This is, however, not an interpretation of the aforementioned texts but only a restatement of Levering's idea that God loves all rational creatures in the same way and wills the salvation of all. It would have strengthened his argument if he had paid more attention to these texts.

Levering's disagreement with Calvin touches upon a deeper theological question. Does reprobation have a goal? Does God, in a certain way, use those who rebel against him in order to fulfil his purposes? It seems that in Levering's account of reprobation the answer is 'no': the sins of humankind (and other evils in the world) are only permitted by God (190). Why? We can only answer apophatically, like God taught Job to do. The element of truth in this is that most of the time we do not understand God's purpose in permitting evil. This does not mean, however, that God does not have a purpose with it and cannot will it actively, although he is not the efficient cause of it. If we say, as I think we should, that God's ultimate goal in history is the manifestation of his virtues through all of his creatures, then those whom he permits to rebel against him also serve that goal. This does apply to hell; it is a place where God manifests his justice, but also his abiding mercy. It also applies to human history and the Christian life. Paul says that God gave him an angel of Satan to buffet him, in order that he would not pride himself on his revelations (2 Cor 12:7). God wilfully allowed Satan to buffet Paul, in order to make Paul more humble, in order to serve God's mercy in Paul. If we formulate God's relation to sin only in terms of permission, we cannot make clear how God uses even sin for the good of his people.

To conclude, Levering has written a very useful book in which he is not ashamed to take another road than mainstream twentieth century theology. He writes in a wonderfully balanced way about positions with which he does not agree. However, with regard to God's relation to sin, he could perhaps have dug deeper.

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Trinity, Freedom, and Love: An Engagement with the Theology of Eberhard Jüngel Piotr Małysz

London & New York: T & T Clark, 2012; 245 pp., £65.00, hb; ISBN 978-0-567-57235-6

RÉSUMÉ

Cet ouvrage de Piotr Malysz a tout pour devenir un incontournable dans le monde académique. Il s'intéresse à deux lignes directrices de la pensée de Jüngel sur la doctrine de Dieu, à la relation entre la liberté et l'amour. Au bout du compte, il trouve l'approche de Jüngel peu satisfaisante parce que celui-ci opère avec une « logique de l'amour » qui met l'accent sur une conception problématique de la liberté avec pour conséquence que Dieu apparaît en fait

comme n'étant pas libre. Malysz propose de résoudre le problème en ayant recours à une « logique de la liberté » qui ne laisse pas la « logique de l'amour » limiter de manière trop fâcheuse la conception de la liberté divine. Cette approche de la doctrine de Dieu aura vraisemblablement d'immenses conséquences pour la manière d'aborder à l'avenir le sujet des relations trinitaires.

SUMMARY

In *Trinity, Freedom, and Love*, Piotr Małysz has produced what is sure to become a key text within the scholarship. The book concerns two trajectories of Jüngel's doctrine of God: the relationship between freedom and love. Ultimately, Małysz finds Jüngel's doctrine of God unsatisfactory in that it operates with a 'logic of love' which prioritises a problematic account of freedom in which God actually appears to be 'unfree'. The remainder of the work offers Małysz's solution to this problem in the form of the development of a 'logic of freedom' which prevents the 'logic of love' from impinging too awkwardly upon divine freedom. This approach to the doctrine of God is likely to have wide-reaching consequences for future understanding of the trinitarian relations.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Mit Trinity, Freedom and Love [Dreieinigkeit, Freiheit und Liebe] hat Piotr Malysz ein Werk geschaffen, das ganz gewiss eine Schlüsselfunktion in der Fachwelt einnehmen wird. Das Buch dreht sich um zwei Hauptlinien in Jüngels Lehre über Gott, und zwar um die Beziehung zwischen Freiheit und Liebe. Letztlich stellt Jüngels Lehre über Gott Malysz dahingehend nicht zufrieden, dass sie sich innerhalb jener "Logik der Liebe" bewegt, die einen problematischen Freiheitsbegriff hochhält, bei dem Gott "unfrei" zu sein scheint. Im übrigen Buch bietet Malysz eine Lösung für dieses Problem in Gestalt einer "Logik der Freiheit" an, die verhindern soll, dass eine "Logik der Liebe" die göttliche Freiheit auf eine allzu seltsame Weise beschneidet. Dieser Ansatz der Lehre über Gott dürfte weitreichende Auswirkungen haben auf das künftige Verständnis der trinitarischen Beziehungen.

The perennial attraction of the scholarship of Eberhard Jüngel is not hard to determine on a quick glance through his theological writings. Combining a sharp perceptiveness with a seemingly limitless breadth of knowledge, the result is never dull and more often than not stunning. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for much of the secondary literature which has a repetitious tendency to reduce Jüngel to nothing more than a disciple of Karl Barth. In Trinity, Freedom, and Love, Piotr Malysz has eschewed the standard repetition of Jüngelstudien and produced what is sure to become a key text in the scholarship. By re-locating Jüngel in closer proximity to Martin Luther, Malysz offers a careful resolution of the glaring lacuna in the prevailing readings of Jüngel's theology: what does it mean to call Jüngel a 'Lutheran theologian'?

As Małysz clarifies at the outset of the work, 'this study explores freedom: God's as well as human. But, insofar as its focus is on freedom, is it also an investigation of love' (1). Within this quotation are contained the two trajectories of the book: on the one hand, explicitly, the relation between freedom and love; on the other, implicitly, the anthropological relationship between divine freedom (and, subsequently, love) and human freedom (and, subsequently, love). Primarily, Jüngel's doctrine of God involves the dual concerns of a commitment to freedom, or 'divine spontaneity and creativity', and love, or 'intersubjective vulnerability'. But alongside this concern runs an anthropological concern: that there must be a correspondence between divine freedom and love, and human freedom and love.

However, lest the work be read as a simple piece of hagiography, Małysz's investigation involves a criticism of Jüngel's project. Despite emphasising the centrality of freedom and love within the doctrine of God, Małysz argues that ultimately Jüngel has not sufficiently clarified the inter-relationship of the two concepts. In his attempt to relate the two concepts (by means of the 'logic of love', as Malysz terms it), it appears that Jüngel's account of the inter-subjectivity of divine love becomes 'swallowed up' by the proclivities of divine freedom so that, in due course, God, in his freedom, begins to look very much like the human person in her unfreedom. It is Małysz's ambition through the flow of the argument to rectify this asymmetric association of love and freedom through the incorporation of an additional logic, the logic of freedom, so that 'the two subjective structures introduce clarity into the doctrine of God, while at the same time doing justice to all of Jüngel's concerns' (15).

The four main chapters follow this progression. In the first two, Małysz analyses the concepts of divine and human freedom as they appear in Jüngel's oeuvre. With respect to human freedom, he highlights Jüngel's complete rejection of the modernist conceptions of anthropological freedom, typified by accounts of self-securing, on the one hand, or a detachment from the world in which one's life appears so vulnerable. In response to this, Jüngel's construal of God's freedom eschews the self-serving 'freedoms' of post-enlightenment philosophy for an intersubjective 'logic of love' in which God's self-determination on the cross is not merely the activity of a self-assured agent, but a 'successful togetherness' (Jüngel) involving both the divine and the human. However, despite this 'logic of love', Matysz avers that the concept of freedom underpinning this logic shows the divine to be 'a subject who merely determines God's self in relation to the other and incorporates the other into God's self-relatedness' (14).

In response to this problem, Małysz suggests a parallel logic to the 'logic of love' termed the 'logic of freedom'. These two logics constitute the two subjective acts of the divine in his own self-determination. Following this, chapter three returns to an examination of the anthropological so as to determine how freedom and love are related in Jüngel's account of the human person. In so doing, Małysz distinguishes between the two acts of being within human existence: the passive and the active – being and becoming. Using these findings, he embarks upon an ambitious final chapter in which the two logics of divine being are brought into relation.

In essence, his concern is to show how neither logic is possible without the other. Without the logic of love, there could be no possibility for a genuine free relationship between the human and the divine. Similarly, without the logic of freedom, there would be no possibility for a genuinely inter-subjective relationship between the human and the divine in which both parties render themselves vulnerable in some way. Both of these logics are, therefore rooted in Trinity as each emphasises the tri-polarity of the divine, albeit in different ways.

In summary, Małysz's treatment of Jüngel's theology is complex yet compelling, offering a new approach to the doctrine of God which pushes the debate forward. For as Małysz elucidates, in asking precisely what it means for God to be free, any answer to the question must proceed with recourse to divine love.

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Heavenly Participation: The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry Hans Boersma

Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011; 224pp, \$20.00; ISBN: 978-0802865427

SUMMARY

Hans Boersma's new volume on sacramental theology makes a good case for thinking that the creation is suffused with the presence of God, in keeping with historic Christian Neoplatonism. Drawing on the *Nouvelle Théologie* theologians like Henri de Lubac, Boersma commends this sacramental tapestry to evangelical readers. However, his book does raise a question about how God is present sacramentally in the created order apart from his being omnipresent. This question is not really addressed in the book, though it would be a fruitful project for future research on this topic.

RÉSUMÉ

Ce nouvel ouvrage sur la théologie sacramentelle défend de manière bien argumentée la thèse de la présence divine baignant la création, dans la ligne du néoplatonisme chrétien historique. S'appuyant sur la Nouvelle théologie de théologiens comme Henri de Lubac, Boersma recommande cette texture sacramentelle aux lecteurs évangéliques. Son livre suscite cependant une question quant à la manière dont le mode de la présence sacramentelle de Dieu dans la création diffère du mode de son omnipré-