the interpretation of Ecclesiastes in particular Chapter Three thus focuses in on 'Modern' interpretations of Ecclesiastes with

a fascinating sampling of Historical-Critical readings. One of the major consensuses of this approach was the secondary nature of the epilogue and the need to *read the book as if the Epilogue were not there*. This marks a major shift from pre-critical readings with the consequence that the text that scholars interpret is *not* Ecclesiastes but a hypothetical reconstruction of some earlier text. Bartholomew argues that the method is deeply rooted in Modernity and Christians need to be suspicious of it. He is open to a *Christian* version of source and form criticism but it is not at all clear to me what such a method would actually look like. I would very much like to see if and how this idea could be developed. One could argue that Christian beliefs *already do* infuse some evangelical attempts at source criticism. Bartholomew's chief objection seems to be source criticism's attempt to get 'behind' the text to some earlier versions of it but surely *any* source criticism will do that Christian or not! Perhaps what Bartholomew is actually wishing to say is that source criticism is a method of secondary importance and can only *follow from* an analysis of the text as a unity. With that I agree.

Chapter Four follows on from this concern to show how Canonical Criticism, New Criticism and Structuralism privilege the final form of the text. This is a welcome move despite various limitations to those methods and the study of Ecclesiastes has been advanced by their use. Chapter Five examines Narrative reading strategies with special focus on the important issues of genre and Fox's fascinating interpretation of Ecclesiastes. I found this discussion to be discerning and balanced. Chapter Six surveys the impact of post modernity on biblical studies with Clines, Brueggemann and Perdue as case studies. Bartholomew welcomes the way in which post modernity alerts us to the role which the reader's pre-understanding plays but he resists its call to shift the locus of meaning from text to reader.

Chapter Eight is, to my mind, the best part of the book. Bartholomew argues that as theism begins with a personal creator personhood must be in the foundations of our hermeneutic. Consequently he endorses a communication model for academic OT interpretation in which a text embodies a message sent from a sender to a receiver. The *text* as we have it is the focus of interpretation. There is an ethics of interpretation so we must not perform a post modern 'rape' of texts (my term not his) but aim to read them, as far as we can, in the role of the implied reader. This is not to say that a more critical reading against the grain of the text cannot *follow*. After this follows one of the most interesting proposals for the reading of Ecclesiastes that I have ever read. It is compatible with, though underdetermined by, the hermeneutic just outlined. One of the perennial puzzles of Ecclesiastes is its constant switching between gloomy and positive passages. Bartholomew suggests that in the book of Ecclesiastes two radically incompatible routes to knowledge (the fear of God and an empiricist route that leads to futility) are deliberately juxtaposed. A gap is opened up for the reader that demands to be filled and it is the Epilogue which points the way forward and leads to a resolution of the tension.

This book is very wide ranging but does not wander off from the track marked out for it. It is well researched and points Christian scholars towards a more self-consciously Christian approach to their academic work. It is highly controversial and although many will not agree with its central claims none can fail to be provoked by its arguments.

Robin Parry
Worcester, England

EuroJTh (1999) **8:2**, 189–190 0960–2720

Just Trading: On the Ethics and Economics of International Trade
D. Finn
Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996, 304 pp,
ISBN 0 687 05209 2

RÉSUMÉ

Finn, qui est à la fois un économiste, un théologien et un chrétien, traite de la moralité dans le commerce international. Il présente la théorie économique s'y rapportant et expose les valeurs bibliques, théologiques et éthiques qui orientent son approche. Il analyse les relations entre le commerce international et l'agriculture, l'environnement et l'emploi, et tire des conclusions nuancées dans une perspective éthique chrétienne. Il fait des propositions pour l'élaboration future de 'règles du commerce'.

Il utilise les données de façon pertinente et applique ses valeurs éthiques de manière conséquente, en évitant les slogans simplistes. Cependant, l'auteur présuppose un modèle herméneutique sans le définir réellement. Ceci appelle un travail supplémentaire dans le champ de l'éthique chrétienne, tout comme la

question des orientations personnelles fondamentales qui déterminent toute réflexion, dans un monde post-moderne de plus en plus incertain quant à la possibilité de la neutralité.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Finn, der als Wirtschaftswissenschaftler, Theologe und Christ schreibt, diskutiert die Ethik des internationalen Handels. Er präsentiert die einschlägige ökonomische Theorie und umreißt die biblischen, theologischen und ethischen Werte, die seiner Diskussion zugrunde liegen. Er analysiert die Beziehungen zwischen dem internationalen Handel und der Landwirtschaft sowie der Umwelt und dem Arbeitsmarkt, wobei er nuancierte, von einer christlichen ethischen Perspektive bestimmte, Schlußfolgerungen zieht. Darüber hinaus macht er konkrete Vorschläge zur zukünftigen Entwicklung von "Handelsbestimmungen".

Das Buch macht guten Gebrauch von Statistiken, wendet ethische Werte auf eine konsistente Weise an und vermeidet simplifizierende Slogans. Allerdings setzt der Autor ein bestimmtes hermeneutisches Modell voraus, ohne dieses genauer zu definieren. Die vorliegende Studie entwickelt ein zukünftiges Programm für christliche Ethiker, wobei in diesem Zusammenhang, d.h. in einer post-modernen Welt, die mehr und mehr an der Möglichkeit zur Neutralität zweifelt, auch die Frage der unterschwelligen Ambitionen eine Rolle spielen wird.

In this interesting book Finn, an economist, theologian and Christian, enters the debate about the merits of international trade. He probes issues of contention, weighs empirical evidence and applies biblical and theological principles in drawing his conclusions and engages with Cobb and Daly's book 'For the Common Good'.

The book begins with definitions and methodology. International trade theories including 'dynamic benefit' analysis are explained; relevant biblical and theological themes with Christian ethical values are outlined; background commitments and their impact on the debate are considered. The text moves on to consider how trade impacts agriculture, the environment and employment, and presents a Christian contribution to this contentious debate. In this Finn uses substantial empirical evidence and theological resources in drawing his conclusions. In ch 9 he considers the 'rules of trade' applying his Christian values in a comprehensive way.

The book is well constructed and reveals a nuanced grasp of a technical subject, avoiding the simplistic sloganising which typifies much of the debate. It is here, particularly, that the investigation of background commitments proves so useful. Finn lists and develops considerations of how prior commitments can affect one's conclusions about the efficacy of trade. For example, one's disposition to the 'market' will influence one's stance on the extension, or otherwise, of market principles across national borders. Finn deals with ten such issues and tellingly exposes how these assumptions can subtly affect objectivity.

The use of data is a second major strength of this book. Finn skilfully utilises a wide range of evidence to show how some popular assumptions about the effects of trade are not proven. An example will suffice. Economic growth and consequent trade will lead to an increase in environmental damage. However, evidence suggests that as an economy develops citizens expect similar improvements in their environmental standard of living. This forces governments into either taxing polluters or making them internalise previously communal pollution costs. In addition, the evidence suggests that closed economies experiencing rapid economic growth suffer pollution rates in excess of open economies experiencing similar growth. This is primarily because economies open to trade have access to new and cleaner technology. Although CFC emissions remain a significant problem in industrialised nations.

This book creates an agenda for the future. Finn outlines biblical and theological themes that inform his analysis, but his hermeneutical model, in arriving at these themes, is assumed rather than defined. There is still more work to be done in engaging biblical texts with the complexity of modern economies. Finn's analysis of the importance of 'background commitments' is very helpful. In the postmodern world this might give the Christian moralist the chance to engage on equal terms with others as supposed neutrality is increasingly questioned.

This is a stimulating consideration of a complex issue that has a positive view of trade, a commitment to an applied Christian morality and an exercise of scholarship that enables the author to avoid naive assumptions or conclusions, to make practical suggestions and to go beyond 'prophecy alone' (p. 264).

Andrew V. West
Cheltenham England

EuroJTh (1999) **8:2**, 191–192 0960–2720

Metaphors of Ministry; Biblical Images for Leaders and Followers

David W Bennett

Grand Rapids: Baker / Carlisle: Paternoster, 1993, 207 pp., p/b, ISBN 1 85364 719 4

RÉSUMÉ

Partant de l'analyse des images utilisées dans le Nouveau Testament, Bennett élabore une classification des termes employés pour évoquer les disciples de Jésus, principalement dans les Évangiles, mais aussi dans le reste du Nouveau Testament. Il présente ceux qui suivent Jésus, à la fois dans leur rôle de responsables et de disciples. Il développe une réflexion en sept points sur la nature du discipulat. Certains traits essentiels de la fonction de conducteur, comme de la condition de disciple, sont mis en lumière. La relation à Dieu, qui est constituée par son appel et dont la nature est christocentrique, y est déterminante. L'exercice de l'autorité, comme le fait de se soumettre à la responsabilité d'autrui, sont déterminés par la place à donner à la personne de Jésus. La fonction de responsable s'exerce dans une communauté dont tous les membres sont égaux en statut, sinon en responsabilité.

Le contenu est éclairant et stimulant et mérite une lecture attentive et réfléchie, de la part de ceux qui sont engagés dans le ministère à quelque niveau que ce soit. Le style est méthodique, et parfois un peu terre à terre. Ce livre aurait sans doute pu être plus court, sans perdre pour autant de sa valeur.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Bennett entwirft, basierend auf einer Untersuchung der neutestamentlichen Metaphorik, eine systematische Darstellung der Begriffe, die zur Charakterisierung der Jünger Jesu verwendet werden. Er konzentriert sich dabei vor allem auf die Evangelien, geht aber auch auf die übrige neutestamentliche Literatur ein. Der Autor stellt uns die Jünger Jesu sowohl als Leiter als auch als Nachfolger vor. Er beleuchtet das Wesen der Jüngerschaft aus sieben unterschiedlichen Blickwinkeln. Leiterschaft, verstanden als Jüngerschaft, wird anhand einiger Kernaspekte definiert. Zentral ist dabei die Beziehung zu Gott, die durch seinen Ruf konstituiert wird, und die ihrem Wesen nach christozentrisch ist. Hinsichtlich der Autorität über andere, der Identität mit anderen sowie der Verantwortlichkeit gegenüber anderen gilt, daß dabei eine Ausrichtung auf die Person Jesu gegeben sein muß. Die Aufgabe der Leiterschaft wird in einer Gemeinschaft ausgeübt, in der alle den gleichen Status, wenn nicht gar die gleiche Verantwortung genießen.

Bennetts Buch ist informativ, stimulierend und lohnenswert für alle, die in irgendeiner Form am Dienst beteiligt sind. Der sprachliche Ausdruck ist jedoch recht nüchtern und teilweise etwas trocken. Ich vermute, das Buch hätte kürzer sein können, ohne dabei an Wert einzubüßen.

Metaphors of Ministry is a comprehensive investigation of New Testament words used to describe disciples of Jesus. The words are explored in their context and with an appreciation of their function as analogy. Bennett shows an appreciation of the importance of image for communication and its particular help in opening up religious phenomena to the imagination.

Beginning with the gospels the book proceeds with a word by word description of New Testament images of discipleship. At each stage a taxonomy of terms is presented, as is an explanation of the relationship between the images. The basic outline of the taxonomy divides metaphors into those related to people and those related to things. Further subdivisions lead to a categorisation by relationship and task in each of the main sections. After each subsequent section, dealing with other NT writings/authors, the taxonomy is extended by adding new images and where appropriate, linking them with similar concepts in the teaching of Jesus.

This leads to a set of conclusions about discipleship which stress the twin roles of being followers and leaders. Bennett offers seven reflections on the nature of discipleship which he derives from his analysis of the images. Leadership, as discipleship, is presented to us as having certain key characteristics. It is about relationship to God, constituted by his call and christocentric in nature. Authority over, identity with and accountability to are all focused on the person of Jesus. The function of leadership is exercised in a community of equality of status if not of responsibility.

As Bennett leaves the gospels to enter the other writings of the New Testament he notices how the images change from the agrarian ones in the parables of Jesus to pictures of the civic and urban life of the Roman empire (for example the ambassadors of 2 Cor.

5 v. 20). He argues that the taxonomy is not altered but extended by these new analogies. Thus the underlying theology remains the same as the social milieu changes. Christian leadership is to be exercised according to the same principles in every context.

I found the book both interesting and frustrating. The taxonomy of images is most enlightening and the analysis of Christian leadership that follows both persuasive and clearly rooted in the text. However the approach becomes too laboured and I am convinced that this book could have been shorter! It is a book which is potentially valuable reading for those training the clergy, those who plan the training of the clergy, those who select potential clergy, and, yes, the ministers themselves. The sometimes stodgy style is worth persevering with, for, those concerned with ministry as theorists or practitioners will find something to be enthused by and something to apply to their calling.

I also found myself asking questions which this book is not seeking to address. The unity of the New Testament ministerial imagery is very illuminating, and may have some bearing on the debate about the relationship of Paul and Jesus, presenting as it does a unity of content without obvious verbal overlap. But that is for another day!

Andrew V. West
Cheltenham, England

EuroJTh (1999) **8:2**, 192–193 0960–2720

Praying as Believing: The Lord's Prayer and the Christian Doctrine of God
Timothy Bradshaw
Regent's Study Guides 6, Oxford: Regent's Park College / Macon, Georgia: Smyth & Helwys, 1998, viii + 214 pp., pb, ISBN (UK) 09518104 5 6 (USA) 1-57312-198-3

RÉSUMÉ

Le livre de Bradshaw qui s'intitule: La prière nourrie de la foi: le Notre Père et la doctrine chrétienne de Dieu, est un guide de la doctrine chrétienne et de la prière élaborée selon les lignes du Notre Père. L'approche est surtout philosophique, en dialogue avec les penseurs et les théologiens modernes, tout en faisant souvent référence à l'Écriture. La position doctrinale de Bradshaw est anglicane évangélique. Il se montre partisan du libre arbitre et opposé à la prédestination. Le livre favorise une réflexion approfondie pour ceux qui ont déjà une assez bonne compréhension de la doctrine chrétienne.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Bradshaws Buch Praying as Believing: The Lord's Prayer and the Christian Doctrine of God ist ein Leitfaden für die christliche Lehre und das Gebet, der sich eines Rahmens bedient, der vom Vaterunser vorgegeben ist. Bradshaws Ansatz ist in erster Linie ein philosophischer, der sich mit modernen Denkern und Theologen auseinandersetzt, wobei jedoch auch eine ganze Reihe von biblischen Aussagen berücksichtigt werden. Bradshaws Glaubensbasis ist die eines evangelikalen Anglikaners, der für den freien Willen und gegen die Prädestinationslehre eintritt. Das Buch ist besonders als Anleitung zum weiteren Nachdenken für diejenigen geeignet, die bereits über ein recht gutes Verständnis der christlichen Lehre verfügen.

Timothy Bradshaw's book *Praying as Believing: The Lord's Prayer and the Christian Doctrine of God* is a guide to Christian doctrine and prayer under a framework which arises from the Lord's Prayer. Bradshaw discusses the most important Christian doctrines in his book. His approach is primarily a philosophical one, scriptural references are supplementary and illustrative and do not constitute the main thread of his arguments, even though all of Bradshaw's discussion assumes that the reader is aware of the basic tenets of Christian doctrine and Biblical theology. Except for some minor details, Bradshaw's approach is exegetical in only a very broad sense; in each chapter he takes one part of the prayer as a springboard from which he embarks to a philosophical discussion of doctrinal questions implied by the part. Then, Bradshaw discusses what various modern thinkers and theologians, such as Schleiermacher, Kant, Pannenberg, Macquarrie and Barth have thought concerning these particular doctrinal questions. Through interaction with these and other thinkers, Bradshaw expounds his own idea of the doctrinal questions at hand, including how one's understanding of a particular aspect of doctrine should affect one's understanding of prayer. Bradshaw's two special favourites are Karl Barth and process theologians, even though this does not mean that he is constrained to agree with them.

In fact, Bradshaw himself expounds an evangelical, Anglican theology as a result of his deliberations.

A number of Bradshaw's Christological thoughts are stimulating. Moreover, Bradshaw has excellent insights into the problem of suffering and how to live life as a Christian in practice, including how prayer relates to these. Overall, when Bradshaw includes scriptural references in his discussion, these are usually very helpful. A quite stimulating part of Bradshaw's discussion is his view of predestination and human free will, whether one agrees with his position or not. In this, Bradshaw takes thoughts from process theologians in order to build a suitable model to the question. Bradshaw is against predestination, and emphasizes human free will, yet he thinks that God knows and is in control of the future in a broad sense. In relation to free will, Bradshaw believes that praying is active, something which can change the mind of God, rather than something which wishes to ask for the fulfilment of something predetermined.

On the other hand, there seems to be a certain circularity included in a number of Bradshaw's arguments. One suspects that Bradshaw has evangelical theology and a particular doctrinal position within it in his mind already at the outset, a result which his philosophical arguments subsequently lead to, even though his philosophical arguments also expand the preconceived position. Here one also needs to ask a further methodological question: How should one mesh scriptural and philosophical arguments in order to form as correct a picture of God and theology as possible?

According to the back flap, Bradshaw's book is a part of a series which has been intended especially to 'those engaged in Christian pastoral ministry, whether as ordained ministers or lay leaders in the congregation', and 'hopefully' to committed enough ordinary church members as well. The book fits well to this category. It is not a starter for learning about doctrinal issues. Rather, it is a book which may provide help through introduction to and further reflection especially of, even though not limited to, the philosophical questions which surround prayer and the main doctrinal issues of Christianity for those who already have a reasonably good understanding of Christian doctrine.

Pekka Pitkänen
Cheltenham, England

EuroJTh (1999) **8:2**, 193–194 0960–2720

At Eternity's Gate: The Spiritual Vision of Vincent Van Gogh
K. Powers Erickson
Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans 1998, xviii+192 pp., $22, H/B, ISBN 0-8028-3856-1

RÉSUMÉ

On considère habituellement que Van Gogh a abandonné sa foi chrétienne lorsqu'il a cessé son ministère de missionnaire protestant et qu'il est entré en conflit avec les membres du clergé qu'il côtoyait. Le présent ouvrage montre cependant que les racines de sa foi n'étaient pas calvinistes, ni même évangéliques, mais basées sur le modernisme hollandais de Groningue, dans la ligne de la pensée de Schleiermacher, et que ses croyances ultérieures sont demeurées dans cette ligne d'un piétisme subjectif sans contenu doctrinal. L'auteur étudie aussi les diagnostics de la maladie de Van Gogh pour conclure à une forme d'épilepsie qui le laissait parfaitement maître de ses facultés entre les crises. L'ouvrage fait preuve d'un arrière-plan théologique impressionnant et se montre très convaincant.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Von Van Gogh wird normalerweise angenommen, daß er dem christlichen Glauben absagte, als er seine Tätigkeit als protestantischer Missionar einstellte und mit seinen im kirchlichen Dienst stehenden Verwandten brach. Das vorliegende Buch macht jedoch deutlich, daß die Wurzeln seines Glaubens nicht kalvinistischer oder evangelikaler Art waren, sondern im Modernismus der Groninger Schule sowie im Modell Schleiermachers begründet lagen, und daß seine späteren Überzeugungen durchaus im Einklang standen mit einem nicht an die kirchlichen Doktrinen gebundenen, subjektiven Pietismus. Der Autor setzt sich außerdem mit verschiedenen Diagnosen zu Van Goghs Krankheit auseinander und kommt zu der Schlußfolgerung, daß er unter einer Form von Epilepsie litt, die es ihm gestattete, zwischen den Anfällen uneingeschränkten Gebrauch von seinen Gaben und Fähigkeiten zu machen. Die Beleuchtung des theologischen Hintergrunds ist faszinierend, und die Studie ist im großen und ganzen überzeugend.

This is a book challenging two common 'myths'—that Van Gogh rejected Christianity

to become an artist, and that mental illness contributed to his artistic insight. Whereas Erickson seeks to show that Van Gogh's illness was only an interruption to his art, and that his faith, re-cast in modernist form, informed all his work, especially that of his last two years.

If Erickson is right, classic images will need to be reinterpreted. In particular, the famous 'Crows over a Wheatfield' from his last year, which has usually been read as an overwhelming of life (the wheatfield) by trouble and death (clouds and crows), Erickson sees as a Bunyanesque journey of life (the roads) leading through death (the cornfield ready for reaping) to a restoring eternity (the blue infinite).

This book needs to enter, then, into the debate about Van Gogh's mental troubles, and also to show from his letters that his faith continued to be active after he left the church. On both counts the argument seems to be successful. The original diagnosis was non-convulsive epilepsy, which still makes sense today, though there may have been a depressive condition as well. There is also evidence of his faith recovering, in transmuted form, in his last years, not least from three biblical subjects painted while in hospital. From the letters Erickson also infers that sunshine, wheatfields, olive groves and reapers also have biblical overtones. This may perhaps be debated.

But there is much more to this book than its main argument. For by unpicking the major theological influences on the young Vincent, Erickson goes a long way to explain the core of his art, the appealing combination of charity and zeal, individualism and subjectivism that has made him such an icon of the modern age. Theology, seems to have been translated, very influentially, into paint.

Van Gogh's antecedents, back to the C17, were both artistic and theological. His uncles were art dealers, his father was a protestant missionary to the Catholic peasants of south Holland, not a Calvinist, but a moderniser of the Groningen school. Groningen, formed out of Arminianism and pietism, emphasised experience—'religion resides in feeling'—and replaced a doctrine of atonement with a demanding requirement to emulate Jesus; or as the author puts it, 'Human beings are relieved of the burden of sin by following the example of Christ and trying to imitate his life' (p. 19). This modern, but not particularly merciful doctrine helps account for the rigours of Vincent's self-deprivation when evangelising destitute miners, and perhaps also his sense that any churchmen whose sacrifices were less extreme must be hypocrites. Van Gogh's other close spiritual guide, the uncle with whom he was to quarrel, took Groningen theology further, rejecting the supernatural, critically investigating the Bible, and reducing the fundamental principle of Christianity, in Opzoomer's words, to 'the oneness of the Divine and the human'.

These were not the only influences on the young Vincent, who seems to have had an evangelical conversion while in London, which alarmed his relations, who feared fundamentalism. Later he became enamoured of the modernising of Renan. But the consistent themes of his faith are those represented in his art; subjective experience, self-sacrifice, devotion to the poor, alienation from institutional religion, and a readiness to encounter God (mystically apprehended) through nature.

Erickson writes with strong empathy for her subject. If there is a weakness, it is that sometimes her argument seems overasserted, tempting her, for example, to use the term 'Christian' for phases of Van Gogh's religion which are scarcely to be distinguished from unbelief. One should perhaps remain cautious about the 'Christian' label. But at the very least she has shown that the trials of faith in the modern age were integral to Van Gogh's being and at the core of his art.

David Thistlethwaite
Leicester, England

EuroJTh (1999) **8:2**, 194–196 0960–2720

Biblical Text and Texture—A Literary Reading of Selected Texts

Michael Fishbane

Oxford: Oneworld, 1998, xiv + 142 pp., £8.99, pb, ISBN 1-85168151-5

RÉSUMÉ

Fishbane commence par une brève présentation de sa théorie littéraire, dont l'élément clé est la distinction entre la 'réalité littéraire' du texte et la réalité de l'histoire ou de l'expérience qui est extérieure au texte. Cette réalité littéraire s'appréhende le mieux en considérant des procédés stylistiques (comme par exemple la répétition d'un mot thème) qui sont des indications pour le lecteur de ce que l'auteur souhaitait mettre en avant, accentuer et communiquer. Le reste du livre (la plus grande partie) applique, à titre d'exemple, cette théorie à trois types de textes de l'Ancien Testament: le cycle narratif, le discours direct et la

'transformation de texte' (par exemple le thème de l'Éden et sa transformation dans les textes ultérieurs). Les observations de Fishbane sur les procédés stylistiques sont instructives, bien que la séparation entre la 'réalité littéraire' du texte et la réalité historique demeure problématique.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Fishbanes Buch beginnt mit einer äußerst knappen Einleitung zu seiner Literaturtheorie, bei der ein Kernaspekt darin besteht, zwischen der 'literarischen Realität' eines Textes und der historischen, d.h. erfahrbaren, Realität, die außerhalb des Textes liegt, zu unterscheiden. Die literarische Realität ist am besten zugänglich mittels stilistischer Konventionen (wie z.B. der Wiederholung eines Leitworts), die dem Leser anzeigen, was der Autor hervorzuheben und zu vermitteln beabsichtigte. Der Rest (d.h. der größte Teil) des Buches ist ein Beispiel für die Anwendung dieser Literaturtheorie auf drei alttestamentliche Literaturtypen, d.h. auf Narrativ-Zyklen, direkte Rede und sogenannte 'Texttransformationen' (wie z.B. das Eden-Motiv und dessen Umgestaltung in späteren Texten). Fishbanes Bemerkungen zu den stilistischen Konventionen sind aufschlußreich, doch seine Unterscheidung zwischen der 'literarischen Realität' eines Textes und dessen historischer Realität ist problematisch.

This book, a reprint of the original published in 1979, is not so much a discussion of literary theory as an example of how to do literary reading. The meat of the book consists of Fishbane's treatment of various biblical texts with a literary reading. His brief theoretical comments, reserved for the introduction and epilogue, bracket this treatment and are considered immediately below.

Fishbane's literary reading methodology is based on three basic presuppositions. First, there is an inseparable relationship between the form of literature and its content. That is to say, the reality presented (content) is constructed by the literary formulation of that text. It is thus a 'literary reality'; to change the form of the text would be to change the reality itself. Further implications of this point as it relates to the Bible are considered below. Second, 'reading rehearses the latent meanings of a text: meaning unfolds in the process of reading, it being a function of the dialectic which takes place between a particular reader and a particular text' (xi). In other words, by reading a text, letting its words wash over her/him, and rebuilding in her/his mind the picture that the text presents, the reader brings to life again the meaning(s) of the text; s/he reconstructs the 'literary reality' that the text represents. The question that arises from this is, What guides the reader in this reconstruction, this bringing forth of the latent meanings of the text? Fishbane's answer, and his third presupposition, is that stylistic conventions are signposts to the reader of what the original author/editor wished to highlight, emphasise, and convey.

One example he notes is the repetition of a theme word. 'Such repetition, where it occurs, gives a text special texture; and it also serves to highlight major and minor features of content'. (xii). This applies also to repetition of larger themes or motifs, whereby '. . . latent networks of intra- and intertextual meaning may be perceived by an interpreter'. (xii). To Fishbane, awareness of such stylistic conventions is the starting point for understanding a text, allowing the reader to enter the text 'on its own terms': 'For it must be stressed that stylistic conventions allow the voice of a text to speak on its own terms and according to its own arrangement. The more conscious a reader is of these conventions, the less likely will he be to subjectivize a text irresponsibly . . .' (xii-xiii; cf. also 141). In this regard it is important to note that Fishbane is promoting a radically different emphasis than most source/higher-critical theorists. Instead of focusing on the repetition of words or themes as indicative of various sources, Fishbane bypasses this question, arguing instead that obvious repetitions in vocabulary or motif are there as markers in the text to alert us to its meanings.

Having sketched in brief the theory of his approach, Fishbane goes on to provide examples of such a literary reading in the context of specific passages. There are three major sections in the book, each of which deals with a different type of text. The first section deals with narratives (Genesis 1) and narrative cycles (e.g., the Jacob cycle), the second with direct speech (e.g., Deut 6:20–25; Psalm 19) and the third with motifs and other 'text-transformations' (e.g., the Eden motif and its 'transformation' in later texts). In each section Fishbane pays close attention to the stylistic conventions that help to demarcate the emphases and meaning(s) of the text. For example, noting some very interesting parallels between Genesis 29 and 31 and the surrounding chapters Fishbane writes:

Genesis 29–31 thus counterpoint the surrounding tale of Esau. Indeed, on reading Genesis 29 . . . one has the distinct sense of déjà vu. The agon of Jacob in pursuit of Rachel, of Rachel in contest with Leah, of Jacob deceived by Laban, and of Laban deceived by Rachel: all mirror the preceding strife between Jacob and Esau and the former's deception of Isaac. By such a foil, moreover, the final formulator of the cycle gives Jacob his comeuppance and circumspectly redresses the injustice of his original act of deceit (in Genesis 27). When Jacob fulfils the serf tenure which Laban has demanded (apparently as a brideprice) for Rachel, but is given Leah in her stead, he reproaches Laban, 'his brother': 'Why have you deceived me [stem: rimmah, 29:25]?' To which Laban rejoins (v. 26): 'It is not our [local] custom to marry off the younger [tze'irah] before the firstborn [bekhirah]'. The counterpoint with Genesis 27 is obvious: there Jacob was the younger (tza'ir/qaton) who misappropriated the birthright (bekhorah) of his elder brother . . . by deception (stem: rimmah, 27:35). With his indignant protest to Laban, Jacob unwittingly condemns himself. (p. 55)

Among numerous other helpful insights in this vein, his chiastic outline of the Jacob cycle (Gen 25:19–35:22; p. 43) and his explanation of the passage where God appears in order to slay Moses (4:24–26; p. 71) are particularly noteworthy.

Several positive features commend this work. Fishbane's sensitivity to stylistic conventions will prove very instructive to those unfamiliar with a literary reading of biblical texts, as well as those only nominally familiar. Moreover, each chapter contains numerous helpful insights into the passage or cycle or motif that he writes on, especially with regard to thematic repetition, and, to a more limited extent, the psychology of the players in the passages (though this at times goes too far). As well, while acknowledging tensions in the text, Fishbane emphasises the unity of the material, allowing him to concentrate on the meaning(s) latent in the text as it stands before us, an emphasis which has at times been neglected in the era of form and source criticism. Further, and perhaps more basically, Fishbane does hold that there is meaning in the text, and that that meaning is discernible to the reader, a point on which many today would disagree.

As mentioned above, Fishbane's work is primarily practical in its approach with theoretical comments restricted primarily to the four page introduction and two page epilogue. Those wanting a more theoretical discussion will have to go elsewhere. On a more foundational level, it is especially important for evangelicals to note that literary readings such as Fishbane's—which we sometimes adopt in order to focus on the final form of the text-are based on a distinction between the 'literary reality' of the text and the experiential or historical reality external to it. Carried to its logical conclusion, such a distinction divorces history from the text. This in turn undermines the authority of the Bible as an accurate representation of the historical reality of God's acting in and redeeming the world. On a minor note, there is a mistake in the verse alignment in line three of the chart on the bottom of p. 68, and p. 72 should read 5:22ff (not 6:22ff) in the second paragraph.

Jay Sklar
Cheltenham, England

EuroJTh (1999) **8:2**, 196–198 0960–2720

Civil Society, Civil Religion
A. Shanks

Oxford: Blackwells, 1995, 250 pp., £45.00 or £13.99, H/B or pb, ISBN 0631197583 (H/B) 0631197591 (pb)

RÉSUMÉ

L'auteur veut montrer que la théologie confessionnelle ne parvient pas à fournir une vision commune susceptible d'unir notre société post-chrétienne. Il propose de la remplacer par ce qu'il présente comme une 'théologie civile'. Il s'agit d'un cadre spirituel large, qui peut être également partagé par des croyants et des non croyants. Il passe en revue une série de tentatives modernistes pour arriver à une théologie civile en s'inspirant de la pensée de Hegel qui est jugée très favorablement. L'argumentaire nous laisse insatisfait pour deux raisons. Premièrement, pour éviter les vérités exclusives de la théologie confessionnelle, la théologie civile de Shanks demeure tellement indéfinie qu'elle est vide de contenu. Deuxièmement, Shanks n'aborde pas la question de la signification de la christologie, qui fait du christianisme une foi exclusive des autres. Au vu de cette carence, l'argumentation laisse intacte ce qui fait la force de la théologie confessionnelle.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Shanks stellt die Behauptung auf, daß die konfessionelle Theologie nicht in der Lage ist, eine einheitliche Vision hervorzubringen, die unsere nachchristliche Gesellschaft

zusammenzuhalten vermag. Seine Alternative besteht in einer "zivilen Theologie". Dabei handelt es sich um ein allgemeines geistliches Rahmenmodell, das sowohl Gläubigen als auch Nichtgläubigen offensteht. Shanks untersucht eine Reihe von modernistischen Versuchen, eine zivile Theologie zu entwickeln, und ist sehr aufgeschlossen für Hegels Konzeptionen. Dieser Rezensent ist mit seiner Argumentation nicht zufrieden, und zwar aus zwei Gründen. Erstens bleibt Shanks zivile Theologie, die dem Wunsch entsprungen ist, die exklusiven Wahrheiten der konfessionellen Theologie hinter sich zu lassen, so unbestimmt, daß sie praktisch inhaltslos ist. Zweitens setzt sich Shanks nicht mit der Bedeutung der Christologie für den christlichen Ausschließlichkeitsanspruch auseinander. Dieser Mangel an Auseinandersetzung hat zur Folge, daß seine Argumentation nicht in der Lage ist, den Standpunkt der konfessionellen Theologen zu untergraben.

Andrew Shanks sets himself a noble task in this work. He is concerned that in the post-Christian west the peaceful coexistence of its population can no longer be maintained on the basis of a common religious confession. He believes that in modern pluralist society confessional theology is too exclusive to provide a common vision. In its place, Shanks develops what he describes as a 'civil' theology. This implies a loyalty beyond ones own confession 'to whatever makes for genuine openness within the surrounding political culture'. (p. 2) Thus a myriad of denominations or secular world-views may clash at the level of confessional loyalty but still share in a common civil religion. The argument of the book surveys the need for such a framework and traces its contours in the work of a number of twentieth century thinkers. His writing is both stimulating and wideranging.

Civil theology provides a context for solidarity and shared ideals among both believers and non-believers. Shanks affirms that commitment to such a civil theology is entirely compatible with confessional theology—so long as the latter does not claim 'exclusive access to the truth'. (p. 4) It might be pointed out that there is already a reigning secular ideology in which confessional religions exist side by side. Shanks is not happy with secularism because he sees a need for a spiritual grounding to any public ideology. Civil religion offers a positive solidarity among religious and non-religious people because it is not hostile to such a spiritual dimension.

The impetus for Shanks' argument is his conviction that the twentieth century has received fresh revelation. The Third Reich looms large in his thought as the voice of revelation concerning the perils of totalitarianism. Learning from this 'revelation', Shanks wants a civil religion that is able both to affirm pluralism as a positive virtue and retain the spiritual dimension. He finds anticipations of such an ideal in Machiavelli, Spinoza, Rousseau and, most importantly for Shanks, Hegel. He deals with opposition to this tradition as it is found in the work of Barth and Kierkegaard.

It is difficult to identify in Shanks' work what content civil theology should have. Presumably, being a 'theology', one might expect at least a deistic commitment to a supreme being but this does not fit his desire that it should incorporate both theist and atheist (p. 115). Given the significance he attaches to the rise of Nazism as a revelatory event one would expect a theology that can identify the character of revelation and delineate what authority it should have. However, this also is missing. Revelation is whatever citizens with an Hegelian sense of history discern as significant (p. 138). Instead of offering the content of civil theology, Shanks outlines the kind of attitude it represents. This attitude is the commitment to three virtues: free-spiritedness, a flair for tradition and generosity. These virtues all amount to an ability to transcend one's own commitments and assumptions in order to experience solidarity with others. While not wishing to dispute the value of such a virtue it does not contribute any positive content to what the civil theologian ought to believe.

Shanks pursues his argument with detailed reference to such thinkers as Hegel, Heidegger and Nietzsche but with little attempt to understand what makes confessional theology so strident in its objection to modernity. Absent in his work is any discussion of Christology and its implications for revelation, authority and loyalty. Furthermore, there is no attempt to engage with historical attempts of confessional groups, such as the Reformers or Puritans, to provide a comprehensive vision of society. He chides the confessional Barmen declaration in its stand against Nazism for its failure to offer solidarity with the Jews. Nonetheless, surely this practical application of confessional theology compares favourably against Heidegger's flirtation with National Socialism? One is left with the sense that the strength and appeal of a confessional approach to pluralist society has not been done justice. Indeed, Shanks

seems to equate exclusive loyalty to a confession with exclusion of the possibility of human solidarity. There is no reason to make such an equation. Exclusive loyalty to the Christian confession provides the basis for a solidarity of the human race who are all created in the image of God and all sinners in need of redemption. The failure to explore such possibilities seems to stem from his failure to consider the significance of Christology in the confessional theology he rejects.

Christopher Sinkinson
Bournemouth, England

EuroJTh (1999) **8:2**, 198–199 0960–2720

The Historical Jesus: A Comprehensive Guide
G. Theissen and A. Merz
London: SCM Press, 1998, xxix + 642 pp., £25, pb, ISBN 0-33402696-2

RÉSUMÉ
Ce livre, destiné aux étudiants, se veut un manuel complet sur la vie et l'enseignement de Jésus. Son approche est plus près de celle de E. P. Sanders que, par exemple, de celle de J. D. Crossan, et il se tient ainsi à la droite du courant principal de la critique. Il est en fait remarquablement conservateur dans son approche des guérisons miraculeuses et de la résurrection. Il présente des aspects de la christologie qui sont implicites, simplement évoqués, ou exposés explicitement dans l'action et l'enseignement de Jésus, et qui ont fourni son fondement à la christologie de l'Église primitive. Le livre est parfaitement approprié pour des étudiants d'un niveau plus avancé.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Das vorliegende Buch ist als umfassendes Textbuch für Studenten des Lebens und der Lehre Jesu gedacht. Sein Ansatz steht dem von E. P. Sanders näher als z.B. dem von J. D. Crossan, d.h. das Buch ist eher rechts vom Hauptstrom der kritischen Forschung angesiedelt. Es ist in der Tat erstaunlich konservativ in seiner Behandlung der Heilungswunder und der Auferstehung, und es geht Teilaspekten der Christologie nach, die in den Taten und der Lehre Jesu entweder implizit, in Form von Anspielungen oder gar explizit enthalten sind und die das Fundament bildeten, ohne das sich die Christologie der frühen Kirche nicht hätte entwickeln können. Das Buch ist auch für fortgeschrittene Studenten bestens geeignet.

Gerd Theissen is well-known as one of the most creative New Testament scholars in Germany today. He and his collaborator, Annette Merz, who also teaches in Heidelberg, have produced what is intended as a guidebook and workbook for students. The authors believe that the question of the historical Jesus is theologically important (vii). They place themselves on the map of New Testament scholarship by distinguishing between what they call the Californian Jesus of J. D. Crossan and B. L. Mack and the Galilean Jesus of E. P. Sanders, with which they find more sympathy. In the first part of their book they offer a detailed evaluation of the historical sources, listing and responding to thirteen objections to the historicity of the Jesus-tradition. They criticise the traditional criteria for evaluating the tradition and argue instead for a criterion of 'plausibility' which asks: 'what is plausible in the Jewish context and makes the rise of Christianity understandable' (11)?

The second part of the book is concerned with background and chronology. The aim is to see Jesus in the context of the Judaism of his time and to avoid the allegedly anti-Semitic understandings of Judaism which are found in some modern writers.

In Part Three the authors look at the activity and preaching of Jesus. They see Jesus as a charismatic in the sociological sense of that term, thus joining forces with G. Bornkamm, M. Hengel, G. Vermes and M. J. Borg, who in their various ways emphasised the sheer authority of Jesus. Jesus is not unknown, as Bultmann claimed, but is known in his relationships with other people, about which we have a reasonable amount of information.

His message was about the kingdom of God. Both present and future statements are accepted as part of the message, but Jesus erroneously expected an imminent end to the world. As for his miracles, they reject those which have no analogies in experience (walking on the water, multiplying loaves) but accept those which do, namely the healings which are attributed to paranormal gifts such as are found in the modern world.

A distinction is drawn between the understanding of the parables as a sacrament of the word and as symbolic pointers to God, 'images which give people freedom to discover how far they disclose their content' (344), and they defend the latter understanding in which the parables 'aim to give impulses towards

thinking of God in constantly new and different ways' (345).

The discussion of ethics is particularly interesting for the way in which Theissen's earlier interpretation of the ethic of Jesus 'as the expression of a radical itinerant charismatic life' is compared with other possible views and held to be relevant for the whole of society and not just for those who choose to live on the margin.

In Part Four the Lord's Supper is seen as a replacement for the temple ritual, but the interpretion in terms of Jesus' death as a sacrifice took place only after the event. With respect to the Passion the authors largely agree with R. E. Brown. Jesus is depicted as an innocent, suffering, righteous man. Finally, there is a discussion of the resurrection. They contrast the objective theories of Pannenberg and the subjective theories of Lüdemann. They firmly accept the historicity of the appearance of Jesus to the disciples as a group. They also believe that he appeared to Mary Magdalene. They do not think that the story of the empty tomb can be proved or falsified, but seem to lean towards acceptance.

But the book is not yet concluded, and the story so far is followed by a section on the beginnings of Christology. A distinction is made between five ways in which christology may have a basis in the historical Jesus: a. explicit christology, where Jesus expressed his authority with a title; b. evoked christology, in which Jesus raised expectations among other people in his lifetime; c. implicit christology, in which Jesus fulfilled the 'conditions' of being Messiah without using the title; d. a heightened use of titles, in which the church gave titles used by Jesus a more transcendent claim; e. an exclusivist use of titles, in which the early church restricted to Jesus titles under which he included others, such as a collective use of Son of man or messiah. Only categories a. and c. give a real basis for christology in the historical Jesus. Implicit christology is seen in the Amen formula, the 'I' sayings and the 'I have come' sayings; the metaphor of God as Father, the granting of forgiveness, the causal attribution of the miracles and the assessment of John the Baptist. Evoked christology is seen in the assessment of Jesus as Messiah, a title which Jesus himself did not use although he had a messianic consciousness. Explicit christology is to be seen in the use of Son of man. 'An everyday expression which simply meant the human being or a human being was evaluated in "messianic" terms by Jesus. Only because of that could it become the characteristic way in which he described himself'. The cross and Easter transformed this expectation, and the titles of Son of God and Lord developed as a result.

Readers may well be surprised by the sheer conservatism of the conclusions reached in this book. But while it is remarkably traditional in its conclusions, it is based on a very careful, critical analysis of the evidence. It lacks the originality of N. T. Wright's reconstruction of *Jesus and the Victory of God*, and it demonstrates that one can defend an essentially orthodox picture of Jesus without resorting to any unusual hypotheses to do so.

At the same time, the book is intended not simply to present the authors' conclusions but to be a comprehensive workbook for students. It is organised in brief sections in which different viewpoints are laid out side by side and evaluated. The language is simple and clear. At various points 'exercises', often based on cited texts, are set for the reader and 'solutions' are supplied at the end of the book. The scholarship addressed is largely but by no means exclusively German; the sectional bibliographies were adapted for English-speaking readers. The result is a book which is far too detailed for a beginning student but which would be suitable for students at a more advanced level. In a book of this kind, which is concerned to analyse different approaches to the problems, it is most surprising that an index of modern authors is lacking.

Of the various books on the historical Jesus currently available this one is probably the best suited for its intended purpose, namely as a textbook which can be consulted on virtually every aspect of the subject and as a guide to the different approaches and conclusions of contemporary scholars. One does not have to go along with all the judgments of the authors (e.g. their overcritical attitude to some of the material in the Gospels) in order to recognise the value of this book as a stimulus to study of the historical Jesus, and one can only rejoice that the historical Jesus is once again the subject of serious study among New Testament scholars.

I. Howard Marshall
Aberdeen, Scotland

EuroJTh (1999) **8:2**, 200–201 0960–2720

Fact, Value and God

A. F. Holmes

Leicester: Apollos, 1997 (183 pp.), ISBN 0-85111-456-3, £19:99 (p.b.)

RÉSUMÉ

L'auteur tisse un récit historique mettant en relation les faits, les valeurs et Dieu, depuis l'époque des penseurs pré-socratiques jusqu'à Nietzsche. Il essaie de montrer que, depuis la Grèce antique jusqu'à la synthèse médiévale, il y a eu une tradition commune qui consistait à fonder les valeurs sur l'ordre cosmique. Le rejet par Ockham des universaux et de la téléologie a préparé le terrain pour une séparation nette entre faits et valeurs. La science mécaniste a considéré la nature comme libre de toute valeur et a essayé de fonder l'éthique sur la raison ou la psychologie. Nietzsche se situe à la dernière extrémité de la révolution d'Ockham, avec son rejet de toute morale objective. Holmes appelle les chrétiens à redécouvrir le lien indestructible entre les faits, les valeurs et Dieu. Une thèse remarquable, d'une lecture exigeante.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Holmes entwirft einen historischen Bericht, der die Beziehung von Tatsachen, Werten und Gott ausgehend von der Zeit der vorsokratischen Philosophen bis zu Nietzsche nachzeichnet. Er stellt die Behauptung auf, daß es von der griechischen Antike bis zur mittelalterlichen Synthese eine gemeinsame Tradition gab, die alle Werte als in der kosmischen Ordnung begründet verstand. Ockhams Ablehnung der Universalien sowie der Teleologie hat dann jedoch den Weg bereitet zu einer Trennung von Tatsachen und Werten. Die mechanistische Naturwissenschaft hat die Natur als wertneutral verstanden und war demgemäß darum bemüht, die Ethik in der Vernunft bzw. in der Psychologie zu verankern. Nietzsche stellt die extremste Ausprägung der von Ockham ausgehenden Revolution dar, die jegliche objektive Ethik verwirft. Holmes ruft Christen dazu auf, die unzertrennbare Verbindung von Tatsachen, Werten und Gott wiederzuentdecken. Dies ist eine faszinierende Sichtweise und ein anspruchsvolles Buch.

Holmes has set out to provide an historical survey of philosophical attempts to ground morality. The story which he weaves begins in Ancient Greece and climaxes in the C 19th with Nietzsche.

The Pre-Socratic philosophers began by rooting morality in an ordered cosmos (ch. 1). Plato too is very keen to ground virtues in reality (the Good) (ch. 2). Aristotle thought that the virtues are founded on the *telos* or end of each natural kind. Their good is found in actualising that *telos*. 'God' is pure actuality (and thus pure good). It ('God') is the ultimate *telos* of nature (ch. 3). The different 'God'—concepts of the Greek philosophers and the relation of 'the divine' to the good are investigated. Christian theology fruitfully drew from and modified Platonic and Stoic thinking in its opposition to Gnostic dualism which had divided matter from rational order. That split and its accompanying degrading of matter was undercut by the Logos doctrine (ch. 4). Augustine's Middle Platonism grounds value and truth in God and thus in his creation order. For Augustine then *all* creation is good and *all* creation can be distorted (ch. 5). Augustine's theology and Aristotle's philosophy are masterfully blended by Aquinas. Goodness (*pace* Aristotle) comes from actualising one's *telos*. The ultimate *telos* of humanity and the rest of creation is knowing God. Values are thus founded on the purposes for which God created things (ch. 6).

The story thus far has been variety within an almost unbroken tradition of rooting values in the way the world is—an ordered cosmos. That tradition was broken by the late Medievals Scotus and Ockham. Ockham's rejection of universals and his proto-empiricism led to a denial of inherent natures and final causes. Teleology is gone and only material and efficient causes remain paving the way for mechanistic science. Morality is grounded in contingent divine commands and discovered by right reason (ch. 7). Mechanistic science saw nature as value free and thus sought to build morality on other foundations such as right reason (Descartes), religion (Bacon) or law (Hobbes) (ch. 8). Others look to base values in human psychology (Hume and Reid in their rather different ways) (ch. 9). Kant (ch. 10) and Hegel (ch. 11) are a throw-back to the tradition of basing values in the nature and *telos* of reality. Comte and Bentham, on the other hand, took the omnicompetence of science to the limits with an attempt to make ethics into an empirical science. Empiricism, however, cannot support the weight of morality as even Mill glimpsed (ch. 12). The extreme end of the fact-value split which began with Ockham is found in Nietzsche's denial of any objective values. There is no God, no natural moral order, no *actual* right

or wrong. Morality is a human creation and projection onto a valueless world (ch. 13). This is essentially Holmes' narrative.

In the final chapter he pulls the threads together to identify four basic positions on the fact–value relationship which he thinks he discerns from the history outlined above. He then outlines in skeleton form an agenda for future thinking on the subject. First of all he argues briefly for resisting Nietzsche and reinstating 'the will of God' as the ultimate foundation of values. Second, he believes that the notion of teleology needs to be reopened for discussion and third, the Logos doctrine and its concomitant theory of universals need to return to the agenda as they provide a resource for grounding values in facts and point to the reliability of human reason.

This is a deceptively lightweight looking book. Do not be deceived. Holmes writes for people who are already familiar with the philosophers under discussion (p. viii) and thus (contrary to some of the comments on the book jacket) it is *not* really an *introduction* for 'readers with no formal training in philosophy'. Holmes writes clearly and competently on a fascinating area of study and gives the lie to the myth that values cannot be grounded in fact. The myth is relatively recent in the history of philosophy. I would have liked the study to move on into the Twentieth Century. It did seem rather arbitrary to halt with Nietzsche. There were also times that one felt that Holmes had wandered from his chief goal of charting the factvalue relation and had got side-tracked detailing the much broader concerns of the ethical philosophy of different characters. I suppose, had he not done so he would have been chastised for not setting his comments in the context of the wider philosophy of the characters. You cannot please all of the people all of the time. Holmes' final sketchy proposals were most interesting and one would very much like to see them fleshed out much more thoroughly. In the end though this book is an agenda setting text that very helpfully sets issues of critical importance to Christian thinkers in broader historical perspective.

Robin Parry
Worcester, England

EuroJTh (1999) **8:2**, 201–203 0960–2720

Warum das Kreuz? Die Frage nach der Bedeutung des Todes Jesu

Volker Gäckle et al.
Wuppertal: Brockhaus, 1998, 224 p., pb,
ISBN 3-417-29080-5

RÉSUMÉ

Le dogme traditionnel de la substitution pénale à la croix est sérieusement remis en question dans le débat théologique contemporain. On peut donc être reconnaissant aux professeurs de l'Abrecht-Bengel-Haus à Tubingue (RFA) pour cet ouvrage solide de réflexion théologique, également accessible au non-théologien. Dans la partie exégétique, le thème de l'expiation est étudié dans le Pentateuque et dans Esaïe 53. De même, on examine l'interprétation de la croix dans les évangiles et chez Paul. Dans la partie historique, les différents auteurs montrent la continuité et le développement de la pensée chrétienne sur ce sujet à partir de l'Église ancienne jusqu'à la Réforme. Ils s'interrogent sur les raisons pour lesquelles le dogme traditionnel a été contesté au siècle des lumières et dans l'idéalisme allemand (Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher). Ils s'intéressent aux interprétations de la croix données au vingtième siècle (Bultmann, Barth, Tillich, Pannenberg). Le livre se clôt par une réflexion homilétique: comment annoncer avec pertinence la croix à l'homme (post-)moderne?

L'ouvrage est une défense intelligente et sans ambiguïté de la subsitution pénale. D'approche pluridisciplinaire, il aurait pourtant besoin d'être complété par une étude proprement dogmatique.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Das traditionelle Dogma der stellvertretenden Sühne, am Kreuz vollbracht, ist in der heutigen Theologie sehr unter Beschuss gekommen. Wir können deshalb den Dozenten des Albrecht-Bengel-Hauses in Tübingen sehr dankbar sein für ihre solide theologische Arbeit zu diesem Thema, die hier auch allgemeinverständlich dargestellt wird. Im exegetischen Teil untersuchen die verschiedenen Autoren die Sühne im Gesetz des Mose und in Jesaja 53. Außerdem gehen sie dem Verständnis des Kreuzes in den Evangelien und bei Paulus nach. Im historischen Teil zeigen sie die Kontinuität und die Entfaltung theologischen Nachdenkens über das Kreuz von der Alten Kirche bis zur Reformation auf, fragen nach Gründen der Infragestellung des überkommenen Dogmas zur Zeit der Aufklärung und des deutschen Idealismus (Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher) und beleuchten Ansätze zum Verständnis des Kreuzes im 20. Jahrhundert

(Bultmann, Barth, Tillich, Pannenberg). Das Buch schließt mit einer homiletischen Untersuchung: Wie können wir die Botschaft vom Kreuz dem (post-) modernen Menschen nahebringen?

Das vorliegende Buch verteidigt mit theologischer Kompetenz und ohne Zugeständnisse die überkommene Lehre der stellvertretenden Sühne. Es verfolgt dabei einen multidisziplinären Ansatz, der jedoch durch eine eigentlich dogmatische Studie ergänzt werden sollte.

Evangelical Christians tend to take penal substitution as the centre of the Gospel: Christ taking the place of the sinner, expiating sin by his death and thus reconciling the world to God. But everybody sensitive to modern theological debate knows that there is hardly a theologian outside the Evangelical movement today who clings to penal substitution. As Evangelicals have been very zealous (and rightly so) in *preaching* the saving grace of the Cross, they have not always manifested the same zeal in *reflecting* upon the Cross and in engaging in scholarly debate.

Therefore we should be very grateful to the teaching staff of the Albrecht-Bengel-Haus in Tübingen (Germany) for having responded to this need. As this institution aims mainly to support students at a main-stream theological faculty, its teachers know by experience the importance of presenting the biblical faith intelligently. The health of our Churches and the future of our missions depend on such an effort.

The book makes a bold defence of the traditional dogma of penal substitution. The authors are not ashamed of the Gospel, and it is a pleasure to see how they expand biblical truth and unmask false presuppositions of the 'modern' world view. At the same time they are sensitive to the obstacles which have to be surmounted before our contemporaries can accept the Gospel. They address a variety of biblical, historical and homiletic topics related to expiation.

About one half of the volume is occupied by valuable exegetical studies: Hartmut Schmid studies the theme of expiation in the Pentateuch. Ralf Albrecht addresses the controversial question of expiation in Isaiah 53. Volker Gäckle contributes two articles: in the first, he asks how the canonical Gospels understand the Cross, with a special interest in the words of Jesus himself. In the second, he examines the Pauline theology of the Cross. All of this is refreshing, positive scholarly work, exegesis rooted in the text, which intelligently defends the traditional understanding of the various texts related to the doctrine of expiation.

A second group of essays is concerned with the history of the dogma of expiation, starting from the Old Church through the Enlightenment right down to contemporary voices. Tobias Eißler looks at the period from the Apostolic Fathers until the Reformation, showing the continuity and the development of Christian thought on the subject. Rolf Hille addresses the question why traditional dogma is no longer credible to modern man. In answer to this question, he analyses prominent Enlightenment and idealist thinkers: Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher and Albrecht Ritschl. Eberhard Hahn finally looks at twentieth century interpretations of the Cross: Bultmann, Barth, Tillich and Wolfhart Pannenberg.

This second group of texts is without doubt the most difficult part of the volume to understand (especially the last two articles), and I admire the courage of the authors in seeking to encompass this very wide range of thought in what are, after all, very concise essays. Perhaps one of the strongest points of the book as a whole is its moderate length, which will avoid discouraging the lay reader! But I must confess nevertheless that this *tour de force* left me unsatisfied. It was not clear to me how the rather lengthy and complicated citations of Hegel, for example, relate to the current debate. Historically, it is surely interesting to know what great philosophers have said about the Cross; but it seems primary to me to show in which respects their teaching has found an echo with our contemporaries. One might also doubt if it is possible to present Barth's theology in seven (small) pages; but it is disappointing to see the author following very closely one single secondary source on Barth. Is this the reason why he qualifies Barth as a 'universalist without ambiguity, in respect to salvation' (p. 184)? Final universalism is certainly the logical consequence of the Barthian system; but Barth himself refused to affirm it unequivocally.

On the whole, I wonder if the more historical than dogmatic approach in this section is perhaps a symptom of a more general weakness of the book (there is no proper dogmatic study included in the volume!), and perhaps of some entire strands of Evangelical theology. There is a need to continue and to deepen the reflection started by the Bengel-Haus teachers. Theologians from a Calvinist and/or Baptist background would perhaps like to react in

some places where Lutheran sacramental theology is assumed to be the biblical view (p. 183, n. 31, p. 184, n. 38, p. 200). More important: we have to respond to the challenges of modernistic theology by a thorough analysis of its presuppositions and by the systematic exposition of biblical teaching, these are both tasks for dogmaticians.

This would engage our thinking on the subject of sin—a very slippery slope, as our intellect was first made to understand creation and not its perversion! This is perhaps the reason for what I feel to be a dangerous bias in Hille's language concerning sin. He criticises the characterisation of sin as 'privatio boni' (i.e., the want of good) as typical of idealistic philosophy (p. 147); sin has to be unmasked as 'a real power . . . which governs him [i.e., man] and which brings him temporal and eternal death' (p. 150). The definition of sin as *privatio boni* is classical and can find support from theologians as prodigious as Augustine, Thomas of Aquinas or in the Reformed tradition, for example, Charles Hodge. The doctrine of creation does not leave room in itself for any essence of sin. Even if I sympathise with the overall intention of Hille's discussion of sin (refusing the optimistic negation of its objectivity), this seems to me to be one more point where systematic theological thinking on expiation must be brought to bear.

The volume closes with a contribution by Wolfgang Becker concerning our homiletic practice. The richness of the multidisciplinary approach adopted by the Bengel-Haus teachers is here at its best. Even if Becker's analysis of the post-modern world view repeats some commonplaces, he goes beyond them to show some very pertinent points of contact between the preaching of the Gospel and our contemporaries. For example, he underlines the omnipresence of death in the mass media, against the commonly received idea of death as a taboo in Western societies (p. 213). He also finds examples of solidarity in guilt acknowledged in recent (German) history—in Nazism and the GDR police state—refuting the modern idea of isolated responsibility of the individual (p. 210–11). Both insights can help to smooth the path for the comprehension of the Gospel.

Warum das Kreuz? is a proof of the potential fruitfulness of co-operation in theological research, which is too often practised by isolated individuals. It is to be hoped that it will not only stimulate Evangelical preaching and thinking on this very central subject, but also give an example for other collective work on important issues of theological debate.

Lydia Jaeger
Nogent-sur-Marne (France)

EuroJTh (1999) **8:2**, 204–205 0960–2720

RECENT EVANGELICAL THEOLOGICAL PUBLICATIONS IN GERMAN

OT / NT

Craig L. Blomberg: *Die Gleichnisse Jesu*. TVG. Wuppertal: R. Brockhaus, 1998, ca. 320 S., DM 78.-

Jakob van Bruggen: *Wie lesen wir die Bibel?* Neuhausen: Hänssler, 1998. 220 S., DM 30.-

Stefano Cotrozzi. *Exegetischer Führer zum Titus- und Philemonbrief: Ein Wort-für-Wort-Überblick über sämtliche Auslegungs- und Übersetzungsvarianten*. Biblia et Symbiotica 16. Bonn: VKW, 1998. 177 S., 42,-

Heinz-Werner Neudorfer: *Das zweite Buch der Könige*. Wuppertaler Studienbibel AT. Wuppertal: R. Brockhaus, 1998, ca. 320 S., DM 39.-

Rainer Riesner: *Essener und Urgemeinde in Jerusalem: Neue Funde und Quellen*. Gießen: Brunnen, 1998. Ca. 160 S., DM 30.-

Carsten Peter Thiede. *Bibelcode und Bibelwort: Die Suche nach verschlüsselten Botschaften in der Heiligen Schrift*. Basel: Brunnen, 1998. Ca. 140 S., ca. DM 22,80

Carsten Peter Thiede. *Ein Fisch für den römischen Kaiser: Juden, Griechen, Römer: Die Welt des Jesus Christus*. München: Luchterhand, 1998. 389 S., DM 39,80

Hans-Georg Wünch: *Das Buch Ruth*. Edition C—Bibelkommentar. Neuhausen: Hänssler, 1998. 280 S., DM 35.-

Systematic Theology

Ulrich Eibach. *Sterbehilfe—Tötung aus Mitleid?* TVG Orientierung. Wuppertal: R. Brockhaus, 1998. Ca. 240 S., DM 39,80

Reinhard Haupt, Karl Farmer, Werner Lachmann, Hrsg.: *Unternehmensethik—wahre Lehre oder leere Ware? Ethik-Bekenntnisse in Unternehmensleitsätzen und Firmenphilosophien*. Wort und Wissen, 1998, 100 S., DM 20.-

Adolf Schlatter: *Die Gründe der christlichen Gewißheit; Das Gebet*. Gießen: Brunnen, 1998. 96 S., DM 20.-

Helge Stadelmann, Hrsg. *Bausteine zur Erneuerung der Kirche: Gemeindebau auf der Basis einer biblisch erneuerten Ekklesiologie*. TVG. Wuppertal: R. Brockhaus: Gießen: Brunnen, 1998. Ca. 280 S., DM 29,80

Church History

Arndt, Joachim. *Das Leben und Wirken des Johann Arndt*. Bielefeld: Missionsverl., 1998. 112 S., DM 16,80

Bernd Brandl. *Die Neukirchener Mission: Ihre Geschichte als erste deutsche Glaubensmission*. Schriftenreihe des Vereins für Rheinische Kirchengeschichte 128. Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1998. Ca. 500 S., ca. DM 58,-

Hyeong-Eun Chi. *Philipp Jakob Spener und seine Pia Desideria: Die Weiterführung der Reformvorschläge der Pia Desideria in seinem späteren Schrifttum*. EHS, R. 23, Bd. 562. Bern: Lang, 1997. 208 S., DM 65,-

Judith Hildebrandt. *Pietistischer Gemeindeaufbau zwischen Gemeinschaft und Gemeinde*. Neuhausen: Hänssler, 1998. Pb., 280 S., DM 27,95

Manacnuc Mathias Lichtenfeld. *Georg Merz, Pastoraltheologe zwischen den Zeiten: Leben und Werk in Weimarer Republik und Kirchenkampf als theologischer Beitrag zur Praxis der Kirche*. LKGG, Bd. 18. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1997. 798 S., DM 59,-

Andreas Lindner: *Leben im Spannungsfeld von Orthodoxie, Pietismus und Frühaufklärung: J. M. Schamelius, Oberpfarrer in Naumburg*. Gießen: Brunnen, 1998. Ca. 320 S., DM 49.-

Nicholas Railton: *The German Evangelical Alliance and the Third Reich: An Analysis of the "Evangelisches Allianzblatt"*. German Linguistic and Cultural Studies, Bd. 2. Bern: Lang, 1998. 265 S., DM 74,-

Werner Raupp: *Christian Gottlob Barth: Studien zu Leben und Werk*. Stuttgart: Calwer, 1998. 304 S., DM 88.-

Ulrike Schuler. *Die Evangelische Gemeinschaft*, Stuttgart: Medienwerk der Evangelisch methodistischen Kirche, 1998.

August Strobel. *Deine Mauern stehen vor mir allezeit: Bauten und Denkmäler der deutschen*

Siedlungs- und Forschungsgeschichte im Heiligen Land. Gießen: Brunnen, 1998. Ca. 128 S., D; 29,80

Reinhold Widter. *Kommentar zum Heidelberger Katechismus für die bekennende Gemeinde*. Zeugnisse der Reformation, Bd. 2. Neuhofen/Krems: Ev.-Ref. Medien, 1998. Ca. 200 S., DM 38,80

PT

Klaus Brinkmann, Hrsg. *Missionare und ihr Dienst im Gastland: Referate der Jahrestagung 1997 des Arbeitskreises für evangelikale Missiologie*. Edition AfeM, mission reports, Bd. 5. Bonn: VKW, 1997. 175 S., 42,-

Paulo Butzke. *Gemeindeaufbau in Brasilien*. EM 26. Erlangen: Erlanger Verlag für Mission und Ökumene, 1998. Ca. 320 S., ca. DM 70.-

Christa Conrad. *Der Dienst der ledigen Frau in deutschen Glaubensmissionen*. Edition AfeM, mission scripts, Bd. 12. Bonn: VKW, 1998. 140 S., 39,80

Lothar Käser: *Fremde Kulturen: Eine Einführung in die Ethnologie*. Lahr: VLM; Erlangen: Verl. d. Ev.-Luth. Mission, 1998, 346 S., DM 40.-

Armin Mauerhofer. *Gemeindebau nach biblischem Vorbild*. Neuhausen: Hänssler, 1998. 380 S., DM 39,95

Klaus W. Müller, Hrsg. *Die Person des Missionars. Referate der Jahrestagung 1996 des Arbeitskreises für evangelikale Missiologie*. Edition AfeM, mission reports, Bd. 4. Bonn: VKW, 1997. 110 S., 29,80

Rüdiger Nöh. *Pietismus und Mission: Die Stellung der Weltmisson in der Gemeinschaftsbewegung am Beispiel des Siegerländer Gemeinschaftsverbandes*. Edition AfeM, mission scripts, Bd. 13. Bonn: VKW, 1998. 179 S., 42,-

Klaus Wetzel: *Wo die Kirchen wachsen: Der geistliche Aufbruch in der Zwei-Drittel-Welt und die Folgen für das Christentum*. Wuppertal: R. Brockhaus, 1998, ca. 128 S., DM 20.-

Reinhold Widter. *Evangelische Missionskirchen im nachchristlichen Europa: Am Beispiel Österreichs*. Theologische Schriften, Bd. 3. Neuhofen/Krems: Ev.-Ref. Medien, 1998. Ca. 120 S., DM 23,80

Getatchew Haile; Aasulv Lande; Samuel Rubenson, Hrsg. *The Missionary Factor in Ethiopia: Papers from a Symposium on the Impact of European Missions on Ethiopian Society, Lund University, August 1996*. Studies in the Intercultural History of Christianity, Bd. 110. Frankfurt: Lang, 1998. 215 S., DM 65,-

Hannes Wiher. *Missionsdienst in Guinea: Das Evangelium für eine schamorientierte, von Animismus und Volksislam geprägte Gesellschaft*. Edition AfeM, mission scripts, Bd. 14. Bonn: VKW 1998. 125 S., 36,-