

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

JOURNAL EUROPÉEN DE THÉOLOGIE

EUROPÄISCHE THEOLOGISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT

XV(2007) : 1
ISSN 0960-2720

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Typeset by Toucan Graphic Design,
25 Southernhay East, Exeter, Devon.
Printed in Great Britain for
Paternoster Periodicals,
PO Box 300, Carlisle,
Cumbria, CA3 0OS UK
by Nottingham Alpha Graphics

ISSN 0960-2720

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The *European Journal of Theology* is published by Paternoster Periodicals twice annually.

Le *Journal Européen de Théologie* est publié par Paternoster Periodicals deux fois par an.

Die *ETZ* erscheint zweimal jährlich bei Paternoster Periodicals.

Great Britain and countries not listed below

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One Year	£29.20	$76.00	£30.40	£29.20	$49.40	£30.40
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Deutschland

Brunnen Verlag GmbH, Gottlieb-Daimler-Str. 22, D-35398 Giessen, Germany

Jahresbezugspreis: 24,90

Für Studenten: 19,50

2/3rds world, individuals and institutions:
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Paternoster Periodicals, PO Box 300, Carlisle, Cumbria CA3 0QS. UK
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Fax UK: 01228 51 49 49
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Fax Overseas: +44(0) 1228 51 49 49
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Editorial

Mark Elliott

Those who have good skills of observation will notice that an article which appeared in the last number is re-printed in this: Philip Ziegler on Kierkegaard, but this time with end-notes in place. The editor of a journal should not allow footnotes to disappear when he converts a file from one format to another, but it happens. We are called to high standards, for the sake of our professional standing, but also for the sake of the Gospel. Yet these are ideals, and take practice to make us consistent in excellence of life. Of course along with this goes a readiness to give others and ourselves a second chance, to be 'generous' in our orthodoxy, as one recent American movement would say. Two essays in this volume speak of the generous provisions in the two testaments by the Lord God for too often ungrateful people. Both show how God's provision of his sacrifice is the heart of the matter of biblical faith. The other essay – on love and self-offering as an approximation to faith – immediately and obviously raises evangelical Protestant suspicions about the notion of 'incipient faith'. One could perhaps allow a NT missiological investigation of the subject and conclude that there are shades of conversion, as taught by Jesus and the centurion, Peter and Cornelius, and of course in recent times, by the Church Growth Movement, although there will be more room for the stirring activity of the Holy Spirit than for the Spirit in creation.

Where evangelicals are known for their generosity then they are known for a position which is far from defensive but which is secure in the knowledge of the resources of the gospel message and the Holy Spirit's guidance and wisdom for life. Often when non-Christian people are asked what is unattractive about the church, it is about the coldness of suspicion, of a lack of forgiveness, of feuds continued, of the message of the gospel of forgiveness neglected in favour of well, debates about how to read Genesis 1-3, or Rom 5. It is not that these matters are unimportant – they are foundational, but too often there is a sort of preference to ignore one's opponent than to seek to challenge, discuss and pray together. In this global village, it can be easier to feel we belong to like-minded people on the other side of the world who agree with us on one point of doctrine than with flesh-and-blood neighbours among churches and families.

It is in part a question of identity. Is it in the Lord or in certain badges or markers of groupings? It would be very pleasing if our evangelical distinctives could include a sharpness in our message, a richness of biblical thought in our discourse, a forgiving and gracious spirit. Our theology will need to be in touch with pastoral issues as well as informed for the battle of minds to be 'taken captive for Christ'. 'Winning hearts and minds' is not going to happen if evangelical theology completely renounces the issues which seem 'trendy' – Jesus and non-Christian religions, faith and ethics, deconstruction and biblical theology, acceptable modes of spirituality. Of course one should not be running after the world's agenda and the old themes should never be ignored: Christology, justification, original sin – but they should be valued as inspiration-filled places (loci) to stand from which we can engage with the 'newer' questions.

We will also want to emphasise the fact that we live in a European, and even a world- community of ideas and doctrines. One problem with the hegemony of English is that, despite English allowing a certain amount of communication across nations, there is a distinction between what we read and write for our mother-tongue audience and a less high-quality summary of these ideas in English. The result can be superficial, as non-native English speaking theologians do not improve or "raise their game" in order to communicate internationally, while English native speakers assume that everyone from other countries is most interested in the kind of things which top American publishers promote. The pull of the Atlantic is great, but the reverse matters. Even of our conferences are going to be in English, that is no reason to allow a British-American agenda to drive what European Evangelicals talk about in public with each other across the national boundaries.

But, to return to the question of the limits of evangelical doctrine concerning a new or at least re-newed question of 'other faiths'. One would want to spend a little more time on the witness of Scripture on this matter, and perhaps also on how the Church through the ages has understood the faith and the status of those who have not explicitly expressed their faith in Christ. To speculate on just which criteria the Lord might use to judge the hearts of those who have not confessed Christ during their lifetime might well be in danger of pushing beyond the 'no entry' sign of Romans 9:20. Yet speculation is one way of sketching out just what might be legitimately inferred from the voices and the silences of Scripture. Some may feel that this article goes too far and I would very much welcome and invite the expression of other views which might complement as well as challenge it, but overall enrich out thinking and protect it from being over-liberal and over-conservative, remembering that Jesus and Paul were neither.

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Liebende Selbsthingabe als anfanghafter Glaube? Überlegungen zur Heilschance für den Nichtchristen

Thomas Gerold
München

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Der Mensch kann nur durch den Glauben an Christus gerettet werden. Was bedeutet dies aber für den Nichtchristen? Im vorliegenden Aufsatz wird die These vertreten, dass sich die Ansätze liebender Selbsthingabe in vielen Nichtchristen als anfanghaften Glauben an Christus deuten lassen. Dafür spreche sowohl, dass Christus die liebende Selbsthingabe in vollendeter Weise lebt, als auch, dass eine solche Haltung am besten ins Christentum passt. Damit wäre eine Heilsmöglichkeit für den Nichtchristen im Rahmen einer voll und ganz christozentrischen Theologie denkbar.

* * * *

RÉSUMÉ

L'homme ne peut être sauvé que par la foi en Christ. Qu'est-ce que cela implique pour le non chrétien ? Dans cet article, l'auteur défend la thèse selon laquelle, lorsque des non chrétiens manifestent un début de don de soi par amour pour autrui, cela peut être interprté comme une foi embryonnaire en Christ. Il avance pour cela deux arguments : le fait que Christ vive à la perfection le don de soi par amour et le fait qu'une telle thèse convienne mieux à l'esprit du christianisme. La possibilité du salut pour des non chrétiens est au moins envisageable dans le cadre d'une thologie pleinement christocentrique.

* * * *

SUMMARY

A human being can only be saved through faith in Christ. But what does this mean for the non-Christian? In the following essay the thesis is adopted that the beginnings of a loving self-offering in many non-Christians is to be counted as an embryonic faith in Christ. The fact that Christ lives out a loving self-offering in a perfect way as well as that such a position suits the spirit of Christianity best--these are good arguments in favour of this. A possibility of salvation for non-Christians in the framework of a full and thoroughly Christ-centred theology is at least thinkable.

* * * *

Als Christen der postmodernen Gesellschaft stehen wir mit zahlreichen Nichtchristen in Kontakt. Nun bemühen wir uns zwar dem Missionsbefehl gehorsam, diese mit Christi Botschaft zu erreichen, aber nicht zuletzt durch eigene Schwäche und durch widrige Umstände gelingt dies zu selten. Was lässt sich nun über das Schicksal der Nichtchristen sagen? Ist es die sichere ewige Verdammnis? Das könnte gerade die reformatorische Einsicht in das zutiefst christliche Prinzip bestätigen, dass wir nur durch Christus und durch den Glauben an ihn gerettet werden können.[1]

Nun könnte man, wie es z.B. die pluralistische Religionstheologie versucht, diesen Grundsatz aufgeben. Demnach würden Christen eben durch Christus gerettet und Nichtchristen auf andere Weise. Aber dieser Lösungsversuch wäre eine Neudefinierung des Christentums. Das würde letztend-

lich Gottes Öffnung für uns Menschen in Christus nicht ernstnehmen. Es gibt keinen Weg an ihm vorbei; denn er selbst ist der Weg.[2] Dies bedeutet für den Nichtchristen, dass er nur dann gerettet werden kann, wenn er zumindest einen anfanghaften Glauben an Christus besitzt. Im Folgenden wird der Frage nachgegangen, inwieweit sich die Ansätze liebender Selbsthingabe, die sich auch in Nichtchristen finden, zumindest als eine Vorform des Glaubens verstehen lassen, die auch heilsrelevant sein könnte.[3] Dabei geht es ausdrücklich um eine Vorform des Glaubens an Christus. Die von Karl Rahner in seinem Aufsatz *Atheismus und implizites Christentum* entwickelte Konstruktion eines transzendentalen Theismus, der bereits ein implizites Christentum sei, ist nämlich aufgrund des zu indirekten Christusbezugs problematisch.[4] Außerdem stand Rahners Denken entsprechend seiner Prägung als römisch katholischer Theologe zur Zeit des II. Vatikanums in einer Tradition, in der die starke Betonung der Kirche die Christozentrik immer wieder zu relativieren drohte. Dass diese Schwerpunktsetzung auch im Werk Rahners immer wieder zu spüren ist, liegt auch daran, dass er auf diesen Kontext eingehen musste und auch selbst von diesem beeinflusst wurde.[5]

Im vorliegenden Aufsatz soll eine Möglichkeit aufgezeigt werden, wie ein solcher anfanghafter Glaube an Christus gedacht werden könnte. Dabei handelt es sich um einen Diskussionsbeitrag und keine abgeschlossene Lehre.

Der sich selbst in Liebe hingebende Christus

Jeder Theologe muss zuerst auf Christus blicken. Er ist der Ausgangspunkt und das Ziel jeder Theologie und der einzige Weg zum Vater. Christus ist der präexistente ewige Sohn des Vaters, der von Ewigkeit an in der göttlichen Herrlichkeit war und Mensch wurde, um die Menschen zu erlösen. Und der Höhepunkt dieser Selbsthingabe war sein Tod am Kreuz.[6] Darin zeigt er sich als der sich selbst aus Liebe gebende Sohn Gottes, der stirbt, um die Seinen zu retten. Das sagt etwas Entscheidendes über Christus aus: Die Hingabe aus Liebe, die sein ganzes Leben durchzieht und ihren Höhepunkt am Kreuz erreicht, bestimmt sein ganzes Leben. Damit gehört liebende Selbsthingabe entscheidend zu Christus.

Das legt es nahe, dass zu jeder Beziehung zu Christus sich selbst hingebende Liebe gehört. Dies untermauert auch das biblische Zeugnis. Beispiele sind die Abschiedsreden im Johannesevangelium und die Bergpredigt. Man könnte nun alle Weisen liebender Selbsthingabe, auch wenn sie nicht bis zum Tod gehen, im Kontext der Selbsthingabe Christi verstehen. Dazu passt, dass Christi ganzes Wirken so verstanden werden kann. Man denke nur an seine Heilungswunder, die Menschen halfen,[7] und an sein Lehren, das Menschen den Weg zu Gott eröffnete. Und dies alles nicht aus Eigennutz, sondern immer für andere. Damit ist das Kreuz wirklich der stimmige Höhepunkt von Jesu Leben und Wirken. Das macht es naheliegend, die liebende Selbsthingabe als das große Prinzip Christi – sowohl in seinem irdischen Wirken als auch als ewiger Sohn des Vaters in Herrlichkeit – zu verstehen.

Ausschluss eines Missverständnisses – keine Reduktion Christi auf ein Prinzip

Diese enge Verbindung zwischen Christus und der liebenden Selbsthingabe darf nicht so missverstanden werden, als ob Christus auf dieses Prinzip reduziert würde und als Metapher der Selbsthingabe seiner Realität beraubt würde. Das ist keineswegs der Fall. In Christus ist zwar diese Selbsthingabe in Liebe durchgehend zu erkennen und das ist sehr wohl ein entscheidender Schlüssel zu Christus. Das wurde in der Theologie z.B. von Thomas Erskine of Linlathen und George MacDonald vertieft.[8] Aber Christus ist weit mehr als ein Bild der Selbsthingabe. Er ist der menschgewordene Sohn Gottes, der unter Pontius Pilatus gekreuzigt wurde, der auferstanden ist, der zum Vater in den Himmel aufgefahren ist und der wiederkehren wird. Aber immer lässt er sich als jemand verstehen, der als sich selbst Hingebender lebt. Er ist derjenige, der dieses Prinzip schon von Ewigkeit an lebt, und der es damit auch schon von Ewigkeit an verkörpert. Wenn man an die gut neutestamentlich belegte Schöpfungsmittlerschaft des Sohnes denkt,[9] ist es geradezu anzunehmen, dass durch Christus so etwas wie die liebende Selbsthingabe erst in die Welt kam, bzw. dass diese ohne ihn niemals möglich gewesen wäre. Ja man kann sogar mit George MacDonald die These vertreten, dass ohne Christus als liebende Selbsthingabe die Schöpfung nicht möglich gewesen wäre.[10] Wenn also alles von Christus her gedeutet wird, dann ist dies das Gegenteil der gelegentlich in der liberalen Theologie anzufindenden Tendenz, Christus metaphorisch zu deuten.

In diesem Kontext bleibt festzuhalten: Um

Christus zu verstehen, muss man sowohl den präexistenten ewigen Sohn des Vaters, als auch den menschgewordenen irdischen Christus, als auch seine liebende Selbsthingabe beachten, ohne davon irgendetwas aufzugeben. Nur so ist es möglich, Christus als ganzen ernst zu nehmen.

Die Bestätigung der liebenden Selbsthingabe durch die Auferstehung

Liebende Selbsthingabe wird nicht nur von Christen gepflegt. Wenn sich jemand in Liebe hingibt, wird dies auch von vielen Nichtchristen sehr positiv gewertet. Allerdings unterscheidet sich ihre Sicht dieser liebenden Selbsthingabe in zumindest einem Punkt deutlich von der der Christen. Im gesamtgesellschaftlichen Kontext scheint dieses Ideal nämlich eher der Intuition zu widersprechen. Denn sowohl dort als auch im Kontext der Natur steht meist die eigene Durchsetzungsfähigkeit im Vordergrund und nicht unbedingt die Selbsthingabe.[11] Und wenn diese in der Praxis bei manchen Nichtchristen doch im Vordergrund steht, dann hat zumindest der moderne Naturalist das Problem, dass er sie letztendlich im Rahmen seiner meist evolutionär geprägten Weltsicht erklären muss und damit wiederum im Kontext des Kampfes um das Überleben.

Vor einem christlichen Verständnis ist dies anders. Hier gibt wieder der Blick auf Christus Aufschluss. Auch bei ihm führt die liebende Selbsthingabe zunächst zum völligen Scheitern, nämlich zum Tod am Kreuz. Aber bei ihm bleibt es ja gerade nicht dabei, vielmehr wird in der Auferstehung dieses Prinzip der Welt radikal durchbrochen. Seine Geschichte findet in der Auferstehung und Himmelfahrt ihre Fortsetzung und wird mit seiner Wiederkehr ihren Abschluss finden, bzw. beim endgültigen Aufgang der Herrlichkeit. Durch die Antwort des Vaters auf die vollendete Selbsthingabe am Kreuz ist diese von Gott selbst bestätigt. Christi in der Auferstehung bestätigte Selbsthingabe zeigt wie falsch der sündige Mensch, mit Luther gesprochen der homo incurvatus in se ipsum[12] liegt. Zur menschlichen Sünde gehört schließlich ganz zentral dessen Selbstzentriertheit.[13] Diese wird durch die Bestätigung der liebenden Selbsthingabe in der Auferstehung widerlegt, womit die von der Sünde geprägten Prinzipen der Welt radikal in Frage gestellt werden. Christus ist also nicht nur das Sühneopfer für die menschlichen Sünden, sondern macht auch sichtbar, wie falsch die Selbstzentriertheit in Sünde ist. Wenn sich also der Christ um liebende Selbsthingabe bemüht und damit um eine gewisse Christusähnlichkeit, dann verhält er sich völlig konsequent. Sein Handeln und seine Überzeugungen bilden eine Einheit. Denn er richtet sich damit an den die Welt bestimmenden Ereignissen Menschwerdung, Kreuzigung und Auferstehung aus. Die stehen zwar für weit mehr, aber eben auch für die Selbsthingabe des ewigen Sohnes Gottes und deren Bestätigung durch den Vater.

Die liebende Selbsthingabe des Nichtchristen

Beim Nichtchristen scheint es nun so zu sein, dass er, wenn er Naturalist ist und sich doch immer wieder für liebende Selbsthingabe entscheidet, gegen die zumindest eingebildete Realität handelt. Er weiß, dass dieses Ideal letztendlich nicht in seine Welt passt, aber wenn er es tut, dann handelt er hier einfach gegen seine Weltsicht und zeigt – gelegentlich oder fast durchgehend – Ansätze dieser liebenden Selbsthingabe. Teilweise können diese Ansätze sogar soweit gehen, dass anfanghaft eine gewisse Christusähnlichkeit erahnbar wenn nicht sogar sichtbar wird. Hier gibt es nun zumindest einen klaren Unterschied zum Christen. Beim Christen entspricht es eindeutig auch dem, was das Zentrum seiner Überzeugungen ist, beim Nichtchristen ist das nicht unbedingt der Fall. Der Atheist muss faktisch, wenn er dieses Ideal vertritt, es gegen seine angenommene Realität leben. Oder er muss zumindest eine große und nicht auflösbare Spannung innerhalb der Wirklichkeit annehmen. Er ist damit faktisch als Person weit besser als seine Überzeugungen, aber das Problem einer inneren Spaltung bleibt dennoch bestehen.[14]

Bei den Vertretern anderer Religionen ist der Fall komplizierter: Die meisten nichtchristlichen Religionen sprechen sich sehr wohl für liebende Selbsthingabe aus, auch wenn der Grad und der Empfängerkreis schwanken. Damit ist dieses Ideal innerhalb ihrer Überzeugungen verankert. Aber in keiner davon spielt dieses Ideal eine auch nur annähernd so große Rolle wie im Christentum. Nach christlicher Überzeugung hat im ewigen Sohn, in Christus, Gott selbst das Kreuz auf sich genommen, um die Menschen zu erlösen. Er ist den Weg aus der ewigen Herrlichkeit in den grausamen Tod gegangen, um zu helfen. Und dies freiwillig aus Liebe. Das ist nicht mehr zu übertreffen und wird von keiner anderen Religion auch nur annähernd erreicht. So gibt es zwar z.B. im Buddhismus durchaus Ansätze zur liebenden Selbsthingabe.

Gerade wenn man an das Boddhisatva-Ideal denkt, wie es z.B. im tibetischen Buddhismus vorhanden ist. Ein Boddhisatva „gelobt die Erleuchtung zu erlangen, aber auf das Eingehen in den vollständigen Frieden zu verzichten und statt dessen voller Mitleid in der Welt zu verbleiben und solange Heilsbeistand zu leisten, bis alle Wesen erlöst sind."[15]. In diesem Gelöbnis verpflichtet er sich zu helfen. Dieses Ideal hat tatsächlich Ähnlichkeit mit dem christlichen Ideal. Aber Christi Handeln ist nicht zu übertreffen; denn ein bloßer Mensch, der nicht auch wahrer Gott ist, könnte nicht auch die Menschwerdung auf sich nehmen. Und dann kommt im Christentum durch das Vorbild Christi ja gerade die Bereitschaft hinzu, Leiden aus Liebe – sei es zu Gott oder zum Mitmenschen – auf sich zu nehmen, die eine neue Dimension auftut. Der „friedvolle Tod in ruhendem Bewußtsein",[16] der von Gautama überliefert wird, und der Tod Jesu am Kreuz, der nicht nur wie von Brück schreibt als „Opfertod mit Heilsbedeutung interpretiert wird",[17] sondern ein solcher ist, zeigen die Gegensätze auf. Gerade wenn es dem historischen Buddha wohl nur darum ging, einen Ausweg aus dem Kreislauf der Wiedergeburten aufzuzeigen,[18] dann übertrifft im Boddhisatva-Ideal ein Teil des Buddhismus seine Ursprünge. Wenn man nun aber diesen Weg konsequent weitergeht, stellt sich die Frage, ob nicht letztendlich das Christentum das folgerichtige Ziel wäre und nicht ein Buddhist, der den am stärksten die Liebe betonenden Elementen seiner Religion folgt, auf die Dauer beim Christentum angelangen müsste. Denn gerade dort wird ja die liebende Selbsthingabe zu etwas, das schon in Gott selbst vorhanden ist, von Gott unendlichfach gelebt wird und von Gott eben aus Liebe auch dem Menschen ermöglicht wird.

Damit wäre am Vorrang des Christentums festgehalten. Dem Einwand von Vertretern der pluralistischen Religionstheologie, dass Anhänger anderer Religionen genauso viele Früchte hervorbringen würden,[19] ist zumindest soweit zuzustimmen, dass es diese Früchte wirklich gibt. Diese lassen sich nicht alle auf versteckten Eigennutz, also auf die Hoffnung auf Gegenleistung reduzieren, sondern sie sind zumindest teilweise nur durch liebende Hingabe ohne Rücksicht auf das Eigeninteresse zu erklären. Und über die Vertreter anderer Religionen hinaus gibt es diese Früchte sogar bei Atheisten. Aber trotz des Vorhandensein dieser Früchte und echter liebender Selbsthingabe bei Menschen aller Religionen muss doch festgestellt werden, dass das Wissen darum, dass der ewige Sohn Gottes selbst dies in Vollendung und in unübertreffbarer Weise praktiziert, eine Grundlage und ein vollkommenes Ziel für diese Praxis bildet, die nicht mehr übertroffen werden kann. Und dieses Wissen ist allein durch die Schrift zugänglich, die der Zugang schlechthin zu Christus, dem alleinigen Retter ist. Diese christliche Überlegenheit liegt aber – darauf ist immer wieder hinzuweisen – nicht im Handeln des Christen begründet, sondern in Christus, der ja selbst die liebende Selbsthingabe in so unübertreffbarer Weise lebt und deren Anfänge im Leben des Christen erst ermöglicht. D.h. wann immer der Christ darauf hinweist, dass seine Religion größer ist, geht es nicht um Eigenlob, im Grunde genommen nicht einmal um das Lob des Christentums, sondern im Kern um das Lob Jesu Christi selbst. Denn im Vergleich zu ihm ist sogar das Christentum sekundär, das ja völlig auf ihn aufbaut.

Hat die liebende Selbsthingabe des Nichtchristen einen Bezug zu Christus?

Die reformatorische Einsicht, dass der Mensch immer ganz von der Gnade Gottes abhängig ist, legt es nahe, die liebende Selbsthingabe im Christen als eine Frucht der göttlichen Gnade zu sehen. Um mit John Wesley zu sprechen: „there cannot be in any man one good temper or desire, or so much as one good thought, unless it be produced by the almighty power of God, by the inspiration or influence of the Holy Ghost."[20] Wenn aber wirklich sogar jeder gute Gedanke nur durch den Heiligen Geist möglich ist, wie sind dann die Ansätze dieser liebenden Selbsthingabe im Nichtchristen zu werten. Sind sie einfach nur den Entsprechungen im Christen ähnlich, aber etwas völlig anderes, oder sind auch sie eine Frucht des Geistes? Gravierende Gründe sprechen für letzteres. Einmal wäre es wider den Anschein, dass die liebende Selbsthingabe beim Christen und beim Nichtchristen etwas völlig anderes wären. Dann scheint sie im Neuen Testament bei jedem positiv gewertet zu werden. Hier ist besonders an die Gerichtsrede in Mt 25,31-46 zu erinnern, bei der nicht gefragt wird, ob diejenigen, die Christus in den geringsten Brüdern aufgenommen haben, Christen sind oder nicht.

Nun zeigt sich in manchen Nichtchristen ein geradezu christusähnliches Verhalten, also klare Anzeichen des Wirkens seines Geistes. Nun kann man, wie Joseph Bernhart es in einem anderen Kontext versucht, einfach feststellen: „der Geist Jesu Christi reicht weiter als das Christentum".[21]

Ähnliche Thesen finden sich auch bei Gavin d'Costa.[22] Dennoch fragt sich, ob das Wirken dieses Geistes nicht eine anfanghafte Gemeinschaft mit Christus voraussetzt. Ein Wirken des mit Christus in der Trinität untrennbar verbundenen Geistes ohne Bezug zu Christus dürfte kaum denkbar sein.[23] Wenn aber dennoch dieser Geist auch unter Nichtchristen wirken sollte, dann wäre ein Bezug zwischen Christus und zumindest einem Teil der Nichtchristen naheliegend. Allerdings stellt sich die Frage, inwieweit ein solcher „ungläubiger Gläubige" denkbar sein könnte. Wäre so etwas allerdings nicht möglich, dann können entweder nur Christen gerettet werden, oder aber es gäbe auch eine Rettung ganz ohne Glauben, womit der klassische reformatorische Grundsatz „nur durch Glaube" einfach falsch wäre.

Liebende Selbsthingabe als anfanghafter Glaube[24]

Eine Möglichkeit wäre, an Rahners anonymes Christentum zu denken. Nur erweckt diese Konstruktion oft genug den Eindruck, z.B. durch den Begriff des „übernatürlichen Existentials", den Bezug zu Christus so abstrakt zu denken, dass davon wenig erkennbar bleibt.[25] Die Rettung durch Christus bleibt dabei erhalten, das ist Rahner ausdrücklich zuzugestehen, genauso die Zentralität Jesu Christi. Damit erreicht Rahner in seiner Theologie zwei wichtige Ziele. Dennoch bleibt zumindest der Verdacht, dass der Bezug zum Tod Christi am Kreuz und damit zur ganz zentralen Heilstat nicht ausreichend deutlich wird. Erst recht gilt dies für die Notwendigkeit des Glaubens an Christus. Aber gerade wenn Rahner keine stimmige Antwort liefert, stellt sich die Frage: Wie kann ein anfanghafter Glaube, der für das Heil notwendig ist, beim Nichtchristen überhaupt möglich sein?[26]

Eine zumindest mögliche Antwort ist, die liebende Selbsthingabe als einen solchen anfanghaften Glauben zu verstehen. Wenn sie in unübertreffbarer Weise in das Christentum passt, wenn also der Nichtchrist in einem Spannungsfeld zwischen liebender Selbsthingabe und seinen übrigen Überzeugungen lebt, dann ist es vertretbar, hier zumindest ein erstes Element des Glaubens anzunehmen. Wäre er nämlich ein konsequenter Nichtchrist, dann wäre es doch naheliegend, nicht wie Christus zu handeln und sich nicht auch nur annähernd hinzugeben. Und wenn eine nichtchristliche Religion dies fordert, auch wenn es zu einigen ihrer Grundlagen in Spannung steht, dann ist doch erst recht anzunehmen, dass hier eine erste Vorentscheidung für Christus gefallen ist. In diesem Kontext würden auch die Bibelstellen Sinn machen, die nicht zwischen Christ und Nichtchrist unterscheiden und dennoch von einem Christusbezug ausgehen. Dies gilt gerade für den oben schon genannten Abschnitt Mt 25,31-46. Hier wird bei denen, welche die Hungrigen speisen, den Durstigen zu trinken geben, die Fremden aufnehmen, die Nackten kleiden und die Kranken und die Gefangenen besuchen, auch ein eindeutiger Christusbezug hergestellt, der auch diejenigen miteinzuschließen scheint, die nicht bewusst Christen sind.

Hinzu kommt ein weiterer Punkt: Die Entscheidung für liebende Selbsthingabe passt – wie oben aufgezeigt – am besten in das Christentum. Bei anderen Religionen passt sie weniger gut, zu einem nichtchristlichen Naturalismus passt sie wohl überhaupt nicht. Wenn sich jemand nun für etwas zentral Christliches entscheidet, was seinen sonstigen Überzeugungen nicht entspricht, stellt sich die Frage, wofür er wirklich steht. Steht er für eine Weltsicht, die ohne Christus auskommt, oder letztendlich doch für Christus? Also steht nicht genau diese praktisch getroffene Entscheidung für Christus, die sogar echte Früchte hervorbringt, schon für einen anfanghaften Glauben an Christus, der heilsrelevant sein könnte? Und diese Möglichkeit wird noch wahrscheinlicher, wenn man Wesleys Einsicht bedenkt, dass selbst ein einzelner guter Gedanke nur durch den Geist Jesu möglich ist.

Ausschluss des Missverständnisses des Werkgerechtigkeit

Die Heilsrelevanz der liebenden Selbsthingabe kann nun als Werkgerechtigkeit durch die Hintertür missverstanden werden. Man könnte denken, dass derjenige, der sich so ähnlich wie Christus verhält, als Belohnung das Heil bekäme. Das wäre eine mit dem Christentum nicht vereinbare Haltung. Aber darum geht es hier gerade nicht. Sondern darum, dass sich eine zumindest unbewusste Grundoffenheit, ja vielleicht sogar eine Grundentscheidung für Christus zeigt, die ein anfanghafter Glaube sein könnte. Wenn durch diesen anfanghaften Glauben eine Beziehung zwischen Christus und dem Nichtchristen vorhanden ist, löst sich auch das Rätsel, wie allem Anschein nach der Geist auch in ihnen wirken kann. Hätten sie nicht einmal einen anfanghaften Glauben, dann würde der Geist entweder ohne Beteiligung Christi in ihnen wirken, oder alles wäre nur Schein, oder aber sie würden es aus eige-

ner Kraft vollbringen. Diese drei Möglichkeiten sind alle höchst problematisch. Wenn aber ein anfanghafter Glaube bei zumindest einigen Nichtchristen gegeben sein sollte, dann wäre all das Positive in ihnen durch Christus ermöglicht und gewirkt. Dem Argument der Früchte gegen die Überlegenheit des Christentums, das z.B. die pluralistische Religionstheologie anführt, wäre damit der Boden unter den Füßen weggezogen. Alles wäre so auf Christus hingeordnet. Diese Konzeption würde alle positiven Früchte echter liebender Selbsthingabe erklären und zu Christus in Beziehung setzen. Wenn solche gegeben sind, und wenn sie echt zu sein scheinen, dann spricht alles dafür, diese als Früchte eines anfanghaften Glaubens zu verstehen.

Ausblick: Christus als das Heil

Die liebende Selbsthingabe steht auf das Engste mit Christus in Verbindung, der sie in überragendem Maße am Kreuz vorgelebt hat. Sie macht sogar so sehr Christus aus, dass die Entscheidung für sie sehr wohl als anfanghafter Glaube verstanden werden kann. Damit wäre eine echte Beziehung des Nichtchristen zu Christus erklärbar. Das Wirken des Geistes in ihm wäre verständlich. Und damit wäre auch eine Heilsmöglichkeit für ihn wahrscheinlich. Und dies alles, ohne die Einzigartigkeit und die Unübertrefflichkeit des einen Erlösers Jesus Christus zu relativieren.

Die Pflicht des Christen, die frohe Botschaft Jesu Christi – und damit ihn selbst – auch und gerade dem Nichtchristen mitzuteilen, wird dadurch eher noch verstärkt. Denn wenn das Beste im Nichtchristen nur durch Christus zu verstehen ist, dann ist es erst recht unverantwortlich, ihn nicht auf seinen Erlöser hinzuweisen. Im Grunde genommen besagt der vorliegende Ansatz, dass der Nichtchrist sich nicht ohne Christus verstehen lässt. Das zeigt christliche Mission als Notwendigkeit auf. Gleichzeitig gesteht dieser Ansatz auch den Nichtchristen einen zumindest möglichen Bezug zu Christus zu. Sie sind durch einen anfanghaften Glauben mit Christus verbunden und so wirkt er im Geist in ihnen. Diese Einsicht macht es für den Christen notwendig, das Gute im Nichtchristen ausdrücklich zu würdigen und in ihm zumindest in anfanghafter Weise einen Bruder oder eine Schwester zu sehen. Und dies gerade in und durch Christus.

Ein ernster Einwand bleibt: Diese Position ist keinesfalls die einzige im Kontext der Schrift mögliche. Auch Haltungen, die die Heilschancen des Nichtchristen pessimistischer einstufen, können Argumente vorweisen. Mir scheint zwar die hier vorgelegte Position besser begründbar zu sein, aber wie bei jeder Abwägungsfrage sind verschiedene Antworten denkbar. Und gerade wenn eschatologische Fragen gestreift werden, muss der Theologe eingestehen, dass seine Systeme immer unter dem Vorbehalt der kommenden Wirklichkeit stehen.

Bei allen offenen Fragen hoffe ich, dass der vorliegende Ansatz sowohl an den fundamentalen Grundsätzen des Christentums festhält, als auch die Hoffnung für das Heil des Nichtchristen begründet offenhält, und damit eine bessere Alternative zu den Ansätzen der pluralistischen Religionstheologie bietet. Insbesondere hoffe ich, durch die Betonung der liebenden Selbsthingabe aufgezeigt zu haben, wie ein echter Bezug des Nichtchristen zu Christus denkbar ist. Damit bleibt die vorliegende Lösung nicht bei einer irgendwie gearteten Ahnung Gottes stehen, sondern postuliert einen anfanghaften Glauben an Christus, der allein der Weg zum Vater ist.

Notes

1 Dass die Rechtfertigung nur durch den Glauben für Luther zentral ist (vgl. Bayer, Oswald, Martin Luthers Theologie. Eine Vergegenwärtigung, Tübingen2: Mohr Siebeck, 2004, 90), ist bekannt. Man bedenke nur, wie bedeutend dieser Punkt für die Schmalkaldischen Artikel ist (vgl. BSLK 415). Für die deutschsprachige Leserschaft ist zu betonen, dass mit dem 11. der 39 Artikel dies von ihren traditionellen Lehrdokumenten her auch für die anglikanische Kirche gilt. Darüber hinaus ist auch für den eigentlich besonders die Liebe betonenden Methodismus die Rettung durch den Glauben von größter Bedeutung. Immerhin ist einer der Startpunkte des Methodist Revival John Wesleys Predigt *Salvation By Faith* (vgl. Edwards, Maldwyn, John Wesley, in: Davies, Rupert, Rupp, Gordon, A History of the Methodist Church in Great Britain. Volume One, London: Epworth Press, 1965, 37-79, 50).

2 Vgl. Joh 14,6.

3 Damit soll versucht werden, den in der Oktoberausgabe 2006 bei der Diskussion des Ansatzes von Schmidt-Leukel geäußerten Vorschlag in die Tat umzusetzen, eine Weiterentwicklung des „anonymen Christentums" zu liefern, die noch deutlicher „die Bezogenheit auf Christus" zeigt (Gerold, Thomas, Ein Rezensionsartikel zu: Schmidt-Leukel, Perry, *Gott ohne Grenzen*, in: EJT XV (2006) 2, 119-123, 123).

4 Vgl. Rahner, Karl, *Schriften zur Theologie* VIII, Einsiedeln, Zürich, Köln: Benziger, 1967, 201-211.

5 Hier ist daran zu erinnern, dass die r.k. Tradition für das Heil des Menschen sehr massiv die Kirche betont. Das ist an sich durchaus vertretbar, weil Christus und die Kirche zusammengehören. Es wird aber sehr problematisch, wenn man die Kirche Jesu Christi mit der unter der Leitung des Papstes stehenden Institution identifiziert und diese für in besonderer Weise heilsrelevant erklärt. Dass dies bis heute die römisch katholische Position ist, demonstriert selbst das Ökumenismusdekret des II. Vatikanums. Dort wird den nicht r.k. Kirchen zwar Positives zugestanden. Zugleich wird es aber als eigentlich der katholischen im Sinne von r.k. Kirche anvertraut bezeichnet. Und es wird auch betont, dass die Fülle der Heilsmittel nur in der r.k. Kirche zu finden ist (vgl. UR 3, zitiert nach Denzinger, Heinrich, Hühnermann, Peter, *Kompendium der Glaubensbekenntnisse und kirchlichen Lehrentscheidungen*, Freiburg im Br., u.a.37: Herder, 1991, 4188-4190). Dass eine solche Überbetonung der Kirche, die in diesem Kontext ja sehr hierarchieorientiert gedacht wird, es nicht gerade erleichtert, Christus ins Zentrum zu stellen, ist offensichtlich. An dieser Stelle ist daran zu erinnern, dass Rahner einer der maßgeblichen Theologen des II. Vatikanums war.

6 Bei einigen Theologen geht dieser Weg in der Höllenfahrt sogar noch weiter. Man denke hier nur an den Ansatz von Hans Urs von Balthasar, der sich beispielsweise in seinem Aufsatz *Abstieg zur Hölle* zeigt (vgl. Balthasar, Hans Urs von, *Pneuma und Institution: Skizzen zur Theologie IV*, Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1974, 387-400). Dieser Ansatz denkt sehr konsequent das Geschehen am Kreuz fort, allerdings ist Christi Tod am Kreuz in Golgotha deutlich besser biblisch belegt als seine Höllenfahrt und sollte deshalb wirklich im Zentrum stehen.

7 Eine interessante Deutung der Heilungswunder liefert George MacDonald, der aufzeigt, dass sie für das Verständnis Christi von großer Bedeutung sind. Sie präsentieren sehr anschaulich Christi Zuwendung an die Menschen (vgl. MacDonald, George, *The Miracles of Our Lord*, Whitethorn CA: Johannesen, 1995 [London: Strahan, 1870] 261-317).
Gerade eine solche Auseinandersetzung mit den Wundern Jesu wie von George MacDonald zeigt, wie viel das Christentum verlieren würde, wenn sie bei der Wahrnehmung Jesu keine ausreichende Beachtung mehr finden würden.

8 Vgl. Horrocks, Don, *Laws of the Spiritual Order. Innovation and Reconstruction in the Soteriology of Thomas Erskine of Linlathen*, Carlisle: Paternoster, 2004, 37. Bei Erskine wird die „self-sacrificing love" geradezu zu einem Schlüssel zum Verständnis Gottes insgesamt. In George MacDonalds Ansätze zu dieser Thematik habe ich im entsprechenden Kapitel von Die Gotteskindschaft des Menschen eingeführt, insbesondere auf den Seiten. 58-70 (vgl. Gerold, Thomas, *Die Gotteskindschaft des Menschen. Die theologische Anthropologie bei George MacDonald*, Münster: Lit, 2007, 58-70).

9 Vgl. Joh 1,10; Kol 1,16.

10 Näher entwickelt wird dies beispielsweise von George MacDonald in seiner Predigt *Creation in Christ* (vgl. MacDonald, George, Unspoken Sermons. Third Series, Eureka: Sunrise, 1996, 1-24).

11 Ein gutes Beispiel für diese Einstellung der Welt liefert George MacDonald in seinem Roman *Sir Gibbie*. Dort denken die Leute über den kleinen Gibbie folgendermaßen: „it was incredible that a child should be poor, unselfish, loving and *not* deficient in intellect !" (MacDonald, George, *Sir Gibbie*, Eureka CA: Sunrise, 1988 [London: Hurst & Blackett 1879] 29).

12 Dieser Begriff taucht bei Luther in unterschiedlicher Fassung immer wieder auf. Den Anfang macht die Römerbriefvorlesung (vgl. WA 56, 356, 5f).

13 Vgl. Bayer, Oswald, *Martin Luthers Theologie. Eine Vergegenwärtigung*, Tübingen2: Mohr Siebeck, 2004, 163-164.

14 Literarisch wird die Spannung zwischen naturalistischen ethischen Modellen und praktischem Handeln von C. S. Lewis in seinem Roman That Hideous Strength ausgeführt (vgl. Lewis, Clive Staples, *That Hideous Strength*. A modern fairy-tale for grown ups, in: Lewis, Clive Staples, *The Cosmic Trilogy* 349-753, London, Basingstoke: The Bodley Head / Pan Books, 1989, 741). Dabei ist seine zeitliche Situation zu bedenken. Dennoch ist sein Werk auch in diesem Punkt von großer Aktualität. Allerdings gibt es einen großen Unterschied zwischen Lewis in *That Hideous Strength* und dem in diesem Aufsatz vertretenen Ansatz: Lewis verweist stärker auf die Gefahr, die von diesen Ideen ausgeht. Dieser Aufsatz versucht dagegen stärker hervorzuheben, dass in der diese Ideen ignorierenden Praxis etwas Positives und vielleicht sogar ein Bezug zu Christus zu erkennen ist.

15 Vgl. Wangmo, Tenzin, Das Boddhisatva Ideal, in: Götz, Josef, Gerold, Thomas, *Die Mystik im Buddhismus* und *im Christentum. Und Aspekte des interreligiösen Dialogs*, St. Ottilien: Eos Verlag, 2006, 37-49, 38.
Neben Tenzin Wangmos gut lesbarer und praxisnaher Darstellung aus der Sicht einer buddhistischen Nonne ist aus religionswissenschaftlicher Perspektive Paul Williams entsprechendes Kapitel in seiner Einführung in den Mahayana-Buddhismus zu nennen. Er zeigt dabei neben diesem Kern auch die für Christen eher befremdlichen Aspekte dieser Vorstellungen auf (vgl. Williams, Paul, *Mahayana Buddhism: The doctrinal foundations*, London, New York: Routledge, 1989, 197-214).

16 Brück, Michael von, Wer ist Buddha für Christen?, in: Schmidt-Leukel, Perry, *Wer ist Buddha? Eine*

Gestalt und ihre Bedeutung für die Menschheit, München: Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1998, 225-240, 232

17 Ebd.

18 Vgl. Tauscher, Helmut, *Die Buddha-Wirklichkeit* in den späteren Formen des mahayanischen Buddhismus, in: Schmidt-Leukel, Perry, Wer ist Buddha?, 93-108, 102.

19 Vgl. Schmidt-Leukel, Perry. *Eine christliche und pluralistische Theologie der Religionen*. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2005, 156-160.

20 Vgl. Wesley, John, *The Works of John Wesley. Volume 9. The Methodist Societies: History, Nature, and Design*, Nashville: Abingdon Press: 1989, 124-125 (Advice to the People called Methodists).

21 Vgl. Bernhart, Joseph, Weitlauff, Manfred ed. *Die philosophische Mystik des Mittelalters*, Weißenhorn: Konrad, 2000, 909.

22 Vgl. D'Costa, Gavin, Christ, The Trinity and Religious Plurality, in: D'Costa, Gavin, Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered. The Myth of a Pluralistic Theology of Religions, Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1990.16-29, 19.

23 Vielleicht liegt im Hinweis auf den Bezug zwischen Christus und dem Geist einer der Vorteile des Filioques in der westlichen Fassung des Nizänischen Bekenntnisses.

24 Diese Formulierung zeigt eine andere Akzentsetzung als sie in Gavin d'Costas *Christ, the Trinity and Religious Plurality* gegeben ist (vgl. D'Costa, Gavin, Christ, The Trinity and Religious Plurality, in: D'Costa, Gavin, Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered, 19-20). Während D'Costa sich sehr auf die Liebe konzentriert und den Bezug zwischen Glaube und Rettung zumindest hier nicht erwähnt, wird im vorliegenden Aufsatz versucht, sehr wohl am Zusammenhang zwischen Rettung und Glauben festzuhalten.

25 Eine Einführung in diese Konzeption mit ihren Begrifflichkeiten findet sich in Rahners Aufsatz *Die Anonymen Christen* (vgl. Rahner, Karl, Schriften zur Theologie VI, Einsiedeln, Zürich, Köln: Benzinger, 1965, 545-554).

26 Zu diesem Problem fällt auf, dass auch Rahner hier eine gewisse Aporie einfach einräumen muss (vgl. Rahner, Karl, *Schriften zu Theologie VIII*, Einsiedeln, Zürich, Köln: Benzinger, 1967, 196).

EuroJTh (2006) 16:1, 13–24 0960–2720

Old Testament Sacrifices And Reconciliation

Sylvain Romerowski

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article étudie la fonction des sacrifices de l'ancienne alliance, principalement à partir du Lévitique. Tout en considérant divers autres points de vue, l'auteur s'efforce de démontrer les thèses suivantes. 1) Le verbe hébreu *kipper* a le sens d'expier, c'est-à-dire de payer pour une faute. 2) Le geste d'imposition de la main symbolise le transfert du péché de l'adorateur sur l'animal destiné au sacrifice. 3) Le sang de l'animal égorgé représente conventionnellement la vie ôtée à l'animal (Lv 17.11) et l'aspersion de ce sang servait de signe qu'une mort était intervenue pour expier les péchés. 4) L'expression *rêaḥ-nîḥoaḥ* (Lv 1.9) signifie probablement « odeur apaisante » et est utilisée pour indiquer que les sacrifices avaient pour fonction d'apaiser la colère divine. L'auteur en conclut que les cinq types de sacrifices avent une fonction d'expiation. L'holocauste expiait les péchés en général et permettait aux Israélites d'être agréés chaque fois qu'ils venaient rendre un culte à Dieu. L'offrande de céréale accompagnait généralement des sacrifices sanglants. Le prêtre en consommait une partie en signe qu'il prenait sur lui le péché de l'adorateur. Le sacrifice de paix donnait lieu à un repas pris en présence de Yahvé en signe de communion avec lui. Le sacrifice pour le péché expiait des fautes involontaires et l'aspersion de sang avait pour but de purifier le sanctuaire souillé par les péchés des Israélites. Le sacrifice de réparation était offert pour des fautes réparables, commises dans le domaine cultuel. Après Ésaïe (ch. 53), le Nouveau Testament, et notamment l'épître aux Hébreux, offre une lecture typologique de ce système sacrificiel. Les sacrifices y sont vus comme une préfiguration de la mort de Christ qui seule est adéquate pour expier véritablement les péchés. Avant la venue de Christ, les Israélites qui avaient une foi authentique recevaient le pardon de leurs fautes par anticipation sur la mort de Christ et demeuraient liés aux rites sacrificiels parce que cette mort n'était pas encore intervenue. Ceux qui n'avaient pas cette foi ne recevaient, en offrant leurs sacrifices, qu'un pardon rituel qui ne leur permettait pas un accès à la présence divine véritable. Selon l'auteur, la réconciliation avec Dieu désigne chez Paul l'abandon par Dieu de sa colère et l'adoption par lui d'une attitude favorable à l'égard de l'homme pécheur. Les lois sacrificielles enseignaient que cette réconciliation – l'apaisement de la colère divine – ne pouvait avoir lieu sans expiation des péchés.

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SUMMARY

This paper is a study of the function of the old covenant sacrifices, essentially from the book of Leviticus. The author discusses various view points and argues the following thesis. 1) The Hebrew verb *kipper* means to "expiate" or to "atone/to pay for sins". 2) The act of laying a hand symbolically represented the transferring of the offerer's sins onto the animal that was to be sacrificed. 3) The blood of the slain animal represents its life taken from it, by way of convention (Lev 17:11). The sprinkling of this blood therefore is a sign that a death has taken place to atone for sin. 4) The expression *rêaḥ-nîḥoaḥ* (Lev 1:9) probably means "appeasing aroma" and is then used to indicate that the offerings' role was to appease the divine wrath. The author concludes that the five types of offerings had an atoning function. The burnt offering atoned for sins in general, in order that the Israelites who came to the Tabernacle for worship be accepted by God. The cereal offering was generally offered alongside animal sacrifices. The priest ate part of it as a sign that he took upon himself the sins of the offerer. The peace offering led to a meal eaten by the Israelites in the presence of Yahweh as a token of communion with Him. The sin offering atoned for unintentional sins and the sprinkling of the blood was to purify the sanctuary that had been defiled by the Israelites' sins. The reparation offering was offered for reparable faults against the sacred things. Following Isaiah (chap. 53), the NT, and especially the Epistle to the Hebrews, yield a typological understanding of the sacrificial system. The offerings are seen as prefigurations of Christ's death which alone is truly fitted to atone for sins. The OT Israelites who had authentic faith received forgiveness for their sins in a way that anticipated Christ's death. They were nevertheless to comply with the sacrificial laws so long as

this death had not taken place. The Israelites who did not have such a faith only received, through their offerings, a ritual forgiveness that did not give them access to the real presence of God. According to the author, reconciliation with God in the Pauline Epistles has to do with the removal of God's wrath against the believing sinners and His adopting a favourable attitude towards them. The OT laws taught that such a reconciliation – the appeasing of God's wrath – could not take place without atonement for sins.

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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Dieser Artikel widmet sich der Funktion der Opfer des alten Bundes, im wesentlichen im Buch Leviticus. Der Autor diskutiert mehrere Ansichten und plädiert für die folgende These: 1. Das hebräische Verb *kipper* bedeutet "abbüßen" oder "sühnen / für Sünden bezahlen". 2. Der Akt des Handauflegens repräsentierte symbolisch die Übertragung der Sünden des Opfernden auf das Tier, das geopfert wurde. 3. Das Blut des geschlachteten Tieres repräsentiert sein ihm genommenes Leben, laut Vereinbarung (Lev. 17,11). Das Sprengen dieses Blutes ist daher ein Zeichen, dass getötet wurde, um Sünde zu sühnen. 4. Der Ausdruck *rêaḥ-nîḥoaḥ* (Lev. 1,9) bedeutet wahrscheinlich "besänftigendes Aroma" und wird benutzt, um anzuzeigen, dass die Rolle des Opfers darin bestand, den göttlichen Zorn zu besänftigen. Der Autor schlussfolgert, dass die fünf Arten von Opfern eine sühnende Funktion hatten. Das Brandopfer sühnte allgemeine Sünden, damit die Israeliten, die zum Opfern zur Stiftshütte kamen, von Gott akzeptiert würden. Das Getreideopfer wurde im Allgemeinen in Verbindung mit Tieropfern dargebracht. Der Priester aß einen Teil davon zum Zeichen, dass er die Sünden des Opfernden auf sich nahm. Das Friedensopfer führte zu einem Mahl, das von den Israeliten in der Gegenwart Jahwes gegessen wurde, zum Zeichen der Gemeinschaft mit ihm. Das Sündopfer sühnte unabsichtliche Sünden und das Sprengen des Blutes diente der Reinigung des Heiligtums, das durch die Sünden der Israeliten verunreinigt worden war. Das Schuldopfer wurde für wieder gut zu machende Vergehen gegen die heiligen Dinge dargebracht. Das NT, besonders der Hebräerbrief, kommt, Jesaja folgend (Kap. 53), zu einem typologischen Verständnis des Opfersystems. Die Opfer werden als Präfigurationen des Todes Christi gesehen, der alleine wahrhaftig geeignet ist, Sünden zu sühnen. Die alttestamentlichen Israeliten, die authentischen Glauben besaßen, erhielten Vergebung ihrer Sünden auf eine Art, die Christi Tod antizipierte. Sie mussten sich dennoch so lange nach den Opfergesetzen richten, so lange dieser Tod noch nicht geschehen war. Die Israeliten, die keinen entsprechenden Glauben hatten, erhielten durch ihre Opfer nur eine rituelle Vergebung, die ihnen keinen Zugang zur echten Gegenwart Gottes gewährte. Dem Autor zufolge hat Versöhnung mit Gott in den paulinischen Briefen mit der Aufhebung des Zornes Gottes gegen die glaubenden Sünder zu tun und damit, dass Gott eine wohlwollende Haltung in Bezug auf sie einnimmt. Die AT-Gesetze lehrten, dass so eine Versöhnung – die Besänftigung des Zornes Gottes – nicht ohne die Sühne für Sünden stattfinden konnte.

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Mosaic instructions concerning sacrifices are given mainly in Lev 1-7. Additional instructions as to which type of sacrifices or offerings should be brought and when are given in Num 15:1-16; 19:28f; 28-29. We will focus on Leviticus. This book appears as the continuation of the book of Exodus. Exodus reports how God saved his people from bondage in Egypt and brought them to Mount Sinai to make a covenant with them. The covenant making ceremony is described in Ex 19-24. God then gives instructions for making the Tabernacle, its furniture and utensils (Ex 25-31), as well as for consecrating the priests. We are then told that the Israelites made the Tabernacle and set it up exactly following God's instructions (Ex 35-40). The book ends on a high note with the story of the coming of the Glory of God to inhabit the Most Holy place within the Tabernacle.

Once the Tabernacle is set up and ready to function, the Israelites have to know how to worship God in the Tabernacle. Hence the laws about the sacrifices in Lev 1-7. The priests will then be ready to begin their ministry in the Tabernacle, and the book of Leviticus goes on with the report of their consecration (Lev 8-10). On this occasion, Aaron offers all the types of sacrifice described in Lev 1-5, except for the last one, the reparation offering, for which there was no point in such circumstances. The consecration ceremony of the priests thus presupposed the sacrificial laws. Leviticus, coming after Exodus, follows a logical order here.

The section devoted to the sacrificial laws is made up of two subsections. The first one contains instructions for the Israelite who offers sacrifices and offerings (Lev 1-5): what the sacrifices and offerings must consist of, how he shall offer them.

The second section contains instructions for the priest who serves in the Tabernacle when sacrifices and offerings are brought (Lv 6-7): how he must be dressed, what portion of the meat or of the cereal offerings he and other priests will receive for themselves, and how they must dispose of them.

There are five types of sacrifices or offerings : the burnt offering or holocaust,[1] the cereal offering, the peace offering, the sin offering, the guilt offering, which I prefer to call reparation offering.

We can observe that these five offerings are divided into two categories. From the literary point of view, v. 4:1 has a new introduction similar to 1:1 and thereby signals a new beginning. The first three offerings are the most regular offerings, those that were offered as part of regular worship. They are said to be of pleasing aroma, or of appeasing aroma to the Lord (1:9,13,17; 2:2,9; 3:5,16). The last two are mandatory when some specific sins have been committed and are said to obtain forgiveness for the person offering them (4:26,31,35; 5:10,13,16,18; 6:7 [5:26]). Some, like Alfred Marx, have made a lot of this difference and have deduced from it a sharp distinction as to the functions of the two groups of offerings. We shall have to deal later with the matter of the function of the sacrifices and the cereal offering.

I propose to start by considering the burnt offering, or holocaust, for that will raise crucial issues. We will then look more briefly at the other types of offerings in order to present their essential distinctive features.

The holocaust or burnt offering (Lev 1; 6:8-13)

As is well known, 'holocaust' comes from a Greek term which means "wholly burnt". This offering was so called because all the parts of the victim were brought and burnt upon the altar, except for the skin. The Hebrew name is *ʿôlàh*, from a root which means "to ascend": the reason for that name is unknown (perhaps it was thus called because of its being brought up to the altar, or because of its ascending in smoke to God).

The victim could be a bull or calf, a ram or a goat; it had to be a male without defect. The offerer was to bring the animal to the entrance of the Tabernacle, kill it, skin it and cut it up. The priest took the blood and sprinkled it against the altar which was in the courtyard. Then he was to arrange the pieces of the victim over the wood upon the altar. The victim could also be a dove or young pigeon, seemingly when the offerer was too poor to bring a more expensive animal. The priest was then to wring off the bird's head and burn the bird on the altar, draining its blood out on the side of the altar. We must notice that the priest did everything that had to be done at the altar, and the offerer did all the rest.

The function of the holocaust

As for the function of the holocaust, Keil saw it as a symbol of total consecration to God, since it was wholly burnt on the altar.[2] Others see it as a way of paying homage to God. As we mentioned, Alfred Marx builds his case on the basis of a division of the five offerings into two distinct groups. Chs 1-3 deal with offerings of which the effect is described by an expression which he translates "pleasing aroma", rejecting the translation "soothing or appeasing aroma". He contends that only the second category of offerings had as its purpose to obtain forgiveness for sins, and that the first category of offerings had nothing to do with sin. He then draws the conclusion that to obtain forgiveness is only a secondary function of the offerings. Their primary function would have been to celebrate Yahweh's presence among His people: in Marx's eyes, the offerings are meals offered by Israel to her divine guest and he quotes Num 28:2 (where God says: "my food") as supporting this idea. Sin and guilt offerings would then be brought in case a light sin had been committed, or in case of uncleanness, so that the Israelite may be reintegrated in the community and remain in God's presence after having committed such a sin or having felt himself in a state of uncleanness.[3] When he writes that offerings are meals offered to God, Marx doesn't think God was supposed to really eat the offerings: offerings are only symbolic meals.

Against Marx, one should note that the sin offering is also said to be of pleasing/appeasing aroma (Lev 4:31), an indication that we may perhaps not draw too much of a sharp distinction between the two groups of offerings. The expression of Num 28:2 does not necessarily mean "the food eaten by God" but can simply mean "the food offered to God".

Various hints of the holocaust's function are given in the text, to which we must pay heed.

kipper

According to v.4, this offering is to make atonement, *lᵉkapper*. The meaning of the verb *kipper* has

been inferred in various ways. Some ascribe to it the meaning "to purify" on the basis of an Akkadian cognate. Others think it means "to cover", which is the sense of an Arabic cognate. Others note that the noun *kopher* means « a ransom » and ascribe to the verb the meaning "to ransom". "Monetary compensation" would probably be a better equivalent for the noun, and "to give compensation" for the verb. Though such approaches could give a hint of the meaning of a word, they are never conclusive. Cognates may have different meanings from one language to another. For instance, the English 'actually' means "truly", "really"; the French cognate *actuellement* means "at the present time". The meaning of the Hebrew may be different from the meaning of the Akkadian word. Furthermore, even within one language, the meaning of a noun may differ from the meaning of the verb of the same root. How does a linguist go after the meaning of a word when he is learning a language? He asks an informer, i.e. a person whose native language is the language to be learned and who also can communicate in a language that is known by the linguist. As far as we are concerned, we have no living informer. Our only informer is the lexical tradition that has been transmitted from generation to generation since the time when Biblical Hebrew was a spoken language, a tradition that is more or less reflected in the traditional lexicons. What we learn from that tradition is that *kipper* has as its meaning, or as one of its meanings, the sense "to atone", to "expiate",[4] i.e. to pay for a fault by a punishment considered as equivalent to that fault.

Then one can also look at usage to check or to try to uncover the meaning of the word. The sense "to pay a ransom" could fit such a text as Ex 30.15. There money is at stake. But in the cases in which we are interested, money is not the matter. We have to look at sacrificial uses of the verb. The idea of purification can be present, especially when sacred objects are the direct object of the verb (Lev 16:20,33; Eze 43:20,26; 45:20). And a sacrifice is required within the context of purification rites in cases of ritual defilement or uncleanness (Lev 12:7f; 14:20; 15:15,30). However, the sacrifices are sin offerings, which suggests that uncleanness calls for some form of forgiveness, and not merely for purification (Lev 12:6,8; 14:19; 15:15,30). Émile Nicole notes various features of the sacrificial use of *kipper* which show that more than purification is at stake, and that the meaning is that of atonement (though he does not himself use that term at this point but speaks of "compensation").[5] Sin is what prompts the offering of sacrifice, more often than defilement (Lev 4-7), and forgiveness is the result of the *kipper* rites, more often than purification (Lev 4:20,26,31,35; 5:10,13,16,18; 6:7; 19:22; Num 15:25,28). Human beneficiaries of the rite are never mentioned as the direct object of the verb, which would be expected if the purpose of the rite was to purify them, but the *kipper* action was performed "on behalf" of the offerer (Lev 1:4. . .).

As noted by Wenham, the meaning "to atone" or "to expiate" is well demonstrated by Num 25:13.[6] Here, the act of *kipper* consisted in killing a guilty Israelite as well as the foreign woman he had brought into the camp. The result of that action is that the plague God was inflicting on His people for their unfaithfulness in taking foreign wives and worshipping their gods stopped (Num 25:1-9). The verb has to do here with turning God's anger away from the Israelites so that he does not exterminate them (v.10). The meaning "expiation" is pretty clear in such a context. Another text is Lev 10.17, which should be translated, not as NIV does, but: God has given you the sin offering in order for you "to bear the guilt of the community and to make atonement for them before the Lord". Here, *kipper* has to do with bearing the guilt of someone else. Its sense is again "to make atonement".

It can be added here that, in some cases, *kipper* can even mean "to appease (an offended party)" (Gen 32:20[21]). There is more to it than mere purification.

One should note that purification and atonement are not ideas far apart from each other. As a matter of fact, the image of purification can be used for the forgiveness of sin that results from atonement, forgiveness being viewed as the removal of the objective defilement that results from sin (e.g. Ps 51.7[9]; cf. the cleansing of our consciences from acts that lead to death in Heb 9:14). However, it is important to see that the Old Testament sacrifices had an atoning value, that there was no such purification without expiation.

The laying of a hand on the animal's head

A second hint in our text is the act that was performed by the Israelite: he was to lay, or more accurately to press,[7] his hand on the head of the animal (Lev 1:4). This has been variously interpreted. Marx and Milgrom see it as a way of indicating ownership. Others view it as representing substitution, the animal taking the place of the Israelite

and being offered as a sign that the Israelite offered himself. Moses interprets that gesture for us. On the *Yom Kippur*, the priest had to confess Israel's sins over the scapegoat while laying his hands on its head (Lev 16:21): this shows that the act symbolically represented the transferring of sins unto the animal.[8] This can be compared with the laying of hands upon the blasphemer by those who had testified to his blasphemy as a way of charging him with the guilt of his own sin, before stoning him (Lev 24:14).[9] The idea of substitution is relevant in conjunction with that meaning : the animal took the place of the Israelite in order to bear his guilt and pay for his sins in his place.

The laying on of the hand is mentioned in Lev 1:4 where the verb *kipper* also appears. The signification indicated for this gesture and the conclusion we have reached about the meaning of *kipper* mutually reinforce each other.

The significance of the blood rite: Lev 17:11

The verb *kipper* appears in the famous text which states the role of blood in sacrifices (Lev 17:11). As a matter of fact, this statement comes as an explanation for the prohibition to eat blood. The point is mainly that blood must be exclusively reserved for the sacrificial rites. The meaning of the verse, and therefore the role played by blood in sacrifices, is a disputed matter. The verse states a relationship between the blood and the *nefesh*, which can either mean here "person" (as in the preceding verse) or "life". The first meaning is more appropriate to the second part of the verse: "for I have given it to you to make atonement for yourselves on the altar". The meaning life better fits the other uses of the word in the verse.

In the first clause Moses says that the *nefesh* "life" is in the blood. Some take it very literally, as if the Israelites believed that life really is in the blood. The last clause says: "it is by the life that blood makes atonement". Two of its elements need elucidation. Which life is being referred to: that of the animal or that of the person offering the sacrifice? And what is the import of the preposition *bᵉ*: is it instrumental, as in the above translation ("*by* the life"), or should we understand it some other way? Many scholars today consider that the life of the animal is in view, take the preposition as instrumental and give the verb *kipper* the sense "to purify". They understand the sacrificial rite as liberating the life of the animal. The life energy would then be communicated to the Israelite and would purify him.

There are various objections against this interpretation of the last clause of the verse. We have already objected to the understanding of the verb *kipper* as meaning "to purify". One also wonders how life could purify. Furthermore, when one considers what was done with the blood in the sacrificial rites, it does not fit the view that it would serve to purify the person offering the sacrifice. For if that were so, one would expect the blood to be sprinkled upon that person, or something to be done with the blood to that person. But this was only very seldom the case (such a rite was performed at the occasion of the priests' consecration, or of the purification and reconsecration of the person who had been cured from a skin disease entailing ritual uncleanness, wrongly called leprosy in English translations).[10] In most cases, the blood was sprinkled upon the altar of sacrifices in the courtyard of the sanctuary, or in some places within the sanctuary. It was thus sprinkled at spots which the lay Israelite had no right to approach, much less to enter into contact with. These were sacred places representing God's domain. This means that the blood was presented to God. Émile Nicole adds another consideration. When an Israelite was too poor to offer even doves or pigeons for a sin offering, he was permitted to replace the usual animal victims by a cereal offering (Lev 5:11-13). That would not be the case if blood was seen as containing a vital force and, as such, as a purifying agent. On a symbolic plane, even water would be more appropriate than cereals to convey the sense of purification.[11]

Should the first clause be taken as literally meaning that life is contained in the blood? Such an understanding is precluded by v.14 which states exactly the reverse: the blood is in the *nefesh*. Furthermore, it equates both twice : "the blood is the life of every creature". This suggests another kind of relationship between the blood and the *nefesh*. And the second clause of v.11, "I have given it to you" tends to indicate that the connection between the blood and life is not by virtue of a natural property of the blood. Henri Blocher argues that it rather implies a relationship established by a decision of God, and therefore a conventional link: blood simply stands for life, it is representative of life.[12] But life in what sense?

Leon Morris has demonstrated that blood represents life taken from some creature, i.e. death.[13] Blood is mentioned in formulas that speak of death, of murder for instance. This for an obvious reason: a creature which looses too much blood

dies. Therefore the pouring out of blood is a sign of death. To shed blood means to kill.

Let us turn back to the last clause. Émile Nicole gives the preposition *bᵉ* a substitutionary meaning and takes the life as being that of the beneficiary of the sacrifice: the blood makes atonement for the life (of that person; cf. NIV), or instead of, or in exchange for this life. He points out that the preposition is sometimes used in contexts of buying or exchanging (Lam 1:11; 2 Sam 3:27; Dt 19:21 "life for life. . ." which uses *bᵉ* where Ex 21:23 & Lev 24:18 use *taḥat*). The LXX, the Vulgate and the Onkelos Targum understood it in this way.[14] However, in cases of buying or selling, or in cases of exchange, the idea of exchange is brought by the verb, it is not the preposition which carries that component of meaning by itself. Even the formula "life for life. . ." of Dt 19:21 is an elliptic expression in which a verb is left unexpressed as the two other texts shows (Ex 21:23 uses a verb meaning "to give" and Lev 24:18 a verb meaning "to replace" or "to make restitution"): here also, it is the unexpressed verb which contains the idea of exchange. There is just no proof that the preposition *bᵉ* has the meaning of exchange or substitution when it is governed by the verb *kipper*.

In connection with this verb, the preposition *bᵉ* ordinarily has an instrumental force. We therefore prefer to take it in the instrumental sense and to consider that the life referred to in the last clause is that of the animal. We understand as follows : "for indeed blood makes atonement by the life of the animal which it represents". This interpretation also has the advantage of ascribing to the word *nefesh* meaning "life" in the third clause the same referent as in the first clause of the verse.[15] Yet, whatever decision we make between the above two options, the meaning is that shed blood, and therefore life taken from the animal, in other words the death of the animal, makes atonement for the person offering the sacrifice.

We can therefore freely render the meaning of the verse as follows: You Israelites must not eat blood (v.10). "For the life animating the creature is represented by the blood and I have reserved the blood for you, for use at the altar, so that you make atonement for yourselves; yes, it is the blood that makes atonement, by the life which it represents, the life which the animal has been deprived of."

The pouring against the altar has probably to be seen as a way of demonstrating that blood has been shed, that a death has taken place to atone for sin.

If then the relationship between blood and life is merely a matter of convention, if blood merely represents life taken from the animal, then one can understand how it is possible to replace an animal by a portion of cereal for the sin offering.

It is to be noted that Lev 17:11 is a general statement concerning the role of blood in sacrificial rites. As such, it applies to all sacrifices in which blood is involved. It therefore applies to the holocaust and to the peace sacrifice. They are to be seen as having an expiatory function.[16]

An appeasing aroma

If we now go back to Lev 1, we find another possible hint that such was the function of the holocaust: it is the expression *rêaḥ-nîḥoaḥ* (Lev 1:9). The NIV translated "a pleasing aroma". Wenham understands a "soothing aroma"; perhaps an "appeasing aroma" sounds better. The Hebrew verb *nûaḥ* means "to rest", "to be quiet", peaceful". In the causative form, the verb can be used with a word designating the wrath of God, to express the idea that this wrath is quieted down by a full punishment being inflicted on God's people (Ez 5:13; 16:42; 21:17[22]). Milgrom also indicates that the Akkadian cognate means "to appease", especially in connection with the gods.[17] There is therefore a strong presumption in favour of the meaning "soothing/appeasing aroma" for the formula of Lev 1:9, though we cannot be sure that the meaning of this expression corresponds in such a way to that of the verb. An informer would be the LXX which renders that expression *euôdia* "pleasing aroma" and is followed by the New Testament (Eph 5:2). However, we cannot be sure that the Greek translators correctly understood the above expression. Émile Nicole argues in favour of their translation but I find him unconvincing on that point.[18] An argument against that understanding is that there were more simple formulas to say "pleasant aroma". Wenham rightly quotes Gen 8:21 as supporting the idea of appeasement: as Yahweh smelled the aroma of Noah's sacrifice, He decided never again to curse the ground and destroy His creatures because of man as He had done by the flood. The aroma had quieted His anger, because it is the aroma of an atoning sacrifice. The data is meagre and it is impossible to reach certitude about the meaning of the expression *rêaḥ-nîḥoaḥ*: we lack an informer whose reliability would be certain. Yet we tend to agree with Wenham.[19] If that is correct, we have a third indication of the atoning and propitiating function of the holocaust. And this will have something to say to our concern for

reconciliation.

Yet Émile Nicole makes an important point here, which had also been made by Peter-Contesse: the only thing that goes up towards God is the smoke, and even the smoke disappears and what reaches God is reduced to a smell, which, contrary to the smoke, cannot even be seen, and which almost amounts to nothing. This means that God does not eat the sacrifice, that the sacrifice is not offered because God needs it. Rather it is the Israelites who need it, in order to obtain forgiveness.[20]

Other texts confirm that the holocaust had an expiatory function and was offered to obtain forgiveness for sins: 2 Sam 24:25; 2 Chr 29:7f; Job 1:5; 42:8. Milgrom points out that Hittite sources also indicate a propitiatory or expiatory function for the burnt offering.[21]

Atonement for what kind of sins?

One question remains: since no sins are mentioned as the ground for offering a holocaust, what type of sins was it to be offered for and how was its purpose different from that of the sin and the reparation offerings? We can follow G. Wenham and Hartley for the answer. The holocaust was an atoning sacrifice for sin in general,[22] "for the general sinful dispositions of the presenter",[23] whereas the sin and guilt offerings were sacrifices for specific sins of particular kinds. The purpose of the holocaust was that the Israelite who came to the Tabernacle to worship be accepted by Yahweh[24] (Lev 1:3 to be translated : "so that *he* will be accepted").[25] Because men are sinners, one could not approach God by entering the courtyard of His sanctuary to worship Him without offering a sacrifice in order to make atonement for one's sins. The holocaust was therefore a constant reminder of the sinfulness of man, of the unworthiness of man to approach God and worship Him. But also a witness to God's willingness to forgive the Israelites' sins and receive their worship.

A holocaust was to be offered every morning and every evening for the whole people of Israel, the *Tamid* (Exo 29:38ff; Lev 6:2). This underlined that Israel's guilt was permanent and, in the end, never really dealt with.

The other offerings

The cereal offering (Lev 2; 6:14-23)

The cereal offering is dealt with in Lev 2. It was most frequently offered alongside animal sacrifices. A small part of it was burnt on the altar as a memorial. The larger portion was eaten by the priests as a very holy thing. Priests thus appear as God's representatives. But also, by eating the offering, the priests took upon themselves the sins of the offerer (Ex 28:38).

Though no blood was shed, the cereal offering seems to have had an atoning value. This appears from the following texts: Ex 28:38; Lev 14:20; 1 Sam 3:14; 26:19. But also from the fact that the portion that was burnt on the altar was said to exhale an appeasing aroma to the Lord (Lev 2:2,9,12, if that is the correct meaning of the expression, as signalled before). That cereals could be offered as a sin offering instead of an animal (Lev 5.11-13) confirms that the cereal offering could have an atoning value.

Wenham proposed that the cereal offering was a kind of tribute paid by vassal Israel to her divine suzerain. The Hebrew word *minḥàh* is used elsewhere to refer to the tribute paid by a vassal to his suzerain. However we find this view unsatisfactory. The argument based on the usage of the word elsewhere looks like involving what James Barr called an illegitimate totality transfer:[26] *minḥàh* probably has a more general meaning, such as "gift". Only in some specific contexts does it refer to a tribute paid by a vassal to a suzerain. But it does not convey this precise meaning by itself and in all contexts in which it is used. Or "tribute" was one of its meanings, and "offering" another. Nothing in the texts dealing with the cereal offering indicates that it was viewed as a tribute paid to the divine suzerain.

The peace offering (Lev 3; 7:11-21)

The ritual of the peace sacrifice was peculiar in that some parts of the animal were burnt on the altar, the breast and the right thigh were given to the priest, and the remaining meat was eaten by the offerer and his family. It was a voluntary offering brought as an expression of thanks to God for some reason, or to fulfil a vow by which one had promised to offer such a sacrifice, or just as a voluntary gift.

Several features indicate that it had an atoning function: the laying of the hand on the animal's head (Lev 3:2,8,13), the sprinkling of blood against the altar (Lev 3:2,8,12) understood in accordance with Lev 17:11, the expression "appeasing aroma" (Lev 3:5,16). The atoning function of the peace offering, among other offerings, is also affirmed in Ez 45:15,17. The name "peace offering" may indicate that it had as its purpose that God be at peace

with the person offering this sacrifice.[27]

It was also an expression of thankfulness, love and devotion (Lev 7:12-16).

In addition, the eating of part of the meat by the Israelite and his family must have had special significance. Wenham proposes that the giving back of part of the meat to the Israelite was a sign that God gave him his life back to enjoy it. But there seems to be more than that in the light of ancient near eastern customs. There was a meal taking place at the sanctuary, in the presence of the Lord. Henri Blocher has opposed the idea that the Israelites would thereby share a meal with the Lord.[28] It is clear that God does not eat what is offered on the altar and does not need it; He therefore is not served by human hands (Ps 50; Acts 17:25). His altar can be called "the table of the Lord" (Mal 1:7,12) but neither the Israelites nor the priests came to sit at that table to eat. Peace offerings were eaten before the Lord, not with Him (Dt 27:7). Peter-Contesse also notes that the fat was offered on the altar and the blood sprinkled against it and the Israelites had no right to eat of them, whereas no meat portion was burnt upon the altar, so that the respective portions allotted to God and to man were clearly defined and exclusively reserved to God or to man.[29] However, though we must insist on the fact that God does not eat with men in the ceremonies of sacrifice, this is not all there is to say.

Covenant making ceremonies led to the sharing of a meal which certainly was a sign of peace and a time of communion between those who had made covenant with one another (Gen 31:53f). Likewise, during the covenant making ceremony at Sinai, Moses, Aaron and two of his sons, as well as seventy elders of Israel, went up Mount Sinai, had a vision of the God of Israel and ate and drank there (Ex 24:10f). Though God does not share the meal with them, it is difficult not to see here a transposition or adaptation of the custom of sharing a meal upon the making of a covenant. God's transcendence is marked by the fact that the meal is taken in the presence of the Lord and not shared with Him. Nevertheless, the transposition of the custom indicates that we have to do with a moment of special communion with Him. This probably is part of the significance of the peace sacrifice as well. The peace sacrifice was offered after the other kinds of offerings. The worship service thereby reached its culminating point. It led to a time of special communion with God symbolised by the meal taken before Him. How not to see in that rite an anticipation of the feast meal of the wedding of the Lamb!

The sin offering (Lev 4:1-5:13; 6:24-30)

The "sacrifice for sin" was offered for certain types of sins : unintentional sins, or sins committed without awareness of them (4:13,22,27), sinning by omission when summoned to witness (5:1), careless oaths that one would not be able to fulfil (5:4).

The more important the function of the person having sinned, the more costly was the sin offering.

The particularity of the ritual lies in the sprinkling of the blood. Depending on who had sinned, the blood was sprinkled in various places. For a priest, or for the whole community, blood was brought within the Holy Place, some of it was sprinkled in front of the curtain, some was put on the horns of the altar of fragrant incense, which was set right before the Most Holy Place, and the rest of it was poured at the base of the altar of burnt offerings in the courtyard. For a lay Israelite and for a leader, some of the blood was put on the horns of the altar of burnt offerings, and the rest of it was poured at the base of this altar. On *Yom Kippur*, the high priest was to sprinkle blood on the front of the cover of the ark and before it (Lev 16:14). One can note that blood had to be sprinkled at the point situated as far as the person offering the sacrifice could go: for the priests, and the community which included the priests, within the Holy Place, for the high priest on the day of atonement, within the Most Holy Place, and for the rest of the Israelites, on the courtyard of the Tabernacle.

This offering obviously had an atoning function and served to obtain forgiveness for one's sin (Lev 4:26,31,35). It was also a purification rite: it purified the places up to where the person offering the sacrifice could enter. The dwelling place of the Lord was defiled by the uncleanness and sins of the Israelites and therefore needed to be cleansed and purified from the Israelites' uncleanness (Lev 15:31; 16:19).

Anthropologist Mary Douglas's comments at that point are illuminating.[30] The defilement of the sanctuary has to be viewed as a reflection of the dishonour caused to God by His people's sins. Sin was sin against God and cast a slur on His honour. This dishonour was then reflected on the sanctuary as God's dwelling place, insult against God reached His sacred place: hence the defilement of the place

in the sanctuary up to where the guilty person penetrated. To declare the sanctuary defiled was a very concrete way of teaching the people that God's honour was injured by their sins.

When the sin offering was brought for a lay Israelite, the priest serving at the altar was to eat part of the meat and this symbolised his taking upon himself the guilt of the lay Israelite in order to make atonement for it (Lev 10:17).

The law of the sin offering teaches that sin makes guilty, even if it is unintentional sin, it defiles, affects God in some way, and impairs the relationship with Him (cf. grieving His Spirit, Isa 63:10; Eph 4:30).[31]

The reparation offering (5:14-26; 7:1-10)

This sacrifice was to be offered when reparable faults had been committed, mostly faults against the sacred things (5:15), for instance in cases when a tithe or something due to the sanctuary had not been brought, or when some sacred food had been eaten by other than priests, or when a nazirite vow had been interrupted, and the like. These were unintentional faults. In addition to offering the reparation sacrifice, the guilty Israelite had to make restitution for what he had failed to do, and add to it 20% of its value. This was to be given to the priest, which is understandable since in most cases the priest had been wronged by the failure to bring what was due to the sanctuary.

Another case is mentioned, that of a dishonest act against one's neighbour involving an oath (6:1-7). Since the oath was taken in the name of Yahweh, it was sacred and the breach of the oath is regarded as sin against the sacred sphere, hence the need for a reparation offering. There must be reparation to the person wronged, here also with an extra compensation of 20%.

General remarks

We have reached the conclusion that the five types of sacrifices have an atoning, an expiatory function. The holocaust or burnt offering was offered, not for particular sins, but for sins in general. It thereby made possible the Israelite's acceptance by God as he approached God in worship. The cereal offering most of the time accompanied the holocaust or other sacrifices. Besides their atoning function, peace offerings led to a meal in the presence of God as a sign of peace and fellowship with Him. The sin offering was destined to atone for unintentional sins and to purify the sanctuary from the defilement caused by these sins. This defilement pointed to the dishonour that sin brought upon the Inhabitant of the sanctuary. The reparation offering atoned for unintentional and reparable sins, mostly in the cultic sphere. In addition to it, the offerer had to bring a reparation as well as a compensation.

The priests functioned both as God's and the Israelites' representatives. As God's representatives, they had been wronged by the Israelites' sins, and they received some portions of various offerings. As men's representatives, they would take upon themselves the sins of the Israelites bringing the offerings and make atonement for them.

The sacrificial laws taught the Israelites that Yahweh is a holy God who cannot let the guilty go unpunished (cf. Nah 1:3), that sin calls for atonement, but also that God is willing to forgive sin.

Yet one has to notice how limited was the import and efficacy of the Old Testament sacrifices. Only unintentional, unconscious or reparable faults are specifically mentioned as sins that could be atoned for by this means. For more serious sins, capital punishment was the only means to take away the guilt and thereby to purify the people of God (Num 15:30f). This explains why David, having committed adultery and murder, declared that God would not receive sacrifices or burnt offerings (Ps 51:16[18]): no sacrifices had been appointed for these crimes. This limited import of the old covenant sacrifices called for another regime, far more efficacious.

Furthermore, besides sacrifices that were offered for particular sins, sacrifices had to be offered at each occasion of worship. The law even required that there be always sacrifices burning upon the altar: a burnt offering was offered every morning and every evening. This even was not sufficient: once a year, there had to be a special day set aside for atonement. Taken seriously, these regulations could only maintain a sense of perpetual guilt, of guilt and unworthiness never really dealt with. This is at least the conclusion drawn by the author of Hebrews (10:2). Did the author of Psalm 130, already back in Old Testament times, expressed the hope of a forgiveness of sins that would go beyond what was made possible by the Old Covenant's provisions (Ps 130:7-8)?

Typological significance of the Old Testament sacrificial ritual

Beyond the Pentateuch, the Scriptures ascribe a

typological significance to the Mosaic sacrificial system, and this already in the Old Testament. For Isaiah prophesied that the Servant of the Lord would take upon himself the iniquities of God's people and that his life would be delivered by God as a reparation sacrifice (Is 53:6,10,11).

Various New Testament texts also bring out such a typological understanding of Old Testament sacrifices. Christ gave himself up for us as an offering of pleasing aroma (*euôdia*, following the Septuagint) and sacrifice to God (Eph 5:2). We have been redeemed by Christ, a sinless man just as the sacrificial victims were without blemish, with his blood, i.e. his life offered to atone for our sins (1 Pet 1:18f). He died for our sins, the righteous for the unrighteous (1 Pet 3:18). He offered himself, as people offered sacrifices, for our sins (Heb 7:27). His blood cleanses us from our sins (1 John 1:7). The purification theme is also exploited by Hebrews (Heb 10:10,14,22).

Moreover, Christ appears as the priest who took upon himself the sins of God's people (Is 53; Heb 5-10)

In the Epistle to the Hebrews

The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews develops at length a typological understanding of the institutions of the old covenant and provides us with illuminating teachings. The Tabernacle was only a type of the heavenly sanctuary which Christ has entered to stand in the presence of God (Heb 8:2,5; 9:11,24). The Tabernacle ritual was a symbolic material representation (Heb 9:9f) and the sacrificial ritual was a prefiguration of Christ's sacrificial death (Heb 9:12-14,23; 10:1). The latter occurred once for all and this shows that it is truly efficacious to make atonement for sins in a definitive way. The significance of the priestly office also finds its fulfilment in Christ (Heb 8-9).

Concerning sacrifices more particularly, the writer of the epistle argues that the blood of bulls and goats cannot take away sins (Heb 10:4): animals cannot take the place of human beings and pay for their sins in their place. How then could God forgive sins under the old covenant? The author of the Epistle writes that it is the death of Christ which in fact atoned for the sins of the believers of old covenant times (Heb 9:15; Paul says the same thing in Rom 3:25).

With this in mind, we must consider that there were two different cases under the old covenant. On one hand, animal sacrifices were a means of obtaining forgiveness for true believers of the old covenant and of the whole Old Testament times. As they offered sacrifices, they received the forgiveness that Christ was to obtain for them. These sacrifices were for them a guarantee that their sins would one day be atoned for, and served as a means to receive forgiveness by anticipation on Christ's death. The anticipatory character of the forgiveness they received was marked by their being bound to comply with the Mosaic sacrificial regulations. It is also by anticipation of Christ's death that David's crimes were forgiven once he repented, even though there was no provision for that under the old covenant.

However, not all Israelites offering sacrifices had authentic faith. For those who did not have such a faith, the forgiveness obtained through sacrifices was what we must call a ritual forgiveness: this forgiveness allowed them to continue to be part of the old covenant people of God and to approach God and take part in the worship services and the cultic rites. But they did not receive the real forgiveness which issues in eternal life. Their approach to God was merely ritual. They only had access to a ritual or symbolic presence of God; they did not have access to His real presence. They did not have a personal and living relationship with Him. This is what the author of Hebrews means when he says they had access to a typological man-made sanctuary and not to the heavenly sanctuary where the real presence of God lies (Heb 9:9-12; 10:19-22). And the people of Israel to which they belonged was only a typological people of God, a mere type of the real people of God which is made up of the true disciples of the Lord (Isa 54:13; 60:21).[32]

Old Testament sacrifices and reconciliation

The Old Testament sacrificial laws teach in their own way that there can be no relationship between God and sinful man without previous atonement for sins. Old Testament sacrifices pointed to the death of Christ which meets that requirement for those who have faith in Him.

If my understanding of the formula "appeasing aroma" is correct, it speaks of the wrath by which God reacts to sin and which needs to be appeased by atoning sacrifices. I think this is what reconciliation is about: God's change of attitude towards us, the removal of His anger and enmity towards us, i.e. His readiness to bring punishment on us, and His taking on a favourable attitude towards us, a readiness to bless us, so that we may enter into a

personal and living relationship with Him.

We encounter again this same theme in particular connection with the peace offering if its name means that that sacrifice had as its purpose to set God at peace with the Israelites.

I think that these aspects of the meaning of the Old Testament sacrifices lie in the background of Paul's teaching about reconciliation. It is striking that Paul presents our reconciliation and that of the creation with God as God's work, as something we have received (Rom 5:11) and that he states that this reconciliation has been achieved by the death of Christ who has become sin for us (Rom 5:9-11; 2 Cor 5:14,18-21; Eph 2:16; Col 1:20-22). Furthermore, reconciliation with God has to do with being saved from His wrath (Rom 5:9-11), it involves His not reckoning sins unto men (2 Cor 5:19), it is a consequence of justification (Rom 5:1). These are to me clear indications that reconciliation with God in Paul has to do, not with the removal of enmity towards God in us, but with the removal of the wrath of God towards us. Reconciliation consists in God adopting a favourable attitude towards the believer.[33] Whereas justification looks at God as a judge, reconciliation looks at Him as an offended party. The wonder is that God Himself did through Christ what had to be done in order that it be possible for Him to take on this favourable attitude towards us. He did so because He loved us while we were still (in His sight) His enemies (Rom 5:6-8), i.e. subject to His wrath (Eph 2:3).

Notes

1 The word 'holocaust' is usually used in English nowadays for the shoah, which is unfortunate since the shoah is not to be seen as an atoning sacrifice offered to God. In French, *holocauste* is the usual name for the sacrifice of Lev 1.

2 F. Keil and C.F. Delitzsch, *Biblical Commentary on the Old Testament*, vol II., *The Pentateuch*, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1978, p. 291.

3 Alfred Marx, *Les Sacrifices de l'Ancien Testament, Cahiers Évangile* 111, Paris, Cerf, 2000, pp. 12,24-27.

4 See for instance Marchand Ennery, *Dictionnaire hébreu-français*, Paris, Librairie Colbo, 1971 ; F. Brown, S.R. Driver, C.A. Briggs, *A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament*, Oxford University Press, 1979.

5 Émile Nicole, « Atonement in the Pentateuch », *The Glory of the Atonement*, Ch.E. Hills ed., Downers Grove, IVP, 2004, pp. 48.

6 Gordon J. Wenham, *The Book of Leviticus* (*NICOT*), Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1979, p. 60.

7 Wenham, *Leviticus*, p. 61 and J. Milgrom, *Leviticus* 1-16 (*Anchor Bible*), New York, Doubleday, 1991, p. 150.

8 The Israelite is said to press one hand on the head of the animal to be sacrificed (Levl :4) whereas the priest had to press both hands on the head of the animal to be sent in the desert (Lev 16:21). Some argue from this difference that we have two different gestures with two different meanings and therefore that the meaning of the laying of the hand in Lev 1.4 should not be inferred from the text of Lev 16. This seems to be oversubtle : in Num 27, in a similar context where Moses lay hand on Joshuah's head, the word for "hand" is in the singular in v.18, then in the plural in v.23 (Dt 34:9 also has the plural).

9 Wenham ascribes another signification to this act: hearing a blasphemy would entail a guilt that the witnesses would transfer onto the blasphemer who was to be punished for their sins as well as his. The conclusion to be drawn from his understanding is however the same as ours (*Leviticus*, p. 62).

10 Lev 8:22-24; 14:3-7,14,25.

11 "Atonement in the Pentateuch", p. 45.

12 Henri Blocher, *La Doctrine du péché et de la rédemption*, Vaux-sur-Seine, Édifac, 2000, p. 132.

13 Leon Morris, *The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross*, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1965, ch. III.

14 Nicole, pp. 38f; also Blocher, p. 132.

15 In the middle clause, *nefèsh* is used differently, with a possessive suffixe, and has another meaning (« yourselves »). See J. Milgrom, *Leviticus* 17-22 (*Anchor Bible*), New York, Doubleday, 2000.

16 Milgrom argues that Lev 17.11 is only concerned with the peace offering because the prohibition of eating blood only bears on this particular type of offering since the offerer was not allowed to eat any meat of the other sacrifices. He thinks that the blood of the peace offering was to be offered to God to atone for the slaughter of the animal, since killing an animal to eat his meat is considered as murder (v.3-4 ; *Leviticus* 17-22, p. 1474ff). This view has to be rejected. Killing an animal for other purposes, for instance at hunting, is not considered as murder. Nowhere else is killing an animal to eat his flesh considered as murder. The sin that is at stake in v.4 does not therefore consist in killing the animal, but in not presenting the blood to God at the sanctuary. Furthermore, it is not specified that v.11 only has to do with the peace offering. The mention of the holocaust alongside the peace offering in v.8 suggests that the reverse is true. Above all, one has to compare the *kipper* function assigned to the blood here with the double fact that a *kipper* function is assigned to the holocaust and that a blood rite takes place in the ritual of the holocaust (Lev 1.3-4). What is said in Lev 17.11 is the explanation of the

blood rite in all offerings involving one.

17 *Leviticus* 1-16, p. 162, though Milgrom himself prefers the meaning "pleasing aroma".

18 Émile Nicole, « Un Sacrifice de bonne odeur », *Esprit et vie*, Festchrift Samuel Bénétreau, Cléon d'Andran, Excelsis, 1997, pp. 55-70.

19 And J.E. Hartley as well, *Leviticus* (*Word Biblical Commentary*), Waxo, Word, 1992, p. 19.

20 Émile Nicole, « Un Sacrifice de bonne odeur », p. 66 ; R. Peter-Contesse, *Lévitique 1-16* (*Commentaires de l'Ancien Testament*), Genève, Labor et Fides, 1993, p. 46.

21 *Leviticus* 1-16, p. 175.

22 Wenham, *Leviticus*, p. 57.

23 Hartley, *Leviticus*, p. 19.

24 Wenham, *Leviticus*, p. 55.

25 Better than NIV: "so that *it* will be acceptable". Hartley argues for the latter translation on the ground that the same idea is repeated in v.4 where it is clearly the offering that is acceptable. However, if the formula of v.3 referred to the offering, one would expect it to come earlier in the sentence: the animal has to be without defect in order to be acceptable. But the idea is, rather, that the Israelite has to present such an offering at the entrance of the tent when he comes to worship God, in order that he be accepted. Peter-Contesse (*Lévitique* 1-16, p. 35) points to other texts where it is the offerer who is accepted (Lev 19:5; 22:19,29; 23:11, where the word *lirtsonkem* is most naturally taken as meaning "so that you may be accepted").

26 See J. Barr, *The Semantics of Biblical Language*, Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 218.

27 Some call it the "communion offering" because of the meal taken by the offerer and his family as we shall see in what follows. This name is descriptive of part of the significance of the rite, it hardly is a translation of the Hebrew name of this offering. Milgrom translates "well being offering", or, as another suggestion, writes that since the piel form of the verb *shillem* can mean to repay, this offering may have been considered as a way of repaying God for His blessings. The meaning "peace offering" for the name of this sacrifice is more congenial with its atoning function.

28 Henri Blocher, « Divine commensalité ? », *Fac Réflexion* n° 48, 1999/3, pp. 31-33.

29 *Lévitique* 1-16, p. 35.

30 Mary Douglas, *L'Anthropologue et la Bible. Lecture du Lévitique*, Paris, Bayard 2004, pp. 175-177.

31 Milgrom writes that this kind of sacrifice was offered for persons who could not have sinned: ladies who had given birth (Lev 12), the priests on the day of their consecration (Lev 8:14 ; Ex 29:36f), the Nazirite on the day of the completion of his vow (Num 6:14). He therefore argues that the name of this sacrifice must be understood in accordance with the meaning of the *piel* form of the verb *ḥatta'* which can mean "to cleanse", "to expurgate", "to decontaminate". Hence his translation for the name of this sacrifice : not "sin offering", but "purification offering". Though one may accept the understanding "purification offering" (also adopted by Wenham, p. 88f), it is in my opinion besides the point to say that this kind of sacrifice was sometimes required of persons who had not sinned. The Hebrew *ḥata'* "sin" refers to a transgression of a norm, be it a moral or a ritual norm. The ritual impurity following a child delivery is therefore considered as *ḥata'*. The offering of a sacrifice for sin for the priests on the day of their consecration and for the Nazirites on the day of the completion of their vows may be understood on similar lines as the sin offering that was part of the ritual of the *Yom Kippur*: those sacrifices were to be offered for the sins that had been previously committed by the priests and the Nazirites, because the courtyard of the sanctuary on which they were standing was defiled by these sins. It was thus taught that being a priest or performing a nazirite vow did not atone for sin: those who were consecrated to the Lord, as priests or as Nazirites, needed in fact special atonement for their sins.

32 For more developments on this point, see S. Romerowski, *L'œuvre du Saint-Esprit dans l'histoire du salut*, Cléon d'Andran, Excelsis § Nogent-sur-Marne, Institut Biblique, 2005, especially pp. 313-317, 328f, 338f.

33 See John Murray, *Redemption Accomplished and Applied*, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1978, pp. 33-42 and Leon Morris, *The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross*, ch. VII.

EuroJTh (2006) 16:1, 25–36 0960–2720

A Christian Context for Conscience? Reading Kierkegaard's Works of Love Beyond Hegel's Critique of Conscience

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SUMMARY

In several late works, Kierkegaard propounds what he calls his "second ethic," one which "presupposes Christian dogmatics." This ethic confounds typical characterizations of Kierkegaard's project as but a variation of the Kantian assertion of the radical moral autonomy of the individual. In fact, in *Works of Love* Kierkegaard reworks one of the hallmark categories of Kantian ethics – conscience – in explicitly theological terms precisely in order to *resist* the collapse of moral reflection into merely subjective caprice and formal vacuity. In doing so, he draws surprisingly near to his arch nemesis, Hegel, and provides an account of conscience highly illustrative for contemporary Christian reflection.

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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

In mehreren späten Werken legt Kierkegaard das vor, was er „zweite Ethik" nennt, eine Ethik, die „christliche Dogmatik voraussetzt". Diese Ethik irritiert typische Charakterisierungen des Kierkegaardschen Projektes als eine bloße Variation der kantischen Behauptung der radikalen moralischen Autonomie des Individuums. Tatsächlich arbeitet Kierkegaard in seinem Buch Werke der Liebe eines der bezeichnenden Kategorien der kantischen Ethik – das Gewissen – in explizit theologischen Begriffen mit dem Zweck um, dem Zusammenbruch moralischer Reflektion in eine bloße subjektive Laune und in eine formale Leere *zu widerstehen*. Indem er dies tut, kommt er seinem Erzfeind Hegel überraschend nahe und bietet eine Darstellung des Gewissens, die für die heutige christliche Reflektion sehr erhellend ist.

* * * *

RÉSUMÉ

Dans diverses œuvres de la fin de sa vie, Kierkegaard propose ce qu'il nomme sa « seconde éthique » et qui « présuppose la dogmatique chrétienne ». Cette éthique mêle les caractérisations typiques du projet kierkegaardien avec ce qui n'est autre qu'une variation de l'affirmation kantienne de l'autonomie morale radicale de l'individu. En fait, dans ses « œuvres de l'amour », Kierkegaard refond l'une des catégories principales de l'éthique kantienne, celle de la conscience, en termes explicitement théologiques, justement pour éviter que la réflexion morale se réduise à un simple caprice subjectif et qu'elle sombre dans une vacuité purement formelle. En faisant ainsi, il se rapproche étonnamment de Hegel et apporte une manière de considérer la conscience qui est très éclairante pour la réflexion chrétienne contemporaine.

* * * *

Introduction

In our time, the concept of conscience is closely, perhaps inseparably, associated with the modern notion of freedom as the self-determination of the enlightened subject. Whether in the religious or more broadly ethical sphere, appeal to conscience often sets individual moral autonomy over against the claims of external authority of one sort or other. This conceptual inheritance has its origins in the Enlightenment liberalisms of Locke, Bentham and Rousseau. However it finds it most remarkable formulation in Kant's practical philosophy. Kant's account of the formal, absolute, universal

and subjective character of conscience as the seat of rational human moral reflection and legislation is a watershed from which contemporary common sense notions of human freedom as the exercise of the unrestricted self-legislating will are all downstream.[1]

It is precisely this Kantian view of the self with its absolute claim to moral self-determination which comes under Hegel's critical scrutiny, and prompts him to develop an ethic which avoids the problems he sees besetting any such radically subjective account of morals.[2] For Hegel, the perils of the radically subjective conscience of Kant's *Moralität* are surmounted by recasting conscience within an account of what he calls *Sittlichkeit*, or actual socio-ethical life. This ethical life overcomes the apparent opposition of the freedom of subjective Spirit (which is the heart of *Moralität*) and the claims of objective Spirit (which constitute the structures of abstract Right), and shows up the essential coherence of individual moral freedom and objective social structures and obligations.

As in all such dialectical ascents in Hegel's thought, subjective moral freedom is surpassed, but only so as to be essentially preserved. Of course, on the other side of this ascent the very idea of ethical freedom is transformed: if, from the perspective of *Moralität* freedom is construed as freedom *from* external, heteronomous ethical constraint, from the perspective of *Sittlichkeit* this opposition of internal and external, autonomy and heteronomy is abolished, so that freedom can now be said to be freedom *freely* to assume and exercise one's role in social and political life. Individual conscience and external moral claims are no longer at odds with one another in Hegel's vision of a human moral freedom "grounded in the *acceptance* of our defining situation… [and] powered by an affirmation of this defining situation as *ours*."[3]

Now, readers of Kierkegaard's *Fear and Trembling* will no doubt recall the Dane's allergy to Hegel's *Sittlichkeit*, a dis-ease made manifest under the evocative figure of the story of Abraham and Isaac (Gn22:1-18), and focussed in the concept of the teleological suspension of the ethical.[4] In that text, Johannes *De Silentio* struggles to extract the individual out from under the totalizing claim of the ethical sphere of custom, role and law (the constituents of *Sittlichkeit*) by positing a religious sphere of individual obligation beyond that of ethics: Abraham's freedom to respond to God's concrete command to sacrifice Isaac *must not* be constrained by any external complex of social obligations, including – alarmingly – that of father and son. *De Silentio* contends that such constraints are impotent in relation to the radical personal freedom of the 'Knight of faith'. Indeed, this work is commonly taken to be an assertion, *contra Hegel*, of the autonomy of human conscience in the teeth of the claims of ethical community.

But is this view of things correct? Is *De Silentio's* task in effect, to put the Hegelian genie 'back in the Kantian bottle' with the help of religion? Is Kierkegaard's own understanding of individual autonomous conscience basically an *irrationalized* version of Kantian moral subjectivism, perhaps even its apotheosis? This is precisely the view famously proposed by Alasdair MacIntyre:

> The fundamental doctrine of Søren Kierkegaard is that not only are there no genuine objective tests in morality; but that doctrines which assert that there are function as devices to disguise the fact that our moral standards are, and can only be, chosen. The individual utters his moral precepts to himself in a far stronger sense than the Kantian individual did: for their only sanction and authority is that he has chosen to utter them.[5]

MacIntyre takes Kant's moral philosophy to be the "immediate ancestor" of Kierkegaard's work, and sees the latter's book *Either/Or* to be "at once the outcome and epitaph of the Enlightenment's systematic attempt to discover a rational justification for morality" whose essential contribution is to make plain the "arbitrariness of our moral culture".[6]

Such a reading of Kierkegaard's understanding of morals in general, and of conscience in particular, is inadequate in the extreme. Not only does it fail to locate *Either/Or* and *Fear and Trembling* in the movement of the authorship, it also neglects to take seriously the teaching developed in the later and explicitly theological writings which form the *telos* of Kierkegaard's life work as a whole. Whereas the ethic put forward in *Fear and Trembling* is chiefly polemical and tactical in nature, that articulated in *Works of Love* (1847) represents the mature expression of the "new" or "second" ethic to which Kierkegaard had gestured in the early paragraphs of *The Concept of Anxiety* – an ethic that "belongs to a different order of things" because it "presupposed dogmatics".[7] Bruce Kirmmse regards this text as one of the most important of Kierkeagaard's works, and certainly his major ethical work.[8] It is in *Works of Love* that the concept of conscience is

treated at length within an account of love as it to be "Christianly understood" and moved beyond whatever constructive ethical proposals one might glean from readings of *Fear and Trembling, Either/Or* or other works of the authorship on their own terms.

My thesis is this: Kierkegaard's exposition of conscience in *Works of Love* in fact shows him to be in active revolt *against* the Enlightenment view of conscience as the consummation of human moral autonomy. Amy Laura Hall, has persuasively argued that *Works of Love* is first and foremost an attack on self-confident moral reasoning, representing

> Kierkegaard's sustained attempt to reinsert the indicting use of the law into a conversation overconfident in human effort and blithely reliant upon God's corporate dispensation of grace.. to precipitate the awareness of sin indispensable for our repentance and to evoke the confession necessary for our reception of grace.[9]

While I concur with this judgment, it seems to me integral to Kierkegaard's pursuit of this aim, that he must spell out what Charles Taylor has called "a situation for human freedom" wherein moral subjectivity is set within a range of determinate relations which form for it the contours of "moral space".[10] Though differing radically in so many other ways, here for a moment, Hegel and Kierkegaard find a point of positive relation. They together reject a view of moral autonomy that violently abstracts human agents from the fundamental ethical reality in which their agency is exercised, and indeed is possible at all. The concept of conscience Kierkegaard develops moves in the same direction of Hegel's critique of the Kantian ethics of subjectivity; it reasserts, within the very notion of conscience itself, an objective situation by which moral agency is substantiated and to which it is trued.

Of course, the nature of this moral field is markedly different for Kierkegaard than for Hegel. It is the strictly *theological* tenor of Kierkegaard's account of nature and context of conscience that is perhaps most striking here.[11] As David Gouwens aptly describes, *Works of Love* offers "an extensive grammar that examines and tests the quality of human love in light of divine love".[12] For Kierkegaard, the ethical reality in which conscience arises is constituted first and foremost by the God-relationship, and then subsequently also by the relationship with the neighbour God establishes. Crucial is the way Kierkegaard sees these two relations with God and neighbour as relations which *mediate* the willing and doing of the individual moral agent. Such mediation – as Hall's work shows – is no trifling matter either. For conscience is where the determinative reality of these two fundamental mediating relations is brought to bear upon personal moral reflection and finds humble and fragile expression. In the movements of conscience, the moral agent is confronted with the "Christian objection to the self-willfulness of drives and inclinations" and their all-too-human moral schemes are exposed to a "chilling inversion".[13] In conscience then, reality itself as Christianly understood presses in to bring to "make foolish the wisdom of the wise" as it reorients all ethical reflection to that one "whom God made our wisdom" (1 Cor 1: 10, 30).

To grasp Kierkegaard's "second ethic" adequately we must pay close attention to the way it confounds typical characterization of his ethics as a close cousin of the Kantian project of asserting the radical moral autonomy of the individual. And few things show how far off the mark such characterizations are than the account of conscience provided in *Works of Love*. For here Kierkegaard reworks one of the hallmark categories of Kantian ethics in explicitly theological terms precisely in order to resist the collapse of moral reflection into merely subjective caprice and formal vacuity. In doing so, he draws surprisingly near to his arch nemesis, Hegel, in ways that are both telling and important.

Hegel's Critique of Conscience

To draw out the correspondence between Hegel and Kierkegaard at this point, it is necessary to recount all-too briefly Hegel's treatment of conscience in the *Philosophy of Right* and the *Phenomenonology of Spirit*. In both works, conscience marks a penultimate stage in the unfolding history of *Geist*. In Hegel's study of Right, conscience emerges as the most intense expression of *Moralität*, the final moment before the dialectical transition to *Sittlichkeit*. In the *Phenomenology*, conscience is discussed within the "third world of Spirit," that of *moral* Spirit, just prior to the dialectical transition to religion.[14] Although engaging slightly different aspects of Kant's understanding of conscience, in both cases consideration of conscience sets up the essential *problematique* which Hegel's own account of ethical life (and similarly Kierkegaard's own recasting of conscience, as will be shown) attempts to resolve.

It is the nature of the merely moral standpoint, Hegel says, to focus one-sidedly upon the individual subject and his moral will. Pursued to its end, this unbalanced stress upon subjective moral will results in the good being characterized "as the universal abstract essentiality of the will, i.e, as duty" (*PR* § 133). Whatever is to be done is to be done simply and solely for duty's sake. The good is thus identified with that which duty unconditionally enjoins from within upon the subjective will. But, Hegel asserts, no content is specified for such duty, because,

> duty itself in the moral self-consciousness is the essence of the universality of that consciousness... all that is left to it, therefore, is abstract universality, and for its determinate character it has identity without content, or that abstract positive, the indeterminate. (*PR* § 135)

Left with this abstraction, the moral subject labours under the formal injunction of duty's *ought* without being able to specify or give content to this *ought* for itself. It is at this point that Hegel says conscience arises. It is in conscience that moral self-consciousness "first has its *self-certainty; a content* for the previously empty duty" (*PS* § 633). Playing on the linguistic affinities of certainty (*Gewißheit*) and conscience (*Gewissen*), Hegel defines the latter as "that which establishes the particular and is the determining and decisive element" within subjective moral consciousness whose "universality, reflected into itself, is the subject's absolute inward certainty of himself" (*PR* § 637).

Conscience makes concrete the abstract will. This is to say that conscience is a "simple action in accordance with duty, which fulfills not this or that duty, but knows and does what is concretely right" in any given situation (*PS* § 635). From within the standpoint of *Moralität*,[15] conscience claims absolute moral authority for the subjective insight of the individual. Indeed, conscience is exactly "the expression of the absolute title of subjective self-consciousness to know itself, and from within itself, what is right and obligatory;" it is "the unity of subjective knowing with what is absolute" (*PR* § 137). In conscience, then, the moral subject claims for himself *immediate certainty* of the content of his duty in the form of his own *inner conviction* (*PS* § 637).

So conscience represents the radicalization of whole moral standpoint with its one-sided emphasis on the subjective will. The moral knowing that is conscience is the knowing of,

> the self-assured Spirit which has its truth within *itself*, in *its* knowledge, and therein as knowledge of duty.... In the strength of its own self-assurance it possesses the majesty of absolute *autarky*.... The *self-determination* is therefore, without further ado, absolutely in conformity with duty. (*PR* § 646)

Moral conscience on such a view finally rests upon the individual's "moral genius, which knows the inner voice of its immediate knowledge to be a divine voice" (*PS* § 655).

In the claims thus made for conscience, Hegel sees starkly manifest the heart of the problem with Kantian morals as a whole. In its singular stress upon the principle of individual subjective willing as the essence of the moral life, *Moralität* is driven first to an entirely formal (and so empty) notion of duty, the content of which, if it is to be made specific at all, can only be specified by the self-legislation of the individual moral will. As a result, appeal to conscience represents an essentially *arbitrary* resolution to the ethical problem.[16] In conscience, the subject's "intention, through being *its own* intention, is what is right; all that is required is that it should know *this* and should state its conviction that its knowing and willing are right" (*PS* § 654). Having no reference to an objective content for its moral knowledge nor external motive for its moral will, conscience lapses into capriciousness: the moral subject, on Kant's terms, "in the majesty of its elevation above every specific law and every content of duty, puts whatever content it pleases into its knowing and willing" (*PS* § 655).

As arbitrary, the claim of conscience is also always also deeply ambiguous. Hegel concludes the matter:

> The ambiguity in connection with conscience lies therefore in this: it is presupposed to mean the *identity* of subjective knowing and willing with the true good, and so is claimed and recognized to be something sacrosanct; and yet, at the same time, as the mere subjective reflection of self-consciousness into itself, it still claims for itself the title due, solely on the strength of its absolutely valid rational *content*, to that identity alone. (*PR* § 137)

In its unflinching concentration on formal subjectivity, Kantian morals never grasps this "absolutely valid rational content" objectively, and yet under the rubric of conscience it nonetheless pretends to knowledge of it all the same. Hegel sees in this simply its *reductio* into arbitrariness and perva-

sive ambiguity. Kant's moral position, finally, must abandon the determination of the good to the voluntary choice of particular subjects, and thus blurs the distinction between moral and amoral, good and evil.[17] This is what lies behind Hegel's famous charge that "if conscience is only formal subjectivity, to have a conscience is simply to be on the verge of slipping into evil in independent self-certainty" (*PR* § 139).

Hegel presses the logic of the Kantian conscience to its extreme, and so into a fundamental *aporia*, for the sake of resolving it. In the *Phenomenology*, this resolution is found in religion; in the *Philosophy of Right*, in *Sittlichkeit*, where the objective one-sidedness of abstract Right and the subjective one-sidedness of abstract moral subjectivity are each overreached in a *concrete* substantiation of the ethical Idea. But for our purposes, what is most significant in all this is the basic *shape* of Hegel's protest against the Kantian ethics of subjective conscience as the background for Kierkegaard's own reworking of the concept of conscience. Hegel's critique of conscience strikes at its *Situationslosigkeit*, its abstraction from all ethical objectivity, and hence its inescapably arbitrary and ambiguous nature. His own discussion of *Sittlichkeit* re-asserts an external and objective situation for conscience, a situation no longer thought to be at odds with subjective moral freedom, but rather the very condition of possibility for the existence of genuine subjective moral freedom at all. Hegel's solution to the adjudged inadequacies of the Kantian conscience is to provide for it a determinative context in an account of ethical life – under the rubrics of family, civil society and the state – that affords a material (and not merely formal) frame of reference within which conscience can stand as a viable category for ethics. To be rehabilitated, conscience must recover its "ethical substance."[18]

Conscience and Love – Kierkegaard's Recasting of Conscience

We know that Kierkegaard was aware of Hegel's critical treatment of conscience, and that he saw his own account of conscience as adequate to avoid the problems Hegel attacks. In a journal entry from 1849, Kierkegaard writes,

> … conscience in its immediate state… contains elements which are the very opposite of conscience. Herein lies the truth of what Hegel says about conscience being a form of evil. But in another sense Hegel says this without justification. He ought rather to have said: What many, indeed most, people call conscience is not conscience at all, but moods, stomach reflexes, vagrant impulses, etc. – the conscience of a bailiff.[19]

Kierkegaard distinguishes between conscience "in its immediate state" and conscience shot through with "ethical substance," freely granting the force of Hegel's critique of the former. Is it possible that, in the matter of conscience at least, Kierkegaard and Hegel might prove to be closer than might be expected given Kierkegaard's generally antagonistic posture towards the German philosopher?

Adequately exploring this possibility and rightly interpreting Kierkegaard's concept of conscience are both inhibited by approaches that have exclusive reference to existentialism as an interpretive framework and that neglect, as a matter of course, the later and explicitly theological works which Kierkegaard penned. Readings of this type are legion, and they typically cast conscience as one of a cluster of concepts with which Kierkegaard describes the subjective moral machinations of individual consciousness. On such views conscience amounts to a mode of subjectivity in which "one recognizes the obligation that one has to oneself to become a self"[20] and so is understood solely as an aspect of individual self-consciousness whose origin, function and goal is the self: conscience exhausts its reality completely within the internal dynamics of the moral subject. Indeed, any suggestion the pseudonymous works might give that Kierkegaard conceives of conscience having external reference to "either universal laws, or an absolute *telos* or God" is vigorously resisted in defense of this strictly existentialist interpretation.[21] The result is to ascribe to Kierkegaard a view of conscience as a legislative and juridical faculty wholly internal to the self, which is "immanently present in the being of rational, self-reflective, self-conscious human beings."[22]

If such readings were correct, Kierkegaard's idea of conscience would be squarely in the sights of Hegel's critique of conscience. That such readings are in fact untenable becomes clear in the light of the account of conscience Kierkegaard gives in *Works of Love*. Here we find an explicitly theological doctrine of conscience, one that articulates the concept of conscience *proper* to which Kierkegaard alludes in the journal entry cited above. Here we find that Kierkegaard has carefully attended to

Hegel's critique of the morality of the immediate subjective conscience, and that he develops a view of conscience on the other side of that critique, as it were. Conscience proper, for Kierkegaard, is invested with a pervasive external, objective aspect as Kierkegaard situates the subjective activity of the moral agent within an ethical field of reference in a manner formally similar (despite significant material differences) to the way Hegel moves to place subjective moral freedom with the context of *Sittlichkeit*. Indeed, Kierkegaard looks, rather counter-intuitively, to this account of conscience to do precisely this work.[23]

In *Works of Love*, conscience appears as a supporting theme within the first division of the text, whose overarching theme is the definition of love itself. Throughout, Kierkegaard presses a sharp distinction between erotic love and friendship on the one hand, and on the other what he calls "genuine love" or love "Christianly understood," a love that corresponds to the New Testament use of the word *agape*. The defining mark of this latter sort of love is that it is enjoined upon the individual as a duty, i.e., as something to which one is subject as a command or a law. Christian love, says Kierkegaard, stands under and responds to the eternal divine declaration: "You *shall* love" which is "the *royal* law" (*WL*, p. 24). Ingredient in this divine imperative are the specific objects proper to this love, namely God himself and the neighbour. To love God Christianly is to do so "*in obedience*" and "*in adoration*" while to love the "very unpoetic neighbour" whom "thinkers call ‚the other'" Christianly demands genuine selflessness (*WL*, p.19, 21). The neighbour, as the concrete occasion to enact what the law of love requires, is "nearer to you than anyone else" and takes precedence over erotic love's preferred objects, whether friend or beloved (*WL*, 21).

For Kierkegaard there is a profound qualitative distinction between love as is generally conceived – whose origins lies in "the play of the powers of immediacy" – and the love that is marked by the "earnestness of eternity, the earnestness of the commandment in spirit and truth, in honesty and self-denial" (*WL*, 25). The application of the "word of the *royal law*" to human love subjects it to "the change of the eternal" and wins for it "enduring continuance" (*WL*, p. 32).

As is already apparent by the introduction of these few concepts, Kierkegaard is here at work unfolding his "second" or "new" ethic which presupposes an explicitly Christian point of view.[24] In this ethic, theological concepts taken over from Scripture offer a description of the reality within which the idea of conscience finds its proper place.[25] This is an exercise of "moral reflection" as Oliver O'Donovan describes it, that "necessary taking-stock of the world" which "asks about our placement in the world, our relation to other realities."[26] For Kierkegaard the primary realities that position us ethically are those of God, the neighbour, and the divine imperative to love *Christianly*. These are more decisive than everyday existence, Kierkegaard contends, for "human existence is indeed at hand a second time, but not fancifully; the second time of its existence is its existence in God, or more correctly, this is its first existence, whereby each individual learns from God what the Law's requirement is... (*WL*, p. 117). It is with reference to one's "existence in God" – and ethically this means concretely, one's existence under the claim of the law of love – that an individual finds "substance and purpose and truth and actuality in existence" (*WL*, p. 117). It is of immense importance that this should be the starting point of the "second ethic" and hence also the basis on which conscience is to be treated. Kierkegaard does not take up the matter of conscience as part of a general phenomenological investigation of the moral subject, but only in the course of unfolding a theological account of the world within which the moral subject is set. And this is a world pervaded by the command, ‚You shall love.'

But what of conscience itself? Kierkegaard makes a crucially important remark at the outset:

> If one were to state and describe in a single sentence the victory Christianity has won over the world or, ever more correctly, the victory by which it has more than overcome the world, (since Christianity has never wanted to conquer in a worldly way), infinity's change that Christianity has as its aim, by which everything indeed remains as it was (since Christianity has never been a friend of the trumpery of novelty) and yet in the sense of infinity has become completely new – I know of nothing shorter but also nothing more decisive than this: it has made every human relationship between person and person a relationship of conscience.... just as the blood pulsates in every nerve, so does Christianity want to permeate everything with the relationship of conscience (*WL*, p. 135).

If in secular terms, only the monarch is thought of as having no other duty than the duty of con-

science, from the perspective of Christianity this regal power must not be denied to even the lowliest of persons. In the midst of the performance of everyday tasks, Kierkegaard indicates that everyone may and indeed must say to himself, "I am doing this work for wages, but that I do it as carefully as I am doing, I do – for the sake of conscience" (*WL*, p. 136). By referring one's work to conscience, what is achieved? Not the casting off of worldly labour and obligations – these, Kierkegaard says, remain in place. What occurs he argues is the *infinite inward* transformation of the nature of such labour and obligations; conscience is a register into which the business of life is translated by the force of the royal law of love. The effect is renovate the ethical substance and significance of the circumstances in which the moral life if live while leaving their forms largely intact.

But what does it mean, exactly, to assert that "*love* is a matter of conscience"? It first means that upon entering any human relationship each individual "must first be asked whether he has consulted with God and with his conscience" (*WL*, p. 140). This rather obvious, since what matters to conscience is precisely what is referred to it in moral reflection. Yet something important is indicated by this redundancy – namely, that *each and every* relationship is to be referred to conscience. The scope of conscience, says Kierkegaard, is unrestricted. In fact, he argues that its ubiquitous reach is in some sense analogous to God's omnipresence (*WL*, p. 140).

Its scope clarified, Kierkegaard must still specify the content of conscience itself; he must explain what takes place when human relationships are referred to it. On this score, Kierkegaard explains that the workings of conscience serve the faithful discharge of the royal law of love by first calling to mind what love itself is, and then comparing actual relationships with the true nature of love thus recalled. Conscience therefore takes the individual to that place where the nature of love itself is truly made manifest, where "a doctrine about love that is the essentially Christian doctrine" can be learned, and for Kierkegaard's second ethic this means we "must start from God and must find God in love to the neighbour." In this movement, Kierkegaard contends, Christian faith "takes possession of every expression of love and is jealous for itself"(*WL*, p. 140). Yet, even more concretely, Kierkegaard sees the law of love to be fulfilled in and laid upon us by Christ. Of this he writes,

> Christ was the fulfilling of the Law. How this thought is to be understood we are to learn from him, because he was *the explanation*, and only when the explanation is what it explains, when the explainer is what is explained, when the explanation [*Forklaring*] is the transfiguration [*Forklarelse*], only then is the relation the right one. (*WL*, p. 101)

The life of Christ is the *very definition* of what love is, being the concrete enactment of "love, in the divine sense" (*WL*, p. 110). Kierkegaard, here as elsewhere in his religious writing,[27] sets forth Christ as the love's "crushing" exemplar, and so as the ever indicting rule to which conscience refers itself.[28] In this context it is sufficient to note that the figure of Christ provides the specific material definition of the law of love which besets and directs moral conscience.

Conscience is thus a reflective act wherein an individual sets a specific love-relationship alongside the rule of love exemplified in the life of Christ for scrutiny and judgment. The act of conscience is that act in which the substantive claim of the law of love is called to mind – "learned again" as Kierkegaard says – as the critical and formative gauge of all acts of human love. As such it is always first and foremost a reflexive and juridical act which aims to check "the self-willfulness of drives and inclinations" (*WL*, p. 140) in the exercise of love.

Kierkegaard further specifies the act of conscience by speaking of God and the neighbour as the "middle" or "mediating" terms of all our human relationships. "*Christianity teaches*," he writes, "*that love is a relationship between: a person – God – a person, that God is the middle term*" (*WL*, p. 107). Or again: "it is God who by himself and by means of the middle term ‚neighbour' checks" and adjudges our loving so that only then can it be said that "love is a matter of conscience" (*WL*, p. 142). The primary middle term, God, and the secondary middle term, neighbour, both interpose themselves between the parties of any and all human love, for it is "self-denial's middle term that steps in between self-love's *I* and *I*, but also between erotic love's and friendship's *I* and *other I*" (*WL*, p. 54). With its demand to mediate the act of love through such middle terms, conscience interrupts the moral self with its insistent and cutting question: "is it actually love, in the divine sense, to show a devotion such as the object of love demanded?" (*WL*, p. 18).

For this reason, conscience refuses to leave the subjective moral self alone with its will to love and

the private works of love, but rather demands that this will and these works be mediated – in effect, be externalized and made public – by reference to God and neighbour. Though it is the moral subject herself who undertakes this reflection, the mediating terms come to her from outside and so reflection is drawn outwards, and the self thereby entangled in a set of particular external relations. By introducing God and neighbour as middle terms in the act of conscience, a fundamental sociality or relationality is interjected into the constitution of the moral subject once again, providing an element of heterogeneity within the concept of conscience itself. In this way Kierkegaard makes clear that, Christianly understood, it will not do for the criteria of conscience to be left to the subject's self-determination or personal discernment.

There is a third and final description of conscience offered by Kierkegaard in *Works of Love*: namely that "to relate to God is precisely to have a conscience" such that "the relationship between the individual and God, the God-relationship, is the conscience"(*WL*, p. 143). Keeping in view that God, for Kierkegaard, is never simply a predicate (transcendental or otherwise) of the human subject but is always the One who is separated from the human by an infinite qualitative difference, such a definition of conscience is striking indeed. Although conscience is always an inward movement of subjectivity, it has as an essential and defining element, a relation to another – God – who can never be absorbed or collapsed into human subjectivity. Said differently, moral conscience is never properly in possession of its middle terms – they remain something given to it only in an existing external relation. The self does not have a grasp upon its own criteria for assessing what shape love ought to take in the world, but must at every point redirect this matter beyond itself by referring it to the *object* of the individual's God-relationship, i.e., God himself.

Recall at this point that the God-relationship is not left as a formal concept in Kierkegaard's account, but as noted above, is materially defined in the person of Christ who is for conscience the both the prototype of *the* God-relationship (*vere homo*) and the manifestation of divine love (*vere deo*). Oriented to Jesus Christ as the concretion of divine and human love, conscience is preserved from lapsing back into that subjective caprice and arbitrariness of which Hegel accused the Kantian moral conscience. Kierkegaard acknowledges that preservation from such self-deception is precisely the issue when he writes,

> God wants each individual, for the sake of certainty and of equality and of responsibility, to learn for himself the Law's requirement. When this is the case, there is durability in existence, because God has a firm hold on it. There is no vortex, because each individual begins, not with ‚the other' and therefore not with evasions and excuses, but begins with the God-relationship and therefore stands firm and thereby also stops, as far as he reaches, the dizziness that is the beginning of mutiny (*WL*, p. 118).

Finally then, for Kierkegaard, conscience is the means by which it is ensured that it is not the moral subject *per se*, but ultimately only God become concrete in Christ, "who in every case will determine what love is" (*WL*, p.126).

Where this is *not* the case, Kierkegaard agrees that Hegel's worst fears about moral conscience are fulfilled, and true conscience is lost, being replaced with the arbitrary because autonomous will. He writes, "as soon as one leaves out the God-relationship, the participants' merely human definition of what they want to understand by loving, what they want to require of each other, and their mutual judgment by virtue of that, become the highest judgment" (*WL*, p. 112). In his treatment of conscience, Kierkegaard is working to ensure that the definition, the scrutiny and the judgment of how love ought to take shape in the world are all ultimately ascribed to God. For the moral self only escapes self-deception and illusion as it heeds God's own explanation of love, which is identical (as already noted) with Christ's person and work. No less than Hegel, but for explicitly Christian reasons, Kierkegaard is committed to resisting the capricious conscience of the ethics of subjective conviction. What he says about Christian faith as a whole can rightly be applied to his understanding of the content of the true conscience as well, namely that essential to it is acknowledgment that "it did not originate in any human heart" (*WL*, p. 27). Conscience is not so much the seal of human moral autonomy as it is the subjective reflection upon and inward appropriation of that radical heteronomy that Kierkegaard understands to constitute the reality of the ethical sphere.

At least two aspects of this view of conscience call for further clarification and invite specific criticism. The first is the deep separation Kierkegaard opens up between the inward transformation of love-relationships (and also labour) at the hands

of conscience on the one hand, and the untroubled maintenance of the external *status quo* on the other. The work of conscience is restricted to the achievement, on the part of the individual, of a different *perspective* or way of seeing one's life and relationships that is inwardly liberating but which outwardly changes nothing. If conscience were to give voice to its vocation, Kierkegaard claims, it would say,

> Do not busy yourself with changing the shape of the world or your situation.... No, make Christianity your own, and it will show you a point outside the world, and by means of this you will move heaven and earth; yes, you will do something even more wonderful, you will move heaven and earth so quietly, so lightly, that no one will notice (*WL*, p. 136).

The infinite transformation which Christian faith effects by making everything a matter of conscience – i.e., by mediating absolutely everything human through the God-relation – is limited, it would seem, strictly to the sphere of subjective inwardness. Thus, Kierkegaard contends the manual labourer remains a manual-labourer externally, even as inwardly, despite discovering in conscience his essential equality with the Regent in eternity; and woman remains subordinate to man within the lived actuality of marriage, though inwardly knowing herself the equal of the man before God (*WL*, p. 139).

There are troubling prospects in all of this. To delimit the ‚infinite transformation' of life achieved by conscience to the inward sphere makes the predicate ‚infinite' suspect. Infinite, here, cannot mean ‚total' since a significant portion of the totality of human existence – its external, social aspect – remains in place despite the transformation. ‚Infinite transformation' may well then simply mean that from the standpoint of the infinite (or the eternal) the specifics of one's external situation are so lost from sight and so fully relativized by the loftiness of this view, as to be rendered irrelevant. But such a reading would open Kierkegaard up to the very charge he was intent on pressing home against Hegel: namely, that despite achieving the lofty, indeed infinite, perspective in thought one must nonetheless still live, east, work (i.e., *exist*) in the actual finite world.

It would be a serious irony indeed if the cost of maintaining a doctrine of conscience able to resist collapse into pure subjectivity (as in Kant) by re-asserting the determinative role of external relations (with God and neighbour) were the loss for theological ethics of the significance of the *actual* world, that external "secondary existence" of which Kierkegaard speaks. It seems very odd that the work of conscience as Kierkegaard describes it would *not* issue in a thorough-going renovation of actual human relationships and ways of life and *be seen* to do so. For instance, it should make all the difference in the world of my *actual* day to day life with others that the relationships I have with others are entirely transformed at the hands of conscience by the interposition of the concept ‚neighbour' before any and all other categorical understandings of them, e.g., as spouse, enemy, boss, friend. Loss of the ethical significance of the conditions of actual existence and the hope of their transformation seems too high a price to pay even for correcting the hypertrophy of moral subjectivity. How does Kierkegaard's notion of the infinite inward transformation of one's life in conscience escape this obvious charge of encouraging flight from the actual and into the purely abstract.?

Yet, we have not yet done sufficient justice to Kierkegaard's carefully worded claims here: as "inwardly everything is changed" by conscience so "outwardly the old more or less remains" (*WL* p. 138). Note well – *more or less*. Or again, as previously cited, when you subject love to the scrutiny of conscience, Kierkegaard contends, "you will do something even more wonderful, you will move heaven and earth so quietly, so lightly, that no one will notice (*WL*, p. 136). Conscience affects not only the quality of moral reflection, it also affects the quality of moral *action*. Moral action is not eliminated – after all, something wonderful is *done*, the world around is *moved*. What concerns Kierkegaard much more than this *per se* is the *character* of such action. It is crucially important that the movement of the world by conscience does not occur in a *worldly* way, and that the actions to which conscience leads are enacted *Christianly*. If, unsatisfied with this stricture of Christian conscience, the moral subject grasps rather at immediate secular effectiveness, then "for what she loses she gains only a mediocre compensation in the fragment of externality she can in a worldly way obtain by defiance." (*WL*, p. 139). In short, the promise that attends conscientious action rests upon its comporting with the reality which gives it form. And this sees to it that such action – ever chastened by the claim of the royal law of love and so solidly in need of grace and patient upon God – is in the world but not of it: "What Christ said about his

kingdom, that it is not of this world, holds true of everything Christian. As a higher order of things, it wants to be present everywhere but not to be seized" (*WL*, p. 138). And while this may remain profoundly dissatisfying to the realist and pragmatic mind, in Kierkegaard's view, such is the inescapable and joyful burden of Christian moral life with a faith that "has never wanted to conquer in a worldly way" (*WL*, p. 135).[29]

Second, this account of conscience provokes an important question about agency. Is it God, the human person, or both who act in conscience? Clearly conscience is an human act, since Kierkegaard says that an individual *relates himself* to God so as to "go with God, hold only to him, and understand under God everything you understand" (*WL*, p. 78). But Kierkegaard hints that we can also properly speak of God's agency in relation to conscience when he writes that in conscience it is "*God who by himself* and by means of the middle term ‚neighbour' checks on whether the love for wife and friend is conscientious" (*WL*, p. 142). These two agencies need not be mutually exclusive, though they are frequently taken to be so. At stake in sorting this out is the question of just how liable Kierkegaard's conscience is to collapse back into Kantian subjectivism. This would be a genuine threat if God were invoked solely as an inactive and mute template with which subjective moral consciousness equipped itself. But certain remarks, like the one just cited, militate against such a view of God. And this is borne out in other texts as well. For example, Kierkegaard's understanding of authority as a necessary and perpetual structure of ethical-religious life – as set forth in *The Difference Between A Genius and an Apostle*, published the same year as *Works of Love* – indicates that God's *active* involvement as the addressing *Other* is essential to any understanding of conscience.[30] This view of authority, along with the crucial theme of Christ's *contemporaneity* with every age, speaks strongly in support of Kierkegaard envisaging, perhaps more strongly that *Works of Love* itself makes clear, that divine agency is an essential aspect of the reality of human conscience.

Conclusions

If conscience is in fact, as the etymology hints, a kind of *co*-knowing, a knowing *long with* another, it might be said that Kierkegaard contends that the individual moral conscience co-knows with Christianity as a whole what God gives it to know, namely the command to love and the living and contemporaneous explanation of this command in the person of Jesus Christ.[31] In the act of conscience, the moment of ethical interrogation in which "Christianity steps forward and asks about relationship to God, whether each individual is first related to God and then whether the relationship of love is related to God" (*WL*, p. 108) is reduplicated inwardly. This internal reduplication in the moral subject of what is, crucially, primarily an *external* interrogation *of* the moral subject by God is in essence what Kierkegaard takes conscience proper to be.

As I have argued, conscience denotes the God-relationship in its subjective ethical aspect. The concept speaks at once of an inward structure of subjective life, and of an objective and outward structure of existence to which it is essentially coordinated. As such, conscience is an individual's reflection upon her situatedness within an ethical reality primarily constituted by relations to God and to neighbour, the situation Kierkegaard significantly speaks of as our "first existence, whereby each individual learns from God" what the Lord requires of us. It is in the midst of the reality constituted by one's relationship to God and relationship to neighbour that the imperative command, ‚You shall love!' resounds and is heard. Kierkegaard's conscience is the event in which the self takes up this reality as its own; it is an act which grounds all personal moral reflection and activity in a prior acceptance of a defining situation, a situation most profoundly and properly described in Kierkegaard's view in explicitly theological terms. Hence, in the act of conscience *we* tell ourselves again what we have already heard about ourselves and our situation in the address of another. The disclosure or revelation that this situation is *our* situation becomes the presupposition of all moral conscience. The Kierkegaardian conscience is thus a kind of human echo of the divine command ‚You shall love!' in the chambers of human subjectivity, and the inwardly reflected claim of the neighbour as *my* neighbour. These echoes and reflections pervade all Christian moral reflection, and are made ever more concrete by being "explained" here and now by the One who *is* their living explanation, Jesus Christ. So, when Kierkegaard speaks of ethical maturity, he describes it as process in which we become more and more intimate with the law and its claim, which it to say, a process by which our subjective moral reality is conformed to the objective moral field or situation which it inhabits: this

is the "eternal truth that love *forms* the heart" (*WL*, p. 12). To become a moral subject is to undergo love's formation of the heart to the end that one's own inner voice more properly and more fully echoes the concrete command of Christ.

In order to avoid the serious shortcomings inherent in a one-sided subjective ethic of conscience (identified by Hegel), Kierkegaard reworks the concept of conscience, interjecting an objective, external and unassimilatable referent right into the heart of moral self-reflection. Working in a theological idiom, Kierkegaard strives for account of moral subjectivity that holds together its proper subjectivity and its determinative external context. This aim parallels that of Hegel's *Sittlichkeit* but, unlike Hegel, Kierkegaard's account is both Christianly specific and committed to holding open the distinctions between *is* and *ought*, law *giver* and law *receiver* that the German philosopher refuses, in the end, to accede. Here as elsewhere, Kierkegaard makes plain his dedication to maintaining the qualitative distinction between God and the human creature and their irreducibly *external* relation. Yet where the efforts of these men coincide is in a common effort to get beyond the Kantian ethics of subjectivity, precisely by insisting on the reality and ethical validity of an external context to which the moral subject is responsible. Here Kierkegaard (if only briefly!) draws alongside Hegel in common cause. Both authors are agreed that "it is law that gives freedom" such that "without law, freedom does not exist at all" (*WL*, pp. 38-9), thus together contest the Kantian opposition of moral freedom and objective moral direction or constraint.

In sum, Kierkegaard's account of conscience as moral reflection mediated and made concrete by reference to God and to neighbour describes a salutary "situation for human freedom" – moral subjectivity always finds itself within a set of fundamental determinative relations, i.e., those with the God of Jesus Christ and the human neighbour, which make up the fabric of moral reality and provide the condition of possibility of there being moral existence at all. Indeed, MacIntyre is right to observe that "it is only when writing from *within* a Christian position that Kierkegaard can find any reason for answering the question" moral question, ‚How shall I live?'.[32] Just so. For Kierkegaard the Christian position can properly found and orient moral life. To demonstrate precisely this is the burden of that "second ethics that presupposes dogmatics" pursued throughout his later theological works. Kierkegaard in fact "possesses precisely the kind of teleological orientation that MacIntyre finds lacking in modernity"[33] though this orientation is not an accomplishment of *reason* but is rather the fraught and searching gift of revelation.

Kierkegaard's treatment of conscience does provoke important questions concerning the relation of human and divine agency, as well as the relation of moral reflection to moral action. However such questions are eventually answered, it is certain that with his concept of conscience Kierkegaard is attempting to "step altogether outside the tradition of freedom as self-dependence"[34] in order to assert once again the ethical necessity of acknowledging an constitutive context for human moral freedom, a freedom whose upholding and fashioning is perhaps even more dear to Christian faith than it is to modernity.

Notes

1 See Charles Taylor, *Hegel and Modern Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 156.

2 See G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*. A.V. Miller trans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), §§632-671 (pp. 383-409), as well as the section entitled 'Good and Conscience' in his *Philosophy of Right*. T.M. Knox trans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1942), §§129-141 (pp. 86-104).

3 Taylor, *Hegel and Modern Society*, p. 160.

4 See especially Problemata I and Problemata II in S. Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling /Repetition*. H.V. Hong and E.H. Hong trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 54-67, 68-81.

5 A. MacIntyre, *A Short History of Ethics* (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 215.

6 A. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*. Second Edition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), pp. 44, 39.

7 S. Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Anxiety*. R. Thomte and A.B. Anderson trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 20-21, 23. See also note #48, p. 228.

8 Bruce Krimmse, *Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 306. This judgment is shared by Philip Quinn who gives pride of place to *Works of Love* in his essay on "Kierkegaard's Christian Ethics," in the *Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard*. A. Hannay and G.D. Marino eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 349-375.

9 Amy Laura Hall, *Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 13.

10 Taylor, *Hegel and Modern Society*, pp. 158-9.

11 Ingolf Dalferth reflects at length upon the significance of this in his tellingly titled essay, " '. . .der

Christ muß alles anders verstehen als der Nicht-Christ. . .' – Kierkegaards Ethik des Untersceidens," in *Ethik der Liebe. Studien zu Kierkegaards "Taten der Liebe"* I.U. Dalferth ed. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), p. 19-46.

12 David Gouwens, *Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 197.

13 S. Kierkegaard, *Works of Love. Some Christian Reflections in the Form of Discourses*. E.V. Hong and E.H. Hong trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 140. Hereafter, cited as *WL* in the body of the text.

14 Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §§ 129-141; *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §§ 632-671. Hereafter these are cited in the body of the essays as *PR* and *PS* respectively.

15 Hegel does also speak of a "true conscience" which belongs not to the moral standpoint, but to that of ethical life itself (PR § 137). *This* conscience is oriented to "fixed principles and is aware of these as its explicitly objective determinants and duties," a view not far from Kierkegaard's own position, as we will see. However, it is the depiction of *moral* conscience which holds our attention at this point.

16 See A.W. Wood, *Hegel's Ethical Thought*, p. 174.

17 L. Siep, "The *Aufhebung* of Morality in Ethical Life," in L.S. Stepelevich and D. Lamb eds. *Hegel's Philosophy of Action* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1983), p. 143.

18 Taylor, *Hegel and Modern Society*, pp. 158, 85-88 where Hegel's notion of 'ethical substance' is helpfully discussed.

19 Entry no. 684 in *Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers*. H.V. Hong and E.H. Hong eds. Vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), p. 321.

20 G.J. Stack, *Kierkegaard's Existential Ethics* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1977), p. 122.

21 Stack, *Kierkegaard's Existential Ethics*, p. 122.

22 Stack, *Kierkegaard's Existential Ethics*, p. 125.

23 See Dalferth, "Kierkegaards Ethik des Unterschiedens,", p. 39: "Kierkegaard rekurriert zwar auf das *Gewissen*, aber nur, um dieses anti-innerlich als Ort des Gottesverhältnisses auzulegen."

24 Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Anxiety*, pp. 20-1, 23; see also the editors' note 48, p. 228. Later in *Works of Love* he speaks plainly of Christianity itself as "the true morality" (p. 51).

25 ". . . what law is referred to here? Our text is the apostolic word, we are speaking about *Christian love*; therefore here the law can be only *God's Law*." (WL, p. 106).

26 Oliver O'Donovan, *Common Objects of Love. Moral Reflection and the Shaping of Community* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), pp. 13-14.

27 Cf. S. Kierkegaard, *Practice in Christianity*. H.V. Hong and E.H. Hong trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 238ff; and the discourse, "Christ the Prototype" in *For Self-Examination and Judge For Yourself!* H.V. Hong and E.H. Hong trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 147ff.

28 D. Gouwens, *Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker*, p. 128.

29 That Kierkegaard makes this case in continuity with some of the basic moral instincts of Lutheranism, can be seen by their similarity to elements of Luther's own ethic. For instance, in the *Treatise on Good Works*, commenting on Rom 8:2 – "Where the Spirit of Christ is, there all is free" – Luther writes that "faith does not permit itself to be bound to any work or to refuse any work, but, as the first Psalm says, it yields its fruit in its season, that is, in the normal course of events" and goes on to give the example of how married partners do "the great and the important as gladly as the small and the unimportant, and vice versa" and do so "all in a glad, peaceful, and a confident heart" as "absolutely willing companion[s]". While the external form of marriage remains in place, and is held in common with others outside the church, its substance is Christianly transformed, in Luther's view, by that freedom faith affords – See Martin Luther, *Treatise on Good Works* in *Luther's Works*. Edited by J. Atkinson. Volume 44 (Philadephia: Fortress Press, 1966), pp. 26-7.

30 See S. Kierkegaard, "The Difference Between A Genius and an Apostle," in *Without Authority*. H.V. Hong and E.H. Hong ed. and trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 91-108.

31 Kierkegaard himself invokes this etymology in a journal entry from 1854, when he writes, "to have a conscience before men does not reach much farther than have a conscience (con-sciousness) with men. . .. How many people really have a conscience with God?" – *Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers*. H.V. Hong and E.H. Hong ed. and trans. Volume 1 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), #688, p. 322.

32 A. MacIntyre, *A Short History of Ethics*. (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 218. MacIntyre comments further that Kierkegaard's ethics is shot through with inconsistency because "he moves uneasily between speaking from within an order in which God's will provides the criteria for action and speaking as the lonely individual outside all criteria" (*Ibid*). Differentiating the Kierkegaard's 'second ethics' and its particularly *theological* form and content from that explored in the pseudonymous works, it seems to me, would go a long way towards resolving this 'inconsistency'.

33 Karen L. Carr, "After Paganism: Kierkegaard, Socrates, and the Christian Tradition," in *Kierkegaard After MacIntyre: Essays on Freedom, Narrative, and Virtue*. Ed. by J.J. Davenport and A. Rudd (Peru, IL: Open Court, 2001), p. 186.

34 Taylor, *Hegel and Modern Society*, p. 159.

EuroJTh (2006) 16:1, 37–47 0960–2720

Human Reconciliation in the New Testament with Special Reference to Philemon, Colossians and Ephesians

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SUMMARY

The study begins by noting that while *katallassō* ('to reconcile') and its cognates are rarely used of human reconciliations in the NT (only four clear cases), the 'concept' of 're-establish[ing] proper friendly interpersonal relations after these have been disrupted or broken' (Louw-Nida) is widely present. The letter to Philemon does not use *-allassō* compounds, but it provides the most delicate and detailed discussion of the topic in the NT, as Paul seeks to bring reconciliation between Philemon and his absconded slave Onesimus.

Part 1 of the paper probes the process and the intended outcome and concludes Paul takes reconciliation much deeper than the mere restoration of healthy conventional master/slave relations. The climax of the exquisite rhetoric is that he bids Philemon welcome Onesimus back, not merely as a slave, but as a *beloved brother*; indeed, *as he would welcome the apostle himself* (Philem 16-17). The practical implications of this are investigated.

Part 2 sets the specific portrait in Philemon on the broader theological canvas of Colossians and Ephesians. On this, the surprising depth of reconciliation Paul attempts is understandable as an instance of the final cosmic reconciliation and total harmonious unity which is already inaugurated in Christ (Col. 1:15-20; Eph. 1:9-10). The 'old humanity' marked by the multiple alienations of the fall are being overcome by the new creation in Christ of a thoroughly relational 'personhood' in the image of the self-giving, forgiving, love of Christ himself (Eph. 4:17-5:2).

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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Der Artikel beginnt mit folgender Beobachtung: Während *katallassō* ("versöhnen) und die verwandten Wörter im Neuen Testament selten in Bezug auf menschliche Versöhnung gebraucht werden (nur in vier eindeutigen Fällen), ist das "Konzept" des "Neuaufbaus echter freundlicher zwischenmenschlicher Beziehungen, nachdem diese gestört oder zerbrochen waren" (Louw-Nida), weit verbreitet. Der Brief an Philemon benutzt keine Wörter der *-allassō* Gruppe, bringt aber die feinfühligste und detaillierteste Diskussion des Themas im NT, da Paulus versucht, Versöhnung zwischen Philemon und seinem entflohenen Sklaven Onesimus zu stiften.

Teil 1 des Artikels untersucht den Prozess und das beabsichtigte Ergebnis und schlussfolgert, dass Paulus Versöhnung viel tiefer versteht als die bloße Wiederherstellung gesunder konventioneller Herr-Sklave-Beziehungen. Der Höhepunkt der vorzüglichen Rhetorik besteht darin, dass er Philemon bittet, Onesimus nicht nur wieder als Sklave, sondern als *geliebten Bruder* willkommen zu heißen, ja sogar so, *wie er den Apostel selbst willkommen heißen würde* (Phlm 16-17). Die sich hieraus ergebenden praktischen Konsequenzen werden untersucht.

Teil 2 positioniert das spezifische Portrait des Philemonbriefes auf dem größeren theologischen Gemälde des Kolosser- und Epheserbriefes. Innerhalb dieses Gemäldes ist die überraschende Tiefe der von Paulus angeregten Versöhnung als ein Beispiel der endgültigen kosmischen Versöhnung und völligen harmonischen Einheit zu verstehen, die in Christus bereits begonnen hat (Kol. 1,15-20; Eph. 1,9-10). Die "alte Menschheit", gezeichnet von vielfachen Entfremdungen des Falles, wird in Christus durch die neue Schöpfung eines durch und durch relationalen "Menschseins" nach dem Bilde der sich selbst opfernden, vergebenden Liebe Christi überwunden (Eph. 4,17-5,2).

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RÉSUMÉ

L'auteur commence par noter que les mots de la famille du verbe *katallassô* (réconcilier) sont rarement utilisés pour la réconciliation entre humains dans le Nouveau Testament (seuls quatre cas sont clairement attestés). Par contre, le concept du rétablissement de relations personnelles normales et amicales après leur rupture ou leur détérioration (selon la définition donnée par Louw et Nida) y est très présent. L'épître à Philémon, où l'on ne rencontre aucun terme de la racine d'*allassô*, offre un traitement détaillé et plein de tact de ce sujet : Paul l'écrit pour amener Philmon à se réconcilier avec Onésime, son esclave en fuite.

Dans la première partie, Max Turner considère quel processus et quelle issue Paul recommande et montre qu'il vise quelque chose de plus profond que la simple restauration d'une saine relation correspondant aux usages entre maîtres et esclaves. Il va même jusqu' à inviter Philémon accueillir Onsime, non plus seulement comme un esclave, mais comme un frère bien aimé, et même comme il accueillerait l'apôtre Paul lui-même (Phm 16-17). Turner explore les conséquences pratiques d'une telle approche.

Dans la seconde partie, l'apport spécifique de l'épître à Philémon est étudié à la lumière de l'enseignement thologique plus global des Epîtres aux Ephésiens et aux Colossiens. La réconciliation que Paul souhaite entre Philmon et Onsime doit être vue comme un cas particulier de la réconciliation cosmique finale et de l'unité pleinement harmonieuse déjà inaugureés par l'oeuvre de Christ (Col 1.15-20 ; p 1.9s). Dieu est en train de triompher des multiples aliénations dont l'ancienne humanité souffre en conséquence de la chute, par la nouvelle création en Christ d'une nouvelle nature pleinement relationnelle de personne, l'image de l'amour miséricordieux de Christ qui s'est donné pour nous (p 4.17-5.2).

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Introduction

Some readers may be puzzled by the restriction of scope implied in the title, and, perhaps, by the inclusion of Philemon as a starting point.

On the first count, after all, it is not as though the word-group 'reconcile/reconciliation' is particularly common in the New Testament (some 16 occasions), and the majority of cases are about reconciliation with God (including, perhaps, the references to cosmic reconciliation in Eph 2.16 and Col 1.20, 22, which we will deal with below),[1] not primarily about reconciliation between human persons.

Otherwise, in relationship to human reconciliation we only have *four* clear occasions:

1. Matthew 5.24, in which Jesus teaches that you should first be reconciled (imp. aorist passive of *diallassomai*) with a brother who bears a specific complaint against you before offering a gift in the temple.
2. Luke 12.58, in which Jesus enjoins that a person get reconciled (perf. passive inf. of *apallassō*) with his accuser, on the issue at hand, before they arrive in court.
3. 1 Corinthians 7.11, where Paul virtually requires that if a woman be separated from her husband, she should either remain single, or become reconciled (imp. aorist passive of *katallassō*) to him.[2]
4. Acts 7.26, where Stephen recounts Moses' attempt to reconcile (imperf. active of *sunallassō*) two quarrelling Jews (see Exod 2.13)

These are relatively straightforward instances of an otherwise widespread secular hellenistic usage of the terminology.[3] and it may be argued that this paper should concentrate on all four instances, relatively trivial as they are on the broader theological canvas (excepting, just perhaps, Mt 5.24).

On the second count, it is clear that no lexeme belonging to the immediate word-group appears in Philemon, so why should that letter even appear on the radar screen, let alone be a starting point?

But the response is, I hope the relatively obvious one, that the 'idea/concept' of 'reconciliation' draws in much more material than merely texts which include '*-allassō*' cognates. The linguistic principle is that you determine the 'sense' of the lexemes in the related word-group, and then scour the texts for the 'concept' embodied in the 'sense', and its componential meanings.

Central to the linguistic *sense* of the reconciliation word-group is 'to reestablish proper friendly interpersonal relations after these have been disrupted or broken'. And that 'sense' usually has the following components of meaning (to continue the quote of Louw-Nida): '(1) disruption of friendly relations because of (2) presumed or real provocation, (3) overt behavior designed to remove hostility, and (4) restoration of originally friendly relations).[4]

In which case, Philemon is 'all about' human reconciliation: indeed, probably the most detailed discussion in the New Testament thereof,[5] even though it does not specifically use the 'reconcile'

word-group. And Colossians and Ephesians crucially paint that concept on a broader theological canvas, in a way no other NT writing does (though, in a sense, we could have included every other writing). That is my justification for the scope and restriction of this paper, the sections of which will follow what is suggested by the title.

1. Reconciliation in Philemon

There is no actual use of the lexeme *katallassō* or of its cognates in this rather more than standard-size letter. Yet those commentators are surely right who argue that 'reconciliation' is its central concern. The story behind the letter clearly involves a catastrophic breakdown of relationships between Philemon and his slave Onesimus, with presumed provocation, and the letter itself is arguably quite the most exquisite short piece ever written in any attempt to resolve such concerns. So let us tease out the issues, in terms of Louw-Nida's classification.

1.1 The break-down of relationships.

This is evident in that Onesimus has absconded without his master's leave, and almost certainly contrary to his will. For an intelligent slave (such as Onesimus clearly was) to do so must have required considerable resolution, and the facing of inordinate hazards and potentially horrendous consequences, including (at least) severe flogging, but also branding, chaining, and very possibly execution by crucifixion.

The degree of the break-down in relationship can also partly be measured by the distance he intended to traverse, and, more importantly, the time he intended to be away. On the latter point, it is traditionally assumed that Onesimus was a runaway slave, with absolutely no intention of return. He would get himself 'lost' in Rome (or wherever, and distant Rome would certainly be safer than relatively nearby Ephesus), because, in his terms, the break-down was fundamentally irretrievable.[6]

But there is now a more probable reading of the Onesimus story which makes the conflict with Philemon a potentially resolvable one. A slave in dispute with his master, or fearing unjust punishment, could run to a patron or friend of the master, seeking refuge and intervention, without criminality, if his overall strategy could be construed as in his master's long-term interest. Onesimus may have set out deliberately to find Paul, because he knew that the apostle had a very strong relationship with his master – Paul was, after all, his master's 'father-in-Christ' (Philem 19) – and he had grounds to think that Paul would intercede for him successfully, and restore harmonious relations. In that case, Onesimus would not (technically) be a *fugitivus/phygas* (i.e, a criminal run-away: a term which Paul conspicuously does *not* use of Onesimus)[7] on his journey to and from Paul,[8] though he must have been aware that not all authorities would have seen the issue quite that clearly.

Onesimus would know where Paul was from Epaphroditus (and may even have journeyed to Paul with him: cf. Philem 23; Col 4.12). Were Paul in prison in Ephesus, Onesimus would only need to count on two weeks to be there and back. If in Caesarea, he would have to reckon with at least a month. If in Rome, then the very shortest, speediest, possibility was a month, and the vagaries of travel were more likely to stretch it out to three months – or considerably more if the return journey fell into the seasons when travel was simply not feasible.

On any account, the calculation suggests the degree of breakdown in the relationships between Onesimus and his master was very considerable. We now turn to that issue.

1.2 The Presumed or Real Provocation

What could drive a slave to run to his master's friend or patron seeking protective intervention? He might do so for fear of an unjustified whipping if the patron lived just down the street, or even in the next town (Laodicea, even Hierapolis?). But to envisage a trip to Ephesus, one hundred and twenty miles away, let alone the much more distant Rome, implies a more serious problem. It is difficult to believe that from Onesimus' point of view the fundamental difficulty was that Philemon was an unbearable tyrant. He was, after all, a *christian* master, and evidently held in high regard by Paul, whose convert he was. I suspect, but have no means of showing, that the crisis issue in dispute was Onesimus' manumission (something Onesimus had done, or not done, had perhaps jeopardized or severely delayed that): reason indeed for seeking out an *amicus domini*. Onesimus does not appear to think the fundamental fault is on *his* side, otherwise Paul would have been quick to mention his regret and repentance, on which he is entirely silent.[9]

If we look at the question from Philemon's side, there is evident cause for severe discontent: whatever the original dispute was about, Onesimus has

absented himself without permission for a considerable time (constituting 'self-stealing'): time not merely to travel to Paul, but to stay with him long enough to become a convert to Christ, the apostle's beloved 'child', and to prove himself a 'faithful' brother (and 'useful' co-worker?: cf. Col. 4.9; Philem 11, 13, 16). Technically and legally, of course, Paul should have returned him *at the very first opportunity*: it was a crime in itself to harbour a slave.

To account for Paul's failure to do so we may only suppose that Onesimus arrived at the place of apostle's confinement near the close of the season of travel,[10] and so was forced at least to winter with him. So we may be thinking of the period from October to May: a significant loss of Onesimus' due services to Philemon! In addition, of course, Onesimus may well have purloined items from Philemon's house, with which to ease his passage (but, on return, that could presumably be counted against what otherwise would have been the master's costs of hearth and board during the months of absence).

1.3 Overt Behavior Designed to Remove Hostility.

On a minor, but not often observed point, Paul's writing of a 'cover-letter' for Onesimus was itself a quite expensive commitment to his cause: Richards calculates it at about the modern equivalent of $100.[11] And, of course, that does not include the (probably considerably greater) cost of sending Tychicus as his companion, though this would partly be mitigated by the fact that Paul had a broader task for Tychicus in relation to the letters to Colossae, Laodicea and Ephesus (cf. Col. 4.7-9; Eph, 6.21-22).

But the letter itself is quite astonishing! Paul does not just do the 'Pliny-to-Sabinianus' thing of advocating clemency, with a plea for recognition of former affection in the relationship with this freedman. Paul writes on behalf of a *slave* (Philem 16), not a freedman, and he bids Philemon welcome Onesimus back, not merely as a slave, but as a *beloved brother*; indeed, *as he would welcome the apostle himself* (Philem 16-17).

That comparison is evidently not just an empty literary platitude. In a quite exquisite three-way 'take' on the issue,[12] he reminds Philemon that he, Philemon, is Paul's beloved brother (Philem 7, 20), partner (Philem 17), and 'son' (in the sense that Paul brought him to 'life'; Philem 19), and thus owes Paul a countless debt (not too subtly put in Philem 19-20). He then also, earlier, in parallel identifies Onesimus as the 'child' he has begotten (Philem 10) and 'beloved brother' (Philem 16), *and* urges that he should be accepted as beloved brother by Philemon also (v.16).

In addition, he strongly identifies himself with Onesimus ('my very heart'; Philem 12), as slave/prisoner (Philem 1, 9, 13), and as one who has no 'rights' with Philemon, but can only 'appeal' to him (Philem 8-10, 14, though the pressure is put on a bit in 17-20!), and promises to pay all monetary debts incurred (v.18). It is then as *a deliberate and well-prepared climax* that in v.16 he bids Philemon accept Onesimus back no longer as a slave, but now as a beloved brother, indeed as the apostle himself (v.17). This whole of vv.8-17 is a cruciform appeal: as N.T. Wright nicely put it, with deliberate echoes of 2 Corinthians 5.17-21, 'God is in Paul reconciling Philemon to Onesimus'.[13]

In keeping with this, a number of commentators argue that taking Paul's expressed wish that Onesimus stay with him, as co-worker (v.13), and the final confidence that Philemon will 'do even more' than he explicitly asks (v.21), the apostle is effectively requesting the *manumission* of Onesimus, and his re-assignment to Paul.[14]

Anyone *not* shocked by all that in the ancient world might well have been advised to consult the equivalent of a psychiatrist, for treatment of apathy. In brief, the writing of the letter to Philemon is in itself a more-than-generous act of reconciliation, and takes reconciliation well beyond the thought of.

1.4 Restoration of Originally Friendly Relations, or Total Transformation thereof?

We, of course, do not know the actual outcome, though Paul warns, again not too subtly, that he will check it out ('Prepare a room for me!' v.22). But the *envisaged* outcome goes well beyond the mere restoration of 'normal' master/slave relationships. Let us consider the implications.

At very least, Paul anticipates a return that does not involve the heavy discipline that would be usual. After all, you do not welcome a brother back by flogging his back![15]

At the other extreme it seems unlikely that Paul seeks the immediate manumission of this slave, and far less probable that he does so as a paradigm for the release of all christian slaves by their christian masters. It is in fact less than clear that he seeks Onesimus' manumission, and the advice in the letters purportedly sent out with that to Philemon,

namely Colossians and Ephesians, clearly implies that he has no challenge to the institution of slavery as such, nor that he expects christian masters to free their slaves, but rather to treat them well (Col 3.22-24; Eph 6.5-9).

So with what are we left in practical terms? How exactly was Philemon to take the quite extraordinary step of welcoming Onesimus back as a 'beloved brother', while also retaining him as his 'slave'? Would it not be an unbearable, unresolvable tension. On this issue, Barclay proves the perhaps slightly cynical realist, asking such important questions as: can you warmly welcome back an absconded slave without sending dangerous signals to other slaves in your household and your community? Can you manumit a converted slave without instigating a Gadarene rush of other slaves to convenience christianity? And how can you treat such a slave as a 'brother', without breaking down the whole 'world' of responsibilities and duties he is heir to, and encouraging all manner of insubordination?[16] If Philemon provides the venue for the 'church', then he needs his slaves to prepare and serve the meals, and to clear up afterwards, no? And can Onesimus realistically 'challenge' Philemon on any moral, spiritual, or ecclesial issue, as a 'brother' might be expected to (cf. Gal 6.1), etc? Barclay is perhaps slightly overly pessimistic, though it must be admitted that the history of Christian master/slave relations shows a strongly dualistic tendency to recognize the slave as a brother in the Lord only from the perspective of eternity, or 'the kingdom of God', while oppressively subjecting him in the economy, or 'in the flesh' (cf. v.16: exactly contra to Paul's own advice).[17]

But Paul evidently does expect a *radical transformation* of relationships. Philemon is implicitly invited to forgo his 'rights', and lovingly embrace Onesimus, *even* as he would Paul himself. How in practice it would work out is unclear and left to Philemon's discretion,[18] but it need not have led to the loss of labour and insubordination that Barclay suspects. Everyone in a household, including the beloved spouse and offspring, knew how to respect the wishes of the *pater familias*, how to work with him for the household good, and how to be tactful on delicate issues. Arguably a slave in the Christocentric environment of love that Paul envisages would actually offer *more* sincere service and respect, rather than less (and that is the assumption in the advice in the *Haustafeln*, as well as in the letter to Philemon itself). And Onesimus could probably hope for an equitable manumission, sooner rather than later, with the normal good on-going relations and mutual obligations as a freedman.

1.5 Theological Implications of the Correspondence with Philemon.

The letter to Philemon is arguably the best test-case of the apostle's understanding of reconciliation. But what it shows, quite clearly, is that he anticipates something much more profound than merely the stabalisation of conventional social relations after they have become disrupted by a conflict. It appears that for him reconciliation means something more like the reversal of the alienations which allow and define the demeaning conditions of 'slavery'.

Here we must tread with caution. As we all know, Paul does not make an explicit attack on the institution of slavery *per se* (nor could he in any practical terms). Some accounts of slavery by NT scholars almost imply that at least 'household' slavery had become a relatively benign state of affairs that called for little criticism, even an opportunity for upward mobility, with the expectation of manumission after six to seven years.[19] It is true that household slaves generally fared better than agricultural slaves (depending on the proclivities and status of the master), and certainly very much better than those labouring in mines,[20] but virtually all slavery in the Roman world of the period reduced the person in question to the status of a property; it was a subjection to the power of another that was regarded as 'contrary to nature', and thus a fundamental alienation, a 'shame', even a social death.[21] If Paul does not attack the institution and legal status itself, and indeed seems curiously laissez-faire about it in 1 Corinthians 7.21-22,[22] that is because his own advice (as offered in Philemon) *largely gives back the personal identity, honour and social standing ('brother' rather than 'slave') that the institution itself effectively denied or effaced.*

It is when we turn to Colossians and Ephesians that we are able to appraise this in its broader theological context.

2. Human Reconciliation in Colossians and Ephesians

2.1 Introductory Issues

There are good reasons for taking these two letters together, the most important being their very close literary relationship: most of the sections of Colos-

sians reappear in some revised (often expanded) form in Ephesians, largely in the order of the Colossians material, and Ephesians shares about one third of the wording of Colossians.[23]

The 'canonical reader' will readily connect Colossians and Philemon through the common destination, the common list of those present with Paul (see esp. Philem 23-24; Col 4.7-16), including, crucially, Onesimus and Epaphroditus, but also Mark, Barnabas, Luke, Aristarchus and Demas: a collection that could not have been 'usual'). Such a reader will also anticipate Ephesians to be a letter sent on the same occasion, not just because of the close material relations with Colossians, but on account of the extensive virtually word-for-word identical passage about Tychicus' role in relation to his giving support information about Paul's circumstances (Col 4.7-8=Eph 6.21-22).

Historical-critical readers may, however, demur, and spread out on a spectrum that (a) accepts the authenticity of both Colossians and Ephesians (and their close relationship to Philemon),[24] (b) accepts Colossians and its implicit relationship to Philemon, while reckoning Ephesians as 'deutero-pauline'[25]; (c) regards Colossians as deutero-pauline, and Ephesians as a contemporary or even later writing.[26] And, naturally, there are various positions in between! It is not possible to enter into detail, in this paper, but for the record, I consider Philemon undoubtedly authentic, Colossians as very probably directly Pauline (albeit with Timothy materially contributing), and Ephesians most probably sent on the same occasion, primarily as a subtle prophylactic but positively encouraging letter (against the incipient Colossian heresy), addressed to Laodicea (and intended to be read in Colossae; cf. Col 4.16b), but with a copy deposited at Ephesus (Paul could not expect his co-workers to pass through Ephesus without the conventional hospitality, information exchange, and encouragement, and the letter would be fairly-well targetted to their concerns with the 'powers' too).[27] I base that judgment in part on Richards' research,[28] and on his conclusions that: (1) named co-authors (such as Timothy at Col 1.1; Philem 1) were genuinely active participants (not merely secretaries, certainly not amenuenses, except in trivial cases); (2) secretaries would have a variety of ways of making 'first-draft' notes, from minimal to full dictation, but that the latter was rare, and secretaries would thus inevitably affect details of 'style'; (3) letter scribes would be given pre-formed material (from, e.g. notebooks, such perhaps as the Colossian 'hymn' of 1.15-20, and the Haustafeln) simply to be added (that too would change 'style analysis' of any purported letter); and, perhaps most important, (4) *both the initial 'composition/dictation', and all the subsequent drafts to completion, would be read out publicly, and discussed, with the consequence that letters sent on the same occasion (in this case Philem, Col and Eph) on related subjects would naturally interpenetrate considerably*.

On such an assumption, i.e. that the three letters were sent at the same time, they immediately co-interpret in a way that would be less true, even if still partially true, if we stretch out the time scale by decades. So, to avoid unnecessary repetition, we shall discuss first the purely 'distinctive' contribution of Colossians, then the fuller, inclusive, treatment of Ephesians.

2.1 The Distinctive Contribution of Colossians

The use of reconcile/reconciliation cognates in Colossians sets the specific portrait in Philemon on a broader canvas, while still addressed to Philemon's own community. Colossians 1.20, 22 are cardinal in this respect, especially the former. As is widespreadly agreed, it belongs to a 'hymnic' section (1.15-20) of some kind, which begins with a strophe in celebration of the pre-existent Christ's unique role, protological, sustaining, and eschatological, in creation (1.15-16, continued in the intermezzo of vv 17-18). From that perspective, all would seem to be at 'peace' under his sovereign control. But the second strophe (1.19-20) unexpectedly speaks of reconciliation and peace being wrought through Jesus' death, on the cross,[29] and so, with Dunn, and others,

> between the two strophes, and the two phases of divine activity in Christ, there is presupposed an unmentioned event or state, that is, presumably the falling of the cosmos under the domination of the heavenly powers created as part of ta; pavnta (1:16), the state already spoken of in 1:13 ("the power of darkness"), an ongoing crisis now resolved in the cross [cf. 2.15]. The defeat of these powers is also the means of reconciling heaven and earth.[30]

The verb used both here and at 1.22 is the intensifying neologism *apokatallassō*, found elsewhere only at Ephesians 2.16, and quite possibly Paul's own creation. As with *katallassō*, it implies an erstwhile alienation, estrangement and hostility (as v.21 clarifies), but not a series of historical events of

'falling out' with God and Christ, but as a universal condition of multiple alienation/estrangement. While Merkel is wrong to say the saving act in 1.20 does 'not concern the reconciliation of the world of humanity to God [more accurately, to Christ?; this is exactly how 1.21-22 interprets the matter], he is nevertheless nearer the mark when he continues,

> but instead involves the reconciliation between the parts of the universe. In the background of this statement stands "the feeling, widespread through the Hellenistic world, of living in a world that is breaking up, in which the struggle of everything against everything else characterizes the whole of nature".[31]

In short, the big plot in which Philemon and Onesimus play their respective parts is one of a fractured, alienated creation, and an eschatology of total cosmic harmony, inaugurated in Christ, and already becoming visible in the church. It is from the perspective of the fulfilment of *that* vision that Paul can maintain that the alienating divisions of mankind (race, circumcision, status: so 3.11) are dissolved in Christ. It is partly why he opposes the elitist, divisive, false-teaching (probably a syncretistic brand of Jewish Christian apocalyptic mysticism),[32] and commends instead a 'new-humanity' ethic of forgiveness, forbearance, compassion, meekness, and self-giving love, which 'binds everything together in perfect harmony' and in 'Christ's peace' (3.12-15). But all this is writ large in Ephesians to which we now turn.

2.2 The Contribution of Ephesians

Ephesians gives a wider picture within which to interpret both Philemon and Colossians. From the perspective of Ephesians, individual reconciliations are part of a much larger scheme of cosmic re-unification. To avoid repetition of previously published material, I first summarise the relevant parts of the argument of two earlier articles – one examining the relationship between cosmic reconciliation and 'unity'; and a second on implications for understanding of personhood – and then turn to some aspects that deserve fuller attention,especially in the light of more recent publications.

2.2.1 Reconciliation and 'Unity' in Ephesians.

It is well known that Ephesians has a predominating emphasis on 'unity', and that this is the case in a variety of dimensions. There is (1) the unity of the whole church as one body, one eschatological congregation, and one corresponding temple, with Christ, the source of that unity; (2) the unity of reconciliatory harmony, between the erstwhile fundamental division between Jew and Gentile, and (3) the unity of interpersonal relationships in the local congregation and in the household.

In an article written in 1995,[33] I argued the following:

1. Ephesians 1.9-10 paradigmatically summarises Paul's gospel as the ultimate 'summing up' or 'unifying' of all things (*anakephalaiōsthai*) in Christ. The passage interprets the thoughts of Colossians 1.15-20, and reflects a much broader Jewish background view that the original harmony of the cosmos, expressed in the paradisal conditions of Genesis 1-2, had dissolved into multiple alienations, and needed to be resolved by eschatological reunification.[34]
2. The rest of the letter deliberately clarifies, exemplifies, and applies this as follows: (a) in Eph 2.1-22 the author articulates two major dimensions of cosmic reconciliation in Christ – that between *all* and God, and that between the major divisions of mankind, i.e. (as seen from a very Jewish perspective), between Jew and Gentile; (b) in Eph 3, the 'mystery' of God's purpose is revealed as his Christocentric action to make Gentile believers co-heirs and co-body members of a new 'people of God', and thus a witness to the world (and to the divisive powers) of his final unifying intent; (c) Eph 4 opens with a climactic exhortation to unity (4.1-6), and expounds it in terms of ministry-enabled corporate growth towards Christ (4.7-16); (d) Eph 4.17-6.18 consists of clarion call to abandon the life of the old alienated humanity and to live according to the pattern of a 'new humanity' revealed in Jesus (and uniquely illustrated by the marriage relationship in Eph. 5.21-32).

2.2.2 Reconciliation and the Renewal of 'Personhood' in Ephesians

All the above, I have argued, implies a completely new view of what it means to be (in modern terms) a 'person'.[35] In Ephesians, there are two (perhaps three?) types of humanity. Gentiles (outside Christ) are stereotyped as beings in the very worst form of alienation from God and from each other (esp 4.17-19, but cf. 2.1-3). Jews are somehow 'nearer' (2.11-12), but still in need of reconciliation to God and to the outsiders (2.14-17). Both of these are regarded as a form of personhood that

needs to be 'put off' and replaced by the 'new man' configured on Christ. I summarised the essential position thus:

(i) The church is constituted as a community of the reconciliation of all things in Christ, and as the bringing together of the two 'realms' – Jews and Gentiles, formerly in hostility – as one new body in Christ, one heavenly eschatological temple (so Eph. 1-2). She is the realm of (messianic) 'peace' that results when alienating enmity is torn down (2:14-18; cf. 4:3). Her very existence in history as one harmonious ecclesia of Jews and Gentiles, and with a new distinct identity (neither Jew nor Gentile, but one body in Christ) is God's witness to the heavenly powers of his manifold wisdom and eschatological intent (3:4-6; 8-11).
All this presupposes that the new man created in Christ is fundamentally restructured away from a personhood of 'self'-centredness, 'closedness' and alienation, towards one of reconciliation, and a new 'openness' of self-giving love to the neighbour.

(ii) Precisely this is the assumption of the extensive treatment of ethical topics, in chs 4-6. This sets out from the urgent call to be 'eager to maintain the unity of the Spirit [=the unity he gives] in [the] bond of peace' (4:3) to a definition of the church in terms of such foundational unity (4:4-6) and then describes the task of all ministry as to promote the harmonious growth of the body in unity towards the stature and maturity of its Lord (4:7-16). It is in that context, that Paul calls his readers to put off 'the old man' and to live instead the personhood they have learned through the Christ-event (4:20-24; 4:30-5:2): the forgiving, loving, self-giving, God-imitating, life of Christ. The ethical advice which follows exemplifies this call,[36]

2.2.3 Special Issues in the Jew/Gentile Reconciliation of Ephesians 2.11-22

It is clear that this passage implies a reconciliation between Jews and Gentiles. But what form does it take? For Markus Barth it means a unification between *all* Jews (believing, or not) and Gentile *Christians*.[37] For most, it is more probable that the unification in question involves the creation of a new 'set'; some kind of *tertium genus*, however horrible that seems to a post-holocaust generation. That is, a quite new 'humanity' defined by its radical new existence in Christ. But Barth's position has found new support in a monograph by T-L Yee,[38] who presents a post-Barth, 'new Pauline' perspective. For Barth:

(1) the 'new man' created in Christ (2.15) is not constituted by the abolition or denial of differences between Jews and Gentiles. The readers are still addressed as Gentiles (2.10) and Jewish Christians are still Jews. The 'new man' is neither Christ, nor the 'christian personality', nor some *tertium quid* ('third entity' – e.g. a new Israel/people of God standing somehow over and against both empirical Israel and the Gentile world). Rather the one 'new man' is created simply by the *ending of the hostility* between Jew and Gentile, by the removal of the separating, enslaving, accusing and provisional functions of the Law.

(2) The 'commonwealth of Israel' (2.12) relates to the *whole nation*; not only the faithful remnant (as Schlier, Robinson, and Dahl have argued);[39] nor an 'ideal' Israel, the 'true' Israel (Vielhauer), or the Church (Hanson). But, *against* most commentators, he asserts that Paul does not subsequently in the passage anywhere restrict the scope of the concept of Israel. Paul does not tell the Gentiles readers that their new relationship is only with *believing* Jews – 'Rather it is clear that 'in Christ' they have been united with Israel as a whole and come before God'. Christ is the Messiah of *all* Israel, not just a part of it, and it is in him that the Church is united with Israel. *The Church has no Mission to Israel, only a calling to oecumenical dialogue*.[40]

To this Yee adds the claims that (a) Paul's criticism of unbelieving Gentile existence, in such passages as Ephesians 2:1-2; 11-13; 4.17-19, is pan-Jewish, rather than distinctively Christian, and (b) that the writer has no theological criticism of (unbelieving) Israel, as such.

The scope of this paper does not allow a detailed response, but requires at least the following demurral and qualification:

1. It simply is *not* true to say that Ephesians has little-or-no criticism of covenantal Judaism. In 2.11-13 Paul offers a restrained polemic against those who brand Gentile converts as still the *akrobustia* (literally, and certainly not neutrally, 'the foreskin'): those who denigrate the Gentile believers in such a fashion (and he is thinking primarily of those who promote the quasi-Jewish false teaching in Colossae) he dubs 'the so-called circumcision, merely performed by human hands in the flesh'. The

use of the adjective *cheiropoiōtos* (by human hands) here, with its connotations of idolatry, is clearly polemical (contra Yee). In 2.16 it is *both* Jews and Gentiles that are together reconciled with God through the Christ-event, which assumes that even Jews need such reconciliation. Most importantly, while 2.1-2 paint Gentiles (before faith) in blackest terms, 2.3 *incorporates Judaism into exactly the same state: dead*, in the thrall of the devil, and children of wrath. It is clear from both Colossians and Ephesians that all those who do not find their essential identity in Christ – whether Jew or Gentile – are in very deep peril: they are without the eschatological Spirit, and are no part of the heavenly temple built on the cornerstone of Christ and his apostles/prophets. And it is simply wrong to say that Paul's mission was only to Gentiles, while he could only conceive of 'oecumenical dialogue' with Jews: that simply makes a nonsense of his polemic in Galatians and of his anguish in Romans 9-11. We need to resist the temptation to devise post-holocaust re-readings of Paul that cut against the grain of his clear criticism of unbelieving Israel. Let Paul be Paul!

2. The above notwithstanding, Ephesians is not in any way 'anti-Jewish'. Even before Christ they are the 'near' to God of Ephesians 2.13, compared with the Gentiles who were those 'afar'. The writer himself is evidently proud of his Jewishness, and regards the people of God 'in Christ' as having a distinctively 'Israel' shape: the fulfilment of her hopes, while Gentiles had no hope.

2.2.4 Reconciliation and 'Forgiveness' in Ephesians 4.32-5.2

We have noted that the 'concept' of reconciliation' might require consideration of many passages that do not specifically use '*-allasssō*)' cognates. Very closely allied, and in the same semantic domain, is the language of 'forgiveness'.[41] To 'forgive' is to put away hostility, in a manner that is usually personally costly. Its meaningful and intended end is the restoration of a fractured relationship (real or potential), and thus 'reconciliation' (that observation, of course, could pull in much of the NT for a consideration of the subject 'human reconciliation', and is part of the reason I have restricted the scope of this paper to Philem-Col-Eph). Ephesians 4.32-5.2 is in a sense pivotal on this issue, even if it not necessarily structurally so in Ephesians. It brims with language iridescent of reconciliation: the puting away of bitterness, wrath, anger and malice; the embracing of kindness, tenderheartedness, forgiveness, and a love to the other which imitates sacrificial self-giving for the other of Christ himself. All this and more lies at the heart of Paul's concept of reconciliation.

3. Conclusion

We began with the tale of Philemon and Onesimus, and what appeared to be Paul's quite extraordinary request that the master, Philemon, accept back his absconded slave, no longer as a slave, but as a brother; indeed even as the apostle himself. How can we understand such a request? The answer comes in the broader picture painted by Colossians, and, especially, Ephesians. The *whole point* of the gospel is to reverse the multiple 'alienations' of the 'fall'. This means two things:

1. Theologically, human 'reconciliation' is extraordinarily important: it is *not* just about fixing bad social relationships, occasioned by some dispute, though it very certainly includes that (as is obvious in the case of Onesimus).
2. At a fundamental level, theologically, 'reconciliation' is about re-integrating as persons who mirror/image (so Gen 1) the divine trinitarian personhood of loving unity, and demonstrate the grace of forgiveness exemplified in the Christ-event.[42]

Notes

1 All three instances are of the apparent neologism *apokatallassō* ('reconcile'). The terminology of reconciliation *with* God is distinctive to Paul amongst the NT writers: for *katallassō*, 'reconcile', see Rom 5.10 (bis); 2 Cor 5.18, 19, 20; for *katallagē*, 'reconciliation', see Rom 5.11; 11.15; 2 Cor 5.18, 19.

2 On which see Antony C. Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text*, NIGTC (Carlisle/Grand Rapids: Paternoster/Eerdmans, 2000), 519-24

3 For the terminology, see esp. I.H. Marshall, *Jesus the Saviour: Studies in New Testament Theology* (London: SPCK, 1990), 258-74; S.E. Porter, Καταλλάσσω *in Ancient Greek Literature, with Reference to the Pauline Writings* (Córdoba: Ediciones el Almendro, 1994)

4 Johannes P. Louw and Eugene A. Nida, eds, *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament, based on Semantic Domains* (New York: UBS, 1988), 502

5 Second in line might be 'the parable of the prodigal son', in Luke 15, which too does not lexicalize

either the 'love' or the 'reconciliation' which the passage gloriously epitomizes.

6 The traditional view – that Onesimus was a runaway slave – faces considerable difficulties: (a) he would not voluntarily visit Paul in prison, were he himself a fugitive; (b) it is most unlikely that, if apprehended, he would be put in the same kind of confinement as Paul (not in Caesarea or Rome, at any rate), and (c) had Onesimus been arrested, then Paul would have absolutely no say in the matter of returning him to his master. The magistrates would have been responsible.

7 Cf. the judgment of (third century) Julius Paulus: 'The slave who absconds to a friend of the master, to beg his intercession, is not a "fugitive"'. Similarly the Roman jurist Proculus in the earlier part of the first century, according to one Vivianus, as quoted in (6th century!) Justinian's *Digest* (21.1.17.4), whose slave had fled to V's mother to seek similar intercession.

8 For details see: P Lampe, 'Keine "Sklavenflucht" des Onesimus', ZNW 76 (1985): 135-37; Brian M. Rapske, 'The Prisoner Paul in the Eyes of Onesimus', NTS 37 (1991): 187-203, esp. 201; cf. Brian Rapske, *The Book of Acts and Paul in Roman Custody*, AICS (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1994); I.H. Marshall in Karl P. Donfried and I. Howard Marshall, *The Theology of the Shorter Pauline Epistles* (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), 177-79; John M.G. Barclay, *Colossians and Philemon* (Sheffield: SAP, 1997), 98-102, reversing his previous acceptance of the traditional understanding (in J.M.G. Barclay, 'Paul, Philemon and the Dilemma of Christian Slave-Ownership', *NTS* 37 [1991]: 161-86); James D.G. Dunn, *The Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1996), 304-07; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *The Letter to Philemon*, Anchor Bible (New York: Doubleday, 2000), 17-23. Markus Barth and Helmut Blanke, *The Letter to Philemon*, ECC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 227-28, are more cautious in their acceptance of this possibility. Cf. J.G. Nordling, 'Onesimus Fugitivus: A Defense of the Runaway Slave Hypothesis in Philemon', *JSNT* 41 (1991), 97-119.

9 Contrast the positive emphasis on repentance made in the 'parallel' case of Pliny-the-Younger's appeal to Sabinianus on behalf of one of S's freedmen (*Ep*.9.21).

10 On those seasons, see e.g. E. Randolph Richards, *Paul and First-Century Letter Writing: Secretaries, Composition and Collection* (Downer's Grove: IVP, 2004), chap. 12, and the sources he cites.

11 *Paul*, 161-170.

12 See the heart-warming analysis of Marianne Meye Thompson, *Colossians and Philemon*, Two Horizons New Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids/Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2005), 219-22.

13 N.T. Wright, *The Epistles of Paul to the Colossians and To Philemon* (Leicester: IVP, 1986), 187; so also Thompson, *Colossians*, 223-25.

14 See Fitzmyer, 122; Dunn, 345; Barth, 492.

15 The term 'brother' did not imply egalitarian relations between siblings, and an older brother might, e.g., be expected to 'discipline' (including beating) a younger (for his benefit, of course!): see. e.g., Andrew D. Clarke, 'Equality or Mutuality? Paul's Use of 'Brother' Language', in *The New Testament in Its First Century Setting: Essays on Context and Background*, ed. P.J. Williams, et al. (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2004), 151-64

16 J.M.G. Barclay, 'Paul, Philemon and the Dilemma of Christian Slave-Ownership', NTS 37 (1991), 161-86, and, *idem, Colossians*, ch. 7. That the danger of insubordination was there is clear from the injunction that slaves honour and respect their christian masters, even though they are 'brethren' (1 Tim 6.2)

17 See Marianne-Meye Thompson's critique, in *Colossians*, 248-60

18 And as Lohse points out, 'Love is resourceful enough to find the right way in accomplishing the good' (E. Lohse, *Colossians and Philemon*, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971), 202).

19 Cf. e.g., S.S. Bartchy, *Mallon Chrēsai: First Century Slavery and the Interpretation of 1 Corinthians 7:21* (Missoula: Scholars, 1973); D.B. Martin, *Slavery as Salvation: The Metaphor of Slavery in Pauline Christianity* (New Haven, Conn.: YaleUP, 1990); Thiselton, *Epistle*, 562-65. The suggestion that manumission was regular, and could be expected after six years of service, is a complete misunderstanding of a remark by Cicero: see, briefly, J.A. Harrill, 'Slavery' in Craig A. Evans and Stanley E. Porter, eds, *Dictionary of New Testament Background* (Leicester: IVP, 2000), 1126; cf. J.A. Harrill, *The Manumission of Slaves in Early Christianity*, HUT (Tübingen: Mohr, 1995).

20 For the variations see e.g. T.E.J. Wiedemann, *Greek and Roman Slavery* (London: Routledge, 1988).

21 Cf. O. Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge: HarvardUP, 1982).

22 Cf. Thiselton, *Epistle*, 544, 552-62, for the defence of the translation of the notorious crux in 7.21-22 as 'If, when God called you, you were a slave, do not let it worry you. Even if there is a possibility that you might come to be free, rather start to make positive use of the present. For the slave who was called in the Lord is a freedperson to the Lord. . .'.

23 The argument for the dependence of Ephesians on Colossians is put in its most extreme and woodenly mechanistic form by George H. van Kooten, *Cosmic Christology in Paul and the Pauline School: Colossians and Ephesians in the Context of Graeco-Roman Cosmology, with a New Synopsis of the Greek Texts*, WUNT II (Tübingen: Mohr, 2003), whose synopsis of the

two letters (215-89) argues that Eph has thoroughly plundered Col, excepting some of the material specific to the false-teaching (2.8-3.4), while adding only two sections (the ecclesiological material in Eph 2, and the 'spiritual warfare' passage in Eph 6). For a much more cautious analysis of the relationship, see esp. E. Best, 'Who Used Whom? The Relationship of Ephesians and Colossians', *NTS* 43 (1997), 72-96, with whom van Kooten rarely interacts.

24 So, recently, the commentaries by Barth, O'Brien (P.T. O'Brien, *The Letter to the Ephesians*, Pillar Commentary [Leicester: Apollos, 1999]), and Hoehner (Harold W. Hoehner, *Ephesians: An Exegetical Commentary* [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2002]).

25 J.D.G. Dunn, "Deutero-Pauline Letters," in *Early Christian Thought in Its Jewish Context*, ed. J. Barclay and J. Sweet (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), 130-44; John Muddiman, *The Epistle to the Ephesians*, Black's New Testament Commentaries (London: Continuum, 2001).

26 So (virtually) Rudolf Schnackenburg, *The Epistle to the Ephesians* [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991]; Andrew T. Lincoln, *Ephesians*, vol. 42 of *WBC* (Dallas: Word, 1990), and Ernest Best, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Ephesians* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998). W. Bujard's *Stilanalytische Untersuchungen zum Kolosserbrief*, SUNT (Göttingen: V&R, 1972) has been particularly influential on the current trend to deny the authenticity of Colossians. But see the cautions concerning his method in Barclay, *Colossians*, 30-33, and M.B. O'Donnell, 'Linguistic Footprints or Style by Numbers? The Use of Statistics in the Discussion of Authorship of New Testament Documents', in *Linguistics and the New Testament: Critical Junctures*, eds S.E. Porter and D.A. Carson (Sheffield: SAP, 1999), 206-62.

27 So C.E. Arnold, *Ephesians: Power and Magic* (Cambridge: CUP, 1989), *passim*.

28 E. Randolph Richards, *The Secretary in the Letters of Paul* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1991), and, *especially, idem, Paul, passim*. In many respects he is not far off from the classical, but somewhat ignored work by O. Roller, *Das Formular der paulinischen Briefe*, BWANT 4 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1933).

29 On critical issues: (1) I take 'the whole fulness' of v.20 to be the subject of the verb 'was pleased', (2) the *referent* to be God, and (3) the 'to him' to refer to Christ, in parallel with v.16f. In 1.22, Christ is the probable subject of the verb 'he reconciled' and the 'to him' and 'before him' now refer to God.

30 Dunn, *Colossians*, 102-03. But cf. also R. McL. Wilson, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Colossians and Philemon*, ICC (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 154-59

31 O. Merkel καταλλάσσω, ἀποκαταλλάσσω, καταλλαγή in *EDNT*:2, 262: his quotation is from E. Schweizer, *The Letter to the Colossians* (London: SPCK, 1982 [EKK 1976]), 81. Schweizer need not have suggested it was a mainly 'hellenistic' view: it was there in Palestinian Judaism too. For Paul, it was not a question of a universal fiery flux, but of Adam's disobedience, and the consequential melt-down into multiple alienations: from God, from Eve, and from self. For Paul, this is all amounts to a fall into satanic darkness (Col 1.13, and cf. Eph 2.1-2 and 6.10-18). For the more Jewish background to the understanding of cosmic alienation, see, e.g., R.P. Martin, *Reconciliation: A Study of Paul's Theology* (London: Marshall, Morgan and Scott, 1981), ch. 4.

32 With e.g. C. Rowland, 'Apocalyptic Visions and the Exaltation of Christ in the Letter to the Colossians', *JSNT* 19 (1983), 73-83; Thomas J. Sappington, *Revelation and Redemption at Colossae* (Sheffield: JSOT, 1991).

33 Max Turner, 'Mission and Meaning in Terms of "Unity" in Ephesians', eds. Antony Billington, Tony Lane, and Max Turner, in *Mission and Meaning: Essays Presented to Peter Cotterell* (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1995), 138-66

34 On that I was initially dependent on S. Hanson, *The Unity of the Church in the New Testament: Colossians and Ephesians* (Uppsala: Almqvist, 1946); but see also Martin, *Reconciliation*, ch. 7.

35 Max Turner, 'Approaching "Personhood" in the New Testament, with Special Reference to Ephesians', *EvQ* 77, no. 3 (2005), 211-33

36 Turner, 'Personhood', 228

37 Quintessentially, M. Barth, *The Broken Wall: A Study of the Epistle to the Ephesians* (London: Collins, 1960).

38 Tet-Lim N. Yee, *Jews, Gentiles and Ethnic Reconciliation: Paul's Jewish Identity and Ephesians*, SNTSMS (Cambridge: CUP, 2005).

39 See W. Rader, *The Church and Racial Hostility: A History of Interpretation of Ephesians 2.11-22* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1978),224, for detail

40 For a response to Barth's position see A.T. Lincoln, 'The Church and Israel in Ephesians 2' CBQ 49 (1987), 605-24.

41 See Louw-Nida 1: 502-04.

42 On which see especially Miroslav Volf, *Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1996); idem, *Free of Charge: Giving and Forgiving in a Culture Stripped of Grace* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2005).

EuroJTh (2007) 16:1, 49–76 0960–2720

Book Reviews – Recensions – Buchbesprechungen

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Christianisierung im Mittelalter

Lutz E. von Padberg

Darmstadt: WBG, Stuttgart: Theiss, 2006, 176 pp., 68 ill., hb., Euro 39,90, ISBN 978-3-8062-2006-3

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Der großformatige Bildband ist eine meisterliche Darstellung der europäischen Christianisierung im Mittelalter. Der evangelikale Paderborner Gelehrte Lutz von Padberg fasst in diesem Buch seine Forschungen zur mittelalterlichen Missionsgeschichte populärwissenschaftlich zusammen. In chronologischer und regionaler Darstellung schildert er die jahrhunderte dauernde Missionierung der europäischen Völker. An deren Ende steht am Vorabend der Neuzeit gegen 1400 das christliche Europa. Padbergs Buch ist mit zahlreichen hochwertigen Photographien vorchristlicher und christlicher Kultorte und -gegenstände illustriert. Es berücksichtigt gleichmäßig die verschiedenen Regionen Europas und stellt die deutsche Entwicklung nicht besonders umfangreich dar. Daher eignet es sich in hervorragender Weise dafür, in möglichst viele europäische Sprachen übersetzt zu werden.

SUMMARY

The large-format illustrated book is a masterful presentation of the European Christianisation in the Middle Ages. The Evangelical scholar Lutz von Padberg from Paderborn brings together in this book for general readership his researches on the medieval history of missions. In a chronological and regional presentatation he describes the centuries-long evangelisation of the European peoples. The book finishes with Christian Europe around 1400 on the eve of Modernity. Padberg's book is illustrated with many high-quality photographs of pre-Christian and Christian places of worship and objects. It considers together the various regions of Europe and so accounts for the German development not particularly comprehensively. On that account it would be very much worth translation into as many European languages as possible.

RÉSUMÉ

Cet ouvrage grand format traite de façon magistrale de la christianisation de l'Europe au moyen âge. Lutz von Padberg, érudit évangélique de Paderborn, y livre au grand public les résultats de ses travaux sur l'histoire des missions médiévales. Il procède par époque et par région pour relater l'évangélisation des peuples européens qui a duré des siècles. L'ouvrage se termine sur l'Europe chrétienne vers 1400, à la veille de l'éclosion de la modernité. Il est magnifiquement illustré de nombreuses photographies de lieux et d'objets de cultes, d'époque pré-chrétienne et chrétienne. Les différentes régions d'Europe sont prises en compte de sorte que l'ouvrage mériterait d'être traduit en autant de langues européennes que possible.

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Der Paderborner Mittelalterforscher Lutz von Padberg hat ein Werk herausgegeben, das sich durch seine große Anschaulichkeit auszeichnet. Padberg hat in diesem großformatigen Bildband seine zahlreichen Untersuchungen zur christlichen Missionsgeschichte des Mittelalters in neun Kapiteln zusammengefasst, mit 68 Abbildungen versehen und allgemeinverständlich dargestellt. Es dauerte fast tausend Jahre, bis Europa christianisiert war.

Padbergs Darstellung geht sowohl chronologisch als auch nach Regionen vor. Sie beginnt mit dem fränkischen Reich, mit Chlodwig und seiner Umwelt. In Irland sind Christen ab der Mitte des 5. Jahrhunderts nachweisbar, aber die Missionierung der grünen Insel setzte schon im 4. Jahrhundert ein. Die Iren beeinflussten die Christianisierung der Angelsachsen. Die britische Kirche war etwa im Jahr 400 „fest im Land verankert" (30). Durch die Arbeit unter den heidnischen Angelsachsen, Friesen und Jüten – am bekanntesten sind die Anstrengungen von Gregor dem Großen und Augustinus von Canterbury – entstand innerhalb von hundert Jahren eine stabile, an Rom orientierte Kirche.

Das Frankenreich bereisten die iroschottischen Mönche anfangs aus asketischen und nicht aus missionarischen Gründen. Erst bei Willibrord steht die Mission im Mittelpunkt der peregrinatio (55). Bonifatius versteht die Taufe von Nichtchristen als Herrschaftswechsel (64). – In karolingischer Zeit ist die Taufe des Sachsenhäuptlings Widukind im Jahr 785 von Bedeutung. Die Vermischung kirchlicher und politischer Absichten führte zu der fatalen Alternative Tod oder Taufe (78f). Der Gelehrte Alkuin forderte am Ende des 8. Jahrhunderts, dass die Glaubensunterweisung der Taufe vorangehen müsse, um die Christianisierung erfolgreich zu betreiben.

Die Missionierung der skandinavischen Länder ging nur langsam voran; in Schweden zog sich die Christianisierung über einen Zeitraum von etwa 250 Jahren hin (112). In Südosteuropa war die Situation von der Konkurrenz zwischen ostkirchlich-byzantinischem und westkirchlich-katholischem Christentum geprägt. In Nordosteuropa wandte sich mit Litauen am Ende des 14. Jahrhunderts das letzte europäische Volk dem christlichen Glauben zu (159). Das christliche Europa ist als Ergebnis der jahrhundertelangen Missionierungsbestrebungen zu verstehen (160-164).

Bei vielen aus dem Englischen übersetzten Werken bemängelt der Leser, dass der englischsprachige Kulturbereich zu ausführlich erörtert wird, die anderen

Regionen aber entsprechend kürzer dargestellt werden. Lutz von Padberg hat im Gegensatz zu diesen Büchern alle Regionen Europas in gleicher Weise berücksichtigt. Nicht nur der ausgewogene Text, sondern auch die hervorragenden Landkarten und Abbildungen nichtchristlicher und christlicher Kultgegenstände, Kultorte und Kirchen aus verschiedenen Gegenden Europas aus allen Jahrhunderten seiner Missionierung, machen das Buch zu einem besonderen publizistischen Ereignis. Es sollte in möglichst viele europäische Sprachen übersetzt werden.

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Schrift und Inspiration: Studien zur Vorstellung von inspirierter Schrift und inspirierter Schriftauslegung im antiken Judentum und in den paulinischen Briefen

Jonathan Whitlock

WMANT 98. Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2002, XVI + 508 pp., Euro 74 , cloth. ISBN 3-7887-1918-4

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Die vorliegende Studie gibt einen umfassenden Überblick über die Inspiration der heiligen Schrift und inspirierter Schriftauslegung im Frühjudentum und bei Paulus. Nach einem guten Forschungsüberblick zeichnet Whitlock prophetische Inspiration und Schriftkanon, weisheitliche Inspiration und Schriftinterpretation, Schrift und Inspiration in der jüdischen Apokalpytik, griechische Vorstellungen und ihre Aufnahme bei Philo nach sowie das Verhältnis von Geist und Schrift in Qumran bzw. von Schrift und Inspiration in der rabbinischen Literatur. Dann beschreibt der Autor die Neuorientierung im Schriftgebrauch des frühen Christentums, das Wesen der Schrift und ihre Inspiration bei Paulus, weisheitliche Inspiration bei Paulus und das Verhältnis zwischen pneumatischer Erkenntnis und Schriftauslegung. Abschließend bringt Whitlock seine Ergebnisse ins Gespräch mit gegenwärtigen Konzeptionen zur Schriftinspiration (u.a. I. H. Marshall). Insgesamt eine gründliche exegetische Studie, die wesentliche Einsichten zum Schrift- und Inspirationsverständnis des Neuen Testaments, sowie zu Schriftentstehung und Schriftauslegung beiträgt.

SUMMARY

This study offers a comprehensive overview of the question of the Inspiration of divine Scripture and inspired interpretation of Scripture in early Judaism and Paul. After a good overview of research Whitlock traces prophetic inspiriation and canon of Scripture, sapiential inspiration and interpreationof Scripture, Scripture and Inspiration in Jewish apocalyptic, Greek ideas and their reception in Philo as well as the relationship of Spirit and Scripture in Qumran and of Scripture and Inspiration in the rabbinic literature. Next the author describes what was the new direction in the use of Scripture in early Christianity, the essence of Scripture and its inspiration in Paul's view, sapiential inspiration in Paul and the relationship between pneumatic knowledge and interpretation of Scripture. Finally Whitlock brings his results into conversation with present-day conceptions of Scriptural inspiration, for example that of Howard Marshall. All in all a thorough exegetical study which contributes key insights into the NT's understanding of Scripture and Inspiration as well as of Scripture in its formation and in its interpretation.

RÉSUMÉ

Cet ouvrage constitue un survol complet de la question de l'inspiration divine des Écritures et de leur interprétation inspirée dans le judaïsme ancien et chez Paul. Whitlock commence par un état de la recherche. Puis il traite des questions suivantes : l'inspiration prophétique et le canon des Écritures, l'inspiration sapientiale et l'interprétation des Écritures, le traitement de l'Écriture et de l'inspiration dans l'apocalyptique juive, les conceptions grecques et leur adoption par Philon, la manière dont les textes de Qoumrân considèrent la relation entre l'Esprit et l'Écriture, et la conception de l'Écriture et de l'inspiration dans les écrits rabbiniques. Puis l'auteur considère la nouvelle orientation donnée par l'Église primitive à l'usage des Écritures et la conception paulinienne de l'essence de l'Écriture et de son inspiration, il traite de l'inspiration sapientiale chez Paul et du rapport entre la connaissance pneumatique et l'interprétation des Écritures. Pour finir, il compare les résultats de sa recherche aux théories actuelles quant à l'inspiration de l'Écriture, comme par exemple celle de Howard Marshall. Cette étude exégétique soigneuse apporte des éléments de réflexion importants quant à la manière dont le Nouveau Testament conçoit l'Écriture et son inspiration, ainsi que sur le sujet de la formation et de l'interprétation de l'Écriture.

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Nachdem über viele Jahre zur Inspiration der Bibel mit gewisser Regelmäßigkeit nur Beiträge aus evangelikaler Feder erschienen sind, kommt dieses Thema auch unter anderen Christen wieder verstärkt in den Blick. So schreibt z. B. Peter Stuhlmacher: „Schon vor Beginn der christlichen Zeitrechnung sind sowohl die hebräische Bibel als auch die Septuaginta als von Gottes Geist durchweht. . . verstanden worden. Jesus und die Apostel haben diese Meinung geteilt, und sie ist dann auch auf die Bücher des Neuen Testamentes übertragen worden. Daran hat sich in den christlichen Kirchen bis heute nichts geändert, obwohl die Inspirationslehre sehr verschieden bewertet wird. In den orthodoxen Kirchen und der römisch-katholischen Kirche ist sie für das Verständnis der Bibel nach wie vor konstitutiv, während sie in den großen evangelischen Kirchen leider zu einer Domäne von Fundamentalisten abgesunken und für Teile der Pfarrerschaft zur Verlegenheit geworden ist" („Der Kanon und seine Auslegung" in P. Stuhlmacher, *Biblische Theologie und Evangelium: Gesammelte Aufsätze*, WUNT 146; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002, 179).

Jedoch gibt es bis heute nur wenige exegetisch und historisch bestimmte Studien. Umso erfreulicher ist die vorliegende Studie von J. Whitlock (im Folgenden W.), die auf eine Tübinger Dissertation unter P. Stuhlmacher zurückgeht.

Nach Einleitung (1-11) schließt W. seinen Forschungsüberblick (12-54; Schrift und Inspiration im Judentum, Hellenismus und NT, das Verhältnis des Paulus zum AT, das AT im NT: eine forschungsgeschichtliche Orientierung, Hermeneutik und Inspiration; der Forschungsüberblick zeigt, „wie wenig Raum die paulinische Auffassung der Schriftinspiration in Studien zum paulinischen Schriftverständnis eingenommen hat", 53) wie folgt: „Um ein besseres Verständnis von Schrift und Inspiration bei Paulus zu erlangen, wird im Folgenden sowohl nach der Rolle des Geistes bei der Schriftentstehung wie auch bei der Schriftexegese gefragt und beide Fragen werden aufeinander bezogen. Dadurch wird ersichtlich, in welchem Maße inspirierte Schrift und inspirierte Auslegung ineinander verschränkt sind: Die Schrift kann nur in dem Geist ausgelegt werden, in dem sie geschrieben worden ist" (54).

W. untersucht *im ersten Teil* „Die Entwicklung der Vorstellung von inspirierter Schrift und inspirierter Schriftauslegung im Bereich des Judentums". Dazu gehören „Prophetische Inspiration und Entstehung des Schriftkanons" (56-76; „. . . der Inspirationsgedanke [ist] nicht in erster Linie Spekulation über die Entstehungsweise der heiligen Schriften, sondern er drückt die Zugehörigkeit der jeweiligen Verfasser zu den maßgeblichen Traditionen des erwählten Gottesvolkes aus", 75), „Weisheitliche I. und Schriftinterpretation" (77-88); „Schrift und Inspiration in der jüdischen Apokalyptik" (89-95), „Die griechische Inspirationsvorstellung und ihre Aufnahme und Verwendung durch Philo (96-121; ein hilfreicher Überblick über den griechischen Befund). Philo möchte durch die zur Beschreibung des Inspirationsvorganges verwendete Terminologie die göttliche Herkunft der mosaischen Tora sicherstellen: „Jeglicher Zweifel an der göttlichen Herkunft der Schrift und an der Berechtigung seiner allegorischen Auslegung der Schrift wird mit dem Argument ausgeräumt, dass Moses (gleich den anderen Propheten) die Tora nicht eigenmächtig verkündigt hat, sondern dass sie von Gottes Geist eingegeben wurde" (120; zu Philo vgl. H. Burkhardt, *Die Inspiration heiliger Schriften bei Philo von Alexandrien*, TVG; Gießen, Basel: Brunnen, 1988).

Ferner untersucht W. „Geist und Schrift in Qumran" (122-151), „Schrift und Inspiration bei Josephus" (152-163) und „Schrift und Inspiration in der rabbinischen Literatur" (164-189; die Inspiration der Schrift sowie der Geist und die Auslegung der Schrift). Die Inspiration der Rabbinen „ist die des inspirierten Weisen und nicht die des mit prophetischem Geist erfüllten Schriftstellers, und ihre Aufgabe besteht in der autoritativen Auslegung der inspirierten Schriften und nicht in der Hervorbringung neuer Schriften. Der Geist und die Gegenwart Gottes ist dennoch unter seinem Volk präsent, und zwar in der Schrift, die zu einer persönlichen Größe wird und das Wort Gottes für die Gegenwart verkündigt" (189). In der Zusammenfassung des ersten Teils (189-191) resümiert W.: Die frühjüdischen Autoren nennen sich nicht Propheten, sondern

> Sie ordnen sich Mose und den Propheten unter und wissen sich im Abhängigkeitsverhältnis zu schon ergangener und als kanonisch geltender Offenbarung. Ihre Inspiration geschieht immer in vielfältiger und verschiedenartiger Bezugnahme auf das biblische Offenbarungszeugnis. Diese Inspiration, die einerseits ihren Ausgangspunkt in intensiver menschlicher Auseinandersetzung mit der autoritativen Tradition hat, andererseits mit Gottes Hilfe bei der Interpretation dieser Texte rechnet, haben wir weisheitliche Inspiration genannt, um sie von der prophetischen Inspiration, zu unterscheiden. Während beim prophetischen Inspirationsmodell die Passivität des Menschen beim Offenbarungsempfang betont wird, bringt die Bezeichnung ‚weisheitliche Inspiration' die menschliche Beteiligung am Inspirationsgeschehen stärker zum Ausdruck, weil sowohl die natürlichen Erfahrungen und Begabungen, als auch die geschichtliche Verankerung des Inspirierten in einem Traditionskontinuum berücksichtigt werden (190).

Zu fragen wäre, ob hier nicht Dinge unnötig gegeneinander ausgespielt werden. Das prophetische Modell schließt keineswegs die natürlichen Erfahrungen und Begabungen sowie die geschichtliche Verankerung aus, wie schon ein oberflächlicher Vergleich der alttestamentlichen Prophetenbücher ergibt.

Der *zweite Teil* stellt „Inspirierte Schrift und inspirierte Schriftauslegung bei Paulus und seiner Schule" dar (194-431). W. beginnt mit einem Überblick über „Die Neuorientierung im Schriftgebrauch des frühen Christentums" (194-218) unter den Stichworten: Der Stand des kanonischen Prozesses in neutestamentlicher Zeit, die neue Verhältnisbestimmung zwischen Gesetz und Schrift, eschatologisches Bewusstsein und christliches Schriftverständnis, das urchristliche Schriftverständnis nach 1Kor 15.3-5, und die Personifizierung der Schrift. Er schließt: „Weil die Christen überzeugt waren, dass Gottes durch die Propheten verheißenes Heilshandeln in Christus erfüllt worden war, verlegte sich der Schwerpunkt ihrer Schriftverwendung weg vom Sinai-Gesetz und hin zur Schrift als Vorauskündigerin von Gottes endzeitlicher Heilstat" (218).

In „Das Wesen der Schrift und ihre Inspiration nach Paulus" (219-283) untersucht der Autor die Schriftbezeichnungen und Einleitungsformeln des Paulus, die Gestalt der Bibel bei Paulus, die Verwendung frühjüdischer exegetischer Methoden, das Schriftverständnis, mehrere paulinische Einzeltexte zur Schrift (Röm 15.1-4; 1Kor 10.1-13; Röm 4.23f) und die Beispiele allegorischen Gebrauchs der Schrift bei Paulus (Gal 4.21-31; 1Kor 9.9f). W. stellt fest, dass das Schriftverständnis des Paulus „Weitreichende Übereinstimmungen mit dem

Schriftverständnis anderer jüdischer Autoren beziehungsweise Gruppen der frühchristlicher Zeit aufweist" (281). Der große Unterschied besteht im Glauben daran, „dass es der Geist Christi ist, der die Schrift durchweht. Weil Gottes Heilsplan, der in Christus ausgeführt wird, von vornherein feststeht, prägt er auch sowohl Gottes Handeln in der ganzen Geschichte, wie auch alles, was kraft Gottes inspirierenden Geistes aufgeschrieben worden ist" (283). Für Paulus gibt es kein Schriftwort, dass nicht als Wort Gottes anzusehen wäre. Gleichzeitig zeigt sich bei ihm teilweise ein freier Umgang mit der Schrift: „Dass eine ‚Verbalinspirationslehre', die die Inspiration gar auf die Formulierung des Textes selbst ausdehnen möchte, auch nicht in Frage kommt. . .. Wer hingegen Paulus eine strenge Verbalinspirationslehre unterstellen möchte, verkennt, dass das frühe Judentum, aber besonders auch das frühe Christentum, sich nicht sklavisch an die Buchstaben hielten, wenn der Anredecharakter der Schrift durch kleine Veränderungen oder Umstellungen im Wortlaut verstärkt werden konnte" (282). Das tatsächliche Vorhandensein solcher Eingriffe ist allerdings im Einzelfall zu prüfen und aufgrund der verschiedenen Septuagintaversionen und -rezensionen sowie der Möglichkeit eigener Übersetzungen der neutestamentlichen Autoren selten definitiv zu entscheiden.

In „Weisheitliche Inspiration bei Paulus" (284-315) spürt W. der Herkunft und Eigenart der paulinischen Pneumatologie nach. Sie war geprägt von dem heilsgeschichtlichen Verständnis, dass die Christen als endzeitliches Gottesvolk den Geist als eine von den Propheten verheißene endzeitliche Gabe empfangen haben, aber auch von verschiedenen weisheitlichen Elementen. W.s Ergebnisse sind weit über das Thema der Untersuchung hinaus von Bedeutung.

Das folgende Kapitel „Pneumatische Erkenntnis und Schriftauslegung" (316-407) fragt: „Wie versteht Paulus die eigene Schriftauslegung? Spielen Offenbarungen des Geistes für ihn im Auslegungsprozess eine Rolle? Das heißt, empfängt Paulus kurz aufleuchtende Einsichten zu bestimmten Texten, die er vom Geist eingegeben hält? Oder versteht er sich eher als ein von Weisheit erfüllter Schriftgelehrter, der Kraft intellektueller Anstrengung die Schriften durchforscht, um festzustellen, wo sie auf Christus und die Kirche hinweisen [alternative Antworten sind scheinbar nicht möglich!]? Reflektiert Paulus überhaupt darüber?" (316) Nach Überlegungen zum Verhältnis zwischen Schrift und Damaskuserlebnis („Paulus lernt die Heiligen Schriften aufgrund seiner Begegnung mit Christus vor Damaskus neu zu lesen. Am Anfang steht eine Offenbarung, die eine *neue Sicht der Schrift* begründet. Diese Offenbarung beinhaltete sicherlich nicht alle Geheimnisse des göttlichen Heilsplans, sondern die zentrale Wahrheit, dass Gott, der sich in Tora, Propheten und Schriften offenbart hat, durch Jesus Christus die Sünder rechtfertigt", 329) beleuchtet W. geistliches Erkennen bei Paulus durch die Auslegung von 1 Korinther 2.6-16 und 2 Korinther 2.14-3.6. Diese Stellen zeigen,

> in welchem Maße Schriftauslegung für Paulus eine pneumatische Angelegenheit ist. Die Schrift richtig zu verstehen und anzuwenden ist eine Gabe des Geistes, die im Kontext der allgemeinen für die Endzeit verheißenen Geistgebung an die Kirche zu verstehen ist. Gemäß der christologischen Orientierung des christlichen Lebens muss alle Schriftauslegung im Sinne Christi betrieben werden, wenn sie „im Geist" geschehen soll. Das bedeutet aber, dass die Auslegung zur Erbauung der Gemeinde. . . und zur Förderung der Einheit geschehen muss. Eine von Gottes Geist getriebene Auslegung der Schrift, die nicht auf die Erbauung des „Leibes" zielt, kennt Paulus nicht. Die Hilfestellung des Geistes bei der Auslegung der Schrift besteht nicht vornehmlich in der Mitteilung von esoterischem Wissen; vielmehr hilft er, da der Geist den Leib Christi durchweht und zusammenhält, dem Ausleger nicht nur die Wahrheit der Schrift zu erkennen, sondern schärft auch seinen Blick für die gegenwärtigen Bedürfnisse der Gemeinde; der Geist gibt ihm das richtige Wort zu richtigen Zeit (406).

Und, „Da die Betonung seines Inspirationsverständnisses nicht auf punktuellen, einmaligen Offenbarungen prophetischer Art, sondern auf einer das ganze Leben gestaltenden Macht des dem Christen dauerhaft einwohnenden Geistes liegt, bereitet Paulus den Weg für eine Inspirationsvorstellung, die sich von einem einseitigen ‚prophetischen Modell' verabschieden kann" (406).

In „Schrift und Inspiration in der Paulus-Schule" (408-431) geht es um Verwendung und Bedeutung der Schrift in den Deuteropaulinen. Während in einer Fußnote darauf hingewiesen wird, dass der Kolosserbrief Paulus sehr nahe steht und der 2Thessalonicher umstritten ist (408, Fußn. 2) wird die paulinische Verfasserschaft anderer Deuteropaulinen nicht einmal erwogen, zumal W. schließt: „Die Verwendung der Schrift in den Deuteropaulinen und die Stelle 2 Timotheus 3.16 lassen keine prinzipiellen Unterschiede zu Paulus hinsichtlich ihrer Einschätzung oder ihrem Gebrauch der Schrift feststellen" (429). Freilich ist denkbar, dass „diese Verfasser diesbezüglich sich am Vorbild Paulus orientiert haben", doch liegt eine andere Schlussfolgerung näher. Angesichts des Umfangs der Studie fällt der Abschnitt zu 2 Timotheus 3.16 erstaunlich knapp aus (411-414; vgl. dazu auch G. Häfner, *Nützlich zur Belehrung (2 Tim 3.16): Die Rolle der Schrift in den Pastoralbriefen im Rahmen der Paulusrezeption*, Herders biblische Studien 25; Freiburg, Basel, Wien: Herder, 2003). Ferner geht es um das Verhältnis zwischen geistlicher Erkenntnis und Schriftauslegung und zwischen Geist und Schriftauslegung.

Im abschließenden Teil, „Schluss und Ausblick" (434-456) umreißt W. die „Bedeutung des paulinischen Inspirationsverständnisses für das theologische Verständnis von Schriftentstehung und Schriftauslegung" und untersucht drei gegenwärtige Konzeptionen zur Schriftinspiration (P. J. Achtemeier, I. H. Marshall, H. Gabel). W. betont, dass eine Erklärung der Schriftinspiration nicht

an das prophetische Inspirationsmodell allein gebunden ist, vielmehr geht es um ein ekklesiologisches Inspirationsverständnis, „das anstelle der Inspiration des prophetischen Individuums die Beseelung der gesamten Gemeinde. . . mit dem lebendigmachenden Geist Christi betont. . .. Überhaupt kann man in den seltensten Fällen die Inspiration eines Textes in dessen Entstehungsprozess genau orten" (452f). Das Fazit bleibt vage: „Inspiriert sind sie also, weil letztlich Gott hinter diesen Texten in ihrer ganzen Menschlichkeit steht. . .. weil es Gott gefallen hat, diese menschlichen Zeugnisse zu einem Teil seiner Offenbarung zu machen, auch wenn ihnen die Widersprüche und Brüche geschichtlicher Kontingenz anhaften" (453). Für die Auslegung der Schrift hält W. fest: „Der Schriftgelehrte Paulus greift mit Leichtigkeit und ohne Scheu auf die zu seiner Zeit zur Verfügung stehenden exegetischen Methoden zurück, um das Evangelium im Rahmen von Gottes Gesamtheilsplan verständlich zu machen. . .. Auf der anderen Seite sind die Methoden nicht beliebig zu nennen. In der paulinischen Exegese kommen solche Methoden zum Einsatz, die sich bei der Suche nach dem Sinn und der Kontinuität von Gottes früherer Offenbarung angesichts seines neuen Handelns im Wort und Wirken Jesu Christi als hilfreich erweisen und die eine dem damaligen Wahrheitsbewußtsein gemäße Darlegung der Einheit der Offenbarung Gottes ermöglichen" (455; vgl. D. Instone-Brewer, *Techniques and Assumptions in Jewish Exegesis before 70 CE*, TSAJ 30; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1992).

Nach W. haben seine Studien gezeigt, „Dass die Schrift keine fertige Konzeption ihrer Inspiration bietet, die zur dogmatischen Norm erhoben werden könnte. Eine Auswertung der biblischen Aussagen zu Schrift und Geistinspiration ist nur ein erster Schritt auf dem Weg zu einer Theologie der Schriftinspiration" (434). Und „Die Entstehungsgeschichte des NT als kanonische Schriftensammlung zeigt deutlicher als der weniger durchsichtige kanonische Prozess des AT, wie autoritative Schrift und Tradition, geschichtliche Offenbarung, inspirierte Auslegung von Tradition und Interpretation von Gottes geschichtlichem Handeln ineinandergreifen, um eine autoritative Schriften hervorzubringen" (435). Literaturverzeichnis, Stellen- und Sachregister (467-508) schließen den Band ab.

Bei der Fülle der behandelten Themen fällt eine Würdigung des gesamten Bandes schwer. Die Studie eines wenig erforschten Bereichs gibt viele hilfreiche Perspektiven für Paulus, für sein Selbstverständnis, seine Hermeneutik und für die konkrete Schriftauslegung des Apostels, für den die Schrift *Zeugnis des Evangeliums* ist. Ferner sind die Ergebnisse für die paulinische Pneumatologie und Ekklesiologie zu berücksichtigen. Daneben gibt W. bemerkenswerte Anregungen für eine christliche Hermeneutik als einer bewussten *hermeneutica sacra* (spräche man in Anlehnung an Paulus besser von einer *hermeneutica spiritualis*?), die sich vom NT leiten läßt und wie sie in letzter Zeit immer wieder gefordert wird.

Einige kritische Anfragen seien gestattet. Zu prüfen wäre, inwieweit das urchristliche Verständnis auch vom Zustandekommen der alttestamentlichen Bücher für Christen heute normativ ist, oder ob man dem, auf historisch-kritischen Prämissen und Einsichten beruhenden wissenschaftlichen Verständnis des Entstehungsprozesses folgen kann und muss („. . . dass weite Partien der Schrift selbst als Auslegung von autoritativer Tradition gelten können", 191; wirklich *weite* Partien?). Dies berührt wichtige fundamentaltheologische, wie auch historischen Fragen. Zudem wäre zu vermerken, dass dieses Verständnis und die Rekonstruktion als Entstehungsprozess auch in der Wissenschaft keineswegs unumstritten ist, wie z. B. die neuere Diskussion um die Einheitlichkeit des Jesajabuches zeigt (vgl. E. Lanz, *Der ungeteilte Jesaja: Neues Licht auf eine alte Streitfrage*, Wuppertal: R. Brockhaus, 2004). Ferner will man fragen, ob das frühjüdische als weisheitliche bezeichnete Verständnis, bestimmt durch das Nachlassen/Ausbleiben der prophetischen Stimme Gottes, wie sie die alttestamentliche Geschichte begleitet hat (und zwischentestamentlich auch so empfunden wurde, vgl. z. B. 1Makk 4.46) nicht das Verständnis des paulinischen Befundes zu sehr bestimmt hat. Wo liegen die – bei aller zu erwartenden Kontinuität – Neuansätze, die sich durch Gottes alles überbietende Offenbarung in Jesus Christus zeigen? (vergleiche die Überlegungen auf S. 283, geht es dabei nicht um mehr als die Einsicht, dass es der Geist *Christi* ist, der die Schrift durchweht?).

Hilfreich wären ähnliche Arbeiten zu anderen Teilen des NT, so zur ausgeprägten Pneumatologie der johanneischen Schriften und des lukanischen Doppelwerkes. Vor einer vorschnellen Verabschiedung eines prophetischen Inspirationsverständnisses zugunsten eines einseitig weisheitlich geprägten Verständnisses und Schlussfolgerungen vom *Corpus Paulinum* auf das ganze NT wäre auch 2 Petrus 1.19-21 gebührend zu prüfen. Kann man, gerade angesichts der wieder stärker beachteten Bezüge zwischen Paulus und Jesus (vergleiche zum Beispiel die Arbeiten D. Wenhams, z. B. *Paul: Follower of Jesus or Founder of Christianity*; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995) und Paulus und der Urgemeinde (vgl. unter anderen P. Stuhlmacher, Biblische *Theologie des Neuen Testaments I: Grundlegung, Von Jesus zu Paulus,* 3. Aufl.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), ohne diese Zwischenschritte traditionsgeschichtlich einfach vom Frühjudentum zu Paulus gehen? Gibt es ein paulinisches Schriftverständnis ohne Berücksichtigung des Schriftverständnisses Jesu?

Nach diesem langen Ritt steht am Ende das Plädoyer Peter Stuhlmachers:

> . . . leitet die biblische Lehre von der Inspiration dazu an, die Bibel im Glauben als durch und durch menschliches, zugleich aber auch durch und durch göttliches Buch zu lesen und dabei zu entdecken, dass in ihr nicht nur vergangene Generationen angeredet werden, sondern auch die gegenwärtige Gemeinde. Auf die Frage, wo und wann Menschen den dreieini-

gen Gott reden hören und den Heiligen Geist empfangen, kann, ja muss man angesichts des biblischen Kanons und seiner Inspiration antworten: Sie empfangen ihn nirgends besser und klarer als durch das geisterfüllte Wort der Schrift (loc. cit., 183).

Christoph Stenschke, Wiedenest, Deutschland
Pretoria, South Africa

Johann Ludwig Krapf: Ein schwäbischer Pionier in Ostafrika

Jochen Eber

Riehen/Basel: Verlag arteMedia; Lahr: St. Johannis-Druckerei, 2006, 271 pp, 160 Abb., Pb., SFr.23.80; Euro 15,-; ISBN 978-3-905290-41-7; ISBN 978-3-501-01544-5

SUMMARY

Jochen Eber's book distinguishes itself by its meticulous opening up of little-known archival sources on the life of the Swabian Missions pioneer, Johann Ludwig Krapf, as well as by its publication of over 160 illustrations not yet known in this form. The author faithfully describes, 125 years after Krapf's death, the creative work and social committment of a man who played an integral part in the development of an independent church in East Africa and the consolidation of the Pilgermission founded in Basel at 1840. Awarded an honourary doctorate by the University of Tübingen for his academic merits, he is nevertheless shown to be a child of his time in his controversial support of the British colonial power in Ethiopia in 1843.

Notwithstanding the too-small illustrations and maps, arteMedia has succeeded in publishing a superb portrayal which gives general readers access to the person of Krapf and inspires them to missionary life and action in the spirit of the Gospel.

RÉSUMÉ

Le livre présenté ici est un ouvrage remarquable par ses 160 petites illustrations historiques ainsi que par sa base d' archives peu connues concernant la vie du pionnier de la mission J. L. Krapf. 125 ans après sa mort, l' activité créatrice du missionnaire est présentée avec une rigueur scientifique tout en restant accessible à un plus large public.

L' auteur réussi à mettre en évidence que le réseau de relations interculturelles de J. L. Krapf avec de nombreuses personnalités et diverses organisations lui ont permis de fortement solidifier la Pilgermission fondée en 1840 et le travail missionnaire parmi le peuple Galla (Oromo).

La libération des missionnaires de la Pilgermission en Ethiopie en 1868 est ici décrite pour la première fois. Elle dévoile un côté toutefois moins brillant d'un missionnaire qui a bénéficié des honneurs de l' Université de Tübingen.

Les Editions arteMedia publient ici un ouvrage d'un caractère scientifique et biographique de qualité qui permet un bon abord de ce père dans la foi et qui encourage à la mission.

* * * *

Im Zusammenhang mit Vorlesungen an der Akdademie für Weltmission im Juni 2005 stand ich in Korntal erstmals vor dem Grab des berühmten Ostafrikamissionars, Forschers, Bibelübersetzers und Sprachgenies Johann Ludwig Krapf (1810_1881). Dabei ahnte ich nicht, dass mir 18 Monate später die Aufgabe zufallen würde, die wissenschaftliche Biographie meines früheren Kollegen und heutigen Studienleiters des Friedrich Hauss-Studienzentrums in Schriesheim, Jochen Eber, über Johann Ludwig Krapf zu rezensieren.

Das vorliegende Buch zeichnet sich aus durch die akribische Erschliessung bisher wenig bekannter archivarischer Quellen über das Leben des schwäbischen Missionspioniers J. L. Krapf und Veröffentlichung von über 160 historischen Abbildungen, die in dieser Art bisher kaum bekannt waren. Damit soll 125 Jahre nach dem Ableben Krapfs, seine schöpferische Tätigkeit nicht nur verlässlich nachgezeichnet, sondern dem amerikanischen Vorbild entsprechend wissenschaftlich und dennoch allgemeinverständlich einer breiteren Öffentlichkeit vorgestellt werden.

Dem Autor gelingt es in eindrücklicher Weise aufzuzeigen, dass J. L. Krapf durch seine Verbindungen zu Persönlichkeiten wie C. F. Spittler, H. Venn, dem äthiopischen König Sahile Selassie, zur Basler Mission, Church Missionary Society, Britischen und Ausländischen Bibelgesellschaften, Swedish Evangelical Mission, United Methodist Free Church, der Brüdergemeinde in Korntal ein Netz von kulturübergreifenden Missionsbeziehungen zu pflegen vermochte, die sich nachhaltig auf die Festigung der 1840 gegründeten Pilgermission und Missionierung des Gallavolkes auswirkte.

Besonders ausführlich berichtet der Verfasser, wie sich J. L. Krapf als Inspektor und später Kollektensammler und Komiteemitglied unermüdlich für die Pilgermission einsetzte. Erstmals wird hier die spannende Befreiung der 1868 in Äthiopien gefangenen Chrischona-Missionare geschildert.

J. L. Krapf's kontroverse Unterstützung der Britischen Kolonialmacht in Äthiopien 1843, sowie die gewaltsame Befreiung der Chrischona-Missionare 1868 zeigen, dass der Missionspionier trotz seiner geographischen und lingüistischen Verdienste, für die er von der Universität Tübingen die Ehrendotkorwürde erhielt, eben auch Kind seiner Zeit blieb. Eine missionstheologische Evaluation könnte in einem separaten Kapitel in eine zweite Auflage einfliessen und die Denkweise des Theologen Krapf aufzeigen.

Dem Verlag arteMedia ist es unabhängig von den zu kleinen Abbildungen und bescheidenen Landkarten gelungen, eine in inhaltlicher und graphischer Hinsicht herausragende wissenschaftlich-biographische Darstellung des grossen Afrikapioniers aus Derendingen herauszubringen, die den inneren Zugang zu diesem

Glaubensvater ermöglicht, und uns neu inspiriert, im Sinne des Evangeliums missionarisch zu handeln bis „das ganze Meer der Gnade Gottes diese Heidenländer überfluten wird" (S. 242).

Hans Ulrich Reifler, St. Chrischona/Bettingen BS, Schweiz

Im Angesicht des Absoluten: Hinführung zur Mitte christlicher Spiritualität

Josef Sudbrack

Würzburg: Echter, 2005, Pb., 128 pp., Euro12,80,
ISBN 978-3-429-02643-1

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Josef Sudbrack ist ein im deutschsprachigen Raum bekannter Forscher im Bereich von Mystik, Meditation und Spiritualität. Der über achtzigjährige Jesuit fasst in diesem Werk die Überlegungen mehrerer Jahrzehnte zusammen und schlägt eine Brücke zwischen Theologie und Frömmigkeit. In vierzehn Kapiteln entfaltet er die Relevanz der christlichen Lehre für den Glauben. Seine Darstellung steht im Gespräch mit mystischen Traditionen des Buddhismus und des Islam sowie mit den großen katholischen Theologen des 20. Jahrhunderts.

SUMMARY

Josef Sudbrack is a researcher, known in German-speaking circles in the area of Mysticism, mediation and spirituality. A Jesuit who is in his eighties, he gathers together in this volume reflections of several decades and builds a bridge between theology and spiritualiity. Through fourteen chapters he unpacks the relevance of Christian doctrine for belief. His account dialogues with the mystical traditions of Buddhism and Islam as well as with the great Catholic theologians of the Twentieth Century.

RÉSUMÉ

Josef Sudbrack est un chercheur jésuite renommé dans le monde germanophone pour ses travaux sur le mysticisme, la médiation et la spiritualité. Alors qu'il a passé quatre-vingts ans, il rassemble dans cet ouvrage le fruit de sa réflexion de plusieurs décennies et jette un pont entre la théologie et la spiritualité. Tout au long de l'ouvrage, il montre la pertinence de la doctrine chrétienne pour la spiritualité. Il entre en dialogue avec les traditions mystiques du bouddhisme et de l'islam, ainsi qu'avec les grands théologiens catholiques du XX^{e} siècle.

* * * *

Josef Sudbrack, katholischerseits der Altmeister der Erforschung von spirituellen Erscheinungen, legt mit diesem Buch eine komprimierte Summa seines mehrere Jahrzehnte umspannenden Werkes vor. Er rekapituliert darin seinen eigenen Denk- und Glaubensweg und zieht ein eindrucksvolles Resümee. Dabei setzt das vorliegende Büchlein seine Versuche fort, zu einem Brückenschlag zwischen Theologie und Spiritualität zu kommen. Sudbrack war von seiner Biographie her dazu prädestiniert, Wege zu einer neuen Einheit von gedachtem und gelebtem Glauben zu suchen. Als Mitglied des Jesuitenordens gab er Zeit seines Lebens ungezählte Exerzitienkurse in der Nachfolge des Ordensgründers Ignatius von Loyola. Daneben erwarb er sich durch zahlreiche Vorträge und Publikationen den Ruf eines Experten auf dem Gebiet der Spiritualität; wobei er vor allem die christliche Meditationsbewegung, die im Raum der katholischen Kirche von Hugo Eunomiya-Lasalle, einem seiner Ordensbrüder, ausgelöst wurde, in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten kritisch-konstruktiv begleitete.

Das Buch steht in der Tradition katholischen Denkens, nimmt aber immer wieder auch ökumenische Impulse auf, hier vor allem aus der evangelisch-theologischen Tradition – etwa in Gestalt des Tübinger Systematikers Eberhard Jüngel. Sudbrack setzt bei der philosophischen Gotteserkenntnis ein, schlägt von dort die Brücke zur Gotteserkenntnis der Religionen und findet die Vollendung der Erkenntnis Gottes im Christentum. Primäre Gewährsleute und Gesprächspartner bei seinen Überlegungen sind neben Ignatius von Loyola, dem Gründer des Jesuitenordens, vor allem Sudbracks Ordensbrüder Karl Rahner, Teilhard de Chardin, Henri de Lubac und Hans Urs von Balthasar, die anerkanntermaßen zu den fruchtbarsten katholischen Theologen des vergangenen Jahrhunderts gehörten. Prägnant formuliert: Das Buch stellt den Versuch einer interreligiös verankerten Lehre der katholischen Spiritualität im ökumenischen Horizont dar, wobei eindeutig das Gespräch mit den mystischen Traditionen des Buddhismus und des Islam im Vordergrund steht. Hinduismus und Polytheismus werden gelegentlich berücksichtigt, das Judentum mit seinen spirituellen Traditionen fehlt ganz.

Der Autor nennt seine Überlegungen eine „Glaubensmeditation". Ich meine, dass er damit gut den Charakter des Buches auf den Begriff gebracht hat. In 14 Kapiteln versucht er zu entfalten, welche Relevanz das christliche Dogma, wie es die Alte Kirche im Credo auf den Begriff gebracht hat, im Alltag des Menschen heute gewinnen könnte. Um eine Auswahl der Themen zu nennen: Es geht in den einzelnen Kapiteln um Schöpfung, Menschwerdung Christi, Auferstehung, Dreieinigkeit, Kirche, Abendmahl. Dabei scheut Sudbrack sich nicht, auch die Problemfelder gegenwärtigen theologischen Denkens in seiner Auseinandersetzung mit der Moderne anzusprechen. Hierbei ragen besonders die Infragestellung der Glaubwürdigkeit der biblischen Texte durch die historisch-kritische Exegese und die Reibungspunkte zwischen der biblischen Schöpfungslehre und der modernen naturwissenschaftlichen Evolutionslehre hervor. Auch das Problem der kirchlichen Lehre von der Erbsünde und die Frage der christlichen Mission wird nicht ausgeklammert. Auch wenn mich die Lösungsangebote von Sudbrack nicht immer zu befriedigen vermögen, enthalten sie allemal beherzigenswerte Denkanstöße. Das gilt nicht zuletzt für seine Aufnahme von Teilhard de Chardins Versuch, die biblische Schöpfungstheolo-

gie mit Erkenntnissen aus den Naturwissenschaften zu unterlegen, um so das Gespräch zwischen Christentum und den modernen Wissenschaften wieder in Gang zu bringen. Hier – und auch an manchen anderen Stellen – hätte man sich allerdings gewünscht, dass Sudbrack zusätzlich die längst weitergegangene neuere Diskussion berücksichtigt hätte.

Was das Buch besonders lesenswert macht: Dass der Autor darin eine klar profilierte Position katholischer Spiritualität vertritt, diese aber gleichzeitig in einen weiten ökumenischen und sogar interreligiösen Denkrahmen stellt und so ihre gegenwärtigen Infragestellungen aufnimmt und zu beantworten versucht. Im Zentrum seines Verständnisses von christlicher Spiritualität steht ein als Liebe verstandener persönlicher Gott, der sich in Jesus Christus dem Menschen offenbart hat: „Die unbegreifbare, alles übersteigende Unendlichkeit Gottes hat sich eingeborgen in die liebenswürdige Menschlichkeit Jesu Christi" (S. 45). Dieser Ansatz christlicher Spiritualität bei der Liebe Gottes macht Sudbracks Überlegungen einerseits für den Leser so sympathisch, andererseits aber auch so attraktiv und verheißungsvoll für das interkonfessionelle und interreligiöse Gespräch.

Prof. Peter Zimmerling, Leipzig, Deutschland

Der sich schenkende Christus. Adolf Schlatters Lehre von den Sakramenten

Daniel Rüegg

TVG, STM, Bd. 15: Giessen 2006, 391 S.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Die Abhandlung stellt detailliert die Sakramentslehre Adolf Schlatters (1852-1938) dar. Sie bietet zuerst einen Überblick über neuere evangelische Tauf- bzw. Abendmahlstheologien und über die Sakramentsdiskussionen (Arnoldshain, Leuenberg, röm.-katholisch-lutherischer Dialog, Lima-Gespräche und innerbaptistische Diskussionen). Nach einer Kurzbiographie folgen Schlatters exegetische und anschliessend seine systematisch-theologischen Aussagen zu Taufe und Abendmahl. Rüegg fragt aber auch nach der Bedeutung für das konfessionsübergreifende Gespräch. Die Leistung des Buches besteht in der differenzierten Darstellung und systematisierenden Präsentation der Schlatter'schen Position. Diese lässt sich nicht ins konfessionelle Schema katholisch-lutherisch-reformiert-baptistisch einordnen.

Rüegg zeigt den christozentrischen und den antispekulativen (gegen das blosse Zeichen gerichteten), das heißt: den kausativen bzw. heilswirksamen Charakter der zu Recht so genannten Sakramente. Das ist für einen reformierten, aus der Schweiz stammenden, mit der freikirchlichen Welt vertrauten Theologen bemerkenswert. Unklar bleibt leider, worin die verschiedenen Konfessionen in der Abendmahls- oder der Tauffrage *heute* von Schlatter lernen können oder sollten, *was* und *auf welcher Seite* zu revidieren bzw. zu akzeptieren wäre.

SUMMARY

This is a treatment which lays out the sacramental theology of Adolf Schlatter (1852-1938). It offers to begin with an overview of the recent Lutheran baptism and eucharistic theologies and disccussions about the sacraments (Arnoldshain, Leuenberg, RC-Lutheran dialogue, Lima conversations, and discussion among Baptists.) After a summary biography come Schlatter's exegetical and with this his systematic-theological statements on baptism and eucharist. Rüegg also enquires after the significance for the ecumenical converrsation. The book finds its achievement in the nuanced description and structured presentation of Schlatter's position. These should not be slotted into a confessionsal catholic-lutheran-reformed-baptist schema. Rüegg shows the Christocentric and anti-speculative (which is directed against the sacramental 'bare sign'), that means: the causative or salvific character of the rightly so called sacraments. That is remarkable for a theologian who came from Switzerland and belonged to the free church world. Unfortunately it remains unclear just how the various confressions could or should learn from Schlatter as to what (and on which side) should be revised or accepted.

RÉSUMÉ

Voici une étude de la théologie sacramentelle d'Adolf Schlatter (1852-1938). L'auteur commence par une présentation des travaux et débats récents chez les luthériens quant à la théologie du baptême et de l'eucharistie (Arnoldshain, Leuenberg, le dialogue entre catholiques et luthériens, les conversations de Lima, et même les discussions entre baptistes). Une courte biographie de Schlatter est suivie d'une présentation de ses travaux exégétiques et de ses convictions théologiques sur le baptême et l'eucharistie. Rüegg cherche à en discerner les apports pour les discussions œcuméniques. Il nous fournit une description de la position de Schlatter nuancée, bien structurée, et réussie. Elle ne se classe pas selon un schéma confessionnel distinguant les positions catholique, luthérienne, réformée et baptiste. Rüegg en souligne le caractère christocentrique et anti-spéculatif (qui l'oppose à la conception des sacrements comme « simple signes ») : ce que l'on nomme à juste titre « sacrements » effectue quelque chose dans le cadre du salut. Cela est remarquable, de la part d'un théologien originaire de Suisse et rattaché au milieu des Églises libres. Néanmoins, on ne saisit pas clairement comment les Églises de différentes confessions devraient ou pourraient apprendre de Schlatter quels points méritent révision ou acceptation.

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Der Schweizer Chrischona-Absolvent und ordinierte Pfarrer Rüegg legt die 2004 auf Englisch eingereichte Dissertation nun in Deutsch vor, dies in einer leicht bearbeiteten und etwas erweiterten Fassung. Das Buch bietet dank der neu eingefügten Teile zunächst einen Überblick über neuere evangelische Tauf- bzw. Abendmahlstheologien und über die Sakramentsdiskussionen der Arnoldshainer Konferenzen, der Leuenberger Gespräche, des

röm.-katholischen-lutherischen Dialogs, der Lima-Gespräche und innerbaptistischer Diskussionen (27-91, ohne Verknüpfung mit Schlatter). Nach diesen 65 Seiten ist man sich der Uneinheitlichkeit christlicher Positionen bewusst. Es folgt eine Kurzbiographie, weitgehend anhand Schlatters eigener Aufzeichnungen (92-116). Sie beschreibt vor allem die prägenden Persönlichkeiten im Leben des St. Galler Theologen. An zwei Stellen bezieht sie sich auf die Sakramente: a) 1875 in Zürich, wo Schlatter das Abendmahl als einigendes Band mit dem Pfarrkollegen, der das Apostolikum nicht bekennen konnte, feierte, und wo er bereits „ein freudiges Ja zur Kindertaufe" fand; b) ab 1888 in Greifswald, wo er sich dem Luthertum annäherte und das lutherische Taufverständnis seines Lehrstuhl-Kollegen und Freundes H. Cremer verteidigte.

Man ist gespannt, was Schlatter auf diesem Hintergrund von der Schrift her (119-227) und in systematischem Horizont (228-339) zu den Sakramenten zu sagen hat. Sein Sakramentsverständnis, das in der theologischen Literatur bisher nur gestreift wurde, wird bei Rüegg aus Schlatters Schriften gründlich erhoben und ausführlich dargestellt. Rüegg fragt auch nach der Bedeutung für das konfessionsübergreifende Gespräch. Vornehmlich im Schlussteil, im sog. „Ergebnis", versucht der Autor zusammenfassend zu sagen, worin die Bedeutung liegt. Dieser letzte Teil ist etwas knapp geraten (340-356).

In der differenzierten Darstellung und systematisierenden Präsentation des Hauptteils besteht zweifellos das Neue bzw. die Leistung des Buches. Der Autor möchte aber mehr erreichen: „In Adolf Schlatter soll eine Stimme Raum gegeben werden, die in der neueren Debatte um die Sakramente noch nicht gehört worden ist." (14) Dass sich dieses Vorhaben wahrscheinlich lohne, sieht Rüegg darin, dass Schlatter schon im Elternhaus eine Offenheit für verschiedene kirchliche Traditionen kennen lernte und später seine theologische Arbeit bewusst als einen Dienst am ganzen Leib Christi verstand (15f). Nun darf Schlatter gewiss als nachahmenswert (im Dialog und selbstkritischen Schriftstudium als Annäherungsmethode, 83) und „auch hier als Vordenker dafür gelten, was sich im heutigen ökumenischen Kontext als konsensfähig erwiesen hat" (345), und deutlich und überzeugend legt Rüegg die Parallelität des Schlatter'schen Tauf- und Abendmahlsverständnisses dar (205-227); er zeigt ihren „christozentrischen" und „antispekulativen" (gegen das blosse Zeichen gerichteten) Charakter. Klar wird auch, wie Schlatter das Neue Testament gelesen hat und wie er daher zu einem kausativen bzw effektiven Verständnis der von Christus eingesetzten Handlungen kommt, nur wird nicht deutlich herausgearbeitet, worin denn die verschiedenen Konfessionen in der Abendmahls- oder der Tauffrage *heute noch* von Schlatter lernen können (vgl. 354, wo Schlatters Aussage von 1911 bzw. 1923 zur katholischen Sakramentsspendung als überholt abgehakt ist). Die Anregungen bleiben oft im Allgemeinen und im Konjunktiv stecken („. . . könnte er. . . von Bedeutung sein", 342).

Besonders fraglich erscheint mir Schlatters positiver Beitrag in Bezug auf ein bapistisches Taufverständnis zu sein: Wieso sollten die (verstreuten) Äusserungen eines landeskirchlichen Theologen und dezidierten Freundes der Säuglingstaufe für Baptisten zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts von Interesse sein, zumal Schlatters Tauflehre seit 1885 (!) weitgehend unverändert blieb (so Rüegg, ebd., 284)? Rüeggs Werk jedenfalls enthält in dieser Hinsicht keine Argumentation, sondern einfach eine Darlegung der Schlatter'schen Lehre. Er gibt darüber hinaus zu, Schlatters dogmatische Ausführungen seien stark mit seinem theologiegeschichtlichen Standort verwoben (340). Sein Beitrag bezieht sich seinem Standort gemäss v. a. auf den evangelisch-katholischen Dialog (vgl. den Exkurs zur Enzyklika *Ecclesia de Eucharistia*, 330-337) und den lutherisch-reformierten Dialog (vgl. die Seite 341 erwähnte Leuenberger Konkordie). Ich bezweifle also keineswegs Schlatters Verdienste in exegetischer Hinsicht und den Wert seiner Beiträge für die erwähnten Dialoge, ich frage mich aber angesichts seines zeitlichen Abstandes, worin genau in den Gesprächen der neueren Zeit Schlatter zu Gehör gebracht werden sollte. W. Dietz Kerners Heidelberger Dissertation zur Frage von „Gläubigentaufe, Säuglingstaufe und gegenseitiger Taufanerkennung" (2004) kommt jedenfalls ohne Schlatter aus (erwähnt ihn nur einmal im Zusammenhang mit Beasley-Murray).

Eine Schwäche des Buches sehe ich in der manchmal zu geringen kritischen Distanz zum behandelten Theologen. Rüegg bedauert bzw. kritisiert auf der einen Seite Schlatters Abendmahlsverständnis in zweierlei Hinsicht: 1. die Verneinung der Selbstvergegenwärtigung des Erhöhten im Abendmahl und 2. die fehlende eschatologische Dimension (328-330). Auf der anderen Seite liest man nichts Kritisches zum Taufverständnis. Vielmehr bescheinigt er Schlatter, dieser habe „mit seiner gründlichen Exegese gezeigt", dass laut den Petrusbriefen in der Taufe Gott handelt (126). Auf Gegengründe, inwiefern dies u. U. nicht für jede Art der Taufe einfach angenommen werden kann, geht er nicht ein. Brox' Fazit, das Rüegg hingegen zitiert (Anm. 36) liesse es aber als geraten erscheinen, ein Taufverständnis nicht von dem umstrittenen 1. Petr 3,20f her zu entwickeln. Während es zu begrüssen ist, dass Taufe und Glaube bei Schlatter, dem neutestamentlichen Zeugnis entsprechend, zusammengehalten werden (bes. auf den Seiten 139 und 144), wäre gerade diese begrüssenswerte Zusammengehörigkeit Grund genug, ein grosses Fragezeichen zu Schlatters Ausführungen zur Kindertaufe (270-277) zu setzen.

Bei aller Kritik an Schlatter und seinem nachgeborenen Schüler Rüegg soll nicht vergessen werden, dass m. E. die groben Linien stimmen. Die entscheidende Frage dürfte sein, wem das Mahl und wem die Taufe *effektiv* zum Heilsmittel (Sakrament) oder zum Gericht wird. Diese Frage ist aber nicht Gegenstand des vorliegenden Buches. Es leistet genug, indem es Schlatters

Sakramentslehre verständlich und nachvollziehbar nahebringt.

Thomas Hafner, Aarau, Schweiz

The Coming King and the Rejected Shepherd: Matthew's Reading of Zechariah's Messianic Hope

Clay Alan Ham

Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2005, xvi + 176 pp., £60.00, hb, ISBN 1-905048-01-7.

SUMMARY

Ham fills a current scholarly void by examining the use of Zechariah in Matthew's Gospel. He builds on previous work by Matthew's use of the Old Testament by examining quotations as well as allusions. Ham relies on Richard Hays's criteria to prove or disprove the presence of allusions, accepting ten of eighteen suggested allusions. The cautious study remains narrow in focus throughout. Ham concludes that Matthew essentially employs Zechariah to emphasize the two themes of "coming king" and "rejected shepherd" (though other elements such as universalism may lie in the background).

RÉSUMÉ

Ham vient combler un vide par son étude spécialisée de l'usage du livre de Zacharie dans l'Évangile de Matthieu. Il tire profit de travaux antérieurs sur l'usage matthéen de l'Ancien Testament pour considérer les citations et les allusions. Il s'appuie sur les critères énoncés par Richard Hay pour déterminer la présence d'allusions, et conclut à la présence effective de dix allusions sur les dix-huit possibles envisagées. Cette étude prudente reste confinée à un champ limité. Ham conclut que Matthieu utilise le livre de Zacharie essentiellement au service de deux thèmes, celui du roi qui vient et celui du berger rejeté (même si d'autres points, comme le caractère universel du salut, figurent aussi, en arrière-plan).

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Ham füllt eine wissenschaftliche Lücke, indem er den Gebrauch von Sacharja im Matthäusevangelium untersucht. Er baut auf früheren Arbeiten zum matthäischen Gebrauch des Alten Testaments auf und untersucht sowohl Zitate als auch Anspielungen. Ham stützt sich auf Richard Hays' Kriterien zur Identifizierung oder Abweisung von Anspielungen und akzeptiert zehn von achtzehn vorgeschlagenen Anspielungen. Die vorsichtige Studie ist durchgängig eng fokussiert. Ham kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass Matthäus Sacharja hauptsächlich benutzt, um die beiden Themen "Der kommende König" und "Der verworfene Hirte" zu betonen (andere Elemente wie der Universalismus bilden aber einen möglichen Hintergrund).

* * * *

Ham's short study carefully details Matthew's use of Zechariah along the lines of previous studies of Matthew's use of the OT. He seeks to fill a gap by analyzing not only citations but possible Matthean allusions to the prophet proposed by various scholars. This is accomplished in a straightforward and careful manner by analyzing the significance of the three citations and testing for the presence of various allusions. After a short introductory review of the present state of studies of the OT in Matthew, Ham thoroughly investigates each citation in his first chapter, which includes extensive discussion of text forms and interaction with scholarship on Zechariah itself. In the second chapter Ham tests for the presence of allusions by means of Richard Hays's criteria, rejecting 10 of 18 possible allusions. The third chapter reviews the conclusions and argues for a "theological" use of Zechariah in Matthew, which is summarized under the rubric of the twin themes of "coming king" and "rejected shepherd". A conclusion provides an overview and again reviews conclusions for those who might have lost their way through 126 well-written pages (forty of which review and summarize).

Sticking tightly to his brief, Ham never attempts to synthesize Matthew's use of Zechariah within the framework of Zechariah's canonical role or Matthew's use of the OT writ large (Richard Beaton's *Isaiah's Christ in Matthew's Gospel*, D. D. Kupp's *Matthew's Emmanuel*, and Boda and Floyd, *Bringing out the Treasure: Inner Biblical Allusion and Zechariah 9-14* are not considered), apart from competent (largely linguistic and textual) discussion of the fusion of references to Jeremiah and Zechariah in Matthew 27; and Isaiah 62, Genesis 49, and Zechariah 9 in Matthew 21. The final page discusses "thematic emphases" shared by evangelist and prophet which "indicate an influence of the theology of Zechariah on the theology of Matthew" (126). The two books share an eschatological orientation via such themes as "the creation of a renewed remnant and the worship of Yahweh by all nations" (126). Regrettably, these themes feature far less in the research than narrowly Christological themes.

Such observations beg questions of Ham and future researchers. Ham follows Donald Senior and Michael Knowles in initially studying citations, then moving to study of allusions. One wonders if there is a still larger base from which to begin: namely, Matthew's representation of, reliance on, or interaction with Israel's story as a whole? Can one successfully isolate use of one book of the OT without reference to the use of the whole? Is there a "grand narrative" element, a sense that Matthew is in some way concluding Scripture's Story, which Ham--with many others, including the majority of scholars reviewed in the first chapter--has left untapped? It may be that a lack of consideration of grander hermeneutical questions prohibits full appreciation for Matthew's use of Zechariah or leads to a less than fair hearing for some alleged allusions. Unfortunately, Ham overlooks C. Moss's unpublished PhD dissertation, "Zechariah and the Gospel of Matthew: the use of a biblical tradition" (Durham, 2002), which appears to engage the

larger questions Ham avoids, given his chosen approach. Given Ham's restraint, there is nothing lofty, grandiose, or particularly new in his conclusions, but the results are largely certain and exegetically satisfying. Those who appreciate cautious exegesis with conservative methods (think Jimmy Dunn) will approve. Those looking for "bigger" exegesis and comprehensive conclusions (think Tom Wright) may be left wanting.

The book contains a reference index, author index, and rather full bibliography (though note above), the latter in part reflecting the inclusion of Ham's many and generally sound conversation partners, but also reflecting the inclusion of a great many works wholly absent from the text. Ham interacts with a large number of evangelical writers (especially commentaries) without slavishly following "conservative" arguments: he follows Peels (*ZAW* 2002) in rejecting any significance for 1st c. canon in Jesus' use of "Abel to Zechariah" in Matthew 23:25, and favors seeing "Zechariah son of Bechariah" as a conflation of characters per rabbinic tendencies (93).

Ham does not relate his conclusions to previous studies of Zechariah in Matthew in the summary (although these are cited in the introduction), nor does he suggest directions for future research based on the present work. Potential avenues for research which might utilize aspects of his study include analysis of Matthew's theological use of Genesis 49:8-11, and the influence of Mark or other early Christian theologies and hermeneutical practices on Matthew's reading of Zechariah. There is also surely a need for more extensive examination of the question of the two books' narrative or eschatological trajectories. Ham has filled a scholarly lacuna by producing a cautious and well-executed (given his preferred methods) text, commendably including study of allusions and the most obvious citations-an improvement over the vast bulk of study on Matthew's use of the OT.

Jason B. Hood, Dingwall, Scotland

BibleWorks™ 7 – software for biblical research

BibleWorks, LLC

2006, $349 (full version), $150 (upgrade from BibleWorks 6)

SUMMARY

BibleWorks 7 is the latest version of this powerful Bible software. It contains a new user interface that is both straightforward and user-friendly. The software provides many helpful tools for the biblical student and scholar.

RÉSUMÉ

BibleWorks 7 est la dernière version en date de ce logiciel performant pour l'étude de la Bible. Elle contient un nouvel interface utilisateur qui est à la fois très direct et très convivial. Elle comporte de nombreux outils et ressources utiles.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

BibleWorks 7 ist die neuste Version dieser leistungsstarken Bibel-Software. Sie beinhaltet eine neue Benutzeroberfläche, die sowohl einfach als auch benutzerfreundlich ist. Die Software stellt viele hilfreiche Werkzeuge für Studenten und Forscher bereit.

* * * *

Reviewing bible-related software brings with it challenges not normally associated with reviewing books – new versions come out at an alarming rate! It was only in *EuroJTh* 13:1 that I reviewed version 6 of the BibleWorks software and here we are, just two years later, reviewing the latest version of this fine programme. It should be said that most of the comments made with regard to BibleWorks 6 still apply to the latest version, so this review will focus more specifically on what has been added to the latest version to set it apart from the previous one. As mentioned before, one's choice of software is about as personal as one's choice of clothes, but for me BibleWorks continues to be the premier bible research software on the market.

So, what is new in version 7? Well the first thing that users of BW will notice as they open up the latest offering is an entirely new graphic user interface. Up until version 6 the initial screen was a combination of a main text window surrounded by smaller windows which included dictionary definitions, search functions, and a text editor for taking notes. The new starting set-up is much more intuitive and user-friendly. The user is faced with three columns spread across the screen. The central column contains the biblical text – either the continuous text of a single version or multiple versions of a single verse (you can toggle between these two options at the click of an icon). The left hand column contains the main search window. One of the nice additions to BW 7 is that searches become tabs at the top of the search window, so an English text search for a particular string of words, followed by a search for the underlying terms in, say, first Hebrew and then the Greek of the LXX results in three tabs at the top of the screen that can be compared with consummate ease by simply clicking on the relevant tab. This may sound like a relatively insignificant detail, but in terms of usage it is a nice addition that eases the task of comparing versions and also allows the user to run multiple searches at the same time.

The third window, to the right of the main text block, is for linguistic analysis and note taking. For example, while reading the text in Greek, it is possible to run the cursor over a word and its definition in BDAG (complete with parsing) appears automatically in this right-hand window. The lexical analysis window also allows for easy study of the definition of the word as it is found in a variety of lexicons (e.g. BDAG, Liddell and Scott, Thayer, Louw-Nida and others in Greek or HALOT, BDB, TWOT and Holladay in Hebrew – however, it should be noticed that both BDAG and HALOT are additional modules that have to be purchased sepa-

rately). Alongside the definition functions, this window also contains a tab that allows the user to take ones own notes that can, if desired, appear alongside any given text whenever it is called up on screen.

In some ways these changes are purely cosmetic. Not all, but most of these tools where available in previous versions of BW. However, it must be said that BW7 makes the use of these functions much more straightforward and user-friendly. Whereas previously I would say that it took a fairly serious amount of effort to learn how to use BW well, the latest version is much more intuitive and is much simpler in its operation. These are the main changes at the heart of the programme and they are definitely worthwhile enhancements.

In addition, as always with each new version of BW, additional databases have been added either to the core programme or as modules that can be purchased alongside BW7. Some of these additions are, if you will excuse the colloquialism, 'sweet'. The addition, for example, of searchable, editable, and printable satellite maps of the Middle East is a great help for anyone teaching the biblical subjects. Also the inclusion of Metzger's *Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament*, alongside tools for diagramming the Greek text and other helps for learning Greek and Hebrew makes this digitised package all the more complete. In terms of versions of the Bible, the addition of the NET Bible complete with translation and study notes is very beneficial, as is the inclusion of the Holman Christian Standard Bible and new versions in Bulgarian, Spanish, German, Polish and Portuguese. The one notable gap is that the TNIV is not included in BW7. I understand that this is due to fairly prohibitive costs being required by the publisher.

For the specialist biblical scholar a whole raft of specific tools are now available within BW7 or for additional purchase. For example, the Greek Apostolic Fathers, the Works of Philo and additional Targums are now available by default in BW7. In terms of additional modules that can be purchased the list is equally extensive: the Qumran sectarian manuscripts, Waltke and O'Connor, a variety of Greek and Hebrew Grammars, and so on. Full details of all of the additions to be found in BW7 can be found on the website www.bibleworks.com.

In conclusion, BW7 is a worthy successor to the previous versions of the software and remains, as far as I am concerned at least, the premier Bible software available on the market today.

Jamie Grant, Dingwall, Scotland

The Troubles of Templeless Judah, Jill Middlemas

OTM (Oxford: OUP, 2005).

SUMMARY

This monograph is a welcome addition to the influx of interest into and publications on the exilic age. Middlemas focuses specifically upon the situation in the land of Judah during the exilic period to identify any distinctive theology of the post-war Judahite community. As such, she differentiates the perspectives of the Judahites remaining in the land to those in Babylon, the *Golah*. To accomplish this, she analyses archaeological, historical and biblical evidence to gain a portrait of worship in Judah during the exile. Her main source from biblical material for the Judahite perspective is the book of Lamentations, as she sees other biblical material (various Psalms and a portion of Second Isaiah) inconclusive as particularly Judahite. She concludes by noting the various theological themes present in Lamentations and how these themes remain distinct from *Golah* literature, thus revealing a distinctive theology of the post-war Judahite community.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Diese Monographie ist eine willkommene Ergänzung zum wachsenden Interesse an der Zeit des Exils und Publikationen dazu. Middelmas konzentriert sich besonders auf die Situation im Land Juda während der Jahre des Exils, um die besondere Theologie der judäischen Gemeinschaft der Nachkriegszeit zu identifizieren. Dabei unterscheidet sie zwischen den Perspektiven der Judäer, die im Land blieben und denjenigen in Babylon, den *Golah*. Um dies zu erreichen, analysiert sie archäologische, historische und biblische Evidenz, um ein Bild des Kultes in Juda während des Exils. Ihre wichtigste biblische Quelle für die judäische Perspektive ist das Buch der Klagelieder, da sie andere biblische Texte (verschiedene Psalmen und einen Teil des zweiten Jesaja) nicht als eindeutig judäisch ansieht. Sie schließt mit der Erwähnung der verschiedenen theologischen Themen der Klagelieder und wie sich diese Themen von der *Golah*-Literatur unterscheiden und damit eine bestimmte Theologie der judäischen Gemeinschaft der Nachkriegszeit offenbaren.

RÉSUMÉ

L'exil a récemment suscité un intérêt renouvelé alimenté par diverses publications. La présente monographie est bienvenue. Jill Middlemas se concentre spécifiquement sur la situation au pays de Juda durant le temps de l'exil et cherche quels pouvaient être les traits distinctifs de la théologie de la communauté demeurée en Juda après la guerre. Elle distingue la perspective de ces Judéens de celle des exilés en Babylonie. Elle analyse les données archéologiques, historiques et bibliques pour obtenir un tableau du culte en Juda pendant l'exil. Le livre des Lamentations constitue sa principale source biblique pour la perspective des Judéens demeurés au pays. D'autres textes bibliques (divers Psaumes et une portion du « second Ésaïe ») ne peuvent en effet être considérés avec certitude comme émanant du même milieu. Elle relève les divers thèmes théologiques des Lamentations et montre qu'ils distinguent ce livre de la littérature née en exil, ce qui révèle une théologie propre à la communauté des Judéens restés au pays.

* * * *

This monograph – a revised version of Middlemas' doc-

toral dissertation written at the University of Oxford under the supervision of Hugh Williamson – undertakes a historical investigation into the period between 587 BCE and 539 BCE, typically known as the exilic period, to discern characteristic theological attitudes and worship practices among the post-war Judahite community. She argues that the typical designation of the period as 'exilic' glosses over the distinctiveness of the Judahite perspective of the age, which she in turn identifies as the 'Templeless Period.' She assesses the historical, archaeological, and biblical material of this time in reference to Judah and concludes that at this time Judah experienced a degree of political and social stability and that scribal activity likely continued in Judah after the destruction of Jerusalem.

This however, drives her to question the distinctiveness of theological formulation among the post-war Judahite community over and against the *Golah* community in Babylon. Middlemas highlights biblical texts that attribute the fall of Jerusalem to syncretistic worship practices among Judahites, both prior to and after the destruction of the capital. She argues that *Golah* authors wrote these texts to provide social, theological, and ideological unity among their community, often at the expense of the perspective of those in Judah. Thus much of *Golah* literature programmatically denounces foreign or syncretistic worship practices and bars those who participated in such activities (e.g., the post-war Judahite community) from blessed future in the land of Judah. This perspective, however, does not accord with the perspective of those *within* the land during the same period.

Middlemas copiously assesses archaeological, historical, and biblical data and concludes that cultic practices persisted in Judah (in Jerusalem's temple ruins and perhaps Bethel) during the Templeless Period though in a diminished state. But how did these Judahites actually worship and what was their theological distinctiveness? With this question in mind, Middlemas assesses texts that scholarly consensus deems as Judahite composed during the exile (Pss 74, 79, 89, 102; Is 63.7-64.11), and argues that these laments cannot *with certainty* be attributed to Judahite provenance or thought milieu. Rather, she prefers to locate the religious ideology of the Judahites in the book of Lamentations. Middlemas argues that chapters 1, 2, 4, and 5 are of a piece and belong to post-war Judahite provenance while chapter three belongs to a different thought milieu. She bases this argument on the provenance of the book on linguistic dating, formal similarities between the chapters, a focus upon Judah and Jerusalem in these chapters, and similarity of perspective as eyewitness accounts of the disaster that befell Jerusalem. From chapters 1, 2, 4, and 5, she attempts to trace responses to the disaster of Jerusalem that were indicative of Yahwistic worship during the Templeless Period. Middlemas discovers that these chapters employ distinctive themes that differentiate them from Golah literature. The themes are as follows: a preponderance of human suffering, a lack of confidence in a future hope, a lesser emphasis on sinfulness and sin in the community with a greater emphasis on protest against Yahweh's punishment, an emphasis on expressing pain, and finally expression of grief that is situated in a stylistic manner so as to provide a glimmer of hope by the time the reader concludes reading chapter five. Thus Middlemas concludes that the post-war Judahite community did in fact have distinctive theology that distinguished it from the *Golah* during the Templeless Period.

This work is a welcome addition to the influx of interest into and publications on the exilic age. The distinctiveness of this contribution lay in Middlemas' concentration on the Judahite perspectives on theology and worship, an area that has not received prolonged reflection. Especially helpful in this regard is her attention to the material culture of Judah during the exilic age (Chapter 3), which enriches the value of the work, particularly with regard to the viability of locales for Judahite worship in this time, and sets her later analysis of the biblical material on solid ground. This monograph should be consulted along with other recent works into the period, especially the recent monograph of Oded Lipschits, *The Fall and Rise of Jerusalem*, which is omitted from the bibliography as it was published at virtually the same time as Middlemas' work.

Not all will agree with Middlemas' delineation of the themes of Lamentations, and this impacts her understanding of theology of the period. In this regard the theology of *Lamentations* is much more ambiguous and equivocating, especially in regards to sin (c.f. Adele Berlin, Lamentations). Also it may be that the exclusion of Lamentations 3, at least the parenetic section (Lam 3.22-39), hinders a fuller understanding of Judahite perspectives on theology during the exilic age. These points notwithstanding, this monograph serves as a welcome addition to Lamentations research and to study on the exilic age.

Heath Thomas, Cheltenham, UK

Ancient Texts for New Testament Studies: A Guide to the Background Literature

Craig A. Evans

Peabody, MA.: Hendrickson, 2005, 535 pp., £21.99, hb, ISBN 1-56563-409-8

SUMMARY

This work is an extensive revision of Evans' previous book, *Noncanonical Writings and New Testament Interpretation* (Hendrickson, 1992). This recent volume is an invaluable reference tool that gives a very brief introduction to virtually all cognate literature (Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha, Qumran Literature, Greco-Roman authors, etc.) composed near the time of the writing of the New Testament. Perhaps the most helpful contributions of the book are the

extensive bibliographies at the end of each section and the appendices that include a very helpful list of allusions in cognate literature that parallel New Testament passages.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Das Werk ist eine erhebliche Neubearbeitung von Evans' früherem Buch *Noncanonical Writings and New Testament Interpretation* (Hendrickson, 1992). Der vorliegende Band ist ein unschätzbares Nachschlagewerk, das eine sehr kurze Einleitung in mehr oder weniger die gesamte verwandte Literatur bringt (Apokryphen, Pseudepigraphen, Qumran, griechsch-römische Autoren etc.), die in zeitlicher Nähe zur Verfassung des Neuen Testaments geschrieben wurde. Der vielleicht hilfreichste Beitrag des Buches sind die ausführlichen Bibliographien am Ende jeden Abschnitts und die Anhänge, die eine sehr hilfreiche Liste der Anspielungen in der verwandten Literatur enthalten, die in Parallele zu neutestamentlichen Abschnitten stehen.

RÉSUMÉ

Cet ouvrage est une édition amplement révisée d'un livre antérieur intitulé *Noncanonical Writings and New Testament Interpretation* (1992). On a là un ouvrage de référence de grande valeur qui fournit une brève introduction à pratiquement toute la littérature composée à une époque proche de la rédaction du Nouveau Testament et pouvant être utile à l'étude de ce dernier (les Apocryphes, les Pseudépigraphes, les écrits de Qoumrân, les auteurs gréco-romains, etc.). Les bibliographies fournies qui se trouvent à la fin de chaque section et les appendices qui recensent les textes de cette littérature ayant un parallèle dans le Nouveau Testament sont parmi les plus utiles contributions de cet ouvrage.

* * * *

This book by Craig Evans, distinguished professor of New Testament at Acadia Divinity College (Nova Scotia), is an important tool for students of the New Testament. Evans himself notes that this book "has been written to serve the needs of students who aspire to become New Testament interpreters. Although it has been prepared primarily for the student, veterans of academy and church will find it useful as well" (from the preface). The book, in fact, provides both an introduction and extensive bibliography to the cognate literature relevant for the study of the New Testament. The literature examined includes: The Old Testament Apocrypha, the Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, the Dead Sea Scrolls (including other works found on Masada, at Nahal Hever, Marabba, and other locations near the Dead Sea), other versions of the Old Testament (e.g. the LXX, the Samaritan Pentateuch, etc.), Philo, Josephus, the Targums, Rabbinic Literature, the New Testament Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, Early Church Fathers, Gnostic Writings, relevant Greco-Roman authors, and Samaritan writings. In short, there is no piece of ancient literature significant for the study of the New Testament that is not covered in Evans' work, as far as I can see. (He even covers various Papyri, Inscriptions, Coins, and Ostraca, see pp. 306-28.)

Within many of these sections, there are sub-sections that give a brief summary of the contents of individual works. For instance, in chapter three on "The Dead Sea Scrolls," Evans not only summaries the contents of the Qumran Literature as a whole, but gives a concise summary of all the major documents in this corpus. In chapter eleven titled, "Other Writings," the author gives a very brief description of all the major Greco-Roman writers who produced material around the time of the New Testament. This is not true of every chapter, however. In the section on Philo for instance (pp. 167-73), there is only a brief description of Philo's writings together with a section on the relevance of his work for the study of the NT, but no description of Philo's individual writings. Similarly, the section on Rabbinic writings (216-55) was fairly brief in comparison to the vast amount of literature in this corpus.

Evans has also included a section titled, "Examples of New Testament Exegesis," where he looks at some difficult passages where the NT writer has used an OT passage or theme in ambiguous ways. He shows how parallels in the cognate literature can help the modern interpreter understand why the NT writer has interpreted the OT passage in an (apparently) enigmatic way. For instance, Evans discusses Paul's use of Deut 30:12-14 in Rom 10:6-8 (pp. 335-36) and shows that a similar interpretive manoeuvre in *Targum Neofiti* may demonstrate a helpful parallel to Paul's interpretation of Deuteronomy.

At the end of this work, Evans gives six appendices including, "Parallels between New Testament Gospels and Pseudepigraphal Gospels" (pp. 410-17) and "Jesus' Parables and the Parables of the Rabbis" (pp. 418-23). The most extensive, and perhaps the most helpful, appendix is number two: "Quotations, Allusions, and Parallels to the New Testament" (pp. 342-409). This section lists all (or, at least many) parallels in the cognate literature to almost every passage in the New Testament.

The one major drawback of the book is that in light of the vast amount of literature examined, the description and summary of each group of writings are necessarily brief. Even for those who have only a basic understanding of, say, the Pseudepigrapha, Evans' introductory section will be rudimentary. But given the diversity of the literature covered (from Jewish material to Magical Papyri), it is likely that the aspiring reader will find some introductory portions – brief as they may be – a very helpful start to one's own study. In all, I have found the extensive and current bibliographies, together with the appendices the most helpful portions of this book.

Preston Sprinkle, Aberdeen, Scotland

Remarriage after Divorce in Today's Church – 3 Views

(Counterpoints)

Gordon J. Wenham, William A. Heth and Craig S. Keener

Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2006 161 pp., £8.99, pb, ISBN 88-7653-104-1

SUMMARY

Three positions on remarriage are defended by the three authors: "No remarriage after divorce" (the traditional church position), "Remarriage for adultery or desertion" (i.e. remarriage after a valid ground for divorce), and "Remarriage for circumstances beyond adultery or desertion" (i.e. for valid grounds which are inferred from biblical principles). For the reader who wants a quick overview of the breadth of protestant biblical interpretations on remarriage, this single small volume covers everything of note up to the twentieth century.

RÉSUMÉ

Trois auteurs défendent trois positions différentes sur le remariage suite au divorce : 1) l'interdiction du remariage après un divorce (la position traditionnelle) ; 2) l'autorisation du remariage seulement lorsqu'il y a eu divorce pour cause d'adultère ou d'abandon par le conjoint (le remariage après un divorce fondé sur des raisons légitimes) ; 3) l'autorisation du remariage en d'autres circonstances (suite à un divorce jugé légitime en vertu de certains principes bibliques). Le lecteur qui veut se faire une idée des différentes positions au sein du protestantisme trouvera dans ce petit ouvrage tout ce qui mérite l'attention parmi ce qui a été dit jusqu'au XX^{e} siècle.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Drei Positionen zur Frage der Wiederverheiratung werden von den drei Autoren verteidigt: "Keine Wiederverheiratung nach einer Scheidung" (die traditionelle kirchliche Position), "Wiederverheiratung bei Ehebruch oder Verlassen der Ehe" (d. h. Wiederverheiratung bei einem stichhaltigen Grund für die Scheidung) und "Wiederverheiratung bei Umständen, die über Ehebruch oder Verlassen hinaus gehen" (d. h. bei stichhaltigen Gründen, die man aus biblischen Prinzipien ableitet). Für Leser, die einen schnellen Überblick über die Breite der protestantischen biblischen Interpretationen zur Frage der Wiederverheiratung suchen, umfasst dieser kleine Band alles Erwähnenswerte bis ins 20. Jahrhundert hinein.

* * * *

The biblical teaching on remarriage is an issue which touches every church minister and almost every family in each congregation. This book brings together three viewpoints, each presented by a different person and then, as in all the titles in this series, allows the contributors a brief response to each other's chapters. This is a very useful format and sometimes the most illuminating material is in these responses.

The three positions are "No remarriage after divorce" by Gordon Wenham, "Remarriage for adultery or desertion" by William Heth and "Remarriage for circumstances beyond adultery or desertion". These three have all authored substantial works on this subject, though the positions they defend in this book do not always represent the main thrust of their own teaching.

All three authors agree that the subject rests on just a few texts in which Jesus appears to disallow all remarriage (Mk.10.11f, Lk.16.18), and Jesus appears to allow remarriage for *porneia* (Mt.5.32; 19.9) and Paul tells someone desertion by an unbeliever that they are "no longer bound" (1 Cor.7.15). They all agree that *porneia* refers to marital unfaithfulness, though Keener thinks the definition may be slightly wider, and they all agree that if even if someone has remarried when they should not have done, the church should not seek to end that second marriage.

Their differences lie in the ways in which they deal with problems arising from these texts: Why does Jesus appear to contradict himself? And why does Paul appear to add an exception not mentioned by Jesus?

Wenham defends the position taught by all church leaders up to the Reformation, with very few exceptions, that Jesus allowed no remarriage after divorce unless a former partner died. Paul's phrase "no longer bound" confers freedom from marriage for someone who has been abandoned, but not freedom to remarry. Jesus' exception "for *porneia*" allows them to separate and possibly to divorce, but not to remarry. In his response to Heth, Wenham lists the three strongest arguments for this case: outside Matthew there is no verse which even hints that remarriage is possible; a no-remarriage view is the only one which explains why Jesus goes on to speak about living like a eunuch in Matthew 19; and the early church was virtually unanimous in this teaching.

Both Heth and Keener respond to the issue of early church teaching, pointing out that early Christians knew very little about the Jewish context of Jesus' teaching, and that they had their own ascetic agenda which caused many of them to promote celibacy for widows and priests as well as divorcees. They also point out that the phrase "no longer bound" (1 Cor.7.15) is closely related to the language on ancient divorce certificates: "You are now free to marry". Neither of them deal with the "eunuch" teaching, but perhaps they felt it was unnecessary, because it is not difficult to read this together with remarriage: Matthew says Jesus' disciples were dismayed to hear that they could not divorce a wife at a whim (as Judaism taught) and said "then it might be better not to marry!", to which Jesus answered that for some it was right to live as a eunuch.

Heth defends the position taken by most Protestant churches, that Jesus disallowed divorce with one exception (unfaithfulness) and that Paul added another (desertion by an unbeliever). He reads Jesus' teaching in the light of the Pharisaic dispute at the time, in which Hillelites propounded a new type of divorce for 'any

cause', whereas Shammaites allowed divorce only for adultery. He says that Jesus sided with the Shammaites, though they demanded divorce for adultery while he only allowed it. Matthew added the Hillelite phrases 'for any cause' and the Shammaite response 'except for *porneia*' because he wrote after Mark, at a time when this dispute was not so well known. Mark's readers would have mentally added these phrases, just as we mentally add to the question "Do you believe in the Second Coming", the phrase which makes this question meaningful: "of Jesus Christ".

Heth goes beyond the traditional Protestant position by allowing remarriage after a valid divorce. Jesus said that remarriage was adulterous in order to emphasise that the divorce was invalid – ie the person getting remarriage was still married. But if Jesus allowed people to get a valid divorce when their partner was unfaithful, then surely Jesus allowed those people to get remarried. He recognizes that some texts record Jesus teaching that all who remarry commit adultery, and he says that the exception must be read from one text into the others. Both he and Keener point out that Jesus often used hyperbole to emphasise his point. When Jesus says that "whoever says 'You fool!' is liable to hell fire" (Mt.5.22) we have to add "unless he has good cause" because Jesus himself used this insult (Mt.23.17). When Jesus says "whoever looks at a woman lustfully has committed adultery" (Mt.5.28) we have to add "unless she is his wife". In the same way, when Jesus says "Whoever marries a divorced woman commits adultery" we have to add "unless she has a valid divorce".

Keener has the most difficult task when he presents reasons why remarriage might be allowed after divorces other than those specifically allowed in the New Testament. He starts from the standpoint of Heth, and argues that the two New Testament exceptions are instances from which we have to infer principles. Jesus mentioned unfaithfulness because this was the Shammaite position in the debate he was asked about, and Paul mentioned desertion because this is what was happening in Corinth. Neither of them addressed the issue of violence done to a partner or to their children, or the issue of drug addiction leading to impoverishment and illegal means of raising money. The fact that these and other situations did not arise or were not envisioned does not mean that Jesus or Paul would have been silent about them if they did. Unless we look for ethical principles in the Bible, we have no way of responding to problems like drug abuse, abortion or eugenics.

He also argues for the right of the guilty party to remarry, so long as their partner does not want them back, but he adds a serious caution to this. Remarriages are statistically less secure than first marriages, probably because the same mistakes are repeated, so he says that there should be sufficient time for the divorcee to go through counseling before remarriage. He says that these ethical discussions are outside his normal area of competence as a biblical scholar, but his sensitive approach shows him to have a wise and pastoral heart.

This volume is invaluable as a brief and well argued defense of all three positions. Ultimately, however, the book has an unfinished feel. This is partly due to the inevitable lack of any conclusion – which is due to the nature of the book – and partly because each author is constantly referring to a work which came out after the structure of the book was conceived, and which is therefore missing. The missing work (*Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible*, Eerdmans 2002) presents many manuscripts and first century texts which had not been brought into the discussion previously, and came to new conclusions which both Heth and Keener have subsequently substantially agreed with. The fact that I, the reviewer, am also the author of that missing work means that it is difficult for me to assess this gap accurately, but the fact that it is referred to in one fifth of the footnotes is probably significant. I understand that some of the contributors wished to have this view represented fully, but the publishers felt it was too late to change the structure.

This deficiency is not as great as it might have been thanks to Heth who devotes a large portion of his space in order to represent some aspects of this work. Heth is a remarkable scholar for one outstanding reasons – he is capable of changing his mind when he finds new evidence. He describes at the start of his chapter how he originally authored a book with Wenham (*Jesus and Divorce*) which argued the no-remarriage position, but pastoral experiences caused him to doubt this, and the new data in *Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible* showed him that his previous conclusions were based on incomplete information. To publicly revise an opinion through which a scholar has established his own reputation is a praiseworthy example of scholarship and Christian discipleship.

For the reader who wants a quick overview of the breadth of protestant biblical interpretations on remarriage, this single small volume covers all the main issues up to the twentieth century.

David Instone-Brewer, Cambridge

Colossians and Philemon: A Critical and Exegetical Commentary

R. McL. Wilson

ICC ; London: T&T Clark/Continuum, 2005. xxxvi + 380pp. £50.00, hb
ISBN 0-567-04471-8

SUMMARY

This commentary by Robert McL. Wilson is a technical but readable analysis of Colossians and Philemon with due attention given to the text, background, and arguments of these letters. The author gives good overviews of scholarship and excavates the text with learned precision. Wilson regards Colossians as pseudonymous, but not a forgery, and

believes Philemon to be authentically Pauline. According to Wilson the heresy that precipitated Colossians stands in a trajectory somewhere between Judaism and Gnosticism.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Dieser Kommentar von Robert McL. Wilson ist eine fachlich versierte, aber lesbare Analyse des Kolosser- und Philemonbriefs, die dem Text, dem Hintergrund und den Argumentationsgängen dieser Briefe die gebührende Aufmerksamkeit schenkt. Der Autor bringt gute Überblicke über die wissenschaftliche Exegese und hebt die Schätze des Textes mit gelehrter Präzision. Wilson hält den Kolosserbrief für pseudonym, aber nicht für eine Fälschung, und er glaubt, dass der Philemonbrief ein authentischer Paulusbrief ist. Nach Wilson steht die Häresie, die den Kolosserbrief hervorrief, irgendwo zwischen Judentum und Gnosis.

RÉSUMÉ

Ce commentaire sur les épîtres aux Colossiens et à Philémon est une analyse technique mais accessible qui prête toute l'attention voulue au texte, à son arrière-plan et aux arguments de ces lettres. L'auteur fait de bonnes présentations de l'état de la recherche et explique le texte avec une précision érudite. Wilson considère que l'épître aux Colossiens est pseudonymique sans toutefois être une contrefaçon, et pense que l'épître à Philémon est authentique. Il considère que l'hérésie à laquelle répond l'épître aux Colossiens se situe quelque part sur un chemin qui va du judaïsme au gnosticisme.

* * * *

Robert McL. Wilson is well qualified to writing a commentary on Colossians given his forty years of expertise on writing about Gnosticism and the obvious echoes of Gnostic terminology in Colossians. The introduction includes discussion about the city of Colossae and the close link between Philemon and Colossians. On authorship, Wilson acknowledges the split among English-speaking scholars as to whether or not Colossians is authentically Pauline. In his view the 'letter was written not so very long after Paul's death, by some disciple who sought to apply his master's teaching to meet a new and dangerous situation which he saw developing' (p. 59). Determinative for this view is the apparent differences in style, language and content in comparison to the accepted Pauline letters. At the same time Wilson is adamant that Colossians is not a fraud or forgery since writing under a false name was not thought reprehensible by ancient writing standards. He thinks the author was honestly and sincerely trying to develop and carry further the teachings of Paul to a new situation (pp. 11-12). Although one thing we can say in response is that falsely attributing literature to an apostle was unanimously censured in the early church (e.g. Tertullian, *De Baptismo* 17). Wilson also thinks Ephesians as being post-Pauline and dependent on Colossians. With regards to the Colossian heresy, Wilson contends that it has both Jewish and Gnostic elements (possibly other sources as well such as magic or mysticism) but it is impossible to be any more specific than that. Here we would have appreciated Wilson at least having an educated guess at the root cause of the heresy even if it was speculative. This would comport with Wilson's own adage that a commentary should be about telling people what one actually thinks (p. x). Rather than summarize the entire commentary I intend in what follows to highlight Wilson's analysis of a few well known passages. Wilson takes Col. 1.15-20 as an early Christian hymn taken up by the author, though the author might himself be responsible for its composition. The hymn and the teaching that it tries to confute is not gnostic, rather, it seeks to correct a deficient view of Christ and so proclaim the pre-eminence and superiority of the Son. The background of the hymn lies in a mixture of Wisdom-Logos and Adam/Christ elements. In regards to Col. 2.11-12, Wilson understands circumcision in the OT to point to circumcision of the heart, but thinks that Paul's view is that true circumcision is experienced in baptism. He understands the 'word of Christ' in Col. 3.16 to denote the gospel about Christ and the word which he spoke. The *Haustafel* of Col. 3.18-4.1 shows the author urging a view of Christian households that are part and parcel of family life in the ancient world the differentiation from Graeco-Roman household codes is that the Christian expression are orientated around the ‚Lord'. Wilson accepts the authenticity of Philemon and prefers the theory of Paul writing from Ephesus. Regarding slavery, Wilson notes that the Christian failure to condemn the practice was because slavery was simply part of the social and economic tiers of the Mediterranean world. He mentions OT rules about slavery and points out how the NT set our principles which were eventually to lead to the abolition of slavery. The impetus to abolish slavery in both the Roman empire and in the Americas found roots in the teaching of Paul (e.g. Gal. 3.28; Col. 3.11). In sum, Wilson has produced a technical but eminently readable commentary on Colossians and Philemon and he is sympathetic to the worldview and arguments of the author whom he regards as writing Scripture.

Michael F. Bird, Dingwall, Scotland

The Nature of New Testament Theology: Christopher Rowland and Christopher Tuckett

Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, xii + 314 pp.,
£19.99, pb, ISBN 1-4051-1174-7

SUMMARY

This volume is a collection of essays on New Testament Theology in honour of Robert Morgan. It pays particular attention to the challenges of doing New Testament Theology, it raises hermeneutical questions about New Testament Theology, and articulates the relationship between exegesis, systematic theology, pastoral theology, and New

Testament Theology. Most authors are generally positive about the possibility of doing New Testament Theology and they propose innovative ways in which one can construct a coherent theological message from the diverse writings of the New Testament.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Dieser Band ist eine Artikelsammlung zur neutestamentlichen Theologie zu Ehren von Robert Morgan. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit kommt den Herausforderungen zu, neutestamentliche Theologie zu betreiben. Hermeneutische Fragen zur neutestamentlichen Theologie werden aufgeworfen, ebenso auch die Beziehung zwischen Exegese, systematischer Theologie, Pastoraltheologie und der Theologie des Neuen Testaments. Die meisten Autoren sehen die Möglichkeit des Betreibens neutestamentlicher Theologie im allgemeinen positiv und sie schlagen innovative Wege vor, auf denen man eine kohärente theologische Botschaft aus den verschiedenen NT-Schriften konstruieren kann.

RÉSUMÉ

Cet ensemble d'essais sur la théologie du Nouveau Testament est dédié à Robert Morgan. Les auteurs s'intéressent tout particulièrement aux difficultés que peut rencontrer l'élaboration d'une théologie du Nouveau Testament, à des questions herméneutiques touchant à cette entreprise, et ils tentent d'articuler ensemble l'exégèse, la théologie systématique, la théologie pastorale et la théologie du Nouveau Testament. La plupart des auteurs considèrent qu'il est possible d'élaborer une théologie du Nouveau Testament et ils proposent de nouvelles manières de construire un message théologique cohérent à partir des divers écrits du Nouveau Testament.

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This book is collection of essays in honour of Robert Morgan. Its purpose is to offer an up-to-date guide to discussion on the discipline of New Testament Theology (NTT).

The opening essay by John Ashton "History and Theology in New Testament Studies" surveys the problem trying to integrate history and theology. John Barton "Biblical Theology: An Old Testament Perspective" wrestles with the issue of how to balance historical exegesis and theological interpretation as understood from his background in the Hebrew Bible. He prefers the two-stage approach of J.P. Gabler (history then theology) as opposed to the canonical approach of B.S. Childs (interpreting Scripture for theology).

Adela Yarbro Collins tackles the subject of "Apocalypticism and New Testament Theology" including a selective history of how NT Theologians have situated apocalypticism in their theologies and surveying theological exegesis of the book of Revelation. She concludes that NTT requires a holistic approach that places the text in a conceptual framework conducive to the interpreter's theology while not contradicting the results of historical study. Philip Esler sets forth a case for a socio-theological hermeneutic in his chapter "New Testament Interpretation as Interpersonal Communion". Esler's social-scientific approach suggests some interesting ways in which modern persons can be in communion with the authors of the NT and so traverse the historical and cultural distance that separates them.

The "Nature of New Testament Theology" is addressed by Morna Hooker and argues that theological reflection on the New Testament is justified by the New Testament authors who themselves had begun a process of theological reflection. This is illustrated with specific reference to Christology in the New Testament. Luke Timothy Johnson, in probably the most interesting essay of the collection, addressed "Does a Theology of the Canonical Gospels Make Sense?" He notes the differences between John and the Synoptics and the differences between the Synoptics themselves and he takes that to imply that a theology "of" the Gospels is almost impossible. He goes on to list ten significant shared characteristics of the canonical gospels and contends that such distinctives are not found in the apocryphal Gospels. Rather than articulate a theology "of" the canonical Gospels he thinks it better to ask what kind of theology does the canonical tradition support and what kind theology is incompatible with it.

Leander E. Keck discusses "Paul in New Testament Theology: Some Preliminary Remarks" and looks at the problems of doing theology with Paul, Paul's theological articulation of the gospel, and how Paul relates to the theologies of the wider New Testament. Ulrich Luz's offering is "The Contribution of Reception History to a Theology of the New Testament". This study defines the difference between *Wirkungsgeschichte* and "reception history" and how "reception history" illuminates the task and horizons of biblical interpretation.

Margaret MacDonald tackles the subject of "Women in Early Christianity: The Challenge to a New Testament Theology". She identifies the engagement of feminists with theology and the challenges they bring to the theological discipline such as correcting inaccurate views of women in antiquity, engaging with modern concerns of the interpretation of NT texts, recovering female voices in the NT, and reconsidering how representations of women is influenced by style, genre and literary conventions. John Muddiman addresses "Deutero-Paulinism, and Pseudonymity and the Canon" the purpose of which is to demonstrate the role that post-Pauline writings can serve in a NTT. Muddiman refutes the idea that Ephesians and the Pastorals reflect an early Catholicism and advocates that the pseudo-Pauline writings testify to Paul's continuing influence. Heikki Räisänen applies the Wredean approach to NTT in "Towards an Alternative to New Testament Theology". He uses personal eschatology in the NT as an example (i.e. resurrection), and plots the development and diversity within the NT on the subject.

Perspectives on practical theology and NTT are offered by Christopher Rowland and Zoë Bennett in their

essay, "'Action is the Life of All' New Testament Theology and Practical Theology" who show how Scripture can be illuminated through the practice of theological reflection. Gerd Theissen discusses sociology and NTT in his essay "Theory of Primitive Christian Religion and New Testament Theology". Christopher Tuckett takes up a topic of Robert Morgan in "Does the 'Historical Jesus' belong within a 'New Testament Theology'?" He concludes that Jesus must play an essential role in any theological process.

In a stimulating essay, "The Gospel of John and New Testament Theology" Francis Watson contests the naiveté of John's so-called naïve docetism. The shorter and longer endings of the Fourth Gospel exhibit a dialectic tension between faith and apostolic testimony. German scholar Michael Wolter engages the topic of "The Theology of the Cross and the Quest for a Doctrinal Norm" in light of Paul's *theologia crucis* and Wolter suggests that all Christian theologies rest on an interpretation of the cross as integral to God's saving act. Finally, the relationship between Christian doctrine and NTT is explicated by Frances Young in his essay "The Trinity and the New Testament".

In summary, this is a helpful volume that raises several pertinent points about the nature and method of NTT.

Michael Bird, Dingwall, Scotland

Looking For Life: The Role of 'Theo-Ethical Reasoning' in Paul's Religion (Journal for the Study of the New Testament Supplement Series 291)

John G. Lewis

London: T & T Clark International, 2005, x + 297 pp., £65.00, hb, ISBN 05670-42723

SUMMARY

This well-presented monograph on the relationship between theology and ethics in Paul's letters began life as a 2004 Oxford dissertation under the direction of Robert Morgan and it seeks to challenge several certain widely-held views regarding Paul's theology and ethics.

RÉSUMÉ

Cette monographie sur la relation entre la théologie et l'éthique dans les lettres de Paul est bien présentée. C'est le fruit d'un travail de recherche en vue d'une thèse de doctorat sous la direction de Robert Morgan à Oxford. L'auteur conteste certaines opinions largement répandues sur la théologie et l'éthique de l'apôtre Paul.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Diese gut geschriebene Monographie zur Beziehung zwischen Theologie und Ethik in den paulinischen Briefen wurde 2004 als Dissertation in Oxford geboren und versucht, mehrere weithin als gesichert geltende Ansichten über paulinische Theologie und Ethik herauszufordern.

* * * *

This book challenges the adequacy of three interrelated topics of mainstream Protestant Pauline interpretation. Lewis maintains that interpreters regularly: (1) make a distinction between theology and ethics in the letters of Paul; (2) stress Paul's oral preaching as the primary vehicle for gospel proclamation and divine revelation; and (3) deny that Paul engages in reasoned, ethical reflection (p. 1). Lewis argues that Paul sought to integrate, rather than separate Christian theology with Christian ethics (p. 1). More specifically, Lewis argues that Paul consistently engaged in reasoned theological and ethical reflection and that the apostle's "theo-ethical reasoning" was grounded in his revelatory experience of the risen Christ (p. 2).

Chapter 1 (pp.1-35) offers a remarkably comprehensive and interesting discussion of the problem of ethics in Paul. After a detailed review of the various solutions to the problem, Lewis introduces his alternative solution. The chapter closes with a discussion on the limitations of the study, and how data was selected for inclusion. The most significant contribution of this chapter is in Lewis' clear and concise presentation of the various opinions regarding the relationship between Paul's theology and ethics. This useful critique of recent scholarly approaches regarding this matter is carefully documented, well organized, and would benefit anyone interested in how scholars understand the important relationship between Pauline theology and ethics.

Chapters 2, 3, and 4 (pp. 36-204) assess the coherence and consistency of the thesis argument by way of an exegetical study of two of Paul's letters -- 1 Corinthians and Galatians. As a way of demonstrating the pervasive nature of Paul's theo-ethical reasoning, Lewis, examines the unfolding rhetorical argument of each of these letters from beginning to end. More specifically, chapter 2 (pp. 36-82) is an exegesis of 1 Cor. 1.1-4.21. Here, Lewis seeks to show how Paul's theo-ethical reasoning became the conceptual framework for the community practice of spiritual discernment. Chapter 3 (pp. 83-145) is an examination of 1 Cor. 5.1-16.24. Here, Lewis seeks to show how Paul engaged in theo-ethical reasoning in order to address specific behavioral issues. Chapter 4 (pp. 146-204) similarly shows how Paul engages in reasoned theological and ethical reflection throughout his letter to the Galatians.

Chapter 5 contains a summary of Lewis' findings. The book ends by identifying connections that exist between modern moral philosophy or discourse (communicative) ethics, and the role reasoned theological ethical reflection plays in the community life of the church.

By way of appraisal, it is worth affirming that this monograph represents an important contribution to the study of Pauline theology and ethics. Dr. Lewis offers new insights and corrects a number of misunderstandings on how Paul's theology relates to his ethics. Perhaps

the most valuable sections of the book are the detailed history of scholarship (chapter 1) and the critical examination of Paul's rhetorical argument in Galatians (chapter 4). The careful and well-balanced analysis offered in chapter 4 sheds a good deal of light on the problem of how Paul addressed key doctrinal issues without causing division within the community.

Some may want to criticize Lewis for his creation of the neo-logism "theo-ethical reasoning." The author might also be accused of engaging in contemporary theological and ethical debate rather than a historical reconstruction of Pauline theology and ethics. However, this does not appear to be so. Throughout his exegesis of 1 Corinthians and Galatians, Lewis repeatedly shows how Paul's theological and ethical arguments have been fused together, arguing that one cannot exist without the other. According to Lewis' reading of Paul, believers are exhorted to engage in both theological and ethical reflection.

In short, the author's study offers a fresh perspective into this important relationship between doctrine and praxis in Christian communities. The interaction with the secondary literature is impressive and anyone studying 1 Corinthians or Galatians would benefit from his balanced and careful exegesis of these epistles. Moreover, his groundbreaking work opens the door for further inquire. For example, what role does cognition language itself play in the apostle's theological and ethical arguments? Romans 12.1-2 is one of the most well known and often quoted passages among Christians. Here, the apostle urges believers to resist the world's way of thinking and "be transformed by the renewing of your mind." Scholars readily agree that the passage serves as a kind of rhetorical bridge, linking the more theological portion of Romans (chapters 1-11) to the more ethical section (chapters 12-16). In a word, the passage is important for understanding how Paul's theology relates to his ethics. Lewis deals with this passage only briefly in his concluding chapter thereby paving the way for further investigation of Romans and other letters like Philippians and Colossians where cognition terminology is frequently found.

Lee S. Bond, Aberdeen, Scotland

The Birth of Satan: Tracing the Devil's Biblical Roots

T. J. Wray and Gregory Mobley

New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2005, 203 pages, £14.99
ISBN: 1-4039-6933-7

SUMMARY

This book provides an introduction to the development of Satan throughout history. It holds that monotheism is unstable since it presents God as the author of evil; thus, the Jews developed Satan to exonerate God. The book assumes the only way the Jews could free God from evil was to blame the devil. It overemphasises the similarities between the Jewish idea of Satan and that of her neighbours, and does not address the role of evil powers as agents of God in the NT. This book, however, would serve as a beneficial introduction and summary.

RÉSUMÉ

Ce livre cherche à reconstruire l'histoire de l'élaboration des conceptions concernant Satan. Les auteurs tiennent le monothéisme pour une conception instable parce qu'elle présenterait Dieu comme l'auteur du mal. C'est d'après eux pour cela que les Juifs ont développé une doctrine de Satan, pour exonérer Dieu. Ils présupposent que la seule manière pour les Juifs d'ôter à Dieu la responsabilité du mal était de l'imputer au diable. Ils ont tendance à exagérer les ressemblances entre l'idée juive de Satan et les idées des peuples voisins. Ils ne traitent pas du rôle d'agents de Dieu attribué aux puissances mauvaises par le Nouveau Testament. On trouvera cependant dans ce livre une introduction et un résumé utiles.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Dieses Buch bietet eine Einführung in die geschichtliche Entwicklung der Satansfigur. Es vertritt die Ansicht, Monotheismus sei instabil, da er Gott als Urheber des Bösen präsentiert; daher entwickelten die Juden Satan, um Gott zu entlasten. Das Buch nimmt an, dass der einzige Weg, Gott vom Bösen zu befreien, darin bestand, dem Teufel die Schuld zu geben. Es betont die Ähnlichkeiten zwischen jüdischen und benachbarten Ansichten über Satan zu stark, und es behandelt nicht die Rolle der bösen Mächte als Werkzeuge Gottes im NT. Dennoch kann das Buch als eine nützliche Einführung und Zusammenfassung dienen.

* * * *

"Satan. As children, we feared him;. . . but as scholars, we understand him." Thus say Wray and Mobley as they share this understanding, which is in reaction to traditions that used Satan to scare the laity. The authors target a popular audience, one made up of anyone who 'has ever been afraid of the devil'. To reach this audience, they include personal testimonies, entertaining comments, and modern illustrations. Moreover, the authors provide an introduction to the authorship, formation, structure and context of the Bible. Next, they deal with the nature of God in the OT, followed by a treatment of the nature of Satan. Before examining the role of the devil in the NT, the authors discuss the influence of Israel's neighbours upon the idea of Satan and the evidence of this influence as found in extracanonical literature. The authors also provide an excursus on the development of hell. The last chapter entitled "Why Satan matters," primarily serves a summary of the previous chapters.

The book is a repackaging of arguments by authors such as N. Forsyth, E. Pagels, and J.B. Russell. In short, Wray and Mobley endorse the argument that there was a development of the devil in the Bible which parallels the

increase and "triumph" of monotheism over henotheism and polytheism in Israel. According to the book, monotheism is unstable since it presents God as the author of evil. Thus, Satan was developed "to relieve God from the duty of evil." Only after centuries of 'relieving God' of this duty by "priestly and prophetic stylists" is God now "presentable in polite company." This development reached a climax during the period of Second Temple Judaism when the Jews borrowed the idea of wicked powers from their neighbours. Thus, by the time one reaches the NT, God is exonerated since evil is now blamed solely on the figure of Satan, who sums up all the other wicked powers in extracanonical literature. The authors conclude then that the Satan in the bible was an *ad hoc* explanation for evil. They do not know whether he is real, only that the one in the bible is *not* him; nevertheless, they encourage the reader to hold on to these passages as parables which demonstrate that although evil moves in the world, it is always opposed by good.

Several comments should be made in response to this book. First, the book gives the impression that the only way the Jews could free God from evil was to blame the devil, and thus, there was a monolithic move among the Jews to find a scapegoat. Even if, however, all Jews felt a need to free God from blame – rather than embracing the mystery of God – the invention of Satan was not the only way to do this. Instead, there are passages which place the blame on wicked people and free choice. Second, in light of synecdoche, one must question the validity of the conjecture that phrases such as the hand of God and sword of the Lord were early attempts to distance God from evil. Next, in the discussions of foreign philosophical influence on the Jewish idea of evil, the authors overemphasise the similarities. In doing so, they depict the Jewish belief as containing no original thought. Moreover, the conclusion that Satan is no longer an agent of God in the NT is not so clear. For example, in 2 Cor. 12.7, Paul tells how God used Satan for divine purposes. To be fair, the authors do admit this in one line; yet, they did not feel the need to elaborate on that which muddles their thesis. Another unaddressed issue is the problem which results in placing all blame on Satan, namely, the extent of divine sovereignty: if Satan is not an agent of God, then why doesn't God destroy him?

It is unfortunate that some have been abused by manipulative presentations of Satan; but, if the goal was to relieve the audience of fears stemming from this abuse, why dismiss the Satan of the bible. There, he is not so much to be feared as resisted and is one who flees before those who submit to God while counting his days before he is crushed beneath them. Rather than focusing on the speculative birth of Satan, it seems a better strategy would have been to focus on his definitive defeat. Despite the above critiques, this book would serve as a beneficial introduction to 'Satan', summary of works about him, and catalyst for conversation.

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Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity In Dialogue with Karl Barth and Contemporary Theology

Paul D. Molnar

London: T&T Clark Ltd, 2002, v + 357 pp., £19.99, pb, ISBN 0-567-04134-4

SUMMARY

As the title suggests, Molnar's concern in this work is the freedom of God, especially in relation to the immanent Trinity. Molnar's basic premise is to uphold God's freedom by revealing the need for a properly conceived doctrine of the immanent Trinity, and by combating the frequently used starting point for formulating such a doctrine, that of human experience. The works of Barth and T. F. Torrance are extensively used in opposition to a broad range of theologians' works on the subject, and in particular, the work of Karl Rahner. Rahner's axiom that 'the immanent Trinity is strictly identical with the economic Trinity and vice versa,' (xi) is questioned in regard to whether or not it can truly respect God's freedom. Molnar contends that God is free, as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, apart from creation, pre-creation and eternally.

RÉSUMÉ

Comme son titre l'indique, ce livre porte sur la question de la liberté divine, en particulier dans son rapport avec la Trinité immanente. Molnar part de la volonté de maintenir la liberté divine en montrant que cela nécessite une doctrine de la Trinité immanente adéquate. Il rejette pour cela le point de départ couramment adopté pour formuler une telle doctrine, celui de l'expérience humaine. Il fait largement appel à l'œuvre de Barth et à celle de T.F. Torrance pour s'opposer à d'autres théologiens qui ont écrit sur le sujet, en particulier Karl Rahner. Il conteste que l'axiome rahnérien selon lequel « la Trinité immanente est strictement identique à la Trinité économique et vice versa » soit à même de faire réellement toute sa place à la liberté divine. Molnar soutient que Dieu est libre, en tant que Père, Fils et Saint-Esprit, indépendamment de la création, de la pré-création et éternellement.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Wie der Titel nahe legt, beschäftigt sich Molnar in diesem Werk mit der Freiheit Gottes, insbesondere in Beziehung zur immanenten Trinität. Molnars grundlegende Prämisse besteht darin, an Gottes Freiheit durch die Offenbarung des Bedürfnisses nach einer angemessen konzipierten Lehre über die immanente Trinität festzuhalten. Außerdem bekämpft er die menschliche Erfahrung als oft benutzten Startpunkt einer solchen Lehre. Die Arbeiten Barths und von T. F. Torrance werden ausführlich in Opposition zu einer großen Bandbreite an Werken anderer Theologen zum Thema genutzt. Insbesondere wird das Werk Karl Rahners und dessen Axiom, "die immanente Trinität sei streng identisch mit der ökonomischen Trinität und umge-

kehrt" im Hinblick darauf in Frage gestellt, ob es Gottes Freiheit wahrhaftig respektieren kann oder nicht. Molnar behauptet, dass Gott als Vater, Sohn und Heiliger Geist frei ist, unabhängig von der Schöpfung, vor der Schöpfung und in Ewigkeit.

* * * *

This is a scholarly work of great depth and thorough research, in a complex and detailed subject. Molnar raises concerns over pressing issues regarding the immanent Trinity. He always desires to uphold God's freedom, while recognising the limitations of our finiteness, where from necessity we describe the eternal God with human projections of earthly relations. At the very beginning he asks the question, '. . . how may we know God in accordance with his nature rather than creating God in our own image?' (x). He argues that God is not just God for us, simply because God was God before us. God is not only the believer's Creator, Redeemer and Mediator, in relation to his creation, but God was and is always Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The danger that needs to be avoided in Molnar's opinion is that of reducing God to merely what he has accomplished for us. Molnar concludes, 'we therefore end where we began, that is, with a recognition of God's freedom to be and to have been the eternal Father, Son and Spirit who existed prior to and apart from creation;. . .' (316).

So how does Molnar reach this conclusion? He begins in chapter one by examining the role of experience in determining a doctrine of the immanent Trinity, plus issues raised by contemporary feminist theology. Molnar examines the theologies of G. Kaufman, C. LaCugna, S. McFague, and E. Johnson, and shows how any theology which fails to think from a centre in God by revelation, will leave us never truly knowing God as he is, and we will '. . . only image God in ways that seem appropriate to ourselves' (25). He wants to stress from the start, that Jesus Christ should be the starting point and norm for theology, not human experience, or things outside of God's revelation of himself.

In the remaining nine chapters, as Molnar's argument develops, he encompasses a wide range of related subjects for tackling the task of revealing the necessity for a well conceived doctrine of the immanent Trinity, which can otherwise lead to a number of unwanted ends, such as dualism, pantheism or panentheism, or in Christology, Docetic or Ebionite tendencies. His solution for avoiding these conclusions is for theology to take God himself as the definition for his eternal being, rather than just the economy. And he repeatedly highlights the need for starting trinitarian theology with Jesus Christ, the self revelation of God, the eternal Logos.

The chapters explore God's self-communication in Christ, with emphasis on the resurrection in the views of Rahner and T. F. Torrance, plus the function of the Trinity in J. Moltmann's ecological doctrine of creation, and the doctrine of the immanent Trinity in the thoughts of A. Torrance, E. Jungel, and lastly C. Gunton. As Molnar's argument develops, various points become clear that he sees as essential for understanding the immanent Trinity. 1) God is God apart from creation, and was free to remain himself if both creation and salvation never materialized. God did not become trinitarian in his creative and redemptive works. 2) The history of God acting for us should not alone define who God is in his own ousia pre-creation. This is to avoid a doctrine of the immanent Trinity which is dependent upon the works of God ad extra, for example, the Word was the Word before the incarnation and resurrection, the Word did not become the Word through or by these events, or as Molnar says, '. . . God's eternity is not defined by its relation to time. . .' (81). 3) Both divine and human freedom is maintained when a doctrine of the immanent Trinity establishes that human beings and their history do not condition God. 4) God's freedom in se, revealed as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, is never dependent upon human experience of faith. God is independent of the world. And, 5) In Molnar's own words, 'In this book I am arguing that Barth did not separate or collapse the immanent into the economic Trinity but distinguished and united them in accordance with the fact that creation, reconciliation and redemption were factual necessities grounded only in God's free grace. Barth did not allow God's being and act to be defined by his relations ad extra.' (270).

This book will be of great worth to any reader wishing to develop a richer understanding of the Trinity, not least because of its depth of research and the interaction with Barth and many other theologians. It should make the reader question their starting point in formulating their own doctrine of the immanent Trinity, and should instil the necessity to let God be God, rather than to make our own.

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Habermas and Theology

Nicholas Adams

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Pp. 267 + ix

SUMMARY

This study is a welcome theological appreciation and critique of the work of the influential German philosopher Jürgen Habermas examining his 'communicative action' and 'discourse ethics' theories. It also addresses the narratives of intellectual and social history of the West which underwrite these ideas. The peculiar focus throughout is upon treatment of theology and religion in connection with Habermas' theorising about the modern public sphere.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Diese Studie ist eine willkommene theologische Würdigung und Kritik des Werkes des einflussreichen deutschen Philosophen Jürgen Habermas. Sie untersucht seine

Theorien der "kommunikativen Handlung" und der "diskursiven Ethik". Sie behandelt auch die Erzählungen der intellektuellen und sozialen Geschichte des Westens, die im Hintergrund dieser Gedanken stehen. Das besondere Augenmerk liegt durchgängig auf der Behandlung von Theologie und Religion in Verbindung mit Habermas' Theorien zum modernen öffentlichen Bereich.

RÉSUMÉ

Cette étude est une analyse critique de l'œuvre du philosophe allemand influent Jürgen Habermas qui s'intéresse en particulier à sa théorie de « l'action communicative » et à son « éthique du discours ». L'auteur traite également des récits de l'histoire intellectuelle et sociale de l'Occident qui sous-tendent les idées de Habermas. Il se concentre surtout sur le traitement réservé à la théologie et à la religion qui découle des théories de Habermas sur la sphère publique moderne.

* * * *

This study is a welcome theological appreciation and critique of the work of the influential German philosopher Jürgen Habermas which examines both elements of his theories of 'communicative action' and 'discourse ethics,' as well as the narratives of intellectual and social history of the West which underwrite them. The peculiar focus throughout is upon treatment of theology and religion in connection with Habermas' theorising about the modern public sphere. Equally important is the context in which Adams chiefly reads Habermas, namely that provided by German philosophy from Kant to Adorno. The combination of clarity, detail and winsomeness that marks Adams' prose would be praiseworthy in any work; it is all the more so in this one given the notorious technicality and sometimes obscurity of both Habermas' own writing as well as that of German Idealism generally. Though not intended as an introductory survey, the expositions and arguments that populate the book betray a teacher's hand and will be accessible to non-specialist readers who will benefit time and again from the deft combination of clear restatement and effective examples Adams deploys in building his case.

Adams moves between two modes of engagement which he calls 'repair' and 'obstruction'. Critical arguments are made in order to complicate the terrain Habermas negotiates, i.e., to identify things (theoretical or practical) that make the road traveled by Habermas' theories rather bumpy, if not treacherous and sometimes finally impassible. Positively, Adams works at various points to help these same theories get over the difficult ground by recommending ways in which identifiable problems might be fixed. Often the recommended repair is quite radical: there are several problematic aspects of Habermas' theory which Adams thinks can simply be left off without compromising his chief practical aim. Key among these is his account of the intellectual history of religion in the modern period, and of the nature of secularisation or rationalisation. This strategy reflects Adams' overarching worry about Habermas, namely his seemingly irrepressible 'desire for theory' itself (201) and climaxes in a judgment that it seems "true that Habermas has the best available theory of argumentation in the public sphere, and equally true that this theory is unusable' (201). The good news will be that a theory is not exactly what is needed any way. More about this below. Again, even non-specialists readers will learn much from paying attention to the form and style of Adams' argumentation, one which reflects his own theological and philosophical formation at Cambridge.

While the book is an extended appreciation and criticism of Habermas' main theoretical achievements, there is also something else afoot throughout. The exposition of Habermas in fact feeds a case Adams makes for a better post-liberal theology. These two undertakings may seem discontinuous, but in fact they prove highly complimentary. This is because at the heart of both projects is a common question. For Habermas the driving question is how there can be truly public political and ethical debate between persons of markedly different traditions. For Christian theology after liberalism, the question is similarly one about identity and involvement: how can Christians maintain their identity as Christians while being fully engaged with the world in which they live, including its political and ethical debates. Alert to this overlapping *problematique*, Adams' analysis of key aspects of Habermas' project readily bears fruit for theological reflection upon this dilemma of 'identity – involvement', and the final chapters of the book are given over to a preliminary harvest. One of Adams' achievements is to show that while, for Habermas, a theologian might be 'either an uninteresting liberal or a useless sectarian' (195) there are other kinds of theologians about who – happily – break these moulds.

The work of the opening chapters is to scrutinize the chief elements of Habermas' ideas about religion and theology and the uses to which they are put in his thinking about publicity. Chapter two considers an important idea from Habermas' early work, namely the 'ideal speech situation' in which persons in public dialogue are thought to be able to argue rationally and peaceably because they do so as equally autonomous subjects free to give and demand reasons from one another in a relationship of symmetry and transparency. The sense in which this procedural vision is 'ideal' – first as an 'anticipation' and later more accurately as an 'abstraction' – is explored, as are the resonances of all this with features of Christian eschatology. Also set forth are the scorching criticisms of the idea from both those who think the rules for reasoning are always themselves embedded in communal contexts and so in principal not prone to being made 'universal' (the Hegelian) and from those who, while not disputing that the universal *per se* exists, deny that it can be theorised as such (the Schellingian).

Chapter three takes up Habermas' important claim that one of the chief impacts of modernity is to distance us from our own traditions by making our relationship

to them reflective and so our societies *post*-traditional in some important sense. The key here is *reflection*, which for Habermas means becoming conscious that our representations and interpretations of the world are just that, representations and interpretations and so not strictly identifiable with the world as such. To grasp one's tradition as a tradition 'rather than as the only reality there is' (55) is, for Habermas, a mainspring of modernity in which, even if traditional norms continue to be affirmed, the nature of that affirmation is fundamentally altered. Upon reflection, in this sense, truths once taken for granted becomes norms and values whose authority must be re-instated by other than traditional means. Adams explores the stakes in all this by considering the debate between Habermas and Gadamer on the losses and gains of reflective distancing from tradition.

Important among these losses Habermas thinks is any clear motivation for moderns to commit to those norms and values that come down to them from their traditions. Adams' fourth chapter dwells on this problem. Reflection corrodes and so loosens the ties that bind people to the substantial visions of the good traditionally proffered, and in turn sets modern ethical theory a crucial task: to compensate for this 'motivational deficit' (66). What is needed, Habermas argues, is a modern reflective version of the authorisation of morality by 'the sacred' as he believes was true in traditional societies. Secularisation itself brings precisely this about. This achievement Habermas calls, rather awkwardly, the 'linguistification of the sacred' by which he means that 'the authority of the holy is gradually replaced by the authority of an achieved consensus' built by rational discourse (79). Communicative action itself now must do the work of authorising morals; the binding power of the sacred migrates into that of rational agreement. In relation to this Adams explores the way in which Habermas' view of the constructive power of discourse closely parallels the theological function of revelation (Rowan Williams provides the comparative account here). The fifth chapter presses further along these lines to examine Habermas' defense of a post-metaphysical universalism, i.e., the identification of those aspects of human action which are the self-same regardless of localities of time and space. Here, again, what is at stake is the possibility of transcending particular traditions in pursuit of a rational *and only so* authoritative public discourse. In discussing Habermas' criticisms of varieties of contemporary theory (post modern and historicist) which despair of such universalism, Adams points to the signal importance for Habermas of distinguishing narrative from argument, and his assertion that it is only within the embrace of the 'unavoidable presuppositions' of the latter that 'all the different narratives that occupy the public sphere' can be co-ordinated without violence. Again, Adams here registers his dismay that Habermas thinks it necessary to theorise all this, rather than simply take note of the 'fact' that such communicative action does in fact take place and so is, on some basis, actually possible (98).

Chapters six through ten treat in some detail Habermas' understanding of religion and theology, and their putatively problematic character within modern public discourse. Here Adams focuses in upon the various ways Habermas tells the tale of the coming of modernity and of religion's displacement by rationalisation and modern politics. In these histories, religion is consistently marked by three essential features: it is metaphysical (i.e., claims a 'God's-eye-view' of things), mythical (i.e., substitutes sub-rational narrative for rational argument) and unreflective. Adams contends that in each case these characterisations of religion and religious thought are over-simple and ignorant of important tensions and distinctions *within* Christian tradition. So, for instance, attention is drawn to the long *pre*-modern history *within* theology of 'metaphysical reserve' when it comes to claiming any 'God's-eye-view', and the way intra-Christian diversity already schools a kind of reflective posture. At another point, Adams effectively takes apart Habermas' appeal to Hegel as the philosopher who 'takes leave of religion' in favour of modernity (156ff.), demonstrating briefly but clearly that this appeal rests a bad reading deaf to Hegel's strong investments in a kind of (speculative) trinitarian theology.

While these chapters offer quite close readings of several of Habermas' key essays on these themes, Adams is also making an overarching point: for all that he talks about it, Habermas is not really interested in religion itself. Rather, religion is cast as modernity's foil and its often crude handling similarly reflects the fact that real interest lies elsewhere, namely in accounting for the need, possibility and practices of universalisable rationality. Adams draws two conclusions from the hard labour of expounding these and other related claims: first, that Habermas' theories are not finally dependent upon the story of secularisation for their cogency, and second, that for all the critical things theologians might wish to say about Habermas' treatment of religion, '*it is a mistake to take Habermas' remarks on religion too seriously*' because 'religion is just a casualty of his systematic intentions' (152). Theological dispute with Habermas is best focused on his account of rationality itself.

And indeed, this is what the final chapters of the book go on to do. The upshot of consideration of debates between Habermas and two leading theological critics, Peukert and Theunissen, in chapter nine is to drive home the double thesis of Adams book: first, given that members of religious traditions wish to be heard in important public policy debates '. . . something like Habermas' theory of communicative action is vitally needed. There needs to be some way for members of different traditions to be intelligible to their neighbours. . . and there is thus a need for a public sphere in which claims can be raised, challenged, redeemed and transformed' (200-01). But, second, this need cannot finally be met by a '*theory* for argumentation' aimed at circumscribing the grounds on which it may be possible. Here Adams shows himself convinced by Schelling's argument that

the kinds of universal elements that must populate any such theory simply cannot in principle be uncovered and grasped (44-45).

The final two chapters make a case for the existence of 'an *alternative* way of considering the question of what Habermas calls "rationality"' (153). The penultimate chapter pursues two issues: first, it asks about the critical *distance* from tradition Habermas takes to be the hallmark of modern life and thought, and argues that the tradition of Christian theology already embraces something similar. Within Christian theology, it is an eschatological reserve, an acknowledgment of 'the difference between divine promise and human institutions'(206) that warrants criticism of tradition. Adams admits that this is not quite what Habermas has in view, but that its recognition complicates the picture of tradition and criticism usefully. The second question concerns narrative, argument and their relation as a manner of revisiting the question of tradition and rationality. Habermas makes a sharp distinction between them, understanding narrative as about the business of 'world-disclosure' while the point of argument is 'problem solving' (215), with the later trumping the former in public discourse. Comparing the contrasting views of Habermas and Milbank (who is quite positively received), Adams argues here that while distinct, these two forms of discourse cannot be cleanly separated, and that there is a 'basic, and rightly mixed up, practice of argumentative narrative' (218) indicative of the fact there are both particular traditions and that 'there is understanding' amongst them (225). He advises in the end that 'the problem about how traditions encounter each other might best be tackled at the same time as the problem of how argumentation *within* traditions is possible' (228), i.e., the resources needed for tackling Habermas' issues must come out of specific traditions, rather than from outwith.

Given that assent to Habermas' theory is 'impossible for Christians, and surely not only for Christians' (226) the final chapter recommends *not* another theory of public rationality – the ground of which is, as Adams has tried to show, 'theory-resistant' (230) – but rather the practice of something called 'scriptural reasoning' as a suggestive alternative to Habermas' own proposals. Adams contends that this practice (which has developed its own literary and social fora in recent years) does all that an alternative to Habermas must do: it acknowledges the complex relation of narrative and argument, it promotes genuine argument in the public sphere, and it eschews grounding any of this theoretically. It also sits well within a Hegelian account of *Sittlichkeit* and a Schellingian view of 'untheorisable thinking' (251). Adams goes on to describe the practice of scriptural reasoning (240f.) which in brief, involves Christians, Muslims and Jews each interpreting their own sacred texts with and before each other and debating with one another in an attempt to make their 'deep reasonings public' (242). What makes argument possible is the friendship and hospitality the traditions themselves enjoin upon their members *from within*. Although the aim of the practice is chiefly study, when agreement occurs is does so 'across traditions' rather than in spite of them (247) and disagreement is often found to be 'tolerable' (250) rather than a warrant for social coercion.

While Adams' advocacy of scriptural reasoning is guarded and hesitant, one can ask about its limits as a profitable construct of public argument. First, the possibility and cogency of the practice, as well as the friendship and hospitality which drive it, seem themselves to be rooted in a cluster of shared or at least strongly parallel convictions and practices: the invocation of 'God', orientation in life and thought towards an authoritative scripture, the promotion of certain mutually recognizable virtues (hospitality, friendship) as well as overlapping philosophical conceptualities. As Adams observes, this is already extant, and so different from the kind of 'achieved consensus' Habermas pursues. One wonders what are the analogies to this kind of *de facto* basis for conversation in the wider and more radically diverse public *civitas*?

Second, scriptural reasoning aims at study and not agreement (247) whereas Habermas is worried about communicative consensus in relation to democratic governance, where such agreement cannot be infinitely deferred, but must indeed be achieved. Does this not expose Adams' proposal to Schmitt's criticism of the discursive public sphere as merely an 'everlasting conversation' (116)? Gilbert Meilander has similarly criticised Jeffrey Stout's not entirely unanalogous proposal regarding the plural public sphere, calling into question whether this sphere is in fact best thought of on the model of a classroom or seminar discussion, both tropes which efface the reality of power, law, governance and the legal and physical coercion integral to all democratic politics. Adams acknowledges this limitation at one point, remarking that 'we are still some way off from an account that can show how something like scriptural reasoning illuminates argumentation in the public sphere at the level of drafting and passing legislation' (250). Traversing the ground needed to offer such illumination will be interesting and important work. Whether scriptural reasoning will be wanted on *this* journey remains to be seen.

In his conclusions, Adams identifies a further theological task that follows on from his investigations. Despite the public sphere being a 'Christian institution by virtue of arising in Christian Europe, it has not been properly theorised within contemporary Christian theology' (250) but in fact this must be done. Similarly, Christian theologians, it is said, ought to adhere to a variant of 'Thesis 11': 'The theologians have only refuted the secular, in various ways: the point is to change it' (251), and this too will require that 'the secular' also be theorised within theology. With these remarks Adams himself points up a notable limit to the kind of pragmatics scriptural reasoning represents. While that exercise is made possible by a 'theory-resistant' *ethos* of friend-

ship and hospitality, this other work will be driven by the salutary power of a particular *logos*. It will require the provision of thick doctrinal descriptions of the reality of the world in which 'the public' and 'the secular' are actualities. Such descriptions will furnish a Christian theological description of things within which a practice like 'scriptural reasoning' makes sense as prudent and possibly also faithful ways for Christians to get on in the world. Here, the priority of *logos* to *ethos* seems clear. A Christian alternative to Habermas' theory of public discourse may well be practical, as Adams has argued, but it will no doubt also be *doctrinal*, unfolding an account of the social and political world in terms of their effective determination by the realities of divine reconciliation, providence, and a human hope for redemption derived from the person and work of one whose execution was a public event (Acts 26:26) outside the walls of the *polis* for its sake. Could it be that the fruitful negotiation of the 'identity – involvement dilemma' is finally and more properly a task of dogmatics than it is of pragmatics, universal or otherwise?

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Hindustan Evangelical Review: Journal of Missiological Reflection (HER-JMR), Vol 1 (January-December 2006).

Editor J. Baskar Jeyaraj

Subscription Euro 20 per year
(cf. academic@hbionline.org).

SUMMARY

This review introduces a newly launched evangelical theological journal in India. It describes the purpose and format of the *Hindustan Evangelical Review: Journal of Missiological Reflection*, lists and reviews the contributions of the first issue. The journal is devoted to missiology, which in an Indian context includes more subjects that in Europe. The contriubutions raise interesting issues and offer some fresh and stimulation solutions and ideas. Journals like these will become more important for European readers as our continent becomes more like India: increasingly more multicultural, multireligious and multiethnic. To listen to an Indian evangelical voice can prepare and help us.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Diese Rezension führt eine neu gegründete evangelikale theologische Zeitschrift in Indien ein. Sie beschreibt den Zweck und das Format des *Hindustan Evangelical Review: Journal of Missiological Reflection*, listet die Beiträge des ersten Bandes auf und rezensiert die Beiträge. Die Zeitschrift widmet sich der Missiologie, die in einem indischen Kontext mehr Bereiche als in Europa umfasst. Die Beiträge werfen interessante Fragen auf und bieten einige frische und stimulierende Lösungen und Ideen. Zeitschriften wie diese werden für europäische Leser immer wichtiger werden, da unser Kontinent immer mehr wie Indien wird: verstärkt multikulturell, multireligiös und multiethnisch. Auf eine indische evangelikale Stimme zu hören kann uns vorbereiten und helfen.

RÉSUMÉ

Un nouveau journal théologique évangélique vient d'être lancé en Inde, la *Hindustan Evangelical Review : Journal of Missiological Reflection*. La présente recension décrit ses buts, donne la liste des articles de la première livraison et en fait la recension. Ce journal est consacré à la missiologie, un domaine qui, dans le contexte indien, englobe un plus large éventail de sujets qu'en Europe. Les articles soulèvent des problèmes intéressants et offrent des solutions ou idées nouvelles et stimulantes. De tels périodiques vont acquérir une importance croisssante pour les lecteurs européens dans la mesure où notre continent va ressembler de plus en plus à l'Inde : toujours plus multi-culturel, multi-religieux et multi-ethnique. Écouter une voix évangélique indienne peut nous y préparer et nous aider.

* * * *

The first issue of this new Indian missiological journal looks promising. It is published by the Academic department of the *Hindustan Bible Institute and College* in Chennai (the former Madras, 86-89 Medavakkam Tank Road, Kilpauk, Chennai – 600 010) in South East India (for details see www.hbionline.org). The journal "intends to publish papers written by former and present faculty members, graduates, visiting professors and others associated with the ministry of HBI. . .. It is to bring out the reflections of scholars on the missiological issues, problems and prospects, based on their research, experience, collection of data and concern for ministry" (from the editorial). It is primarily addressed to theological students, missionaries, evangelists and pastors.

The thirteen articles of the first issue are of different length, quality and nature. Some are more informative and well researched scholarly articles; others are more of the style and level of reflections. I list them in order to indicate the range of topics addressed:

P. Rajkumar Gupta, founder and president of HBI writes on "Global Church and the West: Mission and Partnership" (1-14, listing several principles "as a national Christian leader trained in the West, that are crucial for effective partnerships", 9). B. C. Wintle provides "Some New Testament Reflections on Christian Partnership" (15-22), concluding that in view of the NT "We need to continue with our efforts to bring together all those involved in the same task, and to challenge them with the benefits of resource sharing and corporate accountability" (22). J. N. Manokaran describes the "Challenge of Postmodernism for Missions" (23-28, including some principles for formulating a strategy for reaching postmodern society). G. E. van der Hout contributes "Christ the Sinless Sinner: A Critique of the Hamartiological Aspect of Bonhoeffer's Christology" (29-34).

P. N. Samuel Saravanan examines the "Sourashtrians and their Response to Christ" (35-54), describ-

ing the historical background of the Sourashtrians in Tamilnadu, their cultural and religious as well as their socio-economic background. Next the author surveys the approaches of the early Roman Catholic and Protestant missions towards this group and the approaches of various indigenous mission organisations. He ends with interesting suggestions for further mission among the Sourashtrians. R. E. Hedlund discusses "Methodology in Missiology" (55-60), a much neglected field. Not only Indian missiologists wait for an up-to-date textbook on this important topic! Hedlund concludes that "methodology for doing missiology will be variable and selective as determined by the context and by the issues one decides to focus on. The choice of issues and context then will determine what methodology is used" (60).

B. John traces "The Rise and Growth of Missionary Movement in the Two-Thirds World" (61-78), including a fine survey of the Indian missionary movement, a critical evaluation and recommendations (holistic approach, leadership training, partnership, structure of organisation). D. Katapalli describes "Contextualizing the Christian Gospel according to the Thought and Worship Forms of the Muslims" (79-92), including suggestions on how to best present the Gospel to Muslims, namely the use of comparative and contrasting methods, the dynamic-equivalent method, dialogue method, indirect polemical method, the hermeneutical method, the story-telling method and the incarnational method. According to Katapalli, the "Incarnational witness means more than just the living word being clothed in flesh. It is in whom love has worked so deeply that he seeks in every way possible to become like the hearer so that he can manifest the gospel in thought, communication and religio-cultural forms that relate meaningfully to the hearer" (90).

T. Dayanandan Francis explains the "Unique Attributes of Tamil Saivism" (93-102). V. Thomas suggests in his essay "Teachers as Learners: Towards Professional Development through Service Learning" (103-22) that faculty members should be involved in their communities. "The purpose of this involvement is not merely academic enhancement or professional growth, but also service to church and society. This kind of learning is connected to life, and therefore, its implementation may mean that the image of the 'ivory tower' academic world will no longer haunt us" (122). J. Baskar Jeyarai reflects on "Inter-Faith Relations for Transformation and Higher Education" (123-41, "written to motivate and mobilize the teachers and students in secular colleges to promote effective inter-faith relations in the campus of the institutions and in their local community", 123).

In "Philosophy and Practice of Sacrifice for Social Harmony" (142-50) V. J. Rajan starts with the recent banning of animal sacrifices in Hindu temples in Tamilnadu and describes the understanding and important social function of such sacrifices in rural communities (144f). He discusses the motivation behind the ban and the questions that may be legitimately be raised against it. He summarises the position of human rights groups and closes with a brief summary of the biblical understanding and raises a number of missiological questions like: "Is there not a need for giving a sociological dimension for animal sacrifices to continue even today for those who continue to believe in their own religious traditions? How can a missiologist theologize the animal sacrifices to have a different perspective and contribute for the solidarity of the community?" (150). S. Arles writes on weeping as a strategy for mission (151-55). For Arles, "there is a weeping for soul winning. There is a cry to share the gospel. There is a desperation in order to see all people change. There is intense anguish to transform the world and its course" (155).

The issue closes with a number of reports of seminars which were attended by the members of faculty of HBI. J. B. Jeyaraj reports on "Child Theology: An Emerging Theology for Child Development" (156-59), T. Dayanandan Francis on "The First International Conference on the History of Indian Christianity" (160, held at Concordia College, New York from 13.-16. August 2005, second conference in January 2007) and D. Mathias on the Gathering 2005 of Joshua Vision India (161).

The strength of this issue (and presumably also the following issues) of the *Hindustan Evangelical Review – Journal of Missiological Reflection* lies in the fact that it reflects the Indian context where the Christian minority (the academics among them even a smaller minority!) face unique challenges in a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious India. It is worth listening in on how they go about doing so and to consider what their proposals mean not only for their contexts but also for others. They seem ready to engage society and while we may not agree with all their answers and solutions, they deal with issues which few theologians faced in the past in a Western context. It is likewise interesting to listen to what the authors – indirectly or directly – have to say to the church in the West and its mission. I look forward to further issues and wish this newly launched journal much success.

Christoph Stenschke, Bergneustadt, Germany

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The *European Journal of Theology* is published by Paternoster Periodicals twice annually.

Le *Journal Européen de Théologie* est publié par Paternoster Periodicals deux fois par an.

Die *ETZ* erscheint zweimal jährlich bei Paternoster Periodicals.

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EuroJTh (2007) 16:2, 79-80 0960–2720

Editorial

Mark Elliott

First of all, apologies for the lateness of this volume. There are the usual excuses which could be offered in the form of stories of miscommunication, timings of summer vacations and so on, but it is nearer the truth to say that this summer has simply been too busy. Summer, the time for theologians to research, write and prepare for conferences and publications has been made even more 'hot' in this otherwise cold island by the need for every colleague in every department to have ready four high quality publications for the British government to check and reward with money for good performance. The Christian theologian as part of this world is part of this serious game. Fear of earthly judges and judgement-days begins to add stress and anxiety to those who already sometimes wonder: what *for God's sake* is my work for? In other European countries Christian colleges are working very hard to meet academic standards, or at least to fill in the right forms and say the right things to validating agencies and government bureaucrats, and are just as much under pressure. When we compare our fortunes with the (e.g.) South Asian Christian pastor who leads a bible college, works with the poor, has another job to support his family, oversees hundreds of believers in difficult situations, then we know we are not particularly burdened or worn down. Yet it is the fragmentation of vision, the absence of positive leadership and the loss of fellowship in the gospel at a local level that makes us in Europe turn to theological conferences, to national Christian festivals and to the internet to find people who might just understand us because they are experiencing the same problems. Relationships in the local church and community need time to be worked at. Personal and family ambition or just making the best of our 'marketable' skills makes us want to apply for new jobs elsewhere, get involved in larger causes, for perhaps *there* we will then be appreciated. It becomes easier to blame others in the office along the corridor for not 'getting' us, for contributing to the noise and confusion around us, for not listening to us. We envy students writing PhDs and MAs. They are poor, but they have time and are focused on one main thing they have to do.

The RAE (Research Assessment Exercise) culture, or the wider one of competition between universities and between colleagues for promotion and prestige, has had a pernicious effect. It is theoretical to the largest degree. Within departments it is about being so specialised that intra-disciplinarity is frowned upon, since for an OT specialist to work with say someone in Christian ethics means inevitably to generalise, at least to start with. If the most valuable commodity is a peer-reviewed article in a distinguished specialist journal, then often this will be about joining in one of the lofty conversations already going on in the journal. The practice and practitioners of theology in Chrisitian ministry are not in view for this 'serious play'. Other people can serve the pastors, it is imagined. Experts in 'practical theology', sociology of religion, communication studies and cognitive science step in to 'help'. The voice of biblical and orthodox theology is not heard, also because these brothers are taking part in the equivalent of internet chatrooms, discussions dedicated to minutiae, footnotes, pedantry, self-reference and the gaining of *Drittmittel* and EU funding.

So, where is the joy? Remarkably academics can still come up with interesting ideas and insights. Some of these can even lead to fresh or at least a renewed appreciation of the message of God's love and redeeming grace in Jesus, perhaps an awareness of the majesty of his doctrines, his faithfulness to Israel, the power of the Holy Spirit to an undeserving Church. Even better, theologians can feel themselves called to provide some amount of thinking leadership to complement the more managerial and business-world models which are popular these days in evangelical and also non-evangelical churches. We can serve to get the Church to put the theme of money in its place, we can help Christians to know what it means for God's Church to be visible and how it relates to 'the kingdom of God'.

In this issue of the journal there is a bias towards

biblical studies in the reviews section and a bias against it in the articles (although of course these are biblically informed!) I continue to value all sorts of contributions, not least that which has been written to take issue with a contribution from the last issue (Lydia Jaeger's response to Thomas Gerold, by which I am in good part persuaded, yet find there to be a few questions to which at least Gerold has merely proposed some hesitant answers). I would particularly welcome articles which attempted to join academic work on the bible and historical Christianity, with thoughts on doctrine for today and modern issues facing the Church. Perhaps rather than being trained in one exclusive sub-department ('Christian philosophy of religion' or 'Biblical archaeology') each contributor could take a theme such as creation or sanctification and work at it with all resources. Or, we resolve to work as a team, as we have tried to do at FEET conferences – although too often we are happy to deliver in our one area and show little inclination of thinking things through, the philosopher of religion from the point of view of the archaeologist, and vice-versa. So maybe I would welcome co-authored pieces. This works well in the natural sciences, why not in our 'supernatural' one?

EuroJTh (2007) 16:2, 81–91 0960–2720

"You shall Certainly Drink!": The Place and Significance of the Oracles Against the Nations in the Book of Jeremiah

H. G. L. Peels
Apeldoorn, NL

SUMMARY

The oracles against the nations in the book of Jeremiah (Jer. 46-51) bring along with them many exegetical and theological problems. This article deals with some of these problems: the rationale behind the structure and order of this collection, the discussion about the unity and authenticity of these oracles, a survey of the presumed 'Sitz im Leben' (cult, warfare, thinking in terms of treaties), and the troublesome issue of the different placement in the Septuagint and the Massoretic text. By dealing with these problems a brief 'Forschungsgeschichte' of this controversial part of the book of Jeremiah is given as well. Finally, a terse 'theology' of these oracles against the nations is offered. The function and meaning of these texts are to be found in the proclamation of the sovereign reign of the King of Zion at a juncture, which turned out to be crucial for the ancient Near Eastern nations.

* * * * * * * *

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Die Sprüche gegen die Nationen im Buch Jeremia (Jer. 46-51) bringen viele exegetische und theologische Probleme mit sich. Dieser Artikel behandelt einige dieser Probleme: das Grundprinzip hinter der Struktur und Anordnung dieser Sammlung, die Diskussion der Einheit und Authentizität dieser Sprüche, einen Überblick über den angenommenen „Sitz im Leben" (Kultus, Kriegführung, vertragliches Denken) sowie die lästige Angelegenheit der unterschiedlichen Platzierung in der Septuaginta und im masoretischen Text. Die Behandlung dieser Probleme führt dabei zu einer kurzen Forschungsgeschichte zu diesem kontroversen Teil des Jeremiabuches. Abschließend wird eine knappe „Theologie" dieser Sprüche gegen die Nationen angeboten. Die Funktion und die Bedeutung dieser Texte sind in der Proklamation der souveränen Herrschaft des Königs vom Zion in einem kritischen Augenblick zu finden, der sich als äußerst wichtig für die Nationen des Alten Orients entpuppte.

* * * * * * * *

RÉSUMÉ

Les oracles contre les nations dans le livre de Jérémie (Jr 46-51) présentent de nombreux problèmes exégétiques et théologiques. Le présent article traite de certains d'entre eux : la logique de la structure et de l'ordre de cette collection d'oracles, la question de l'unité et de l'authenticité de ces oracles, leur *Sitz im Leben* présumé (est-ce le culte, la guerre, les traités d'alliances ?), la différence entre la Septante et le texte massorétique quant à leur position au sein du livre. Ce faisant, il dresse un état de la recherche sur cette portion du livre de Jérémie sujette à controverse. Pour finir, l'auteur offre de façon concise une théologie de ces oracles contre les nations. La fonction et la signification de ces textes réside dans la proclamation du règne souverain du Roi de Sion à une période charnière de l'histoire qui s'est avéré cruciale pour les peuples du Proche-Orient ancien.

* * * * * * * *

1. Unknown and Unpopular

In the ecclesiastical practices of preaching, pastoral care, and catechism the Old Testament oracles against the nations play hardly any role. This is certainly true of the collection of oracles near the end of the book of Jeremiah, Jer. 46-51. Reasons are

easy to find. These chapters are rightly rated among the most puzzling ones of the book of Jeremiah.[1] The exegete will be fascinated by richly varied metaphors as well as by many allusions to historical events that are unknown to us. Frequently, it is unclear when, where, to whom, and why the oracle was declared. Not only the degree of complexity but also the kerugmatic content has contributed to the unpopularity of these oracles. Many an Old Testament scholar interprets the blazing judgment scenes in these oracles as being based on reprehensible emotions and on a nationalistic and narrow-minded way of thinking, and characterizes these parts as the fruit of 'false prophecy' or, at any rate, as texts that are to be found at the periphery of the prophetic message. These scholars hesitate to attach any theological value to such unattractive texts.

This article explores these and similar problems from a bird's-eye view. After a brief overview of the structure of the collection Jeremiah 46-51 we will respectively deal with the authenticity, the background, and the placement of these oracles. The order of discussion is not arbitrary, but reflects more or less the progression in the scholarly analysis of these chapters.[2] In the earliest phase of the research (the end of the 19th century till the beginning of the 20th century) the literary-critical approach dominated, focusing on the authorship and dating of these chapters. Since the beginning of the thirties and forties of the 20th century more and more often the implications of the fact that collections of oracles against the nations occur in the books of almost all Old Testament prophets were taken into account. Oracles against the nations, one contended, are not to be seen as a marginal phenomenon in the Old Testament. During the second period genre-critical and tradition-critical survey turned to the form and origin of these oracles, often with much energy and sometimes with impressive imagination. The seventies of the 20th century show an increase of, mostly, editorial-critical questions concerning the place and function of the oracles against the nations in their own literary context. Finally, by an analysis of theological motives that lie at the basis of the oracles against the nations, we try to better understand the meaning of these so unknown and underestimated passages of Scripture.

2. The Structure of the Oracles Against the Nations

In these six chapters the downfall of the nations is declared to them in fierce colors and in a variety of ways. It is YHWH Zebaot himself who brings destruction or calls on enemies to bring destruction to other nations. The collection opens with a double oracle against Egypt (Jer. 46) and is closed by a long oracle against Babylon, which encompasses as much as two chapters (Jer. 50-51). From an editorial point of view, the unity of this collection is marked by a summarizing superscription at the beginning ("This is the word of the LORD that came to Jeremiah the prophet concerning the nations," Jer. 46:1) and at the end by the mention of Jeremiah's message to Seraiah, asking him to read the oracle against Babylon aloud and to throw the scroll on which it is written into the Euphrates, which is followed by a closing phrase ("The words of Jeremiah end here" Jer. 51:64). Between the oracles against Egypt at the beginning and those against Babylon at the end seven other nations receive a word of judgment: the Philistines (Jer. 47), Moab (Jer. 48), Ammon, Edom, Damascus, Kedar/Hazor, and Elam (Jer. 49).

It is remarkable how many motives and metaphors these oracles have in common: the cup of judgment which has to be drunk (Jer. 48:26, 49:12, 51:7, 51:39), the devouring sword of God (46:10,14, 47:6-7, 48:2, 49:37, 46:16, 50:16, 35ff.),[3] the wrathful ire of God, the plan of God, the kingship of God, the notion of the time and day of wrath, the nation from the north, the terror all round, the approaching vulture, the spreading fire, etc.[4] Also remarkable are the many doublures, passages that are literally identical to passages elsewhere in the book of Jeremiah (these passages are to be found especially in Jeremiah 4-6 and 30-31.).[5] Finally, these texts have a lot in common with the oracles against the nations that we find in Isaiah and Obadiah.

Albeit differing with respect to magnitude, form, and content, the oracles against the nations in the book of Jeremiah can be seen as a thematic and editorial unity. It has to be added that this whole consists of two parts, because in several regards the oracle against Babylon in Jeremiah 50-51 differs from the rest of the collection. In Jeremiah 46-49 Babylon is considered to be the suppressor of the nation, the great 'enemy from the north'; in Jeremiah 50-51 Babylon is considered to be the victim of the nations, especially of the Medes, the

new 'enemy from the north'. Moreover, the oracle against Babylon is out of all proportion compared to the other oracles against the nations. Finally, only in the oracle against Babylon are the violence against and the liberation of Israel mentioned.

The order of the oracles against the nations in Jeremiah 46-51 is not arbitrary, but it is not easy to find out what the rationale behind the order is. Both a chronological order and a geographical order have been proposed. The first option is dependent on the dating of each of the oracles, for which concrete data are more than once absent. The collection presents itself as a collection of oracles that were pronounced between the fourth year of Jehoiakim (Jer. 46:2) and the fourth year of Zedekiah (Jer. 51:59), thus between 605 and 594 BC, the period of the expansion of the New-Babylonian empire. Much more than this cannot be derived from a chronological order.[6] That is why other exegetes defend a geographical order in Jeremiah 46-51, which they interpret as a move from the south to the west and then from the east to the north.[7] This order is as unconvincing as the chronological order. It is true that the placing of Egypt at the beginning and the placing of Babylon at the end of the collection are meaningful. These nations were the two most important antagonists that ruled the world in Jeremiah's days. The Nile and the Euphrates frequently flow over the world around them. Israel has to bow down under the invasion by Egypt in 609 (Pharaoh Neco) and several times under the invasion by Babylon after 605 (king Nebuchadnezzar). The small nations of the Orient go up and down, prosper and decline, as the superpowers come and go. The prophet visionary sees that even Egypt and Babylon themselves at some point will have to bow down before the God of Israel, and in their wake all the nations of the world.[8] But Babylon as the last. And Babylon most of all.[9]

3. The Authenticity of the Oracles Against the Nations

The first question which has been asked in the survey of Jeremiah 46-51 and over which many scholars have racked their brains, is the question as to the authorship of these oracles. To be sure, it is said in a few places that the word of the LORD came to the prophet Jeremiah or that God spoke through the service of Jeremiah, and the superscript (46:1) and subscript (51:64) of this collection refer to the same prophet. This, however, does not exclude the possibility of later extensions or additions. According to some Old Testament scholars, the aforementioned clauses are even to be considered as later glosses that do not pretend to be indicating the author in the way such clauses do nowadays. In his work "Die Reden des Buches Jeremia gegen die Heiden. XXV. XLVI-LI" from 1888, an article which, almost everyone agrees, inaugurated the study of the oracles against the nations in the Old Testament, F. Schwally says that it is impossible that Jeremiah is the author of Jeremiah 46-51.[10] Other celebrities of the literary-critical survey, such as K. Budde, B. Duhm, A. Kuenen, J. Skinner en P. Volz, follow the same trail and answer the question concerning authenticity negatively.

The argumentation used by these academics (which, by the way, even in our days can be found in studies on Jeremiah 46-51) is both of a stylistic and theological nature. According to Schwally, the composition and language of the oracles against the nations significantly differ from the even-tempered style of the prophet Jeremiah.[11] This negative judgment is strengthened by presumed derivations from other books from Scripture. The content of the oracle about Babylon's destruction in Jeremiah 50-51, he contends, seriously conflicts with Jeremiah's continuous preaching about Babylon as the "hammer" of God, God's instrument of punishment. Even more ponderous, as he sees it, is the theological difference between the image of God of the 'genuine' Jeremiah and that of the authors of the oracles against the nations. Jeremiah speaks in the name of the exalted God of the covenant, who calls to repentance and conversion and punishes Israel for his disobedience. Entirely different is the 'Rachegott' of the oracles against the nations who seeks after the destruction of the other nations and leaves Israel undisturbed.[12] Here, so these exegetes claim, a moral-religious motivation stands over against particularistic nationalism.

Now, each of these arguments can be weakened in several ways. Nowadays, the literary qualities of the oracles against the nations are thought of completely differently. Also, scholars have learned to value the doublures within the framework of actualization and reinterpretation of texts. A detailed exegesis, which reckons with the progression in history and the changing situation and address in the oracles, gives short shrift to the contention that there are inconsistencies in their content. On second thoughts the presumed difference in the image of God appears to have to do with the specific theological presumptions, rather than with

factual data about the text. Unconsciously, the total image which those scholars formed of the Old Testament oracle strongly influenced their opinion. Since the work of J. Wellhausen and B. Duhm in the older stage of research the pre-exilic prophets were generally considered mostly as doomsayers to Israel, ethical-religious geniuses who, with their new ideas, stood at right angles to the patriotism of the national religion of Israel. Because of this interpretation from the very start the oracles against the foreign nations were discredited and had to be sidetracked as late and non-authentic, because, it was claimed, they implicitly are oracles of welfare for Israel.[13]

Till today much attention is paid in the literature to the Jeremianic authorship of Jeremiah 46-51. Most scholars are now inclined to ascribe a small or big part of this collection to the prophet Jeremiah himself. For many prophets have spoken words against foreign nations; probably Jeremiah was not an exception in this regard. "I appointed you as a prophet to the nations" (1:4,10): thus reads the calling of Jeremiah. God sends Jeremiah to the nations to let them drink the cup of wrath (25:15). Baruch writes on a scroll all the words that God spoke to Jeremiah "concerning Israel, Judah and all the other nations" (36:2). Nevertheless, there might be good reasons to date some parts of the oracles against the nations at a later time.[14] A well-known problem is the fact that the criteria for determining authenticity are often based on circular arguments.

That is why in recent research more and more often the question is asked whether the issue of authorship is truly relevant. K. A. D. Smelik, for instance, proposes to cease searching for the *ipsissima verba* of the prophet and to concentrate on the literary figure 'Jeremiah'.[15] R. P. Carroll, a renowned Jeremiah-commentator, interprets the book of Jeremiah as a later collection of a highly diverse range of thought which has grown in the course of time and which has been kept together by the 'idea' of the prophet Jeremiah.[16] Now, on the one hand we will indeed have to be modest in our judgment on the authenticity of the oracles against the nations. We have to realize that our concepts of authorship and copyrights do not directly apply to the production and tradition of texts in the ancient Near East. It is not without meaning that of some entire books of the Bible the author(s) is (are) unknown to us. On the other hand, we deem that modern research risks creating such an enormous gap between the historical and the literary Jeremiah that the former disappears behind the latter. When the text is more and more disconnected from the historical text references, the go-ahead is given to speculative reconstructions that proceed from an ideological annexation of the figure of Jeremiah by later religious circles that edited Jeremiah's writings at their own discretion.[17] In a word, the issue of the authenticity of the oracles against the nations – however complicated it may be – remains both hermeneutically and theologically of importance.

4. The Background of the Oracles Against the Nations

Of no less importance is the issue of the background and origin of the oracles against the nations. Unmistakably, Jeremiah has not been the innovator of the phenomenon 'oracle against the nations'. Jeremiah himself makes mention of this fact when he tells Hananiah about the prophets of old who "have prophesied war, disaster and plague against many countries and great kingdoms" (Jer. 28:8). The books of almost all prophets contain oracles against the nations that share many themes and images. What was the nature of this prophetic tradition and in which context of deliverance should we place these oracles? It is improbable that Jeremiah made voyages abroad to prophecy in foreign countries. More plausibly, the oracles were declared in Jerusalem, in the presence of the people of Israel. But what did this look like in practice? Can we say more about the original and actual 'Sitz im Leben' of the oracles against the nations? In form-critical and tradition-critical research, which started in the thirties of the 20th century, three things have been singled out: the relation between the oracle against the nations and Israel's cult, the relation between the oracle against the nations and warfare, and the relation between the oracle against the nations and the provisions of treaties.

The undervaluation of the oracle against the nations as a late product of prophetic epigones suddenly came to an end when the initiator of form-critical research, H. Gunkel, on the basis of a 'gattunggeschichtliche' analysis thought that the oracle against the nations was not the youngest, but the oldest form of prophecy.[18] He situated the declaration of the oracle against the nations in a cultic setting before a military expedition or during the lamentations after a military defeat. These ideas, although in diverse forms, were rapidly accepted by Old Testament scholars. New terms, such as 'cult prophets' and 'prophetic liturgies' were intro-

duced. Highly influential was S. Mowinckel, who interpreted the new year festival in the autumn as a celebration of the kingship of YHWH as Lord of the cosmos, whose accession to the throne also meant judgment on the hostile powers of chaos. It was claimed that prophets put mythical-cultic elements of this accession feast into their oracles against the nations.[19] An even stronger claim was made by H.G. Reventlow, who postulates a prophetic ceremony of imprecation in the context of covenantal feasts. He refers to Egyptian 'curse texts' that were scrutinized by A. Bentzen. These were proverbs directed at hostile nations and kings written on earthenware. This earthenware was broken in a ceremony of curse in order to magically destroy the power of potential enemies.[20] Now, the oracles against the nations themselves never give any explicit signal about a cultic origin or function. However, we do know about activities of Jeremiah in, and in the neighborhood of, the temple. It is not impossible that the oracles against the nations had a place within a cultic context – during the Feast of Tabernacles, for instance – but conclusive evidence is still to be found.

Some exegetes interpret the oracles against the nations against a completely different background, especially those who belong to the Harvard school of F.M. Cross: the background of warfare. The ancient Near East knew the practice of imprecations directed at hostile nations at the occasion of war, as is shown, for instance, by the Mari-texts that date from the 18th century BC. The ever present element in the oracles against the nations seems to be the military phraseology.[21] The history of Balaam (Nu 22-24) indeed shows how one could use prophetic imprecations before the battle started to paralyze the enemy. Elsewhere in the Old Testament as well prophets appear to be involved in warfare (cf., for instance, I Ki 20 or II Ki 3). Following G. von Rad the oracles against the nations are related to the tradition of the holy war and the notion of the Yom YHWH, the day on which God himself will destroy the enemies.[22] One can also point to texts such as Psalm 2 and Psalm 110, in which hostile nations are called to bow down before the king of Zion, who is considered to be a universal king. Although I think literary influence is possible, it seems to me improbable that the oracles against the nations are a theological transformation of ancient war oracles. For many oracles against the nations are directed at nations with whom Israel was not at war or could not even get at war with (such as Elam in the prophecy of Jer. 49:34-39). Moreover, in many cases the reason for the judgment on the nations is not be sought in an aggressive attitude toward Israel.

A third line of explanation is defended by scholars who were persuaded by the publications of G.E. Mendenhall, F.C. Fensham, D.R. Hillers, and others. These scholars claim that the ancient Near Eastern way of thinking in terms of treaties strongly influenced the oracles against the nations.[23] Treaties, sanctioned by curses, structured and confirmed the international relations of those days. In this way the relation between the suzerain and the vassal could be laid down unambiguously. There are numerous parallels between conventional covenant curses and prophetic doom messages. Not only did the prophets use stereotypical curse formulas in the articulation of their oracles against the nations, but the immediate cause for these oracles is also to be found in the violation of treaties between Israel and other nations. T.G. Smothers, for example, suspects that the thought of the *imperium Dei* is to be sought behind the oracles against the nations in Jeremiah 46-49: God is the suzerain, Nebuchadnezzar is his servant, and the nations rebel against him by violating the treaties with Babylon.[24] A problem for this interpretation as an elaborated covenantal curse is that nowhere in Jeremiah 46-51 – not even implicitly – do we read about the conclusion or violation of a treaty.

In summary we can say that the genre-critical and tradition-critical research of the oracles against the nations, partly inspired by parallels with the Umwelt, has offered enlightening and often surprising points of view that contribute to a better understanding of the function and context of curses directed at the enemy. The question as to the concrete background of the oracles against the nations, however, remains unanswered. Till today it has turned out to be impossible to formally or contextually interpret these oracles, which in all their variation are literature *sui generis*, by a unifying definition.

5. The Place of the Oracles Against the Nations

During the last few decennia in the survey of Old Testament oracles against the nations more and more emphasis has been laid on synchronic text analysis. It turns out to be no longer possible to treat the collection of Jeremiah 46-51 as an isolated, secondary appendix. Exegetes pay more and more attention to the place of this part in the

whole of Jeremiah, the function of this placing and possible editorial intentions of this placing. Here, we touch a broad area of text critical and edition critical problems that, because of their size and complexity, we can deal with only summarily.

As we know, there are considerable differences with respect to the size and ordering of the material of the Hebrew and Greek texts of the book of Jeremiah.[25] The old discussion which of these two texts has priority came into a new phase when in Chirbeth Qumran two different sorts of Hebrew texts of Jeremiah were found, one proto-Massoretic text (2 QJer, 4QJer^{a} and 4 QJer^{c}) and a text which shows great resemblance to the presumed Septuaginta-Vorlage (4QJer^{b} and 4QJer^{d}).[26] The Septuagint places the oracles against the nations not at the end, but in the middle of the book, after Jeremiah 25:1-13. This is a part in which Jeremiah announces judgment on Judah and the nations. This judgment will be exercised by the enemy of the north. This is followed by the oracles against the nations, but in an order different from that of the Massoretic text. Elam, Egypt, and Babylon, and then the smaller nations. In the Septuagint this is closed by the cup vision of Jeremiah 25:15ff., in which the prophet has to accept the cup filled with the wine of wrath out of God's hand, in order to give it to the nations – an evocative résumé of the oracles against the nations. Often the structure of the Septuagint is thought of as more original than that of the Massoretic text, partly because the Septuagint shows the same tripartite structure which can be found in the writings of the other prophets: first a series of doom oracles against Israel, then oracles of judgment directed at the nations, and finally oracles of salvation for Israel. In this structure the oracles against the nations form the condition for and introduction to Israel's recovery.

Still, a few questions remain. The connection of Jeremiah 25:1-13 to the oracles against the nations is not without problems. The same applies to the relation to 25:15ff. It is telling that some scholars consider the cup vision to be not the closing of, but, the introduction to the collection of oracles against the nations. Also, a transposition of the oracles against the nations from the middle to the end of the book is less intelligible than its reverse. Moreover, the order of the oracles against the nations in the Septuagint clearly differs from the order in the cup vision, which is almost identical to the order of the Massoretic text. Another problem is that in the structure of the Septuagint the downfall of Babylon, which is described extensively, is placed in the middle of the book of Jeremiah, whereas in the second half of the book the very same Babylon still functions (and functions even more than it used to) as God's instrument to punish Israel.

That is why it is understandable that several exegetes, such as A. Rofé, S.R. Seitz, G. Fischer, and Oosterhoff have pled in defense of the priority of the Massoretic text.[27] According to Oosterhoff, the placing of the oracles against the nations in the Septuagint is based on a misunderstanding both of the first and the second part of Jeremiah 25. He considers certain text elements in Jeremiah 25 that refer directly to the oracles against the nations to be later glosses (vs. 13 and vs. 26b). We think, however, that there are too many formal and material analogies between the cup vision of Jeremiah 25 and the collection of oracles against the nations in Jeremiah 46-51: one cannot deny a certain relation between these two parts, as Oosterhoff does. The wine in the cup which Jeremiah offers to the nations is the judgment which he preaches in the broad fanning out of his oracles against the nations. It remains questionable, however, whether the search for the original literary unity of these parts and the reasons for a later disconnection in the final edition of the book of Jeremiah can lead to satisfactory results.

Further research into the place of the oracles against the nations in the Massoretic text is Jeremiah is desirable. Interesting lines have been drawn by exegetes such as J.G. McConville, who considers the theology of the new covenant in Jeremiah 30-33 to be the key for understanding the oracles against the nations (mostly the oracle against Babylon)[28] and also by C.R. Seitz, who accepts the parallelism between Moses and Jeremiah, the first and last great prophets, as 'Leitmotif' for a deuteronomistic edition. According to Seitz, the exegesis of Jeremiah 45 (the promise to Baruch) is crucial, for Jeremiah 45 functions as a bridge and offers an introduction to the oracles against the nations.[29]

However that may be, it seems clear that in the Massoretic text of Jeremiah which has been handed over to us, the place of the oracles against the nations is functional. Their inclusion with Jeremiah's calling vision in chapter 1 puts the whole book under strain. God had appointed Jeremiah "over the nations and kingdoms to uproot and tear down, to destroy and overthrow, to build and to plant" (Jer. 1:10). After Jeremiah 25, where the cup is handed to all nations, Jeremiah 26-45 recounts the exercise of judgment, because Jerusalem had to drink as the first of all (Jer. 25:19). After Israel

come the nations, Egypt, the great antipode of Babylon, coming in front. It is on Egypt that a refuge remnant from Judah puts its trust (Jeremiah 43-44.). The apotheosis is formed by a prophetic word about Babylon, a cacophonic judgment composition about the downfall of Babylon in which we also hear an eschatological voice telling us about a new beginning for Israel.[30]

6. The Purpose and Meaning of the Oracles Against the Nations

This brings us to the last question, the question concerning the theological meaning of the oracles against the nations. This question is quickly answered, if one agrees with P. Volz that the oracles against the nations show "in religiösen und ästhetischen Werten einen unter die Propheten herabführenden Rückschritt,"[31] or if one agrees with H. Barthke that the oracles against the nations have to be ascribed to the starting time of Jeremiah, when he still functioned as a cultic prophet announcing welfare.[32] Less positive is R.P. Carroll, who claims that the oracles against the nations are superseded already within the book of Jeremiah itself: "They (..) represent a view of life rapidly disappearing".[33] These scholars – and many with them! – paid little attention to the specific function that the oracles against the nations had in the prophetic preaching and in the concrete life of Israel and, therefore, were unable to assess their value.[34] What did prophets such as Jeremiah aim at by their oracles against the nations? What did they want their listeners to do?

In earlier research it was thought that the listeners in question were the heathen nations themselves and that the oracles against the nations contained an implicit call to conversion. One refers to Jeremiah 27, which describes how Jeremiah, having a yoke on his neck, brings a message of God concerning the nations to the delegates that for diplomatic purposes are in Jerusalem. Also, Jeremiah 12:14ff. speaks about nations that get used to the ways of God's people and want to swear to God. And is it not true that Seraiah has to read aloud the oracle against Babylon in the city itself (Jer. 51:61)? Nevertheless, the addressee of the oracles against the nations, that, by the way, do not contain any call to conversion, is Israel itself. It is in the city of God, in front of God's people, that the prophets announced judgment to the nations in the name of God. But with what purpose?

Particularly in the literature which places the oracles against the nations in a cultic context, the view can be found that the words of doom against the nations were in fact words of welfare for Israel. For the downfall of hostile nations *ipso facto* meant the salvation of God's people. In the same way as ancient prophetic war oracles cursed the enemy and strengthened one's own armed forces, the oracles against the nations are thought to have been a consolation and encouragement for the assailed Israelites. It is hard to imagine that this was indeed the universal purpose of the oracles against the nations. Only in Jeremiah 50-51 is the judgment explained by reference to the crimes against Israel and does Babylon's downfall bring the resurrection of Israel. More often the oracles concern Israel's factual or possible allies than Israel's enemies, which is why these oracles probably evoked fear rather than joy. This is confirmed by the tone of dismay which governs the oracles.[35] If the oracles against the nations were veiled prophecies of welfare for Israel, it would be incomprehensible that four times in Jeremiah 46-51 a word of welfare is added to a word of judgment on a foreign nation (46:26, 48:47, 49:6, 49:39).[36] This view is also contradicted by the fact that in other collections of oracles against the nations Israel itself has a place among the nations (see Amos 2 and Isaiah 22).

According to another explanation, the central aim of the oracles against the nations is to warn Israel not to trust in foreign powers or to enter into a treaty with them.[37] Perhaps this thought plays a role in some oracles, such as Jeremiah 46, but elsewhere it is completely absent.

We think that the primary intention of the oracles against the nations cannot be translated into terms of a call to conversion, encouragement or warning, but that it only becomes clear when we see that the oracles unanimously put the acts of God at the centre and contain a concentrated preaching of the God, who reveals himself as "the King, whose name is the LORD Almighty" (this clause is used three times in Jeremiah 46-51: 46:18, 48:15, 51:57). A lawsuit between God and the nations is unfolded before the eyes of those who hear these oracles. The heart of the collection of oracles in Jeremiah 46-51 is formed by the oracle against Elam, which is in a class of its own and which shows in a pregnant way the rationale of the oracles against the nations: the erection of the 'throne' of YHWH.[38]

From the beginning the relation between God and the nations plays an important role in the book of the prophet Jeremiah. Jeremiah is appointed as

prophet for the nations (1:5,10), who announces the punishment of God to all who are circumcised only in the flesh, those of Israel and those of the foreign nations (9:25-26), and who himself has prayed for wrath on the nations (10:25). God is called "King of the nations, the living God, the eternal King. When he is angry, the earth trembles; the nations cannot endure his wrath." (10:7,10). At the same time hope is given that once the nations will come and serve the name of the Israel's God (3:17, 12:15v., 16:19). In Jeremiah's preaching the contours of 'the enemy from the north' become clearer and clearer: Nebuchadnezzar is the servant who is used by the God of Israel to discipline Israel and the nations. The cup of judgment is given to all the nations and if they refuse to take it, Jeremiah is to say in God's name: "You must drink it!" (25:28). It is God who ordains by his sovereign will: "With my great power and outstretched arm I made the earth and its people and the animals that are on it, and I give it to anyone I please. Now I will hand all your countries over to my servant Nebuchadnezzar king of Babylon" (27:5). "The tumult will resound to the ends of the earth, for the LORD will bring charges against the nations; he will bring judgment on all mankind" (25:31).

In the oracles against the nations themselves this coming judgment is motivated in different ways. Only seldom, as we said, is the attitude toward Israel the cause of God's anger. The view of Smothers and others, who see at the background of the oracles against the nations a violated treaty with Babylon which is avenged by God as the keeper of international law, does not find any basis in the text itself. The same applies to the view of Barton, who postulates the violation of some sort of natural law as the cause for God's judgment, an 'international customary law', which is not so much related to the laws and commandments of God. Rather, it just follows from 'common moral sense'.[39] Clearly the motif of hubris can be found in the oracles against the nations: the foreign nation, full of pride and mockery, has turned against God. It is his name which comes into play.

Placed in the historical context of the end of the seventh and the beginning of the sixth century BC the oracles against the nations offer a breathtaking message. In the whirlpool of the downfall of Assyria which terrorized the world for centuries and the emergence of Babylon which takes Assyria's place, Judah sinks into despair. A storm of destruction proceeds through all countries. Soon, Jerusalem will be taken, the temple will be devastated and the people of Israel will be decimated and dispersed. When everything collapses and all hold falls away, the prophetic finger points to him, who sovereignly goes his way in this hectic world. It points to him who is not bound to geographical or ethnic borders. The prophetic word is the scan which shows the world events in the light of God and his deeds. Not politics, but God determines history. At the background of the insanity of those days, not fate but the hand of God rules. Nebuchadnezzar is only the servant of him who in his majesty calls nations, and governs the progression of times after his will and plan. No injustice will go unpunished: the heathen nations also have to give account to him. Those who reach for world wide power are punished by this King. He does not allow the powers of evil to triumph permanently. In the big tangle of history, with all its evil and incomprehensible suffering, God rules.

In this preaching of God's world wide sovereign kingship the permanent value of the oracles against the nations is to be found. These passages of Scripture certainly are not the product of a narrow-minded and nationalistic way of thinking. Rather, they offer a universal view of the nations. The centre of history lies in Judah, in Jerusalem – the judgment on the nations is directly related to the judgment on Israel, which has to drink the cup first. Although everything in the Old Testament is centered around Israel, YHWH Zebaot is concerned with much more: the nations over which he rules. In this way the oracles against the nations take their place between particularism and universalism, in a *historia salutis* which leads to the One, who has accepted the cup out of the hand of the Father and has drunk it to the bottom, on whom judgment was exercised fully, as a Lamb who died for his own enemies, and who in that way broke down the separating wall, the Lion from Judah's tribe, the King of kings.

Notes

1 D. R. Jones, *Jeremiah* (NCBC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992), 484: "These chapters compete for the reputation of being the most puzzling in the book of Jeremiah, and no confident conclusions can be expected in respect of date, authorship, purpose or the history of transmission."

2 Besides the commentaries on these chapters, several dissertations are devoted to Jeremiah's oracles against the nations: L. H. K. Bleeker, *Jeremia's profetieën tegen de volkeren* (Cap. XXV, XLVI-XLIX) (Groningen: Wolters, 1894); E. Coste, *Die Weissagungen*

des Propheten Jeremias wider die fremden Völker. Eine kritische Studie über das Verhältnis des griechischen Textes der LXX zum masorethischen Texte (Leipzig, 1895); L. C. Hay, *The Oracles Against the Foreign Nations in Jeremiah 46-51* (Nashville, 1960); C. de Jong, *De volken bij Jeremia. Hun plaats in zijn prediking en in het boek Jeremia* (Kampen: Kok, 1978); D. J. Reimer, *The Oracles Against Babylon in Jeremiah 50-5: A Horror Among the Nations* (San Francisco: University Press, 1993); A.O. Bellis, *The Structure and Composition of Jeremiah 50:2-51:58* (Lewiston: Mellen, 1995) and B. Huwyler, *Jeremia und die Völker. Untersuchungen zu den Völkersprüchen in Jeremia 46-49* (Forschungen zum Alten Testament, 20), (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997).

3 Cf. P. Volz, *Der Prophet Jeremia* (KAT; Leipzig: Deichert, 1928), 389v.

4 Cf. D. R. Jones, *Jeremiah*, 487.

5 See A. Marx, "A propos des doublets du livre de Jérémie. Rélections sur la formation d'un livre prophétique," in *Prophecy* (ed. J. A. Emerton; Berlin: De Gruyter, 1980), 106-120.

6 A clearly chronological order is absent; Jeremiah 47, for instance, seems to treat events that occurred before those in Jeremiah 46, cf. B. J. Oosterhoff, *Jeremia. Deel 1* (COT; Kok: Kampen, 1990), 61. Compare also A. Dicou, "De structuur van de verzameling profetieën over de volken in Jeremia 46-51," *ACEBT* 10 (1989): 84-87.

7 Thus, for instance, G. Fohrer, "Vollmacht über Völker und Königreiche (Jer. 46-51)," in idem, *Studien zu alttestamentlichen Texten und Themen (1966-1972)* (BZAW 155), (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1981), 44-52.

8 Cf. D. L. Christensen, *Prophecy and War in Ancient Israel. Studies in the Oracles against the Nations in Old Testament Prophecy*, Berkeley 1989; id., "In Quest of the Autograph of the Book of Jeremiah: A Study of Jeremiah 25 in Relation to Jeremiah 46-51," *JETS* 33 (1990): 145-153.

9 Perhaps the structure of the oracles against the nations, as we find them in the book of Jeremiah, contains a reference to the beginning (Egypt) and the end (Babylon) of Israel's history, cf. G. Fischer, *Jeremia* 26-52 (HThKAT, Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2005), 463.

10 F. Schwally, "Die Reden des Buches Jeremia gegen die Heiden. XXV. XLVI-LI," *ZAW* 8 (1888): 177-216.

11 The style of the oracles against the nations is "unruhig und verworren, voll Wiederholungen, ohne jede Disposition (..) während der echte Jeremia klar und ruhig entwickelt" ("Die Reden", 206).

12 H. Barthke, "Jeremia der Fremdvölkerprophet," *ZAW* 53 (1935): 231, for instance, contends: "Auch als Fremdvölkerprophet hätte Jeremia Jahwe richten, nicht rächen lassen."

13 Cf. F. Fechter, *Bewältigung der Katastrophe. Untersuchungen zu ausgewählten Fremdvölkersprüchen im Ezechielbuch* (BZAW 208), (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1992), 6f. and J. H. Hayes, "The Usage of Oracles against Foreign Nations in Ancient Israel," *JBL* 87 (1968): 81-92.

14 J. R. Lundbom, *Jeremiah 1-20* (AB 21 A), (New York: Doubleday, 1999), 150, rightly speaks of "a mix of genuine and nongenuine sayings": "a blanket judgment either for or against Jeremianic authorship of the collection does not seem possible." The most recent commentary on Jeremiah, that of G. Fischer, published in 2005, places the author of the book in the 4th century BC.

15 K. A. D. Smelik, "De functie van Jeremia 50 en 51 binnen het boek Jeremia," *NTT* 41 (1987): 265f.

16 R. P. Carroll, *From Chaos to Covenant. Uses of Prophecy in the Book of Jeremiah* (New York: Crossroad, 1981); idem, "Intertextuality and the Book of Jeremiah: Animadversions on Text and Theory," in *The New Literary Criticism and the Hebrew Bible* (JSOTS 143) (ed. J. C. Exum and D. J. A. Clines; Sheffield: Academic Press, 1993), 55-78; idem, *Jeremiah* (OTL; London: SCM, 19962). Cf. W. McKane, *Jeremiah* (ICC; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996), clxxi.

17 Cf. two PhD-thesis on Jeremiah that take opposed views in this matter: J. Dubbink, *Waar is de HEER? Dynamiek en actualiteit van het woord van JHWH bij Jeremia*, (Gorinchem: Narratio, 1997), and H. Lalleman – de Winkel, *Jeremiah in Prophetic Tradition. An Examination of the Book of Jeremiah in the Light of Israel's Prophetic Traditions* (CBET 26) (Leuven: Peters, 2000).

18 H. Gunkel, *Einleitung in die Psalmen. Die Gattungen der religiösen Literatur Israels*, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 19854), xxxii-xxxiii.

19 S. Mowinckel, *Psalmenstudien II*, (Amsterdam: Schippers, 1961), 71-73.

20 H. G. Reventlow, *Das Amt des Propheten bei Amos* (FRLANT 80), (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), 56-75; idem, *Wächter über Israel. Ezechiel und seine Tradition* (BZAW 82), (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1962), 134-157.

21 Cf. M. Sæbø, Sacharja 9-14. *Untersuchungen zu Text und Form* (WMANT 34), (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1969); R. Bach, *Die Aufforderungen zur Flucht und zum Kampf im alttestamentlichen Prophetenspruch* (WMANT 9), (Neukirchen-Vluyn, Neukirchener Verlag, 1962).

22 G. von Rad, *Der Heilige Krieg im alten Israel* (AThANT 20), (Zürich: Zwingli Verlag, 1951).

23 Cf. the summary of the research on this topic in the interesting monograph by D. J. McCarthy, *Treaty and Covenant. A Study in Form in the Ancient Oriental Documents and in the Old Testaments* (Analecta Biblica 21), (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1981^3).

24 T. G. Smothers, "A Lawsuit against the Nations: Reflections on the Oracles against the Nations in Jeremiah," *Review and Expositor* 85 (1988): 545-554; G. L. Keown (a.o.), *Jeremiah 26-52* (WBC 27; Dallas: Word Books, 1995), 275-277.

25 The literature offers an extensive treatment of this issue. Among the more recent works are P. -M. Bogaert, "Le livre de Jérémie en perspective: les deux rédactions antiques selon les travaux en cours," *RB* 101 (1994): 363-406; B. Gosse, "La place primitive du recueil d'Oracles contre les Nations dans le livre de Jérémie," *BN* 74 (1994): 28-30; idem, "Jérémie XLV et la place du recueil d'Oracles contre les Nations dans le livre de Jérémie," *VT* 40 (1990): 145-151; A. Schenker, "La redaction longue du livre de Jérémie doit-elle etre datée au temps des premiers hasmonéens?," *ETL* 70 (1994): 281-293; J. W. Watts, "Text and Redaction in Jeremiah's Oracles against the Nations," *CBQ* 54 (1992): 432-447; E. Tov, "The Literary History of the Book of Jeremiah in Light of its Textual History," in idem, *The Greek and Hebrew Bible. Collected Essays on the Septuagint* (VTS 72; Leiden: Brill, 1999), 363-384; G. L. Archer, "The Relationship between the Septuagint Translation and the Massoretic Text in Jeremiah," *TEJ* 12 (1991): 139-150; F. D. Hubmann, "Bemerkungen zur älteren Diskussion um die Unterschiede zwischen MT und G im Jeremiabuch," in *Jeremia und die "deuteronomistische Bewegung"* (BBB 98), (ed. W. Gross; Weinheim: Beltz Athenäum, 1995), 263-270; C. J. Sharp, ""Take Another Scroll and Write"." A Study of the LXX and the MT of Jeremiah's Oracles Against Egypt and Babylon," *VT* 47 (1997): 487-509.

26 Cf. E. Tov, *Textual Criticism of the Hebrew Bible* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2001), 319-327.

27 G. Fischer, "Jer. 25 und die Fremdvölkersprüche: Unterschiede zwischen hebräischem und griechischem Text," *Biblica* 72 (1991): 474-499; B. J. Oosterhoff, *Jeremia*, 64-72; A. Rofé, "The Arrangement of the Book of Jeremiah," *ZAW* 101 (1989): 390-398; C. R. Seitz, "Mose als Prophet. Redaktionsthemen und Gesamtstruktur des Jeremiasbuches," *BZ* 34 (1990): 234-245; idem, "The Prophet Moses and the Canonical Shape of Jeremiah," *ZAW* 101 (1989): 3-27.

28 J. G. McConville, *Judgment and Promise. An Interpretation of the Book of Jeremiah*, (Leicester: Apollos, 1993).

29 See the literature mentioned in footnote 25.

30 Cf. K. A. D. Smelik, "De functie van Jeremia 50 en 51 binnen het boek Jeremia," *NTT* 41 (1987): 265-278; idem, "The Function of Jeremiah 50-51 in the Book of Jeremiah," in *Reading the Book of Jeremiah. A Search for Coherence* (ed. M. Kessler; Winona Lake, 2004), 87-98 and K. T. Aitken, "The Oracles against Babylon in Jeremiah 50-51: Structures and Perspectives," *TynB* 35 (1984): 25-63.

31 P. Volz, *Jeremia*, 380.

32 H. Barthke, "Jeremia", 232.

33 R. P. Carroll, *From Chaos to Covenant. Uses of Prophecy in the Book of Jeremiah* (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 252.

34 The undervaluation of the oracles against the nations, which dominated Old Testament research for a long time, has come to an end. The view that the oracles against the nations contain an outburst of xenophobia and narrow-minded nationalism (cf. in this line of thinking W. McKane in his commentary on Jeremiah in *ICC*), is shared by only a few nowadays. In recent times several monographs have appeared that try to do justice to the specific intention of the oracles against the nations. Besides the literature mentioned in footnote 2 see, for instance: J. Barton, *Amos's Oracles against the Nations. A Study of Amos 1.3-2.5* (Cambridge: University Press, 1980); D. L. Christensen, *Prophecy and War in Ancient Israel. Studies in the Oracles against the Nations in Old Testament Prophecy* (Berkeley: Bibal Press, 1989); J. H. Hayes, *The Oracles against the Nations in the Old Testament. Their Usage und Theological Importance* (Princeton,1964); P. Höffken, *Untersuchungen zu den Begründungselementen der Völkerorakel des Alten Testaments* (Bonn, 1977); B. B. Margulis, *Studies in the Oracles Against the Nations* (Ann Harbor, 1967); M. Cahill, "The Oracles Against the Nations: Synthesis and Analysis for Today," *Louvain Studies* 16 (1991): 121-136; P. C. Beentjes, "Oracles against the Nations. A Central Issue in the "Latter Prophets"," Bijdragen 50 (1989): 203-209; D. H. Ryou, *Zephaniah's Oracles Against the Nations. A Synchronic and Diachronic Study of Zephaniah 2:1-3-8* (Amsterdam, 1994).

35 There is good reason to agree with B. Huwyler, *Jeremia*, 323: "In den Völkersprüchen wird Juda gerade nicht Heil angesagt, sondern zutiefst bedrohlich, ernst und besorgniserregend – dasselbe Unheil, welches in der Sicht Jeremias die Nachbarvölker ohne Ausnahme trifft" (cf. 303f.). Cf. also R. E. Clements, *Prophecy and Tradition*, (Atlanta: Blackwell, 1975), 58ff.; G. R. Hamborg, "Reasons for Judgment in the Oracles against the Nations of the Prophet Isaiah," *VT* 31 (1981): 145-159 and D. H. Ryou, *Zephaniah's Oracles*, 328f.

36 B. Huwyler, *Jeremia*, 382, rightly claims that the reason for this number and this placing of promises of welfare is not clear, in spite of the work of P. Höffken, "Zu den Heilszusätzen in der Völkerorakelsammlung des Jeremiabuches. Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Frage nach den Überlieferungsinteressen an den Völkerorakelsammlungen der Prophetenbücher, " *VT* 27 (1977): 398-412; cf. also C. de Jong, *De volken bij Jeremia*, 381f. It is interesting, by the way, that in the Septuagint, the oracle against Elam is the only one which has a superscript and a prophecy of welfare at the end.

37 Thus C. de Jong, *De volken bij Jeremia*, passim.
38 Cf. H. G. L. Peels, "God's Throne in Elam: The Historical Background and Literary Context of Jeremiah 49:34-39," in *Past, Present, Future. The Deuteronomistic History and the Prophets* (OTS XLIV; ed. J.C. de Moor & H.F. van Rooij; Leiden: Brill, 2000), 216-229.
39 J. Barton, *Amos's Oracles*, passim; idem, "Natural Law and Poetic Justice in the O.T.," *JTS* 30 (1979): 1-14.

EuroJTh (2007) 16:2, 93–105 0960–2720

Of Babies and Bathwater? Recent Evangelical Critiques of Penal Substitution in the Light of Early Modern Debates Concerning Justification

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SUMMARY

Penal substitutionary models of the atonement have recently been criticised for their lack of ethical consequences. This essay examines such criticisms in the light of Roman Catholic and Anabaptist criticisms of justification by faith alone and early nineteenth-century debates about atonement. I attempt to show that similar, although not identical, arguments were deployed in all three cases, and suggest some possible responses to the recent criticisms based on the historical analogues.

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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Strafrechtliche Stellvertretermodelle von Sühne sind kürzlich für ihren Mangel an ethischer Konsequenz kritisiert worden. Dieser Artikel untersucht diese Kritik im Lichte römisch-katholischer und täuferischer Kritik der Rechtfertigung allein aus Glauben und im Lichte von Debatten aus dem frühen 19. Jahrhundert zur Sühneproblematik. Ich versuche zu zeigen, dass in allen drei Fällen ähnliche, wenn auch nicht identische Argumente benutzt wurden, und ich schlage einige mögliche Antworten auf die kürzlich geäußerte Kritik vor, die auf den historischen Analogien basieren.

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RÉSUMÉ

La compréhension de l'expiation en termes de substitution pénale a récemment fait l'objet de critiques pour son manque de conséquences éthiques. Le présent article considère ces critiques en les comparant aux critiques des catholiques et des anabaptistes concernant la doctrine de la justification par la foi seule, ainsi qu'aux débats du XIX[e] siècle sur l'expiation. L'auteur s'efforce de montrer que des arguments similaires à ces critiques, sans leur être identiques, ont été avancés dans les trois cas. Il indique des réponses possibles aux critiques récentes en s'inspirant des réponses apportées par le passé.

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1. By Way of Introduction

Let[1] me state a thesis, bluntly and boldly, that I intend to argue in this paper: one recent criticism of penal substitutionary atonement, offered by Evangelicals as well as others, repeats lines of argument first advanced by the Roman Church against the Reformation doctrine of justification sola fide. If this criticism stands, then we will be forced to conclude that the Reformers were simply wrong on the *articulus stantis vel cadentis ecclesiae*.

I am conscious that this could be a rather inflammatory thesis in the wrong hands, so I will say as clearly as possible now that I do not for a moment suppose that penal substitutionary atonement is the article by which the church stands or falls; nor do I accept that there is any reason to call for those who object to penal substitution to be expelled, on account of that rejection per se, from Evangelical bodies, let alone from the church. I have argued in

public against such an idea before, and I re-affirm that position now. It seems to me that most criticisms of penal substitution are misguided in several ways, central among them the fact that the criticisms are aimed at a caricature, rather than a clear statement, of the doctrine. As such, I generally find myself able to agree entirely with the criticism (and hence regarding well-meaning defenders of an indefensible caricature as misguided). Further, there are valid concerns even with a well-formed statement of penal substitution, and this is not a doctrine so clearly advanced in Scripture (even in Is. 53) that rejection of it must entail expulsion by Bible-believing Christians. All that said, it seems to me that one common line of criticism, perhaps the most theologically serious, can be related to Reformation debates in interesting and worthwhile ways. Hence this paper.

2. Reformation and Early Modern Accounts of Reconciliation

The story of the Reformation beginning with Martin Luther's transformative discovery that the iustitia Dei is gift not demand is familiar enough. No doubt it needs all sorts of qualifications, but for Luther at least, the free and incomprehensible gift of justification given by God through Christ, and known only in the cross, is absolutely the heart of the doctrine of reconciliation, and of all Christian teaching and piety. Indeed, at one point, and with characteristic boldness, Luther announced that he would concede the Pope his claim to authority, if only the Pope would confess the free justification of sinners in Christ.[2] The slogan that sums up such a concern for this particular belief about reconciliation is the insistence that justification is the *articulus stantis vel cadentis ecclesiae*. This phrase is not used by Luther, although similar phrases are;[3] McGrath suggests its first employment is by Alsted in 1618, and that the belief expressed by the phrase was by then general.[4]

I have neither space nor knowledge to trace the lines of development or dispute between different Reformers. Clearly, at times what is at stake is definitions. (So, when McGrath argues that Luther stands 'closer to the position of the Council of Trent than is generally realized,'[5] it is in connection with Luther's claim that *justificare* will in different ways describe the beginning, the continuation, and the consummation of the life of the saints; I suspect that Luther's avoidance of the language of sanctification has more to do with his construction here than any particular closeness to the doctrines developed at Trent, which on this point were developed explicitly to deny the freeness of God's justifying grace.) To trace the lines of controversy, I will turn to the relatively settled thought of the confessions, with only occasional references back into history.

God freely justifies the sinner, and so the sinner is reconciled with God. This may not be the most basic claim of the Reformers (it is consequent on the claims *solus Christus* and *sola gratia*), or even perhaps the most important (surely *soli Deo gloria*!), but it became the signature claim. In the Lutheran symbols, this point is promoted as high as article IV of the Augsburg Confession, with free justification and imputed righteousness being stressed.[6] Indeed, Melancthon's Apology for the confession[7] describes the free gift of justification as 'the chief topic of Christian doctrine'. The 'Smalcald Articles,' written by Luther, and also a part of the *Book of Concord*, alike insist on the centrality of this doctrine: 'Of this article nothing can be yielded or surrendered [nor can anything be granted or permitted contrary to the same], even though heaven and earth, and whatever will not abide, should sink to ruin... And upon this article all things depend which we teach and practice in opposition to the Pope, the devil, and the [whole] world.'[8] Unsurprisingly, then, the *Formula of Concord* denounces any who believe

> '[t]hat in the prophetic and apostolic declarations, which treat of the righteousness of faith, the words *justify* and to be *justified* are not the same as to absolve and be absolved from sins, and to obtain remission of sins, but that we, through love infused by the Holy Ghost, through the virtues and through the works which flow forth from charity, become in very deed righteous before God.'[9]

For the Lutheran symbols, reconciliation between human beings and God is the central matter of Christianity, and so necessarily the central topic of Christian doctrine, and at the heart of the locus is the confession of free justification, given graciously by God in Christ, apprehended by faith, and comprising both passive and active righteousness.

On the Reformed side, virtually identical positions can be found. The Second Helvetic Confession makes the point at length in ch. XV, which begins with a summary, *Justificare significat Apostolo in disputatione de justificatione, peccata remittere, a*

culpa et pœna absolvere, in gratiam recipere, et justum pronunciare (sec. 1), and then expands the point at length in §§4-5. The Heidelberg Catechism is briefer, but similarly clear: 'Our Lord *Jesus Christ*... is freely given unto us for complete redemption and righteousness'[10] I have no wish to labour the point, which should already be clear enough: as Lutheran and Reformed faith was codified in the sixteenth century, the centrality and truth of the free gift of justification in Christ as the heart of reconciliation was uniformly insisted upon.

The careful statements of the 'Decree on Justification' of the Council of Trent were devised to exclude this claim; particularly Canons IX and XI.[11] These are built upon the positive teaching of the earlier sections concerning the doctrine of reconciliation, notably ch. VII, which serves as something of a summary of the whole decree: '[j]ustification itself, which is not remission of sins merely, but also the sanctification and renewal of the inward man, through the voluntary reception of the grace, and of the gifts, whereby man of unjust becomes just, and of an enemy a friend, that so he may be an heir according to hope of life everlasting.'[12] There is, here, a three-fold division in the nature of justification: the remission of sins and sanctification; continual renewal; and glorification – which division can be traced through the Decree.[13] There are, to be sure, other polemical points about the doctrine of reconciliation being made in this Decree (notably: the continuation of free will after the fall; the possibility of falling away from grace; and the impropriety of seeking assurance of salvation), but this single point, the question of whether justification is an external declaration or an internal change, and so the question of whether there is any human involvement in being reconciled, are clearly at the heart of the issue. Reformation debates over justification essentially turn on this question: for the Lutherans and Reformed, God reconciles us sovereignly and freely, of his grace, in Christ, through faith, for His glory; for Roman Catholics God graciously and sovereignly provides the possibility of reconciliation, certainly, but the accomplishment of reconciliation requires our action and cooperation with God's grace.[14]

One of the arguments offered at Trent will become important in a moment in this paper, so let me highlight it. The Council suggested in various ways that one of its core concerns about the 'new' Reformation doctrines of grace was their failure to give any motive to ethical living. Concerning the use of acts of penance, for example, the Council insists: 'these satisfactory punishments greatly recall from, and check as it were with a bridle, and make penitents more cautious and watchful for the future; they are also remedies for the remains of sin, and, by acts of the opposite virtues, they remove the habits acquired by evil living.'[15]

I do not suppose that any of this is news to any reader of this journal, but bear with me a little, and I hope its importance will become clear. Let me first, however, turn to the parallel disputes between the Reformed and Lutheran, on the one hand, and the Anabaptists on the other.

A concern for visible holiness as necessary to reconciliation between humanity and God is one of the (few) constant marks of the various groups who made up sixteenth-century Anabaptism. Michael Sattler's basic claim in the preface to the *Schleitheim Articles* is that 'we have agreed that we will abide in the Lord as obedient children of God,' and this demand that reconciliation implies visible obedience runs through the articles as a constant axiom which drives each argument. Baptism is to be given to those 'who have learned repentance, amendment of life, and faith through the truth that their sin has been removed by Christ'; the ban is to be 'used against all who have given themselves to the Lord and agreed to follow his commandments... and who nevertheless sometimes slip and fall into error and sin'; the article on the breaking of bread stresses repeatedly that the Lord's table is for the community that has been 'called out of the world to God'; separation is to be made from 'all who have not submitted themselves to the obedience of faith'; and so on.[16]

Of course, a demand for visible holiness is not yet a denial of the freeness of justification in Christ. Reconciliation can imply obedience and amendment of life in two senses. It might be that reconciliation, itself achieved through the freeness of God's grace, still necessarily leads to holiness and obedience, and so the absence of holiness is adequate evidence that reconciliation has not, in fact, taken place. On the other hand, it might be that obedience and so visible holiness is a part of reconciliation, not just a consequence of it, and so reconciliation can no longer be understood as the free gift of God in Christ through faith. The Schleitheim articles do not notice this distinction, and so do not ask the question; other sixteenth-century Anabaptist writings do pose the question, and many, at least, do indeed deny the freeness of justification. Conrad Grebel, writing to Müntzer, wastes few words in condemning Luther: 'You

have the Bible (of which Luther had made bubel and Babel) for your defense against the idolatrous sparing of Luther... against the deceitful, negligent faith, against their preaching in which they do not teach Christ as they should.'[17] Hans Denck's *On the Law of God* is (after a brief consideration of the meaning of defeat in the Peasant's War) almost entirely a discussion on this very point, pressing the doctrine of reconciliation with the question of whether justification is free or depends on human obedience and holiness, with Denck repeatedly attacking standard points of Lutheran teaching.[18] Again, Denck in his 'Recantation' teaches 'Faith is to obey God and trust in his promise through Jesus Christ. Where there is no such obedience the trust is false and deceptive.'[19]

Balthasar Hubmaier, probably the most able theologian amongst the early Anabaptists, seems to develop through his life on this point. Unsurprisingly, in his first published work, the 'Achtzehn Schlussreden', he adopted a basically Zwinglian position on justification, asserting straightforwardly that '[f]aith alone makes us righteous before God.'[20] In later works this position is no longer central, with a classically Anabaptist mix of faith, repentance, baptism and good works being necessary to reconciliation, although there is sometimes still a sense that faith alone justifies, along with a strong emphasis that real faith produces good works.[21] By the time he writes the two tracts of free will, the place of works is even more central: these essentially advance a theology of reconciliation that claims that Christ's death has sufficiently healed our human nature that it is our choice whether to repent, believe the gospel, and follow the law or not.[22] The only straightforward assertion that justification is not free I can find, however, is in Hubmaier's *Apologia*,[23] where he begins his first article with the claim '[m]ere faith alone is not sufficient for salvation,'[24] and the second with the assertion '[s]ince mere faith is not sufficient for salvation, good deeds must truly be added to the faith.'[25] The *Apologia*, written in prison, tends to stress Hubmaier's points of agreement with Roman Catholic doctrine, as for instance on the perpetual virginity of Mary, and her status as 'mother of God',[26] but never to the point of misrepresenting his views, so he denies the existence of purgatory (article XIII) and the possibility of seeking the intercession of the Saints (article XXIV).

Melchior Hoffman is perhaps on the edge of the Anabaptist movement (like Denck), but develops a similar theology in a much more complete way. For Hoffman, there are two justifications. The first is by faith alone and grace alone, and gives a 'foretaste of the Kingdom of God'. The second justification comes about through our own efforts, and leads to true reconciliation.[27] In his attempt to synthesize sixteenth-century Anabaptist doctrine, Friedmann claims that the distinctive Anabaptist idea of salvation is not justification, the forensic declaration of the sinner as righteous, but an actual change of status and relationship which he characterizes with the word 'Fromm-Machung', a word first used by Hubmaier.[28] As witnesses to this position he cites Hans Hut, Peter Riedemann and Leupold Scharnschlager. It seems to me that Friedmann falls a little into the trap of over-synthesizing, and viewing the Anabaptists (and indeed the Lutherans) more as a distinct and coherent group than they in fact were, but the perspective is helpful.

The same point is made by later confessions in a similar tradition. Take, for instance, the fifteen theological propositions which make up the Apology of Robert Barclay, widely considered to be the most authoritative statement of the teachings of the Society of Friends in the seventeenth century. In proposition seven, 'Concerning Justification', Barclay writes:

> As many as resist not this light, but receive the same, in them is produced an holy, pure, and spiritual birth, bringing forth holiness, righteousness, purity, and all those other blessed fruits which are acceptable to God; by which holy birth, to wit, Jesus Christ formed within us, and working his works in us, as we are sanctified, so we are justified in the sight of God, according to the apostle's words, 'But ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified, in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God.'[29]

In classical scholastic language, Barclay makes justification consequent on sanctification. Forgiveness follows holiness; reconciliation is dependent upon obedience. This is blunter and less nuanced than the earlier Anabaptist writers, but recognizably in the same tradition.

We do not need to read very far in Lutheran and Reformed writings to find condemnations of this move. The *Formula of Concord* offers specific condemnation of seventeen Anabaptist teachings (nine doctrinal, five political and three moral). The articles are hardly fair to the variety, or even the centre of gravity, of Anabaptist teaching, despite the rather grudging acknowledgement of the preamble that there are 'many sects', who maintain

more or fewer errors. The first article criticizes the distinctive Christology of Melchior Hoffman and Menno Simons,[30] which was hardly universal amongst the Anabaptists; and the second, remarkably, cooly suggests that Anabaptists did not believe in the true deity of Christ. The third, on justification, seems more general in application, at least in its first sentence: '[t]hat our righteousness before God does not consist in the merit of Christ alone, but in our renewal, and thus in our own uprightness in which we walk'; when it goes on to insist that 'this righteousness of the Anabaptists consists in great part in a certain arbitrary and humanly devised sanctimony, and in truth is nothing else than some new sort of monkery' we must, I think, discount the comment almost entirely.[31]

On the Reformed side, whilst Anabaptist beliefs concerning baptism and the magistracy are repeatedly condemned, I can find no symbol that rejects their beliefs about justification by name. The matter of the teaching is repeatedly condemned, however. Consider, for example, the bold claim of the Second Helvetic Confession: 'we must first be just before we can love or do any just works.'[32] The point is also common enough in Reformed polemical literature. For Calvin, I need to no more than refer to Willem Balke's treatment of the issues.[33] For a later controversialist, consider Turretin's long and careful controversial topic on justification.[34]

Before I move on, please notice a particular feature of the debate. In measured or immoderate tones, whether from Roman prelates or Anabaptist radicals, the complaint against the Lutheran and Reformed doctrine of free justification was always the same: it led to carnal Christianity, or cheap grace, or belief without practice. That is, the doctrine of free justification was inadequate because it was ethically inadequate. An account of reconciliation that does not, somehow, promote and demand holiness of life amongst the reconciled is assumed for that very reason to be deficient. Now, of course the Reformed and Lutherans had answers to this charge, albeit different ones. Lutheran teaching insists that faith should bring forth good works,[35] and that the gift of 'renovation' given by the Spirit to all the justified should lead to daily growth in holiness;[36] the Reformed rather more that gradual sanctification and instant justification both flowed from the same source, the union of the believer with Christ.[37] They were alike strident in their opposition to antinomianism, to any suggestion that free justification removed ethical responsibility from women and men. But to their detractors, that appeared the logical conclusion of their doctrine, and so that was the charge they had to face. I have pressed this, I acknowledge fairly obvious, point, at such length because it is basic to the argument of this paper. Let me now move a little forward in time, however, and discuss what has been the primary Evangelical account of how men and women are reconciled to God, the doctrine of penal substitutionary atonement.

3. Evangelical Debates about Penal Substitution in Context

Penal doctrines of the atonement are, of course, common in the Reformation symbols. The Heidelberg Catechism follows Calvin's lead in reading the trial of Christ before Pilate as an image or type of Christ's suffering the punishment that our guilt deserved; the Belgic Confession reads the atonement in straightforwardly penal terms;[38] as does the Scotch Confession:

> It behooved farther the Messias and Redemer to be very God and very man, because he was to underlie the punischment due for our transgressiouns, and to present himselfe in the presence of his Fathers Judgment, as in our persone, to suffer for our transgression and inobedience... (Art. VIII)

It seems to me that this adoption of penal theories of the atonement, whilst not required by a belief in free justification (the Lutheran symbols tend to retain the language of sacrifice or satisfaction, rather than penal imagery), is consonant with it. A penal account of the atonement stresses the completeness and finality of Christ's work: he has done all that is to be done; there is nothing left. We are reconciled because of what Christ has done, not because of what we do. This doctrine thus coheres well with a stress on the freeness of God's gift of justification in Christ.

This acceptance of penal substitution amongst mainline protestants largely continues into the early eighteenth century, when the Evangelical movement began. It is there in Quenstedt's *Theologia Didacto-polemica* (1685) as clearly as in Turretin's *Insitutio Theologiae Elencticae* (1682);[39] in English-speaking theology it is assumed by the great Bishop Butler to be normal and natural, corresponding to the observable ways of the world.[40] I have argued elsewhere[41] that penal accounts of atonement were more often assumed than argued for by Evangelicals through the eighteenth century,

and that serious criticism of the idea begins in the nineteenth century, amongst both Evangelicals (Edward Irving; Thomas Erskine of Linlathlen; and of course John McLeod Campbell) and non-Evangelicals (rather too numerous to mention…). It is perhaps useful to examine some of these criticisms in a little more detail.

McLeod Campbell offers a discussion of John Owen, Jonathan Edwards and Thomas Chalmers as exponents of traditional Calvinism, largely focussing on the relationship between their accounts of atonement and the doctrine of limited election. When he turns to 'Calvinism, as Recently Modified',[42] however, he is more expansive about his critiques of penal conceptions of the atonement. It seems he felt able to dismiss the earlier writers with the claim '*[t]hat cannot be a true conception of the nature of the atonement which implies that Christ died only for an election from among men*'.[43] However, he believes more recent Calvinism to hold that the atonement was indeed for all,[44] and so other arguments are needed. He sees several other changes also: a shift from forensic justice being a perfection of the divine nature to it being seen as required by God's moral governance; a shift from seeing Christ as suffering the exact penalty merited by the sins of the saved, to seeing him as undergoing sufferings which were acceptable to God's moral government as a substitute for that punishment; and a shift from definite atonement and election to the atonement as merely providing the possibility of salvation to all.[45]

If this is indeed what was being taught as Calvinism in the Kirk in the middle of the nineteenth century, then it is surprising: right or wrong, the vision of reconciliation Campbell describes is Grotian and Arminian, not Calvinistic.[46] However, it is Campbell's reasons for preferring the new system that are relevant to my argument. On the first, '[a] necessity for an atonement arising out of rectoral or public justice, *is felt less repulsive* than one that implies a demand in the divine nature for a certain amount of suffering as the punishment for a certain amount of sin.'[47] As to the second, '*[a]ll the men have revolted from* in the idea of the Son of God being actually in His Father's eyes as a criminal through the imputation of man's sin…'[48] In both cases, the phrases I have emphasised indicate that it is a sense of revulsion that drives the objection to the traditional penal scheme, at least in Campbell's mind.

Campbell will go on to argue that these modifications merely render the 'Calvinism' of those who hold to them incoherent, without actually solving any problems, and so will claim that his preferred 'filial' view is more helpful than any form of 'legal' view. The point of interest for this paper, however, is that questions of morality or acceptability drive the criticisms in large measure. This is also of course true of many of the non-Evangelical criticisms of the penal theory. Grensted, writing in the early twentieth century, offers a telling example. In recounting the history of the doctrine of the atonement, he tells it (from the Reformation on) as a history of the rise and collapse of penal ideas. The collapse is repeatedly described as the coming of 'a more human theology';[49] it is due to the fact that 'the conception of penal justice remains repugnant to man's moral sense';[50] the supposed ending of the dominance of penal theories is 'the dawn of a better age'.[51] The 'days of the Penal theory… are over', a 'fact obvious to any student of doctrinal history.' One question alone remains: '[w]hether the theory is capable of moderating its claims, and so of surviving in a sense that does not repel the moral sense of mankind.'[52] The criticism is clear: penal substitutionary atonement gives us an account of justice, and a doctrine of God, that is morally repugnant. Reconciliation on this account is immoral.

For a second Evangelical writer from the early nineteenth century, and a second, although linked, criticism of penal substitution, let me turn to Thomas Erskine. Erskine also believed penal theories of the atonement to be morally unworthy,[53] but pressed also the charge that penal substitution had nothing to say about the moral transformation of the believer. This is made very clear in Erskine's 'Introductory Essay' to some letters he published.[54] In that essay he argues that we should believe all people antecedently forgiven through Christ's death, rather than any account of election or justification through faith. Along the way he claims that traditional doctrines of the atonement fail morally for two reasons. On the one hand, whatever motive they provide for action is mere selfishness: I believe that I may be saved, not out of love for God, but out of desire for salvation; and, claims Erskine, 'Every such religion must in the nature of things be false, because its necessary tendency is not to produce love, but selfishness, and to train the mind in the very element of rebellion.'[55] On the other, Erskine claims (with his characteristic concern for the Biblical teaching) that all the commands of the epistles presume the readers already know themselves to be saved.[56]

The point is pressed in another direction in the first essay on the 'freeness of the gospel':[57] Erskine begins that essay with a candid acknowledgement that there are many 'who oppose the doctrine of justification by faith, from the honest conviction that it opposes the interests of practical holiness'.[58] Erskine confesses himself in some sympathy with such complaints, finally concluding that 'I cannot help thinking that they are borne out to a considerable extent by the way in which that doctrine is very commonly stated.'[59] The restatement asserts that humanity faces two problems: guilt and corruption, both of which must be dealt with if we are to be reconciled. Of these, by far the more serious is corruption. Again we find the teaching that all are forgiven through Christ's action, but that does not mean that all will enter into heaven. 'Heaven is the name for a character conformed to the will of God... [t]he idea, therefore, of having heaven, without holiness, is like the idea of having health without being well... a contradiction in terms.'[60] Faith, then, for Erskine, becomes the means by which the pardon proclaimed freely to all becomes morally effective for some: 'The use of faith, then, is not to remove the penalty, or to make the pardon better – for the penalty is removed, and the pardon is proclaimed, whether we believe it or not – but to give the pardon a moral influence...'[61] In the second essay, this point is pushed to its conclusion, with regard to the idea of penal substitution, which pictures forgiveness, pardon, as the only significant result of the atonement. Says Erskine:

> Whilst pardon is conceived to depend on faith, and whilst it is confounded with eternal life, it is very difficult to press the warnings, and precepts, and exhortations of the Bible, as the Bible itself presses them. If pardon and eternal life are by faith alone, what is the use of obedience? And how can the preacher urge it as absolutely necessary, without some inconsistency in his plan of instruction?[62]

The 'salvation' pictured by a penal doctrine of the atonement becomes a purely extrinsic matter, a forensic change of state from technically guilty before God to technically righteous before God, which can have no moral consequences.

In another book, the *Brazen Serpent*, Erskine squarely faces a penal substutionary doctrine of the atonement, describing it as '[o]ne answer that would be pretty generally given to [the question of why Christ came into the world]'.[63] Erskine's comments are generous, but blunt: 'I believe that the Spirit of God has made this view of the atonement spirit and life to many souls – and yet, I believe that, with some truth in it, it is a very defective view, to say the least of it.'[64] Erskine's first objection concerns the justice of substitution, which he meets with a strong doctrine of the 'mystical body' of Christ ('The whole nature is as one colossal man, of which Christ continues the head during the whole accepted time and day of salvation...'[65]). His second objection, more relevant to my argument, picks up again the demand that a doctrine of the atonement should have some moral outcome. '[H]e did not suffer the punishment of sin... to dispense with our suffering of it, but to change the character of our suffering, from an unsanctified and unsanctifying suffering into a sanctified and sanctifying suffering.'[66] Erskine's idea is that all punishment is reformatory, and so we should not want to escape the punishment for our sin, because only that punishment can make us holy; we must be punished in order to be reconciled. Right or wrong, the core of his complaint, that penal substitutionary doctrines of the atonement have no moral or ethical consequence, is clear.

All this background enables us to put recent Evangelical debates in a bit more context. In perhaps the most serious of the recent Evangelical critiques, Joel Green and Mark Baker offer five 'pressing questions' concerning the doctrine of penal substitution: Scriptural accuracy (is it consonant with Biblical teaching?); cultural conditioning (is it merely a product of modern culture?); cultural relevance (if so, will it continue to be helpful in a post-modern culture?); missional relevance (and will it be helpful in non-Western cultures?); and ethical issues (is the portrayal of justice meaningful, and is the theory ethically generative?).[67] Obviously, the last of these relates to the questions I have been discussing above. Let me then look at Green and Baker's criticisms in this area more carefully.

As first stated, the question about justice and the nature of God is directed at 'misunderstanding[s]' and 'caricature[s]' of penal substitution.[68] The view of the angry Father venting his wrath on the loving Son, and the more extreme language of 'divine child abuse' are to the fore here. By the time the agenda is summarised, however, it is less clear that such criticisms address only misrepresentations of the theory: it 'at the very least invites more careful articulation.'[69] Later in the book, when the theme re-emerges, the caution of the initial statement is lost completely. After a review of some recent criti-

cisms of atonement theology by feminist theologians, notably Rita Nakashima Brock, Beverly W. Harrison, and Carter Heyward, the authors offer their response:

> However we might want to urge... that atonement theology, either biblically or classically understood, is misappropriated and misrepresented when coerced into the popular mold of the model of penal substitution, the fact remains that [various manifestations of American Christianity] often represent this model as nothing less than *the* historical teaching of the Christian church. As such, when criticisms of this view are raised, we can do nothing less than admit straightforwardly that, on biblical and traditional grounds, this contemporary manifestation of atonement theology is both deficient and disturbing...'[70]

The criticism is now directed straightforwardly at penal substitution per se, not at any misrepresentation or caricature.[71]

What is particularly interesting about this criticism in Green and Baker's hands is that it is no longer primarily a theological criticism. McLeod Campbell cared what was being said about the doctrine of God itself; Green & Baker, following the feminist critics, care far more about the ethical consequences of what is being said about the doctrine of God. This doctrine 'represents the sadomasochism of Christian teaching at its most transparent';[72] it 'legitimates and perpetuates abuse in human relationships... advising the abused to participate in their own victimization.'[73] The 'scandal' is not what is being said about God, but '[t]hat atonement theology might be placed in the service of abusive behavior, and indeed serve to provide the divine imprimatur for that behavior...'[74]

Of course, this extension of the critique the theological implications of penal substitution to ethical issues is not new, although the link to child abuse might be. Timothy Gorringe's *God's Just Vengeance*[75] argued for a link between satisfaction theories of the atonement more generally, although most of his examples were advocates of a penal theory, and criminal justice systems.[76] René Girard has for some decades been advancing a sophisticated theory of scapegoating which interprets the gospel story as an act of reconciliation through the undoing of the primal violence of culture.[77] This has passed into Christian discourse through Walter Wink's discussion of 'the myth of redemptive violence',[78] which phrase is used regularly in criticisms of penal substitution, and more recently in J. Denney Weaver's book, *The Nonviolent Atonement*.[79] On all these tellings, satisfaction theories of the atonement, at least including, and sometimes paradigmatically, penal substitutionary theories, lead to an illegitimate acceptance of, or support for, violence.[80]

Green and Baker's second ethical critique is not the penal substitutionary theories promote improper ethics, but that they fail to promote proper ethics, or indeed any ethics at all. 'Proponents of this theory often leave little room for the importance of ethical comportment (sic)... Apart from allowing my name to be moved to the correct side of God's legal ledger, what significance has the cross of Christ for faith and life, according to this view?'[81] The point is expanded in the next paragraph:

> It is also true that this particular way of portraying the significance of the Jesus' death has had little voice in how we relate to one another in and outside of the church or in larger, social-ethical issues. That a central tenet of our faith might have little or nothing to say about racial reconciliation, for example, or issues of wealth and poverty, or our relationship to the cosmos, is itself a startling reality. It is all the more discomforting, though, when it is remembered that the death of Jesus was the consequence of social and political factors, as well as theological ones... a faith grounded in the cross of Christ is a faith that has profound and far-reaching, this-worldly implications.[82]

The form of this criticism is important. It is not that penal substitution as it has been taught has happened not to be applied to social or ethical issues, but that the very shape of the theory specifically denies the possibility of it having any relevance to such issues. Salvation, on this account, it is argued, is nothing more than a change of legal state; it provides no impetus, no motive, and no power for me to live in any other way than I have always lived, just as Erskine had argued. An account of the vertical dimension of reconciliation must have consequences for the horizontal dimension of reconciliation; if it does not, that is sufficient evidence that it is false.

Now, of course, it is rather obvious, and probably should have been to Green and Baker, that at most one of these criticisms can hold. If penal substitution justifies child abuse, violence, and punitive penal policies, then it rather obviously cannot

be a doctrine that is structurally unable to have any ethical consequences. For what it is worth, I regard the former position as more nearly right: Barth's Christological argument that every doctrine is at the same time an ethic just seems right, to me, and to criticize a profound and far-reaching statement of who God is and what he has done as having no ethical impetus shows an intolerably modernistic view of the nature of doctrine. The feminist and post-colonial theologians, schooled as they are in at least some aspects of postmodernity, are right in their methods, if not in their arguments: an account of what God has done necessarily contains within it an account of the way life is to be lived. If I disagree rather fundamentally as to what way of life is promoted by penal substitution, I suspect it is because I have a rather clearer view of what is actually taught by that doctrine than most American feminists, on which more in a moment.

The point I have been trying to make thus far is that, whereas in the nineteenth century criticisms of penal substitutionary ideas, particularly ideas about God, were at stake at least as much as actions, in the twenty-first century, ethics reigns supreme. This doctrine is held to be inadequate because it is ethically inadequate. It may be that a logical presentation could be made, that had an adequate account of justice, and did not distort the character of God; it may even be that the Biblical roots of the doctrine could be demonstrated to the satisfaction of all; but so long as the doctrine promotes, or at least does not prevent, violence and child abuse, it is not to be held to.

4. A Comparison and some conclusions

I have so far argued the following points:

1. that the core criticisms against the doctrine of free justification, the *articulus stantis vel cadentis ecclesiae*, from both Roman and Anabaptist opponents were ethical; the doctrine was inadequate because it either had no ethical import, and so gave no impetus to holy living, or it had unhelpful ethical import, in that it encouraged the continuance of carnal living;
2. that, particularly in the Reformed confessions, this doctrine was related closely to a penal substitutionary account of the atonement;
3. that recent criticisms of penal substitutionary accounts of the atonement by Evangelical writers have stressed, amongst other things, that the doctrine is inadequate because it either has no ethical import, and so gives no impetus to holy living, or it has unhelpful ethical import, in that it encourages or legitimates improper actions.

It seems to me, then, that there is an interesting comparison in the doctrine of reconciliation to be drawn between Roman and Anabaptist criticisms concerning justification in the sixteenth century and more recent criticisms of penal substitution. Let me therefore note a number of conclusions, deliberately moderately stated, that might follow from this comparison:

1. The comparison raises the question, already raised in passing above, as to whether the arguments concerning the lack of ethical implications of penal substitution hold. The sixteenth-century debates over justification show that it is possible to so describe a doctrine that it appears to be ethically weak, whilst ignoring the defences that can be mounted with a properly-ordered account of the doctrine in relation to other doctrines. The core Lutheran and Reformed defence against charges of antinomianism or cheap grace was to point to a wider matrix of teaching concerning reconciliation within which the doctrine of free justification stood as a central and defining part. Its ethical import, then, came not from a consideration of the doctrine itself in splendid isolation, but from a consideration of a more rounded theology of which it was a necessary and intrinsic component. I suppose, without attempting to demonstrate, that a similar defence could be made for the doctrine of penal substitution within Evangelical theology.
2. Further, the sixteenth-century examples include examples of pointing to the failings in the lives of those who claim to believe a particular doctrine of atonement (as the Anabaptists repeatedly did over justification) as evidence for its ethical weakness; this is a core part of the arguments of Green and Baker, and of others, against penal substitution; given this example, and others that could be drawn from the history of the Church, it is not clear to me that it is a helpful way of arguing. (The regular Reformation response to Anabaptist criticisms in this direction was to draw comparisons with Augustine's defences against

the Donatists; the doctrines of grace and belief in a mixed and imperfect visible church do seem to belong together.)

3. These thing said, no more direct lesson can be drawn from the sixteenth-century disputes to more recent debates without more research. That similar sorts of arguments were used does not mean that the same arguments have been used, hence my cautions about a too-easy willingness to condemn those of our sisters and brothers who object to penal substitution at the beginning.
4. There is perhaps a need to draw a very sharp distinction between Anabaptist-influenced criticisms of penal substitutionary atonement (Stuart Murray-Williams; J. Denney Weaver) and more general Evangelical criticisms. The former may well have an intellectual integrity, due to the coherence with the older Anabaptist witness against the Reformation doctrine of justification, which cannot be given to the latter. As I understand it, most Anabaptist-influenced Evangelicals in recent times have not been so ready to jettison the notion of justification by faith, rather holding to a middle way that stresses the genuinely transformative nature of true justifying faith; this weakens the point I am currently making, but does not remove it.

Let me finish by outlining both why the standard ethical criticism of penal substitution does not work, and some of the ethical consequences that do in fact follow from the position. In simplest outline, the standard criticism goes like this: penal doctrines picture an angry Father venting his rage on His Son, who, because of His love for humanity, bears the Father's violence uncomplainingly to protect us from it. The Son thus becomes the justifying example for abused women who become complicit victims of their partner's violence in the belief that by so doing they will protect the children, and so on. Now, let us first of all be fair: we have, I am sure, all seen tracts or heard evangelistic presentations which fit this caricature remarkably well. But let us next point out that it is a caricature: it stresses a separation between Father and Son which no informed Christian theology could ever countenance. Indeed, if we take seriously the claim of classical trinitarianism, codified by the sixth ecumenical council, that there is only one activity in the Godhead, we cannot even say that the Father and Son are engaged in similar or complementary actions; we have to say that they are about the same action.

(This is complicated a bit by Christology; the Council decreed that there are two activities in the incarnate Son, the one activity of the triune God, and a true and proper human activity. Given this, it might seem that a theologically sophisticated form of the 'divine child abuse' argument could be developed if any of its supporters actually understood the core grammar of Christian theology. This is not so, of course: insofar as the human nature, maintaining its own integrity of course, is anhypostatic of itself, and enhypostatic only in the hypostasis of the eternal logos [that is, the human nature of Christ has no independent existence apart from the incarnation of the divine Word], both activities of the hypostatic union are activities of the Second Person of the Trinity, and so there is no room to create the separation of activity necessary for the 'divine child abuse' argument to make sense. It would only work if we accepted straightforward Nestorianism in Christology.)

So, if the ethical import of an acceptance of penal substitutionary atonement is not the legitimation of domestic abuse, what is it? I suspect that there are many ethical ramifications of the doctrine, but let me note just two, one that I have written about before, and one that answers another common charge against penal doctrines of the atonement.

The first argument runs like this: one of the things a penal account of the atonement claims is that wrongdoing cannot be forgotten or hidden, but must be dealt with. This is asserted to be a part of the nature of things on a penal telling. Now, one of the big issues with sin in our world is the abuse of power to hide wrongdoing. Whether it is a politician using the power of office to hide his corruption or adultery, or a colonial oppressor murdering an entire village to eradicate all evidence of his theft, or a businesswoman using bribes and threats of unemployment to cover over her inappropriate financial dealings, the point is the same. But let me consider again child abuse: one of the enormously common features of child abuse is manipulation by the abuser using shame mechanisms to prevent the abused child from revealing what is going on. We all know, from direct pastoral experience or from the media, of cases where such silencing mechanisms have been effective for decades – it may be that there are many other cases where they have been effective for lifetimes, which naturally we don't know about. A penal account of the atonement, with a strong stress on the reality

and ineradicability of guilt maintains a witness that even the most successful oppressor or abuser will be held accountable for his or her crimes. This is an ethical consequence, which it seems to me speaks very directly and helpfully to certain aspects of our culture, which comes straight out of a penal doctrine of the atonement.

My second argument is an answer to the common complaint against, not just penal substitution, but any account of the atonement which presupposes the need for some sort of satisfaction. The argument as usually phrased goes like this: we are commanded in the Gospels to forgive without conditions; why then does God impose a condition – the death of His Son, no less – before He will forgive us? The answer, of course, is once again to point to the fact that it is God Himself who provides the lamb for the sacrifice. Penal substitutionary accounts of atonement teach in fact that God requires nothing of us; hence the connection with the Reformation doctrine of *sola fide*. Reconciliation comes to us as free gift, born of grace alone, known in Scripture alone, found in Christ alone, apprehended through faith alone, and directed to the glory of God alone. God does not ask us to do anything, precisely because He – Himself, and not another – remember the Trinitarian theology above – He has in and of Himself done everything necessary. And so the Gospel call is to go and do likewise. Understanding the atonement as an act of penal substitution teaches us that forgiveness is not free and easy, it is hard, hard as nails, and costly, even unto death. And thus when we are called to forgive freely we are called to love as God first loved us, to go to our sister or brother, to bear the pain and the cost, ourselves, whatever it may be, so that they may find in being reconciled to us, freely for them, costly and painful for us, some small echo of the way God has antecedently reconciled each of us to Himself through Christ – free, wonderfully, astonishingly, amazingly, free for us; costly and painful for Him.

Notes

1 This paper was originally delivered at the 2006 FEET conference. I am grateful for the comments I received there, and particularly to Prof Henri Blocher, who offered a response to the paper that was as perceptive as it was gracious.

2 'Once this has been established, namely that God alone justifies us solely by His grace through Christ, we are willing not only to bear the pope aloft on our hands but also to kiss his feet.' *LW* 26 p.99 (1535 Commentary on Galatians, on 2:6)

3 e.g., *quia isto articulo stante stat Ecclesia*, ruente ruet Ecclesia WA 40 III.352.

4 Alister E. McGrath *Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification* (2 vols) (Cambridge: CUP, 1986). See II.193 for Alsted and II.1 for the generality of the idea.

5 McGrath, II.18.

6 *Item docent, quod homines non possint justificari [Vergebung der sünde und Gerechtigkeit erlangen] coram Deo propriis viribus, meritis aut operibus, sed gratis [aus Gnaden] justificentur propter Christum per fidem, cum credunt se in gratiam recipi, et peccata remitti propter Christum, qui sua morte pro nostris peccatis satisfecit. Hanc fidem imputat Deus pro justicia coram ipso*. Text from Schaff.

7 Included in the Book of Concord.

8 Article 5 of Pt. II.

9 *In dictis Propheticis et Apostolicis, ubi de justificatione fidei agitur, vocabula 'justificare' et 'justificari' non idem, esse ac a peccatis absolvere et absolvi, et remissionem peccatorum consequi: sed nos per caritatem, a Spiritu Sancto infusam, per virtutes et per opera, quæ a caritate promanant, reipsa coram Deo justos fieri*. From the Epitome, Antithesis III; the Solid Declaration expands in like terms.

10 'Unser Herr Jesus Christus, der uns zur vollkommenen Erlösung und Gerechtigkeit geschenkt ist.' Q. 18 Antwort.

11 Canon IX: *Si quis dixerit, sola fide impium justificari, ita ut intelligat nihil aliud requiri, quod ad justificationis gratiam consequendam cooperetur, et nulla ex parte necesse esse, eum suæ voluntatis motu præparari atque disponi: anathema sit.*
Canon XI: *Si quis dixerit, homines justificari, vel sola imputatione justitiæ Christi, vel sola peccatorum remissione, exclusa gratia et caritate, quæ in cordibus eorum per Spiritum Sanctum diffundatur atque illis inhæreat; aut etiam gratiam, qua justificamur, esse tantum favorem Dei: anathema sit.*
(Texts from Schaff.)

12 *justificatio..., quæ non est sola peccatorum remissio, sed et sanctificatio et renovatio interioris hominis per voluntariam susceptionem gratiæ et donorum, unde homo ex injusto fit justus, et ex inimico amicus, ut sit heres secundum spem vitæ, æternæ.*

13 So McGrath, II.82.

14 Consider further: 'they, who by sins were alienated from God may be disposed through his quickening andassisting grace, to convert themselves to their own justification, by freely assenting to and co-operating with that said grace...' (Ch. V)

15 Decree on Satisfaction; see also Decree on Justification ch. VII & ch. IX.

16 I am using the translation found in Michael G. Baylor (ed. & tr.), *The Radical Reformation* (Cambridge: CUP, 1991), pp. 172-80.

17 From W.R. Estep, Jr (ed.), *Anabaptist Beginnings*

1523-1533: A Sourcebook (Nieuwkoop: B de Graaf, 1976), p. 38.

18 A translation can be found in Baylor, pp. 130-51; the attack of Lutheranism begins on p. 134: 'The carnal wisdom of this world...says that Christ has fulfilled the law, so we do not need to.'

19 Estep, p. 134.

20 I am using the English translations from H. Wayne Pipkin & John H. Yoder (trs & eds), *Balthasar Hubmaier (Classics of the Radical Reformation)* (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1989). The Eighteen Theses can be found on pp. 31-4; the quotation is thesis 1.

21 So, e.g., in 'A Christian Catechism' (Pipkin & Yoder pp. 340-65), 'Hans' confesses that 'the Law is now fulfilled in Christ, who has paid the debt of sin for us and has already vanquished death, devil, and hell.' (p. 347) Faith is simply belief in this truth (p. 348), although 'living faith' necessarily 'produces the fruits of the Spirit and works through love' (p. 348).

22 Pipkin & Yoder, pp. 426-91.

23 Pipkin & Yoder pp. 525-62.

24 Pipkin & Yoder p. 526.

25 Pipkin & Yoder p. 527.

26 Pipkin & Yoder, pp. 537-8. Both articles are however quite carefully written. Hubmaier confesses his belief in the virginity of Mary before, during, and after the birth of Christ, but says nothing in either direction concerning the gospel texts about Jesus's brothers (he does, however, condemn 'Helvidians'; Helvidius was opposed by St Jerome for teaching that Mary had other children by Joseph after Jesus; whether Hubmaier would have known the details of the debate, or just the standard form of condemnation, I do not know). His confession of the Blessed Virgin as the mother of God is a straightforward repeating of conciliar orthodoxy, condemning Nestorius. Hence, both articles are designed to appeal to a Roman Catholic king, without actually conceding very much.

27 See Klaus Deppermann, *Melchior Hoffmann: Social Unrest and Apocalyptic Visions in the Age of Reformation* (tr. M. Wrenn) (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1987) pp. 229-40 for a summary of Hoffmann's doctrine, on which I am relying.

28 Robert Friedmann, *The Theology of Anabaptism: An Intepretation* (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1973), p. 88.

29 The *Apology* was first issued in Latin in 1675. I have no access to a Latin edition. This English text is from Schaff, who dates it to the eighth English edition of 1765.

30 *Quod Christus carnem et sanguinem suum, non e Maria virgine assumserit, sed e cœlo attulerit.*

31 *Quod justitia nostra coram Deo, non in solo Christi merito, sed in renovatione atque adeo in nostra propria probitate, in qua ambulemus, consistat. Ea vero Anabaptistarum justitia magna ex parte electitia et humanitus excogitata quadam sanctimonia constat, et revera nil aliud est, quam novus quidam monachatus.*

32 *...nos prius justos esse, quam diligamus aut faciamus opera justa.* Ch. XV.5.

33 Willem Balke, *Calvin and the Anabaptist Radicals* (tr. W. Heynen) (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981).

34 *Inst. Elenc. Theol.* Topic XVI.

35 E.g., Augsburg Confession art. VI.

36 On which see most conveniently the catena of quotations in Schmid's *Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church* §48.

37 See similarly Heppe's *Reformed Dogmatics* ch.22.

38 *Nous croyons que Dieu étant très-parfaitement miséricordieux et aussi très-juste, a envoyé son Fils prendre la nature en laquelle la désobéissance avait été commise, pour porter, en elle, la punition du péché par sa très-rigoureuse mort et passion Dieu donc a déclaré sa justice envers son Fils, chargé de nos péchés, et a répandu sa bonté et miséricorde sur nous, coupables et dignes de damnation...* Art. XX.

39 Grensted's assertion that Turretin illustrates 'the uneasy self-consciousness of the later Penal theory' which is 'already on the defensive, not only against the criticism of its opponents, but also against the human instincts of its supporters' (L.W. Grensted, *A Short History of the Doctrine of the Atonement* (Manchester: M.U.P., 1920), p. 245) seems to me to have more to do with Grensted's feelings about penal theology than Turretin's. Certainly Turretin is writing in elenctic mode, and so with a continual consciousness of the arguments that have been advanced against this theory; but I see nothing uneasy in his defence.

40 '[I]n the daily course of natural providence, it is appointed that innocent people should suffer for the faults of the guilty' and so that 'vicarious punishment is a providential appointment of every day's experience.' Joseph Butler, *The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature* (London: RTS, n.d), pp.224-5.

41 Again in 'Ransomed, Healed,...'

42 John McLeod Campbell, *The Nature of the Atonement* (with a new introduction by James B. Torrance) (Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1996), pp. 81-104; the quotation is the chapter title.

43 Campbell, p. 71; italics original.

44 'Calvinism, as recently modified, differs from the earlier Calvinism in these points. First, as to the reference of the atonement, which is held to have been for all men and not for the elect only.' Campbell, p. 81

45 Campbell, p. 81.

46 The writers Campbell quotes as representatives of this new Calvinism include Thomas W. Jenkyn, *On the Extent of the Atonement in its Relation to God and the Universe*; Andrew Fuller; William Stroud, *A Treatise on the Physical Cause of the Death of Christ and Its Relation to the Principles and Practices of Christian-*

ity; John Pye Smith, *Four Discourse on the Sacrifice and Priesthood of Jesus Christ…*; Ralph Wardlaw, *Discourses on the Nature and Extent of the Atonement of Christ*; and most often, George Payne, *On the Reality of the Atonement*. Fuller is noted solely for introducing a distinction which he did in fact use; Pye Smith does not, as far as I can see, fit Campbell's picture of 'modified Calvinism'; the other works are unknown to me.

47 Campbell, p. 82, my italics.

48 *Ibid*; my italics; the grammar of this sentence is obscure to me (I suspect that it should begin 'All that…' rather than 'All the…'), but the broad sense is plain enough.

49 Grensted, p. 251, in connection with the supposed softening of penal doctrines in later Protestant scholasticism.

50 Grensted, p. 279, in the course of an argument why Edwards, and all successful evangelists who hold to the penal theory, are 'most convincing when [they are] least consistent.'

51 Grensted, p. 306, on the rise of Grotianism.

52 Grensted, pp. 312-3.

53 See *The Brazen Serpent; or, Life coming through Death* (Edinburgh: Waugh & Innes, 1831), pp. 36-9.

54 *Extracts of Letters to a Christian Friend by a Lady, with an Introductory Essay by Thomas Erskine* (Greenock: R.B. Lusk, 1830).

55 p. xiv.

56 p. xliv.

57 Thomas Erskine, *The Unconditional Freeness of the Gospel in Two Essays* (Edinburgh: Waugh & Innes, 18314).

58 *Unconditional Freeness*, p. 1.

59 *Unconditional Freeness*, p. 5.

60 *Unconditional Freeness*, p. 9.

61 *Unconditional Freeness*, p.22. Elsewhere Erskine comments: '[o]thers… have talked disparagingly of holiness and obedience, and have treated of faith as if it were the channel of justification, merely in virtue of an arbitrary appointment of God, and without any reference to is moral effect on the human character.' *An Essay on Faith* (Edinburgh: Waugh & Innes, 1822[2]), p. 3.

62 *Unconditional Freeness*, p. 143.

63 Thomas Erskine, *The Brazen Serpent: or, Life Coming through Death* (Edinburgh: Waugh & Innes, 18312), p. 36.

64 *Brazen Serpent*, p. 36.

65 *Brazen Serpent*, p. 38.

66 *Brazen Serpent*, p. 39.

67 Joel B. Green and Mark D. Baker, *Recovering the Scandal of the Cross: Atonement in New Testament and Contemporary Contexts* (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2000), pp. 27-32.

68 Green & Baker, p. 30.

69 Green & Baker, p.32.

70 Green & Baker, p. 92 (italics original).

71 It is, I suppose, just possible to read into this paragraph a distinction between 'the popular/contemporary model of penal substitution', which is itself a caricature, and some more scholarly presentation. There is no hint that Green and Baker do this, however. Indeed, a paragraph or two later there is a clear statement of a programme to 'reject penal-substitutionary atonement' (p.93).

72 Harrison & Heyward, cited by Green & Baker, p. 92.

73 Green & Baker, p. 92.

74 Green & Baker, p. 92.

75 Timothy Gorringe, *God's Just Vengeance: Crime, Violence and the Rhetoric of Salvation* (Cambridge: CUP, 1996).

76 A link I find wholly convincing – see my 'Ransomed, Healed,…' – although I do not except Gorringe's argument that the cause is from theology to culture, or his (rather quaintly modernist) attempt to imagine a different social praxis in the last chapter.

77 See, for example, his Violence and the Sacred (tr. Patrick Gregory) (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1977); *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World: Research undertaken in collaboration with Jean-Michel Oughourlian and Guy Lefort* (tr. Stephen Bann and Michael Metteer) (London: Athlone, 1987); Job: Victim of his people (London: Athlone, 1987).

78 Walter Wink, *Engaging the Powers: Discernment and Resistance in a World of Domination* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), pp. 13-31.

79 J. Denney Weaver, *The Nonviolent Atonement* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001). See especially pp. 46-9.

80 I have noted before now that the acceptance of such ideas into Christian discourse should not have been as easy as it was. Girard is honest that he can only substantiate his claims through a straightforward rejection of various bits of the Bible, notably the book of Hebrews, and an idiosyncratic Christology which denies any classical sense of the true deity of Christ.

81 Green & Baker, p. 31.

82 Green & Baker, p. 31.

EuroJTh (2007) 16:2, 107–112 0960–2720

Liebende Selbsthingabe Als Anfanghafter Glaube?

Antwort An Thomas Gerold, ~~Europäische Theologische Zeitschrift XVI, 2007, S. 5-12.~~

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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

In dem Artikel „Liebende Selbsthingabe als anfanghafter Glaube? Überlegungen zur Heilschance für den Nichtchristen" (*Europäische Theologische Zeitschrift* XVI, 2007, S. 5-12) vertritt Gerold die These, dass liebende Selbsthingabe möglicherweise als anfänglicher Christusglaube zu interpretieren und somit heilsbringend sei. Ein solcher Ansatz zum Heil des Nichtchristen weist jedoch entscheidende Schwachpunkte auf: Er nimmt, meines Erachtens, die nichtchristlichen Ansätze in der ihnen eigenen Begründung für liebende Selbsthingabe nicht ausreichend ernst, kann dazu führen, die eschatologische Trennung von Geretteten und Verlorenen zu vernachlässigen und das Liebesgebot auf die horizontale Beziehung zum Nächsten einzuengen. Vor allem entbehrt die These jeder biblischen Grundlage. Die auf der Schöpfung aufbauende allgemeine Gnade darf nicht mit der heilsschaffenden Gnade verwechselt werden. Insbesondere besteht der zur Rettung nötige Glaube nicht in der Nachahmung der Selbsthingabe Jesu, sondern im Vertrauen auf den stellvertretenden Opfertod Jesu. Somit liegt der These Gerolds ein schwerwiegendes Missverständnis bzgl. des Eigentlichen des Glaubens zugrunde, so dass sie nicht der reformatorischen Ablehnung der Werkgerechtigkeit Rechnung tragen kann. Zum Schluss gehe ich auf die Frage ein, inwieweit es möglich ist, Rettung auch ohne expliziten Christusglauben anzunehmen, ohne dabei den Boden biblisch begründeter evangelischer Theologie zu verlassen.

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SUMMARY

In his article 'Liebende Selbsthingabe als anfanghafter Glaube? Überlegungen zur Heilschance für den Nichtchristen' (*European Journal of Theology* XVI, 2007, pp. 5-12), Gerold defends the thesis that loving self-offering could be interpreted as an incipient faith in Christ and thereby salvific. Yet such an approach to the salvation of non-Christians displays definite weaknesses: the disregard for the foundation for loving self-offering present included also in certain non-Christian positions; the danger of overlooking the eschatological separation of the saved and the lost and of narrowing the love-commandment to the horizontal relationship to one's neighbour; a lack of Scriptural evidence; a confusion of common and saving grace; a misunderstanding of the nature of the faith required for salvation. In conclusion, I raise the question of how far it is possible to accept that salvation can be without explicit faith in Christ without abandoning the ground of biblically grounded evangelical theology.

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RÉSUMÉ

Dans l'article «Liebende Selbsthingabe als anfanghafter Glaube? Überlegungen zur Heilschance für den Nichtchristen» (*Journal Européen de Théologie* XVI, 2007, pp. 5-12), Gerold défend la thèse selon laquelle un don de soi par amour pour autrui pourrait être vu comme une foi embryonnaire en Christ et apporterait alors le salut. Une telle approche du salut des non chrétiens manifeste pourtant des faiblesses significatives: l'oubli de certains comptes rendus non chrétiens de l'altruisme; le danger de négliger la séparation eschatologique entre sauvés et damnés et de réduire le commandement de l'amour à la relation horizontale avec le prochain; un appui bibli-

que défaillant; la confusion entre la grâce commune et la grâce qui sauve; une mauvaise compréhension de la nature de la foi qui sauve. À la fin, j'apporte quelques éléments de réflexion en réponse à la question de savoir dans quelle mesure il est possible de postuler un accès au salut sans foi explicite en Christ, sans pour autant quitter le cadre d'une théologie protestante ancrée dans les Écritures.

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Einleitung[1]

Da der Herausgeber ausdrücklich in seinem „Editorial" gewünscht hat, dass kontrastierende Stellungnahmen zum Thema des Heils von Nichtchristen eingesandt werden, erlaube ich mir – angeregt durch Kollegen – meine Bedenken gegenüber der von Thomas Gerold in „Liebende Selbsthingabe als anfanghafter Glaube? Überlegungen zur Heilschance für den Nichtchristen" (*Europäische Theologische Zeitschrift* XVI, 2007, S. 5-12) vertretenen These zu formulieren. Auch wenn ich mich dabei – wie in einer kritischen Stellungnahme üblich – auf die Aspekte der Arbeit Gerolds konzentriere, die ich als problematisch empfinde, sei ausdrücklich darauf hingewiesen, dass gewisse andere Aspekte sehr zu schätzen sind. So sollte man z.B. beachten, dass Gerold die ewige Gottessohnschaft Jesu betont und ausdrücklich eine Lösung anstrebt, die trinitarischen Charakters ist (S. 6, 9). Ebenso lehnt er es ab, nichtchristliche Religionen als Heilswege anzuerkennen (S. 6). Trotzdem erscheint mir die Kernaussage seines Artikels, dass liebende Selbsthingabe möglicherweise als anfänglicher Christusglaube zu interpretieren und somit heilsbringend sei, als nicht haltbar. Der Übersicht halber stelle ich meine Einwände in sechs Thesen dar:

1. Nichtchristliche Ansätze müssen in der ihnen eigenen Begründung für liebende Selbsthingabe ernst genommen werden.

Gerolds These, dass liebende Selbsthingabe als anfänglicher Christusglaube zu interpretieren sei, baut wesentlich auf seiner Überzeugung auf, dass nichtchristliche Religionen und atheistische Weltanschauungen nicht wirklich eine schlüssige Begründung für selbstlose Liebe liefern können. So geht er z.B. davon aus, dass „im Boddhisatva-Ideal ein Teil des Buddhismus seine Ursprünge" übertrifft. Somit „stellt sich die Frage, ob [...] nicht ein Buddhist, der den am stärksten die Liebe betonenden Elementen seiner Religion folgt, auf die Dauer beim Christentum angelangen müsste" (S. 8). Ebenso kann der evolutionäre Naturalist nur in Spannung zu seinem Weltbild selbstlos handeln (S. 7) Eine solche Einschätzung nichtchristlicher Ansätze nimmt diese jedoch nicht in ihrer Eigenart ausreichend ernst.

So hat der Buddhismus z.B. eine vom Christentum so unterschiedliche Einschätzung der Realität, dass es meines Erachtens abwegig ist, eine Kontinuität zwischen dem Boddhisatva-Ideal und dem Kreuz Christi zu suggerieren. Der Buddhismus entwirft ein grundlegend anderes Weltbild (in dem z.B. weder das Göttliche noch eine binäre Logik im westlichen Sinne Platz haben), das in seiner radikalen Andersartigkeit geachtet werden sollte. Die selbstlose Hilfe eines Boddhisatva (der vorerst darauf verzichtet ins Nirvana einzugehen, um Anderen zu helfen, dem Kreislauf der Wiedergeburten zu entrinnen) kann nur dann mit dem Heilswerk Christi am Kreuz in Verbindung gesetzt werden, wenn man von allen theologischen und metaphysischen Kategorien absieht und sich ganz auf die moralische Dimension der liebenden Selbsthingabe konzentriert. Das von einem Boddhisatva verfolgte Ziel ist jedoch in ganz entscheidender Hinsicht dem Heil im christlichen Sinne entgegen gesetzt, da es weder die Begegnung mit dem Göttlichen noch ein persönliches Überleben des Menschen kennt, ja diese sogar gerade ablehnt.

Ebenso gibt es sehr wohl Möglichkeiten, altruistisches Verhalten im Rahmen einer evolutionären Ethik zu rechtfertigen. Wenn man als Ziel nicht das Überleben des Einzelnen, sondern das der Gruppe sieht (und dies ist wesentlich naheliegender in einem solchen Ansatz), so ist liebende Selbsthingabe sogar leicht zu begründen. Dass viele Arten altruistische Verhaltensweisen entwickelt haben (man denke nur an die Aufopferung, die häufig zum Heranziehen der Jungen nötig ist[2]), ist – im Rahmen eines evolutionären Ansatzes – sogar ein eindeutiger Beweis des Selektionsvorteils von Selbsthingabe des Einzelnen zum Wohle der Gruppe. Somit kann evolutionäre Ethik sehr wohl die theoretische Begründung von liebender Selbsthingabe leisten.[3] Damit entfällt jedoch ein entscheidendes Argument Gerolds, liebende Selbsthingabe des Nichtchristen auf die Menschwerdung und den Kreuzestod des Gottessohnes hin zu ordnen.

2. Die eschatologische Trennung von Geretteten und Verlorenen darf nicht abgeschwächt werden.

Es ist nicht eindeutig klar, ob Gerold seinen Ansatz als Heilsversprechen für alle (oder zumindest die allermeisten) Nichtchristen ansieht oder ob er eine Gruppe von Nichtchristen im Auge hat, die sich durch besonders selbstloses Verhalten hervortut. Wenn er im Schlussteil vom « Heil des Nichtchristen » spricht und uns dazu auffordert, « das Gute im Nichtchristen ausdrücklich zu würdigen und in ihm zumindest in anfanghafter Weise einen Bruder oder eine Schwester zu sehen » (S. 10), so scheint er tatsächlich einen sehr weit gefassten Begriff des anfanghaften (und heilsbringenden) Glaubens zu haben. Denn sowohl die Erfahrung als auch Hinweise in der Schrift (Lk 11,13; Rö 2,14) legen nahe, dass viele, wenn nicht sogar alle Menschen ein gewisses Maß an selbstloser Liebe aufbringen.

Nun gibt es jedoch eine unausweichliche Fülle von Schriftbelegen, die die eschatologische Trennung der Menschheit in zwei Gruppen darstellen (Jes 66,24; Dan 12,2; Mt 25,46; Mk 9,47f; Lk 16,19ff; Offb 14,11 etc.). Dabei ist es nicht ausreichend, diese biblische Lehre auf ihre paränetische Funktion einzugrenzen und sie nur als dringenden Ruf zur rechtzeitigen Buße zu verstehen; denn die ewige Verdammnis wird auch in anderen Kontexten erwähnt. So darf etwa der verfolgte Christ aus der Perspektive des kommenden Gerichts über die Gottlosen Mut für seine jetzige Lage schöpfen (2. Thess 1,4-10). Ebenso sagen gewisse Textstellen die tatsächliche Verdammnis bestimmter Menschen voraus (Offb 19,20). Damit ist die ewige Verdammnis eines Teils der Menschheit in jedem Fall als Faktum von der evangelischen Theologie ernst zu nehmen und die damit entstehenden Fragen zu behandeln. Gewisse Textstellen laufen dabei sogar einer zu optimistischen Einschätzung des Anteils der Geretteten entgegen (Lk 13,23f).

3. Die vom Gesetz geforderte Liebe darf nicht auf die horizontale Dimension eingeengt werden, sondern umschließt entscheidend die Liebe zu Gott.

Wenn Gerold wiederholt von der „liebenden Selbsthingabe des Nichtchristen" spricht, so bleibt zunächst unklar, wer die Adressaten solcher Liebe sind. Es erscheint mir jedoch offensichtlich, dass der Autor die horizontale Dimension im Blick hat, d.h. die Selbsthingabe ist auf andere Menschen gerichtet. Nun weist die Bibel immer wieder darauf hin, dass eine Gott wohlgefällige Religion die Liebe zum Mitmenschen mit einschließt (Jes 58,6; Jak 1,27), jedoch darf sie keineswegs darauf reduziert werden. So gehört Liebe zu Gott und Liebe zum Menschen zusammen, wie etwa die beiden Tafeln des Dekalogs oder das Doppelgebot der Liebe unterstreichen. Die alttestamentlichen Propheten verurteilen Götzendienst *und* soziale Ungerechtigkeit. Auch im ersten Hauptteil des Römerbriefs, der die Sündhaftigkeit aller Menschen beweist, kommen die vertikale und die horizontale Dimension zusammen, wobei Paulus eindeutig die Ablehnung des Schöpfergottes als Wurzel der Sünde im zwischenmenschlichen Bereich sieht (Rö 1,24.26.28). Deshalb ist es nicht zulässig, die geforderte Liebe auf die horizontale Ebene einzugrenzen und die Frage nach der direkten Gottesbeziehung des Nichtchristen außer Acht zu lassen. Selbst das Kreuz Christi, das ja nach Gerolds Auffassung durch die liebende Selbsthingabe des Nichtchristen nachgeahmt wird, ist entscheidend Hingabe an Gott (Hb 9,14). Somit ist es nicht einsichtig, wieso liebende Selbsthingabe zum Mitmenschen die Ablehnung Gottes beim Nichtchristen aufwiegen sollte; denn der Glaube, ohne den es unmöglich ist, Gott zu gefallen, schließt nach Hb 11,6, gerade die Überzeugung mit ein, dass Gott „ist und dass er denen, die ihn suchen, ihren Lohn gibt".

4. Die These, dass liebende Selbsthingabe anfanghafter Glaube ist, entbehrt jeder biblischen Grundlage.

Evangelische Theologie lebt vom Schriftbezug. Aber gerade hier offenbart sich eine entscheidende Schwäche von Gerolds These. Der einzige Bibeltext, den ich in seinem Artikel als Beleg für seine These habe finden können, betrifft das Gleichnis vom Weltgericht in Mt 25,31-46. Dies ist jedoch sicherlich eine unzureichende Ausgangsbasis für eine solch weitreichende Neuformulierung des heilsbringenden Glaubens, wie sie Gerold vornimmt. Insbesondere sollte die literarische Gattung des Textes uns zu großer Vorsicht mahnen, eine neue Lehrmeinung auf ihn zu stützen.

Ohne hier eine Exegese dieser viel diskutierten Schriftstelle zu wagen, erlaube ich mir darauf hinzuweisen, dass es nicht klar ist, dass das Gleichnis tatsächlich vom Heil des Nichtchristen handelt. Zum einen ist es Teil der Endzeitreden Jesu und richtet sich somit an die Jünger Jesu, um sie auf die

kommenden Schwierigkeiten vorzubereiten. Zum anderen betrifft das Erstaunen der „Schafe" (und der „Böcke") nicht die Tatsache, dass Jesus der Herr ist (wie man dies von Menschen erwarten könnte, die nie mit der christlichen Botschaft in Berührung gekommen sind), sondern die Tatsache, dass Liebesdienste am „geringsten der Brüder Jesu" dem Herrn selbst gegolten haben. Hinzu kommt, dass im Mittelpunkt des Textes nicht die Art der erwiesenen Wohltaten steht (das Thema der liebenden Selbsthingabe kommt so überhaupt nicht im Text vor), sondern die Besonderheit der Empfänger der Liebesdienste. Falls man in den „Brüdern Jesu" Jünger sieht (wie dies durchgehend im NT der Fall ist: siehe Mt 12,49f; 28,10; Joh 20,17; Rö 8,29; Hb 2,11.17), handelt das Gleichnis auf jeden Fall nicht von Menschen, die nie mit der christlichen Botschaft in Berührung gekommen sind, da sie ja gerade mit Christen zu tun hatten. Zumindest machen diese knappen Bemerkungen deutlich, dass Mt 25,31-46 eine unzureichende Schriftgrundlage für die von Gerold vertretene These ist.

5. Die auf der Schöpfung aufbauende allgemeine Gnade darf nicht mit der heilsschaffenden Gnade verwechselt werden.

Nun versucht Gerold über biblische Belege hinaus, auf dogmatische Weise seinen Ansatz begründen: Er weist darauf hin, dass liebende Selbsthingabe im Christen Frucht der göttlichen Gnade ist und dass ähnliches Verhalten im Nichtchristen analog auch auf den Heiligen Geist zurückzuführen ist, woraus er dann auf eine Zuordnung auf Christus hin des so handelnden Nichtchristen schließt (S. 8). Nun ist es tatsächlich reformatorische Überzeugung, dass jedes gute Werk auf das Wirken göttlicher Gnade zurückzuführen ist. Dass die Sünde im gefallenen Menschen nicht zur vollständigen und damit alles Gute vernichtenden Entfaltung kommt, verdankt der Sünder nicht einem von der Verdorbenheit ausgenommenen „guten Kern" im Menschen, sondern dem gnädigen Handeln Gottes, der auch sein gefallenes Geschöpf nicht aufgibt.

Diese „allgemeine" Gnade darf jedoch nicht mit der heilsschaffenden Gnade in der Erlösung verwechselt werden. Es ist sicherlich richtig, sie als Folge des Heilsplanes Gottes für die Menschheit anzusehen: Da die Erlösung sich in der Geschichte entfaltet, lässt Gott Geduld walten und räumt allen Menschen, auch denen die schlussendlich nicht gerettet werden, „Gnadenzeit" ein (2. Pt 3,9). Damit kann man auch in der allgemeinen Gnade eine Auswirkung des Kreuzes Christi erkennen. Dies bedeutet aber nicht, dass sie die Errettung des Einzelnen mit einschließt. Sie gilt dem zeitlichen Wohl des Menschen; durch sie wird dem Sünder – gerade auch als Sünder – die Möglichkeit gegeben, während des irdischen Lebens von den guten Gaben der Schöpfung zu profitieren (Mt 5,45; Apg 14,16f). Dies betrifft auch die im Menschen durch die Schöpfung angelegten Fähigkeiten, so auch gerade die Fähigkeit zu lieben. Somit ist der Überzeugung Gerolds zuzustimmen, dass jede liebende Selbsthingabe auch des Nichtchristen als Wirkung der göttlichen Gnade einzuordnen ist; daraus folgt aber *nicht* das Heil des so handelnden Nichtchristen. Denn die allgemeine Gnade hebt die eschatologische Trennung zwischen Gläubigen und Ungläubigen nicht auf. Deshalb ist es auch unbegründet, aus der liebenden Selbsthingabe der Nichtchristen auf « eine anfanghafte Gemeinschaft mit Christus », die auf Glauben beruht, zu schließen (S. 9).

Sobald man erkennt, dass die allgemeine Gnade Gottes in allen lebenden Menschen dem Wirken der Sünde Grenzen setzt, merkt man auch, dass es nicht zulässig ist, aus dem Evangelium ähnlichen Elementen im Handeln von Nichtchristen auf deren mögliche Gemeinschaft mit Christus zu schließen. Nach den beiden ersten Kapiteln des Römerbriefs ist der Sünder ja gerade der „Mensch im Widerspruch". Durch die Gottesoffenbarung in der Schöpfung weiß er um Gott, will ihn aber nicht als solchen anerkennen – er „hält die Wahrheit in Ungerechtigkeit gefangen" (Rö 1,18). Sein Gewissen bezeugt ihm seine moralische Verantwortung, der er sich jedoch immer wieder entziehen will (Rö 2,15f). Paulus geht sogar so weit zu sagen, dass die Heiden das Gesetz „von Natur aus" tun (Rö 2,14). Dies umschließt mit Sicherheit das Liebesgebot, in dem ja gerade das Gesetz seinen höchsten Ausdruck findet (Rö 13,10). Damit gehört es zum Eigentlichen der Situation des Ungläubigen, dass in seinen Überzeugungen und in seinem Handeln Richtiges und Verkehrtes vermischt sind. Daraus folgert nun Paulus jedoch gerade nicht das Heil aller Menschen, sondern deren nicht zu leugnende Schuld vor Gott. Gerade die Überreste des Guten beweisen, wie unentschuldbar der Sünder ist, nicht alle Ehre Gott zu geben (Rö 1,20; 2,1.12; 3,9f).

6. Heilsschaffender Glaube ist nicht Nachahmung der Selbsthingabe Jesu, sondern Vertrauen auf den stellvertretenden Opfertod Jesu.

Letztendlich liegt dem Ansatz Gerolds ein schwerwiegendes Missverständnis über das Wesen des Glaubens zugrunde: Aus der Ähnlichkeit liebender Selbsthingabe mit dem Heilshandeln Jesu (verbunden mit der angeblichen Unmöglichkeit, solch selbstloses Handeln in einem nichtchristlichen Weltbild zu begründen) schließt Gerold auf einen anfänglichen Glauben im so handelnden Nichtchristen. Nun wehrt er sich ausdrücklich gegen den Vorwurf der Werkgerechtigkeit (S. 9f); jedoch ist es nicht einsichtig, wie er diesem Vorwurf tatsächlich entkommen könnte. Denn heilsentscheidend ist in seinem Ansatz das menschliche Handeln, wobei das Kreuz Christi in seiner Beispielfunktion wirkt (auch wenn dies dem Nichtchristen nicht bewusst ist). Rettender Glaube besteht aber nach dem einheitlichen neutestamentlichen Zeugnis gerade nicht in der (bewussten oder unbewussten) Nachahmung der Selbsthingabe Jesu am Kreuz, sondern im Vertrauen darauf, dass Christus stellvertretend die Strafe für unsere Sünde am Kreuz getragen hat. Die sehr präzise geführte Auseinandersetzung des Apostels im dritten Kapitel des Römerbriefs (und ebenso an anderen Stellen, wie z.B. im Galaterbrief) macht deutlich, dass hier kein Kompromiss möglich ist: Entweder ist die Rechtfertigung aus Glauben oder aber aus Werken (seien sie als „liebende Selbsthingabe" oder sonst wie definiert).

Eine Verfeinerung des Ansatzes Gerolds (die ich nicht so in seinem Artikel gefunden habe) könnte darin bestehen, liebende Selbsthingabe nicht mit anfänglichem Christusglauben gleichzusetzen, sondern solches Handeln nur als untrügliches *Zeichen* eines solchen Glaubens anzusehen. Damit würde man dem Vorwurf der Werkgerechtigkeit entgehen, was jedoch nicht alle Schwierigkeiten aus dem Weg räumt. Auch wenn es neutestamentliche Lehre ist, dass sich echter Glaube in guten Werken erweist (Jak 2,14ff), ist der umgekehrte Schluss – von den Werken auf den Glauben – damit noch nicht gerechtfertigt. Wie soll man sich insbesondere Glauben, der sich seiner nicht bewusst ist, vorstellen, ja der sogar mit der expliziten Ablehnung des Schöpfergottes (wie z.B. beim Atheisten oder Buddhisten) einhergehen kann?

Ausblick

Bedeutet die Zurückweisung des von Gerold vorgeschlagenen Ansatzes, dass alle, die nicht ausdrücklich Jesus als HERRN bekennen, verloren gehen? Bevor ich abschließend versuche skizzenhaft auf diese Frage einzugehen, sei darauf hingewiesen, dass praktisches Handeln – in Evangelisation und Mission – gefragt ist, wenn diese Perspektive uns als beunruhigend erscheint (was sie ja auch tatsächlich ist!). Auch wenn Theologen dies nicht immer genehm ist, muss klar sein, dass die an dieser Stelle nötige Antwort nicht zuerst spekulativ-intellektueller Art sein kann, sondern konkretes Handeln gefragt ist. Die erschreckende Aussicht der ewigen Verdammnis sollte uns zu brennenderer und eifrigerer Evangeliumsverkündigung anspornen. Theologische Spekulationen sind dabei zweitrangig, und wir sollten der Versuchung widerstehen, durch eine zu optimistische Einschätzung der Heilschancen von Nichtchristen unser Gewissen zu beruhigen. Einzig ein aufmerksames Hören auf die Heilige Schrift kann uns zu einer realistischen Einstellung bei diesem schwierigen und schmerzhaften Thema helfen.

Nun scheint es mir jedoch tatsächlich gewisse Hinweise in der Bibel zu geben, die darauf schließen lassen, dass manche Menschen auch ohne explizit formulierten Christusglauben gerettet werden. Den eindeutigsten Beleg liefern die Gläubigen des Alten Bundes: So sprach Jesus davon, dass Abraham seinen Tag gesehen und sich darüber gefreut hatte (Joh 8,56) – obwohl offensichtlich Abraham nicht in irgendeiner expliziten Weise an Jesu Opfertod glauben konnte. Ebenso kannte David den rettenden Glauben an die Gnade Gottes (Ps 32,1f, in Rö 4,6-8 zitiert). Jedoch lässt sich das Beispiel Abrahams und Davids nicht ohne Weiteres auf die heutigen Nichtchristen übertragen, da diese alttestamentlichen Heiligen ja sehr wohl mit der Offenbarung Gottes in seinem Wort in Kontakt waren (Ps 103,7; Rö 3,2). Eine direktere Parallele bilden biblische Figuren, wie Melchisedek, die außerhalb des Bundesvolkes und damit der verbalen Offenbarung standen und trotzdem als echte Gläubige anzusehen sind. Dabei ist natürlich nicht auszuschließen, dass Melchisedek eine spezielle Offenbarung zuteil geworden war; er war aber auf jeden Fall schon „Priester des höchsten Gottes" (1 Mose 14,18), bevor er mit Abraham und damit mit der Tradition, die in die Offenbarung der Heiligen Schrift einmünden würde, in Kontakt kam.

Bedeutet ein Zulassen des Heils ohne explizi-

ten Christusglauben, dass man damit doch wieder auf einen ähnlichen Ansatz wie den von Gerold vertretenen zurück kommt? Keineswegs; denn Paulus macht in Römer 4 deutlich, dass die alttestamentlichen Gläubigen aufgrund ihres Vertrauens in Gottes Gnade gerechtfertigt wurden. In analoger Form kann man vermuten, dass der Heilige Geist in gewissen Menschen auch ohne direkten Kontakt mit dem Evangelium ein Bewusstsein ihres sündhaften Zustandes erzeugt und bewirkt, dass sie sich ganz der Gnade des sich ihnen in der Schöpfung offenbarenden Gottes anbefehlen. Eine solche Möglichkeit zuzulassen, schmälert in keiner Weise den Missionseifer; denn sowohl in der Bibel als auch in unserer Erfahrung sind solche Menschen selten. Missionare, die als erste Christen in eine bestimmte Volksgruppe kommen, berichten manchmal davon, dass sich einzelne bekehren, sobald sie mit dem Evangelium in Kontakt kommen. Es scheint ganz ihren Erwartungen zu entsprechen, sodass eine allererste Verkündigung ausreicht, damit sie Christen werden. Es handelt sich dabei jedoch um Ausnahmen; im Regelfall braucht es eine länger anhaltende Wortverkündigung, bis der Sünder seinen Zustand einsieht und in der Gnade Gottes Zuflucht sucht.

Egal wie man zu der Möglichkeit des Heils auch ohne expliziten Christusglauben steht (und in Anbetracht der spärlichen biblischen Belege muss jede Übersetzung mit Vorsicht vertreten werden), bleibt auf jeden Fall festzuhalten, dass der „normale" Heilsweg immer die Wortverkündigung mit einschließt. Insbesondere müssen wir jedem Versuch widerstehen, eine zweite Heilsmöglichkeit neben dem Vertrauen in die rettende Gnade Gottes zu suggerieren. Auf keinen Fall darf wie auch immer geartetes menschliches Handeln die Basis des Heils werden: Die Rettung wird dem Sünder aus Gnade zuteil, aufgrund seines Glaubens, der auf Gott ausgerichtet ist und eben gerade nicht als menschliches Werk aufgefasst werden darf.

Notes

1 Mein Dank gilt Henri Blocher und Sylvain Romerowski, die eine frühere Fassung meiner Antwort gelesen und mir wertvolle Anregungen gegeben haben. Insbesondere der dritte Kritikpunkt ist aus unseren Diskussionen hervorgegangen.

2 Bei gewissen Tierarten, wie etwa den südafrikanischen Erdmännchen, wird diese Fürsorge sogar auch von anderen als den Eltern vorgenommen.

3 Genauer gesagt, gelingt es einem solchen naturalistischen Ansatz genauso gut (vermutlich sogar besser), altruistische Verhaltensweisen zu rechtfertigen, als den legendären „Kampf ums Dasein" zu begründen. Die grundsätzliche Frage, ob es je möglich ist, aus der Naturwissenschaft eine gültige Ethik herzuleiten, bleibt davon unberührt. Schon David Hume wies darauf hin, dass man nicht vom „Sein" aufs „Soll" schließen kann (solange man eine wertfreie Wirklichkeit voraussetzt, wie es ja der Naturalist tut).

EuroJTh (2007) 16:2, 113–119 0960–2720

The Church and the churches: A Dogmatic Essay on Ecclesial Invisibility

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SUMMARY

I will sketch a dogmatic account of the Church and the churches – thereby reframing a Reformed affirmation of Christian unity – in light of the observable splintering of the institutions and contexts tied to Christendom. In so doing, the life of the Church will be considered as related to four foci: the doctrine of God, the economy of salvation, eschatology, and the relation of true and false churches to the Church. The dogmatic necessity of the invisible Church within ecclesiology will be suggested, and the effects of such a doctrine for assessing denominational divisions and the place of ecumenism within the salvific economy will be noted.

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RÉSUMÉ

Cet ouvrage est une étude dogmatique sur l'Église et les Églises, qui repense la doctrine réformée de l'unité chrétienne, en prenant en considération les divisions en institutions et mouvements divers au sein de la chrétienté. Il aborde le sujet de la vie de l'Église en rapport avec quatre thèmes clé : la doctrine de Dieu, l'économie du salut, l'eschatologie, et la relation des Églises authentiques et inauthentiques avec l'Église. Il montre la nécessité dogmatique de la doctrine de l'Église invisible et indique les conséquences de cette doctrine quant à la façon de considérer la multiplicité des dénominations ecclésiastiques, ainsi que la place de l'œcuménisme dans l'économie du salut.

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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Ich skizziere eine dogmatische Darstellung der Kirche und der Kirchen im Lichte der beobachtbaren Zersplitterung von Institutionen und Zusammenhängen, die mit dem Christentum verbunden sind. Dabei wird eine reformierte Bejahung der christlichen Einheit neu formuliert. Das Leben der Kirche wird in Bezug auf vier Brennpunkte betrachtet: die Lehre von Gott, die Heilsgeschichte, Eschatologie und die Beziehung von wahren und falschen Kirchen zur Kirche. Die dogmatische Notwendigkeit der unsichtbaren Kirche innerhalb der Ekklesiologie wird aufgezeigt und die Auswirkungen so einer Lehre auf die Bewertung denominationeller Trennungen und auf den Ort der Ökumene innerhalb der Heilsgeschichte wird registriert.

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I. Toward a Dogmatic Ecclesiology of Ecumenical Expectations

Contemporary discussions of ecclesiology and ecumenism have integrated a variety of disciplinary concerns, suggesting the importance of socio-historical, politico-ideological, even economic methods of investigation.[1] At their most influential moments, recent ecumenical discussions have lingered graciously in careful thought over matters of ecclesial practice and, in particular, liturgical formation amongst the varied ecclesiastical communions. Thus documents like the World Council of Churches Faith and Order Commissions's justifiably well-noted "Baptism, Eucharist, and Ministry," have tailored the ecumenical enterprise along cultural-linguistic lines. Following theorists like

Alasdair MacIntyre and George Lindbeck, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Clifford Geertz, the commonalities and differences of practice within varied denominations and churches have been the focus of relatively traditional ecumenical efforts.

In a different vein, however, have been the ideological pursuits of radical inclusivity within the mainline denominations and amongst minority factions of other communions. In these situations, ecumenism has followed the path of broader cultural engagement: relativism and tolerance have been brandished as moral commonplaces for the embrace and encouragement of a bevy of sociocultural and indeed ecclesiastical practices and professions. Oftentimes the inclusivist agenda has been (sub)merged within the aesthetics, or even the participatory ontology, of the (to all appearances) traditional ecumenical concerns noted above. Whether couched in terms of sacramental and ministerial praxis or in the incarnational extension of the *assumptio carnis*, to contemporary ecclesiastical embrace of varied sexualities and liturgical pluralisms, ecumenical theory has been driven towards visible points of contact. These tangible commonplaces may be inherently ecclesiastical (liturgical) or generically cultural (tolerance, inclusivism), yet they pursue the conversational task of ecumenical reflection (oftentimes strictly) with reference to the visible actions of the churches.[2]

A dogmatic theology of the Church involves an approach befitting its object of study: investigation of the particular shape which the community of those gathered by and around the Word of God takes in the economy of triune grace.[3] That this investigation limits itself to consideration of the people of the Word (rather than some phenomenological category) further implies that dogmatic ecclesiology will critically appropriate the confessional understanding of Scripture for the sake of testifying to the Church which the Gospel creates. My task, then, will be to sketch a dogmatic account of the Church and the churches. This sketch will focus on the question of Christian unity in light of the observable splintering of the institutions and contexts tied to Christendom. In so doing, four *foci* will be considered: the doctrine of God, the economy of salvation, eschatology, and the relation of true and false churches to the Church. My goal will be to suggest the dogmatic necessity of the invisible Church within ecclesiology and note the effects of such a doctrine for assessing denominational divisions and the place of ecumenism within the salvific economy. The present essay will proceed from the confessional texts of the post-Reformation Reformed tradition, thereby sketching what ecumenical expectations might be dogmatically appropriate within this particular confessional context.

II. The Church of the Transcendent and Triune God

The Church lives in the space provided by God. That God makes space for the Church's life entails the distinction of God and Church. Just as God and world must be distinguished by the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo,[4] so also the Church and the triune God are differentiated by the doctrines of calling, vocation, and election (Eph. 2:10). The Church's life and the divine life cannot be identified or merged.[5] The life of God freely precedes and exists independently of the causal activities of the people of God.[6] The unceasing freedom of the Lord finds ultimate expression in the claim that the incarnate Son of God did not circumscribe the life of the second person of the Trinity.[7] Even more so, the "body of Christ" does not directly, nor extensively, represent the Son's identity.[8]

The Church does live, however, and this must be attributed solely to the determination of God's Word to shape this community.[9] Therefore, the life of the Church and the divine life must be asymmetrically ordered as speaker and listener.[10] That the Word precedes and provides in no way violates the freedom of the Church as a communal agent (e.g., reader and preacher of God's Word; celebrant of Eucharistic feast). Rather, the transcendence of God qualitatively distinguishes the action of God and this God's people such that ontological competition cannot occur.[11] The Spirit mediates the Word through these graced activities: mortifying and vivifying in exegesis and proclamation, sanctifying the common elements for union with Christ in the sacraments. As David Willis puts it, "Holiness is not the opposite of creatureliness, but is the right use of creatureliness."[12] God makes the Church holy, thereby perfecting her concrete life as uniquely formed for fellowship in Christ.

A dogmatic account of the Church's life, therefore, must attend to the ontological shape of the creaturely life of God's people, given by the transcendent Lord of grace. Such metaphysical clarification follows from the logic intrinsic to the Scriptural accounts of the triune God's self-revelation (Ex. 3:14; Isa. 46:5, 9-10).[13] The implicit ontological judgments necessitated by such texts

must precede and qualify later considerations of ecclesiology, lest the Church somehow occlude the place of Christ himself.[14]

III. The Church of the Electing God

That the Church is distinct from the world follows only from the freedom of God's election unto fellowship with sinners through the Word (Jn. 17:14). Her common elements are sanctified by God's actualizing call, wherein the divine declaration sets apart that which is culturally and historically natural for distinctly supernatural ends.[15] That the Church participates in the economy of salvation, therefore, involves the Church in the covenantal relation of Lord and servant, as well as the eschatological sublimation of nature in the beginning by grace at the end. Grace neither destroys, nor merely perfects nature; rather, grace perfects nature through a disruptive event which must be classified as mortification and vivification.[16] Not only ecclesiology more broadly, but the churchly fellowship considered under the rubric of ecumenism remains tethered to God's sanctification of a people. The unity of the Church beckoned forth by Jesus in prayer (Jn. 17:21-22) follows the pursuit of ecclesial sanctification (Jn. 17:17, 19). However this unity is to be considered must be tied to the manner in which Jesus's sanctification involves that of his people.

Dogmatic ecclesiology, therefore, requires that the Church be considered not only subsequent to Trinitarian orthodoxy (in the vein of Nicaea), but soteriological orthodoxy (as clarified in the Protestant confessions). Differences between Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, liberal *Kulturprotestantismus*, and confessional evangelicalism flow through the doctrine of salvation (e.g., justification) to the nature of mediation in the Church (e.g., sacraments, authority).[17] The shape of soteriology, then, affects the concrete life of the Church and suggests the manner by which communal existence will form around the Word. A Reformed soteriology which emphasizes the continuing integrity of humanity and created nature, even in the hypostatic union, will restrict speech about the Church's life in nature-appropriate ways (*finitum non capax infiniti*).[18] The Church will not be burdened with divine tasks, nor will the sanctifying calling out of these people be withdrawn from its broader redemptive-historical context.[19] The Church exists as people elected for service, marked only by God's mortifying and vivifying speech, *simul iustus et peccator*. The creaturely being of the redeemed people has been assumed in Christ and glorified in his raising; the inclusion of the saints in this vicarious identity grounds the self-effacing nature of the Church's Gospel, as well as her attestation. The Church in the economy of divine grace finds justification *solus Christus*, thereby mandating an extension of the material principle of the Reformation into extensive ecclesiological qualification and restraint.[20]

IV. The Wandering Church

The Church wanders from bondage in sin and death to the awaited city of God.[21] That her life is marked by pilgrim expectations, *simul iustus et peccator*, suggests that her constitution may be particularly difficult to discern in concrete history. The battle for assurance of personal salvation may be paralleled by the quest for discernment of the Church's true visible unity; true fellowship is "hid with Christ in God" (Col. 3:3).[22] Such epistemological caution is not in vogue within the recent ecumenical and ecclesiological literature. In fact, the distinction between the visible and invisible Church has been lambasted as of late, by Roman Catholic and mainline ecclesiologies which have proposed a patently visible Church or none at all.[23] From Bonhoeffer's worries during the Nazi era, to the pleas of narrative theologians of hope during the tumultuous Sixties, to the bold anti-secular posturing of the Radical Orthodoxy movement, the invisibility of the Church has been denounced as a flight from responsibility and reality to sectarianism and fantasy.[24] Rather than recede into some idyllic realm of ecclesial remove, the Church's concrete practices have been the ontological and pastoral focus of recent ecumenical efforts.[25]

Yet the Church of the Word cannot accept such terms and allow ecclesial definition to proceed in an immanent fashion, for the Word which makes alive must first kill.[26] That the Spirit continually inspires the life of the Church around the Word in no way minimizes the need for the Spirit's illumination of proper acknowledgment of the Church and Word. The visibility of the Church, therefore, involves what John Webster has called a "spiritual visibility."[27] That is, her true manifestation cannot be considered an universally-perceptible truth available to all.[28] Quite to the contrary, the Nicene marks of the Church confess *belief*, not observation, of the Church's life as one, holy, catholic, and apostolic. The Spirit alone makes known the

Church's veiled glory.

The invisible Church lives as a concrete people veiled by the flesh and made visible in the Spirit. That is, the Church's invisibility is an epistemological limitation.[29] Is it merely an epistemological principle? The Westminster Larger Catechism defines the invisible Church as "the whole number of the elect, that have been, are, or shall be gathered into one under Christ the head."[30] This definition distinguishes these elect members of Christ ontologically – as those gathered to live united in Christ – privileging the ontic over the noetic.[31] The actual number composing the Church visibly and invisibly differs, because the visible Church as mixed multitude includes the elect and those who profess faith, but already have or yet will fail to persevere in faithfulness. At this point the argument for invisibility by Barth falls short, insofar as he fails to ground adequately the epistemic invisibility in an ontic reality under the rubric of divine election/predestination. The provisional communion of the reprobate within the *communio sanctorum* marks the primary need for a doctrine of the invisible Church – the elect only to be revealed in definitive fashion at the eschatological judgment – which Barth shies from, apart from relatively reticent admissions of divine providence. Only secondarily does the invisibility of the Church serve to highlight the sinful-yet-justified nature of the Church's witness, wherein even the truly redeemed are less than patently obedient in their attestation. Care in distinguishing these two uses of the doctrine – as well as maintenance of both – will be necessary in addressing the quest for true unity.

Invisibility marks the life of the Church due to her eschatological placement (Jn. 17:11).[32] That the triune God has made space for her being in the wake of Christ's passion and with anticipation for his glorious return marks her life with unfulfilled expectation. Christ's vindication has been distinguished as "first fruits" from the long-awaited resurrection of those in Christ (1 Cor. 15:23).[33] Thus the New Covenant promises have yet to be enacted in their fullness, leaving the makeup of the Church mixed rather than a strictly regenerated membership.[34] This eschatological context leads G. C. Berkower to claim that "the continuity of the Church becomes visible in hope."[35] The eschatological invisibility of the Church, therefore, extends ecclesiology along the principle of *sola fide*.

Yet the invisible Church resides in the visible Church, partaking of the ordinary "means of grace" found in her consecrated ministry of the Word.[36] Ontological passivity – dependence upon the life-giving Spirit – cannot be likened to phenomenological laxity, nor can it facilitate a docetic ecclesiology which spiritualizes the material by abolishing it.[37] The spiritual character of the Church works through creaturely mediation, attestations which hearken in human voice and symbolic testimony. Even champions of the invisibility of the Church affirm the mandate to vigorously work for the purification of the visible churches.[38]

Her concrete life, however, can never be ascribed metaphysical necessity, for her life follows from God's election. That is, the Nicene Creed confesses *credo ecclesiam*: "I believe the Church," rather than "I believe in the Church."[39] This dogmatic point simply affirms the sanctification of this creaturely company for divine use in the ministry of reconciliation (2 Cor. 5:18ff.). As with the spiritual presence of Christ in the visible words of washing and feasting, so the ecclesial life will be only spiritually discerned because eschatologically limited: as Christ is absent from the table physically (because ascended physically), so the Church will fail to evidence concrete obedience in any perfect or unceasing measure.[40]

V. The Invisible Church, True Church, and false churches

The Church enlivened by the Spirit of the Word transgresses all socio-cultural boundaries (Gal. 3:28; Eph. 2:11-22). Communion enjoyed by those gathered around the pulpit, table, and font, involves fellowship with fellow saints across the globe and through the centuries (the *communio sanctorum*). Yet the typical observer will see anything but joyful fellowship among those within the churches of the twenty-first century. Denominations abound; proselytism continues; anathemas remain. A theology of the Church must address the concrete plethora of churches.

The invisibility of the Church does not directly solve the dilemma of relating at institutional levels, for the invisibility applies primarily to individuals within churches.[41] Contrary to some Lutheran renditions of the invisibility doctrine, its purpose is primarily to note the presence of a mixed multitude within the people of God and only secondarily to distinguish the just activities of the Church amidst the enduring sinfulness of the as-yet-not-fully-redeemed saints.[42] Yet the invisibility of the Church does affect the life of the churches and therefore dogmatically precedes consideration of

the true Church and the false churches. That there are churches does not necessarily reflect sinful failure to maintain unity, except when such multiplicity reflects differences other than geographical diversity.[43] Disunity for reasons of petty difference, scandal, or (worse yet) theological division reflect failures to appropriately maintain Christian communion. Thus the Reformers and their confessional heirs sought to note the marks which characterize the life of a true, though perhaps less than ideal, Church in hopes of identifying the churches with which one ought to fellowship.

The true marks of the Church are the preaching and reception of the pure Word of God and the right administration of the two sacraments.[44] Later confessional documents and orthodox dogmatics included the appropriate exercise of church discipline as a third mark; however, this was likely included within the Word and sacraments in earlier formulations and ought be seen as an expansion for clarification, rather than addition of an alien principle.[45] Nevertheless, these marks do not remove the invisibility of the Church. Rather, they are touchstones by which the visible Church might be tested and found acceptable as an instrument and witness of the Gospel.[46]

Thus the invisibility of the Church must be adequately acknowledged – not removed – in each of its two manifestations, albeit differently.[47] Regarding individual hypocrisy, church discipline can and must be enacted faithfully; yet such efforts, no matter how well-intentioned, will never remove all hypocrisy from the Church.[48] Only the eschatological judge, Jesus Christ, will decisively separate the righteous from the unrighteous (Mt. 13:24-30, 47-58).[49] Similarly, regarding ecclesial sinfulness amidst the life of even the righteous, hidden behind facades of flesh and failure, the Church can and must listen to the Word and allow her witness – in Word and sacrament – to be tested by the Gospel (*semper reformanda*). False churches will be shunned, such that the Church may be unified gradually, imperfectly, but concretely in some fashion through the varied lives of the true churches. That is, the division of churches into true and false may incrementally aid the quest for unity by making explicit the grounds for true fellowship, adequate witness to the Gospel. The most difficult decisions will undoubtedly involve the provisional judgments about varying degrees of faithfulness to the Word and different levels of failure to rightly administer the sacraments.[50] Such witness will certainly remain "daily advancing," though imperfect and visible only to the eyes of faith, and in so doing be on the pilgrim path of holiness.[51]

Notes

1 Many thanks to Prof. Henri Blocher for his gracious comments – marked by encouragement and perceptive analysis – on an earlier version of this essay.

2 For an excellent survey of recent literature on the integration of sociological analysis (particularly of the communitarian style) and contemporary ecclesiology, see Stanley J. Grenz, "Ecclesiology," in *The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology* (Cambridge Companions to Religion; ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 252-268.

3 John Webster, "On Evangelical Ecclesiology," in *Confessing God: Essays in Christian Dogmatics II* (London: T & T Clark, 2005), 153-154.

4 Janet Martin Soskice, "Athens and Jerusalem, Alexandria and Edessa: Is there a Metaphysics of Scripture?" *IJST* 8, no. 2 (2006), 153.

5 *contra* Henri de Lubac, *Catholicism: Christ and the Common Destiny of Man* (trans. Lancelot Sheppard and Elizabeth Englund; San Francisco: Ignatius, 1988), 53, 73, 82, 88, 127, 196.

6 Webster, "On Evangelical Ecclesiology," 156-158.

7 E. David Willis, Calvin's *Catholic Christology: The Function of the So-Called* Extra *Calvinisticum in Calvin's Theology* (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought 2; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1966), 26-60.

8 Ian A. McFarland, "The Body of Christ: Rethinking a Classic Ecclesiological Model," *IJST* 7, no. 3 (2005), 244-245. cf. Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics* IV/1: 667-668 (hereafter *CD*).

9 Webster, "On Evangelical Ecclesiology," 154.

10 John Webster, "Christ, Church, and Reconciliation," in *Word and Church: Essays in Christian Dogmatics* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2001), 228; Christoph Schwöbel, "The Creature of the Word: Recovering the Ecclesiology of the Reformers," in *On Being the Church: Essays on the Christian Community* (ed. Colin E. Gunton and Daniel W. Hardy; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1989), 122; Martin Luther, WA 8:491.

11 Kathryn Tanner, *Jesus, Humanity, and the Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001), 2-4.

12 David Willis, *Notes on the Holiness of God* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 48.

13 Matthew Levering, *Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology* (Challenges in Contemporary Theology; Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 47-74; Brevard S. Childs, *Exodus: A Critical, Theological Commentary* (OTL; Louisville: Westminster, 1974), 83; *pace* R. Kendall Soulen, "YHWH the Triune God," *Modern Theology* 15 (1999), 34.

14 Tanner, *Jesus, Humanity, and the Trinity*, 20-21; Webster, "On Evangelical Ecclesiology," 179; Douglas Farrow, *Ascension and Ecclesia: On the Significance of the Doctrine of the Ascension for Ecclesiology and Christian Cosmology* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 259; *pace* de Lubac, *Catholicism*, 53 (but see 363).

15 Karl Barth, "The Real Church," *SJT* 3, no. 3 (1950), 341-342.

16 George Hunsinger, "Baptized into Christ's Death: Karl Barth and the Future of Roman Catholic Theology," in *Disruptive Grace: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 269-270; Colin E. Gunton, "Creation: (2) The Spirit Moved Over the Face of the Waters. The Holy Spirit and the Created Order," in *Father, Son, and Holy Spirit: Essays toward a Fully Trinitarian Theology* (London: T & T Clark, 2003), 109-110, 112, 118; *pace* de Lubac, *Catholicism*, 283-284.

17 Willis, *Notes on the Holiness of God*, 94: For example, Roman Catholic doctrine supplants the true humanity of the sacramental elements and, similarly, the Church by their participation in the divine movement (deification or theopoeisis). In this way, neither transubstantiation nor papal infallibility takes the creaturely nature of the *communio sanctorum* seriously enough; *contra* de Lubac, *Catholicism*, 286.

18 Adrienne Dengerinck Chaplin, "The Invisible and the Sublime: From Participation to Reconciliation," in *Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition: Creation, Covenant, and Participation* (ed. James K. A. Smith and James H. Olthuis; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005), 90-91, 104; *pace* de Lubac, *Catholicism*, 211.

19 Westminster Confession of Faith xxviii.3; see Michael Horton, "Participation and Covenant," in *Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition*, 129-132; George Hunsinger, "Fides Christo Formata: Luther, Barth, and the Joint Declaration," in *The Gospel of Justification in Christ: Where Does the Church Stand Today?* (ed. Wayne C. Stumme; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 77-78.

20 Suggestions of this in Calvin, Institutes, IV.i.21, 27. Calvin helpfully notes the fittingness of confessing "forgiveness of sins" immediately after confession of the "communion of saints." See Gerhard O. Forde, "The Word that Kills and Makes Alive," in *Marks of the Body of Christ* (ed. Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 1; *pace* de Lubac, *Catholicism*, 226.

21 First Helvetic Confession xi; see Augustine, *City of God*, I.35.

22 G. C. Berkouwer, *The Church* (Studies in Dogmatics; trans. James E. Davison; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976), 178-182.

23 De Lubac remains a notable exception (to some extent); see *Catholicism*, 72, 273, 292, 363 (but see 53).

24 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Discipleship* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001), 113; Robert Jenson, *Systematic Theology* (2 vols.; New York: Oxford University Press, 1997-1999), 1:205-206; 2:211-227; John Milbank, *The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 159-165.

25 See, e.g., James J. Buckley and David S. Yeago, eds., *Knowing the Triune God: The Work of the Spirit in the Practices of the Church* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 8; see the recent criticisms by Nicholas Healy, "Practices and the New Ecclesiology: Misplaced Concreteness?" *IJST* 5 (2003), 287-308.

26 Forde, "The Word that Kills and Makes Alive," 11-12.

27 Webster, "On Evangelical Ecclesiology," 175, 179; Barth, *CD* IV/1: 654.

28 Barth, "The Real Church," 338-340; idem, *CD* IV/1: 654.

29 Webster, "On Evangelical Ecclesiology," 181-182.

30 Westminster Larger Catechism 64.

31 pace John Murray, "The Church: Its Definition in Terms of 'Visible' and 'Invisible' Invalid," in *Collected Writings of John Murray*, vol. 1: *The Claims of Truth* (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1976), 231.

32 Forde, "The Word that Kills and Makes Alive," 2; Douglas Farrow, "Eucharist, Eschatology, and Ethics," in *The Future as God's Gift: Explorations in Christian Eschatology* (ed. David Fergusson and Marcel Sarot; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000), 205, 214; idem, *Ascension and Ecclesia*, 3

33 Colin E. Gunton, "The Church and the Lord's Supper: 'Until He Comes.' Towards an Eschatology of Church Membership," in *Father, Son, and Holy Spirit*, 224.

34 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, IV.i.13; on the partial fulfillment of the "new covenant" promises of Jer. 31, see Richard L. Pratt, Jr., "Infant Baptism in the New Covenant," in *The Case for Covenantal Infant Baptism* (ed. Gregg Strawbridge; Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed, 2003), 168-169; pace Henri Blocher, "Old Covenant, New Covenant," in *Always Reforming: Explorations in Systematic Theology* (ed. A. T. B. McGowan; Leicester: Apollos, 2006), 247-248.

35 Berkouwer, *The Church*, 194.

36 Westminster Shorter Catechism 88; Westminster Larger Catechism 35, 153-154; Westminster Confession of Faith xxvii.3; Calvin, *Institutes*, IV.i.4-5.

37 Tanner, Jesus, *Humanity, and the Trinity*, 71-73.

38 Belgic Confession, xxviii; Barth, *CD* IV/1: 653-654; Calvin, *Institutes*, IV.i.7.

39 Berkouwer, *The Church*, 10; Calvin, *Institutes*, IV.i.2.

40 Barth, *CD* IV/1: 662.

41 Scots Confession xvi.

42 Calvin, *Institutes*, IV.i.7; Westminster Confession of Faith xx.1; First Helvetic Confession xvii; pace I. U.

Dalferth, "The Visible and the Invisible: Luther's Legacy of a Theological Theology," in *England and Germany: Studies in Theological Diplomacy* (Studies in the Intercultural History of Christianity; ed. S. W. Sykes; Bern: Peter Lang, 1982), 33-37;

43 Barth, *CD* IV/1: 671; see Second Helvetic Confession xvii.

44 Second Helvetic Confession, xvii; Westminster Confession of Faith xxvii.4.

45 Heinrich Heppe, *Reformed Dogmatics* (ed. E. T. Bizer; trans. G. T. Thomson; London: Wakeman Trust, nd), 668-670; see also Scots Confession xviii; Belgic Confession xxix.

46 "Touchstone" (*ad Lydium lapidem*) comes from Calvin, *Institutes*, IV.i.11.

47 For careful response to both individual hypocrisy and institutional apostasy, see Belgic Confession xxix.

48 Heppe, *Reformed Dogmatics*, 666-667.

49 Calvin, *Institutes*, IV.i.13.

50 On the notion of such degrees, see Westminster Confession of Faith xxvii.4-5; Calvin, *Institutes*, IV.ii.8.

51 Calvin, *Institutes*, IV.i.17.

Book Reviews – Recensions – Buchbesprechungen

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Freudenchristentum: Der Erbauungsschriftsteller Stephan Praetorius

Eckhard Düker

Arbeiten zur Geschichte des Pietismus, vol. 38, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003, 360 pp., € 59,-, hb, ISBN 3-525-55822-8

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Der Pfarrer im norddeutschen Salzwedel Stephan Praetorius (um 1536-1603) verfasste in einer von dogmatischen Streitigkeiten geprägten Zeit der Kirche zahlreiche Erbauungsschriften, die wenig polemischen Inhalts sind. Dükers Dissertation ist ein eindrückliches Beispiel dafür, dass die lutherische Frömmigkeit im Zeitalter der altprotestantischen Orthodoxie bisher kaum erforscht und daher in der Wissenschaft wenig bekannt geworden ist. Eine Ausnahme bildet die breite Überlieferung von Liedern aus der Epoche der Orthodoxie im Evangelischen Gesangbuch. Wirkungen von Praetorius' Schriften finden sich bei Johann Arndt und Philipp Jakob Spener, die seine Werke neu aufgelegt haben. Er kann mit Recht – wenn auch mit einigen Unterschieden – als Vorläufer des Pietismus im 17. Jahrhundert gelten.

SUMMARY

The Pastor Stephan Praetorius (c. 1536-1603) who worked in Salzwedel in North Germany published numerous writings of an edifying sort with little polemical content in a period that was marked by dogmatic conflicts. Düker's dissertation is an impressive example of the fact that Lutheran spirituality in the age of the old-protestant orthodoxy has hardly been researched and thereby is little known in the scholarship. One exception was the wide distribution of hymns from the age of this orthodoxy in the German Lutheran hymnbook (Evangelisches Gesangbuch). One can trace the effects of Praetorius' writings in Johann Arndt and Philip Jakob Spener who re-issued his work. He can justifiably with a few reservations be counted as a forerunner of Pietism in the C17.

RÉSUMÉ

Le pasteur Stephan Praetorius (~ 1536-1603), qui a œuvré à Salzwedel dans le nord de l'Allemagne, a publié de nombreux écrits d'édification au contenu très peu polémique à une époque caractérisée par les conflits dogmatiques. La thèse de Düker fait apparaître que la spiritualité luthérienne au temps de l'ancienne orthodoxie protestante a fait l'objet de peu de travaux de recherche et demeure mal connue dans le milieu académique. Fait exception la large distribution de cantiques de cette époque dans le recueil de cantiques luthérien Allemand (Evangelischen Gesangbuch). On peut repérer l'influence des écrits de Praetorius chez Johann Arndt et Philip Jakob Spener, qui les ont eux-mêmes réédités. Avec quelques nuances, on peut à juste titre le considérer comme un précurseur du piétisme allemand au XVII[e] siècle.

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Das Zeitalter der altprotestantischen Orthodoxie leidet unter den Fehlurteilen, die durch Aufklärung und Pietismus verbreitet wurden und bis heute nicht auszurotten sind. Die pietistische Kritik richtete sich gegen die zahlreichen Lehrstreitigkeiten und orthodoxe Rechthaberei, nicht aber gegen den Inhalt des Glaubens oder fromme altprotestantische Geistliche und Professoren. Aufgeklärte Kritik nahm den Inhalt der Glaubenslehre aufs Korn und wollte ein ethisch hochstehendes Christentum jenseits der Dogmenbindung realisieren. Zwischen diesen beiden epochalen Mahlsteinen wurde die Orthodoxie aufgerieben. Im universitären Bereich lösten Theologien aus der Schule der Aufklärung die Orthodoxie ab; an der Gemeindebasis dominierte, zumindest für einige Zeit im 18. Jahrhundert, der Pietismus.

Die Märlein über die angeblich unfruchtbare Zeit der Orthodoxie werden nicht nur durch einen Blick ins Verfasserregister des Evangelischen Gesangbuchs widerlegt, sondern auch durch gründliche Untersuchungen wie die Dissertation des Paderborner Pfarrers Eckhard Düker, der den heutzutage wenig bekannten Erbauungsschriftsteller Stephan Praetorius (circa 1536-1603) publizistisch wieder „ausgegraben" hat. Düker weist nach, dass Praetorius in die Vorgeschichte des Pietismus gehört (299f). P. J. Spener hat das Lesen von Praetoriusschriften empfohlen.

Zentrales Thema von Praetorius' Denken und Handeln ist die gegenwärtige Seligkeit der Christen aufgrund der Taufe (13). Seine Werke sind Teil einer größeren Menge von Erbauungsschriften gegen Ende des 16. Jh.s, die überwiegend auf konfessionelle Polemik verzichten. Bekannter als Praetorius sind in dieser Zeit Johann Arndt (1555-1621), Martin Moller (1547-1606) und Philipp Nicolai (1556-1608). Durch Literatur dieser und weiterer Autoren sollte der lutherische Glaube intensiviert und die Frömmigkeit lebendiger gemacht werden.

Nach einem einführenden Kapitel (I, 13-25) stellt Düker die Biographie des in Salzwedel zwischen 1536 und 1539 geborenen Theologen dar, der in seiner Heimatstadt auch die überwiegende Zeit seines Lebens als Diakon und Pfarrer gewirkt hat (II, 26-64). Während seiner Studienzeit in Rostock (1558-1565) wurde Praetorius besonders durch David Chytraeus (1531-1600) geprägt (37). Schon während seines Studiums amtierte Praetorius als Lehrer und Kantor an der St. Marien-Kirche (41). Praetorius war verheiratet und hatte mindestens sechs Kinder, von denen wahrscheinlich drei

früh verstarben (47).

Das dritte Kapitel der Dissertation widmet sich den lateinischen Schriften von Praetorius, die dieser vorwiegend bis 1578 publizierte (III,65-110). Neben Schriften für den Schulgebrauch und das Studium finden sich in dieser Gruppe auch lateinische Lehr- und Trostschriften. Interessant für den heutigen Leser ist eine Schrift zum Theologiestudium aus dem Jahr 1574 (Ordo studiorum). Nicht nur den Theologiestudenten, sondern allen Christen empfiehlt der Autor, einen klaren Tagesablauf einzuhalten und täglich eine Stunde lang die Bibel zu lesen (72). Nachtarbeit ist nicht zu empfehlen (77). Das Morgengebet ist unverzichtbarer Bestandteil des geistlichen Lebens (94). Das „Freudenchristentum" wächst aus der Gotteskindschaft, deren uns der Heilige Geist versichert, aus dem Trost der Wohltaten Christi (83, vgl. 105).

Breite Wirksamkeit entfaltete Praetorius besonders durch seine deutschen Schriften in Gemeindekreisen (IV, 111-203). Zahlreiche Trostschriften richtete er an die ganze Gemeinde oder an bestimmte Leidens- und Berufsgruppen, aber auch lehrhafte Traktate, katechetische Texte und Lieder. Seine von „fröhlicher Glaubensgewissheit" geprägte Theologie transformiert der Prediger in konkrete Situationen der Gemeinde hinein (111). Seeleute und Kaufleute, Witwen und Waisen, Kranke und Sterbende wusste Praetorius in gleicher Weise zu berücksichtigen. Kriegsgefahr wird ebenso thematisiert wie die Feste des Kirchenjahres und dogmatische Themen. Praetorius' Lieder thematisieren das in der Taufe begründete Heil der Christen, das zu Dank, Freude und Lob anregt (194f). Antinomistische Tendenzen lassen sich in seiner Lehrauffassung nicht von der Hand weisen (208).

Im zweiten Teil des Werkes untersucht Düker die Rezeption und Wirkungsgeschichte von Praetorius' Schriften (210-301). Wenn nicht Johann Arndt seine Schriften nachgedruckt hätte, wäre der Salzwedeler Erbauungsschriftsteller wohl bald vergessen worden. In der *Geistlichen Schatzkammer* der Gläubigen des Danziger Theologen Martin Statius (1589-1655) wurden zahlreiche Praetoriustraktate der Nachwelt überliefert. Sein Streben für ein erneuertes Christentum brachte ihm den Vorwurf des Perfektionismus ein (229f). Praetorius' Rechtgläubigkeit wurde anhaltendes Thema der orthodoxen Theologen. Spener sprach sich nach kritischer Lektüre für ihn aus und veröffentlichte 1668 eine Sammlung von Praetoriusschriften, denen er erstmals Grundsätze seines Reformprogramms voranstellte (254). Wirkungen von Praetorius' Werk kann Düker besonders im Halleschen Pietismus, aber auch bis hin nach Skandinavien ausmachen. Besondere Wirksamkeit entfalteten die Schriften am Ende des 18. Jh. bei C. G. Pregizer und der Gemeinschaft der „Seligen" (291-294). – Im dritten Teil seiner Arbeit dokumentiert Düker in einer ausführlichen Bibliographie die Schriften von Praetorius (304-326). Literaturverzeichnis und Register runden die vorzüglich edierte Dissertation ab.

Die Beschäftigung mit der sprachlich und inhaltlich „fernen" Zeit der Orthodoxie fällt heutigen Lesern nicht leicht. Dennoch kann jeder, der sich in das Thema einarbeitet, feststellen, dass seine Mühen belohnt werden. Die obige Darstellung zeigt, dass in anderen Zusammenhängen Themen behandelt werden, die auch heute von Bedeutung sind. Es ist Eckhard Düker nachdrücklich dafür zu danken, dass er auf Stephan Praetorius aufmerksam gemacht hat.

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De Baptismo – Über die Taufe
Augustinus

Zweisprachige Ausgabe hrsg. von Hermann-Josef Sieben. Augustinus Opera – Werke, Teil D 1 / Bd. 28, Paderborn: Schönigh, 2006, Hb., 462 pp., € 59,-, ISBN 978-3-506-71332-2; 3-506-71332-9

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Der Kirchenlehrer Augustinus hat sich intensiv mit der falschen Lehre der Donatisten, die sich von der Großkirche getrennt haben, auseinander gesetzt. Für ihn ist es wichtig, dass die Einheit der Kirche gewahrt bleibt, auch wenn sie mit Bösen vermischt ist. Was innerhalb der Kirche rechtmäßig ist – eine im Namen des dreieinigen Gottes gespendete Taufe – ist auch außerhalb nicht unrechtmäßig, sondern als gültig anzuerkennen. In der kritischen Diskussion donatistischer Argumente für eine Wiedertaufe und für die Separation von der katholischen Kirche erörtert Augustinus grundsätzliche dogmatische Fragen gegenseitiger Taufanerkennung und der Einheit der Kirche, die auch heute im zwischenkirchlichen Gespräch noch bedeutsam sind. Wenn sie die Donatisten auf Cyprian von Karthago berufen, steht doch die Beweisführung aus der Heiligen Schrift über der Lehre des hochgeschätzten Kirchenvaters.

SUMMARY

The Church Father Augustine spent much energy in debate with the false teachings of the Donatist, who had separated from the Catholic Church. It is important for him that the unity of the church was maintained, even when it was mixed up with evils. What is legitimate within the church -one baptism given in the name of the Trinity is also when given outside the church is not illegitimate but to be acknowledged as valid. In the critical discussion of the Donatist arguments for a re-baptism and for separation from the Catholic Church, Augustine raises fundamentally dogmatic questions of mutual recognition of baptism and of the unity of the Church which remain meaningful for ecumenical dialogue today. The Donatists could appeal to Cyprian of Carthage, but the weight of Scripture is to be valued more than that of the eminent Church Father.

RÉSUMÉ

Saint Augustin a employé beaucoup d'énergie dans la controverse avec les donatistes qui s'étaient séparés de

l'Église Catholique. Il était important à ses yeux que l'unité de l'Église soit maintenue, même lorsque celle-ci se trouvait infectée par le mal de diverses manières. Un acte légitime à l'intérieur de l'Église -le baptême administré au nom de la Trinité-, ne devient pas illégitime lorsqu'il est administré en dehors de l'Église, mais doit être reconnu comme valide. Dans sa critique des arguments donatistes en faveur d'un rebaptême et de la séparation d'avec l'Église catholique, Saint Augustin soulève des questions dogmatiques fondamentales en rapport avec la reconnaissance mutuelle du baptême et l'unité de l'Église, qui demeurent pertinentes pour le dialogue œcuménique actuel. Les donatistes pouvaient en appeler à Cyprien de Carthage, mais on doit accorder plus de poids à l'Écriture qu'à l'éminent père de l'Église.

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Die schismatische Gemeinschaft der Donatisten im Nordafrika des 4. und 5. Jahrhunderts war eine Gruppierung, die mit ihrem Heiligkeitsanliegen von vielen als Vorläufer pietistisch-freikirchlicher Interessen angesehen wird. Mit der Großkirche lagen die Donatisten im Streit, weil sie die Gültigkeit der Sakramente von der Heiligkeit des spendenden Priesters abhängig machen wollten. Wer in der Verfolgungszeit den Gegnern des Christentums heilige Schriften ausgeliefert hatte, wurde aus der Kirche ausgeschlossen. Die Donatisten – sie bildeten zeitweise zahlenmäßig zeitweise die Mehrheit der Christen! – wollten eine Kirche der echten Nachfolger von Jesus, eine Märtyrerkirche sein.

Augustinus (354-430 n. Chr.) hat sich in über zwanzig Schriften mit den Donatisten beschäftigt. In De Baptismo behandelt er vor allem die Frage nach der Gültigkeit von gespendeten Taufen bzw. das Problem der Wiedertaufe. So werden hinter den historisch-zufälligen Gegebenheiten dogmatisch-normative Lehrfragen deutlich, die noch heute die Gemüter im Gespräch zwischen Großkirchen und Freikirchen erhitzen. Auch wenn Evangelische nicht jeder Argumentation des Kirchenlehrers folgen können, lohnt es sich dennoch, sich in diese Materie zu vertiefen; und nebenbei lernt der Leser noch einiges über die nordafrikanische Kirche.

Die vorliegende Ausgabe von Augustins Taufabhandlung ist durch Einleitung (7-50), Bibliographie und Register (434-462) von Hermann-Josef Sieben hervorragend erschlossen. Inhaltlich gliedert sich das Werk in drei Teile: einen knappen ersten über die katholische Tauflehre (bis 1,17,26, S. 95), einen zweiten Hauptteil, in dem sich Augustin mit der Lehre des Kirchenvaters Cyprian von Karhago (ca. 200-258 n. Chr.) auseinandersetzt (1,18,27-5,28,39) und die Stellungnahmen der Konzilsväter des Konzils von Karthago im Jahr 256 bespricht (6,1-7,49,97, S. 417). Darauf folgt nur ein kurzer Schlussteil (7,50,98-7,54,103, S. 427).

Augustinus bietet in De baptismo keine abgeschlossene Tauflehre. Insbesondere fehlen umfangreichere Ausführungen zu Wesen und Wirkung der Taufe. Die spezielle Situation im Streit um die außerhalb der katholischen Kirche gespendete Taufe („Ketzertaufe") bedingt es, dass die Frage der Taufanerkennung im Vordergrund steht. Genauer geht es um die Gültigkeit der Sakramente außerhalb der Kirche und damit auch um die kirchliche Einheit. In immer neuen Anläufen wird dieses Thema von verschiedenen Seiten beleuchtet, wobei sich die Argumente manchmal wiederholen. Die Donatisten reklamieren den geachteten Kirchenlehrer Cyprian, den Augustinus eigentlich für die katholische Großkirche vereinnahmen möchte, für ihre theologische Position. Augustin achtet Cyprian zwar hoch, er muss dessen Argumentation aber auch kritisieren und begibt sich damit in die Rolle eines Kritikers der hochgeschätzten kirchlichen Tradition bzw. des angesehenen Kirchenlehrers. In diesem Zusammenhang macht er interessante Bemerkungen über Schrift und Tradition. Die Autorität von Cyprians Werken und die Entscheidungen der Konzilien relativiert er mit dem Hinweis auf die kanonische Heilige Schrift, die allen späteren Kirchenväterschriften vorzuziehen sei (2,3,4f, S. 109f, vgl. 5,17,23 S. 275).

Für Augustinus wurde eine Taufe allein durch die trinitarische Taufformel gültig. Sie beruht nicht auf der Heiligkeit des Spendenden, sondern auf dem Verdienst von Jesus Christus (3,4,6, S. 149, vgl. 4,4,5f, S. 189). „Die Taufe Christi ist durch die Worte des Evangeliums geweiht und heilig, auch wenn sie durch Unreine und in Unreinen gespendet wird. Auch wenn diese Leute schamlos und schmutzig sind, so kann doch die Heiligkeit der Taufe nicht beschmutzt werden, und die Kraft Gottes steht seinem Sakrament bei zum Heil derer, die es gut gebrauchen, beziehungsweise zur Vernichtung derer, die es schlecht gebrauchen." (3,10,15, S. 155, vgl. 4,12,18, S. 215; 7,47,93, S. 415) Kein Mensch kann geben, was er nicht hat, und Gott selber gibt den Heiligen Geist, den der Mensch nicht besitzt (vgl. 5,21,29f, S. 283f).

In der Kirche können „Christen" dem Teufel gehören, wenn sie nicht aus der Taufe in Heiligkeit leben, genauso wie es aufgrund gültiger Taufe außerhalb der Kirche wahre Christen geben kann (4,9,13, S. 205). Die eine Taufe der einen Kirche wird nicht zu zwei Taufen dadurch, dass einige die Kirche verlassen, indem sie sich von ihr abspalten (7,36,71, S. 405). Wer nicht aus seiner Taufe lebt, braucht eine wahre Bekehrung; als Kinder getaufte Christen brauchen in späteren Jahren eine Bekehrung ihres Herzens (4,21,28, S. 233, vgl. 217, 239, 371, 379f, 389).

Im Gegensatz zu Optatus von Mileve (gest. vor 400), der nur die Taufe von Schismatikern anerkennt, kann Augustinus durch seinen Ansatz die Taufe von Schismatikern und Häretikern anerkennen, ohne damit die jeweilige christliche Gruppierung zu legitimieren (vgl. S. 35 u. 55, 1,1,2). In der katholischen Kirche gibt es die richtige Taufe und sie wird auch richtig empfangen, während es sie bei den Donatisten zwar gibt, aber sie nicht in rechter Weise empfangen wird. Das Zerreißen des Bandes kirchlicher Einheit ist für Augustinus die schlimmste Sünde der Donatisten (vgl. S. 34 u. 73,

1,8,10f). Diese berufen sich in der Frage der Wiedertaufe auf Cyprian, dem gerade wichtig ist, dass die Einheit der Kirche gewahrt bleibt.

Dem evangelischen Leser wird mancher „Schriftbeleg" des Augustinus nicht wahrhaft schlüssig zu sein; auch seine stark ekklesiologische Argumentation wirkt an manchen stellen überzogen. Dennoch ist die Schrift „De baptismo" ein guter Einstieg in das Thema gegenseitiger Taufanerkennung und somit auch von Bedeutung für das ökumenische Gespräch und die Begegnung evangelisch-landeskirchlicher Christen mit Schwestern und Brüdern aus den Freikirchen.

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Geschichte der Evangelischen Allianz in Österreich: Von ihren Anfängen im 19. Jahrhundert bis zum Ausgang des 20. Jahrhunderts

Frank Hinkelmann

Studien zur Geschichte christlicher Bewegungen reformatorischer Tradition in Österreich, Bd. 1.

Bonn: Verlag für Kultur und Wissenschaft, 2006, 208 pp., € 17, -, Pb., ISBN 3-938116-18-8

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Seit 1875 ist die Abhaltung der Allianz-Gebetswoche in Wien nachweisbar. Für Wien gibt es eine breite, kontinuierliche Quellenbasis (vor allem Protokolle) ab 1926, für Graz, Linz und Salzburg dagegen erst ab den 1970er Jahren. In Österreich waren vorwiegend die Vertreter von Freikirchen und freien Werken die tragenden Kräfte. Evangelische Repräsentanten engagierten sich in der Allianz insbesondere in den Jahrzehnten nach dem 2.Weltkrieg. Eine große Stärke dieser Untersuchung ist ihre breite Quellenbasis. Hinkelmann suchte ca. 20 Archive auf, auch mehrere außerhalb von Österreich (London, Bad Blankenburg, Reutlingen, Zürich). Die Geschichte der Allianz wird hier im chronologischen Verlauf dargestellt. Die spannend zu lesende Darstellung ist primär deskriptiv, veranschaulicht durch viele Zitate aus den Quellen. Die offizielle Gründung einer Österreichischen Evangelischen Allianz erfolgte 1975, die behördliche Genehmigung (d.h. „Nichtuntersagung") als Verein erfolgte 1989.

SUMMARY

Since 1875 there is evidence of a week of prayer by the Evangelical Alliance in Vienna. There was a broad base of support there from as early as 1926, but for Graz, Linz and Salzburg only since the 1970s. In Austria it was the representatives of the Free Churches and independent agencies which were predominantly the forces behind it. Lutheran representatives became more involved in the Alliance during the decades after World War II. A great strength of this research is its broad base of sources. Hinkelmann has visited about 20 archives and several beyond Austria (London, Bad Blankenburg, Reutlingen, Zürich). The history of the Alliance is told in chronological sequence. The account is interesting to read and is mostly descriptive with examples of citations from the sources to illustrate it. The official founding of an Austrian Evangelical Alliance came about it 1975 and the state recognition or non-proscription as a body in 1989.

RÉSUMÉ

On a des traces de l'existence d'une semaine de prière de l'Alliance Évangélique à Vienne depuis 1875. Il y avait là une large base de soutien dès 1926, alors que ce n'est le cas à Graz, Linz et Salzburg que depuis les années 1970. Pour l'Autriche, elle se composait principalement des représentants des Églises libres ainsi que de mouvements indépendants. Des représentants de l'Église luthérienne se sont davantage impliqués dans les décennies qui ont suivi la seconde guerre mondiale. Ce travail de recherche se distingue par la grande étendue de ses sources. Hinkelman a exploré les archives d'environ une vingtaine de lieux, dont plusieurs en dehors de l'Autriche (Londres, Bad Blankenburg, Reutlingen, Zürich). L'histoire de l'Alliance Évangélique est abordée par séquences chronologiques. Le récit qui en est fait est intéressant ; il est surtout descriptif, et étayé par des citations tirées des sources. La fondation officielle d'une Alliance Évangélique autrichienne date de 1975 et sa reconnaissance ou son autorisation par l'État de 1989.

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Die Darstellung der Geschichte verhältnismäßig kleiner Kirchen oder Werke findet oft nur geringe Verbreitung (weil: im Selbstverlag gedruckt, in kopierter Form präsentiert...). Diese neue Reihe soll die Publikation solcher Forschungsergebnisse erleichtern, vorausgesetzt die Ergebnisse entsprechen wissenschaftlichen Kriterien. Die von dieser Reihe in den Blick genommenen „christlichen Bewegungen reformatorischer Tradition" haben in Österreich seit der Gegenreformation nur eine Nebenrolle gespielt. Davor, im 16.Jh., breiteten sich in Österreich sowohl Lutheraner als auch Täufer stark aus – beide sind mit dem Anliegen dieser Reihe natürlich mitgemeint. Ebenso die Freikirchen des 20. Jh.s – sie sind durch die täuferische Tradition mitgeprägt. Zu differenzieren ist im Hinblick auf die pluralistische Situation der durch Luthers Wirken initiierten evangelischen Kirche: Ihr volkskirchlicher Charakter gibt ihr eine große Offenheit für Strömungen der jeweiligen Gegenwart. Innerhalb (und im Umfeld) der evangelischen Kirche will diese Reihe solche Aufbrüche erforschen, die – wie der Pietismus – Luthers Anliegen (Errettung aus Gnade durch Glauben, Schriftprinzip) ins Zentrum rückten. Ähnliches gilt für eine Reihe von freien Werken (wie zum Beispiel Bibelgesellschaften).

Dass nun die *Geschichte der Evangelischen Allianz in Österreich* als erster Band dieser Reihe erschien, kann geradezu als programmatisch betrachtet werden. Denn

die mittels dieser Allianz einander nähergekommenen Kirchen und Werke sind das Objekt dieser Reihe.

Die Weltallianz wurde bereits im Jahr 1846 gegründet, also lange vor dem Beginn der Ökumenischen Bewegung. Ansätze zur Verpflanzung des Allianz-Gedankens nach Wien gab es bereits um 1870 (seit 1875 ist die Abhaltung der Allianz-Gebetswoche nachweisbar). Während die Allianz in Deutschland eine eher volkskirchliche Basis hatte (und Vertreter von Freikirchen dort anfänglich beargwöhnt wurden), waren in Österreich vorwiegend die Vertreter von Freikirchen und freien Werken die tragenden Kräfte, namentlich Methodisten, Baptisten, Bibelgesellschaft, CVJM, Heilsarmee, Volksmission. Evangelische Repräsentanten (Bischöfe, Superintendenten, Theologieprofessoren) engagierten sich in der Allianz insbesondere in den Jahrzehnten nach dem 2.Weltkrieg, bis dem *Ökumenischen Rat der Kirchen* mehr Gewicht gegeben wurde (1958 wurde er in Ö. gegründet; seit 1970 arbeitet dort auch die katholische Kirche als Beobachter mit – das hat starke Auswirkungen, denn die kath. Kirche hat in Ö. ungefähr zehnmal so viele Mitglieder wie alle anderen christlichen Kirchen miteinander!). Für die Evangelische Kirche Augsburgischen Bekenntnisses und Helvetischen Bekenntnisses sowie die Methodisten wurde die Ev. Allianz ab ca. 1980 weniger wichtig, und galt dort außerdem als „eng" oder „evangelikal". Seither ist das Engagement in der Ev. Allianz auch ein Bekenntnis-Akt.

Die Geschichte der Allianz wird hier im chronologischen Verlauf dargestellt, mit kurzen Zusammenfassungen am Ende der Kapitel sowie am Ende des Buches (im Umfang von insgesamt sieben Seiten). Die spannend zu lesende Darstellung ist primär deskriptiv, Erklärungsversuche werden nur zurückhaltend präsentiert. Da Hinkelmann viele Quellen selbst sprechen lässt (indem er ausführlich zitiert), führt er den Leser unmittelbar an die Ereignisse heran. Englische und französische Zitate (in den Jahrzehnten um 1900) bringt Hinkelmann zusätzlich in deutscher Übersetzung.

Etwa ein Fünftel der österreichischen Bevölkerung lebt in Wien, und auch kirchliche Organisationen haben zuerst in Wien Fuß gefasst. Was die Allianz betrifft, so gibt es eine breite, kontinuierliche Quellenbasis (vor allem Protokolle) für Wien ab 1926, für Graz, Linz und Salzburg dagegen erst ab den 1970er Jahren.

Eine große Stärke dieser Untersuchung ist ihre breite Quellenbasis. Hinkelmann suchte ca. 20 Archive auf, auch mehrere außerhalb von Österreich (London, Bad Blankenburg, Reutlingen, Zürich). Neben handschriftlichen Protokollen sind Archive auch als Aufbewahrungsort von kirchlichen Zeitschriften wichtig, denn viele von diesen fehlen in öffentlichen Bibliotheken. Als Quelle für das Umfeld der Allianz in Österreich wichtig sind folgende Zeitschriften: Für die Anfangszeit Evangelische Kirchenzeitung für Ö. (1883-), *Monatlicher Anzeiger des CVJM* (1896-), *(Worte der) Wahrheit und Liebe* (1904-), *Der Evangelist für die Donauländer* (1911-). Für die Nachkriegszeit *Weckruf* (Wiedenester Brüdergemeinden) und *Quelle des Lebens* (Mennoniten-Brüdergemeinden), und natürlich der *Allianzspiegel* (1986-). Schon diese wenigen Hinweise lassen erahnen, welche große Menge von Zeitschriftenbänden Hinkelmann im Hinblick auf Allianzerwähnungen durchgesehen hat. Es ergibt sich nun ein ziemlich vollständiges Bild von den Vorgängen, Hinkelmann versuchte auch jeweils die Größenordnung zu erfassen (zum Beispiel sollten für die Gebetswoche 1923 aus Deutschland 1000 Gebetshefte bestellt werden, S. 50). Ebenso wichtig ist natürlich das Selbstverständnis der Allianz – in der Zwischenkriegszeit achtete die Wiener Allianz darauf, dass die einzelnen Kirchen und Werke im Vorstand vertreten sind, sah sich demnach als Bund von Kirchenvertretern, nicht – wie heute – als „Bund von Brüdern" (S. 49). Manche Nebeninformationen bereichern unsere Kenntnis der Geschichte einzelner Kirchen, so erfahren wir etwa, dass es 1930 in Graz Baptisten gab (S. 62; bisher wissen wir kaum, ob es dort zwischen ca. 1890 und 1950 eine Baptistengemeinde gab). Aber natürlich wird auch das bereits Erforschte von Hinkelmann in seiner Darstellung aufgenommen, etwa die NS-kritische Predigttätigkeit von Arnold Köster (S. 58-61).

Wichtige Ereignisse in der Allianzgeschichte waren die Audienz einer internationalen Allianzdeputation bei Kaiser Franz Joseph (1879), Allianzkonferenzen als jährliches Zusammentreffen für die Prediger aus der Donaumonarchie (in Ansätzen in den 1880er Jahren, dann regelmäßig 1900-1918), die auf Allianzbasis arbeitende (S. 73: „Männer aus zwölf Ländern und zwölf Kirchen ließen sich gemeinsam ausbilden") Bibelschule St. Andrä für Südosteuropa (1922-1940), Allianzkonferenzen in Salzerbad (1951-1975), die offizielle Gründung einer *Österreichischen Evangelischen Allianz* 1975, Großevangelisationen wie zum Beispiel mit Anton Schulte 1977 in Linz (mit tausenden Besuchern), das Missionarische Jahr 1984, die evangelistische Verteilschrift *MiniMag* im Jubiläumsjahr *Ostarrichi* 96, Auseinandersetzungen mit Verantwortlichen der Evangelischen Kirche (wobei der für juristische Angelegenheiten zuständige Kirchenkanzler der Ev. Kirche, Emmerich Fritz, sehr scharfe Briefe schrieb) um den Namensschutz für „evangelisch" (um 1990), die Konstituierung als Verein 1988 (behördliche Genehmigung, d. h. „Nichtuntersagung" 1989), eine Leitungskrise 1991 (mitverursacht durch die 1981 erfolgte Gründung der *Arbeitsgemeinschaft evangelikaler Gemeinden Österreichs* (ARGEGÖ), wodurch Kräfte von der Allianz abgezogen wurden) – daraufhin übernahm Fritz Börner den Vorsitz, Klärung der Möglichkeit der Mitarbeit von Pfingstlern bzw. Charismatikern in den 1990er Jahren, Unterstützung ausländischer Mitarbeiter bei der Erlangung einer Aufenthaltsbewilligung (seit 1995).

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Den Sinn biblischer Texte verstehen: Eine Auseinandersetzung mit neuzeitlichen hermeneutischen Ansätzen

Helge Stadelmann (ed.).

TVG 499, Systematisch-theologische Monografien (STM), Bd. 16. Gießen: Brunnen; Witten: R. Brockhaus, 2006. 233 pp., Paperback, € 20,-, ISBN 3-7655-9499-7.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Dieser Aufsatzband geht auf eine Tagung des deutschen Arbeitskreises für evangelikale Theologie im Jahr 2005 zurück und gilt entscheidenden hermeneutischen Grundfragen. Aus praktisch-theologischer, bibelwissenschaftlicher und theologisch-philosophischer Sicht geht es um den Sinn biblischer Texte und um dessen Findung. Wie kann angesichts der Entwicklungen in der neueren Hermeneutik am Primat des Literalsinns und der Autorenintention, die zurecht als wesentliches Element protestantischen Glaubens und evangelikaler Theologie gesehen werden, festgehalten werden? Die teils inspirierenden Aufsätze werfen viele für evangelikale Theologen wichtige Fragen auf, ohne auf alle Fragen befriedigende Antworten zu geben.

SUMMARY

This volume of essays goes back to a meeting of the German working group for Evangelical Theology and touches on decisive hermeneutical issues. It concerns the sense of the biblical text and how to get hold of this from practical-theological, biblical studies and theological-philosophical angles. How in light of the development in recent hermeneutics on the primacy of the literal sense and the intention of the author which are rightly viewed as essential parts of protestant faith and evangelical theology? The essays are to an extent inspiring and throw up many important questions for evangelical theologians, without giving satisfactory answers to all questions.

RÉSUMÉ

Ce livre reprend les contributions d'une rencontre du groupe de travail allemand pour la théologie évangélique et aborde des questions herméneutiques importantes. Ces essais traitent du sens du texte biblique et de la manière de l'appréhender. Ce sujet est abordé du point de vue de la théologie pratique, des études bibliques, et de la théologie et de la philosophie. Comment peut-on, dans le contexte des développements récents en matière d'herméneutique, maintenir ce qui est avec raison considéré comme un point essentiel de la foi protestante historique et de la théologie évangélique, à savoir la primauté du sens littéral et de l'intention de l'auteur ? Les essais sont stimulants et soulèvent d'importantes questions pour la théologie évangélique, sans toutefois apporter de réponses satisfaisantes à toutes.

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Der vorliegende Band enthält die überarbeiteten Vorträge der 14. Studienkonferenz des deutschen Arbeitskreises für evangelikale Theologie (AfeT), die im September 2005 stattfand. Die Autoren repräsentieren verschiedene evangelikale Prägungen in konfessioneller und theologischer Hinsicht, sie eint jedoch zweierlei:

> 1. die begründete Überzeugung, dass nur der die Bibel sachgemäß auslegen wird, der ihren Literalsinn in größtmöglicher Sorgfalt wahrnimmt und im Kontext des Schriftganzen text- und schriftgemäß versteht; sowie 2. die nicht unbegründete Sorge, dass die „Kirchen des Wortes" ihre Identität preisgeben, wenn sie sich im Umgang mit der Schrift von der subjektiven Kreativität postmodern-emanzipatorischer Hermeneutik bestimmen lassen (VI)

Der *erste Teil* gilt den „Herausforderungen aus der Praxis" (3-83; Missiologie, praktische Theologie). P. Beyerhaus beschreibt die „Die Normativität biblischer Texte und ihre Kontextualisation in der missionarischen Kommunikation" (3-28; die autoritative Vorgegebenheit der biblischen Botschaft, Einheit und Variabilität der biblischen Botschaft, das Anliegen im Kontextualisierungsbemühen, der Übersetzungsvorgang in der missionarischen Kommunikation). Nach Beyerhaus ist die eigentliche Aufgabe bei einer dialogischen Kommunikation in der Mission, „der Mitteilung des von Christus erworbenen Heils an die heillose Welt dadurch zu dienen, dass wir unseren nichtchristlichen Zuhörern zu etwas Zweifachem verhelfen: Erstens das Heil von ihren eigenen kontextuellen Voraussetzungen her selbst zu verstehen sowie unter Antrieb des Heiligen Geistes danach zu verlangen, zweitens es – von einem neuen pneumatischen Standort her – wiederum in ihren Kontext hinein umzusetzen" (28). H. Stadelmann schildert „Die Wende vom 'Text' zum 'Hörer': Der Paradigmenwechsel zur emanzipatorischen Hermeneutik in der Praktischen Theologie" (29-49). T. Richter schreibt über den „'Texttod der Predigt' und seine Überwindung: Wilfried Engemanns semiotisch-homiletische Konzeption" (50-83).

Teil 2 behandelt den Sinn des Textes in den Bibelwissenschaften (87-154). In „Zur Verbindlichkeit kanonischer Texte: Der *'sensus literalis'* und hypothetische Sinnschichten 'über' bzw. 'unter' dem Text in seiner kanonischen Gestalt" (87-106) beschreibt H. Klement die Herausforderung der Postmoderne für die Exegese und die Unmöglichkeit einer Rückkehr zum Modernismus und Historismus. Klement plädiert für eine integrierte Exegesemethodik unter einem literarischen, historischen und theologischen Fragehorizont. R. Gebauer („Der 'sensus literalis' neutestamentlicher Texte angesichts der Herausforderung leserorientierter Ansätze in der Exegese", 107-127) behandelt die Spannung zwischen dem *sensus literalis* und dem *sensus lectoris*, d. h. der Sinnkonstituierung eines Textes durch den Leser bzw. Rezipienten, die bei einigen neueren hermeneutischen Ansätzen im Vordergrund steht. Ferner geht es um Schriftauslegung als Textinterpretation, sowie Schriftauslegung im Spannungsfeld von Lesersinn und Literalsinn. Angesichts der gegebenen Normativität und Autorität der neutestamentlichen Texte, „muss die Anwendung der rezepti-

onsästhetischen Maxime, dem Leser ein Höchstmaß an interpretatorischer Freiheit gegenüber dem Literalsinn und den Steuerungsmechanismen eines Textes einzuräumen, grundsätzlich hinterfragt werden" (123f). Für diese Hinterfragung führt Gebauer mehrere Gründe an. Gebauer schließt:

> Der Literalsinn ist und bleibt der maßgebende Sinn der neutestamentlichen Schriften. Das ergibt sich aus dem Wesen und dem Anspruch sowie der kanonischen Dignität der Texte. Freilich muss hier differenziert werden, denn den Literalsinn gibt es nicht ohne den Leser. Jedoch steht dieser... dem Text gegenüber in einer unter- bzw. nachgeordneten Position, die sich aus der Geltung des Textes als Teil der Heiligen Schrift der christlichen Kirche ergibt. Das durch die so verstandene Schrift vermittelte Zeugnis vom grundlegenden und alles bestimmenden Heilshandeln Gottes in Jesus Christus will (und muss) als solches nicht nur historisch-theologisch interpretiert werden, sondern auch im Blick auf ein heutiges Vernehmen als Reden Gottes.... In diesem Kontext hat die Rezeptionshermeneutik ihr theologisches und methodisches Recht, insofern sie dazu beiträgt, in den von den biblischen Texten her intendierten Kommunikationsprozess den Leser als konstitutiven Faktor miteinzubeziehen. Hierin scheint mir die Chance und der große Gewinn dieser Hermeneutik zu liegen, insofern sie den Leser mit seiner Personalität methodisch in den Auslegungsvorgang einbringt und so ein tieferes Verstehen und Vernehmen des neutestamentlichen Zeugnisses ermöglicht. Dadurch können Dimensionen und Horizonte der Texte erschlossen werden, die bislang verborgen geblieben bzw. nicht wahrgenommen worden sind (126).

H. von Siebenthal fragt „Was ist der Sinn des Textes? Anmerkungen zur neutestamentlichen Exegese aus sprachwissenschaftlicher Sicht" (128-157). Nach von Siebenthal ist der verbreitete Pessimismus oder gar Defätismus im Blick auf den Textsinn unbegründet, denn verschiedene Erkenntnisse der Textlinguistik zeigen, dass sich der Sinn von Texten allgemein nicht nur adäquat definieren, sondern auch adäquat erheben und beschreiben läßt (154). Obwohl die Suche nach dem intendierten Textsinn der Bibel mit einer Reihe besonderer Schwierigkeiten verbunden ist, „führt auch hier ein 'normaler' (mit dem Standard-Options-Prinzip und dem Prinzip der kontextuellen Angemessenheit operierender) Umgang mit der Textform gewöhnlich – trotz 'unscharfer Ränder' – in völlig adäquater Weise zum Textsinn" (154).

Teil 3 gilt den theologisch-philosophischen Hintergründen (161-233). J. Eber beleuchtet „Literalsinn und Klarheit der Schrift im Schriftverständnis von Martin Luther" (161-181, Darstellung in verschiedenen Schriften Luthers, ferner das Verhältnis von Literalsinn und Allegorie bei Luther, sowie die zwischen Literalsinn und der menschlichen Vernunft). Nach Luther bleibt das Verstehen der Schrift eine unerledigte Aufgabe: Mit einem einmaligen Lesen eines Textes ist es nicht getan. Ferner ist das Schriftverständnis ein vom Teufel angefochtener Bereich. Angesichts ihres gewaltigen Inhalts und der daraus erwachenden Aufgabe des kirchlichen Amtes ist die Bibel immer wieder neu zu lesen und zu verstehen (181). Von B. Rothen stammt der Beitrag „Reformatorisches Schriftverständnis und neuzeitliche Hermeneutik: Die Bibel im Licht von Taufe und Abendmahl lesen" (182-212); von H. Hempelmann, „'Der Wille zur Macht interpretiert': Grundsätze postmoderner, nachmetaphysischer Hermeneutik nach Friedrich Nietzsche" (213-233).

Die Beiträge bieten interessante Perspektiven auf eine aktuelle Debatte aus evangelikaler Sicht. Einige Fragen bleiben offen, zum Beispiel wie kommt es, dass auch evangelikale Ausleger den Literalsinn von Texten verschieden bestimmen und ihre Auslegungen voneinander abweichen? Wie kommt man vom Literalsinn zu einer textadäquaten Anwendung und zu Lehraussagen (vgl. dazu I. H. Marshall, Beyond the Bible: Moving from Scripture to Theology, Acadia Studies in Bible and Theology; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2004; vgl. meine Rez. in Neot. 40, 2006, 210-213)? Welche Rolle spielt die Kirche und die Einbindung des Auslegers in eine größere Lesegemeinschaft bei der Erhellung des Textes?

Gerade für evangelikale Ausleger und ihre Bibliologie stellt sich die Frage, ob der inspirierte Text nicht auch über seinen Literalsinn hinaus oder in Anknüpfung an den Literalsinn einen geistlichen Sinn (jenseits einer pragmatisch-homiletischen Anwendung) haben kann und wie dieser zu erhellen ist. Die Schriftauslegung im Neuen Testament zeigt, dass zumindest manche Stellen des AT über ihren Literalsinn hinausweisen. Die Tradition der *geistlichen Schriftlesung*, die Auslegungen der Kirchenväter sowie die gegenwärtige Renaissance und Rehabilitation des Origenes und seiner Hermeneutik sowie Auslegungen (vgl. *De principiis* IV.2.1-6; vgl. C. Reemts, *Origenes: Eine Einführung in Leben und Denken*; Würzburg: Echter, 2004) weisen auf Fragen hin, die auch von evangelikalen Theologen aufgegriffen werden müssen. Zum Thema vgl. auch T. Söding (Hrsg.), *Geist im Buchstaben? Neue Ansätze in der Exegese*, QD 225 (Freiburg, Basel, Wien: Herder, 2007).

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Antike Medizin: Ein Lexikon

K. H. Leven (ed.)

München: C. H. Beck, 2005, 968 Sp., € 50,-, cloth.
ISBN 3-406-52891

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Das vorliegende Lexikon gibt einen hervorragenden Überblick über die antike Medizin. Zu über tausend Stichwörtern bieten die Autoren eine stark an antiken medizinischen Quellen orientierte Darstellung und Sekundärliteratur. An vielen Stellen werfen die Artikel neues Licht auf die im Neuen Testament erwähnten Ärzte, Krankheiten, Heilungen und Heilverfahren. Daneben behandelt das Lexikon Themen, die auch in der christlichen Ethik von Interesse sind sowie einige Kirchenväter, die sich zu medizinischen Themen geäußert haben.

SUMMARY

This dictionary offers an excellent overview of Medicine in Antiquity. There are more than one thousand entries where the authors provide a description strongly based on the ancient medical sources and secondary literature. In many places the articles offer new light on the doctors, diseases, healings and healing processes mentioned in the New Testament. In addition there are treatments of themes which are also of interest for Christian Ethics and also of Church fathers who wrote on medical themes.

RÉSUMÉ

Ce dictionnaire offre une excellente présentation de l'état de la médecine dans l'antiquité. Il contient plus d'un millier d'articles dans lesquels les auteurs fournissent une description solidement basée sur les sources médicales anciennes et la littérature secondaire. À de nombreuses reprises, les articles apportent un éclairage nouveau sur les docteurs, les maladies, les guérisons et les procédés de soin mentionnés dans le Nouveau Testament. En outre, certains thèmes sont abordés qui présentent un intérêt pour l'éthique chrétienne. Les portions des écrits des pères de l'Église portant sur des thèmes médicaux sont aussi traitées.

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In diesem Lexikon bieten neunzig Medizinhistoriker, Althistoriker und Philologen aus Europa und den USA in rund tausend Artikeln alles Wissenswerte zur antiken Medizin. Schwerpunkt ist dabei der griechisch-römische Kulturkreis von der archaischen Zeit bis in die Spätantike. Byzantinische Namen und Sachstichwörter sind nur in Auswahl aufgenommen worden (A. Garzya, „Byzantinische Medizin", 178-82). Zu anderen Themenkreisen gibt es Überblicksartikel (U. Weisser, „Arabische Medizin", 74-76; O. Riha, „Mittelalterliche Medizin", 622f; F. Hoffmann, „Ägyptische Medizin", 11-13; K. Volk, „Mesopotamische Medizin", 607-609). Da sich die Einträge auf schriftliche Quellen der Antike konzentrieren, gibt es zum Beitrag der Archäologie (M. Steinhart, 76-78) und der Paläopathologie (K. W. Alt, 663-665) ebenfalls nur Überblicksartikel; starke Berücksichtigung archäologischer Funde bei E. Künzel, *Medizin in der Antike: Aus einer Welt ohne Narkose und Aspirin* (Stuttgart: K. Theiss, 2002; viele Abbildungen!). Der Skopus des Lexikons ist umfassend: „Medizin der Antike meint nicht nur das Wirken und Denken derjenigen, die sich selbst als 'Ärzte' verstanden, sondern alle am 'Gesundheitsmarkt' beteiligten Gruppen und sämtliche Phänomene, die mit Gesundheit und Krankheit zu tun haben" (VII). Dabei reicht der inhaltliche Darstellungsrahmen „von bedeutenden Ärzten der Antike wie Hippokrates und Galen, über einschlägige Quellenwerke wie das *Corpus Hippocraticum* weiter über Heilpflanzen, Arzneimitteltheorie, Untersuchungstechniken und Krankenversorgung bis zum Tod. Ebenfalls in die Darstellung aufgenommen wurde die Rezeption der jeweiligen Autoren in der Antike, gelegentlich auch die nachantike Rezeption" (Klappentext). Jeder Eintrag enthält neben der eigentlichen Darstellung die Angaben der antiken medizinischen Werke sowie Hinweise auf die weiterführende Sekundärliteratur. Seinem Anspruch wird der Band gerecht: „Das vorliegende Lexikon versucht als handliches Nachschlagewerk für Forschung und Lehre, ferner für interessierte Laien, den aktuellen Forschungsstand zuverlässig und knapp darzubieten" (VIII).

Der Band hat Neutestamentlern viel zu bieten, geht es doch auch im ersten und im letzten Kapitel des Neuen Testaments um Themen, die die antike Medizin bewegt haben: In Mt 1.18,25 wird von der Schwangerschaft Marias und der Geburt Jesu berichtet (D. Schäfer/K.-H. Leven, „Schwangerschaft", 781-783; D. Schäfer, „Geburt", 327-339). In Offenbarung 22.1 von den Blättern der Bäume des Lebens im neuen Jerusalem, die zur Heilung (qerapeia) der Völker dienen (vgl. C. Schulze, „Therapie", 855-559; P. Potter, „Heilung", 395f). Neben den summarischen Berichten, dass Jesus, die Apostel und andere Christen der ersten Generationen viele Kranken heilten (vgl. z. B. Lk 4.40f; Apg 5.12; 19.11f), kommen im Neuen Testament Ärzte, verschiedene mehr oder weniger detailliert beschriebene Krankheitsbilder sowie weitere Themen antiker Medizin vor (vgl. auch Sir 37.27-38.15). In der Regel ist eine genaue Diagnose aufgrund dieser Angaben nicht möglich, schon deshalb, weil sie nicht im Interesse der Erzähler liegt. Wörterbücher und Kommentare gehen oft über vage Angaben nicht hinaus. Gelegentlich wird vermutet, welches moderne Krankheitsbild hinter den biblischen Angaben liegen könnte. Zur Methodik und Problematik einer retrospektiven Diagnose vgl. P. Potter, „Diagnose, retrospektive", 220f:

> … ist eine bewusste Trennung zwischen Diagnose in antiken und neuzeitlichen Kontext notwendig, also zwischen einem historischen Diskurs, der sich mit der Untersuchung der antiken medizinischen Gedankenwelt befasst und einem naturwissenschaftlichen Diskurs, der zum Bereich der Paläopathologie gehört. Diese methodische Sorgfalt wird bei der retrospektiven Diagnose häufig missachtet, indem literarische oder archäologische Zeugnisse – so bezüglich

individueller Krankheiten – direkt mit modernen klinischen Krankheitsbildern in Beziehung gesetzt werden.

Selten jedoch wird der ntl. Befund ausführlicher auf dem Hintergrund antiker Medizin behandelt. Hierzu bietet das vorliegende Lexikon Hilfestellung. Einige Beispiele, die zum Weiterarbeiten einladen, genügen:

Zu den in Lukas 10.34 erwähnten antiken Heilmitteln Öl und Wein vgl. M. Stamatu, „Öl", 657f" (Öl zur Wundreinigung, äußerliche Anwendung u. a. zur Blutstillung und in Form von Umschlägen gegen Schwellungen bei Knochenbrüchen) und *dies.*, „Wein", 921-923: „Neben dem Öl stellte Wein die wichtigste Substanz der antiken Medizin und Diätetik dar.... weingetränkte Binden bei Knochenbrüchen", in römischer Zeit wurde Wein in der traditionellen Hausmedizin als nahezu wundertätiges Allheilmittel betrachtet"; innerliche Anwendung von Wein in 1 Tim 5.23 (Wein um des Magens willens, vgl. M. Stamatu, „Magen", 581). Zum lauteren Auge von Mt 6.22f vgl. K. Bergdolt, „Auge", 123: „Das Augenlicht wird durch den Seelenzustand modifiziert (milder, feuriger Blick)". Zum Fieber der Schwiegermutter des Petrus (Lk 4.39) vgl. B. Gundert, „Fieber", 299-301. Die Kombination von Fieber und „Ruhr" erscheint in Apg 28.8; dazu vgl. M. Stamatu, „Dysenterie", 237f: „Der Verlauf war häufig tödlich und in allen Fällen langwierig". Das schlichte Gebet des Paulus erwies sich als effektiver als die ärztlichen Therapien, nämlich bei dieser Diagnose „vollständige Entleerung des Magens, Anwendung schleimfördernder Brechmittel, Diät..., Aderlass und adstringierende Klistiere". Zu den verschiedene Vorkommen von Aussatz im NT vgl. K.-H. Leven, „Lepra", 565-567: „Der ästhetische Makel der durch Lepra verunstalteten Kranken... und die Angst vor Ansteckung, die auf 'klebrige Absonderungen' zurückgeführt wurde, bewirkten, dass die Kranken mitunter in einsamen Gegenden ausgesetzt wurden.... Die christliche Auffassung der Lepra sah demzufolge den Kranken als von Gott besonders Geprüften, seine Mitmenschen in der Pflicht zum Helfen, Mt 25.36".

Zu den „Mondsüchtigen" in Mt 4.24 und 17.15 vgl. K.-H. Leven, „Mondsucht", 626f und ders., „Epilepsie", 260-262. Zum besessenen Gadareners (Lk 8.27,35) vgl. A. van Hooff, „Nacktheit", 640f, zu den Dämonen und Exorzismen vgl. K.-H. Leven, 206f; A. Grote, „Besessenheit", 145f („Als Merkmale der Besessenheit galten u. a. Herumwälzen auf dem Boden oder Unempfindlichkeit gegen Hieb, Stich, Feuer und Gift") und M. Stamatu, „Geisteskrankheit", 334f („... die gr.-röm. Medizin verstand psychische Störungen nicht als göttlich-dämonische Besessenheit, sondern als rational erklärbare krankhafte Veränderungen"). Zur Krankheit der blutflüssigen Frau in Lk 8.43-48 und den antiken Therapien vgl. B. Gundert, „Blut", 166-168 und A. E. Hanson/R. Flemming, „Frauenheilkunde", 310-313; zu dem für erfolglose ärztliche Bemühungen ausgegebenem Vermögen in Mk 5.26 vgl. G. Marasco, „Arzthonorar", 104f. Nach E. Kislinger („Essig", 274f) sollte die Essig-Reichung an Gekreuzigte das Leiden verlängern. Mit Wasser verdünnter Wein wurde besonders vom Militär getrunken. Zum äthiopischen Eunuchen vgl. J. König, „Eunuch", 281f („Der als 'weiblich' angesehene Eunuch wurde zwar einerseits allgemein verachtet, faszinierte jedoch andererseits durch seine exotische Ausstrahlung") und *dies.*, „Kastration" (484-486). Zu den Zauberbüchern in Apg 19.19 vgl. G. Marasco, „Amulett" (38f) und M. Stamatu, „Aberglaube" (3-5).

Zum „Augenleiden" des Paulus (Gal 4.15; 6.11; Apg 23.2-5, 2 Kor 12.7) und dem des Tobit (2.10; 6.8f; 11.4-10 detaillierte Beschreibung – „... und ich bekam weiße Flecken auf der Hornhaut. Ich suchte Hilfe bei Ärzten; aber je mehr Salben sie an mir ausprobierten, desto schlimmer wurde es. Zuletzt konnte ich überhaupt nichts mehr sehen" – und Heilung durch Fischgalle; dazu M. Stamatu, „Fisch", 301f, „für Salben auch Fischleim") vgl. K. Bergdolt „Augenheilkunde" (125-127; auch für die „Augensalbe" von Offenbarung 3.18, die der erhöhte Herr der Gemeinde in Laodizäa verordnet) und *ders.*, „Blindheit", 165f („... die wohl häufigste Behinderung in der Antike"). Zum Begriff Schwäche bei Paulus ist es interessant zu wissen: „In der Medizin verwandte man Euphemismus zur abmildernden Umschreibung von Krankheiten (z. B. lat. *infirmitas* 'Schwäche' für 'Krankheit')", M. Stamatu, „Euphemismus", 282 (vgl. auch Apg 20.35). Zum Training des Athleten, der nach 1 Kor 9.27 seinen Leib bezwingt und ihn zähmt vgl. A. van Hooff, „Athlet", 121f („leistungssteigernde Ernährung.... Wer Athlet werden wollte, unterwarf sich einem strengen Training und einer Diät... Der Nahrung kam besondere Andacht zu. Sexuelle Enthaltsamkeit wurde vorgeschrieben"). Zu den farmakoi von Offenbarung 21.8 und 22.15 vgl. S. Ihm, „Gift", 358-361.

Zur Einschätzung von „Lukas, dem geliebten Arzt" aus Kolosser 4.14 vgl. M. Stamatu, „Arzt", 99-102, dies., „Ausbildung, ärztliche" (129-31) und P. von Möllendorff / K.-H. Leven, „Bildung", 155-157, zur medizinischen Allgemeinbildung damaliger Autoren vgl. z. B. H. Hein, „Juvenal", 477; ferner C. J. Thornton, *Der Zeuge des Zeugen: Lukas als Historiker der Paulusreisen*, WUNT 56 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1991); von den älteren W. K. Hobart, *The Medical Language of St. Luke*, vgl. dazu die Würdigung bei W. W. Gasque, *History of the Criticism of the Acts of the Apostles*, BGBE 17; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1975, 124f, 169, 172, 179).

Spannend ist ferner der Beitrag zur „Lebenserwartung" antiker Menschen (A. van Hooff, 557-559), der ein interessantes Licht auf die Lebensalterangaben im NT wirft: Mit ungefähr dreißig Jahren beginnt das öffentliche Auftreten Jesu (Lk 3.23). Die Prophetin Hanna war 84 Jahre alt (Lk 2.37). Man denkt auch an die jungen Männer aus Apg 5.6,10 und an das Alter des Paulus (Phm 9). Nur Witwen über sechzig sollen von den Gemeinden unterstützt werden (1Tim 5.9; weitere Altersangaben in Lk 1.7-36, Joh 21.18-23; Apg 2.17; 6.22; 10.30; 14.23; 16.4; Röm 4.19-21; 2Kor 5.8; Phil 1.23; 1Tim 4.14; 5.1-5; Tit 2.2; Hebr 11.11; 1Petr

5.1-5; Off 4.4,10). Vgl. dazu J. N. Neumann, M. Sigismund, U. Volp, „Der Mensch in seinen Lebensphasen" (zum Alter S. 59-62) in K. Erlemann *et al.* (Hrsg.): *Neues Testament und Antike Kultur II: Familie – Gesellschaft – Wirtschaft* (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2005), 52-64, zu Krankheiten und Behinderungen vgl. R. von Bendemann, J. N. Neumann „Krankheit und Gesundheit / Lebenserwartung", 64-68 und J. N. Neumann, „Behinderung", 68-71 (jeweils mit hilfreicher Bibliographie); vgl. dazu auch L. Capasso, *et al.*, „Demographische Ergebnisse: Die Struktur der antiken Bevölkerung" und „Paläopathologie: Die Krankheiten" in J. Mühlenbrock, D. Richter (Hrsg.), *Verschüttet vom Vesuv: Die letzten Stunden von Herculaneum* (Mainz: Ph. von Zabern, 2005), 51-55 und H. Brandt, *Wird auch silbern mein Haar: Eine Geschichte des Alters in der Antike* (München: C. H. Beck, 2003).

Von Interesse für Neutestamentler sind ferner die Einträge M. Stamatu, „Aberglauben" (3-5); J. Martin, „Anthropologie" (58-60), R. May, „Apollonius von Tyana" (70f); O. Wenskus, „Astronomie / Astrologie" (115-118); K.-H. Leven, „Atheismus" (118f); K.-H. Leven, „Beschneidung" (145); B. Amundsen / G. B. Ferngren, „Bibel (Neues Testament)" (152-154); S. Kottek, „Bibel (Altes Testament)" (150-52); G. B. Ferngren / B. Amundsen, „Christentum", (199-201); A. Grote, „Fasten" (293f); A. E. Hanson/R. Flemming „Frau" (307-310); A. Grote, „Gebet" (327); D. Schäfer, „Geburt" (327-329); S. Föllinger, „Geschlecht" (339-343); B. Amundsen / G. B. Ferngren, „Jesus" (467f) und T. Schnalke, „Wunderheilungen" (926-928). Durchweg laden die Einträge zum Weiterarbeiten mit den angegebenen antiken Quellen ein.

Neben Artikeln direkt zu den im Neuen Testament erwähnen Krankheiten und zur Umwelt des Neuen Testaments (z. B. „Asklepieion", „Asklepios", „Asklepios-Schlange", „Barbar", „Brot", „Ernährung") gibt es auch wichtige Einträge für die Kirchengeschichte und die christliche Ethik, z. B. E. Kislinger „Abtreibung" (5-8; dazu auch A. E. Hanson/R. Flemming, „Frau", 307-310: „Abtreibung, ob durch Medikamente, Pessare oder dementsprechende Nahrung... galt als gefährlich, kaum jedoch als unmoralisch oder illegal..."); A. Labisch, „Armenpflege" (90f), A. Grote, „Augustinus" (127f); R. Volk, „Basileios von Kaisareia" (139); K.-H. Leven, „Behinderte" (141-43); G. Staab, „Benedikt von Nursia" (143f); E. Kislinger, „Bordell" (172f); E. Kislinger, „Dirne" (231), K.-H. Leven, „Empfängnis" (252f); H. Flashar, „Ethik", 275-277, A. van Hooff, „Euthanasie" (284f); K.-H. Leven, „Geschlechtsverkehr" (345-347); A. Labisch, „Gesundheit" (350-353); G. B. Ferngren, „Kirche" (489-500), A. Grote, „Klemens von Alexandria" (500f), C. Oser-Grote, „Laktanz" (550f); O. Wenskus, „Tertullian" (848f), A. Grote, „Mönch" (624), M. Stamatu, „Nächstenliebe" (638-640).

Zu knapp (aus der Sicht eines Neutestamentlers!) ist der Eintrag „Lähmung" mit einer halben Spalte (A. Karenberg, 550); ähnliches gilt für „Epilepsie" und „Dämonen". Anstatt oder neben dem Verzeichnis der Einträge (945-968) wünscht man sich ein Sachregister, ferner dringend ein Register der lateinischen und griechischen Wörter bzw. Fachausdrücke. Der Band kommt ohne Illustrationen aus, die sich z. B. für den Artikel „Instrumente" (K.-H. Leven, 459-461) angeboten hätten (vgl. Künzel). Ferner wäre wünschenswert, wenn eine Neuauflage den ntl. Befund stärker berücksichtigen würde. Für antike Ärztinnen (E. Kislinger, 16f) und Hebammen (E. Kislinger, 383) vgl. auch A. Rottloff, Lebensbilder römischer Frauen, Kulturgeschichte der antiken Welt 104 (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 2006), 116-120.

Zum Thema Abführmittel bzw. Verstopfung gibt es keinen Eintrag (trotz eines Querverweises auf Abführmittel im Artikel „Abtreibung"; vgl. aber „Klistir, bzw. „Koproskopie"). Dazu gibt es einen instruktiven antiken Geschäftsbrief (P.Oxy. I 126):

> In meinem Mantelsack habe ich euch ein Maß Datteln aus Ombos und fünfundzwanzig Granatfrüchte durch Kalokairos versiegelt geschickt. Bitte schickt mir darin Abführmittel im Wert von zwei Drachmen. Ich benötige sie dringend. Durch den gleichen Kalokairos habe ich euch eine Kiste sehr guter Weintrauben und ein versiegeltes Körbchen mit schönen Datteln gesandt (zitiert nach J Leipoldt, W. Grundmann (Hrsg.), *Umwelt des Urchristentums II: Texte zum neutestamentlichen Zeitalter*, 7. Aufl. (Berlin: EVA, 1986), 74).

Insgesamt ist das Lexikon ein inspirierender Band, der einlädt, selbst mit den detailliert angegebenen Quellen zur antiken Medizin zu arbeiten und so über das in der ntl. Wissenschaft Geläufige hinauszugehen. Zu den Ärzten der Bibel vgl. ferner die Zusammenstellung in J. A. Bühner, *Arztgeschichten der Bibel* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2005) und C. Schulze, *Medizin und Christentum in Spätantike und frühem Mittelalter: Christliche Ärzte und ihr Wirken* (Mohr Siebeck, 2005).

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Paulus und das antike Schulwesen I: Schule und Bildung des Paulus

Tor Vegge

BZNW 134. Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 2005. XVI + 575 pp. 148. cloth. ISBN 3-11-018345-5

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Die vorliegende Monographie gibt einen hervorragenden Überblick über Ausbildung und Bildung in hellenistischer Zeit. Dabei geht es um Lehrer und Schüler, um die soziologische Identität und Funktion von Schulen, um literarische Bildung und das Verhältnis zwischen Ausbildung und Bildung. Auf diesem Hintergrund beleuchtet der Verfasser detailliert Ausbildung und Bildung des Paulus (seine lite-

rarische Bildung, Relevanz der Herkunft des Paulus für die Nachzeichnung seines Bildungsgangs, pharisäische Bildung sowie Paulus und seine Schule). Der Band zeigt das hohe hellenistische Bildungsniveau des Paulus und wirft interessante Perspektiven auf die prägenden Faktoren im Leben des Apostels sowie auf seine literarischen und rhetorischen Fähigkeiten.

RÉSUMÉ

On a dans cette monographie une excellente présentation de ce qu'étaient l'éducation et la formation dans la période hellénistique. L'auteur traite des professeurs et des élèves, de l'identité sociologique et de la fonction des écoles, des formes littéraires de formation et de la relation entre éducation et formation. En la replaçant dans ce contexte, l'auteur étudie ensuite la formation de Paul (sa formation littéraire, l'impact de son arrière-plan sur son parcours de formation, la formation chez les pharisiens, puis l'école de Paul). Il montre le haut niveau de l'éducation hellénistique reçue par Paul et jette quelques lumières intéressantes sur les facteurs qui ont exercé une influence dans la vie de l'apôtre, ainsi que sur ses compétences littéraires et rhétoriques.

SUMMARY

This monograph provides an excellent overview of education and formation in the Hellenistic Age. It concerns the teacher and the pupil, the sociological identity and function of schools, the literary forms of formation and the relationship between education and formation. The author sets against this background the education and formation of Paul (his literary formation, the relevance of Paul's background for the tracing of his formation process, the Pharisaic formation as well as Paul and his school). The volume shows the high Hellenistic level of Paul's formation and throws up interesting perspectives on the influential factors in the life of the Apostle as well as on his literary and rhetorical abilities.

* * * *

Neben der Theologie des Apostels hat auch die Biographie des Paulus die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft bewegt. Das Interesse galt dabei vor allem den in Galater 1f beschriebenen Ereignissen, anderen Berichten seiner Berufung aus seiner eigenen Feder oder in der Apostelgeschichte (vgl. R. Schäfer, *Paulus bis zum Apostelkonzil: Ein Beitrag zur Einleitung in den Galaterbrief, zur Geschichte der Jesus-Bewegung und zur Pauluschronologie*, WUNT II, 179; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), ferner seinen Missionsreisen und seinem Ende (vgl. F. W. Horn, ed., *Das Ende des Paulus: Historische, theologische und literaturgeschichtliche Aspekte*, BZNW 106; Berlin, New York: W. de Gruyter, 2001; H. Omerzu, *Der Prozess des Paulus: Eine exegetische und rechtshistorische Untersuchung der Apostelgeschichte*, BZNW 115; Berlin, New York: W. de Gruyter, 2002). Seit der neueren Betonung der jüdischen Prägung des Paulus im Rahmen der sog. „new perspective on Paul" wird die Frage nach seiner Herkunft und Bildung stärker gestellt; vgl. K. Haacker, „Zum Werdegang des Apostels Paulus: Biographische Daten und ihre theologische Relevanz", *ANRW II.26.2*, 815-938, 1924-33 (= *Paulus: Der Werdegang eines Apostels*, SBS 171; Stuttgart: KBW, 1997); R. Riesner, *Die Frühzeit des Apostels Paulus: Studien zur Chronologie, Missionsstrategie und Theologie*, WUNT 71 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1994) und M. Hengel, „Der vorchristliche Paulus" (unter Mitarbeit von Roland Deines), in M. Hengel, *Paulus und Jakobus: Kleine Schriften III*, WUNT 141 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 68-192. Was waren die prägenden Faktoren in Tarsus und in Jerusalem? Wann kam Paulus nach Jerusalem? Wie jüdisch, bzw. wie hellenistisch war seine Ausbildung in Jerusalem?

Eng verbunden mit den Antworten auf diese Fragen ist die traditionsgeschichtliche Prägung der Theologie des Paulus: Welche Spielart des Frühjudentums war bestimmend, zumal sich die traditionelle Unterscheidung zwischen Diasporajudentum und einem palästinischen Judentum nicht als tragfähig erwies? Wie viel hellenistische philosophische Bildung hatte der Apostel? Sind die Zitate aus hellenistischen Schriftstellern, die sich in seinen Briefen und in der Apostelgeschichte finden, dem Apostel zuzutrauen? Weisen sie auf eine mehr oder weniger gründliche hellenistische Bildung hin oder hat sie Paulus als „Körnerpicker" (Apg 17.18) lediglich aufgelesen?

Neben dem Hintergrund der paulinischen Theologie wird die Frage nach der Bildung des Paulus auch von Studien aufgeworfen, die die Briefe des Paulus nach den Maßstäben antiker Rhetorik analysieren. Hatte der Apostel eine rhetorische Ausbildung, die ihn im Aufbau und der Argumentationsstruktur seiner Briefe leitete? Oder hat Paulus sich die rhetorischen Elemente, die sich zweifelsohne in seinen Briefen finden, durch informelle Übernahme von Rednern, etc., angeeignet. Wie viel hellenistische Rhetorik darf man bei einem Diasporapharisäer aus Tarsus voraussetzen? Welche rhetorische Ausbildung gab es in Jerusalem?

Diese Fragen zeigen, dass die vorliegende Studie des Norwegers Tor Vegge (Diss. Universität Oslo, 2004; Betreuung David Hellholm) keineswegs einem Randthema der neutestamentlichen Umwelt gilt. Der *erste große Teil* der Arbeit gibt einen detaillierten Überblick über Ausbildung und Bildung in hellenistischer Zeit (3-340). Vegge beginnt mit „Lehrer und Schüler" (Lehrer in der allgemeinen Ausbildung, der Pädagoge, Schüler in der allgemeinen Ausbildung, Lehrer und Schüler in Rhetorik und Philosophenschulen, zum sozialen Status griechischer, römischer und jüdischer Lehrer). Dann geht es um die „Soziologische Identität und Funktion von Schulen" (73-107; strukturelle Merkmale, soziologische Identität der Rhetoren- und Philosophenschulen, höhere jüdische Schulen, 101-105).

Ein weiteres Kapitel untersucht „Die literarische Bildung in Schulen" (109-232), nämlich den Umgang mit Texten in der allgemeinen Ausbildung (sowohl in jüdischen als auch in griechisch-hellenistischen Schu-

len), den Einsatz von Texten in Rhetorenschulen (*Progymnasmata*), das Verhältnis von Umgangssprache und literarischer Sprache und den Einsatz von Texten in Philosophenschulen. Dabei beschreibt Vegge die Relevanz der rhetorischen Argumentation für die Philosophie, die Gattung der Diatribe und das Verhältnis von Schriftlichkeit und Literatur im schulischen Kontext (philosophische Bibliotheken, Literatur in Philosophenschulen, Briefe in Philosophenschulen). Ein weiteres Kapitel widmet sich dem Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Ausbildung und Bildung (233-329, Bildungsideale, Bildung durch Rhetorik, Bildung durch Philosophie). Der Abschnitt zur jüdischen Bildung fällt verhältnismäßig knapp aus (279-296): jüd. Bildung ausserhalb Jerusalems, höhere jüd. Bildung: Pharisäismus, gesellschaftliche Verortung der Pharisäer, Bildung und Unterricht als besonderes Merkmal der Pharisäer, Lernstoff und Bildung der Pharisäer). Der Umfang liegt zum einen an der dürftigeren Quellenlage zur jüdischen Bildung. Zum anderen „kann von einer allgemeinen (griechisch-) hellenistischen Ausbildung geredet werden, von der sich die jüdische Elementarausbildung nicht grundsätzlich unterschied. Eine spezifischere jüdische Bildung, wie etwa jene der Pharisäer, hatte durchaus ein besonderes Gepräge, das sie gegenüber anderen Bildungswegen abgrenzte, doch ist sie letztlich als eine Alternative innerhalb der Bildungswege der hellenistischen Zeit einzustufen" (196); vgl. dazu auch B. Ego, H. Merkel (Hrsg.), *Religiöses Lernen in der biblischen, frühjüdischen und frühchristlichen Überlieferung*, WUNT 180 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005).

Der erste Teil, selbst schon im Umfang einer Monographie (340 Seiten!) endet mit einer hilfreichen Zusammenfassung. Während mit Philosophie und Rhetorik die für Paulus interessantesten Aspekte hellenistischer Bildung zu Recht im Mittelpunkt stehen, wäre es angesichts der Biographie und der Bilderwelt des Paulus reizvoll, auch nach Kenntnissen und Ausbildung in Geographie zu fragen, sowie nach Hinweisen auf formale Ausbildung in römischer Verwaltung und Finanzwesen.

Auf diesem Hintergrund geht es im *zweiten Teil* um „Ausbildung und Bildung des Paulus" (343-486). Vegge beginnt mit der literarischen Bildung des Paulus (345-424). Zunächst zeigt er auf, wie Ausbildung und Bildung eines Schriftstellers in seinen Schriften zum Ausdruck kommen und fragt nach Paulus' literarischer und rhetorischer Bildung im Licht seiner Argumentationsweise (352-75). Bei der Einstufung der literarischen Kompetenz des Apostels geht es um die schulische Rhetorik bei Paulus, die Rhetorik in seinen Briefen, das Verhältnis zwischen Muttersprache und literarischer Sprache, das Zitieren klassischer Literatur und um Paulus als hochgebildetem Verfasser. Auch wenn Paulus zur Niederschrift seiner Briefe gelegentlich auf einen Sekretär zurückgegriffen haben mag, kann eine Sekretätshypothese allein die literarische und rhetorische Qualität der Paulusbriefe nicht erklären. Beispielhaft für diese Kompetenz des Paulus legt Vegge eine detaillierte Analyse der Argumentationsformen in 1Kor 7 und 2Kor 10-13 vor (376-423; vgl. dazu auch M. Mayordomo, *Argumentiert Paulus logisch?: Eine Analyse vor dem Hintergrund antiker Logik*, WUNT 188; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005).

Dann bespricht Vegge die Relevanz der Herkunft des Paulus für die Nachzeichnung seines Bildungsgangs auf (425-456, Tarsus versus Jerusalem, zum Lebenslauf, Ausbildungsorte und Bildungsverlauf, Juden in Kleinasien und in Tarsus, die Erziehung im Elternhaus, Schichtzugehörigkeit und Bildungsmöglichkeit) und beschreibt „Die Bildung des Paulus (457-486), nämlich seine griechisch-hellenistische und seine pharisäische Bildung (u. a. gesellschaftliche Stellung und Organisationsform der Pharisäer, die pharisäische Bildung und deren Voraussetzungen). Vegge schließt:

> Mit dem literarisch, griechisch-hellenistisch gebildeten Paulus, wie er sich in seinen Briefen zu erkennen gibt, stimmt die ihm in der Apostelgeschichte zugeschriebene literarische Kompetenz überein. Die Bildungsinstitutionen in Tarsus haben ihm alle Möglichkeiten geboten, eine solche literarische (rhetorische und philosophische) Bildung zu erlangen... Auch als Christusglaubender setzt Paulus zur Stützung seiner Thesen Argumente ein, die er von seinen pharisäischen Lehrern her kannte, allerdings in veränderter Gewichtung und zur Untermauerung des Neuen in seinen Thesen. Für die Gestaltung seiner Texte kam ihm natürlich auch das in seiner rhetorischen und philosophischen Bildung erlernte Forminventar zugute (486).

In der „Auswertung" (487-492) stellt Vegge zunächst allgemeine „Überlegungen zum kulturellen Hintergrund und Identitätsgefühl" an und trägt anschließend die Hinweise auf die kulturelle Identität des Paulus zusammen (467-492). Da die Selbstcharakterisierung des Pauls wenig ergiebig ist, muss auf Indizien zurückgegriffen werden, nämlich: „formale Sprachelemente und Vorstellungszusammenhänge (d. h. Vertrautheit mit den aktuellen philosophischen und religiösen Themen und ihrer sprachlichen Vermittlung)... Aspekte, die vorzugsweise in Bildungseinrichtungen erworben wurden". Der komplexe Hintergrund des Paulus ergibt sich wie folgt: „Paulus hat sich ohne Zweifel immer als Jude definiert; dies hat sich auch durch die neugewonnene Überzeugung, dass Jesus der Messias ist, nicht geändert. Zu seinem Judentum gehörte allerdings, dass eine griechisch-hellenistische Bildung sein integraler Bestandteil war; die seinen Schriften ablesbaren literarischen Fähigkeiten belegen dies eindeutig" (491). Als Jude aus Tarsus konnte sich Paulus mit der allgemeinen griechisch-hellenistischen Bildung vertraut machen und hat dies wohl auch getan. „Diese Bildung stellte in keiner Weise einen Hinderungsgrund für ein Festhalten an seinem Judentum dar. In seinen Konflikten mit Juden und Judenchristen ging es weniger darum, dass ihm eine Vermischung mit Griechischem vorgehalten würde, sondern eher um die Bedingungen für die Aufnahme von Nichtjuden in

den Gemeinden der Christusglaubenden" (491).

Die „Ergebnisse" (493-499) bündeln Vegges Beobachtungen zur Bildung („Stil- und Formanalysen seiner Texte zeigten eine so hohe Textkompetenz, dass auf eine literarische und rhetorische Bildung geschlossen werden musste, und die Sichtung der von ihm behandelten Themen sowie besonders die Art und Weise ihrer Bearbeitung ließen ebenfalls auf eine breit angelegte und fundierte Ausbildung und Bildung schließen", 493), Paulus als Schüler („Wegen der vielen inhaltlichen und formalen Berührungspunkte mit philosophischen Texten, die sich bei Paulus finden lassen, wurde hier dafür plädiert, eher davon auszugehen, dass er einen relativ kontinuierlichen Philosophieunterricht genossen hatte, also wahrscheinlich Mitglied eines festen Schülerkreises war", 494f), die von ihm besuchten Schulen, deren Lernstoff (vor allem die Textkompetenz, pharisäische Bildung – „Eine solche Bildung verdankte sich der Eigeninitiative im Erwachsenenalter; ihrem Wesen nach erforderte sie eine so hohe Textkompetenz, dass sie eine allgemeine literarische Ausbildung voraussetzte", 498 – sowie seine literarische Sprache), sowie seinen „Fortschritt" in der Bildung (Gal 1.14, „Fortschritt war in Philosophenschulen eine zentrale Vorstellung vom Bildungsverlauf", 498).

Im letzten Kapitel gibt Vegge einen Ausblick auf die „Schulbildung" des Paulus (501-520). Nach einem Forschungsüberblick beschreibt er Lehrer- und Schüleridentität in der Schule des Paulus. Vegge kündigt einen weiteren Band zur Schulbildung des Paulus auf der Grundlage der in diesem Band präsentieren Darstellung von Ausbildung und Bildung in hellenistischer Zeit an (501). Literaturverzeichnis, Autorenregister und Stellenregister beenden den umfangreichen Band.

Vegge gelingt es, die Ausbildung und Bildung des Paulus auf dem Hintergrund hellenistischer Bildung überzeugend darzustellen und zu würdigen. Eine ganze Reihe der eingangs aufgeworfenen Fragen lassen sich klären. Die Fragen nach den prägenden Faktoren in der Theologie des Paulus lassen sich allerdings mit den Schlagworten Hellenismus und Judentum kaum klären. Ferner ist positiv zu vermerken, dass Vegge das Paulusbild der Apostelgeschichte berücksichtigt. Bei deutlichen Anfragen im Detail (z. B. war Paulus nach Vegge kein Schüler Gamaliels) erweisen sich die Angaben zu Ausbildung und Bildung des Paulus als zuverlässig, bzw. entspricht die Darstellung des Paulus dessen Ausbildung und den literarischen Fähigkeiten, die auch seine Briefe bezeugen. Insgesamt bietet Vegge eine gründlich recherchierte, wahrhafte *tour de force* mit vielen Anregungen und wichtigen Ergebnissen.

Neben dem Ertrag für die eingangs aufgezeigten Fragen wirft der Band nicht nur Licht auf eine mögliche „Paulusschule" nach der Inhaftierung oder dem Tod des Apostels, sondern auch auf den Mitarbeiterkreis des Paulus. Neben einigen atl.-frühjüd. Parallelen und dem Jüngerkreis Jesu gibt es auch Berührungspunkte mit den hellenistischen Philosophenschulen. Wenn Paulus sie gekannt hat, kann man fragen, welche Aspekte für seine spätere Kollegialmission Pate gestanden haben. Wie wurde diese Kollegialmission von anderen hellenistisch Gebildeten wahrgenommen? So beobachtet Vegge z. B.: „In den Schulen konnten unterschiedliche Formen gepflegt werden, die Zugehörigkeit zur Gruppe und zum Lehrer sichern sollten. Kontakte mit abwesenden Schülern und auch mit anderorts angesiedelten Gruppen wurden durch Korrespondenz aufrechterhalten. Nach Plutarch gehörte man beim Philosophieren einem Kreis an, nach dem man sich in der Abwesenheit sehnte" (333). Es wäre zu wünschen, wenn Vegge auch diese Fragen im angekündigten Folgeband aufgreifen würde. Das Verhältnis zwischen Paulus und seinen Gemeinden und dem des Philosophen Epikur zu seinen Anhängern bzw. Schülern hat jüngst in instruktiver Weise Peter Eckstein verglichen (*Gemeinde, Brief und Heilsbotschaft: Ein phänomenologischer Vergleich zwischen Paulus und Epikur*, HBS 42; Freiburg, Basel, Wien: Herder, 2004).

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Daring, Trusting Spirit: Eberhard Bethge and Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Portrait of a Theological Friendship

John W. Gruchy

London: SCM, 2005, 221 pp., Pb., GB £ 14.99
ISBN: 978-033-4-029-687

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Diese Biographie des wichtigsten Freundes von Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Eberhard Bethge (1909--2000), ist ein bemerkenswertes Buch aus der Feder eines südafrikanischen Theologen. Gruchy beschreibt die Theologie Bonhoeffers, seine Freundschaft mit Bethge und den deutschen Kirchenkampf. Er beleuchtet dann Bethges Rolle als Bonhoeffer-Promotor nach dem 2. Weltkrieg. Darüber hinaus versteht er es, Bethges eigenes theologisches Profil und dessen eigenständige Arbeit aufzuzeigen. Eine wissenschaftliche Biographie von Bethges Leben in deutscher Sprache ist leider noch immer ein Desiderat.

RÉSUMÉ

Eberhard Bethge (1909-2000) fut le principal ami de Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Gruchy, théologien sud-africain, nous en livre une biographie remarquable. Il présente la théologie de Bonhoeffer, son amitié avec Bethge et le combat de l'Église allemande (*Kirchenkampf*). Il montre ensuite quel a été le rôle de Bethge dans la promotion de l'œuvre de Bonhoeffer après la seconde guerre mondiale. Il nous présente aussi la théologie de Bethge et son œuvre indépendante. On attend toujours une biographie de Bethge en allemand.

SUMMARY

This biography of the most significant friend of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Eberhard Bethge (1909--2000) is a noteworthy

book from the pen of a South African theologian. Gruchy describes Bonhoeffer's theology, his friendship with Bethge and the German Church Struggle (Kirchenkampf). He then illustrates Bethge's role as Bonhoeffer's promoter after the Second World War. Moreover he knows how to present Bethge's own theological profile and his independent work. Yet we still lack sadly a scholarly biography of Bethge in German.

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My first contact with Eberhard Bethge (1909--2000) was short after the fall of the Berlin wall, when I asked his advice for the topic of my doctoral dissertation on Bonhoeffer's ecclesiology. His answer was a very warm letter, full of encouragement. About one year later I had the privilege to meet him personally in his home. We were discussing a passage in Bonhoeffer's diary, when I stayed in Rome as student. Bethge went to a drawer and brought fourth the original booklet. I enjoyed the discussion, the warmth of his hospitality. And again a year later I met Bethge again. He held a lecture at the University of Zürich and his topic was: The theology of friendship. And here Bethge quoted Bonhoeffer, where he called him friend and a "daring, trusting spirit."

Reading Gruchy's book, I was reminded of my personal encounters with Eberhard Bethge, who died in 2000. It is interesting, that the first biography of him does not come from Germany but from South Africa.

Nearly two thirds of the book describes the theology of Bonhoeffer, the time of the Kirchenkampf and the friendship of Bonhoeffer and Bethge. Facts which are well known to those, who have read Bethge's Bonhoeffer biography and his autobiography. Nevertheless interesting to read. You will notice the difference of focus from a person with quite different cultural background.

When Gruchy starts to write about the time after World War II, he offers facts and insights, which are not yet accessible in this form of a biography. He tells us, how Bethge found his role as preserver of the Bonhoeffer heritage and at the same time as his authoritative interpreter, since he was friend and eye-witness.

Sometimes in the German-speaking realm we had the impression, that Bethge was representing Bonhoeffer and his theology, rather than being a theologian of his own value. Gruchy shows how besides publishing and interpreting Bonhoeffer, Bethge became that theologian of his own value.

Gruchy does not only point at the value of Bethge's service at church academies in Germany, it were his visits overseas, which had impact on Christians outside Europe. Being South African citizen Gruchy tells us, how Bethge engaged himself in the struggle against apartheid, and how he supported Christian leaders in South Africa. Then Gruchy focusses on the anti-Semitism debate. He shows as Bethge as a person who fights against, who points his finger on the wounds, who is not afraid to uncover hidden forms of anti-Semitism. And Gruchy shows that in this whole debate Bethge very sensitive always uses the form "we" and never "they".

Towards the end of his book Gruchy once more describes Bethge as friend, when at the end of the last century Bethge once more points out the relevancy and actuality of Bonhoeffer's theology.

A biography, worth reading. It is more than a reminder of times past and a hommage to a great contemporary theologian and Christian. Gruchy does not claim, that his work is *the* biography of Bethge. It is a "thank you" offeres by a friend. And probably we will have to wait still some years for a scientific biography of Bethge in German.

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Eine Theologie des Lebens: Dietrich Bonhoeffers „nichtreligiöse Interpretation biblischer Begriffe"

Ralf K. Wüstenberg

Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2006, 160 S.,
Pb., Euro 24,--
ISBN 978-3-374-02425-4

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Ralf K. Wüstenberg will Dietrich Bonhoeffers Aussagen über die „nicht-religiöse Interpretation biblischer Begriffe" fast ausschließlich von der Philosophie Wilhelm Diltheys her verstehen. Der Verfasser meint, Bonhoeffer habe „Religion" nicht selber definiert, sondern den Begriff in verschiedenen Kontexten unterschiedlich verwendet. Die nichtreligiöse Interpretation sei rezeptionsgeschichtlich eine christologisch gedeutete Verbindung der theologischen Religionskritik Karl Barths mit dem philosophischen Historismus Diltheys. Der Rezensent kann sich dieser einseitigen Deutung nicht anschließen.

SUMMARY

Ralf K. Wüstenberg aims here to understand Dietrich Bonhoeffer's expression concerning the 'non-religious interpretation of biblical concepts' almost exclusively through the philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey. The author's view is that Bonhoeffer did not himself define 'religion' but rather used the concept with different shades of meanings in different contexts. The non-religious interpretation in terms of its reception history is a christologically interpreted uniting of the theological critique of religion by Karl Barth with the philosophical historicism of Dilthey. The reviewer cannot identify himself with this one-sided interpretation.

RÉSUMÉ

Ralf K. Wüstenberg cherche à expliquer le propos de Dietrich Bonhoeffer concernant « l'interprétation non religieuse de concepts bibliques » presque exclusivement selon la philosophie de Wilhelm Dilthey. Il pense que Bonhoeffer n'a lui-même pas défini ce qu'il faut entendre par « religion », mais qu'il a plutôt utilisé le concept en

lui donnant différentes nuances suivant les contextes. L'interprétation non religieuse tente une synthèse, dans une perspective christologique de la critique théologique de la religion proposée par Karl Barth et de l'historicisme philosophique de Dilthey. L'auteur de la recension ne peut être d'accord avec cette interprétation unilatérale.

* * * *

Das angezeigte Buch unternimmt den Versuch, Bonhoeffers Sätze zur „nichtreligiösen Interpretation biblischer Begriffe" fast ausschließlich von Dilthey her zu deuten. Wüstenberg stützt sich dabei auf die Literaturliste von Bonhoeffer während der Tegeler Haftzeit. Nun reicht dies aber nicht für eine tragfähige These aus. Deshalb untersucht Wüstenberg, ob Bonhoeffer einen eigenständigen Religionsbegriff entwickelt hat. Im Gegensatz zu Rainer Mayer (der bei Wüstenberg übrigens keine Beachtung findet) vertritt der Verfasser die Meinung, Bonhoeffer habe keine eigene Definition von Religion geliefert. Deshalb könne man auch nur aus dem jeweiligen Kontext heraus erschliessen, in welchem Sinne Bonhoeffer den Terminus gebraucht.

So zeichnet denn Wüstenberg einen Weg Bonhoeffers „von der „Religionswürdigung zur Religionskritik", „von der Religionskritik zur Religionslosigkeit", und endlich als Folgerung „die Rezeption einer Lebensphilosophie" von der Bonhoeffer zur „nichtreligiösen Interpretation" gelangt. So die Titel der drei Hauptteile.

Wüstenberg vertritt die These, dass sich Bonhoeffer seiner jeweiligen theologischen Entwicklungsstufe entsprechend das „Religionsverständnis" seiner Mentoren angeeignet habe. Das sich bereits der frühe Bonhoeffer mit Dilthey und James beschäftigt hat, wird dabei berücksichtigt. In der Darstellung von Wüstenberg erscheint Bonhoeffer dann aber eher als ein Eklektiker denn als eigenständiger Denker. Dieser Eindruck entsteht, weil der Autor sich zu stark seine Annahme als bewiesen betrachtet. So nimmt er sich selbst den Blick auf die theologische Leistung Bonhoeffers.

Der dritte Teil des Buches, in dem es um die „nichtreligiöse Interpretation" geht, stellt Wüstenberg die These auf: „Die nichtreligiöse Interpretation ist *rezeptionsgeschichtlich* (sic) eine Verbindung der theologischen Religionskritik Karl Barths mit dem philosophischen Historismus Wilhelm Diltheys." Die Begründung liest sich spannend, sie ist fast überzeugend. Wüstenberg meint, Bonhoeffer wende die Lebensphilosophie christologisch. Das bedeutet, Bonhoeffer „Jesus Christus" liest, wo Dilthey „Leben" sagt. Diese Erkenntnis ist durchaus richtig, aber dann muss bedacht werden, dass Bonhoeffer seit „Sanctorum Communio" alles von der Christologie abhängig macht.

Wüstenbergs Studie ist interessant, beachtenswert – aber sie ist zu einseitig. Zu seiner Schlussthese kann man auch auf anderen Wegen gelangen; bzw. sie ist an anderen Orten bereits vorgelegt worden. „Die nichtreligiöse Interpretation ist eine lebens-christologische Interpretation, die den christlichen Glauben und das mündige Leben aufeinander bezieht."

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What is Stronger than a Lion? Leonine Image and Metaphor in the Hebrew Bible and the Ancient Near East

Brent A. Strawn

Fribourg: Academic Press Fribourg/Göttingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005
587 pp., £93,00, h/b, ISBN 3-7278-1515-9/
ISBN 3-525-53006-4

SUMMARY

This book examines the use and function of leonine imagery in the Hebrew Bible and ancient Near East. The author analyzes the archaeological remains of ancient Israel/Palestine and the ancient Near East in an effort to gain insight into the perception of the lion during the Late Bronze Age through the Persian Period. The Hebrew Bible's use of leonine imagery is then brought into dialogue with the material culture by examining the similarities and dissimilarities between the two.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Dieses Buch untersucht die Verwendung und die Funktion von Löwen in der Bildersprache der hebräischen Bibel und des Alten Orients. Der Autor analysiert die archäologischen Funde des alten Israel/Palästina und des Alten Orients mit dem Versuch, Einsichten in die Wahrnehmung des Löwen von der späten Bronzezeit bis zum Ende der persischen Zeit zu gewinnen. Die Verwendung des Löwen in der Bildersprache der hebräischen Bibel wird dann mit der gegenständlichen Kultur in Dialog gebracht, indem die Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschiede zwischen beiden untersucht werden.

RÉSUMÉ

Cet ouvrage est une étude de l'usage et de la fonction de l'image du lion dans la Bible hébraïque et dans le Proche-Orient ancien. L'auteur examine les trouvailles archéologiques qui ont trait à l'Israël ancien et au Proche-Orient ancien dans le but de mieux comprendre ce que le lion représentait dans la dernière partie de l'âge de bronze et jusqu'à la période perse. L'auteur compare ensuite l'usage de l'image du lion dans l'Ancien Testament avec la culture environnante, en relevant similitudes et différences.

* * * *

In this carefully written and well researched monograph, Brent Strawn has done an excellent job of showing the use and function of leonine imagery in the Hebrew Bible and ancient Near East.

The book is divided up into four main chapters (chs. 2-5) and is driven by the conviction that familiarity with

the naturalistic use of the lion in the Hebrew Bible is "critical for any responsible understanding of its metaphorical use" (p. 27). As such, Strawn opens chapter 2 by offering some preliminary observations on the various species, gender, anatomy and habitat of the lion in Israel/Palestine before moving on to examine the metaphorical usages of the lion in the Hebrew Bible. He makes a few noteworthy observations: the lion image is used only infrequently in the Hebrew Bible as a positive application for the self or righteous, but frequently to depict one's foe. The lion is used only one time for an Israelite king (Ezek 19:2-9), which is striking in the light of the fact that the lion is frequently used to depict kings in the ancient Near East (as he shows in chapter 5). The lion is very frequently used as a depiction for Yahweh in the Hebrew Bible. Strawn concludes the chapter by saying that whether the lion is used metaphorically for the self, the righteous, the wicked, or the divine, "the lion is a trope of threat and power" (p. 65).

In chapter 3 Strawn turns to the archeological record of ancient Israel/Palestine in order to see how it relates to the usage of the lion in the Hebrew Bible. He analyzes the material culture (which is mostly minor art – i.e. seals, scarabs, and amulets) from the Late Bronze Age through the Persia Period (1500-332 BCE) by briefly discussing the contents (i.e. are they naturalistic, cultic/religious or official/royal), contexts (i.e. are they official or cultic assemblies), and connections (i.e. are they connected to the north or south) of the archaeological remains. He concludes by noting that the lion as an image is predominantly used to represent the deity, the monarch, or the enemy in Israel/Palestine during the periods under consideration. In addition, influences from the south (Egypt) and the north (Syria, Mesopotamia, Babylon etc.) can be noted in the style of the artistic tradition.

Strawn then broadens the discussion in chapter 4 and shows how the lion was depicted in the material culture of the ancient Near East. The material is organized by rubric or function (e.g. the lion attacking its prey, attacking humans, the monarch versus the lion, the gods as lions etc.) and after surveying a massive amount of material (he discusses 318 images in this chapter alone!), he arrives at the fairly predictable conclusion that the threatening tenor of the lion is what is most often evoked in leonine imagery. In the ancient Near East, the lion is most often associated with the enemy/wicked, monarch/mighty one, and deity/deities.

Chapter five brings the discussion back to the Hebrew Bible where the Israelite usage of the lion is brought into dialogue with the ancient Near Eastern usage of the image. An important point made in this chapter is that, in contradistinction to the ancient Near East, the royal lion metaphor is almost completely absent in the Hebrew Bible and "reflects something different or distinct about Israel's theology of kingship..." (p. 247). Leonine imagery is never used to illustrate in a positive light the militaristic capabilities of the monarch in the Hebrew Bible. In the Hebrew Bible, this imagery is reserved for Yahweh. Strawn then discusses the portrayal of Yahweh as a lion and notes that no other Canaanite deity is figured like a lion to the extent that Yahweh is.

While Strawn's conclusions are not particularly new or surprising (most people would realize that the lion is a symbol for threat and power), he has succeeded in expanding what is familiar to most by showing how the leonine imagery in the Hebrew Bible relates to the ancient Near Eastern perception of the lion. The 483 images reproduced at the back of the book are an added benefit as they give the reader the opportunity to see the material remains under consideration and thus allow her to engage more fully in the discussion. Strawn has made an important methodological contribution in that he has effectively shown how the study of ancient metaphors and imagery should not limit itself to either text or art exclusively. Additionally, Strawn has succeeded in reminding us that since metaphors rely on naturalistic perceptions of images, both the literal and figurative uses of the image in question must be analyzed when studying ancient metaphors. Strawn's book is a useful paradigm for anyone interested in studies on metaphor in the Hebrew Bible.

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Metaphor and the Hebrew Bible.
P. Van Hecke ed.

Leuven: Peters, 2006
308 pp., pb, ISBN 90-429-1640-0

SUMMARY

Studies on metaphor can be quite diverse. The book contains 16 articles which analyze metaphors appearing in various passages in the Hebrew Bible. Some essays are more theoretical in nature, focusing on methodological matters, while others focus mainly on exegesis or theology. The book is a 'must read' for anyone interested in the further research on metaphor in the Hebrew Bible.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Arbeiten zur Metaphorik können recht unterschiedlich sein. Das Buch enthält 16 Artikel, die Metaphern aus verschiedenen Abschnitten der hebräischen Bibel analysieren. Einige Essays sind eher theoretischer Natur und konzentrieren sich auf methodische Fragen. Andere konzentrieren sich hauptsächlich auf Exegese oder Theologie. Das Buch ist ein Muss für alle, die an der weiteren Erforschung der Metaphorik in der hebräischen Bibel interessiert sind.

RÉSUMÉ

Les études consacrées aux métaphores peuvent être très diverses. Cet ouvrage contient seize articles étudiant des métaphores que l'on rencontre dans divers passages de l'Ancien Testament. Certains essais sont plus théoriques et traitent de questions méthodologiques, tandis que d'autres

sont principalement des travaux exégétiques ou théologiques. Ce livre est un passage obligé pour quiconque s'intéresse à la recherche sur les métaphores de l'Ancien Testament.

* * * *

This book is a collection of 16 papers that were presented at the metaphor session of the joint SBL and EABS meeting held in Berlin in 2002, the EABS meeting in Copenhagen in 2003, and the joint SBL and EABS meeting in Groningen in 2004. As would be expected of a book written by 13 different authors, the articles vary significantly in both their scope and intent. The diversity of the articles included in the volume demonstrates that studies on metaphor can be quite variegated. Since space does not permit me to interact with all of the articles appearing in the book, I offer below a sampling of a few of the articles which I found to be the most noteworthy.

Some of the contributions focus on methodology, while others are concerned more with theology and exegesis. Several of the articles focus on the same passages, but even when the same texts are examined, there is enough room under the broad heading "Metaphor in the Hebrew Bible" for each author to say something new. So for example, although three of the articles treat metaphors in Lam 3, the amount of overlap between these three contributions is actually minimal. G. Eidevall ("Spacial Metaphors in Lamentations 3:1-9") shows how spatial metaphors contribute to the sense that the passage of prayer has been blocked by God in Lam 3. G. Baumann ("'Er hat mir den Weg mit Quadersteinen vermauert' (Thr 3,9): Ein Vorschlag zur Auslegung einer ungewöhnlichen Metapher") examines the metaphor of the blocked road and notes that the reference to hewn stones alludes to the destroyed temple in Jerusalem, and A. Labahn ("Bitterkeit und Asche als Speise – das Leiden Jeremias am Schicksal Jerusalems. Metaphern und Metaphervariationen in Thr 3, 1-21 LXX") looks at how the LXX treats the metaphors in Lam 3:1-21.

I found E.K. Holt's article ("The Fountain of Living Water and the Deceitful Brook: The Pool of Water Metaphors in the Book of Jeremiah") to be the most engaging. She examines three texts from the book of Jeremiah (Jer 2:13; 17:13; 15:18) that employ the metaphor "Yahweh as water." After offering a close reading of each passage, she surveys the immediate context in order to see how the metaphor interacts with its broader context. In the final section of her essay, she then examines the intertextual network of water in the book of Jeremiah in order to "broaden the picture of water imagery" in the book (p. 112) and concludes that water is one of the basic metaphors in the book of Jeremiah and attracts many similar metaphors such as "God is a fountain," "God is a failing brook," etc.

In contradistinction to Holt (who is concerned primarily with exegesis), P. Van Hecke takes up the task of outlining a new methodological approach to the study of metaphors in his article "Conceptual Blending: A Recent Approach to Metaphor Illustrated with the Pastoral Metaphor in Hos 4,16." The Conceptual Blending Theory builds on the cognitive approach (which regards metaphor as consisting of a target and a source domain) yet contends that "metaphor cannot be fully understood if regarded as a simple mapping operation between two domains" (p. 220). Two new elements are therefore added, the connecting generic space and the blending space. Van Hecke then applies the theory to Hos 4:16 in an effort to show how it can help to solve interpretation problems. But while Van Hecke claims that this new approach is not merely descriptive of how the metaphor functions cognitively, but can provide tools for interpreting metaphors whose meaning is unclear, I am skeptical that the theory offers anything really new. It is unclear how the Conceptual Blending Theory is any different from determining the relationship between the source and target domain (a task which all scholars agree is central to the analysis of metaphors)?

Szlos ("Body Parts as Metaphor and the Value of a Cognitive Approach: A Study of the Female Figures in Proverbs via Metaphor") explores how various body parts (e.g. hand, arm, mouth) are used metaphorically in the depiction of the Woman of Valor in Proverbs 31:10-31 and in the Strange Woman in Proverbs 1-9. She demonstrates that the woman in Prov 31 is described in terms that are usually used for men and YHWH, and thus this metaphorical use of body parts emphasizes her physical strength and manual labor. The strange woman in Prov 1-9, however, is described in terms of oral body parts (e.g. lip, tongue) and via her seductive words, and help to depict her as an alluring, immoral woman.

In "Wild Animals and Chasing Shadows: Animal Metaphors in Lamentations as Indicators for Individual Threat," A. Labahn examines the eight animal metaphors in the book of Lamentations and concludes that it is the natural habits of the animals that serve as the vehicle of the animal metaphors, although the metaphors leave gaps on exactly how to interpret their meaning. This as such allows hearers and readers to reinterpret the metaphor in different situations and contexts.

The closing article by K. Nielsen ("Metaphors and Biblical Theology"), challenges scholars to take into account the variety of metaphors about God (both personal and impersonal) when forming a Biblical Theology. She examines two passages in the HB that depict God as a rock (Deut 32 and 2 Sam 22) before turning to several NT passages where the rock is used metaphorically (e.g. Matt 16:18; Matt 3:7-9; 1 Cor 10:1-4). After demonstrating how the rock is used in different ways in the NT, she concludes by suggesting that the differences in the way personal and impersonal metaphors are used in the HB and NT are markers of important changes from the Old to the New Testament. I fully agree with Nielsen that changes in the use of metaphors between the Old and New Testaments may at times be theologically significant, although I would add that these changes may also merely reflect a change in the conception of a

particular image rather than a change in theology.

The book is rounded off with a very helpful subject index of the metaphors (which are classified by both tenor and vehicle) treated in the volume. As the editor of the book states in the introductory chapter, research on metaphors in the Hebrew Bible is an area of studies that is still in full development (p. 2) and since most of the contributors have written extensively on metaphor in the Hebrew Bible (e.g. K. Nielsen, P. Van Hecke, B. Doyle, G. Eidevall), the book is a good resource for those interested in this particular area of study since it offers a fine sampling of the current trends and issues related to the field.

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Samuel at the Threshold
Selected Works of Graeme Auld

SOTS Monographs; Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004
ix + 297 pp., £62.50, hb, ISBN 0 7546-3913-4

SUMMARY

A selection of Graeme Auld's essays are gathered together, focusing for the most part on his work on the books of Samuel and their relationship to other parts of the Old Testament. The collection provides a good overview of Auld's approach, especially as he frequently swims against the stream of most Old Testament scholarship. Although each essay needs to be judged on its own merits, key themes are followed through, especially his contention that Samuel-Kings and Chronicles derive from a common source rather than Chronicles making use of Samuel-Kings. Even when one is not persuaded by the argument, the questions he raises are important.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Dies ist eine Sammlung einer Auswahl von Essays von Graeme Auld, die sich hauptsächlich auf seine Arbeit an den Samuelbüchern und deren Beziehung zu anderen Teilen des Alten Testaments konzentriert. Die Auswahl stellt einen guten Überblick über Aulds Ansatz dar und zeigt besonders, wie er oft gegen den Hauptstrom der alttestamentlichen Wissenschaft schwimmt. Obwohl jedes Essay einzeln beurteilt werden muss, ziehen sich Schlüsselthemen durch das ganze Buch, besonders seine Behauptung, Samuel-Könige und die Chronikbücher gingen auf eine gemeinsame Quelle zurück (im Unterschied zur Benutzung von Samuel-Könige in den Chronikbüchern). Auch wenn man von den Argumenten nicht überzeugt ist, sind doch die aufgeworfenen Fragen wichtig.

RÉSUMÉ

Cet ouvrage comporte une sélection d'articles de Graeme Auld. Ils traitent pour la plupart d'entre eux des livres de Samuel et de leur relation avec d'autres parties de l'Ancien Testament. Ce recueil fournit une bonne vue d'ensemble de l'approche de Auld, et montre en particulier comment il va fréquemment à contre courant de bien des travaux académiques sur l'Ancien Testament. Chaque article doit être jugé selon sa propre valeur, mais des thèmes clé se retrouvent tout au long du livre, en particulier la thèse selon laquelle les livres de Samuel-Rois et les livres des Chroniques dériveraient d'une source commune, au lieu que les Chroniques aient été rédigées sur la base de Samuel-Rois. Même lorsque l'argumentation ne convainc pas, les questions soulevées sont importantes.

* * * *

For some years now, Graeme Auld has been reflecting and writing on the Former Prophets and their relationship to other parts of the Old Testament. Although this is not a comprehensive gathering of his essays and papers on these themes (see also his Joshua Retold), this is an excellent sample of them, especially focused on the books of Samuel. Most have been published elsewhere, but Auld has also provided the collection with an introduction which provides an overview of his thought as well as guiding readers through what is to come. This process of guidance continues through the essays themselves with short comments directing readers to other papers in the book where related points are discussed, though disconcertingly comments which relate to books in which an essay originally appeared also occur. The attempt to provide a consistent presentation even carries through to the footnotes which are numbered sequentially through the volume as a whole rather than specific to each essay. A section numbering system is also offered throughout most of the papers, though the Hebrew font employed is surely too small to be read with clarity.

As indicated by the title, Auld is not so much interested in the books of Samuel as a discrete entity but rather the ways in which they provide a point of entry into wider concerns in the Old Testament. Intertextuality is thus a key theme that runs through the collection as a whole, though perhaps not the sort of intertextuality that some literary theorists would have us practise. Thus, Auld explores the ways in which themes in the books of Samuel shape material in the Pentateuch, as well as developing his theory of a shared source (which he calls the Book of Two Houses) which formed the basis of Samuel-Kings and Chronicles, with each developing the material in different ways.

The book is divided into three sections. The first, with its freshly written introduction, contains two papers which provide an overview of Auld's concerns and of his understanding of the former prophets as a collection. A second section of eleven papers develops the insights from his seminal paper 'Prophets through the Looking Glass'. When this paper was originally published in JSOT it included responses by Hugh Williamson and Robert Carroll, reflecting the format of its initial presentation where responses were given. This volume contains his response to them, but not their responses to him, an omission which is unfortunate. This section

provides some of the underlying research that led to his *Kings without Privilege*, and then some which develop his argument and respond to critics. The third section then explores ways in which the argument developed in the second can be extended into the wider realm of Old Testament studies.

As was also the case with Joshua Retold, Auld swims against the stream in much of this. As well as rejecting the common view that Chronicles depends upon Samuel-Kings, he also raises important questions about the value of continuing to regard the Former Prophets as 'deuteronomistic', largely because he wants to reverse the historical order between these books and Deuteronomy. Related to this is his move to date much of this material considerably later than is currently fashionable even within critical scholarship. Auld is aware of this, but suggests that his view 'through the looking glass' in which we see things from other angles may turn out to be more persuasive. I rather suspect that the stream will continue to flow against Auld on many of these matters, but there remains great value in having cogent arguments presented for alternative views because in this way the fragility of many of the assumed results of scholarship are made manifest to us.

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Review of Recent Psalms Commentaries

The Psalms
A Historical and Spiritual Commentary with an Introduction and New Translation
John Eaton
London: T&T Clark, 2003
536 pp., £15.99, pb, ISBN: 0826488951

Psalms 2
A Commentary on Psalms 51-100
Frank-Lothar Hossfeld and Erich Zenger
(trans. Linda M. Maloney)
Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2005
552 pp., £36.99, hb, ISBN: 9780800660611

The Psalms
Strophic Structure and Theological Commentary
Samuel Terrien
Eerdmans Critical Commentary; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003
971 pp., hb, ISBN: 0802826059

Psalms Volume 1
Gerald H. Wilson
NIVAC; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2002
1024 pp., £23.99, hb, ISBN: 9780310206354

SUMMARY
While they are all quite different in approach, tone and target audience, each of these four commentaries, in its own way, makes a welcome contribution to our understanding of the Psalter. As is to be expected, Hossfeld and Zenger's *Hermeneia* commentary is probably the most overtly 'academic' in tone and approach. The other commentaries are equally rigorous in their research and grasp of current psalms scholarship but they seek to address other questions or more general audiences. Terrien's primary concern is analysis of the strophic structure of each of the psalms. Eaton's approach is focussed on historical reading of the text and a more meditative response to the psalms. Wilson, following the pattern of the NIVAC series, seeks to discuss not only what the text *meant* in its historical setting, but also what the text *means* for Christians today. Each of these commentaries makes a fine contribution to psalms studies.

RÉSUMÉ
Chacun de ces quatre commentaires a une approche et une tonalité différentes, et s'adresse à des publics différents, mais chacun apporte une contribution utile à notre compréhension des Psaumes. Comme on pouvait s'y attendre, le commentaire que nous livrent Hossfeld et Zenger dans la série *Hermeneia* est probablement le plus ouvertement académique. Les autres commentaires sont tout aussi rigoureux dans leur recherche et leur assimilation de travaux académiques contemporains sur les Psaumes, mais ils cherchent à traiter d'autres questions ou à répondre aux besoins d'un public plus large. Le but principal de Terrien est l'analyse de la structure strophique de chaque psaume. Eaton s'attache à une lecture du texte dans son contexte historique pour se livrer à une méditation des Psaumes. Wilson suit le modèle de la série *NIVAC* et cherche à montrer non seulement ce que le texte signifiait dans son contexte historique, mais aussi ce qu'il signifie pour les Chrétiens d'aujourd'hui. Chacun de ces commentaires apporte une bonne contribution à l'étude des Psaumes.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Obwohl sie im Hinblick auf Ansatz, Tonlage und Zielpublikum recht unterschiedlich sind, stellt doch jeder dieser vier Kommentare auf seine Weise einen willkommenen Beitrag zum Verständnis der Psalmen dar. Wie zu erwarten ist der Hermeneia-Kommentar von Hossfeld und Zenger am deutlichsten „akademisch" in Tonlage und Ansatz. Die anderen Kommentare sind ebenso streng in Bezug auf ihre eigene Forschung und ihre Kenntnis der gegenwärtigen Psalmenforschung, aber sie wollen andere Fragen behandeln oder ein allgemeines Publikum ansprechen. Terriens Hauptsanliegen ist die Analyse der strophischen Struktur jedes Psalms. Eatons Ansatz konzentriert sich auf eine historische Leseweise des Textes und eine stärker meditative Antwort auf die Psalmen. Nach dem Muster der NIVAC-Reihe versucht Wilson nicht nur zu diskutieren, was der Text in seiner historischen Situation *bedeutete*, sondern auch, was der Text für Christen heute *bedeutet*. Jeder

dieser Kommentare stellt einen ausgezeichneten Beitrag zum Studium der Psalmen dar.

* * * *

John Eaton's commentary is the product of a lifetime spent studying the psalms. That in itself should commend the book to the reader. Each section includes a translation of the psalm followed by a brief discussion of the psalm as a whole and (also fairly brief) exegetical discussion of the text as it breaks down into strophes or stanzas before final comments and a concluding prayer. The pitch of Eaton's commentary is accessibly academic, therefore the translations tend to be more functionally equivalent (smooth, polished, poetic English) than formally correspondent (close to the rhythm and brevity of the Hebrew text). The translations read well and, even although the comment on each psalm tends to be brief, Eaton gets to the heart of the theology of each poem.

Readers of Eaton's commentary should be careful to make their way to the appendix at the back of the book as they study each psalm. It is there that we find some very helpful discussion of translation questions and the historical interpretation of the text. The appendix complements well the more contemplative discussion in the main text of the commentary. This is a truly sympathetic commentary with a great grasp of the tone and spiritual purpose of each poems. Eaton does a tremendous job of grounding that rhetorical (for want of a better word) impact of the psalms in the realities of contemporary Christian spirituality.

Unusually perhaps, Hossfeld and Zenger begin their three-volume commentary on the psalms with psalms 50-100. In part this is because they have already written on Pss 1-50 in the German *Neue Echter Bibel* series but it is also the result of Hossfeld and Zenger's commitment to understanding the psalms as an ordered canonical document. Their plan is to publish first on Pss 50-100, then on Pss 101-150 and only then will they revisit the first fifty psalms. Obviously, the first volume will contain introductory discussion, including consideration of the canonical shape and historical development of the Book of Psalms, and it is their desire only to return to this question after their study of the shape of the Psalter as a whole is complete. The commentary follows the familiar pattern of the Hermeneia series. Each section begins with a translation of the psalm under consideration, followed by notes on the text and translation and questions for analysis (anything from structure to genre to redaction-critical questions to the dating of the text). This discussion is then followed by 'exposition' of the text (really exegetical analysis), study of its context in relation to neighbouring psalms and the possible significance of the psalm in the New Testament.

The tone throughout is scholarly and all the discussion is well-grounded in the secondary literature (both English-language and German). The translations that Hossfeld and Zenger offer are of particular value as they take a translation approach that 'is not primarily concerned with good English (whatever that is), but [is] transparent to the structure of the Hebrew language' (xi). This means that on occasion the authors will leave two possible translations in place where they believe that there is no clear evidence to support one over the other (e.g. is Ps 61:7 [EVV 61:6] to be read as an imperfect [promise] or a jussive [prayer]?). Occasionally, they will leave a bracketed translation with a question mark where they are unsure of whether a word needs to be added to the translation or not (e.g. the added 'me' in Ps 61:6 [EVV 61:5]). Their translations are rich and grasp more of the terseness and rhythm of Hebrew parallelism text than contemporary English translations tend to. Quite simply, this is a thoroughly good commentary that is competent in every way. Anyone interested in close readings of the psalms and interaction with the Hebrew text will benefit greatly from this commentary. This series appears to be the natural successor to the older Fortress series of Continental Commentaries. And, just as Hans-Joachim Kraus' Continental Commentary on the Psalms was the automatic starting point if you wanted a close reading of the text, so Hossfeld and Zenger's three-volume series will become the starting point for a new generation of scholars looking for close readings of the text.

As the subtitle of Terrien's commentary suggests, his focus is more specific than that of the typical psalms commentary. Terrien also includes his own translations of the text which probably fall somewhere between Hossfeld and Zenger's formal correspondence on the one hand and Eaton's functional equivalence on the other. In each translation, Terrien is clear to distinguish the structure of the poem. He divides the text into its various strophes (where appropriate) and uses italicised and normal text to show repetition and transition in the various parts of the psalm. Determining the structure of a psalm can be very difficult and the reader will not necessarily always agree with Terrien's suggestions yet, on the whole, he makes a good case for his suggested analyses of the poems' structure.

So the reader will find more discussion of issues of structure and metre in this commentary but Terrien also moves on from there to offer brief analysis of the meaning of each strophe and discussion of the dating and theology of the text. The strength of Terrien's commentary is to be found in its unique focus. The reader who is interested in a psalms commentary that discusses textual issues in depth may not find what they are looking for here as the exegetical comment is fairly short. However, Terrien's knowledgeable discussion of the structure of each psalm, as well as his consideration of questions of form and metre, are the real strengths of this work. Such issues tend to receive only the briefest of consideration in 'normal' commentaries, so Terrien's work truly 'fills a gap in the market' and is a welcome addition to psalms scholarship.

Finally, Wilson's NIVAC commentary is an excellent example of thorough scholarship made accessible for the general audience. Wilson, in many ways, was the father

of the canonical approach to the Psalter which advocates the contextual interpretation of the psalms in relation to their neighbours or in linked groups. This approach comes through in Wilson's commentary where he encourages an awareness of the interpretative influence of a psalm's placement within a pairing or group. (Hossfeld and Zenger's commentary also devotes a good deal of discussion to questions of the canonical interpretation within the Book of Psalms.)

Wilson's commentary follows the usual pattern of the NIVAC series. Consideration of each psalm begins with the text from the NIV followed by a brief general comment and then discussion in three sections: 'Original Meaning', 'Bridging Contexts' and 'Contemporary Significance'. The discussion of 'Original Meaning' focuses on the exegetical examination of the text including questions of translation (although the NIV is used as the main text for discussion this does not inhibit the author's presentation of other translation options where necessary). The 'Bridging Contexts' section explains imagery, metaphors and common practices (amongst other things) that are found in the psalms but whose meaning may not be apparent to a contemporary audience. This section gives the opportunity to explain the significance of these images and practices. The 'Contemporary Significance' section goes on to suggest lines of application of the psalmic text within the realities of modern life. Obviously, such suggested application is a task that is immensely culture-bound. Although Wilson was clearly writing primarily in the American context, he does a good job of suggesting areas of relevance that are certainly applicable to most in the 'Western world' and which would probably be beneficial also to readers in the 'majority world'. Once again, this is a strong commentary that both student and Christian reader will benefit from greatly.

So, in summary, each of these commentaries is a helpful addition to the field of psalms studies. They each bring their own strengths to the table and each one makes a valuable contribution in its own way. So for close readings of the text Hossfeld and Zenger provide a great starting point; for discussion of issues of structure Terrien's commentary is great; for a more contemplative approach to the text Eaton's commentary is immensely helpful and for thorough discussion of the text and its application, at a level that is accessible to every thinking/reading Christian, Wilson's work is to be recommended.

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The Personification of Wisdom

Alice M. Sinnott

London: Ashgate, 2005
v + 208 pp., £50, hb, ISBN 0-7546-5124-x

SUMMARY

Alice Sinnott argues that the question of theodicy is the context for the creation and development of Wisdom in order to enable Judaism to survive in its Hellenistic context. This hypothesis is based on the lack of mention of sacred spaces and the similarities of Sophia's speech with exilic literature. While the background and commentary notes are beneficial, the hypothesis concerning the creation of Sophia is speculative in that it is based on arguments from silence and comparison. This book is recommended for a reader desiring an introduction to Lady Wisdom and a survey of recent scholarship on her.

RÉSUMÉ

La thèse d'Alice Sinnott, c'est que la question de la théodicée est à l'origine de la création et du développement de la sagesse et que celle-ci avait pour but de permettre au judaïsme de survivre dans le contexte hellénistique. Cette thèse se fonde sur l'absence de mention de lieux sacrés dans les écrits de sagesse, ainsi que sur les similitudes des discours de Sophia avec la littérature de l'exil. Les informations apportées sur l'arrière-plan et les notes explicatives sont utiles, mais l'hypothèse relative à la création de Sophia a un caractère hautement spéculatif dans la mesure où elle ne se fonde que sur des arguments tirés du silence ou sur des comparaisons. On peut recommander cet ouvrage aux lecteurs cherchant une présentation de Dame Sagesse et un survol des travaux académiques récents sur la sagesse.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Alice Sinnot argumentiert, dass die Theodizeefrage den Kontext für die Entstehung und die Entwicklung der Weisheit darstellt, deren Zweck in der Befähigung des Judentums lag, in der hellenistischen Welt zu überleben. Diese Hypothese basiert auf der fehlenden Erwähnung heiliger Räume und der Ähnlichkeiten der Weisheitsreden mit exilischer Literatur. Obwohl der Hintergrund und die Kommentaranmerkungen hilfreich sind, ist die Hypothese in Bezug auf die Entstehung der Weisheit spekulativ, da sie auf Argumente aus dem Schweigen beruhen und Vergleiche fehlen. Das Buch ist Lesern empfohlen, die nach einer Einführung in die Figur der Weisheit und nach einem Überblick über die neuere Forschung zum Thema verlangen.

* * * *

Alice Sinnott devotes her study to the subject of personified Wisdom in the OT and Deuterocanonical books in order to examine and provide explanations of why Lady Wisdom was created and how she developed. Sinnott begins by discussing possible antecedents for Wisdom, especially in Egyptian and Mesopotamian sources. The author surveys different approaches concerning such antecedents; whereas some see Wisdom as an original

ANE goddess made subordinate to Israel's God, others argue that Sophia developed from the example of holy women in the nation. To these conjectures, Sinnott posits her own – 'the question of theodicy is the context for the literary creation and development of the Wisdom figure.' Wisdom was created from Mesopotamian materials by writers in a 'strong monotheistic system' following the fall of Jerusalem in 587 BCE in order to address the crises of the event, particularly the role of YHWH. Later, to counteract the danger of losing their identity, these writers drew on the broader idea that God created the world through wisdom rather than on traditions restricted to the land of Israel. No longer did the Jews have to rely on 'covenantal presuppositions,' now they had Wisdom as a 'personal mediator,' giving Judaism what it needed 'to survive in its Hellenistic context.' Sinnott derives this hypothesis from the lack of mention of sacred spaces: 'Wisdom's speaking in public places is a strong indication that the Temple does not exist.' Sinnott also founds her thesis on the similarities of Sophia's speech with motifs and styles found in the 'Priestly account' in Genesis and in the exilic prophets. Next, Sinnott discusses the elusive nature and the role of Wisdom in Job. According to the author, Wisdom demonstrates that the solution to Job's problem is not found in the answers of his friends. In Baruch, Ben Sira, and the Wisdom of Solomon, Sophia is developed as a new identity marker for post-exilic Jews in unstable times. Ben Sira identifies Wisdom with the Torah, Baruch stresses her as a unique gift to the Jews and the Wisdom of Solomon exalts her above the Egyptian goddess, Isis.

This monograph will serve as an invaluable resource for the study of personified Wisdom – a resource which gives one a view of both the forest and the trees. The background notes, commentary, and survey of the history of research are beneficial; however, the hypothesis concerning the creation of Sophia is speculative. Does the lack of mention of sacred spaces really point to their destruction? Even *if*, Sophia's speech intentionally excludes mention of the Temple, could their not be other explanations for why this is the case? As tenuous as an argument from silence is, so also is an argument from comparison, since one could find a number of differences between the speech of Wisdom and the 'Priestly account' or exilic prophets as well. Do parallels in texts necessarily suggest the works are contemporary? Much stronger is the thesis that Wisdom assists the audiences of the Deuterocanonical works in keeping their identity and faith in the midst of Hellenistic pressures; however, an identity crisis does not have to be related to theodicy.

A clearer definition of and hermeneutic for personification is also needed. Sinnott gives the phrase 'Wine is a mocker' as an example of other biblical personifications like Wisdom, but surely this phrase (even if one concedes this as a personification) is vastly different from Wisdom, besides in length alone. She comments that Wisdom is a mere personification 'rather than a person, or hypostasis;' but, no reason is given why Wisdom could not be a personification of a person or hypostasis (nor does she define what she means by person or hypostasis). Moreover, Sinnott concludes that Sophia's depiction is 'clearly in no sense intended as 'other than' or equal to YHWH,' and that in all of Jewish Wisdom literature, Lady Wisdom is never 'envisaged as a second god in a theological sense.' Is this really 'clear'? Can we say with certainty what an author intended or how Wisdom would be envisaged by an author or audience in a world full of the belief in suprahuman powers? Furthermore, rather than modern theories alone, a survey of ancient rhetorical theory concerning the definition and role of personification would have been helpful. Despite these comments and numerous, distracting printing errors, this book is recommended for a reader desiring an introduction to Lady Wisdom and a survey of recent scholarship on her.

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The Child-Parent Relationship in the New Testament and its Environment

Peter Balla

WUNT 155; Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 2003
xii + 279 pp., hb, € 69, ISBN 3-16-148006-6

SUMMARY

In this monograph Hungarian scholar Peter Balla examines the child-parent as it is expressed in the New Testament. He aims to wrestle with the question of how, on the one hand, Jesus makes some radical commands about abandoning one's parents in order to follow him. But on the other hand, the rest of the New Testament is overwhelming in favour of the command to honour one's parents. The way that Balla approaches this tension is by surveying the relevant portions of Greek, Latin and Jewish literature as well as the New Testament writings. He concludes that Jesus' teachings were exceptional rather than paradigmatic and that New Testament authors affirmed the standard view of their day that children should honour their parents.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

In dieser Monographie untersucht der ungarische Gelehrte Peter Balla die Beziehung zwischen Kind und Eltern, wie sie im Neuen Testament dargestellt ist. Er beabsichtigt mit der Frage zu kämpfen, dass Jesus einerseits einige radikale Gebote zum Verlassen der Eltern um seiner Nachfolge willen gibt, das Neue Testament aber andererseits stark das Gebot des Ehrens der Eltern unterstützt. Dazu sieht Balla die relevanten Abschnitte sowohl der griechischen, lateinischen und jüdischen Literatur als auch der neutestamentlichen Schriften durch. Er schließt, dass Jesu Lehren an diesem Punkt die Ausnahme, nicht das Paradigma darstellen und dass die neutestamentlichen Autoren die Standardansicht ihrer Zeit bestätigten, dass Kinder ihre Eltern ehren sollen.

RÉSUMÉ

Peter Balla, théologien hongrois, a consacré cette monographie au sujet des relations entre parents et enfants dans le Nouveau Testament. Il cherche comment comprendre le fait que Jésus prononce des commandements radicaux, allant jusqu'à demander d'abandonner ses parents pour le suivre, alors que le reste du Nouveau Testament réitère le commandement d'honorer ses parents. Pour résoudre cette tension, Balla considère l'ensemble des textes grecs, latins et juifs relatifs à son sujet, ainsi que ceux du Nouveau Testament. Il conclut que les enseignements de Jésus avaient un caractère exceptionnel, qu'ils ne doivent pas être pris comme une règle générale, et que les auteurs du Nouveau Testament maintenaient ce qui était considéré comme la norme à leur époque, à savoir que les enfants doivent honorer leurs parents.

* * * *

In this volume Peter Balla (Professor of New Testament at Károli Gáspár Reformed University, Budapest) draws attention to the child-parent relationship as it is reflected in the New Testament and in the literature of antiquity. Balla wrestles with the tension in the New Testament between the pattern of child-parent relationships as it appears in the Gospels and how it is formulated in the epistles. For instance, in the epistles such as Ephesians and Colossians children are expected to obey their parents (e.g. Eph 6:1); and in the Gospels we encounter a similar commandment to 'honour your father and mother' (Mk 7:9-13 and parallels) but we also find radical sayings about 'leaving' (Mk 10:29 and parallels) and even 'hating' (Lk 14:26) one's own parents. In light of this Balla sets out firstly to determine whether or not the first Christians fulfilled the expectation to honour their parents? Secondly, to find out what is shared by the first Christian generations with their non-Christian neighbours concerning the child-parent relationship.

Chapters one and two survey classical Greek sources such as Plato, Aristotle, Pythagoras, Euripides, as well as Greek and Latin sources from the Roman imperial period including Cicero, Epictetus, and the Stoics etc. The chief expectation that authors depict as the norm was that children should honour their parents through obedience and provision and this is bound up with a certain matrix of duties, limitations to duties, and a socio-religious rationale for these expectations. Jewish sources are discussed in chapter 3 including texts that illustrate daily life and Balla identifies once more the duties and limitations and rationale for the obedience of Jewish children to their parents. He notes that on the Jewish side that the list of mandated duties was similar to the surrounding culture, but the basis and limits of obedience were unique in light of its Scriptural tradition.

Balla combs through the Gospels and works through two types of material, units that speak of honouring one's parents and units that speak of family tensions. This shows that Jesus and the early church reflected standard Jewish attitudes exhibited in the Decalogue about honouring one's parents. Concurrently, several passages imply conflict between Christians and their families as to how followers were received by their families. He surmises from this, firstly, that the radical language this takes on (e.g. 'Let the dead bury their own dead') is ultimately a hyperbolic way of expressing the view that honouring God is prioritized over honouring one's parents. Secondly, Balla also finds reason for supposing that such commands were limited to Jesus' travelling companions. Thirdly, the urgency and demand of Jesus' teachings about family are influenced by the apocalyptic setting where urgency is due to a unique eschatological expectation.

Much the same continues in chapter 5 where Balla examines the Pauline letters. In both the disputed and undisputed letters he analyses the significance of architecture, the household codes and material that talks about parental relationships even in a figurative sense. He observes Paul regarding his congregations as a type of family where honour of parents is affirmed for children. These letters also exhibit a far lesser degree of intra-familial tension when compared to the Gospels which Balla attributes to the fact that the letters were addressed to recipients with relatively stable families. He also advocates that the epistles testify to the view that the early church did not regard the radical sayings of Jesus as abrogating the fourth commandment of the Decalogue.

Chapter six surveys the rest of the New Testament (Acts, Hebrews, Catholic Epistles, and Revelation). Balla observes a largely figurative use of the parent-children relationship and God is often referred to as 'Father'. Not only does this imply a continued imperative to honour parents and love God, but it also creates a bond of unity between Christians since the 'children of God' are 'brethren' to one another.

In his conclusion, Balla seeks to answer whether or not Jesus and the early Christians shared the view of their environment on children's duty to honour their parents. Despite the radical nature of many of Jesus' commands like leaving one's parents to follow him, if one accepts the view that Jesus was regarded by the early Christians as being divine, then the priority given to Jesus corresponds to that in pagan and Jewish literature, namely, the gods take precedence over parents. In the rest of the New Testament, authors do not exhibit this radicalism because they write for settled congregations and often use parent-child language figuratively. The absence of references to family tensions is attributable to the fact that Christians wanted to show that they did not present a threat to the social fabric of society. In Christian gatherings children honoured their parents and congregations acted like extended families.

All in all, this volume makes a worthwhile contribution to the study of families, patronage, and households in early Christianity and in the Graeco-Roman world. I think the decision to exclude rabbinic writings from the study was overly cautious; while it is true that the rabbinic corpus post-dates the NT period, some rabbinic

traditions do extend into the pre-70 period. That is a small objection to what is otherwise an excellent monograph.

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Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony

Richard Bauckham

Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007,
hb, £17.99, 522 pp., ISBN 0-8028-3162-1

SUMMARY

In this volume Richard Bauckham argues for the influence of eyewitnesses as propagators and controllers of the Jesus tradition. He detects in the Gospels specific traits that he believes indicate the presence of eyewitness testimony and argues for a moderate form of the Scandinavian approach regarding the transmission of the Jesus tradition. The volume pays a great deal of attention to eyewitness testimony in relation to the Gospel of John and the impact this has upon questions of authorship as they relate to the Fourth Gospel. In the end, Bauckham advocates that what the Gospels present to us is neither the Jesus of history, nor the Christ of faith, but the 'Jesus of testimony'. This is an important and valuable study that all students of the Gospels should read.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

In diesem Band argumentiert Richard Bauckham für den Einfluss von Augenzeugen als Verbreiter und Sammler der Jesustradition. Er entdeckt in den Evangelien bestimmte Züge, die seiner Ansicht nach die Gegenwart von Augenzeugen-Aussagen anzeigen und er argumentiert für eine moderate Form des skandinavischen Ansatzes zur Überlieferung der Jesustradition. Der Band widmet einen Großteil seiner Aufmerksamkeit den Augenzeugen-Aussagen im Johannesevangelium und deren Einfluss auf die Fragen der Autorenschaft des vierten Evangeliums. Schlussendlich vertritt Bauckham die Ansicht, die Evangelien präsentierten uns weder den Jesus der Geschichte noch den Christus des Glaubens, sondern den „Jesus der Zeugenaussagen". Dies ist eine wichtige und wertvolle Arbeit, die alle Studenten der Evangelien lesen sollten.

RÉSUMÉ

Richard Bauckham défend la thèse d'une influence décisive des témoins oculaires qui ont répandu et contrôlé la tradition concernant Jésus. Il détecte dans les Évangiles des traits spécifiques qui indiquent à son avis qu'on a affaire au témoignage de témoins oculaires et il défend une forme modérée de l'approche scandinave quant à la transmission de la tradition concernant Jésus. Il accorde beaucoup d'attention au témoignage de témoins oculaires en relation avec l'Évangile de Jean et montre quelles en sont les implications pour la question de l'auteur de cet Évangile. Finalement, Bauckham soutient que les Évangiles ne nous présentent ni le Jésus de l'histoire, ni le Christ de la foi, mais le « Jésus auquel il est rendu témoignage ». C'est là une étude importante et de valeur que tout étudiant des Évangiles devrait lire.

* * * *

In the opening chapter Bauckham notes the debates about the relationship between the historical Jesus and the Gospels. While historians may reject the Evangelist's presentation of Jesus as selective and subjective the same can be true of the construction of Jesus made by the historian. The way to circumvent the history vs. theology divide is to understand the Gospels as 'testimony'. In contrast to older former critical approaches that postulated an anonymous oral tradition distant from Jesus as the procrustean bed of the Gospel tradition, Bauckham urges that we take seriously the claim that the Gospels rest on the testimony of eyewitnesses.

In chapter two Bauckham gives his analysis of the fragments from Papias and its elucidates the role of eyewitnesses in the tradition. In the prologue to Papias' *Expositions of the Logia of the Lord* (reminiscent of Lk. 1.1-2), Bauckham proposes that Papias during his life had encountered witnesses to Jesus in Aristion and the elder John. Moreover, the account gives credence to the view that the words and deeds of Jesus were attached to specific named eyewitnesses rather than anonymous communal tradition. Papias' preference for the "living and surviving voice" reflects a school of historiography that emphasized the need to either be an eyewitness of events or have access to eyewitness accounts (e.g. Galen, Polybius, Lucian of Samosata). What is more, the fact that Papias writes when eyewitnesses and their disciples were still living means that he is referring to "oral history" rather than "oral tradition".

There is an examination of the named figures in the Gospel tradition in chapter three. Bauckham believes that many of these persons are named because they were eyewitnesses and thus originators and guarantors of their traditions. Against Bultmann and others, Bauckham points out that the tendency of the tradition was not to add names in order to increase detail, but rather, to subtract them. He cites the example of the women at the cross and tomb, Simon of Cyrene and his sons, and recipients of healings as evidence for this phenomenon. At the end Bauckham also intimates resurrecting the criterion of vividness as an indication of eyewitness testimony. Finally, Bauckham lists the named and unnamed figures in the Gospels in a series of tables.

Chapter 4 engages in a study of Jewish names in Palestine. Building on the work of Tal Ilan, Bauckham looks at the most well attested names from extant Palestinian sources. He notes the popularity of names associated with the Hasmonean dynasty and how people with similar names were differentiated. The named persons in the Gospels largely corresponds with lists of personal names from other Jewish sources and so indicates the

authenticity of personal names in the Gospels.

Discussion of the twelve is brought up in chapter 5 and there Bauckham argues the twelve were the 'authoritative transmitters of the sayings of Jesus and authoritative eyewitnesses of the events of Jesus' history' (96). He does not find the different names in the lists insurmountable and argues for the identification of Thaddaeus and Judas of James, but rejects the identification of Levi with Matthew. Attention is also paid to the various epithets of the apostles which were designed to distinguish members of the twelve from each other.

In chapter six, Bauckham argues that the list of the Twelve in the Synoptics functions to nominate the list of official eyewitnesses who formulated and promulgated the Jesus tradition. He detects a literary device called eyewitness *inclusio* in Mark, Luke and John and this is analogous to other biographical works by Lucian and Porphyry which employ a similar device.

Bauckham then turns to discussion of the Petrine perspective of the Gospel of Mark (chapter seven), where he argues that in addition to the *inclusio* of eyewitness testimony there is also evidence that the narrative is drawn from Peter's perspective. To that end he argues that the plural-to-singular narrative device where plural verbs without an explicit subject is used to describe the movements of Jesus and the disciples followed by a singular verb or pronoun that refers to Jesus alone. Also, the point-of-view or focalization introduces a Petrine perspective into the story. Peter is not merely a representative of the disciples and a foil for their failure, but his teaching or testimony stands behind the Marcan text.

In chapter eight Bauckham, building on the work of Gerd Theissen, argues that many of the anonymous witnesses in Mark's Gospel are part of a strategy of 'protective anonymity'. Mark's tradition stems from a Jerusalem source that sought to keep certain names anonymous (e.g. the women who anointed Jesus, the disciple who struck the High Priest's servant) in order to protect their identity.

The focus of chapter nine is Papias' remarks about Mark and Matthew. Bauckham attempts to defend the thesis of a Petrine origin for Mark. Mark translated the chreia of Peter and the lack of 'order' that Papias found in Mark's Gospel was a lack of aesthetic arrangement in comparison to Matthew and John.

In chapter ten Bauckham evaluates different proposals to the transmission of the oral tradition beneath the Gospels. This includes a devastating critique of form criticism, a sympathetic examination of the Scandinavian approach, and some brief remarks on Kenneth Bailey's mediating view on 'informal controlled oral tradition'. Despite the popularity of the latter model with James Dunn and N.T. Wright, Bauckham notes that Bailey's model still fails to take into adequate account the existence of eyewitnesses as sources and authenticators of the tradition.

Chapter eleven concerns the transmission of Jesus traditions. Bauckham looks for signs of the transmission process in the Pauline letters and argues that it was essentially an isolated tradition which was not shaped, by and large, by community needs or a community setting. The tradition was controlled through memorization which was a standard feature of Jewish and Hellenistic education. The use of writing materials to preserve and pass on the tradition cannot be discounted either.

The subject of anonymous tradition or eyewitness testimony is taken up in chapter twelve and Bauckham argues that nowhere in the Gospels are stories attributed to a community but feature around named individuals. In his understanding, the Jesus tradition is largely the product of the memory of individuals passed on to a community rather than a feature of communal memory. The Gospels themselves were composed to maintain the accessibility of eyewitness testimony beyond the lifetime of the original eyewitnesses. Chapter thirteen is very much an extension of this section by looking at concepts of memory in psychology. Bauckham notes the general reliability of recollective memory and how it parallels the Gospels in many instances by the type and detail of items recalled.

Chapters fourteen to seventeen examine eyewitness testimony as it relates to the Gospel of John. Bauckham argues for the integrity of John 21 which in his view is not an epilogue added later. This is followed by a substantive argument that the 'we' of Jn 21:24 is the 'we of authoritative testimony'. He refutes the charge that the Beloved Disciple is exclusively a narrative, rhetorical, or theological construct embodying the witness motif of the Fourth Gospel. Bauckham discusses the testimony of Papias and the Muratorian canon that the Fourth Gospel was written by John the Elder and not John son of Zebedean.

In the final chapter, Bauckham presents the 'Jesus of Testimony'. He then sets out to analyze the epistemological, historical, and theological significance of testimony as it relates to history and Christian theology. This is an erudite and excellent treatment of the role of eyewitnesses in shaping the Jesus tradition. If Bauckham is right (and in most cases I would have to say 'yes') then the whole form critical enterprise can be relegated to the 'defunct' category. In some cases, I think Bauckham's points need to be adjusted or contested. For example, concerning the control and dissemination of the Jesus tradition, I think eyewitnesses and Christian communities both played a role and one should not over emphasize the importance of community and eyewitnesses in shaping and preserving the tradition. Bauckham's reference to 'protective anonymity' sounds a little like a Christian form of the witness protection program which I have reservations about. While vividness in description might be consistent with eyewitness testimony, vividness can also be apparent in purely fictional works. These are minor objections, however, on the whole the work is brilliant.

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Judgment & Justification in Early Judaism and the Apostle Paul

Chris VanLandingham

Peabody: Hendrickson, 2006
xvi + 384 pp., Price £16.99, hb, 978-1-56563-398-8

SUMMARY

VanLandingham critiques the idea of 'covenantal nomism' by addressing the meaning and function of judgment by works in early Judaism and Paul. He does not advocate returning to the Old Perspective, for he finds this method of reading Paul to be incorrect also. He argues that Abraham received the covenant as the reward for his obedience. Grace and mercy do not refer to unmerited divine actions of forgiveness. Early Judaism, including Paul, agreed that the final judgment was according to works and that it determined one's destiny. 'Justification by faith' does not mean acquittal at the judgment. Christ's death only atones for one's past sins, frees one from the power of sin, and gives one the ability to obey God's will. Paul and his contemporaries agreed that the criterion that determined whether one received eternal life or damnation was one's obedience.

RÉSUMÉ

VanLandingham critique la notion de « nomisme d'alliance » en considérant comment le judaïsme ancien et Paul abordent le sujet du sens et de la fonction du jugement que Dieu porte sur les œuvres humaines. Il ne préconise pas de retourner à « l'ancienne perspective », car il trouve aussi cette lecture des écrits pauliniens incorrecte. Il considère qu'Abraham a reçu l'alliance comme la rétribution de son obéissance. La grâce et la miséricorde n'ont à ses yeux pas de lien avec un pardon divin immérité. Paul était d'accord avec le judaïsme ancien pour considérer que le jugement final serait basé sur les œuvres, et que cela déterminerait la destinée finale de chacun. La « justification par la foi » ne signifie pas l'acquittement au jugement dernier. La mort de Christ n'expie que les péchés passés, elle libère du pouvoir du péché et apporte la capacité d'obéir à la volonté divine. Paul et ses contemporains s'accordaient pour penser que le critère qui détermine si un individu obtient la vie éternelle ou la damnation, c'est son obéissance.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

VanLandingham kritisiert die Vorstellung des „Bundesnomismus", indem er die Bedeutung und Funktion des Gerichtes nach den Werken im frühen Judentum und bei Paulus behandelt. Er vertritt keine Rückkehr zur alten Perspektive, da er deren Methode, Paulus zu lesen, ebenfalls nicht korrekt findet. Er argumentiert, dass Abraham den Bund als Lohn für seinen Gehorsam erhielt. Gnade und Barmherzigkeit verwiesen nicht auf unverdiente göttliche Vergebungshandlungen. Das frühe Judentum inklusive Paulus stimmte darin überein, dass das letzte Gericht nach Werken sei und dass es das Schicksal jedes einzelnen festlegte. Der Tod Christi sühnt nur die vergangenen Sünden, befreit von der Macht der Sünde und schenkt die Fähigkeit, Gottes Willen zu gehorchen. Paulus und seine Zeitgenossen stimmten darin überein, dass das Kriterium, anhand dessen ewiges Leben oder Verdammnis festgelegt würden, der individuelle Gehorsam sei.

* * * *

VanLandingham not only opposes the New Perspective on Paul, but he also seeks to overturn the Old Perspective. In light of the Protestant emphasis on justification by faith and the claims of E.P. Sanders and the New Perspective that Paul (and early Judaism) agreed that salvation is by grace not works, VanLandingham suggests another option for understanding judgment by works. This work contributes to the evaluation of 'covenantal nomism' by challenging Sanders' claim that for early Judaism salvation was based solely on God's grace. VanLandingham argues instead that (most) early Jewish authors held that eternal life or damnation was the result of one's obedience, which God judges at the final Assize. Paul, he claims, adopts this same perspective about judgment by works: one's obedience, which is the criterion of the final judgment, determines one's eternal destiny.

VanLandingham begins by analyzing the basis on which God entered into a covenant relationship with Israel (chapter 1). His goal is to challenge Sanders' interpretation that election was founded on God's grace. He discusses the origin of the Abrahamic covenant as it is described in Genesis 12, 15, 17 and how these portions of Genesis were interpreted by second temple Jewish authors. Abraham received, he argues, the covenant based not on God's grace but because of his obedience. While VanLandingham provides a significant challenge to Sanders' understanding of the election of Israel, most will not be surprised by his interpretation of the second temple texts. Perhaps most surprising is his claim that in Genesis the covenant is a reward for obedience.

In chapter 2, he argues that, for a significant portion of early Judaism, obedience did not simply maintain or give evidence of one's place in the covenant. Rather, obedience to the Torah was the means to eternal life, and disobedience resulted in damnation. The judgment is indeed according to works, and it determines one's eternal status. Salvation is the reward given to the obedient. The conclusions drawn from chapter 2 are applied to Paul in chapter 3. According to VanLandingham, Paul also thought that the final judgment is based on one's deeds not whether one believed, and the judgment determines one's status before God and one's eternal destiny. To claim that all believers will be saved regardless of their moral behaviour renders Paul's moral exhortations and his comments about divine judgment meaningless.

In the final chapter, VanLandingham argues that the phrase 'justification by faith' has been completely misunderstood by Pauline scholars. In particular, he maintains that terms from the dikai- root rarely have a forensic or judicial meaning and 'do not refer to an acquittal at the Last Judgment' (p.331). Rather, these terms refer to the initial benefits of Christ's death: forgiveness from past

sins and deliverance from Sin.

Underlying VanLandingham's argument is a basic concern for divine justice. Fundamental to his thesis are the definitions of mercy and grace introduced in chapter 1. Mercy (חן; רחם) and grace (חסד) are not unmerited divine actions in which God passes over human transgressions. Rather, grace refers to God's loyalty to the covenant (pp.55-57), and mercy is the reward given to the repentant (pp.57-60). VanLandingham finds these concepts of grace and mercy, which are developed first from the Hebrew Bible, throughout second temple Judaism.

This work will certainly draw mixed reactions. I note here three broad problem areas that will need to be addressed for the argument to be convincing. First, although VanLandingham references a significant number of primary sources, he never attempts to understand his selected (proof) texts within the context of the whole work. It is not enough to claim that *Jubilees*, for example, says the final judgment is by works. The important question, which is not asked, is how does this function with the soteriological scheme that the author of *Jubilees* develops? Exploring themes will only get us so far and can quickly result in unfair comparisons.

Second, VanLandingham's thesis does not adequately account for Paul's Christology or pneumatology. The effects of Christ's death cannot be limited simply to freeing a person from the human inclination to sin, wiping the slate clean, and giving one the potential to be obedient with the Spirit's assistance (p.335). Further, it is doubtful that VanLandingham has understood rightly the eschatological orientation of Paul's theology. The Christ-event and its effects were far more important to Paul than VanLandingham's argument suggests.

Third, although he notes that early Judaism contained other perspectives, VanLandingham commits the same error as Sanders: he minimizes the diversity and produces a soteriological scheme that is the same for everyone, including Paul. His arguments may explain some sources, but, in the quest for a unifying perspective, he downplays different points of interest (for example, predestination in Qumran). Further, he provides no significant reasons why one should simply apply this scheme to Paul. Perhaps Paul used the same ideas but redefined them around his understanding of God's action in Christ (cf. Jesus' use of 'Kingdom of God' language).

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Divine and Human Agency in Paul and His Cultural Environment

John M.G. Barclay and Simon J. Gathercole, editors

Early Christianity in Context; Library of New Testament Studies 335
London/New York: T&T Clark, 2006, x + 208 pp., £65, hb, 05-6708-453-1

SUMMARY

The essays in this volume address how Paul and his contemporaries, especially other Jews, understood the relationship between God's actions and those of humanity and the implications for salvation. The Introduction outlines some of the methodological problems of this particular subject. The essays highlight the diversity of early Judaism, but they do not set Paul against his contemporaries. Paul's view of divine and human agency is one perspective among many. The volume represents well the current state of research.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Die Essays in diesem Band widmen sich der Frage, wie Paulus und seine Zeitgenossen, besonders andere Juden, die Beziehung zwischen Gottes Taten und menschlichen Handlungen sowie deren Implikationen im Hinblick auf die Errettung verstanden. Die Einleitung skizziert einige der methodischen Probleme des vorliegenden Themas. Die Essays heben die Vielfalt des frühen Judentums hervor, setzen Paulus aber nicht in Gegensatz zu seinen Zeitgenossen. Die Perspektive des Paulus auf göttliche und menschliche Wirkungsweisen ist eine unter vielen. Der Band repräsentiert den gegenwärtigen Forschungsstand gut.

RÉSUMÉ

Les essais contenus dans cet ouvrage traitent de la question de savoir comment Paul et ses contemporains, en particulier d'autres Juifs, considéraient la relation entre les actions de Dieu et celles des humains, et quelles implications en découlaient pour la conception du salut. L'introduction indique quelques-uns des problèmes méthodologiques que l'on rencontre lorsqu'on aborde ce sujet. Les essais mettent en évidence la diversité des opinions au sein du judaïsme, mais ils ne présentent pas Paul comme étant en opposition à ses contemporains. Le point de vue de l'apôtre quant à l'action divine et l'action humaine en est un parmi beaucoup d'autres. Cet ouvrage présente bien l'état actuel de la recherche.

* * * *

The essays in this book are the result of a symposium held at the University of Aberdeen in the summer of 2004. The book as a whole seeks to revisit and, in some cases, to correct our understanding of how Paul and his contemporaries explained the relationship between God's actions and those of humans. As J.M.G. Barclay explains in the Introduction, the time is now right to return to this issue (pp.2-4). In their own ways, then, the authors of this volume attempt to explain how Paul

and his contemporaries understood the interaction and relationship between God and humans.

One of the most difficult problems related to this topic is defining exactly what one means by divine and human agency. In his essay on Paul and Epictetus, T. Engberg-Pederson argues that approaching the issue of divine and human agency from a theological perspective is 'a fundamentally post-ancient one' (p.117). Because he defines the issue solely in terms of 'opposition' (p.139), he maintains that neither of these authors is concerned with the subject. If the question revolves only around human autonomy, then many ancient authors will be excluded. Nevertheless, as Barclay explains in the Introduction, it is not necessary to limit the topic to only human autonomy. He proposes three categories to explain the way God and humans relate: 'competitive'; 'kinship'; and 'non-contrastive transcendence' (p.6-7). These categories provide a helpful way forward and can help avoid the modern emphasis on human autonomy and conflict between God and humans.

The diversity of early Judaism is brought to the forefront in this volume. In the first essay of the volume, G. Boccaccini traces the development of second temple Jewish sects and how each understood the relationship between God and humanity. His essay demonstrates the wide-range of perspectives available during this time period. P.S. Alexander, in his essay on Qumran, highlights the importance of predestination for the community's theology. In the Two-Spirits sermon (1QS 3.13-4.24), divine action comes to the forefront, while the human agent remains in the background. In contrast to the Qumran community are the Rabbis, who emphasize human agency and make 'salvation' contingent on human action. F. Avemarie concludes that for the Rabbis, 'God and Israel depend on each other mutually' (p.70). Philo presents a slightly different option since he begins with God's action and, at some points, appears to eliminate any human action (Barclay). Nevertheless, the character of the human agent is important.

Three other factors that arise from the essays reveal the difficulty of this topic. First, S. Westerholm provides significant evidence that ancient Jewish authors thought the human agent was capable of keeping the Torah. Paul, by contrast, doubts human ability because of his understanding of sin. Second, developing from this is how one understands the role of 'supra-human powers', such as Sin (J.L. Martyn). As S.J. Gathercole shows, the role of sin, whether viewed as a power over humans (Sin; Roman 7) or as disobedience (sin; Romans 1), must be factored into the question since Paul describes its place in the divine economy. Finally, F. Watson draws our attention to how the early Jewish authors interpreted the Torah. Paul introduces an antithesis that he finds in the Torah: one receives life through obedience to the Torah or through divine grace. From Paul's perspective, 4QMMT and 4 Maccabees instruct their readers to obey the law. The issue of divine and human agency is localized in Paul's reading of the Torah.

Somewhere within these diverse options Paul appears. Although at times Paul may appear to be completely different from his contemporaries (for example, in his reading of the Torah), in other instances he emphasizes the same concepts (for example, the role of grace in Philo). Paul cannot consistently be set over against the rest of his Jewish contemporaries, but neither can he be described as in complete agreement with their views.

This volume contains many more insightful suggestions than this review can mention. The volume represents well the current state of scholarship and throughout it the authors suggest some issues that need further research. While this work presupposes that the reader is familiar with the debate, those not working in this field or new-comers to it can gain access to the various options being proposed by scholars who have produced much more detailed arguments elsewhere. Scholars interested in early Jewish views of soteriology, anthropology and theology proper will find this volume helpful.

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Paul, Moses, and the History of Israel The Letter/Spirit Contrast and the Argument from Scripture in 2 Corinthians 3

Paternoster Biblical Monographs

Scott J. Hafemann

Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2005, xii + 497 pp., £29.99, pb, ISBN 1-84227-317-5

SUMMARY

In this reissued 1995 monograph, Hafemann, with extensive knowledge of the secondary literature and detailed attention to the primary texts, argue s that the letter/Spirit contrast in 2 Cor 3:6 should not be confused with a law/Gospel contrast. The Apostle does not seek to criticise the Law at all and the contrast is best understood in 'salvation-history' terms. Further, while many suggest 2 Cor 3 is evidence of Paul's christological hermeneutic, Hafemann maintains that Paul's argument proceeds in dependence on Exod 32-34 without altering the original intention of the Pentateuchal text. These arguments necessitate a noteworthy reinterpretation of the meaning of Moses' veil, and the Greek words katarge/w and te/lov. The review ends with a few critical reflections on this learned work.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

In dieser 1995 neu aufgelegten Monographie argumentiert Hafemann mit weitreichender Kenntnis der Sekundärliteratur und detailliertem Studium der Primärtexte, dass der Wort/Geist-Kontrast in 2. Kor 3,6 nicht mit dem Gesetz/Evangelium-Kontrast zu verwechseln sei. Der Apostel, so Hafemann, sei keinesfalls darauf aus, das Gesetz zu kritisieren und der Kontrast verstünde sich am besten im heilsge-

schichtlichen Zusammenhang. Entgegen der verbreiteten Ansicht, 2. Kor. 3 als Beleg paulinisch christologischer Hermeneutik zu sehen, hält Hafemann daran fest, dass die Argumentation des Paulus auf der Basis von 2. Mose 32-34 geführt wird, ohne die ursprüngliche Intention des Pentateuchtextes zu verändern. Diese Darstellung fordert eine bemerkenswerte Neuinterpretation der Bedeutung von Moses Schleier und den griechischen Worten katarge/w und te/lov. Die Rezension schließt mit einer kritischen Reflexion dieser hochakademischen Arbeit.

RÉSUMÉ

On a là une réimpression d'une monographie originellement publiée en 1995. Hafemann considère les textes bibliques de manière détaillée et possède une large connaissance des travaux publiés à leur propos. Il tente de montrer que l'opposition entre la lettre et l'Esprit en 2 Corinthiens 3.6 ne doit pas se confondre avec une opposition entre la loi et l'Évangile. L'apôtre ne vise aucunement à critiquer la loi, et cette opposition doit se comprendre comme ayant trait à l'histoire du salut. En outre, alors que de nombreux spécialistes suggèrent que 2 Corinthiens 3 fournirait une preuve de l'herméneutique christologique de Paul, Hafemann maintient que l'argumentation y procède bien du texte d'Exode 32-34 sans en altérer l'intention originelle. Cette thèse nécessite une réinterprétation importante de la signification du voile de Moïse, ainsi que du sens des mots grecs katargéô et télon. La recension se termine par quelques réflexions critiques sur ce travail érudit.

* * * *

How should one understand the letter/Spirit contrast in 2 Cor 3:6? Most scholarship has understood a law/Gospel separation implicit in this verse, and others the key to Paul's scriptural hermeneutic. Hafemann, in light of 'the current paradigm shift in Pauline studies' (16) argues in this reissued monograph (originally published in 1995 by Mohr Siebeck) that time is ripe for a reconsideration of this pivotal passage and its context.

Hafemann proceeds to develop an argument concerning the theological and hermeneutical significance of 2 Cor 3:6 that takes seriously the context, especially that of Paul's own use of OT Scripture in 3:7-19. Paul's apostolic defence, Hafemann has argued in detail elsewhere, involves a portrayal of Paul himself as 'the eschatological counterpart to the role of Moses as the mediator *par excellence* between YHWH and his people' (33-34). The substantiation of this hypothesis in relation to 2 Cor 3:4-6a is the concern of the first two chapters.

Hafemann argues that Paul uses the allusions and parallels to Moses' call in 2:16b and 3:4-6a to defend the legitimacy of his own ministry. A thorough analysis of the 'sufficiency' and 'call' of Moses in second Temple literature is undertaken with the purpose of understanding how Exodus 3-4 could be, and indeed was, understood in Paul's milieu (chapter one). He then turns to address the 'sufficiency' and 'call' of Paul in 2 Cor 3:4-6 (chapter two). 'Paul', Hafemann writes, 'asserts his sufficiency in spite of the suffering which seems to call his legitimacy into question... And in each case Paul's affirmation of his sufficiency is based upon the call of God in his life' (100). However, while Paul asserts the *similarity* between his call and the call to Moses in 2:16b and 3:4f, in the letter/Spirit division he explains something of the essential *difference* between his ministry and that of Moses. 'But having done so', Hafemann asserts, 'Paul must now substantiate and clarify the letter/Spirit contrast itself in order to keep it from being either rejected out of hand or misunderstood' (185).

This leads to part two in which Hafemann addresses the apparent contradictory Pauline view of Moses' ministry in 2 Cor 3. This is done by investigating Paul's understanding of Moses' role in the 'second giving of the law' as found in Exodus 32-34. Chapters three to five analyse Paul's interpretation of this OT source with the aim of showing that Paul derived his argument concerning the nature and legitimacy of his own ministry from the Scriptures. Hafemann's argument, then, is to determine the nature of the letter/Spirit contrast in light of Paul's self-understanding of his apostolic ministry in contrast with the ministry of Moses.

It is to Hafemann's credit that he seeks to understand the ministry of Moses in its wider canonical context, a strategy less widely accepted when the monograph was published in 1995. This leads him to conclude that the veil on Moses' face was actually provided in order to stop the Israelites looking in to the glory of God and suffering death because of their hard-heartedness (chapter three). In chapter four, and his study of 2 Cor. 3:7-11, he analyses the significance of the 'veil' in Paul's argument. While others have taken this as evidence that Paul radically reinterprets the original intent of Exod 34, Hafemann proposes that Paul was being true to the meaning of his OT source. This also means that '[i]t is Moses' *ministry* which can appropriately be associated with "death", not the law *per se*' (285). In response to the question as to whether Paul was changing the OT text by speaking of the fading glory on Moses face, Hafemann argues that the Greek should be understood to read 'because of the glory of his face, *which was being rendered inoperative*' (310). Thus, 'Paul is *already* referring to the fact that the veil of Moses brought the glory of God to an end in terms of that which it would accomplish if not veiled, i.e. the judgment and destruction of Israel' (311). This use of Exodus is thus not *midrash* or *pesher*. Paul has presented an interpretation of the Scriptures which is based on their 'original intention' (458). These observations are tied smoothly to his structural analysis.

Chapter five develops the argument in relation to 2 Cor 3:12-18. In these verses, Paul argues that his ministry mediates the Spirit and glory of God in such a way that brings life and not, as with Moses, the destruction that would have been wrought had he not worn the veil. For this interpretation, Hafemann offers a plausible way of reading the τέλος in 3:13. Given Paul's faithfulness to the Exodus narrative, Hafemann argues that the 'Lord'

mentioned in vv. 16-18 is not christological, but rather indicates YHWH. Further, by turning to the Lord the believer, in fulfilment of Jer 31:31ff and Ezek 36:26ff, has his hard heart removed so that he may now behold the glory of the Lord. This also means that the freedom of 3:17 is not freedom *from* the law, but rather freedom *for* the law. 2 Cor 3 thus doesn't contain negative and positive mentions of the law. Rather, the difference between the two ministries of Paul and Moses are to be based upon a 'salvation-history' contrast. This allows Hafemann to assert that Paul has a thoroughly positive view of the law both within the old and new covenants. While the whole monograph has been a detailed focus on just one chapter in Paul, he argues that 2 Cor 3 can be treated as paradigmatic for Paul's theology generally.

Not all critical responses to Hafemann's arguments have been fair. C. Marvin Pate (in *The Reverse of the Curse*, [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000]), for example, has arguably not entirely understood Hafemann's thesis. However, though Hafemann's contribution is detailed, creative and even at times brilliant, there remains the need for judicious reflection. First, as Pate has pointed out, 'letter' is perhaps better understood as indicative of the law itself. In this regard, Hafemann's questionable appeal to Rom 2:27-29 and 7:6 in support of his thesis needs to be challenged. His argument also raises more serious and broader questions: if the law is operative for the Christian then why does Paul teach that Christians are dead to the law in Romans 7:1-6? And if only part of the law remains binding on Christians, then what of Galatians 5:3 in which the law appears to be portrayed as an indivisible unity (cf. Pate)? Second, not all will be persuaded by Hafemann's interpretation of the Greek words καταργέω and τέλος even if the latter remains plausible to this author. As Pate writes: 'Hafemann's interpretation seems to be born out of a desire to extricate Paul from altering Exodus 34:29-35... [But if] Paul can recast Jeremiah 31:31-34 and Ezekiel 26:25f. by eliminating the presence of the law in the new covenant in Christ..., then so can he revise Exodus 34:29-35' (426). Third, Hafemann argues that the 'value of the LXX is seen most clearly... in *comparison* to the Hebrew tradition as its *Vorlage*' (191, 243-48). This is then often reduced to comparison of the LXX with the MT, which informs his arguments at various points. However, '[W]hile it is convenient to use *BHS* or *BHK* as a starting point for understanding what undergirded the LXX translations, it is dangerous, dishonest and wrong to assume that Leningradensis B 19A (MT) lay before the pre-Christian translators' (Cf. Melvin K. H. Peters, "Septuagint," in *The Anchor Bible Dictionary*. Vol 5. [London: Doubleday, 1992], 1100). Further, there exist particularly noteworthy anomalies between the LXX and the MT precisely at key verses in Hafemann's argument. For example, the existing Greek versions of Jeremiah and Ezekiel 36:23-38 were probably based upon different Hebrew texts than represented by the MT. Fourth, one wonders why Hafemann has not engaged with the Psalmic tradition which describes those who have sought to behold the glory of God without any fear of death, but rather with expectation of delight (cf. Ps 42; 63). Finally, it is difficult to be as confident as Hafemann is in terms of the specific referent of the title κύριος in 3:16-18; the matter is more complicated than he seems to appreciate.

These points aside, this is a work of massive learning and piercing intellect that will repay anyone who takes the necessary time to work though his careful and detailed research.

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Laws of the Spiritual Order
Innovation and Reconstruction in the Soteriology of Thomas Erskine of Linlathen

Don Horrocks

Studies In Evangelical History And Thought; Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2004
361 pp., pb, £24.99, ISBN 1-84227-192-x

SUMMARY

Don Horrocks' study of the theology of Thomas Erskine of Linlathen gives a deep insight into an important figure of Scottish theology. Erskine's theology is an incarnational one, because for him the our redemption can be understood only in the context of Christ's incarnation. He shows God as universal Father and as Holy Love. Horrocks introduces Erskine's theology and puts him in the context of his time period. An important opponent was the Scottish Federal Orthodoxy, an important influence was the Romantic movement. This book is a real help to discover a 19th century theologian who has very much to say to European Christians today.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Don Horrocks' Studie der Theologie von Thomas Erkine of Linlathen bietet einen tiefen Einblick in eine wichtige Gestalt der schottischen Theologie. Diese ist inkarnatorisch; denn für ihn kann unsere Erlösung immer nur im Kontext der Menschwerdung Christi verstanden werden. Er zeigt Christus als universalen Vater und als Heilige Liebe. Horrocks führt in Erskines Theologie ein und stellt ihn in den Kontext seiner Zeit. Ein bedeutender Gegner war die schottische föderaltheologische Orthodoxie, ein wichtiger Einfluss die Romantik. Dieses Buch ist eine echte Hilfe, um einen Theologen des 19. Jahrhunderts zu entdecken, der auch den europäischen Christen von heute viel sagen kann.

RÉSUMÉ

Don Horrocks examine la théologie de Thomas Erskine de Linthalten et nous livre ainsi une vision claire et profonde de la pensée d'une figure importante de la théologie écossaise. La théologie d'Erskine est centrée sur l'incarnation,

car, à ses yeux, notre rédemption ne peut se comprendre que dans le contexte de l'incarnation de Christ. Il dépeint Dieu comme Père universel et saint Amour. Horrocks présente cette théologie et la replace dans le contexte de son époque. L'orthodoxie fédérale écossaise a été pour lui un adversaire important, tandis que le mouvement romantique a exercé sur lui une influence considérable. Ce livre nous permet de découvrir un théologien du XIX[e] siècle qui a beaucoup à dire aux chrétiens d'Europe d'aujourd'hui.

* * * *

Horrocks starts the first of the two parts of his study with an introduction to Thomas Erskine, a Scottish lay theologian who was a 'key transitional figure' (1) between the 18th century Federal Orthodoxy and today. He was influenced by different theological sources, one of which was German Pietism. He was in close contact with several important theologians of his time, e.g. John McLeod Campbell, F.D. Maurice and George MacDonald.

Horrocks shows us Erskine's emphasis to renew his readers 'Perception of God' (27). Instead of as a judge God has to be understood as 'Holy Love' (29) and as universal Father. He is a relational God whose coming into the flesh is a coming into us. He is himself a God defined by the Father-Son-relation in himself. And he is the universal Father of all human beings.

Erskine was influenced by the Romantic movement. Instead of the authority of external evidences he emphasised the authority of internal ones. For him experience was of highest importance, especially the self-evidence of moral change. This was founded upon his belief in the restoration of the human nature through the incarnation, which makes his theology deeply incarnational. Man has to will God's will, he can have something as a 'new birth'. There are close parallels between Erskine and Wesley, which could – even if it is not mentioned by Horrocks – make Erskine a bridge between the Calvinistic and the Methodist tradition.

Saving Faith provokes for Erskine a living response from the heart to the inward voice of God. His version of Calvinism can be called 'mystical'. Salvation is a 'real union with God'. Justification is a process. In 'Erskine's thought salvation and sanctification became virtually anonymous' (95). There is 'an ever-present sanctifying influence in the heart' (103). Through his strong linking of the 'atonement with incarnation' (105) the whole life and not only the death of Christ become important to understand salvation. Yet Erskine's doctrine that Christ's death has no intrinsic salvific efficiacy was controversial. This shows clearly the differences between Erskine's theology and the theological background of his time. An interesting point is that he changes the Scottish Federal Orthodoxy not so much by inventing new terms but be redefining the traditional ones.

Another interesting point is Erskine's view of suffering. For him it is one of God's tools to educate humans. So his theodicy has influences on his soteriology. Human suffering has its share in the redemption, yet the foundation for this redeeming function of human suffering is Christ's suffering. Then Erskine understands Christ not as the substitute of humans but as the head of humanity. According to Horrocks it is doubtful whether Erskine was really successful in keeping the singularity of Christ's sacrifice. For Erskine sin is a disease, which has to be healed. He has a tendency 'like Schleiermacher and F. D. Maurice to regard sin in terms of self-centredness, individualism and alienation' (124). Erskine changes the Calvinistic understanding of election. For him in choosing Christ, the one elect, human beings become elect. So in some way an act of co-operation between God and man is necessary. Horrocks mentions Erskine's 'anticipation of soteriological aspects of Karl Barth's theology' (130).

Of course Erskine's theology was heavily attacked. From the side of the Calvinistic orthodoxy especially James A. Haldane was a strong critic. Another opponent was the Methodist Richard Watson. According to him Erskine was a Semi-Pelagian. The main critique was that he had a too psychological understanding of the Spirit. Horrocks defends Erskine against these attacks and tries to explain them as misunderstandings in the context of the strong influence of philosophical idealism in his time. According to another critic – John H. Newman – the logical outcome of Erskine's theology leads to rationalism, which does not take the mystery seriously enough. For his view of conversion it was important that everybody is offered God's grace, but that it is man's decision to accept it or not. As an overreaction against the Calvinism of his time Erskine develops a positive view of human nature. Yet for him salvation is only possible in Christ.

In the second part Horrocks tries to understand Erskine in the context of his time. He shows that he is influenced both by the Enlightenment and by the Romantic movement. One of Erskine's most important sources is William Law who stood in close connection with John Wesley and emphasised the importance of divine love. However, according to Horrocks the influence of Edward Irving is less important than previously thought. Furthermore a number of other mystical theologians influenced Erskine, among them Boehme and the Quakers. Erskine himself influenced theologians like John McLeod Campbell and F. D. Maurice.

Erskine stood in a wider context than that of Scottish theology. In his own time there was a strong German influence and Erskine builded on it and helped to introduce it more deeply to British theology. Two important roots for the German influence on him were his friend A. J. Scott and the family of Madame de Stael. Erskine's visit in Herrnhut shows his openness for one of the oldest traditions of German pietism. Then there are close connections between Erskine's theology and some continental tendencies, especially the theological school of Erlangen. Their questions and answers were similar. So the 19th century theological transitions in Britain and

Germany are closely interwoven. Horrocks shows this European dimension of Erskine. This dimension makes it helpful for European Christians to look at Thomas Erskine of Linlathen. And this study is a good introduction to this remarkable theologian of 19th century Scotland.

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