

Wolfhart Pannenberg's *imago Dei* doctrine as interpreted by F. LeRon Shults and Kam Ming Wong *Jan Vales*

RÉSUMÉ

L'interprétation de la conception de l'image de Dieu chez Wolfhart Pannenberg est sujette à débat. Le présent article expose le point de vue de deux auteurs sur cette question. F. LeRon Shults, dont l'analyse est exposée dans son étude consacrée à Pannenberg en 1999 et dans l'ouvrage *Reforming Theological Anthropology* (2003), considère l'anthropologie de Pannenberg comme une « interprétation eschatologique » dans le cadre de son

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projet plus large d'appliquer la notion de « réciprocité relationnelle » à des thèmes théologiques majeurs. Le second auteur, Kam Ming Wong, dans l'ouvrage intitulé *Wolfhart Pannenberg on Human Destiny* (2007), caractérise l'anthropologie de Pannenberg comme étant « salvifique et eschatologique » et il établit un lien entre ses concepts et l'hamartologie. La fin de cet article considère les conséquences des deux points de vue pour la question des « droits de l'homme ».

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SUMMARY

In the study of theological anthropology, a debate is raging about how to interpret Wolfhart Pannenberg's concept of the *imago Dei* doctrine. This article presents the views of two authors on Pannenberg's handling of the *imago Dei* concept, F. LeRon Shults and Kam Ming Wong. Shults' reflections can be found in *Reforming Theological Anthropology* (2003) and in his 1999 study on Pannenberg. He calls Pannenberg's anthropology an

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'eschatological interpretation' within his larger project of applying 'relational reciprocity' to major theological themes. The second author, Wong, characterises Pannenberg's anthropology as 'salvific and eschatological' and relates Pannenberg's concepts to hamartiology. Wong's interpretation appears in the book *Wolfhart Pannenberg on Human Destiny* (2007). At the end of this article, the consequences of both viewpoints will specifically be applied to the issue of 'human rights'.

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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Im Bereich der theologischen Anthropologie findet eine heftige Debatte darüber statt, wie Wolfhart Pannenburgs Konzept der *Imago Dei* Lehre zu interpretieren sei. Dieser Artikel legt die Ansichten zweier Autoren – F. LeRon Shults und Kam Ming Wong – dar, wie Pannenberg selbst mit dem *Imago Dei* Konzept umgeht. Shults Gedanken dazu sind in *Reforming Theological Anthropology* (2003) enthalten sowie in seiner Studie über Pannenberg aus dem Jahr 1999. Er nennt Pannenburgs Anthropologie eine

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„eschatologische Interpretation“ innerhalb seines größeren Plans, bei dem letzterer „relationale Reziprozität“ auf bedeutende theologische Themen anwendet. Der zweite Autor, Wong, charakterisiert Pannenburgs Anthropologie als „soteriologisch und eschatologisch“ und bringt Pannenburgs Konzept mit dem Bereich der Hamartologie in Verbindung. Wongs Darstellung erscheint in seinem Buch *Wolfhart Pannenberg on Human Destiny* (2007). Am Ende des Artikels werden die Auswirkungen beider Standpunkte insbesondere auf das Anliegen der Menschenrechte angewandt.

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1. Introduction

The distinct and inspiring theological anthropology of Wolfhart Pannenberg draws considerable scholarly attention, as is illustrated by the existence of several monographs on his work. Examples are the general theological introduction by Stanley Grenz, the North American evangelical scholar and student of Pannenberg (1990, revised 2008), and the textbook by Gunther Wenz, Pannenberg's successor on the chair of systematic theology at the University of Munich, Germany (2003). There are studies of Pannenberg with a Trinitarian perspective by Timothy Bradshaw (1988 and 2009), Iain Taylor (2007) and Daniel Munteanu (2010). Concerning hermeneutics, methodology and the dialogue between theology and philosophy, one may look at Reginald Nnamdi (1993), M.W. Worthing (1996) and F. LeRon Shults (1999). Then there is Elisabeth Dieckmann's (1995) work on Pannenberg's theological anthropology, concentrating on the personality of God and humankind, and work by Kam Ming Wong (2007) and Mary E. Lowe (2010), which gives special attention to sin and gender issues.

This article deals with two of these authors, Shults and Wong, scholars who have more than once published on Pannenberg's thought and have summarised their perspective in recent monographs. F. LeRon Shults is an American theologian in the Reformed tradition who teaches at the University of Agder, Norway, and is a former lecturer at Bethel Seminary, St. Paul, Minnesota, USA. Shults' ongoing project is to reform major theological doctrines from the perspective of what he calls a 'turn to relationality'. In 2003 he published *Reforming Theological Anthropology: After the Philosophical Turn to Relationality*. This book is foundational for the present article. Kam Ming Wong, associated with Wolfson College and King's College in Oxford, England and with Hong Kong Baptist University, has published several articles on Pannenberg since 2004. These served as preparation for a major study on Pannenberg's anthropology under the title *Wolfhart Pannenberg on Human Destiny* (2007), in which Wong offers a theological interpretation which – he believes – is fully in accord with Pannenberg, yet at the same time not found explicitly in Pannenberg's writings. He expresses his intention at the beginning of the last chapter of the book: 'We have made a conscious effort to fill in those doctrinal gaps left undeveloped by Pannenberg.'¹ This statement stands like a thesis for the book.

2. The *Imago Dei* doctrine

In theology and the history of Christian doctrine, there is a distinction between the biblical expression 'created after the image of God' and its synonym *imago Dei*. In the Old Testament the biblical term is used five times in Genesis 1, 5 and 9 – including Hebrew parallelism in those chapters. In the New Testament we see that this general concept includes every human being (1 Cor 11:7, Jas 3:9).² But in the New Testament epistles there is also the concept that Jesus is the image of God and that Christians are to grow into the image of Christ (cf. Rom 8:29, 2 Cor 3:18, Eph 4:24, Col 1:15, 3:10 and other places). This biblical testimony sets the tension and dilemma for later theological development.

Pannenberg published his first monograph in 1962 on the question *Was ist der Mensch: die Anthropologie der Gegenwart im Lichte der Theologie*; it was translated into English as *What is Man?* (1970). The book came a year after the joint publication of *Offenbarung als Geschichte* with Rolf Rendtorff, Ulrich Wilckens and Trutz Rendtorff. Pannenberg's 1962 book aims at a large audience and revolves around the notion of 'Weltoffenheit', that is, openness to the world. Two years later in his Christological proposal Pannenberg develops the notion of 'prolepsis' – meaning the way in which the eschatological resurrection is already present in history through the resurrection of Jesus Christ – and he applies the concept of revelation as history to the resurrection of Jesus (*Grundzüge der Christologie*, translated as *Jesus – God and Man*, 1968). In the 1960s and 70s, Pannenberg's anthropology was reflected in a number of articles on the method of theology. At the end of this period he published an anthropological monograph offering a theological interpretation of philosophical, psychological and social anthropology, *Anthropologie in theologischer Perspektive* (1983; English *Anthropology in Theological Perspective*, 1985). Here he states two key themes of his theological anthropology: 1) humanity as created after the image of God and (2) human sin, its root and effects. The work stresses the importance of the individual as well as the social development of the human being:

Human 'openness to the world' [Weltoffenheit] thus loses the character of a given state which it has in many remarks of Scheler and even of Gehlen; instead, it is seen as describing a direction in the process of human 'self-realization,'

a process through which alone a human being takes form as a self and which therefore may not, with Gehlen, be one-sidedly reduced to human action.³

For Pannenberg anthropology is the starting point for thinking about God in the public square. More than before, in this book he elaborates the doctrine of sin. He makes it clear that his intention is to make sin recognisable for every human being, though its full clarity is part of God's special revelation which is accessible only through faith in Jesus Christ:

If this relatedness of everything to the ego is, in the form of *amor sui*, the essential element in sin or the failure of human beings in regard to themselves, then sin is not simply or first of all something moral but is closely connected with the natural conditions of our existence.⁴

Pannenberg published his magnum opus *Systematische Theologie* volumes 1-3 in 1988-1993 and it was translated into English in 1991-1998. In the larger context of theological anthropology, Pannenberg's idea of the independence of creatures as God's goal for creation is important (vol. 2 chapter 7). From the beginning, Pannenberg's theology has a strong eschatological accent which grows out of his historical, diachronic thinking. For this reason Pannenberg is often understood under the heading 'theology of hope'. In addition to this, there are other strong features to his theology: the dialogue with the sciences, the underlying relation of revealed and empirical knowledge, the presence of pneumatology in every volume of his systematic theology and his ecumenical involvement. Pannenberg's thinking prompted several other controversial issues related to theological anthropology, which are not elaborated further in this article, such as the interdisciplinary method of interaction between theology and philosophy, psychology and sociology; the rejection of the notion of *iustitia originalis*; and the role of anthropology in theology as a whole.

3. Shults: Relational reciprocity

In his doctoral dissertation, written under the guidance of J.W. van Huyssteen at Princeton Theological Seminary and published in 1999, F. L. Shults studies a debate over the nature of rationality. Following his Doktorvater Van Huyssteen, Shults points to a postfoundationalist approach as a better solution than foundational-

ism (objectivity of reason) or nonfoundationalism (extreme relativism). Pannenberg serves as an example of a theologian who does not align himself with either of these approaches and yet develops a methodology and a position which are quite close to those of the postfoundationalists. In the foreword to Shults' 1999 book Pannenberg himself declares: 'I feel rather sympathetic with the position he [Shults] describes as postfoundationalist.'⁵ Shults then applies the postfoundationalist approach to the basic tasks of theology. He develops the argument which leads to a thesis of *reciprocity* between epistemology and hermeneutics. In subsequent years he expressed the same idea with the term *relationality*⁶ and applied it to other questions as well. In philosophy this relationality refers to the development of a relation as a category for defining the substance of an object (like quantity or shape). Shults' project of re-forming theological anthropology means 'to thematize the reciprocity between conceptions of relationality and doctrinal formulations'.⁷

Shults is asserting two things about Pannenberg.⁸ First, that the exocentric human nature is a constitutive relational concept (also called reciprocal) and secondly, he contends that this concept has a regulative function outside of theological anthropology, namely in Trinitarian theology. This article concentrates on the first assertion.

Before we go further in this direction, let us review all three constitutive reciprocal elements in Pannenberg's theological anthropology according to Shults' 1999 book: exocentric human nature (in relation to the image of God), personal identity (in relation to the concept of Spirit) and centrality (in relation to the sin).⁹

3.1 Relational reciprocity expressed by exocentricity

We need to begin with the term 'openness to the world'¹⁰ as Pannenberg does in *What is Man?* At the beginning of the book he explains the term 'openness to the world' as a prism through which he reads anthropological themes. Seven out of the book's ten chapters are organised around this notion, showing clearly how important this term is. The term *Weltoffenheit* originates from the philosophical anthropology in the German tradition, especially from Max Scheler (1874-1928). Pannenberg declares: 'Openness to the world must mean that man is completely directed into the "open".' He clarifies the idea in a summarising paragraph:

It can be misunderstood to mean that man is oriented toward the world, while it really involves the necessity that man enquire beyond everything that he comes across as his world. This peculiarity of human existence, man's infinite dependence, is understandable only as the question about God. Man's unlimited openness to the world results only from his destiny beyond the world.¹¹

Twenty-one years later in *Anthropology*, the notion of openness to the world stands again proudly in the centre of the *imago Dei* doctrine, as we see clearly in the quote above. Even so, the roots of this term go back beyond Scheler, to Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803). Pannenberg compares Scheler's notion of Weltoffenheit with the notion of exocentricity of the German philosopher and sociologist Helmuth Plessner (1892-1985) and he concludes that openness is the essential term:

[Plessner] intends to express the same content, however, and the new term [exocentricity] points only to a critical limitation of that content and represents an effort to define it more precisely.¹²

But as soon as Pannenberg moves to the doctrine of sin, preference is given to Plessner's exocentricity:

It is perhaps the most important merit of Plessner's description of the human form of life that it provides a way of interpreting the ambiguity of human behaviour, namely, in the light of the tension between centrality and exocentricity in the human being. Plessner himself has not fully developed the potentialities of his anthropological approach in this direction, because he has not thought out in a fully radical way the implications of the tension between centralized position – subjection to the here and now – and exocentricity in human beings.¹³

In this way Pannenberg shows the nature of the relationship between these two terms. Openness to the world embodies the doctrine of the *imago Dei*; exocentricity expresses something of the nature of sin. Pannenberg then – for the rest of the book – uses both terms almost interchangeably in their theological implications.¹⁴ The notion of exocentricity developed by Plessner is based on the biological knowledge of central organisation of animals. Humans share with other animals a central organisation of the body, yet we possess an

incomparable capacity of stepping out of this centrality, and Plessner calls this stepping out exocentricity. Humans can step outside of their situation and become their own object. Besides the capacity of exocentricity, Plessner also speaks about the tension between the self and the body which results from the dual structure of humans. This is the point where Pannenberg uses exocentricity to explain the universality of sin. He does so, let us note, without using the concept of hereditary sin. Rather, he says that sinfulness is connected to the elementary structure of human beings. Somehow our reality always leads to sinful behaviour. Exocentricity is thus both a capacity and an occasion for sin.

How are these terms used in the second volume of Pannenberg's *Systematic Theology* (1991)? Two things happen. First, nothing essential changes on the precise relation and content of these terms. Yet, secondly, they clearly do not replace traditional terminology and they are used less than might be anticipated on the basis of his earlier *Anthropology*.

As we come back to Shults there are two questions worth asking: 1) What is lost due to the fact that the notion of openness largely disappears from Shults' analysis? 2) What does Shults gain by employing the term exocentricity for grounding human nature in fellowship with God rather than employing the term together – with Pannenberg – as an explanation of human sinfulness?

As to the first question, *what is lost by the dropping of 'openness'* after establishing the concept of relational reciprocity? Shults tests Pannenberg in three areas, using two related terms in each of them.¹⁵ Spirit, Shults suggests, is the movement from above, with personal identity coming from below. *Imago Dei* relates to exocentricity. Sin relates with centrality. Exocentricity – with the implied concept of centrality – in large measure replaces the notion of openness. However, this does not represent the real content of Pannenberg's *Anthropology*. In 2003 Shults described Pannenberg's anthropology solely as 'exocentric relationality'. The tension between openness and exocentricity does not appear. Shults' approach, then, may be compared with that of E. A. Johnson, who writes: 'While the connection of exocentricity with the doctrine of the image of God is felicitous and productive of insight, Pannenberg's way of equating centrality and sin seems to me to be highly problematic.'¹⁶ Shults evaluates the terms quite differently without explaining why.

According to Pannenberg, openness well

describes the human situation in relation to the world – including God's revelation. Exocentricity, meanwhile, expresses well the problem of the human ego.¹⁷ These are central concerns which the notion of openness of humanity addresses: How can we, on the basis of the Christian message, explain the uniqueness of human beings in the universe? What are we to make of the fact that human sin does not prevent humans from receiving God's grace?¹⁸ The next crucial question deals with soteriology: What can we say about human nature so that God's supernatural grace will not be just another dimension of human subjectivity? These questions underline Pannenberg's use of the term openness.¹⁹ Shults, as we have observed, prefers exocentricity over openness but in this preference he loses important aspects of openness: Exocentricity lacks the human reaching-beyond-every-horizon to transcendental reality; it does not explain aspects of human culture which grow out of openness. Exocentricity describes the outer centre of the human subject, but it cannot include God if it is understood in the way Plessner intends. Exocentricity well describes inner conflicts, yet how is it possible, in soteriological terms, that these are not just dead ends?

3.2 Dropping exocentricity

Turning to the second question, I would like to ask Shults: What does he gain by employing the term exocentricity for grounding human nature in fellowship with God rather than using the term – with Pannenberg – as an explanation of human sinfulness?

Shults draws a major application from Pannenberg's thinking: the legitimacy of talking about God. He writes, 'For Pannenberg, "exocentricity" is a tensional relation grounded in our biological nature, and its effects point ultimately to the "religious thematic" of human life.'²⁰ Yet, this answers only one of the questions mentioned above. Shults prefers the term exocentricity. My conclusion is that exocentricity probably fits his concept of relational reciprocity better. In 2001, Shults reiterated this concept with fewer technical details and with wider application, saying:

My thesis is that understanding Pannenberg's interdisciplinary method requires a recognition of the dynamics of reciprocity and sublation that hold his anthropological works together in an asymmetric bipolar relational unity. Pannenberg does not start in a foundational

sense either with theology or science but rather holds the two together in a mutually conditioning relationship. I take this opportunity to outline these dynamics again and illustrate both Stewart's failure to see them and the interpretive stumbles that follow this failure.²¹

Relational reciprocity, let us be clear, involves two moves: 1) reciprocity from above and the move from below and 2) sublation (*Aufhebung* in German) of the fundamental task (move from below) by the systematic task.²²

Human nature consists of two centres – one centred and the other exocentric. Shults traces this dual structure of the human subject back to Friedrich Schleiermacher and argues persuasively for a constant and a variable element: 'the one expresses the existence of the subject for itself, the other its co-existence with an Other'.²³ The relationship between these two plays a regulative role in Schleiermacher's anthropology. Although Pannenberg interprets Schleiermacher differently, Shults sees a similar dual structure of the human subject in the term exocentricity.²⁴

4. Wong: Salvific interpretation

Since 2004 K. M. Wong has been publishing on Pannenberg and his writings. His monograph, *Wolfgang Pannenberg on Human Destiny* (2007), shows his long-term interest: theological anthropology. His thoughts revolve around the *imago Dei* doctrine and around hamartiology, adding a perspective of eschatology and ethics. The final picture is 'theological anthropology destiny-centred, history-focused' as is the title of the summarising chapter of his book. Unlike Shults, Wong understands openness as the central notion in Pannenberg. Pannenberg's interpretation of the *imago Dei*, Wong contends, is one of the theologian's unique contributions to the current theological discourse:

This allows him to place the image of God in relation not only to creation, but also to salvation and eschatology. Indeed, this specific idea of the image of God is probably the most distinct theological claim in Pannenberg's anthropology, and forms the starting point upon which the rest of his anthropology is constructed.²⁵

4.1 Pannenberg and Herder on humanity

Here is the question: When and how is the image of God realised in humanity and to what does it

refer? Wong reads Pannenberg with special reference to Herder and his *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (1784-1791),²⁶ noting that Pannenberg follows Herder in seeing the *imago Dei* as the direction of humanity. Herder elaborates this idea from the point of anthropology, philosophical anthropology and ethnology; Pannenberg does it from the point of philosophy, psychology and sociology (1983). To quote Wong,

Indeed, both Herder and Pannenberg are at pains to insist that a disposition for the image of God exists in the initial human natural state, and that the image must not be regarded as existing only in a realm beyond the natural human existence, while at the same time they emphasise repeatedly the dependence of the disposition, destiny and its fulfilment on God himself.²⁷

Wong continues to summarise similarities and differences between Herder and Pannenberg, saying they share a synthetic approach to the knowledge of humanity from different sources (anthropology, ethnology etc.). For both of them, this knowledge is provisional and subject to revision based on subsequent experience, and for both God is the all-determining reality. Herder, however, makes a sharper distinction between dogmatics and religion; under the influence of Aristotle he 'views the final human purpose as happiness (Glückseligkeit or eudaimonia)'.²⁸ The greatest distinction between Herder and Pannenberg, though, pertains to the question of how humanity develops and what the processes are behind human becoming. Herder gives four answers to this question: tradition, learning, reason and experience. These four together carve out of stone the image which is already present within that stone. Pannenberg's answer, Wong asserts, is Christological:

The destiny is not in a human being already; rather, it can be found only beyond him in God and in the new Adam, the man who is united with God. To put it more elegantly, the image of God as the destiny of humanity is completed by, and proleptically present in, Jesus Christ. This is the most central and distinct theological claim of Pannenberg's concept of human destiny, and forms the basis for his theological anthropology.²⁹

In *Offenbarung als Geschichte* (1962) Pannenberg works with the concept of anticipation. Since *Jesus – God and Man* (1964) he uses the term 'prolepsis', meaning that in the Christ

event the end of the world is revealed and present in the centre of the world's history. And so resurrection is the real goal and end of humanity. Jesus' claims anticipate their confirmation in the future. Pannenberg writes, 'The anticipation of the future verdict ... is the proleptic structure of Jesus' claim.'³⁰ Since the resurrection of one person, Jesus, concerns all humanity, it reveals the common and communal destiny of all humans. Wong says about Pannenberg: 'The human destiny to be in fellowship with God cannot be realised apart from the community of human beings among themselves' and at the same time: 'God's power is at work in the encounter between human beings.'³¹

Only the occurrence of what is ultimate, no longer superseded, is capable of qualifying the whole of the temporal course of time, beyond the moment of its own occurrence, that it can be strictly conceived as true in eternity and therefore as united with God's eternity.³²

4.2 The openness of humanity

Wong starts his exposition of the notion of the openness of humanity with the same application as Shults: 'We shall see the irreducible dimension of human religiosity, which underlies all structures of human culture.'³³ There are, however, important implications of human openness. Humans are not limited to their environment. We have the task of 'constituting ourselves', Wong says, in that we are capable of experiencing ourselves in terms of the world and also in contrast to the world. Openness signifies infinite dependence. It is debated whether this dependence can offer an anthropological proof of God's existence. Pannenberg refused to say this, yet his commentators work with it, Wong being one of them: 'Openness to God becomes, for Pannenberg, the bridge out of the poverty of the natural beginning point of humanity into the full realisation of human destiny.'³⁴

The great importance of trust is the last implication mentioned by Wong. He takes it further than Pannenberg, connecting openness with salvation and covenant:

In short, through human openness, the eternity of what is represented becomes present in time, or the visibly material becomes a sign of the invisibly spiritual. For human beings are orientated to the presence of future eschatological salvation in Jesus Christ that is bound up with the institution of a sacrament. In the

sacrament of the new covenant, and above all in the Eucharistic bread and wine, all believers in their openness are taken up into the sacramental action of praising and honouring God.³⁵

In a chapter on the openness of humanity Wong spends a considerable amount of space on the terms openness and exocentricity. Both terms, he contends, though differing in philosophical background, refer to 'beyondness' for the human subject. Openness is a header for both of them. This reflects Pannenberg's writings more precisely than the words of Shults.

4.3 Sin as passivity to destiny

Wong is clearly interested in the ethical dimensions of Pannenberg's anthropology. Among other things, openness to the world answers the question about the character of salvation. The direct connection of openness with covenant and covenantal sacraments is a creative thought of Wong, but it will need further elaboration to be convincing. Even so, he writes:

As such, we believe that the image of God, which constitutes the worth of individual human life and finds its expression in fellowship with God, is the true ground of ethics.³⁶

The major ethical question now becomes the question of sin. As stated above, Pannenberg uses the notion of openness mainly in the area of the *imago Dei* doctrine, whereas when dealing with sin he prefers the term exocentricity. Pannenberg here follows the Reformed teaching on the sinfulness of humanity. As always, sin is a major problem. Pannenberg's chapters on sin in *Anthropology* and *Systematic Theology* deal primarily with the question of the root of sin. He follows Augustine, contending that the sinful 'nature' of humans lies in their natural conditions which are broken by disobedience and mistrust of God.

Wong builds on Pannenberg's understanding as he brings openness to the core of hamartiology, writing: 'We argue, therefore, that for Pannenberg, sin is essentially passivity to destiny or weakness to destiny.'³⁷ The tension between self-centredness and openness (or exocentricity), Pannenberg believes, becomes the opportunity for sin, since humans are unable to preserve unity in the tension. Centredness means independence, while openness requires trust in God. Sin, then, is either selfishness or mistrust. According to Wong, sin lies in passivity to the destiny that is expressed proleptically in Jesus Christ: fellowship with God.

Sin goes against humanity in Jesus. It means that the self turns away from being open through the world to God, thus turning away from the true basis of the self, which is found in God alone. This vivid exposition of sin involves the concept of freedom to turn away from God and against the self. Sin as passivity to destiny is clearly anti-thesis, not having any thesis of its own. Wong's conception of sin as passivity to destiny, he believes, 'is sufficiently general and conceptual to be an all-inclusive expression of sin, and yet it is concrete enough to be explicitly about the goal of human existence'.³⁸

4.4 Soteriological interpretation

Wong does not draw any general typology of interpretations of the *imago Dei* but he does label Wolfhart Pannenberg's interpretation of *imago Dei* in comparison with J.G. Herder's:

Pannenberg attempts to ground Herder's anthropology on a Christological foundation in order to present a salvific, rather than a providential, account of the renewal of the *imago Dei*, though Pannenberg himself has not explicitly said so.³⁹

Herder's approach is called 'providential' by Wong, who introduces Herder in his book under the question of how the image of God is to be realised. In his *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* Herder speaks about mankind's development in history. Humans exhibit, he says, a unique position in nature in that, while other animals excel in 'this' or 'that', humans excel all other animals by the combination and subordination of instincts under the capacities of art, speech and freedom of act. Humanity has the gift of speech and cultural institutions which grow out of tradition, the crown of traditions being the art of writing. Book four of Herder's *Outlines* is about the structure of humanity and culminates in the thesis that humanity is formed 1) for humanism and religion, and 2) for the hope of immortality. Religion, he claims, is the aim of humanity's natural state. As such, Jesus of Nazareth does not play any essential role in Herder's anthropology. God's role is in the creation of humans, thus setting the direction which we can recognise in human natural conditions.

By contrast, Pannenberg is profoundly 'Christian' in his anthropology. He agrees with Herder that God's design in creation is humanity's disposition, but this disposition is fully expressed

in the person of Jesus, to be realised in the lives of women and men only in connection with Jesus himself. Wong puts it this way:

Thus, we believe that the Christological foundation of Pannenberg's concept of human destiny is at its core soteriological and eschatological, for it speaks of the eschatological destiny of humanity embodied by Jesus, the eschatological salvation that springs from the appearance of Jesus and the eschatological lordship of God proclaimed by Jesus.⁴⁰

5. Typology of interpretations of the *imago Dei*

Wong distinguishes two types of answers to the 'how' question when the *imago Dei* is understood as the design or the destiny of human person and of mankind. Shults uses two typologies: classic distinctions between rationality and righteousness, and between image and likeness.⁴¹ Shults also employs three contemporary interpretive types: functional, existential / relational and eschatological.⁴² The eschatological interpretation points to fulfilment or growth in the *imago Dei* concept. This interpretation has a tradition dating back to Irenaeus in the second century AD and to Herder during the Enlightenment; recent representatives of this approach are Wolfhart Pannenberg and Jürgen Moltmann. Pannenberg himself, however, uses no typology; he mentions the functional interpretation but he chooses to interpret the *imago Dei* as *Bestimmung* (destiny).

In the following paragraphs North American and European thinking merge. As a Slav I understand the importance of typologies or classifications – as much as they are simplistic and misleading – as an occasion to ask good questions. After all, they serve as a powerful clarification on the way of leaving all classifications behind.

5.1 Erickson

It will be helpful to put all three authors into the larger context of classifications of the interpretations of the *imago Dei* in systematic theology. One such classification is offered by Millard J. Erickson⁴³ who distinguishes three such interpretations:

- 1 a substantive view: the image of God is seen in some specific human capacity or ability such as rationality or freedom;
- 2 relational views, of which Emil Brunner and

Karl Barth provide examples. Their views differ somewhat but both essentially emphasise relationality;

- 3 a functional view: the image of God is not situated in a capacity but in one specific function of humanity, namely that they rule over the creation.⁴⁴

Erickson strongly argues against the substantive view because people differ sharply in the amount and development of their capacities, such as rationality and freedom. Shults helps us to see the difference between rationality and righteousness as the capacity which represents the image of God. Both of these interpretations are based on the understanding that humans need to be saved from sin and death by the mercy of God through the salvation in Jesus Christ. It was understood that the gift of human rationality is part of what it means to be created in the image of God. It is difficult to believe, though, that salvation somehow radically enhances this human capacity. It is also possible to see the image of God present in humanity in the form of moral qualities such as righteousness. Yet even then it is not always obvious that an unsaved person is morally less developed.

Thus we are able to differentiate two versions of Erickson's substantive view:

- 1 a substance in humanity which belongs fully to the fallen human as we know him today – like rationality or freedom. In this perspective the capacity of sinful humanity has a godly origin; let us call it the 'earthly substance view'.
- 2 a substance in the sanctified person – like holiness or righteousness. Thus God's character is expected from sinful man; this is the 'heavenly substance view'.

The earthly substance is usually identified with that which distinguishes humans from higher animals. The godly substance is usually that which lies at the heart of salvation according to this or that theological tradition.

The functional view mentioned by Pannenberg and used in the typology of Shults is different because it identifies the *imago Dei* with a verb, not a noun. Rationality or holiness is a noun, a static feature of a person. Ruling over creation is an action. Verbs are often overlooked in theology, though not as much in recent generations. Yet if 'substance' includes nouns as well as verbs then even the functional interpretation is included in the substantive view as an 'earthly substance'.

5.2 Grenz

Stanley J. Grenz (1950-2005) was a younger contemporary of Pannenberg (born 1928), actually one of his students and later a commentator on his work. Grenz presents a variation on Erickson's typology in which he replaces the third view with a 'dynamic' view. The dynamic view emphasises *becoming* in the image of God by the power of the Spirit and of the Word.⁴⁵ Grenz quotes Martin Luther's commentary on Genesis 9:6 and summarises the history of this interpretation with the help of Pannenberg's term *openness*:

Working from the idea of 'openness to the world,' his [i.e. Herder's] followers have posited a link between the biblical concept of the image of God and the future human destiny. This link introduces a dynamic dimension into the concept of the divine image. The image of God is a reality toward which we are moving. It is what we are enroute to becoming.⁴⁶

The approach of Grenz reminds us of Wong's salvific interpretation and also of the classic distinction between image and likeness. This distinction was mentioned by Shults under the perspective of the classical history of salvation between *imago* and *similitudo*, between the lost aspect of the image and that which is present even in a fallen world. The main point is the difference which God's salvation makes to human destiny. How is salvation part of creation in God's image? Here Erickson's classification does not help us enough. In a broader sense we can see this perennial question in most of the philosophical interpretations of the human being, that is, the human being is on the way to becoming human. Development, this life-long path from one point to another, from disposition to realisation, is what is intrinsic to being truly human. And so, whoever stops, whoever resigns from the struggle to become fully human, has lost the battle already. In the history of humankind there is a corporate dimension to this struggle of becoming.

5.3 Brunner

We cannot overlook Emil Brunner's interpretation of the *imago Dei*. When Brunner attempted to clarify disagreements between himself and Karl Barth over the relationship of grace and nature, Barth strongly refused this with his response 'No!' (1934). Then Brunner, after the publication of *Mensch im Widerspruch* (1937) and *Wahrheit als Begegnung* (1938), summarised his understanding

in volume 2 of his *Dogmatics*. He distinguishes two sides of the *imago Dei*, two aspects, two lines of interpretation. According to him these two belong together, they are not alternatives. They are the formal (structural) and the material aspect of the *imago Dei*. Humanity was created in relation to God, we are capable of answering to God, which means that we are responsible. But it is not clear what kind of answer a human will give. This freedom Brunner calls the formal aspect. The material aspect is the responsible existence of Jesus, who is the 'being-in-the-Word' of God.⁴⁷ Along these two lines he also arranges the historical interpretations of the *imago Dei*.⁴⁸ The distinction between image and likeness in patristic and scholastic theology refers to the distinction between the formal and the material aspect of the *imago Dei*. Luther was, according to Brunner, the first theologian who recognised both aspects and, at the same time, understood the Hebrew parallelism in Genesis 1:26 as one entity; Luther uses the words *imago publica et privata*. The Reformers, then, rightly protested against any separation of these two aspects; they refused the view of their contemporaries that image means a natural endowment of reason and that likeness means supernatural holiness. Yet, Brunner continues, the Reformers offered an equally unsatisfactory 'relic' interpretation. He then summarises his own position thus:

First of all, that the formal structural *Imago* does not consist in the possession of reason, or a 'rational nature' existing in its own right (as it were), but in man's relation to God as responsibility (a relation which cannot be lost), as responsible personal being; secondly, that the existence of a merely formal responsibility, without its material fulfilment through the love of God, is the result of the Fall and of Sin.⁴⁹

As I see it, Brunner's strength is in his faithful presentation of scriptural testimony and in holding two different points of view together rather than just one.

Pannenberg chooses not to enter into a dialogue with Brunner on this issue. He mentions interpretations of others but comments only on those who influenced him. How does his distinction between disposition and destiny relate to Brunner's formal and material aspects of the *imago Dei*? *Imago* as *Bestimmung*, i.e. destiny for fellowship with God probably falls under the material aspect while *imago* as openness or exocentricity falls under the formal aspect.

So the typology of interpretations of the *imago Dei* with regard to Pannenberg has brought the following insights:

- 1 Pannenberg does not build on any substantial interpretation of the *imago Dei*. His line of argument points toward the future, exploring God's design and goal.
- 2 Pannenberg argues that natural conditions of the human being, such as openness and exocentricity, point toward theological or revealed future destiny. Thus notions of openness and exocentricity only resemble the substantial interpretation.
- 3 Wong strongly argues for a Christological reading of Pannenberg, so that the *imago Dei* cannot be interpreted as describing any natural conditions of all humanity; Shults on the other hand emphasises the temporal aspect. Pannenberg's interpretation is eschatological: the fullness of creation in God's image is still ahead and must be understood as such.
- 4 Comparing Pannenberg with Brunner, we can almost say that Pannenberg also has two aspects rather than just one: There is a disposition, a natural condition of humanity as we know it in the present – and there is also a destiny, goal and fullness which is indispensably connected with the person of Jesus Christ and which will be fulfilled at the end of time.
- 5 The *Imago Dei* is primarily and essentially the connection between humanity and God. There is no God the creator without 'his humans' and there is no human person without 'our God'. This connection with God does not have the form of a noun, it is not a human attribute. Humans do not 'have it'. As Brunner observed, 'And this is the most important point to grasp. Responsibility is a relation; it is not a substance.'⁵⁰ The *humanum* flows from the way God relates to humanity, his covenant partner. Simply put, God and humans belong together because God has chosen so. As Brunner insists, human beings cannot be thought of as separate from God.

6. Application to human rights

By way of application, let us evaluate the content of this article from the point of view of human rights. Parenthetically it can be said that the next paragraphs are quite brief and assume some acquaintance on the reader's part with human rights issues.

The human rights movement reached decisive world-wide influence in 1948 with the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*.⁵¹ In a broad sense we can say that in modern times human rights primarily have the function of protecting individuals and groups against violence by the powerful (states and international corporations). Thus human rights set publicly enforceable standards.⁵² There is a close connection between human rights and the Christian faith.⁵³ An important question for Christians today in relation to human rights is whether in a pluralistic world we can present and interpret human rights as universally valid and binding. Are human rights reasonable and righteous in religious and cultural contexts other than Christianity? How obvious is the truth of the Gospel without the Christian faith? Regarding the relationship of human rights and natural law, I follow the thinking of Thomas K. Johnson rather than that of Božena Komárková as outlined by Pavel Hošek.⁵⁴ Johnson argues for the use of a certain kind of natural law which contains important aspects of God's general revelation in setting ethical standards in law. Pannenberg's understanding of general revelation and of the role of reason and experience in theology and ethics is essentially in line with the approach of Johnson.⁵⁵

6.1 Interpersonal dimension

In order to apply the *imago Dei* doctrine in the area of human rights we need to interpret the relationship between an individual and a group/society in a way that is ethically applicable. Human rights must be enforceable as they deal with relationships between individuals, between individuals and groups, and between groups.

Generally speaking, the *imago Dei* doctrine is primarily about the individual before God. Rationality and righteousness are understood as attributes of an individual which have (only) outward expression in social relationships. The functional view of the *imago Dei* is different since it is corporate and deals with authority. Karl Barth understands the relational view as to do with the relationship between a man and a woman, between husband and wife; yet these male-female aspects are left behind by Barth, as he emphasises the individual in relationship with God.⁵⁶ As much as Brunner was inspired by the I-Thou existential philosophy of Martin Buber,⁵⁷ for him too the critical relationship is between the individual and God.

On the other hand Pannenberg, with empha-

sis on the future destiny which is proleptically present in world history in the resurrection of Christ, has a definite social dimension to his thought and he makes some important intentional steps toward the social dimension of the *imago Dei*.⁵⁸ However, these social dimensions remain largely undeveloped by Shults and Wong. It is Pannenberg's emphasis on ego development that involves other human beings as necessary partners for the individual. Openness to the world includes others. Positively, others are part of the 'world'. Negatively, others are a target of our misdirected trust. Openness requires space to enter; it contains the possibility of reaching beyond the horizon. To the extent that openness is understood as the key term for Pannenberg's theological anthropology (Wong), there is an unusually strong emphasis on interpersonal relationships. Openness in the process of understanding – that is, epistemology – corresponds with freedom of movement, of thought, conscience and religion, of opinion and expression. Openness in the process of becoming – that is, ontology – corresponds with the right to live, with freedom of movement, of thought, conscience and religion. Exocentricity describes subjects without special attention to others, i.e. to those around them. To the extent that exocentricity is understood as the key term for Pannenberg's theological anthropology (Shults), it becomes more deficient in the area of interpersonal relationships.

6.2 *Imago Dei*

Human rights do not grow out of scientific or philosophical study of humans in comparison with animals. They are not the result of principles for distinguishing which rights belongs to humans and which rights people share with animals or living nature in general. Nor do human rights reflect inner structures of the human person, for example Shults' concept of regulative relationality which opens up the dynamism of the human person.

Among the interpretations of the *imago Dei*, human rights tend toward the substantial approach. Pannenberg understands that being created in the image of God means that we are destined for the fellowship with God as it is accomplished and embodied in Jesus Christ. The most essential aspect of being created after God's image is the inalienable connection between humans and God. God is the main partner in this relationship. The condition of the human heart, its readiness for this

communion, is never certain. The words openness and exocentricity describe in non-religious language what Christianity understands about this condition.

6.3 Crime against the *imago Dei*

To state what is theologically and ethically inalienable to human beings is at the same time to point towards the remedy of the human problem. In a chapter called 'Why do we need to be protected from each other?' T.K. Johnson says emphatically: 'The entire human rights movement is a gigantic protest against human nature as it is.'⁵⁹

Pannenberg's notion of exocentricity describes well the inner conflict in human subjects. That is what human rights protect us from. Sin has a form of centrality according to Shults, who also shows how centrality (in relation to sin) corresponds with exocentricity (in relation to image of God). Wong defines sin as passivity towards our destiny which is a relationship with God.

What then constitutes a crime against humanity, a crime against the *imago Dei*? To what extent is the doctrine of sin defined by the doctrine of the *imago Dei*? Pannenberg uses the term exocentricity for expressing the fact that the natural human condition inevitably leads to sin. Yet Pannenberg does not mirror the *imago Dei* and sin. Exocentricity expresses the structural tension in the human ego. Wong searches for a way to interpret sin Christologically, arguing that the core of sin is defined by passivity to human destiny. The advantage of this approach is that it connects hamartiology with the doctrine of the *imago Dei* in a similar way as a crime against humanity is a crime against human dignity. The disadvantage is that it, again, puts more emphasis on individuals before God rather than on the interpersonal, relational constitution of our humanity. This individualistic bias means that sin is primarily an offence against God and against one's potentiality; with this focus on the individual, the social aspect of sin is often only implicitly present.

7. Conclusion

Shults and Wong both appreciate the thinking and theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg. They try to understand him, build on him and progress in the direction in which he has pointed. Shults finds Pannenberg valuable for his own programme of reforming theology after the turn to relationality. Wong applies Pannenberg's exposition of

the *imago Dei* to the area of hamartiology and ethics. Shults compares Pannenberg primarily with Schleiermacher and Barth; Wong compares him with Herder. Shults prefers the notion of exocentricity as central to Pannenberg's theological anthropology; Wong prefers the notion of openness. The evidence of Pannenberg's own writings is that openness plays a greater role than Shults admits. Wong characterises Pannenberg's theological anthropology by the answer to how the image of God is realised in the human person: it is in Christ and by Christ's work for the salvation of humanity. Pannenberg himself interprets the *imago Dei* as disposition and as destiny. The disposition is in the openness and exocentricity of the human subject in the present situation as we know it under the influence of sin; the destiny is in the fullness of humanity in Christ and in the resurrection. Our application of their ideas to human rights pointed out the importance of the interpersonal dimensions both of the *imago Dei* and of sin. We also noticed differences in their interpretations of the type of *imago Dei*, and thirdly we saw the unique approach of Wong who connects the *imago Dei* doctrine with hamartiology.

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Endnotes

- 1 K.M. Wong, *Wolfhart Pannenberg on Human Destiny* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007) 159.
- 2 Regarding the New Testament situation I follow Emil Brunner who adds to this first group of texts also Acts 17:28. This meaning he calls the 'formal structural idea of the *imago*', while the other group of texts he calls the 'material concept'. E. Brunner, *The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, Dogmatics vol. II* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980) 76.
- 3 W. Pannenberg, *Anthropology in Theological Perspective* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1985) 42.
- 4 Pannenberg, *Anthropology*, 107.
- 5 W. Pannenberg, 'Foreword' in F.L. Shults, *The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology: Wolfhart Pannenberg and the new theological rationality* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999) ix.
- 6 It is interesting to see how Shults, *Postfoundationalist Task*, actually starts with the word 'relational' and comes back to it after using a few other terms. He introduces the question on page 28: 'In order to

draw these similarities into sharper relief, my strategy is to define a "postfoundationalist" as one who would assert a particular kind of relationality as obtaining between four conceptual pairs: experience and belief, truth and knowledge, individual and community, explanation and understanding.' In the conclusion of this early chapter he says: 'Because the term "fusion" [van Huyssteen's term] might imply a conflation or a melding of the two ... I prefer the term "link" for the relation of epistemology and hermeneutics, although this might be too weak. ... I will thematize this relational unity and attempt a more thorough presentation of this "linking".' (79) He builds this argumentation to reach the term 'reciprocity' in a major chapter which analyses the theology of Pannenberg: 'Several characteristics of the "reciprocity" in Pannenberg's methodology will emerge that are not captured by the simple concept of sublation [Aufhebung]. These include *asymmetry* (material primacy of the "from above" movement), *bipolarity* (two clearly differentiated tasks), and a real relational *unity* (a single process with two moments).' (166) In later years he comes back to 'relationality' as a broad general term which he uses from the very beginning to explain the other terms.

- 7 Shults, *Reforming Theological Anthropology: After the philosophical turn to relationality* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003) 35.
- 8 This is the content of chapter 6 in the part which deals with Pannenberg; see *Reforming Theological Anthropology*, 117ff, esp. 132.
- 9 Shults, *Postfoundationalist Task*, 210-235.
- 10 After World War I there is just one other theologian who uses the term 'openness' (Offenheit) in an anthropological sense in a comparable extent, viz. Karl Rahner (1904-1984). The philosophical background for Rahner's notion of openness is the existential philosophy of Martin Heidegger with transcendental analysis as the main method.
- 11 W. Pannenberg, *What is Man?: Contemporary anthropology in theological perspective* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970) 8 and 12.
- 12 Pannenberg, *Anthropology*, 35.
- 13 Pannenberg, *Anthropology*, 80. See the critique of Pannenberg's interpretation of Plessner in T. Pröpper, *Theologische Anthropologie* (Freiburg: Herder, 2011) 425.
- 14 An example: 'If the peculiarity of human beings among the higher animals is correctly captured in the concept of exocentricity or is correctly described as an objectivity that is open to the world and help human beings achieve distance from themselves and therefore self-consciousness or reflection on themselves, then such a description calls for a clarification of human identity in terms of the twofold reference of human self-consciousness that corresponds to

- the tension between centrality and exocentricity.' Pannenberg, *Anthropology*, 105.
- 15 Shults, *Postfoundationalist Task*, 210.
 - 16 E.A. Johnson, 'The legitimacy of the God question', *Irish Theological Quarterly* 52.4 (1986) 301.
 - 17 Pannenberg, *Anthropology*, 80, quoted above.
 - 18 This underlying question Pannenberg shares with Karl Rahner (cf. note 10 above). Both of them say that God's grace and salvation is not altogether alien or external to the human subject. Pannenberg argues on the basis of Romans 1:22-30 that God's intention with creation is not external, yet is not fully realised in it either (*Systematic Theology* 261). Rahner criticises the so-called 'extrinsicism' of grace and explains his understanding using the term openness in 'Concerning the relation between nature and grace' in his *Theological Investigations* Vol. I (1961) 309-310; see also *Grundkurs des Glaubens* (Freiburg: Herder, 1976) part four, namely 129-130.
 - 19 As was mentioned above, the term is not used extensively in *Systematic Theology*, so here I refer mainly to *What is Man?* as the introductory book and to *Anthropology* as the most thorough interpretation of the openness of humanity. The three questions mentioned are taken from my unpublished doctoral research on human openness in the thinking of Rahner and Pannenberg.
 - 20 Shults, *Reforming Theological Anthropology*, 132.
 - 21 F.L. Shults, 'Theology, science, and relationality: Interdisciplinary reciprocity in the work of Wolfhart Pannenberg', *Zygon* 36.4 (2001) 812-813.
 - 22 Shults, 'Theology, science, and relationality', 814-818.
 - 23 Quoted from F. Schleiermacher, *Der christliche Glaube* [The Christian Faith], §3-5, cited by Shults, *Reforming Theological Anthropology*, 100.
 - 24 Shults examines three critiques of Schleiermacher by Pannenberg which can be solved by the regulative relationship of the two elements of the human subject, *Reforming Theological Anthropology*, 105-108.
 - 25 Wong, *Pannenberg on Human Destiny*, 160.
 - 26 *Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man* (1800).
 - 27 Wong, *Pannenberg on Human Destiny*, 27.
 - 28 Wong, *Pannenberg on Human Destiny*, 38.
 - 29 Wong, *Pannenberg on Human Destiny*, 40.
 - 30 W. Pannenberg, *Jesus – God and Man* (London: SCM, 1968) 60.
 - 31 Both quotes: Wong, *Pannenberg on Human Destiny*, 34.
 - 32 Wong, *Pannenberg on Human Destiny*, 52.
 - 33 Wong, *Pannenberg on Human Destiny*, 60.
 - 34 Wong, *Pannenberg on Human Destiny*, 61.
 - 35 Wong, *Pannenberg on Human Destiny*, 75.
 - 36 Wong, *Pannenberg on Human Destiny*, 155.
 - 37 Wong, *Pannenberg on Human Destiny*, 111.
 - 38 Wong, *Pannenberg on Human Destiny*, 115-116.
 - 39 Wong, *Pannenberg on Human Destiny*, 39.
 - 40 Wong, *Pannenberg on Human Destiny*, 50.
 - 41 Shults, *Reforming Theological Anthropology*, 220-230.
 - 42 Shults, *Reforming Theological Anthropology*, 230-242.
 - 43 There is also a less conceptual classification in G.R. Lewis and B.A. Demarest, *Integrative Theology* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1987) II, 123-134. They recognise six historical approaches: the early church view which emphasizes rationality, the traditional Roman Catholic view (Irenaeus, Lombard, Aquinas), the Lutheran postulate of righteousness and holiness, the functional view of Pelagians, Socinians and others, the relational view of neo-orthodox and theistic existentialists, and the view of Augustine and some Reformed and evangelical authorities.
 - 44 M.J. Erickson, *Christian Theology* (ninth edition; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1992) 498-512.
 - 45 S.J. Grenz, *Theology for the Community of God* (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1994) 223-224.
 - 46 Grenz, *Theology for the Community of God*, 224. A few years later he pushed this interpretation even further. He talks about movement 'from structure to destiny', it is *imago Dei* 'as a goal'. He starts with Irenaeus who perceives the creation of humankind as starting with a child which then grows to maturity. S.J. Grenz, *The Social God and the Relational Self: A trinitarian theology of the imago Dei* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001) 162.
 - 47 E. Brunner, *Dogmatics* Vol. II (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1952) 55-61.
 - 48 The following lines are based on Brunner, *Dogmatics* II, 75-78.
 - 49 Brunner, *Dogmatics* II, 77-78.
 - 50 Brunner, *Dogmatics* II, 59.
 - 51 See the text at www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.
 - 52 J. Filip, *Ústavní právo* Vol. I (Constitutional law) (Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 1993) 106-107.
 - 53 P. Hošek, 'Christian claims for universal human rights in relation to natural law. Two perspectives', *International Journal for Religious Freedom* 5.2 (2012) 147-148. Hošek refers further to William H. Brackney, *Human Rights and the World's Major Religions* (Westport: Praeger, 2005).
 - 54 Hošek, 'Christian claims', 147-160.
 - 55 Pannenberg seldom touches explicitly on human rights; in *Systematic Theology* there is only one short comment, vol. 2, 177.
 - 56 Karl Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik* [Church Dogmatics] III/2 §45. Compare the introductory summary and the content of the chapters themselves.
 - 57 Martin Buber, *Ich und Du* [1922] (Stuttgart:

Reclam, 2008); English *I and Thou* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937; reprint London: Continuum, 2004).
58 Here I refer to Pannenberg, *Anthropology*, Part 2:

The human person as a social being.
59 T.K. Johnson, *Human Rights. A Christian Primer* (The WEA Global Issues Series; Bonn: Verlag für Kultur und Wissenschaft) 43.

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