EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY
JOURNAL EUROPÉEN DE THÉOLOGIE
EUROPÄISCHE THEOLOGISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT

XXIV (2015) : 1
ISSN 0960-2720

Editorial Policy

The Editorial Board and Publishers, while commending the content of the journal to our readers, take no responsibility for particular opinions expressed in any part to the journal.

Politique de rédaction

Tout en recommandant le contenu de la revue à ses lecteurs, le comité de rédaction et les éditeurs laissent aux auteurs la responsabilité des opinions exprimées dans les articles qui y sont publiés.

Anmerkung des Herausgebers

Trotz grundsätzlicher Empfehlung übernehmen Redaktion und Verlag keine Verantwortung für individuell vertretene Meinungen innerhalb der Zeitschrift.

Typeset by Toucan Graphic Design,
25 Southernhay East, Exeter, Devon.
Printed and bound in Great Britain for
Paternoster Periodicals,
by Alpha Graphics 8-9 Vanguard Court
Preston Farm, Stockton-on-Tees TS18 3TR

ISSN 0960-2720

European journal...

Contents/Table des matières/Inhalt

Articles/Articles/Artikel

* * * * * * * * *

Book Reviews/Recensions/Buchbesprechungen 85

Availability and Subscription Rates / Diffusion et abonnements / Erscheinungsweise und Abonnement

The *European Journal of Theology* is published by Paternoster Periodicals twice annually.

Le *Journal Européen de Théologie* est publié par Paternoster Periodicals deux fois par an.

Die *ETZ* erscheint zweimal jährlich bei Paternoster Periodicals.

Period	Institutions UK	Institutions USA and Canada	Institutions Elsewhere	Individuals UK	Individuals USA and Canada	Individuals Elsewhere
One Year						
hard copy	£60.00	$108.00	£65.00	£32.00	$58.00	£34.00
electronic version	£60.00	$108.00	£65.00	£32.00	$58.00	£34.00
joint subscription	£73.00	$129.00	£78.00	£38.00	$69.00	£41.00
Two/Three Years, per year						
hard copy	£55.00	$97.00	£59.00	£29.00	$52.00	£31.00
electronic version	£55.00	$97.00	£59.00	£29.00	$52.00	£31.00
joint subscription	£65.00	$116.00	£70.00	£34.00	$62.00	£37.00

Deutschland
Brunnen Verlag GmbH, Gottlieb-Daimler-Str. 22,
D-35398 Giessen, Germany
Jahresbezugspreis: 29.90 Euros
Für Studenten: 19.50 Euros

All subscriptions to:
Paternoster Periodicals, c/o AlphaGraphics, 3.2 Clarendon Park,
Nottingham, NG5 1AH, UK
Tel UK: 0800 597 5980 • Fax 0115 704 3327
Tel: Overseas +44 (0)115 704 3315 • Fax: +44 (0)115 704 3327
Email: periodicals@alphagraphics.co.uk

Subscriptions can be ordered online at:
www.paternosterperiodicals.co.uk/european-journal-of-theology
All orders placed via our websites will receive a 5% discount off the total price. Rates displayed on the website will reflect this discount.

Important note to all postal subscribers
When contacting our Subscription Office in Nottingham for any reason, always quote your Subscription Reference Number. This appears on the address label used to send your copies to you.

From the editor

1. Readers are advised that the website has been renewed; see www.paternosterperiodicals.co.uk/european-journal-of-theology. The website contains a featured author and a blog.
2. Readers are also advised that *EJT* is available electronically as well as in printed format; see above for details.
3. In the next issue we hope to publish papers of the 2014 conference of the Fellowship of European Evangelical Theologians (FEET) on Christian Ethics in Contemporary Europe.
4. God willing, the next FEET conference will be held in Lutherstadt Wittenberg and/or Berlin on the theme of the contemporary relevance of the Reformation. The provisional dates are 26-30 August 2016.

Editorial: Some Thoughts on the Recurring Crises in the Contemporary World

Pierre Berthoud

Christoph Stenschke's thought-provoking editorial on World War One in the previous issue of this Journal brought to my mind further questions with regards to the contemporary scene. In the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries we have witnessed major economic crises, two world wars and the rise and fall of two murderous ideologies, not to mention genocides as well as extensive persecution of Christians.

Analysts have offered different explanations to account for such dramatic events: conflicts and crises related to the monotheistic religions, to the clash of civilizations, to racial and socio-economic ideologies, to inadequate educational and political systems… No doubt one can find some truth to each one of these analyses, but they seem to come short of the central issues at hand.

In fact, the contemporary crises are primarily linked to the fundamental questions of our existence, both individual and community-wise. Two contemporary authors have expressed this fact in a recent interview related to the financial crisis: 'Every great financial crisis is in a certain way, a cultural, religious crisis, a crisis of civilization, of faith. With this present crisis, it is a whole set of values which has collapsed.' This is what 'happens when money has become an end in itself, instead of it being a means.' Excess (*hubris* for the Greeks) is at the core of this crisis. One can see it in the disorders pertaining to nature (the climate change and biodiversity crises), in the development of social injustices and in the division between virtual and real economy.[1]

Albert Camus, the famous French novelist, expressed similar thoughts when he said:

> We human beings have been thrust into existence with neither knowledge of our origin nor help for the future. We have questions about our meaning and purpose that the universe cannot answer. In a word our very existence is absurd.

Camus goes on to say that the silence of the universe 'betokens the evils of war, of poverty, and of the suffering of the innocent.' This leaves him with only one alternative: 'to commit suicide, intellectual or physical suicide, or to embrace Nihilism and go on surviving in a world without meaning'.[2] He chose the latter. What is interesting, though, is his continued search for meaning even to the point of considering Christianity as a possible answer.[3] Such a plight shows profound insight, for Camus understood that the answer we give to the ultimate question of human existence has dramatic consequences on the way we act in the city!

In an article dealing with the twentieth-century 'European problem', George Weigel argues rather convincingly that its roots 'go back to the nineteenth century, and to the drama of atheistic humanism and the related triumph of secularization in Western Europe'.[4] Weigel refers primarily to Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Henri de Lubac. The former saw in the Great War (1914-1918) 'the beginning of a civilizational crisis, in Europe, and perhaps especially in Western Europe, whose effects are much with us today'. Solzhenitsyn relates the origin of this crisis to 'the failings of human consciousness, deprived of its divine dimension'. In other words, 'the leaders of Europe lost awareness of a Supreme Power above them'.[5] De Lubac considers the mid-twentieth-century tyrannies as 'expressions of an atheistic humanism that took its cues from' nineteenth-century philosophers such as Comte, Feuerbach, Marx and Nietzsche.[6] Thus, according to de Lubac, the horror of these tyrannies resulted in the combination of 'atheistic humanism and modern technology'. But, beyond the nineteenth century one should also consider the impact of the rationalism and humanism of the Enlightenment on the contemporary cultural climate!

In fact, this is what the French philosopher, Luc Ferry, does in a recent monograph which relates the debate he had with Cardinal Gianfranco

Ravasi. Though aware of the significant contribution of Christianity to the development of Western civilization, Ferry nevertheless argues forcefully in favour of a purely horizontal perspective of the world and human existence. Since the Enlightenment and especially Nietzsche in the nineteenth century, the idea of a transcendent God is irrelevant with regards to matters pertaining to the city. Thus norms and civil values no longer rooted within a theological setting are characteristic of the 'democratic space' in our contemporary world. Such is the heritage that the Enlightenment and the French Revolution have passed on to us, 'the end of political theology'.

This means that 'the human being is the ultimate lawgiver' and that it constitutes the very 'essence of secularism (*laïcité*)'. This is true for both law and ethics. Ferry goes on to argue that 'the emergence of the major secular ethical systems as from the 18th Century onwards predicts the end of an Ethics rooted in theology' and he concludes his thoughts as follows: 'We believe we can and are able to handle the question of public life and to take the right decisions regarding it by ourselves without receiving orders from above.'[7]

The above examples remind us that, as we are confronted with the contemporary crises, we need to consider their roots. Without denying the importance of dealing with their more apparent political, economic, social and educational aspects, it is crucial to take into consideration the world and life views and historical events that have brought about such drama and disaster within the public space. We need to examine the philosophical origins of the tragedies we have witnessed in our midst. As Christians we need to recover and develop a theologically informed understanding of history. Such an alternative to secular humanism implies a united field of knowledge and a high view of the human being created in the image of God. It is both credible and relevant as it offers the full picture of the creature's plight and of God's generous work of redemption and restoration. It is no doubt revolutionary, but it carries the hope of genuine renewal and reformation within the human community. In fact Christianity, both Catholicism and Protestantism, has a rich heritage within this field, the best of which draws abundantly from the Scriptures, both Old and New Testaments.[8]

Pierre Berthoud is Professor Emeritus of the Faculté Jean Calvin in Aix-en-Provence and chair of the Fellowship of European Evangelical Theologians

Endnotes

1 Cf. *TGV Magazine*, June 27, 2009. For a development of this analysis, cf. P. Viveret, *Pourquoi cela ne va pas plus mal* (Paris: Fayard, 2006) and B. Montaud, *Bénie soit la crise de l'Occident. Une analyse spirituelle de la crise* (Caudecoste: Edit'As, 2009). Patrick Viveret is 'conseiller référendaire' at the *Cour des Comptes* and has been the editor of the magazine *Transversales – Sciences et culture*; Bernard Montaud is a body psychoanalyst and advocates a lay spirituality grounded in ordinary life.

2 Howard Mumma, *Albert Camus and the Minister* (Brewster MA: Paraclete Press, 2000) 13.

3 This is well documented in Mumma, *Albert* Camus, who relates the conversations he had with Camus in Paris over a period of years.

4 George Weigel, 'Europe's Problem – and Ours' on www.firstthings.com/article/2004/02/europes-problemmdashand-ours, 10 [accessed 06-12-2014]. Weigel offers a catholic perspective influenced by the excellent writings of Christopher Dawson.

5 A. Solzhenitsyn, 'Men Have Forgotten God'. The Templeton Address, 1983, quoted by Weigel, 'Europe's Problem'.

6 Weigel, 'Europe's Problem', 9. Cf. Henri de Lubac, S.J., *Le drame de l'humanisme athée* (Paris: Spes, 1945), which remains very helpful in understanding the contemporary scene from a theological perspective.

7 Luc Ferry and Gianfranco Ravasi, *Le cardinal et le philosophe* (Paris: Plon, 2013) 97-98.

8 In 2009 I had the privilege of participating in a congress in Aix-en-Provence organised by the Research Centre in Economic Ethics (University Paul Cézanne). The theme was *Qu'est-ce qu'une société juste? (What is a Just Society?)*. I took part in a panel discussion on 'Les religions et la justice' and read a paper entitled 'Les religions et la justice : un regard protestant réformé' which was published in the conference proceedings: *Qu'est-ce qu'une société juste ?* (Aix-en-Provence: Presses Universitaires d'Aix-Marseille, 2010) 138-154. In this article I further develop some aspects of the significant contribution of the Reformation to these vital questions. A non-published English translation is available.

Demut als christliche Lebensweise. Eine Studie zu den Paulusbriefen in ihrem hellenistischen und biblischen Kontext

Jacob Thiessen

SUMMARY

The Pauline concept of 'meekness' or 'humility' developed at least in part through a deliberate interaction with Greek philosophical ideas which were common among believers in the Pauline churches; this conclusion affects in particular the debate of ideas which existed in the church in Corinth. Nevertheless, the sources of Paul's thinking in this respect are obviously to be found in the Old Testament and in the life and teaching of Jesus Christ, in which a servant heart and a person's attitude towards God are crucial. In contrast to the Greek philosophical mind, all humans are equal before God not only with regard to their redemption from sin, but also with regard to their being equipped for ministry, which happens without partiality.

* * * * * * * *

RÉSUMÉ

L'auteur montre que la notion de douceur et d'humilité chez Paul a été élaborée au moins en partie en réponse à des idées philosophiques grecques qui étaient aussi communes parmi les croyants dans les Églises pauliniennes, et qui exerçaient notamment une influence sur les débats d'idée au sein de l'Église de Corinthe. Néanmoins, c'est évidemment dans l'Ancien Testament et dans la vie et l'enseignement de Jésus que l'on discerne l'origine des idées de l'apôtre en la matière. Pour lui, un esprit de service et l'attitude adoptée par rapport à Dieu sont cruciaux. En contraste avec la pensée philosophique grecque, Paul considère tous les humains égaux devant Dieu, non seulement pour ce qui concerne leur rédemption du péché, mais aussi leurs aptitudes au ministère, sans partialité.

* * * * * * * *

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Das paulinische Konzept von „Niedrigkeit" beziehungsweise „Demut" ist zumindest zum Teil in bewusster Auseinandersetzung mit dem griechisch-philosophischen Denken, das auch unter den Gläubigen in den paulinischen Gemeinden verbreitet war, entstanden, und zwar besonders in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Denken, das in der Gemeinde von Korinth vorhanden war. Andererseits sind die Quellen des paulinischen Denkens diesbezüglich offenbar das Alte Testament sowie das Leben und die Lehre Jesu Christi. Dabei ist die Diensthaltung und die Haltung Gott gegenüber zentral. Vor Gott sind – im Unterschied zum griechisch-philosophischen Denken – alle gleich, und nicht nur die Erlösung von der Sünde, sondern auch die Befähigung zum Dienst geschieht nicht im Ansehen der Person.

* * * * * * * *

1. Allgemeine Einführung

Für Friedrich Nietzsche gehört die Demut zu den „gefährlichen, verleumderischen Idealen", die aber „wie Gifte in gewissen Krankheitsfällen" als „nützliche Heilmittel" wirkten. Dabei seien alle diese Ideale gefährlich, „weil sie das Tatsächliche erniedrigen und brandmarken", aber als „zeitweilige Heilmittel" seien sie „unentbehrlich".[1] Und für Hitler war Demut „das größte Übel für das deutsche Volk"; sie habe ihren Ursprung in der

„orientalischen Faulenzerei".[2] Nach Dihle war der Gedanke der Demut „der gesamten [außerbiblischen bzw. -jüdischen oder -christlichen] antiken Ethik fremd",[3] was grundsätzlich sicher zutrifft, auch wenn es einzelne Äußerungen gibt, in denen der Begriff ταπεινός („niedrig") auch in gewisser Hinsicht mit positiver Konnotation verwendet wurde.[4] Um 200 n. Chr. sah sich das Christentum auf Grund der Betonung der Demut als christliche Tugend dem Gespött der Leute ausgesetzt.[5]

Dagegen fällt nach Feldmeier auf, „dass in jüngster Zeit jenes verdächtige Wort Demut im öffentlichen Diskurs plötzlich wieder deutlich häufiger verwendet wird, und zwar dezidiert positiv".[6] Verursacht wurde diese Wende besonders durch die „Finanzkrise", die ihrerseits auf menschliche Überheblichkeit zurückzuführen ist. Trotzdem hat man den Eindruck, dass Demut nicht unbedingt zum Alltag der Gesellschaft gehört. Aber auch bei denen, die an Jesus Christus glauben, ist die „Herzensdemut" (vgl. Mt 11,28) nicht einfach vorhanden.

Der positive Sinn von „Demut" geht auf den biblisch-christlichen Gebrauch zurück. Dabei spielen besonders die Paulusbriefe eine zentrale Rolle. Sie heben sich in ihrem Verständnis der „niedrigen Gesinnung" deutlich von antiken hellenistisch-philosophischen Texten ab, mit deren Auswirkung Paulus besonders in der Gemeinde von Korinth konfrontiert wurde. Es geht dabei aber nicht um eine Selbsterniedrigung zum Selbstzweck, sondern um eine Diensthaltung, die der Apostel von Jesus übernommen hat. Voraussetzung dafür ist für Paulus das erneuerte Denken durch die Hinwendung zu Jesus Christus, wie im Folgenden dargelegt werden soll.

2. „Demut" in antiken Texten

Das griechische Nomen ταπεινοφροσύνη bedeutet wörtlich etwa „niedrige Gesinnung" (aus ταπεινός und φρήν bzw. φρονέω). Dieses Nomen erscheint im Neuen Testament siebenmal,[7] davon fünfmal in den Paulusbriefen und einmal im Mund des Paulus (in Apg 20,19). Nur in 1. Petrus 5,5 wird das Nomen somit nicht von Paulus verwendet. In 1. Petrus 3,8 erscheint zudem das Nomen ταπεινόφρων („eine niedrige Gesinnung habend, demütig"). Ansonsten erscheint im Neuen Testament achtmal das Adjektiv ταπεινός („niedrig, demütig"[8]), 14-mal das Verb ταπεινόω („erniedrigen, demütigen"[9]) und viermal das Nomen actionis ταπείνωσις („Erniedrigung, Demütigung").[10] In dem frühchristlichen 1. Clemensbrief (ca. 96 n. Chr. oder früher) erscheint der Begriff ταπεινοφροσύνη sechsmal (21,8; 30,8; 31,4; 44,3; 56,1; 58,2). In 1. Clemens 44,3 ist von den Aufsehern die Rede, welche „der Herde des Christus tadellos mit Demut … gedient haben".

Das zusammengesetzte Nomen ταπεινοφροσύνη ist vor Paulus nicht bezeugt und erscheint in außerbiblischen antiken Texten kaum.[11] Das Nomen ταπεινόφρων erscheint hingegen in der LXX in Proverbia 29,23,[12] und das Verb ταπεινοφρονέω („niedrige Gesinnung haben, demütig sein") erscheint in der LXX einmal in Psalm 131,2. In der LXX erscheint vor allem das einfache Verb ταπεινόω häufig (167-mal), während das Adjektiv ταπεινός 66-mal und das Nomen actiones ταπείνωσις 42-mal gebraucht wird. Das zusammengesetzte Verb ταπεινοφρονέω erscheint auch in Sibyl. 8,480.[13] Flavius Josephus (ca. 37-100 n. Chr.) verwendet das Nomen ταπεινοφροσύνη einmal in seinem „Jüdischen Krieg",[14] wonach Galba nach seiner Einsetzung als Kaiser von den Soldaten in Rom beschuldigt worden sei, und zwar „auf Grund von Verzagtheit/niedriger Gesinnung" (ἐπὶ ταπεινοφροσύνης).[15] Bei Josephus erscheint zudem das Adjektiv ταπεινός 29-mal,[16] das einfache Verb ταπεινόω 17-mal,[17] das Nomen abstractum ταπεινότης („Niedrigkeit") siebenmal,[18] das Nomen actionis ταπείνωσις („Erniedrigung") viermal[19] und das Adverb ταπεινῶς einmal.[20] Philo von Alexandria verwendet das Adjektiv ταπεινός 38-mal,[21] das einfache Verb ταπεινόω neunmal,[22] das Nomen abstractum ταπεινότης dreimal,[23] das Nomen actionis ταπείνωσις neunmal,[24] das Adverb ταπεινῶς einmal[25] und zudem das zusammengesetzte Adjektiv ὑψηλοτάπεινος („hoch-niedrig") einmal – parallel zum zusammengesetzten Adjektiv μεγαλόμικρον („groß-klein").[26] In weiteren jüdisch-hellenistischen Texten fällt vor allem auf, dass besonders das Nomen actionis ταπείνωσις verwendet wird.[27] Dabei ist unter anderen von der „Erniedrigung des Herzens"[28] oder von der „Erniedrigung der Seele"[29] die Rede.

Plutarch (ca. 45-120 n. Chr.) verwendet zweimal das Nomen ταπεινόφρων („eine niedrige Gesinnung habend"), wobei eine solche Person mit einer furchtsamen Person identifiziert wird.[30] Epiktet (ca. 50-138 n. Chr.) verwendet das Nomen ταπεινοφροσύνη („niedrige Gesinnung") einmal,[31] und zwar in einem Kontext, in welchem relativ häufig das Adjektiv ταπεινός erscheint.[32] Epiktet betont dabei, dass es da, wo eine Person sich nicht durch die Dinge, die sie nicht in ihrer Hand hat, binden lässt, keinen Platz für Schmeichelei und niedrige Gesinnung (ταπεινοφροσύνη) gebe. Zudem verwendet er einmal das Verb ταπεινοφρονέω („eine niedrige Gesinnung haben"), und zwar ebenfalls in direkter Verbindung mit dem Adjektiv ταπεινός.[33] Es fällt insgesamt auf, dass in griechisch-philosophischen Texten kaum das entsprechende Verb oder Nomen (actionis) verwendet wird, sondern hauptsächlich das Adjektiv ταπεινός und manchmal auch das Adverb ταπεινῶς. Damit wird sichtbar, dass es vor allem um die Beschreibung eines Zustands geht, der grundsätzlich negativ betrachtet wird.[34] Die (Selbst-)Erniedrigung spielt dabei im Gegensatz zu biblischen (und gewissen jüdischen Texten) kaum eine Rolle.

Im griechischen Handwörterbuch von Pape heißt es zu dem Begriff ταπεινοφροσύνη lediglich, dass damit „das Wesen u. Betragen eines ταπεινόφρων [d. h. eines ‚Demütigen']" gemeint sei,[35] und dieses (substantivierte) Adjektiv wird mit „niedrig gesinnt, niedergeschlagenen Sinnes, kleinmüthig" umschrieben.[36] Walter Grundmann beschreibt den Gebrauch des Begriffs ταπεινός in der Antike u. a. mit folgenden Worten:

> Vom seelischen oder moralischen Stand eines Menschen heißt ταπεινός *niedrig, von knechtischer Art u[nd] Gesinnung*, oft verbunden mit anderen Begriffen, die ταπεινός in abwertendem Sinne festlegen. Für die altgriechische Adelskultur wird der Wert eines Menschen durch seine Abstammung bestimmt. Edle Gesinnung u[nd] Tugend sind erblich u[nd] nicht erwerbbar ...[37]

Der Begriff ταπεινός bezieht sich auf die geringe Bedeutung oder den geringen Einfluss des Staates oder eines Menschen.[38] Die „Demut" ist die Gesinnung eines Sklaven „der Natur gemäß".[39] Dieser Aspekt wird im Folgenden anhand von antiken Quellen weiter ausgeführt.[40]

3. „Niedrigkeit" in griechisch-philosophischen Texten

Nach dem antiken Historiker Homer nimmt Zeus dem Menschen die Hälfte der Würde, wenn er ihn „die Tage der Sklaverei" sehen lässt.[41] Plato lässt Sokrates sagen, dass die Menschen entweder durch die Erkenntnis der Wahrheit in die Freiheit gelangten oder sonst „gedemütigt" beziehungsweise erniedrigt würden (ταπεινωθέντες), wobei man sie wie Seekranke treten und mit ihnen machen würde, wie man wolle/beschließe.[42] Die „Niedrigen/Demütigen" (ταπεινοί) werden mit den „Unfreien" (ἀνελεύτεροι) identifiziert.[43] Auch die Selbsterniedrigung wird nicht als Tugend aufgefasst.[44] Gemäß Aristoteles sind

> wir denen [gegenüber], die sich uns gegenüber demütigen (τοις ταπεινουμένοις) und nicht widersprechen, [sanftmütig], denn dadurch scheinen sie zu bekennen, schwächer zu sein. Schwächere aber fürchten sich, und niemand, der sich fürchtet, verachtet [den anderen]. Dass aber denen gegenüber, die sich demütigen (πρὸς τοὺς ταπεινουμένους), der Zorn nachlässt, dass beweisen sogar die Hunde, da sie sitzende Menschen nicht beißen.[45]

Aber auch diejenigen, die Bitten und Entschuldigungen vorbringen, beweisen eine größere Demut.[46] Aristoteles teilt alle Tätigkeiten in die der Freien und der Unfreien auf, da gewisse Arbeiten für die Ausübung der Tugend untüchtig machten und dem Denken (διάνοια) die Muße raubten und es erniedrigten (ποιοῦσι ... ταπεινήν).[47] Das Ideal ist für Aristoteles der Mittelstand zwischen reich und arm, da dieser am ehesten geneigt sei, „der Vernunft zu gehorchen" (τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχεῖν).[48] Dabei werden die Armen als diejenigen beschrieben, die „ein Übermaß an Mangel dieser Dinge" haben und „sehr unterwürfig/demütig" (ταπεινοὶ λίαν) sind, so dass sie nicht zu regieren verstehen, sondern sich als Sklaven beherrschen lassen.[49] Diese „Demut" beziehungsweise Untertänigkeit den Herrschern (= Reichen) gegenüber bezeichnet Aristoteles als „Werk der Schmeichelei".[50] Anderswo identifiziert er den „Niedrigen/Demütigen" mit dem „Laien" (ἰδιώτης).[51]

Nach Xenophon (ca. 430-354 v. Chr.) wird das Leben für die Guten ehrenvoll und frei zubereitet, während „das Zeitalter" den Schlechten als erniedrigend (ταπεινός), schmerzhaft und nicht lebenswürdig auferlegt wird.[52] Und Demosthenes (4. Jh. v. Chr.) meint, dass es nicht möglich sei, „geringe und böse Dinge zu tun" und dabei eine „große/hohe und jugendliche/kraftvolle Gesinnung (μέγα καὶ νεανικὸν φρόνημα) zu empfangen", wie auch niemand, der „erleuchtete und gute Dinge" tue, „gering und niedrig/demütig denke" (μικρὸν καὶ ταπεινὸν φρονεῖν).[53]

Nach Cicero (106-43 v. Chr.) ist der „Weise" allein ein freier Mann, während die Schlechten für ihn „Sklavengemüter" sind.[54] Wirkliche Sklaverei besteht nach ihm nämlich darin, dass man einer kraftlosen und kleinmütigen Psyche, die keinen freien Willen hat, nachgibt, sodass niemand bestreiten könne, „dass alle Leichtfertigen, alle Leidenschaftlichen, kurz alle Schlechten Sklaven sind".[55] Grundlage dieser Ansicht über die „Demut" ist die Vergöttlichung der Vernunft. Cicero bezeichnet die Vernunft als „Licht des Lebens",[56] und nach Seneca (bis 65 n. Chr.) ist die Vernunft dem Menschen eigentümlich, und wenn sie vollkommen ausgebildet sei, führe das zur Tugend, welche mit dem Guten identifiziert wird.[57]

Epiktet (ca. 50-138 n. Chr.) verwendet die Gottesverwandtschaft des Menschen als Gegenbegriff zur „Demut" beziehungsweise Niedrigkeit des Menschen.[58] Gemäß Epiktet ist derjenige frei, „wer lebt, wie er beschließt", und wer weder gezwungen (ἀναγκάσαι) noch gehindert noch durch Gewalt (von einer Sache) abgehalten werden kann.[59] Epiktet stellt dabei die Frage, ob jemand „zügellos, über das Schicksal klagend, niedrig/demütig" (ἀκόλαστος, μεμψίμοιρος, ταπεινός) leben möchte.[60] Die Antwort heißt: „Niemand!"[61] Und wenn jemand etwas so Großes, Wertvolles und Edles wie die Freiheit erlangt habe, dürfe er nicht „niedrig/demütig" sein.[62] „Niedrig/demütig" (ταπεινός) ist also das Gegenteil von „edel" (γενναῖος) usw.[63] Die Begierde nach Herrschaft und Reichtum führt nach Epiktet dazu, dass Menschen „niedrig/demütig" und „den anderen unterordnet" werden.[64] „Niedrig/demütig" und ein Sklave soll nach Epiktet die Person sein, die der „göttlichen Verwaltung" nicht gehorcht.[65]

Der „Demütige" beziehungsweise „Niedrige" (ταπεινός) wird also mit dem Sklaven identifiziert.[66] Dabei verwendet Epiktet den Ausdruck ταπεινοφροσύνης τόπος („[Platz] für eine niedrige Gesinnung/Demut") parallel zum Ausdruck κολακείας τόπος („Platz für Schmeichelei").[67] Epiktet betont, dass niemand, der den Lehrsatz für richtig halte, dass „wir alle von Gott geworden sind" und dass „Gott Vater der Menschen und der Götter ist", in Bezug auf sich selbst unedel oder niedrig denken könne (ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀγεννὲς οὐδὲ ταπεινὸν ἐνθυμηθήσεται περὶ ἑαυτοῦ).[68] Die ἀγέννεια („unedle Herkunft; niedrige Gesinnung") wird sogar mit der Gottlosigkeit identifiziert, da Gott nicht nur die Kräfte gegeben habe, sich allem gegenüber, was einem begegne, nicht zu erniedrigen, sondern auch, um ihnen gegenüber ungehindert und ohne Zwang zu bleiben.[69]

Voraussetzung des Denkens von Epiktet ist, dass das Wesen Gottes „Verstand" (νοῦς) und „rechte Vernunft" (λόγος ὀρθός) ist, sodass derjenige, der danach trachtet, dem Wesen Gottes am nächsten kommt.[70] Gott hat nach Epiktet die Welt als Ganze geschaffen, damit sie frei von jeder Behinderung und in sich selbst Zweck sei.[71] Nur der Mensch als vernünftiges Wesen habe die Fähigkeit, zur Erkenntnis aller dieser Dinge zu gelangen. Da er „von Natur aus edel und von großer Seele/psychischer Kraft/Gesinnung und frei ist" (φύσει γενναῖον καὶ μεγαλόψυχον[72] καὶ ἐλεύτερον γενόμενον), sehe er, dass er über einen Teil dieser Dinge um ihn herum unbehindert verfüge.[73] Dazu gehört nach Epiktet vor allem das, was dem sittlichen Leben des Menschen dient. „Wenn er daher in diesen Dingen, über die er ungehindert und frei verfügen kann, allein Gutes und Nützliches sieht, so wird er frei, froh, glücklich, schadlos, von großer Besonnenheit (μεγαλόφρον),[74] gottesfürchtig sein ..."[75] Wer dagegen sein Heil in den äußeren Dingen, die ihm nicht ungehindert zur Verfügung stehen, suche, werde notwendig behindert und Sklave der Menschen werden, werde „gottlos" (ἀσεβές), und weil er immer auf mehr Besitztümer bedacht sei, werde er „notwendig auch niedrig und von geringer/gemeiner Gesinnung" sein (ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ ταπεινὸν εἶναι καὶ μικροπρεπές).[76] Damit ist die μεγαλοφροσύνη („große Gesinnung/Besonnenheit") etwas, dass auf jeden Fall anzustreben ist, während die ταπεινοφροσύνη („niedrige Gesinnung/Besonnenheit") verwerflich ist.

Dio Chrysostomus (ca. 50-110 n. Chr.) z. B. verwendet unter anderen die Begriffe ἀγεννής („unedel"),[77] φαῦλος („untauglich, faul, böse"),[78] ἀσθενής („kraftlos"),[79] ἀνευλεύτερος („unfrei"),[80] δοῦλος („Sklave")[81] und ἄτιμος („unehrenhaft") parallel und damit gewissermaßen synonym zum Begriff ταπεινός.[82] Ein „Niedriger/Demütiger und Niedergeschlagener" ist das Gegenteil von einem „Glückseligen und Vergnügten".[83] Der „Niedrige/Demütige" wird mit „den Vielen und [dem] Laien (ἰδιώτης)" identifiziert.[84]

Umgekehrt ist der μεγαλόφρων ἀνήρ („groß denkender/sehr besonnener Mann") identisch mit dem edlen Mann (γενναῖος ἀνήρ),[85] dem Tapferen (ἀνδρεῖος),[86] dem starken Mann (ἰσχυρός ἀνήρ),[87] dem, der Überfluss (δαψιλής) hat,[88] dem Milden (ἐπιεικής),[89] dem Brauchbaren/Freundlichen (χρηστός),[90] dem Sanftmütigen (πραΰς),[91] dem Einfältigen (ἁπλός),[92] dem Freien (ἐλεύτερος),[93] dem Ehrgeizigen (φιλότιμος)[94] sowie dem Ungetrübten (ἄλυπος) und Menschenfreundlichen (φιλάνθρωπος),[95] aber das Gegenteil von einem Unverständigen und Ungelehrten (ἀνόητος καὶ ἀμαθής).[96] Gemäß Chrystostomus liegt das gute oder böse Schicksal (δαίμων) nicht außerhalb vom Menschen, sondern ist dem Verstand eines jeden Einzelnen eigen.[97] Und zwar gehört das gute Schicksal dem Besonnenen (φρόνιμος) und dem Guten, das böse Schicksal dem Bösen und ebenso die Freiheit dem Freien, der Sklavenzustand dem Sklaven, der königliche Zustand dem Königlichen und demjenigen von großer Besonnenheit (μεγαλόφρων), das niedrige/demütige (ταπεινόν) Schicksal aber dem Niedrigen (ταπεινός) und Unedlen (ἀγεννής).[98]

Der hellenistische Jude Philo von Alexandria (bis ca. 50 n. Chr.) beginnt seine Abhandlung, die an einen gewissen Theodotus gerichtet ist,[99] mit folgenden Worten: „Der frühere Bericht (ὁ μὲν πρότερος λόγος) war von uns [geschrieben worden], o Theodotus, um [darzulegen, dass] jeder Schlimme/Faule/Böse/Untaugliche (φαῦλον) ein Sklave ist …"[100] Dagegen soll in der folgenden Abhandlung dargelegt werden, dass jeder „Weise" (bzw. „Vornehme, Tugendhafte") frei sei (ὅτι πᾶς ὁ ἀστεῖος ἐλεύθερος).[101] Philo betont weiter, dass der Mensch, der sich auf Grund einer niedrigen und sklavenhaften Gesinnung (ἀπὸ ταπεινοῦ καὶ δουλοπρεποῦς φρονήματος) entgegen seiner eigenen Meinung mit niedrigen und sklavenhaften Dingen befasse (ταπεινοῖς καὶ δουλοπρεπέσι παρὰ γνώμην ἐγχειρῶν), wirklich ein Sklave sei.[102] Wer alles „richtig" (ὀρθῶς) mache, habe die Vollmacht/das Verfügungsrecht, in jeder Hinsicht so zu handeln und zu leben, wie er beschließe, und wer diese Vollmacht/dieses Verfügungsrecht habe, sei frei. Da der „Weise" in jeder Hinsicht besonnen handele, sei er allein frei.[103] Wer zu etwas gezwungen werde, der handele unfreiwillig und sei deshalb ein Sklave, während der „Weise" weder gezwungen werde noch unfreiwillig handele.[104]

Philo zitiert Euripides,[105] nach dem Herakles gesagt haben soll, dass der Edle (εὐγενής)[106] selbst dann, wenn er (in die Sklaverei) verkauft werde, nicht ein Diener (θεράπων) zu sein scheine.[107] Als Hermes gefragt worden sei, ob Herakles „untauglich/böse" (φαῦλος) sei, habe er geantwortet: „Keineswegs untauglich, sondern im Gegenteil: In der Erscheinung ist er ehrwürdig, nicht niedrig/unterwürfig (σεμνὸς κοὐ ταπεινός) … wie Sklaven …."[108] Ob jemand in der Sklaverei ist, will Philo nicht von der Abstammung abhängig machen, sondern von der „Natur der Seele". Wenn die Seele nämlich Unwissen durch Besonnenheit (φρονήσει), Unmäßigkeit durch Selbstbeherrschung (σωφροσύνῃ), Feigheit durch Mut und Habgier durch Gerechtigkeit bezwungen habe, habe sie den Zustand der Freiheit erreicht.[109] Andererseits sind die Menschen es nach Philo gewohnt (zu behaupten), dass „aus Reichen plötzlich Arme geboren werden, oder aus Herrlichen und Großen Unehrenhafte und Niedrige, oder aus Herrschern Laien (ἰδιῶται), oder aus Freien Sklaven", indem sie behaupteten, dass das Göttliche sich nicht um die menschlichen Angelegenheiten kümmere.[110] Kurz darauf betont Philo, dass keiner der „Untauglichen/Bösen" reich sei (τῶν φαύλων πλούσιος οὐδείς) und dass alle Törichten Arme seien.[111] Und während der Begriff ταπεινός κτλ. als Kompositum in Verbindung mit dem Begriff φρονέω κτλ. bei Philo nicht erscheint, erscheint das Nomen μεγαλοφροσύνη („große Gesinnung/Besonnenheit") beziehungsweise das entsprechende Adjektiv μεγαλόφρων („von großer Gesinnung/Besonnenheit") unter anderen im Tugendkatalog,[112] wobei im Gegensatz zu diesem Adjektiv in Virt. 182 im folgenden Lasterkatalog das Adjektiv ὀλιγόφρων („von wenig/geringer Besonnenheit") erscheint. In den Paulusbriefen erscheint hingegen in ähnlichen (kürzeren) Tugendkatalogen das Nomen ταπεινοφροσύνη („niedrige Gesinnung, Demut").[113] Nach Philo ist die Feigheit (δειλία) niedrig (ταπεινόν), während die Tapferkeit (ἀνδρεῖα) ein Kriegsfeind von der Erniedrigung (ταπείνωσεις) und Feigheit ist.[114]

Insgesamt zeigen diese Texte somit eine einheitliche Einstellung den „Niedrigen" gegenüber. Sie sind in ihrem Handeln unfrei und damit „Sklaven", aber auch ihr Denken ist nicht auf der Stufe der „Freien". Da das Denken mit dem Göttlichen identifiziert wird, ist der „Niedrige" dem Göttlichen nicht so nahe wie der „denkende Mensch", das heisst besonders der Philosoph.

4. „Demut" im Alten Testament und in der Verkündigung Jesu

In der Bibel hat die Demut einen ganz anderen Stellenwert. Sie ist das Gegenteil von Hochmut.[115] Nach Proverbia 29,23 erniedrigt der Hochmut einen Menschen, aber der Demütige (LXX: τοὺς ταπεινόφρονας) erlangt Ehre. Es ist Gott, der die Hochmütigen erniedrigt und die Demütigen beziehungsweise „Niedrigen" erhöht (vgl. z.B. Ps

10,18; 18,28; 34,19; 82,3; 138,6; Jes 2,11; 11,4). Demut ist aber nicht ein Wert an sich – das kommt damit auch zum Ausdruck –, sondern ist vielmehr eine Haltung Gott gegenüber. Der Demütige vertraut auf Gott, und Gott ist seine Rettung und sein Schutz (vgl. z.B. Sach 2,3.13; Jes 25,4; 49,13; 66,2; Jer 22,16).

Die neutestamentlichen Evangelien, in denen der griechische Begriff nur bei Matthäus (Mt 11,29; 18,4; 23,12) und Lukas (Lk 1,48.52; 3,5; 14,11; 18,14) vorkommt, knüpfen an diese alttestamentliche Sicht an (z.B. Lk 1,52; 3,5; auch Apg 8,33). Es gilt das Prinzip, dass derjenige, der sich selbst erniedrigt, erhöht werden wird (Mt 23,12; Lk 14,11; 18,14). Nach Matthäus 18,4 sagt Jesus, dass jeder, der „sich selbst erniedrigt wie dieses Kind, dieser ist der Größte im Reich der Himmel".

Andererseits soll der „Größte" ein Diener sein (Mt 23,11; 20,26; Mk 10,43; Lk 22,27). Anders ist es mit den „Herrschern der Nationen", die nach der Aussage Jesu in Matthäus 20,25 gewaltsam herrschen. Jesus sagt dagegen zu seinen Jüngern, dass derjenige, der „unter euch groß sein will, euer Diener (διάκονος) sein wird", und wer „unter euch der Erste sein will, wird euer Sklave (δοῦλος) sein", mit der Begründung, dass auch „der Sohn des Menschen" nicht gekommen sei, „bedient zu werden, sondern zu dienen" (Mt 20,26-28; Mk 10,43-45). Nach Matthäus 11,25 preist Jesus sogar den himmlischen Vater dafür, dass er das, was er den „Weisen und Einsichtigen" verborgen hat, den Unmündigen offenbart hat. Der Mensch ist demnach in seiner (geistlichen) Erkenntnis ganz auf Gott angewiesen.

Die Jünger sollen von Jesus lernen, da er „sanftmütig und von Herzen demütig"[116] ist (Mt 11,29). Es geht also nicht um eine Scheindemut, die nach außen hin beeindrucken will. Jesus lehnt vielmehr jede „Scheinheiligkeit", die entweder auf sich selbst vertraut oder andere Menschen beeindrucken will, ab (Mt 6,1-4; 23,27-32; Lk 18,9-14). Demgegenüber preist er die „Armen in Bezug auf den Geist" selig, wobei die „Armen" sicher mit den „Demütigen" identifiziert werden können (z.B. Ps 34,19 bzw. PsLXX 33,19 [τοῖς συντετριμμένοις τὴν καρδίαν καὶ τοὺς ταπεινοὺς τῷ πνεύματι]; Jes 61,1.3 [„die gebrochenes Herzens sind … anstelle eines zerschlagenen Geistes"; LXX: τοὺς συντετριμμένους τῆς καρδίας … ἀντὶ πνεύματος ἀκηδίας]). Dafür spricht nicht nur der alttestamentliche Hintergrund der Seligpreisungen (z.B. Ps 37,11; Jes 61,1-3), sondern auch z.B. „Parallelen" in den Qumran-Texten, in denen von den „Geringen/Demütigen des Geistes"[117] oder den „Geschlagenen des Geistes"[118] die Rede ist.[119]

5. Die Demut bei Paulus als Diensthaltung

Die Haltung Jesu hat das Leben und die Lehre des Apostels Paulus offensichtlich wesentlich geprägt (z.B. Phil 2,5-8).[120] Sein Verständnis von Demut geht nicht auf die griechische (philosophische) Ethik zurück, sondern auf Jesus und das Alte Testament.[121] Auch wenn das Nomen „Demut" (ταπεινοφροσύνη) und verwandte Wörter nur relativ selten in den Paulusbriefen erscheinen – und dabei durchaus zweideutig verwendet werden –, so zeigt doch z. B. Philipper 2,3 im Kontext, wie entscheidend die demütige Diensthaltung (nicht die Selbstdemütigung!) für Paulus war und wie stark er dabei durch das Vorbild Jesu geprägt war.

Für Paulus scheint die Aussage Jesu in Matthäus 20,26-28 (= Mk 10,43-45) sowohl in Bezug auf seinen eigenen Dienst als auch in Bezug auf die (öffentlichen) Verkündiger des Evangeliums sowie auf die Gemeindeleitung zentral gewesen zu sein. So wird in den Paulusbriefen die Bezeichnung als διάκονος („Diener; Diakon") wiederholt für Paulus selbst (1. Kor 3,5-6; 2. Kor 3,6; Eph 3,7; Kol 1,23) und für seine Mitarbeiter (Eph 6,21; Kol 1,7; 1. Tim 4,6) verwendet, wie Paulus andererseits Christus als „Diener der Beschneidung" beschreibt (Röm 15,8). Christus hat die Apostel zu „Dienern des neuen Bundes" fähig gemacht (2. Kor 3,6), und sie empfehlen sich „in allem als Gottes Diener" (2. Kor 6,4). Epaphras wird als „treuer Diener des Christus für euch" bezeichnet (Kol 1,7), und Timotheus wird ein „Diener Christi Jesu" sein, wenn er den Geschwistern „diese Dinge" lehrt (1. Tim 4,6).

Andererseits bezeichnet Paulus sich selbst als „Knecht Christi Jesu" (Röm 1,1; Phil 1,1; vgl. auch Gal 1,10) beziehungsweise als „Sklave Gottes" (Tit 1,1). Obwohl Paulus nach Galater 1,10 nicht „Christi Sklave" wäre, wenn er noch Menschen zu gefallen suchen würde, hat er nach 1. Korinther 9,19 sich selbst „allen zum Sklaven gemacht", damit er „die meisten [d. h. möglichst viele] gewinne". Ebenso betont der Apostel in 2. Korinther 4,5, dass er mit seinen Mitarbeitern (bzw. mit den übrigen Aposteln) „nicht sich selbst, sondern Jesus Christus als Herrn" verkündigt, „uns selbst aber als eure Sklaven/Knechte durch Jesus".[122] Dabei kommt es ihm auf die Gesinnung an, die „auch in Christus Jesus [war], der, obwohl er in der Gestalt Gottes war …, sich selbst entäußerte, indem er die Gestalt eines Sklaven annahm“ (Phil 2,5-7a).[123]

In Bezug auf das „ethische“ Verhalten der Gläubigen spielt für Paulus also das Vorbild Jesu Christi – und zwar besonders in seiner Erniedrigung – eine wichtige Rolle (z.B. 2. Kor 8,9; Phil 2,5-11; vgl. 1. Kor 11,1; Eph 5,1; 1. Thess 1,6). Dazu gehören speziell auch die Demut und die Diensthaltung, und zwar gerade auch in verantwortungsvollen Positionen.[124] Dabei soll einer den anderen höher achten als sich selbst (Röm 12,3.16; 15,5.7; 2. Kor 12,6; Phil 2,3; vgl. Röm 11,20). Paulus betont diese Haltung in Römer 15,1-13 auch im Umgang mit den „Schwachen“. Die Christen sollen „sich nicht selbst gefallen“, sondern „dem Nächsten zum Guten, zur Erbauung“, wie auch „der Christus nicht sich selbst gefiel“ (Röm 15,1-3). Und das heißt nach Römer 15,7, dass sie einander annehmen, „wie Christus euch angenommen hat zur Verherrlichung Gottes“. Wie Gott dem Sünder gegenüber langmütig ist (Röm 2,4; 9,22; 1. Tim 1,16), so sollen Christen allen Menschen gegenüber langmütig sein (1. Thess 5,14).

6. Paulus und das Denken in Korinth

Es fällt auf, dass Paulus den Begriff ταπεινός („niedrig, demütig“) κτλ. in den neutestamentlichen Briefen chronologisch gesehen zum ersten Mal im 2. Korintherbrief (m.E. 56 n. Chr.) verwendet (2. Kor 7,6; 10,1; 11,7; 12,21). Das nächste Mal erscheint das Adjektiv in Römer 12,16 (im Winter 56/57 n. Chr.), einer inhaltlichen Parallele zu Philipper 2,2-3, wo in diesem Zusammenhang das Nomen ταπεινοφροσύνη („niedrige Gesinnung, Demut“) verwendet wird.[125] Dieses Nomen wird im positiven Sinn bei Paulus noch in Epheser 4,2 und Kolosser 3,12 und damit in zwei weiteren „Gefangenschaftsbriefen“, die etwa gleichzeitig zum Philipperbrief zu datieren sind (m.E. Februar/März 62 n. Chr.),[126] gewissermaßen parallel zu Philipper 2,2-3 verwendet. Das Nomen erscheint bei Paulus nur noch in Kolosser 2,18.23 im negativen Sinn und einmal im Mund des Paulus, und zwar in der Miletrede (Apg 20,19), die wohl im Frühjahr 57 n. Chr. gehalten wurde. Paulus bezieht sich dabei auf seine dreijährige Tätigkeit in Ephesus (wohl vom Herbst 52 bis zum Herbst 55 n. Chr.), wobei er „mit jeder Demut und [mit] Tränen und Versuchungen“ das Evangelium verkündigt hat. In dieser Zeit musste Paulus sich auch immer wieder mit den Korinthern auseinandersetzen und schrieb dabei den 1. Korintherbrief (1. Kor 16,5-11). Der 2. Korintherbrief, der einige Monate nach der Tätigkeit in Ephesus geschrieben wurde, geht auf das erfreuliche Umdenken der Korinther ein, wobei es in Korinth aber immer noch kritische Stimmen Paulus gegenüber gab. In beiden Zusammenhängen wird nun von Paulus der Begriff ταπεινός verwendet. Damit scheint dieser Kontext für den paulinischen Gebrauch des Begriffs grundlegend zu sein.[127]

Und zwar bezieht sich der Apostel zum ersten Mal in 2. Korinther 7,6 auf die erfreulichen Nachrichten, die ihm Titus bei seiner Ankunft vermittelte, wodurch Gott, „der die Niedrigen ermutigt“, auch sie ermutigt hat. Ansonsten wird einmal das Adjektiv ταπεινός (2. Kor 10,1) und zweimal das Verb ταπεινόω (2. Kor 11,7; 12,21) in der Auseinandersetzung mit den „Gegnern“ des Paulus, die immer noch aktiv sind, gebraucht. Dabei wird der Begriff durchaus ambivalent verwendet, das heisst dass die „Demut“ beziehungsweise „Erniedrigung“ nicht einfach ein Wert für sich ist, sondern immer in seiner Relation zum Dienst gesehen werden muss.

Nach 2. Korinther 11,7 hat Paulus sich selbst dadurch erniedrigt beziehungsweise gedemütigt, dass er in Korinth das Evangelium verkündigt hat, ohne dafür finanzielle Entschädigung zu erhalten. In der Gemeinde in Korinth spielten die Rhetorik und die damit verbundenen Rivalitäten zwischen den verschiedenen Rednern offenbar eine große Rolle (zumindest bei einem Teil der Gemeindeglieder; z.B. 1. Kor 1,10-13; 2,1-4), wie das bei berühmten philosophischen Rednern der Antike der Fall war.[128] Dabei waren die Redner bestrebt, „den Gegner als ungebildet und unwissend zu entlarven“, wobei alle Mittel recht waren.[129] Es geht schlussendlich um Macht und Einfluss. Und je bessere rhetorische Fähigkeiten man besaß, desto mehr konnte man auch in finanzieller Hinsicht verdienen. Umgekehrt weisen die finanziellen Einnahmen damit auf einen gewissen Status als Rhetoriker hin. Paulus hat in Korinth bewusst auf die Anwendung besonderer Rhetorik und auch auf die finanzielle Entschädigung verzichtet (1. Kor 2,1-4; 9,12-18). Damit hat er sich aber vor den Korinthern selbst „gedemütigt“, weil sein Ansehen dadurch bei gewissen Personen litt. Die Gegner des Paulus in Korinth scheinen im Gegensatz zu Paulus das Unterhaltsrecht in Anspruch genommen und Paulus deshalb einen

Mangel an apostolischer Autorität vorgeworfen zu haben (2. Kor 11,7-11.20; 12,13-14).

Andererseits rechnet Paulus nach 2. Korinther 12,21 damit, dass Gott ihn den Korinthern gegenüber demütigen könnte, was Paulus verhindern möchte. Es geht also nicht darum, dass die Demütigung bewusst gesucht wird. Sie wird jedoch im Dienst für Gott in Kauf genommen, um den Auftrag nach dem Willen Gottes durchzuführen. Andererseits hat Paulus nach 2. Korinther 7,6 ja auch selbst erfahren, dass Gott die „Niedrigen" (Gedemütigten) wieder aufrichtet und ermutigt.

Auch wenn im 1. Korintherbrief der Begriff ταπεινός κτλ. nicht verwendet wird, so erscheinen in diesem Brief doch Ausdrücke, die zeigen, dass der Apostel sich mit dem hellenistischen Konzept von „Niedrigkeit", das offenbar auch Kreise der Gemeinde von Korinth stark geprägt hat, auseinandersetzt.[130] So hat Gott nach 1. Korinther 1,28 „das Unedle der Welt und das Verachtete" auserwählt, und zwar „das, was nicht ist, damit er das Seiende wirkungslos mache". Gott setzt nach Paulus also ganz andere Maßstäbe an den Menschen, als die griechische Philosophie meinte. Die „Weisheit dieser Welt" ist nämlich „Torheit bei Gott" (1. Kor 3,19; vgl. 1,25). Und darum hat Gott „das Törichte der Welt erwählt, damit er die Weisen zuschanden mache; und das Schwache der Welt hat Gott erwählt, damit er das Starke zuschanden mache" (1. Kor 1,27). Nach 1. Korinther 4,10 sind Paulus und seine Mitarbeiter „töricht durch Christus, ihr aber seid besonnen (φρόνιμοι) in Christus, wir sind schwach (ἀσθενεῖς), ihr aber seid stark, ihr seid herrlich, wir aber verachtet (ἄτιμοι)" (vgl. 1. Kor 4,8; 2. Kor 13,3-9). Dass diese Charakterisierung der Korinther auch eine Kritik gegenüber ihrer Einstellung beinhaltet, zeigen andere Stellen deutlich (z.B. 1. Kor 10,15; 13,11; 14,20; 2. Kor 5,13; 11,19).

Paulus beschreibt sich damit bewusst mit Begriffen, die in der griechischen Philosophie in Bezug auf die Sklaven, Unfreien und damit „Niedrigen/Demütigen" gebraucht wurden. Das tut er einerseits, weil er weiß, dass Gott nach anderen Maßstäben misst, und andererseits, weil er sich Jesus Christus gegenüber als „freien Sklaven" betrachtet, der nicht anders kann, als seinen Auftrag auszuführen (vgl. 1. Kor 9,16-19), wobei er wiederum Begriffe verwendet, welche in Bezug auf die Sklaverei (im negativen Sinn) verwendet wurden.[131] Dabei kommt immer wieder zum Ausdruck, dass Paulus den Korinthern gegenüber ein Vorbild sein möchte (z. B. 1. Kor 4,14-16; 9,1-6).

Nach 1. Korinther 4,1-2 sieht Paulus sich als Handlanger und Hausverwalter Gottes, von dem man Treue erwartet. Deshalb kann er auch die Kritik der Korinther in Kauf nehmen (vgl. 1. Kor 4,3). Dementsprechend will Paulus sich den Korinthern gegenüber in allem als Diener Gottes „empfehlen" (2. Kor 6,4). Die Korinther sind sein „Empfehlungsbrief" (2. Kor 3,1-3; vgl. 6,1-3; 7,2-4). Paulus empfiehlt sich somit nicht selbst (2. Kor 5,11-12), sondern – wenn schon – „als Gottes Diener, in vielem Ausharren, in Drangsalen, in Nöten, in Ängsten, in Schlägen, in Gefängnissen, in Tumulten, in Mühen, in Wachen, in Fasten" (2. Kor 6,4-5) und „durch die Wahrheit jedem Gewissen der Menschen vor Gott" (2. Kor 5,12). Im Gegensatz dazu empfehlen die „Hyper-Apostel" (dazu 2. Kor 11,5), die für Paulus „falsche Apostel" und „betrügerische Arbeiter" sind, „welche die Gestalt von Aposteln Christi annehmen", sich selbst und messen sich an sich selbst, und darum sind sie ohne Einsicht (2. Kor 10,12-13). Für Paulus ist jedoch nicht derjenige bewährt, der sich selbst empfiehlt, sondern den „der Herr" (Jesus) empfiehlt (2. Kor 10,18). Deshalb ist es für Paulus wichtig, dass er seinen Dienst nicht davon abhängig machen lässt, dass er nach menschlichen Maßstäben gemessen wird. Sein höchstes Ziel ist es, vor Gott bewährt zu sein, das heisst „die Prüfung bestanden zu haben" (u. a. 1. Kor 9,24-27; 2. Kor 13,7; auch 2. Tim 2,15).

Die Demut im Dienst hat für Paulus somit nichts mit Feigheit und Schwäche zu tun (vgl. z.B. 2. Kor 10,2.21; Phil 1,14), aber auch nichts mit Faulheit. Es geht ihm vielmehr um die richtige Motivation in seinem Dienst, welche aus der Liebe zu Gott und zu den Menschen kommt (vgl. u. a. 2. Kor 5,14).

7. Erneuertes Denken und ekklesiologische Diensthaltung

Demut im positiven Sinn hängt für Paulus sehr eng mit dem entsprechenden Denken beziehungsweise der entsprechenden Gesinnung (φρονησις) zusammen. Das kommt einerseits durch die bewusste Verwendung des griechisches Wortes für „Demut", ταπεινοφροσύνη („niedrige Gesinnung"), zum Ausdruck, und zwar besonders im Kontext des Philipperbriefs (Phil 2,2-3.5.8; 3,15.19; 4,2; vgl. Kol 3,1-2). Auch in Römer 12,16, einer Parallelstelle zu Philipper 2,2-3, verbindet Paulus ταπεινός („niedrig, demütig") mit dem Begriff φρονέω („denken, im Sinn haben, trachten nach, gesinnt sein"). Demnach sollen die Gläubigen „gegeneinander gleichgesinnt" sein (vgl. Röm 15,5; 2. Kor 13,11; Phil 2,2; 4,2), indem sie nicht nach hohen Dingen trachten (φρονοῦντες), sondern sich zu den niedrigen Dingen (τοῖς ταπεινοῖς) halten beziehungsweise hinführen lassen und nicht klug (bzw. besonnen) bei sich selbst (φρόνιμοι παρ' εαυτοῖς) sind (vgl. Röm 11,25; 2. Kor 10,12). Mit dem „Wortspiel" um den Begriff φρονέω („gesinnt sein") in Römer 12,16 knüpft Paulus offenbar an Römer 12,3 an, wo bereits ein ähnliches „Wortspiel" erschien. Dort schreibt der Apostel:

> Denn ich sage durch die Gnade, die mir gegeben wurde, jedem, der unter euch ist, nicht höher [von sich] zu denken, als zu denken sich gebührt, sondern darauf bedacht zu sein, dass er besonnen sei/gesund denke (μὴ ὑπερφρονεῖν παρ' ὃ δεῖ φρονεῖν ἀλλὰ φρονεῖν εἰς τὸ σωφρονεῖν), wie Gott einem jeden das Maß des Glaubens zugeteilt hat.

Die „niedrige Gesinnung" beziehungsweise „Demut" schließt also eine gesunde Einstellung den von Gott geschenkten Gaben gegenüber nicht aus, sondern vielmehr ein. Paulus selbst bringt diese Einstellung in Bezug auf seinen eigenen Dienst schon damit zum Ausdruck, dass er auf Grund der Gnade, die ihm gegeben worden ist, gebietet (vgl. Röm 15,15; Gal 2,9; Eph 3,2-7; Kol 1,25). Er weiß, dass Gott ihn zum Dienst befähigt hat, und diesen Dienst führt er im Auftrag und in der Vollmacht Gottes beziehungsweise des Herrn Jesus aus.

Aber nicht nur dem Paulus ist eine solche Gnade gegeben worden. Nach Römer 12,4-6 sind alle Gläubigen Glieder des „einen Leibes in Christus" und haben „verschiedene Gnadengaben nach der Gnade, die euch gegeben wurde". Dementsprechend sollen auch sie ihren Dienst ausüben. Dabei sollen sie nach Römer 12,3 so von sich denken, wie ihnen das „Maß des Glaubens" zugeteilt worden ist. Bei diesem „Maß des Glaubens" handelt es sich dem Kontext nach nicht um die Größe des Glaubens, sondern um die Wirkung der Gnade im Leben der Gläubigen (vgl. Röm 12,4 „hat nicht dieselbe Tätigkeit"), nämlich um die „Gnadengaben" beziehungsweise Dienstfähigkeiten (vgl. Röm 12,4-6).[132] Es handelt sich also um die Gnadengaben, wie sie vom Heiligen Geist den Gliedern des Leibes Christi, der Gemeinde, zugeteilt wurden (vgl. 1. Kor 12,11). Jeder Gläubige soll seine Fähigkeiten, die Gott ihm zum Dienst in der Gemeinde geschenkt hat, richtig einschätzen und sie dankbar annehmen und ausüben.

Grundlage für eine solche Gesinnung ist nach Römer 12,2 die Verwandlung „durch die Erneuerung eures Verstandes, damit ihr prüfen könnt, was der Wille Gottes ist, das Gute und Wohlgefällige und Vollkommene". Das Gegenstück dazu kam bereits mit einem ähnlichen Wortspiel, wie es in Römer 12,3.16 vorliegt, in Römer 1,28 zum Ausdruck. Dort hatte der Apostel in Bezug auf „Gottlose" (Röm 1,18) geschrieben: „Und wie sie nicht geprüft haben (οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν), Gott in Erkenntnis festzuhalten, hat Gott sie zu einem ungeprüften/unbewährten Verstand (εἰς ἀδόκιμον νοῦν) hingegeben, zu tun, was sich nicht geziemt." Solche Menschen werden in Römer 1,29-31 als „hochmütig" (ὑπερηφάνους) beschrieben,[133] haben also offenbar eine zu hohe Gesinnung von sich. Nach Römer 1,21-22 sind sie jedoch „in ihren Überlegungen in Torheit verfallen, und ihr unverständiges Herz ist verfinstert worden", ja, „indem sie behaupten, weise zu sein, sind sie töricht geworden", weil sie den (einzigen) Schöpfer-Gott nicht verherrlicht oder ihm gedankt haben.

Im Zusammenhang zwischen Römer 1,21-23 und Römer 12,2-3 wird somit deutlich, dass für Paulus der Verstand des Menschen von Natur aus grundsätzlich nicht in der Lage ist, so zu denken, wie es Gottes Willen entspricht. Nur durch die Vergebung der Sünden, die Rechtfertigung sowie die Erneuerung und Veränderung des Herzens (Röm 3,21-31) ist der Mensch dazu in der Lage. Damit verbunden ist, dass nicht die „hohe Gesinnung" Ziel ist, sondern die „niedrige Gesinnung" beziehungsweise die Demut, da der Mensch sonst seine Abhängigkeit von Gott nicht beachten würde. Andererseits soll derjenige, der durch den Glauben an Jesus Christus erneuert wurde, sein Denken nicht an den Nagel hängen, sondern vielmehr entsprechend gebrauchen (vgl. z.B. 1. Kor 13,11; 14,20). In Philipper 2,2-3 scheint Paulus an Römer 12,16 anzuknüpfen, indem er schreibt:

> Erfüllt meine Freude, dass ihr gleichgesinnt seid (τὸ αὐτὸ φρονῆτε) und dieselbe Liebe habt, einmütig, eines Sinnes seid (τὸ ἓν φρονοῦντες), nichts aus Eigennutz oder eitler Ruhmsucht [tut], sondern dass in der Demut (τῇ ταπεινοφροσύνῃ) einer den anderen höher achtet als sich selbst.

Eine solche Einstellung schließt jeden Neid und jede Eifersucht aus. In Philipper 1,15 erwähnt Paulus einige, die „wegen Neid und Streit" Christus verkündigen, während andere das „wegen Wohlgefallens" tun. Erstere wollen dem Paulus in seiner Gefangenschaft Bedrängnis zufügen und handeln nicht aus lauterer Motivation (Phil 1,17). Paulus freut sich trotzdem darüber, dass Christus verkündigt wird (Phil 1,18). Es ist sicher kein Zufall, dass Paulus gerade in diesem Kontext die einmütige Gesinnung – welche die unterschiedliche Erkenntnis nicht ausschließt (Phil 3,15) – besonders hervorhebt (Phil 2,2.5; 4,2). Die Grundlage der Demut im Dienst des Paulus ist somit das christozentrische Denken und Handeln sowie die Gesinnung Jesu Christi (Phil 2,5), der sich selbst erniedrigte, „indem er gehorsam wurde bis zum Tod, ja, zum Kreuzestod" (Phil 2,8).

Neben Philipper 2,3 erscheint der Kompositum ταπεινοφροσύνη („niedrige Gesinnung, Demut") in den Paulusbriefen im positiven Sinn nur noch in Epheser 4,2 und der Parallelstelle in Kolosser 3,12. Interessant ist dabei einerseits, dass in Epheser mit dem Ausdruck μετὰ πάσης ταπεινοφροσύνης („mit jeder Demut") der gleiche Ausdruck verwendet wird, der auch in Apostelgeschichte 20,19 in der Miletrede des Paulus (an die Ältesten von Ephesus) erscheint. Andererseits scheint sich Epheser 4,17-19 ebenso wie Philipper 2,2-3 an Römer 12 anzulehnen, wobei Epheser 4 aber auch Römer 1,21-23 aufnimmt. Nach Epheser 4,17-19 wandeln die Heiden „in Nichtigkeit ihres Verstandes", indem sie in ihrem Denken verfinstert sind (vgl. Röm 1,21-22.28-32), und sie haben sich der Ausschweifung hingegeben (vgl. Röm 1,24.26.28). Die Empfänger des Briefs haben Christus jedoch anders kennen gelernt (Eph 4,20), indem sie den „alten Menschen" abgelegt haben (Eph 4,22; vgl. Röm 6,6) und nun „im Geist eures Verstandes" erneuert werden (Eph 4,23; vgl. Eph 5,10 und Röm 12,2).[134] Und wie Epheser 4,11-16 und Römer 12,3-8 zeigen, geht es in diesen beiden Kapiteln um die Erbauung der Gemeinde (vgl. Kol 3,12-15), wobei zum Teil gleiche oder ähnliche Ausdrücke erscheinen (vgl. auch Eph 4,25b: „denn wir sind einander Glieder" mit Röm 12,5b: „aber im Einzelnen [sind wir] einander Glieder"). Damit erfolgt die Betonung der „niedrigen Gesinnung" sowohl in Römer 12 als auch in Epheser 4 im Kontext der Erbauung der Gemeinde Jesu. Demut ist also für Paulus nicht Selbstzweck (vgl. Kol 2,18.23!), sondern ist im Rahmen des Dienstes zu sehen und ist damit auch eng mit der jeweiligen Befähigung verbunden.

8. Schlussfolgerungen

Ein wichtiger Grund für den fundamentalen Unterschied zwischen Paulus und den griechisch-philosophischen Texten ist die unterschiedliche Beurteilung der Vernunft des „natürlichen Menschen". Von Paulus wird der Verstand und das Denkvermögen des Menschen viel kritischer beurteilt, da das „Herz" des Menschen nach Paulus von Natur aus „unverständig" (vgl. Röm 1,21) und sein Denken deshalb „verfinstert" ist (Eph 4,17-18). In der Stoa wurden die menschlichen „Fehlverhalten" beziehungsweise die „Laster" mit „Unwissenheit" (ἄγνοια; vgl. Apg 3,17; Eph 4,18; 1. Petr 1,14) begründet.[135] Das Sein wird als Sein des Logos, der Weltvernunft, gedeutet. Wenn der Mensch in Übereinstimmung mit dem Weltlogos lebt, kann seine autonome Vernunft ihm den rechten Weg zeigen und seine Ansichten korrigieren.[136] Für Paulus dagegen ist auch der Verstand des Menschen unter die Herrschaft der Sünde gefallen und kann nur durch die neue Gemeinschaft mit Gott durch das Erlösungswerk Jesu Christi erneuert werden (z.B. Röm 1,21-32; 12,2-3; Eph 2,1-3; 4,17-19). Dieses Denken, das ständig erneuert werden muss, bleibt somit auch ständig von Gott abhängig, was in einer entsprechenden demütigen Gesinnung zum Ausdruck kommen soll. Gleichzeitig ist dieses erneuerte und ständig erneuert werdende Denken grundlegend für eine Diensthaltung innerhalb der christlichen Gemeinde (Röm 12,2-8.16; Phil 2,2-11; Eph 4; Kol 3,12-17).

Die Mahnung des Paulus zur Demut erfolgt damit „im Horizont der Gemeinde", wie Klaus Wengst richtig betont.[137] Demut ist demnach „nicht individueller Verzicht, sondern Grundbedingung einer neuen Gesellschaft, die wirklich alles einschließt".[138] Und Feldmeier ergänzt: „Wo Demut nicht Selbstbegrenzung zugunsten des anderen ist, sondern als Selbstverkleinerung *per se* zur religiösen Tugend wird, wird sie zerstörerisch."[139] Die Erbauung der christlichen Gemeinde steht für den Apostel Paulus im Vordergrund allen christlichen Handelns (z.B. Röm 14,19; 15,2). Durch Demut verlieren die Christen nicht ihre Würde, sondern gewinnen sie vielmehr. Weil sie ihre Identität in Jesus Christus gefunden haben, können sie auch seinem Weg des Dienstes, der mit der Demut beziehungsweise der Erniedrigung verbunden ist, folgen.

Dr. Jacob Thiessen is Rektor and Professor of New Testament at the STH Basel, Switzerland.

Endnotes

1 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Der Wille zur Macht. Kritik der bisherigen höchsten Werte*, 223 (Kröners Taschenausgabe, Bd. 78, Stuttgart: Kröner, 1972, 159).

2 M. Hesemann, *Hitlers Religion* (München: Pattloch, 2004) 135.

3 A. Dihle, Art. „Demut", in *Realenzyklopädie für Antike und Christentum* 3 (1957) (735–778) 738; vgl. auch St. Rehrl, *Das Problem der Demut in der profan-griechischen Literatur im Verhältnis zu Septuaginta und Neuem Testament* (AcC 4; Münster: Aschendorff, 1961) 24-26; K. Wengst, *Demut – Solidarität der Gedemütigten* (München: Kaiser, 1987) 15-17.

4 Z.B. Aeschylos, Prom. 320; Plato, Nom. 716a-b; Xenophon, Ag 11,11. Vgl. Rehrl, *Problem*, 62-64; Wengst, *Demut*, 32-34.

5 Origenes, Cels. 6,13.

6 R. Feldmeier, *Macht – Dienst – Demut. Ein neutestamentlicher Beitrag zur Ethik* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012) 86.

7 Apg 20,19; Eph 4,2; Phil 2,3; Kol 2,18.23; 3,12; 1. Petr 5,5.

8 Mt 11,29; Lk 1,52; Röm 12,16; 2. Kor 7,6; 10,1; Jak 1,9; 4,6; 1. Petr 5,5.

9 Mt 18,4; 13,12; Lk 14,11; 18,14; 2. Kor 11,7; 12,21; Phil 2,8; 4,12; Jak 4,10; 1. Petr 5,6.

10 Lk 1,48; Apg 8,33; Phil 3,21; Jak 1,10.

11 U.a. Hermann Cremer, *Biblisch-Theologisches Wörterbuch des Neutestamentlichen Griechisch* 11. Aufl. (Stuttgart/Gotha: Perthes, 1923) 1043; Walter Bauer, *Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, 6. Aufl. hg. von K. Aland/B. Aland (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988) 1605.

12 Der Begriff ταπεινόφρων („eine niedrige Gesinnung habend") bezeichnet in ProvLXX 29,23 das Gegenteil von der ὕβρις („Überheblichkeit"), während die ὕβρις nach ProvLXX 21,4 die Haltung eines Mannes ist, der als μεγαλόφρων („von großer/hoher Gesinnung") beschrieben wird.

13 Griechisch: ἐν κραδίᾳ τε ταπεινοφρονεῖν, πικρὰ τέρματα μισεῖν (etwa: „Im Herzen habe eine niedrige Gesinnung, bittere Entscheidungen hasse").

14 Bell. 4,494; vgl. ders., Ant. 6,179: μὴ ταπεινὸν ἔστω τὸ φρόνημα … („Die Gesinnung sei nicht niedrig …").

15 In den Schriften von Flavius Josephus erscheint das Kompositum ταπεινοφρονέω κτλ. insgesamt 30-mal (achtmal als Nomen, zehnmal als Adjektiv, achtmal als Adverb und viermal als Verb). In den biblischen Texten erscheint dieses Kompositum nur in ProvLXX 21,4 – als Charakterisierung des hochmütigen Sünders (vgl. aber 4. Macc 6,5.24; 9,21).

16 U.a. Ant. 2,46; 5,115; 6,51; 6,179.200.

17 U.a. Ant. 2,205; 4,128; 5,186; 6,30.

18 Ant. 7,84; 14,430; Bell. 1,313.478; 2,122.300; 4,147.

19 Ant. 2,234.238.255; Bell. 2,448.604.

20 Bell. 2,448.

21 U.a. Leg. 1,68; 2,89; 3,18.19.84.134; Det. 13.16.34.

22 Sacr. 62; Post. 46.48.74; Fug. 1.207; Mut. 194; Ios. 150; Spec. 4,88.

23 Leg. 3,214; Post. 136; Congr. 107.

24 Leg. 1,68; Post. 41.46.74; Her. 268; Fug. 1.5.207.

25 Leg. 3,82.

26 Ios. 142.

27 Z.B. TestRub. 6,10; TestJud. 19,2; TestDan. 5,13; TestGad. 5,3; TestJos. 10,2; TestBenj. 10,7; PsSal 2,35; 3,8.

28 TestRub. 6,10; TestJos. 10,2.

29 TestJud. 19,2; PsSal. 3,8.

30 Plutarch, Alex. 326e; ders., Tranq. An. 475e („… Das Glück/der Zufall kann nämlich mit Krankheit befallen, Besitztümer nehmen …, aber es kann den Guten nicht zaghaft und von niedriger Gesinnung [ταπεινόφρονα] und unedel und furchtsam machen").

31 Epiktet, Diss. 3,24,55.

32 Epiktet, Diss. 3,24,36.43.58.75 (zweimal); vgl. Diss. 3,24,54, wo das entsprechende Adverb ταπεινῶς verwendet wird.

33 Epiktet, Diss. 1,9,10: „… damit ihr nicht eine niedrige Gesinnung habt (μὴ ταπεινοφρονήσητε) und nicht gewisse niedrige und unedle Überlegungen (διαλογισμούς) über euch selbst habt".

34 Vgl. die Studie zu den Quellen im nächsten Punkt.

35 W. Pape, *Griechisch-Deutsches Handwörterbuch* (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 3. Aufl. 1914) Bd. 2, 1069.

36 Pape, *Griechisch-Deutsches Handwörterbuch* 2, 1069.

37 W. Grundmann, Art. ταπεινός in *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum NT* VIII (1969) (1–27) 20; vgl. auch Cremer, *Wörterbuch*, 1042; Rehrl, *Problem*, 9.

38 Z.B. Demosthenes, Orat. 4,23; 9,21; Isokrates, Or. 4; Xenophon, Eq Mag. 5.7.

39 Platon, Nom. 728e; auch Nom. 791d.

40 Ich danke meinem Kollegen Harald Seubert herzlich für die Besorgung einiger der verwendeten Quellen.

41 Homer, Odys. 17,322f.; vgl. Euripides, Andr. 164ff. und Fragm. 688ff.

42 Plato, Theait. 191a.

43 Plato, Nom. 5728e und 791d; vgl. Nom. 774c, wo die „niedrige Sklaverei" (δουλεία ταπεινή) mit einem Unfreien in Verbindung gebracht wird.

44 Z.B. Plato, Lys 210e; Aristoteles, Rhet. 2.

45 Aristoteles, Rhet. 1380a,20-25.

46 Aristoteles, Rhet. 1380a,28f.

47 Aristoteles, Pol. 1337b,5ff.
48 Aristoteles, Pol. 1295b,5ff.
49 Aristoteles, Pol. 1295b,15ff.
50 Aristoteles, Pol. 1213b,40f.
51 Aristoteles, Poet. 1458a.
52 Xenophon, Cyropaed. 3,3,52.
53 Demosthenes, Org. 13,25.
54 Cicero, Parad. 1,33ff.; auch z.B. Xenophon, Comment. 4,5-12.
55 Cicero, Parad. 1,34; übersetzung nach L. Baus [Hg.], *Der stoische Weise – ein Materialist und „Über die Freiheit" von Cicero, Epiktet und einem unbekannten Stoiker. Texte und Abhandlungen zur stoischen Philosophie* (Homburg/Saar: Asclepios, 2. Aufl. 2010) 104.
56 Cicero, Luc. 8,26.
57 Seneca, Ep. ad Luc. 76,7–12.
58 Epiktet, Ep. 4,38,42ff.
59 Epiktet, Diss. 4,1,1; auch z.B. Diss. 4,7,11. Vgl. S. Vollenweider, *Freiheit als neue Schöpfung. Eine Untersuchung zur Eleutheria bei Paulus und seiner Umwelt* (FRLANT 147; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989) 23-25.
60 Epiktet, Diss. 4,1,2; vgl. auch Diss. 3,12,13; 2,1,11: „... der Vorsichtige/Ängstliche und Schamhafte von Natur aber [ist] feige und niedrig, voll von Furcht und Verwirrung".
61 Epiktet, Diss. 4,1,2.
62 Epiktet, Diss. 4,1,74.
63 Auch z.B. Epiktet, Diss. 3,24,58.
64 Epiktet, Diss. 4,4,1.
65 Epiktet, Diss. 3,24,43; vgl. auch u. a. Diss. 3,11,1f.
66 Auch z.B. Epiktet, Diss. 3,24,75.
67 Epiktet, Diss. 3,24,55. Das ist offenbar die einzige Stelle, an der Epiktet den Begriff ταπεινοφροσύνη verwendet.
68 Epiktet, Diss. 1,3,1; vgl. Diss. 1,3,4: „... sie denken nichts Niedriges und Unedles von sich; die meisten aber [denken] das Gegenteil [von sich]".
69 Epiktet, Diss. 1,6,39f.
70 Z.B. Epiktet, Diss. 2,8,1ff.; vgl. auch Diss. 4,1,175-177: Die Beseitigung der Begierde bewirkt wahre Freiheit. Deshalb soll man sich statt mit einem reichen Alten mit einem Philosophen beschäftigen und sich an seiner Tür zeigen. „Du wirst nicht leer und ohne Gewinn weggehen ..."
71 Epiktet, Diss. 4,7,6. Vgl. dazu auch M. Ebner, *Die Stadt als Lebensraum der ersten Christen* (Das Urchristentum in seiner Umwelt I; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012) 276–278.
72 Zum Begriff μεγαλόψυχος κτλ. vgl. 3. Macc 6,41; 4. Macc 15,10; Arist. 19.26; Josephus, Ant. 1,12.61; 7,332; 12,21.25.84.219; 14,31.97.252 – der Begriff erscheint bei Josephus insgesamt 29-mal).
73 Epiktet, Diss. 4,7,7-8.
74 Zum Gebrauch des Adjektivs μεγαλόφρον bei Epiktet vgl. auch Diss. 2,14,13; 3,20,5; 3,24,12; Ench. 24,3. Das Adjektiv wurde auch im (tadelnden) Sinn von „hochmütig, prahlend" gebraucht (z.B. Plato, Euthyd. 293a; Xenophon, Hell. 4,5.6; vgl. Pape, *Handwörterbuch* II, 108).
75 Epiktet, Diss. 4,7,9.
76 Epiktet, Diss. 4,7,10-11. Nach Plutarch ist der „Niedrige/Demütige" offenbar identisch mit dem Armen (πένητος) und demjenigen, der bemitleidenswert (ἐλεεινός) ist (Plutarch, Orat.2,1,93; Plutarch, Pelop. 28,2).
77 Orat. 4,80.91; 65,32; vgl. z.B. Plutarch, Pomp. 23,2; Plutarch, Quom. 1,19.160; Plutarch, Praec. 1,74.121; Plutarch, Resp. 1,27; Lucian, Sacr. 1,155; Lucian, Demosth. 11,3; Josephus, Bell. 4,365.
78 Orat. Orat.2,7; 11,33.134; 30,4.15; 48,5.
79 Orat. 19,6; 65,32; 75,6. Vgl. z.B. Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. Hist. 20,86,2.
80 Orat.27,12; 33,8; vgl. Orat. 6,58.
81 Orat.62,1.
82 Orat.61,34.
83 Orat.49,12; vgl. Orat. 4,122.
84 Orat.2,49; vgl. Orat. 30,8: „Ich bitte/fordere, dass niemand von euch das sehr besonnene und weise Wort (λόγον μεγαλόφρονα καὶ σοφόν) in dieser Abhandlung abweist, sondern das laienhafte und böse/untaugliche (ἀλλ' ἰδιωτικὸν καὶ φαῦλον), demgemäß auch die Taten sind."
85 Orat. 61,29.
86 Orat. 1,4; 61,37; vgl. auch Orat. 2,1: ἀνδρείως καὶ μεγαλοφρόνως („tapfer und von großer Besonnenheit").
87 Orat. 1,75.
88 Orat. 7,91.
89 Orat. 32,27.
90 Orat. 34,45.
91 Orat. 24,10.
92 Orat. 35,5.
93 Orat. 36,10
94 Orat. 42,1.
95 Orat. 61,15.
96 Orat. 23,34-35.
97 Orat. 4,79.
98 Orat. 4,80.
99 Es wird zum Teil angenommen, dass Philo den Text nicht selbst formuliert hat, sondern eine Abhandlung „zitiert".
100 Philo, Prob. 1.
101 Philo, Prob. 1.
102 Philo, Prob. 24.
103 Philo, Prob. 59.
104 Philo, Prob. 60–61 (dazu auch unten zu 1. Kor 9,16-17).
105 Euripides, Frag. Nr. 495
106 Der Begriff εὐγενής („vom guten Geschlecht, edel") erscheint in den Schriften des Philo insgesamt 51-mal, und 42-mal erscheint das entsprechende Nomen εὐγένεια (einmal das Adverb

εὐγενῶς). Dabei wird der Begriff sehr häufig parallel zum Begriff ἐλεύτερος („frei") verwendet (z.B. Agr. 59; Ebr. 58; Migr. 67; Abr. 38.251; Ios. 106; Virt. 222; Prob.119.123.149; Legat. 215.332).

107 Philo, Prob. 99f.

108 Philo, Prob. 101.

109 Philo, Prob. 158f.

110 Philo, 2QGen. 5.

111 Philo, 2QGen. 11.

112 Philo, Sacr. 27; Virt. 182; zudem Philo, Mos. 2,29.72; Spec. 2,88; Virt. 90; Legat. 203.

113 Eph 4,2; Kol 3,12; Phil 2,1-3; auch Phil 4,8; Eph 4,25-32; 5,3-5.8-9. In den zwei erwähnten Listen bei Philo (Sacr. 27; Virt. 182) erscheinen folgende Begriffe, die an diesen Stellen in den Paulusbriefen ebenfalls erscheinen: ἀλήθεια, δικαιοσύνη beziehungsweise δίκαιος, κοινωνία, πραότης beziehungsweise πραΰτητος, χρηστότης beziehungsweise χρηστός, ἀγαθότης beziehungsweise ἀγαθωσύνη und σεμνός; zudem werden verwandte Begriffe verwendet wie z.B. ψευδολογία – ψεῦδος beziehungsweise μωρολογία; εὐθυμία – ἐπιθυμία.

114 Leg. 1,68.

115 Dazu u. a. Rehrl, *Problem*, 147-149; Wengst, *Demut*, 35-37.

116 Der Ausdruck ταπεινὸς τῆς καρδίας („demütig in Bezug auf das Herz/von Herzen") erscheint auch in OdSal 8,87 (= AddDan 3,87) sowie in ActPhil 132,2 und in ActThom 66,7. In Sir 25,23 erscheint der Ausdruck „ein niedriges/demütiges Herz" (καρδία ταπεινή; vgl. Sir 2,17). Nach Dan 5,22 hat Belsazar sein Herz nicht gedemütigt (LXX: οὐκ ἐταπείνωσας τὴν καρδίαν σου), und in Ps 34,19 werden diejenigen, die ein „zerbrochenes Herz" haben, mit denjenigen identifiziert, die einen „zerschlagenen Geist" haben, wobei die LXX von den „Niedrigen/Demütigen in Bezug auf den Geist" (τοὺς ταπεινοὺς τῷ πνεύματι) spricht (vgl. auch PsLXX 50,19; 106,12). Und gemäß 2. Chr 32,26 demütigte sich Hiskia „in dem Hochmut seines Herzens", wobei sein Herz nach 2. Chr 32,27 weich wurde und er sich vor Gott demütigte. In TestRub 6,10 und TestJos 10,2 erscheint jeweils der Ausdruck ἐν ταπεινώσει καρδίας („in Erniedrigung/Demütigung des Herzens"), und nach Sib 8,840 soll man „im Herzen niedrig gesinnt sein" (ἐν καρδίᾳ τε ταπεινοφρονεῖν).

117 Dazu 1QM 14,7; 1QHa 6,14; 4Q521 2,2.

118 Dazu 1QM 11,10; 1QHa 23,16; 4Q417 2,1,11; 4Q428 1,4,5.

119 Das gleiche Wort, das in hebräischen Übersetzungen in Mt 5,3 erscheint („gering, niedrig"), erinnert nicht nur an Qumran-Texte (vgl. 1QM 14,7; 1QHa 6,14; 4Q521 2,2), sondern erscheint auch z.B. in Ps 37,11 und Jes 61,1 und somit in AT-Texten, an die sich die Seligpreisungen offensichtlich anlehnen.

120 Dazu Rehrl, *Demut*, 147-149; vgl. Rehrl, „Demut III. Neues Testament" in *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* 4. Auflage Band 8 (1981) (463–465) 465.

121 Auch K. Wengst, „‚... einander in Demut für vorzüglicher halten ...' Zum Begriff ‚Demut' bei Paulus und in paulinischer Tradition" in W. Schrage (Hg.), *Studien zum Text und zur Ethik des Neuen Testaments* (FS Heinrich Greeven; Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986) (428–439) 431: „Wer formuliert, daß er sowohl das eine als auch das andere vermag, im Mangel zu leben und auch im Überfluß, ist kaum von Haus aus ein Armer. Die Lebensweise als ταπεινός ist daher für Paulus offenbar nicht ihm von vornherein vorgegebener Zwang, sondern bewußte Wahl."

122 Hinter der Selbstbezeichnung des Paulus als „Diener" (διάκονος) steht nach Roloff, „wie 2Kor 4,5 andeutet, chronologische Reflexion". „Die Dienstnorm der Jünger Jesu (Mk 10,44) wird hier, wie die wörtlichen Anklänge erweisen, aufgenommen". J. Roloff, *Die Kirche im Neuen Testament* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993) 133. Paulus setzt in diesen Ausführungen offenbar die Ermahnung Jesu an die Jünger voraus und lehnt sich daran an, wobei weniger deutlich ist, ob der Text, wie er in Mt 20,27 („euer Sklave") oder in Mk10,44 („aller Sklave") überliefert ist, vorausgesetzt wird. Während 1. Kor 9,19 („allen habe ich mich zum Sklaven gemacht") eher an Mk 10,44 denken lässt, deutet 2. Kor 4,5 („euer Sklave") auf Mt 20,27 hin. Es ist durchaus möglich und wahrscheinlich, dass der Matthäus-Text dem Paulus bekannt war. Nach Häusser bestehen von dem Logion in Mk 10,45 par. auch Verbindungen zu 1. Kor 15,3ff., Phil 2,6ff. und Gal 4,4f.; vgl. D. Häusser, *Christusbekenntnis und Jesusüberlieferung bei Paulus* (WUNT II/210; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006) 113, 143, 252-259, 281-283, 291-292, 321, 350–354.

123 Zur Verbindung zwischen Mk 10,45 (= Mt 20,28) zu Phil 2,6ff. vgl. auch Häusser, *Christusbekenntnis*, 252–259, 281-283, 291-292 und 350-351. Nach Häusser sind auch die „Menschensohnworte" Jesu Hintergrund der paulinischen Ausführungen (241–243, 250–252 und 350).

124 Vgl. Feldmeier, *Macht*, 13-15. Er betont mit Recht, dass sowohl das Leben als auch das Sterben Jesu unter der Kategorie des Dienstes zusammengefasst werden müssen (*Macht*, 129). „Insofern die Nachfolger der dienenden Lebenshingabe Jesu ihr Leben verdanken, insofern sie als Glaubende ‚in Christus' eine ‚neue Schöpfung' sind, werden sie nicht nur durch Jesu Vorbild auf ein anderes Verhalten verpflichtet, sondern in der durch seine Hingabe gestifteten Gemeinschaft, ‚in Christus' auch dazu befähigt, weil er als der erhöhte Herr dort ‚mitten unter ihnen' ist, weil sein Geist in

ihnen ‚wohnt' und sie ‚treibt' – und weil der durch ihn als ‚Vater' nahe gekommene Gott ihnen ‚alles schenkt'" (129-130).

125 Darauf wird im nächsten Punkt noch einzugehen sein.

126 M.E. ist der Philipperbrief wenige Tage oder maximal ein paar Wochen nach dem Epheser-, dem Kolosser- und dem Philemonbrief geschrieben worden.

127 Dazu V. H. T. Nguyen, *Christian Identity in Corinth: A Comparative Study of 2 Corinthians, Epictetus and Valerius Maximus* (WUNT II/243; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008) 78-80.

128 Dazu Eckhart Schnabel, *Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther* (HTA; Wuppertal: Brockhaus und Gießen: Brunnen, 2006) 94.

129 So Th. Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht. Zur sozialen und politischen Funktion der zweiten Sophistik in der griechischen Welt der Kaiserzeit* (Zetemata 97; München: Beck, 1997) 117.

130 Auffallend ist in diesem Zusammenhang auch, dass der Begriff φρονέω κτλ. in chronologischer Hinsicht in den Paulusbriefen zum ersten Mal im 1. Korintherbrief erscheint (1. Kor 4,10; 10,15; 11,22; 13,11; 14,20).

131 Vgl. 1. Kor 9,16-17: „…ein Zwang liegt mir auf … Wenn ich dies nämlich freiwillig tue, so habe ich Lohn [zu erwarten], wenn aber unfreiwillig, so bin ich [nur] mit einer Verwaltung betraut". Nach Philo kann nur ein Sklave gezwungen werden (ἀναγκάζεται), etwas zu tun, während der freie Mann nicht gezwungen werden kann und nie „unfreiwillig" (ἄκων) handelt (Philo, Prob. 9,60f.; vgl. Prob. 3,21f.). Der Begriff ἑκών wird von ihm etwa im Sinn von „in freier Entscheidung" verwendet (vgl. Philo, Deus 10,47), während ἄκων das Gegenteil zum Ausdruck bringt im Sinn von „nicht in eigener/freier Entscheidung, sondern auf Grund einer Entscheidung von anderen". Dementsprechend sollte ἑκών wohl eher mit „in eigener Absicht" oder ähnlich wiedergegeben werden (vgl. P.G. Gardner, *The Gifts of God and the Authentication of a Christian: An Exegetical Study of 1 Corinthians 8:1–11:1*, Lanham: University Press of America, 1994, 92). Es ist gut möglich, dass Paulus sich seinerseits mit diesen Ausführungen von den Personen in Korinth „abheben" wollte, die sich rühmten, dass die Leiter „frei" seien und nicht zur Arbeit gezwungen werden könnten, während die Sklaven zur Arbeit gezwungen wurden; vgl. D. Martin, *Slavery as Salvation: The Metaphor of Slavery in Pauline Christianity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990) 82. Als Apostel ist Paulus zwar „frei" (1. Kor 9,1.19), doch hat er sich selbst „allen zum Sklaven gemacht, damit ich möglichst viele gewinne" (1. Kor 9,19). Das geschieht aus voller Überzeugung und in diesem Sinn nicht „unfreiwillig". Es ist auch zu beachten, dass Paulus nicht über seine Gefühle, sondern über seinen Status in Christus spricht; vgl. J. Héring, *The First Epistle of Saint Paul to the Corinthians* (London: Epworth, 1962) 80.

132 Cranfield versteht die paulinische Aussage in dem Sinn, dass vom Glauben die Rede sei, der allen gleichermaßen zugeteilt worden sei; vgl. C.E.B. Cranfield, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans: Introduction and Commentary on Romans IX–XVI and Essays* (ICC; Edinburgh: Clark, 1979) 613–616. In Röm 14,1 ist von den „Schwachen im Glauben" die Rede (vgl. Röm 4,19), aber das ist an unserer Stelle nicht das Thema.

133 Dazu auch Lk 1,51; 2. Tim 3,2; Jak 4,6; 1. Petr 5,5. Der ὑπερήφανος wird dabei immer wieder dem „Niedrigen" beziehungsweise „Demütigen" gegenübergestellt.

134 Vgl. Röm 12,4-6 mit Eph 4,7.15f.; Röm 12,8.13 mit Eph 4,28; Röm 12,12c mit Kol 4,2a; Röm 12,19 mit Eph 4,27.

135 Z.B. Stobaeus, Ecl. 2,59,4.

136 Siegfried Wibbing, *Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge im Neuen Testament und ihre Traditionsgeschichte unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Qumran-Texte* (Berlin: Töpelmann, 1959) 18.

137 Vgl. Wengst, „… einander", 434.

138 Wengst, „… einander", 436.

139 Feldmeier, *Macht*, 85-86.

Obstacles on All Sides: Paul's Collection for the Saints in Jerusalem
Part 1

Christoph Stenschke

RÉSUMÉ DE LA PREMIÈRE PARTIE

Dans la première partie de cet article, l'auteur situe la collecte organisée par Paul en faveur des saints de Jérusalem dans le contexte de la vie de l'apôtre et expose brièvement sa raison d'être et sa mise en œuvre. Il considère en détail cinq obstacles que l'apôtre devait surmonter du côté des donateurs pagano-chrétiens (en particulier les Corinthiens) et comment il y a fait face. Dans la culture de ces gens, les bienfaiteurs pourvoyaient à un besoin de leur cité et recevaient pour cela reconnaissance publique et honneur. Les sentiments anti-judaïsme étaient très répandus dans la société. En outre, les relations de Paul avec les chrétiens de Corinthe étaient tendues et il avait des adversaires influents, à la fois à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur de leur communauté. En demandant aux chrétiens de Corinthe une participation à la collecte, Paul paraissait aussi changer considérablement de politique en matière financière et cela appelait des explications. Il est aussi possible que ces chrétiens aient déjà pris d'autres engagements financiers, ce qui pouvait les rendre peu disposés à contribuer à un nouveau projet. Ainsi, la réconciliation que Paul cherchait à produire en organisant la collecte paraissait avoir un coût élevé.

Dans la seconde partie, l'auteur considérera les obstacles qui existaient du côté des destinataires de la collecte à Jérusalem et comment Paul a dû y faire face, pour autant que l'on puisse le déterminer. Enfin, il traitera des obstacles qu'il pouvait y avoir du côté de Paul lui-même et comment il les a surmontés ou ignorés. Il proposera ensuite quelques implications pour le ministère de réconciliation dans le monde actuel.

* * * * * * * *

SUMMARY OF PART 1

The first part of this essay places Paul's collection for the saints in Jerusalem in the context of Paul's biography and briefly discusses its origin and development. It examines in detail five obstacles to be overcome on the side of the Gentile Christian donors (in particular the Corinthians) and Paul's response to each of them. The Gentile Christians had to overcome their understanding of benefaction as serving *local* patronage and *local* honour and the prevalent anti-Judaism of the ancient world. In addition, Paul's relationship with the Corinthians was strained and there were influential opponents in the community and from outside. In demanding the Corinthians to participate, Paul also seemed to take a sharp turn in his financial policy which needed explanation. There also might have been previous other financial engagement of the Corinthians that made them reluctant to participate in another project. It becomes clear that the reconciliation which Paul sought to procure through the collection came at a high price.

Part two will examine the obstacles on the side of the recipients of the collection in Jerusalem and Paul's likely response to them as far as it can be reconstructed. In addition, it will discuss the obstacles on Paul's side and how he addressed or neglected them. A final section will provide a summary and draw out some of the implications for the ministry of reconciliation in today's world.

* * * * * * * *

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG VON TEIL 1

Der erste Teil dieses Aufsatzes stellt die Sammlung von Paulus für die Heiligen in Jerusalem in den Zusammenhang seiner Biographie und setzt sich kurz mit dem Ursprung und der Entwicklung dieses Sammlungsprojektes auseinander. Dann folgt eine detaillierte Untersuchung von fünf Hindernissen, die seitens der heidenchristlichen Geber zu überwinden sind (insbesondere auf Seiten der Korinther), und die Erwiderung von Paulus auf jedes von ihnen. Die Heidenchristen mussten ihr Verständnis

von Wohltätigkeit, die einer *ortsansässigen* Klientel und den dazugehörigen Ehrenvorstellungen dient, und den vorherrschenden Antijudaismus in der antiken Welt überwinden. Außerdem war die Beziehung des Paulus zu den Korinthern gespannt und es gab einflussreiche Gegenspieler in und außerhalb der Gemeinde. Durch seine an die Korinther gerichtete Aufforderung, sich an dem Projekt zu beteiligen, schien Paulus eine scharfe Kehrtwende in seiner Finanzpolitik vorzunehmen, die einer Erklärung bedurfte. Auch könnte es andere, vorherige finanzielle Verpflichtungen der Korinther gegeben haben, was zu ihrer widerstrebenden Haltung in Bezug auf ein weiteres finanzielles Projekt geführt haben mag. Es wird deutlich, dass die Versöhnung, die Paulus durch die Sammlung anstrebt, einen hohen Preis gekostet hat.

Der zweite Teil wird sich mit den Hindernissen seitens der Empfänger in Jerusalem befassen und mit der vermutlichen Antwort von Paulus an sie, so weit dies rekonstruiert werden kann. Darüberhinaus werden die Hürden auf Seiten von Paulus selbst erörtert, und wie er sie anging oder ignorierte. Der letzte Abschnitt legt eine Zusammenfassung vor und zieht einige Schlussfolgerungen daraus für den Dienst der Versöhnung in der Welt von heute.

* * * * * * *

1. Introduction

The language of reconciliation is used in the New Testament primarily for God's initiative in reconciling sinful humanity to himself. God took the initiative, provided the means of reconciliation and now offers it to all who believe (see e.g. 2 Cor 5:18-20).[1] This reconciliation is the foundation and mandate for reconciliation between humans.[2] While the language of reconciliation hardly appears in this context in the New Testament, what is meant by it appears over and over again in other terms. The theme is so prominent in the Bible and in the society, in the churches and in families that we cannot ignore it. This article is devoted to a New Testament example and model of reconciliation between different groups of people. It argues that already in early Christianity reconciliation had to overcome major obstacles on all sides and that it came at a high price.

Before entering a new phase in his mission ministry in the West at the end of his third missionary journey (Rom 15:22-32), Paul returned once more to Jerusalem with a delegation of Christians which represented the predominantly Gentile Christian communities which he had founded in the Eastern Mediterranean world (Acts 20:4-5). They brought with them a substantial sum of money for the poor Christians in Jerusalem. The funds were meant to meet the material needs, but for Paul far more was at stake: the collection was intended as an expression of Gentile Christian recognition of debt to Israel/Jewish Christianity and as an effort of reconciliation and mutual recognition between some Jewish and Gentile Christians.

Paul made high demands on all the people involved in this project: for the *Gentile Christians*, Jerusalem was far away; therefore no bestowal of local honour was to be expected in return for contributing to the collection. In addition, in the context of ancient anti-Judaism, the Jews were a suspected minority in the Roman Empire, and bestowing benefactions on them was not a natural choice. For the *Jewish Christians of Jerusalem* to accept the donation – and with the sum of money also its donors – implied the recognition of these Gentiles as part of the people of God (at least this was what Paul had in mind) and a relegation of their own ancient Jewish privileges. The delivery of the collection and its acceptance, perhaps impressively staged by Paul (earlier on, Paul had brought the Gentile Christian Titus with him to Jerusalem; Gal 2:1-3), would happen in Jerusalem and not remain a private, inner Christian matter. Jewish Christians who relativised Jewish privileges in this way would have to face resistance and criticism from fellow Jews in a politically increasingly tense climate in the 25 years leading up to the first Jewish war (AD 66-73). *Paul* had to delay his own plans, travel East once more and face a number of risks.

While we do not know what precisely happened in Jerusalem in the early summer of the year AD 56 or 57, when Paul eventually arrived to deliver the funds which he had collected,[3] Paul's effort of reconciliation between followers of Jesus of different backgrounds still poses a major challenge to Christians of all sorts and all ages despite its salvation-historical particularity: Whom are they willing to recognise as part of God's people? What are they willing to sacrifice for each other? Are they ready to acknowledge each other publicly? While the focus of this essay is primarily historical-exegetical, it also draws out the implications for Christians facing the challenge of reconciliation. For the New Testament, the horizontal and vertical dimension of reconciliation must not be separated.

We shall first briefly survey the origin and development of Paul's collection for the saints of Jerusalem.[4] Then we shall examine what was involved on the side of the Gentile Christian donors, with a particular focus on Corinth. Which obstacles had to be overcome in getting involved? How did Paul address these obstacles? Thereafter we will examine the obstacles on the side of the Jewish Christians in Jerusalem. How did or would Paul address them? Finally, we will see what obstacles Paul himself had to overcome. In a final section we shall draw out the implications for reconciliation between Christians of different backgrounds and traditions in our day and age. It will become clear that reconciliation came at a high price for those Paul wanted to reconcile to each other and for Paul, the reconciler, himself. Paul lost his freedom during this visit to Jerusalem and spent several years in prison.

2. The origin and development of Paul's collection for the saints

The origin of Paul's collection enterprise is not fully clear. Two passages are of interest for this question, and both raise a number of issues.

If *Galatians* is to be dated early,[5] then Galatians 2:10 is chronologically the first reference to some kind of collection in which Paul was involved. On Paul's second visit to Jerusalem as a Christian (according to his own account in Gal 1-2), he met with leaders of the Jerusalem Christian congregation (2:2) and reached an agreement with them (2:9). They accepted Paul and his ministry among the Gentiles and placed only one obligation on him, namely 'that we remember the poor, which was actually what I was eager to do' (2:10; Paul had come with Barnabas and Titus, 2:1). The note has a private character (a personal charge to Paul, Barnabas and Titus, not to all the Gentiles that he/they had and was/were about to convert). Probably at a later stage during his so-called second and third missionary journeys,[6] Paul extended this charge to all the Christians within his sphere of ministry. Even if Galatians is to be dated late,[7] Paul is not referring to the present time of writing anyway but to events some fourteen or seventeen years after his calling.[8] Even with a late date, this would still be an indication concerning the origin of the collection.

Many have noted the strange absence of the collection in Acts.[9] There may be a cryptic reference to it in Acts 24:17 where it might appear in the disguise of private piety: 'I came to bring alms to my nation and to offer sacrifices.'[10] Acts 20:4 mentions the delegates from various areas of Paul's previous ministry who met with him at the end of the third missionary journey in order to travel with him to Jerusalem. Although this is the beginning of the third 'we-passage' in Acts (where the author probably indicates his personal involvement in the events), no reason is given why these delegates came to Jerusalem.[11] In the context of Paul's arrival and meeting with the Christian leaders of the city, no mention is made of a collection (21:17-25; Paul was asked to pay for some rites in order to demonstrate his own Jewish identity and his loyalty to his fellow Jewish Christians; he probably did so from the collection fund).[12]

However, it is noteworthy that Acts tells of an early visit of Paul to Jerusalem; according to Acts, this was his second visit to the city after his conversion/calling. At that point Barnabas and Paul were sent by the Gentile Christians of Antioch to Jerusalem with a donation to relieve hunger due to a famine.[13] There are good reasons to equate this visit to Jerusalem with the visit reported in Galatians 2:1-10,[14] one of them being that both events include gifts to the poor. It was probably on this occasion that Paul met with the Jerusalem leaders (as reported in Gal 2) and they charged him to *continue* to remember the poor, which Paul was 'eager to do' (Gal 2:10).

Paul's collection for the saints in Jerusalem, as it is generally understood, comes clearer into focus during the second missionary journey. In 1 Corinthians 16:1-4, Paul addresses the collection as something that needs no further introduction as the Corinthians must have been aware of it.[15] The Corinthians are to follow the instructions which Paul also gave to the churches of Galatia (16:1). In 2 Corinthians 8-9 Paul goes to great lengths to persuade the Corinthians to overcome the obstacles to participation on their side. The last reference to the collection appears in Romans 15:22-31. Paul informs the Roman Christians about his impending journey to Jerusalem to deliver the collection. He voices his concerns regarding his own safety and the acceptance of the collection and requests their prayer support.[16]

3. Costly reconciliation then

In this section we shall *first* address the obstacles on the side of the *donors*. The references to the collection in 1 and 2 Corinthians indicate that participation from the Gentile Christians – which Paul expected and certainly demanded! – was far from obvious.[17] Paul had to use all his rhetorical skill to persuade them. We will then focus on obstacles on the side of the *recipients.* In Romans 15:31 Paul – in the form of a prayer request – voices some doubts about the acceptance of the collection: '… and that my ministry to Jerusalem may be acceptable to the saints'. What could have made the funds, which were urgently needed, 'unacceptable'? Finally we examine what obstacles the collection entailed for *Paul* himself.

In this quest we have to rely on Paul's own statements and his own estimate of the situation as no other sources are available. This involves some 'mirror-reading'. It is not clear why other New Testament authors are silent regarding Paul's collection for the saints of Jerusalem and why Paul's later letters do not mention it either. Was the collection a matter of the past that had accomplished its purpose and needed no further mention? Did Paul perhaps have good reasons not to mention the matter again as it did not achieve its intended purpose?

3.1 Obstacles on the side of the donors

There were several obstacles to participating in Paul's collection which concerned *all* Gentile Christian donors in the North-Eastern area of the Mediterranean world (Galatia, Macedonia, Achaia).

3.1.1 Local patronage and local honour

There are instances of upper class people in the ancient world serving as benefactors and recipients of public honour (for example through statues and inscriptions) in other places. For example, king Herod the Great did not only rebuild and enlarge the temple in Jerusalem and fund other projects within his realm, but also outside of it. The same applies to king Herod Agrippa I.[18] But within the prevalent ancient reciprocal system of patrons and clients, the usual praxis of benevolence was to use funds *locally* in order to gain public recognition and honour, and to enhance one's own status within the community.[19] In this context, it made little sense to donate for recipients hundreds of miles away, who were unable to reciprocate in any meaningful way. As Paul expected all Christians to be involved, there was little potential for status-enhancement within the local and translocal Christian community through generous contributions. Those contributing to Paul's collection renounced their chances to gain status at home. Ascough has rightly observed:

> For the Christian groups themselves their first priority seems to have remained their local congregations. … Paul's troubles with raising the money promised, and his rhetorical strategies in his letters to the Corinthians … suggest, that they, at least, remained unconvinced that they had a social and religious obligation to an otherwise unknown group. What confuses the Corinthians is not necessarily the fact that they have to donate, but that the monies are going to Jerusalem rather than the common fund of the local congregation.[20]

3.1.2 Ancient anti-Judaism

While some Gentiles were attracted to Judaism to varying degrees (from full proselytes to sympathising 'god-fearers'[21]) – also attested for Corinth – there was also the latent and at times violent anti-Judaism of the Roman world.[22] The account in Acts 18:12-17, located in Corinth, provides evidence of this.[23] Gentile Christians without any prior attachment to Diaspora Judaism were unlikely to donate for impoverished *Jews* of all people.

Reluctance motivated by anti-Judaism on the side of some Corinthians was all the more probable as some ancient Roman authors accused the Jews of being a lazy people[24] because of their strict Sabbath observance,[25] although it is difficult to assess how representative such views were for the wider population.[26] Thus, if some Jewish people in Jerusalem were in need, the solution was simple and obvious: let them work more and more often.

In addition, for the Corinthians there were three more obstacles which were peculiar to them:

3.1.3 Paul's quarrels with the Corinthians and the presence of opponents

Both letters to the Corinthians indicate strained relationships between Paul and some of the Corinthian Christians. While 1 Corinthians is more didactic than apologetic (here I follow Hafemann against Fee[27]), by the time Paul wrote 2 Corinthians, in addition to the various quarrels between Paul and the Corinthians regarding doctrine and ethics, there were a number of fierce opponents in Corinth. Hafemann describes the problems as follows:

> By the time Paul wrote 2 Corinthians everything had changed. For a while, between the writing of 1 and 2 Corinthians, the church as

a whole was in open rebellion against Paul and his gospel due to the influence of Paul's opponents who had recently arrived (cf. 2 Cor 11:4). Since then a significant segment of the church had repented and returned to Paul's side. But Paul's apostolic authority is no longer common ground between Paul and his entire church. There is still a sizeable opposition to Paul among the Corinthians, with Paul's opponents lurking behind them. As a result, the church now stands divided over Paul and his legitimacy as an apostle. ... Hence, whereas the problems in 1 Corinthians were within the church, the central problem to be solved in 2 Corinthians is the authority and legitimacy of Paul as an apostle.[28]

Regarding the strategy of the opponents, Hafemann notes:

By the time of 2 Corinthians, however, Paul's opponents had arrived from outside Corinth and had capitalized on the Corinthians' over-realized eschatology, preaching a view of Christ and of the Spirit that the Corinthians were open to receiving (2 Cor 11:4). Instead of calling the Corinthians to endure faithfully in the midst of adversity in hope of their future resurrection and vindication, Paul's opponents promised the Corinthians a life in the Spirit that was characterized by deliverance from suffering and by a steady diet of miraculous experience.

If this reconstruction of their teaching is correct, some Corinthians or the opponents there might have suggested a simple and obvious solution to the needs of the Christians of Jerusalem: let them simply live in the Spirit and experience divine deliverance from their suffering! And let the money stay in Corinth! Whatever is donated for Jerusalem is no longer available for Paul's opponents who would readily accept gifts from the Corinthians.

3.1.4 Paul's financial policy in Corinth

Another obstacle was peculiar to Corinth. While ministering there Paul had refused to accept money (although he defends his right to do so in 1 Cor 9:1-14) and insisted on meeting his needs through his own manual labour.[29] Paul refused to depend on the local upper class Christian patrons whose client he would have become by accepting their support.[30] Furnish spells out the implications of this decision:

In the ancient world, giving and receiving, placing someone under and being oneself placed under financial obligation were extremely important components of the social structure. Thus, within Roman society specifically – and the Corinth Paul knew was a Roman colony – the wealthy expressed and enhanced their power by becoming patrons of the needy. The extent of one's philanthropies and the number of one's clients were important measures of a person's social standing and influence . To be the recipient of a benefaction was to be placed immediately under an obligation of gratitude to the benefactor, and the gratitude of the beneficiary in turn placed the benefactor under further obligation.... Therefore, to accept a gift was to become a client of and dependent upon the more privileged person, even though the patron, too, assumed the obligation of further benefaction. At base, the relationship sprang not from friendship, although the conventions of friendship were there, but from the patron's quest for power and prestige and from the client's need to be helped. One made friends by money ... and since friendship was based on benefaction, not the reverse, to refuse a benefaction was an act of social enmity, for which in Paul's day an elaborate protocol had been developed. If this social context is taken into account, it is understandable why the Corinthians were upset by Paul's refusal to accept their financial support: it was a renunciation of their status as a patron congregation (cf. 2 Cor 12:13) and therefore a repudiation of their friendship (cf. 11:11), as well as a regrettable act of self-humiliation.[31]

In addition to unavoidable dependency, such kind of relationships would have impeded Paul's mission, as Schnabel observes:

Paulus verweigert die Annahme von Unterstützung seitens einer Gemeinde, solange wegen der Annahme derselben durch gegenerische Agitationen seine Missionsarbeit in der betreffende Gemeinde bzw. das von ihm gebrachte Evangelium gestört oder gar vernichtet werden könnte. Einige Christen in Korinth meinten, Paulus hätte finanzielle Mittel von ihnen annehmen sollen (1Kor 9,1-18; 2Kor 2,17) und sich mit brillanten Redetechniken aggressiver um Erfolge kümmern müssen (vgl. 1Kor 1,17-2,5). Vielleicht handelt es sich um dieselben korinthischen Christen, die glauben, dass Paulus ihnen im Blick auf seine Reiseziele Rechenschaft schuldig sei (2Kor 1,17). Paulus betont gegenüber diesem Ansinnen von

Christen in Korinth, dass nicht nur die Inhalte und die Erfolge seiner Missionspredigt, sondern auch der *modus operandi* seiner Mission im Blick auf Redetechniken, im Blick auf seine Reisen und im Blick auf seine finanzielle Unabhängigkeit allein von Gott abhängig ist.[32]

This issue led to tensions with some Corinthians and Paul's opponents would have readily attacked his policy.[33] At the same time, Paul accepted gifts from other churches (Phil 4:10–20) and even tells the Corinthians about it in 2 Corinthians 11:8-9. Furnish observes:

> It is probable ... that the Corinthians were distressed with Paul's refusal of support from them because it seemed inconsistent with his accepting support from other congregations. In Thessalonica, for example, Paul had received contributions from the Philippians at least twice (Phil 4:16) in order to supplement what he was able to earn from his craft (see 1 Thess 2:9), and the Philippians continued their support of his ministry even after he left Macedonia (Phil 4:15). Indeed, it is likely that the aid which was brought to him in Corinth by certain brothers who came from Macedonia (2 Cor 11:9) had been sent by the Philippians. ... This would be further evidence for his critics of the inconstancy and inconsistency of which they have long suspected him.[34]

While refusing their support (with all the strings attached to it!), Paul at the same time expected the Corinthians to contribute to the collection and to provide the means for his own travelling and for his co-workers as he writes in 1 Corinthians 16: 'so that you may send me on my way, wherever I go' (v. 6); 'send him on his way in peace, so that he may come to me' (v. 11); 'I urge you to put yourselves at the service of such people, and of everyone who works and toils with them' (v. 16).

It might have seemed to some that – despite his early insistence of his independence and refusal of patronage –Paul was now trying to get at their money after all.[35] Could Paul be trusted? Would the money really go to Jerusalem?

Some of this happened when Paul's opponents readily accepted payments from the Corinthians and for these reasons would have opposed sending money to Jerusalem. Hafemann observes:

> Moreover, Paul's opponents sealed their claims by demanding money from the Corinthians as a sign of the value and legitimacy of their message (2 Cor 2:17). But in order to make these claims and demand this payment they had to attack Paul himself and his apostolic legitimacy, which called both their gospel and their lifestyle into question.[36]

3.1.5 Previous other financial engagement of the Corinthians?

Perhaps in apparent conflict with our first observation regarding reluctance in translocal involvement, a further reference needs brief attention. The last words of 2 Corinthians 9:13, 'and with all others' (καὶ εἰς πάντας), do not mean that the saints will also glorify God over the involvement of other churches (which Paul will have hoped for); they rather suggest that the Corinthians had also share(d) with *(all) other Christians*: '... the generosity of those who graciously share their resources with them and (so the saints may presume) with all Christian brothers and sisters'.[37] Although some of this sharing could and most likely will have happened *among* the Corinthians, it was not limited to local confines but directed εἰς πάντας. Martin comments: 'This should strictly mean that the Gentile congregations raised money *gifts for other churches and worthy causes other than the needs of the people at Jerusalem*.'[38] However, as we have no knowledge of such actions, Martin suggests that the phrase must be taken 'to be a general one in praise of the generous spirit that moves the readers, and would move them wherever there may be need'.[39] Yet the fact that *we* might not know of such actions does not mean that Paul simply praises a generous *attitude*. The statement should therefore be taken at face value.[40] If 'all others' refers primarily to Christians in Achaia, there would have been some direct benefits involved for the Corinthian donors, at least more benefits than from donating for Jerusalem. We do not know what role Paul may have played in this past sharing of the Corinthians.[41] Possibly this past and present sharing with 'all others' also accounts for the Corinthians' reluctance to get involved in yet another translocal project, in particular as it was a project far beyond their control. Such giving of the Corinthians would have secured them a prominent role among the Christians in Achaia. This explains the intensity of Paul's interaction with the Corinthians and his opponents there.

3.2 Paul's answer

3.2.1 First Corinthians 16

It is instructive to read Paul's letters to the Corinthians against this backdrop. This is not the place to analyse Paul's argument in detail, rather we note how he addresses these obstacles in the context of the collection enterprise and elsewhere. We cannot examine how Paul deals with his opponents and defends his apostolic ministry and his financial policy.

In 1 Corinthians 16:1-4, Paul asks the readers to follow the instructions given to the churches of Galatia, which must have been known in Corinth.[42] The collection is by no means a project designed just to get at the Corinthians' money after all but it is part of a larger project. The same instructions apply to all Christians. Paul indicates that the Galatians are also called to contribute to a translocal project. While not obvious for some Corinthians, translocal responsibility for other believers is part and parcel of Christian identity.

According to Paul *all* Corinthians are to be involved ('each of you', 16:2). Christian charity is not just a status-enhancing project for the wealthy members. Garland notes that,

> Paul's concern throughout the letter to build up horizontal relationships among the Corinthians … his expectation that everyone will take part in this project on a voluntary basis fosters this goal. If a few patrons were to give all the money, they would gain all the honor and divide the 'haves' from the 'have-nots' even more. If free artisans, small traders, and slaves also give, then the gift will represent the entire body, not just a few wealthy donors.[43]

This charge agrees with Paul's emphasis on the unity of the church throughout the letter:

> It is striking that most of the commands throughout 1 Corinthians center on some aspect of church unity (cf. 1 Cor 1:10; 3:1-3; 4:14, 16; 5:4, 5, 7, 8; 6:1, 4, 6f, 18, 20; 8:9, 13; 10:14; 11:33f; 12:14, etc.). Clearly Paul's primary concern is with the true nature and life of the church, making ecclesiology the most important theme of 1 Corinthians. As the 'church of God' (1 Cor 1:1), the Corinthians are 'the temple of God', due to their reception of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor 3:16f; 14:24f); and the 'body of Christ', due to their submission to the lordship of Christ (1 Cor 6:17; 10:17; 11:29; 12:12–16, 27).[44]

In addition, the collection should be well prepared and organised: 'on the first day of every week, each of you is to put aside and save whatever extra you earn'. Garland describes several

> principles that undergird Paul's instructions for the collection. It is to be done regularly ('on the first day of every week'), universally ('let each of you'), systematically ('set aside', 'save up'), proportionately ('as one has been prospered'), and freely ('so that no collections might take place when I come').[45]

Furthermore, the Corinthians are to approve the delegates who will take the gift to Jerusalem together with a letter explaining the collection and its purpose (16:3).[46] Against all possible suspicions regarding Paul's financial policy and in particular regarding his use of funds entrusted to him, Paul emphasises and guarantees full transparency: the money will definitely *not* go through and eventually end in his own pocket.[47] Rather, delegates from Corinth and approved of by the congregation will deliver the funds directly to Jerusalem.

In addition, while for now the Corinthians had to take Paul's word for it, the delegates will eventually see the need of the Christians in Jerusalem themselves; it will become clear that they have not been naive in taking Paul's statements at face value.[48]

Paul's contribution will be an explanatory letter to Jerusalem. If it seems advisable that Paul should travel also, these delegates will accompany him (16:4; Acts 20 indicates that this option had materialised later on).

3.2.2 Second Corinthians 8

In 2 Corinthians 8-9, Paul first reports of the exemplary involvement of the Christians of Macedonia (in addition to the churches of Galatia, 1 Cor 16:1). The implementation of this 'work of grace' (8:1) is then described. Again, the collection is not exclusively aimed at the Corinthians, but a truly ecumenical project. The Macedonians are already involved translocally; they have already overcome this obstacle. Now the Corinthians are called to do likewise.

Paul exuberantly praises the Macedonians for their generous participation despite their poverty: 'for during a severe ordeal of affliction, their abundance of joy and their extreme poverty have overflowed in a wealth of generosity on their part' (2 Cor 8:2). Furnish notes: 'The apostle's comment about the extreme poverty of the churches in

Macedonia shows that he perceives the Corinthian Christians to be relatively well off.'[49] In this way Paul adds pressure to his charge. The wealthier Corinthians are not to be put to shame by the generosity of the poor Macedonian Christians. Paul's praise of the Macedonians was to challenge the Corinthians to contribute with similar commitment.[50] While for the Corinthians' local honour for such involvement was limited or non-existent, they will also receive public honouring before the wider Christian community from Paul if they contribute generously.

Paul calls the Corinthians to excel in this matter as they have excelled in others. He creates a sense of rivalry between the Christians of Macedonia and Corinth. In the ancient value system of honour and shame – where honour was a considered a limited good – this was a powerful strategy.[51] The earnestness of the Macedonians serves to challenge and to prove the genuineness of the Corinthians' love (v. 8).[52] They were to complete now what they had begun in the past (v. 10-13).

Paul refers to the 'generous act' of the Jewish *Messiah*, the Lord Jesus *Christ*, who, though he was rich, yet for the readers' sake he became poor, so that by his poverty they might become rich (8:9). Christ's example challenges all notions of reciprocity and status gain.

In 2 Corinthians 8:12-13, Paul describes Christian sharing and his vision of fair balance. He relates the contribution of the Corinthians to the recipients in Jerusalem ('others', v. 13) and shows that the collection was not to be a one-way enterprise. Currently the abundance of the Corinthians can supply the need of the 'saints' there. However, a time might come when the Corinthians will benefit from the abundance of others (8:13-14). There is to be equality and mutuality. What Paul has in mind is different from ancient patronage and benefaction. The Christians of different places and regions are interrelated: they are responsible for each other, not only in prayer but also materially.[53] This principle is motivated by a quotation from the Exodus story of God's provision for Israel.

Paul then mentions several other people who are involved (the collection is far from a private project of Paul!) and again emphasises full transparency (v. 16-24). The response of the Corinthians is a matter before all the churches – in honour or in shame (again, there is concern beyond local confines[54]). Regarding Paul's emissaries, Murphy O'Connor notes:

> Once before, however, the Corinthians had given their assent and then done nothing. This time Paul was not prepared to rely on words alone, and decided to send emissaries to Corinth, whose presence would be a continuous reminder of his invitation. Even such discreet pressure, however, might be resented by the Corinthians as interference in the internal affairs of a local church. Paul's nervousness is palpable in his presentation of Titus. He emphasizes that he is not really sending Titus, as 8:6 might imply. The latter had volunteered to return to Corinth in response to Paul's appeal (8:17)![55]

Titus shares the eagerness for the Corinthians and is on his way to Corinth of his own accord (v. 16-17). He will be accompanied by another unnamed Christian, sent by Paul, who is 'famous among all the churches for his proclamation of the good news'.[56] The Corinthians should not disappoint a man thus qualified! In addition, this brother 'has also been appointed by the churches to travel with us while we are administering this generous undertaking for the glory of the Lord himself and to show our goodwill' (v. 19). The Corinthians are to hear from this man himself that other churches fully participate in the collection and have already appointed this delegate to travel with Paul to Jerusalem – at a time when the Corinthians had not even really started with the collection! This prominent Christian also serves as an independent witness to the Corinthians and the churches who sent him regarding the integrity of Paul and the events during the journey and in Jerusalem.

Far from being a project to enhance Paul's personal status, the collection's prime purpose is 'for the glory of the Lord himself' and 'to show our goodwill' (probably an inclusive plural: Paul and all the other participants, v. 19). Neither is this act of benefaction designed to bring honour to the *donors*. Its purpose is the glory of the Lord himself so generous participation is mandatory. The gratitude of the recipients will be directed primarily to God (v. 12). At the same time, God will provide every blessing in return (v. 8-15).

In verses 20-21 Paul openly asserts his concern for his integrity and transparency in the matter. Thus the Corinthians should dismiss their reservations against Paul and wholeheartedly participate. In addition to Titus and the unnamed brother, Paul will send even another Christian to Corinth, whom he has often tested and found eager in many matters. This brother is more eager than ever to come to Corinth and be involved there in the preparation of the collection because of his great confidence in the Corinthians (v. 22). This eagerness and confidence in them, the Corinthians should better not disappoint.[57]

Paulus closes with a warm recommendation of Titus: 'he is my partner and co-worker *in your service*'.[58] Through the sending of these men, Paul is not trying to exploit the Corinthians for his purposes, but to minister to them. Far more is behind their impending visit to Corinth than Paul's authority and commission: these men come 'as messengers of the churches, the glory of Christ' (v. 23). In view of these visitors and witnesses and the ecumenical perspective which they constitute, Paul admonishes the Corinthians once more: 'Therefore openly before the churches, show them the proof of your love and of our reason for boasting about you' (v. 24). Participation in the collection is an opportunity for them to prove their love of the Lord and of their fellow Christians. Paul has already boasted about the Corinthians' participation to other Christians and thus has already enhanced their status within the wider Christian community. There they already have received honour through him so they should not let Paul down but act according to their determination and Paul's boasting. The response of the Corinthians is a matter before all the churches (again, there is to be concern beyond local confines).

3.2.3 Second Corinthians 9

In 2 Corinthians 9:1-5, Paul again draws on ancient notions of honour, acknowledging the Corinthians' virtues: 'for I know your eagerness'. He has already boasted about this to the Christians of Macedonia and thus honoured the Corinthians (v. 2). Murphy O'Connor writes regarding Paul's argumentation:

> Even though he has to stretch the truth to do so, he praises what can be praised – the willingness of the Corinthians (although it was now a year old; 9:2) – and sedulously avoids even a hint of criticism. He explicitly states that he is not ordering them to contribute (8:8a), but merely expressing his opinion (8:10). The example of the Macedonians is introduced in such a way as to permit the Corinthians' self-respect to function as an internal incentive. In order to assuage any possible anxiety on their part as to the sum expected, he is at pains to emphasize that their attitude is more important than the value of the gift (8:12). Near the end, however, a hint of the old Paul surfaces in the way he highlights the possibility that he and the Corinthians might be humiliated by the much poorer Macedonian church (9:4). Fortunately, he immediately excludes the hint of moral blackmail, by denying that he wants to extort money from them (9:5).[59]

By mentioning the Macedonian Christians to the Corinthians, Paul indicates that he readily informs and praises the good that other Christians do and in this way bestows honour on them. Although participation in the collection may not serve to enhance local status, elsewhere this surely happens. Paul's earlier report of the Achaians' zeal (including the Corinthians) in contributing to the collection has stirred up most of the Macedonians in their participation. (At the beginning of chapter 8, Paul praised the Macedonians to the Corinthians in order to spurn them on.) This is the background to Paul's sending of the three brothers:

> But I am sending the brothers in order that our boasting about you [to the Macedonians] may not prove to have been empty in this case, so that you may be ready, as I said [to the Macedonians] you would be; otherwise, if some Macedonians come with me [to Corinth, in addition to the three brothers?] and find that you are not ready, we would be humiliated – to say nothing of you – in this undertaking [shame rather than honour for Paul and for the Corinthians]. So I thought it necessary to urge the brothers to go on ahead to you, and arrange in advance for this bountiful gift that you have promised [a reminder of their previous commitment], so that it may be ready as a voluntary gift and not as an extortion (v. 3-5).

In verses 6-14, Paul outlines the *spiritual* benefits of being involved in this charitable project. What the donors forfeit in local recognition and honour, they will receive abundantly from God. In view of this prospect, they have all the more reason to give cheerfully. For their great generosity, they will be in every way enriched by God (v. 11). There will be thanksgiving, not addressed to the Corinthians, but to God. By sharing in this ministry, they glorify God by their obedience to the confession of the Gospel of Christ, the Jewish Messiah and they glorify God through their generosity in sharing with the Christians of Jerusalem and all other Christians (v. 13). In addition to these spiritual benefits, the recipients will long for the Corinthians and pray for them (v. 14): 'Those who have been aided by the collection will also respond with intercessory prayers on behalf of their benefactors', which is a way for Christians to reciprocate for benefits received.[60]

3.2.4 The Messiah of Israel

In addition to Paul's careful argumentation regarding the collection in 1 and 2 Corinthians, in both letters we also observe Paul's thoroughly 'Jewish' theology, soteriology and pneumatology and the references to the Jews/Israel/Jewish Christians.[61] Many of these references indicate that the Gentile Christians of Corinth, Achaia and elsewhere have already benefitted tremendously from God's salvation which was primarily intended for his people Israel, into which the Gentile Christians were included.[62] Therefore there is an existing obligation on their side toward Israel: rather than graciously extending their generosity to the Christians of Jerusalem, the Corinthians owe it to them, as Paul writes in Romans 15:27.

A few notes have to suffice: Paul is the apostle of the Jewish *Messiah* Jesus (1 Cor 1:1). The Corinthians are among those who call the name of the Lord Jesus *Christ* (1:2, and many other references to the *Christ*). Jews and Gentiles both fail in view of God's revelation in Christ crucified (1:22-23); the Corinthians have no reason for feeling superior (1:26-28). The Gospel had been brought to them by Jewish Christian leaders (1:12; 9:5; all witnesses of the resurrection were Jews, 15:5-8). There is no room for judgement (4:1-4) or arrogance (4:6-13) on the side of the Corinthians. A number of severe ethical failures among Gentile *Christians* deconstruct all claims and feelings of superiority over the Jews (chapter 5). Paul reminds the readers of their own ignominious past (6:9-11). In view of this, they are not in the position to lecture anyone on ethics (i.e. to work harder). The quotations and allusions to the Old Testament and the references to the history of Israel in both letters show *where* the authority really lies and *whose* past is relevant for the present:[63] what happened in Israel's distant past in a sense happened and was recorded for the present readers' instruction (10:1-22). In the language of the Jews, they cry out 'Maranatha' (16:22). Judea remains an important point of reference for Paul (2 Cor 1:16). Israel saw the glory of God in the face of their God-appointed leader Moses (3:7, 13-16). The promise in 2 Corinthians 6:16-18 was first given to Israel: they were God's sons and daughters. In addition, several statements in both letters leave no doubt that – probably contrary to their own assessment – many Corinthian Christians have little to boast about.

Thus, for Gentile Christians, sharing in the widespread anti-Judaism of the ancient world is not acceptable at all. What Paul writes to the Romans, namely that the Gentile Christians have a debt to repay to Israel (Rom 15:27) also applies to the Corinthians.[64]

Space does not permit us to outline in detail how Paul defends his own disputed apostolic status and ministry in both letters. Paul also explains his 'financial policy' over against the Corinthians and against likely attempts of patronage and the implications which this kind of relationship would have implied on his side.

Dr Christoph W. Stenschke teaches New Testament in Germany and as professor in South Africa.

Endnotes

1 For surveys see Ralph P. Martin, *Reconciliation: A Study of Paul's Theology*, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1990); Cilliers Breytenbach, *Grace, Reconciliation, Concord. The Death of Christ in Graeco-Roman Metaphors* (NT.S 135; Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2010) and Stanley E. Porter, 'Reconciliation as the Heart of Paul's Missionary Theology' in T.J. Burke and B.S. Rosner (eds), *Paul as Missionary: Identity, Activity, Theology, and Practice* (LiNTS 428; London: T. & T. Clark Continuum, 2011) 169-179.

2 This reconciliation can happen through God's initiative (a prominent example is Eph 2:11–20 which speaks of the reconciliation between Jews and Gentiles) or people are called to reconcile themselves to each other (see, for example, Mt 5:24).

3 For the dates see Rainer Riesner, 'Pauline Chronology' in Stephen Westerholm (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to Paul* (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2011) 9-29.

4 For a recent survey see David J. Downs, *The Offering of the Gentiles. Paul's Collection for Jerusalem and Its Chronological, Cultural and Cultic Contexts* (WUNT II.248; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008); for issues of poverty in the Greco-Roman world and in the Pauline literature see Bruce W. Longenecker, *Remember the Poor. Paul, Poverty and the Greco-Roman World* (Grand Rapids, Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2010) and my review in the present issue.

5 Presupposing the so-called South-Galatian theory, i.e. the recipients are in the Roman province of

Galatia; for the full argument see D.A. Carson and D.J. Moo, *An Introduction to the New Testament*, second edn (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2005) 458-468.

6 For a survey of Paul's mission see Eckhard J. Schnabel, *Paul, the Missionary. Realities, Strategies and Methods* (Nottingham: IVP/Apollos, 2008) 39-122.

7 For the arguments see Carson & Moo, *Introduction*, 460-461.

8 Three years and fourteen years, Galatians 1:18 and 2:1; for discussion see Riesner, 'Chronology'.

9 See the survey in David J. Downs, 'Paul's Collection and the Book of Acts Revisited' in *New Testament Studies* 52 (2006) 50-70.

10 On this statement see Jerome Murphy O'Connor, *Paul. A Critical Life* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996) 348.

11 See Carson & Moo, *Introduction*, 290-291.

12 See the reconstruction of the events in Murphy O'Connor, *Paul*, 343-346. The fact that Paul came to Jerusalem with a group of Gentile Christians who represented various areas in which he had founded churches, was probably a further reason for the request made by the Jerusalem leaders of Paul to demonstrate his own Jewish identity. The reason Luke provides this demonstration are false accusations concerning Paul's ministry in the Jewish Diaspora that had spread in Jerusalem and were believed by many Christians (Acts 20:20-25).

13 Acts 11:27-30; see Rainer Riesner, *Paul's Early Period. Chronology, Mission Strategy, Theology* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998) 125-136 and Bruce W. Winter, 'Acts and Food Shortages' in D.W.J. Gill and Conrad Gempf (eds), *Graeco-Roman Setting* (AFCS II; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Carlisle: Paternoster, 1994) 59-78. Luke does not directly mention that the church in Antioch also consisted of Jewish Christians (see Acts 11:19-20).

14 See David Wenham, 'Acts and the Pauline Corpus II. The Evidence of Parallels' in B.W. Winter and A.D. Clarke (eds), *Ancient Literary Setting* (AFCS I; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Carlisle: Paternoster, 1993) 215-258; Carson & Moo, *Introduction*, 319-320 and Holger Zeigan, *Aposteltreffen in Jerusalem. Eine forschungsgeschichtliche Studie zu Galater 2.1–10 und den möglichen lukanischen Parallelen* (ABG 18; Leipzig: EVA, 2005) 307-386.

15 For details on 1 Cor 16:1-4 and 2 Cor 8-9 see Christoph Stenschke, '"Not the only Pebble on the Beach." The Significance and Function of Paul's References to Christians Other than the Addressees in 1 and 2 Corinthians' in *Neotestamentica* 45 (2011) 331-357.

16 See Robert Jewett, *Romans: A Commentary* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007) 918-940. A number of suggestions have been made as to the conceptual background of Paul's collection (did Paul follow any known model for collecting funds from Diaspora Jews or Gentiles for Jerusalem?) which need not concern us here; for surveys see Downs, *Offering*, 3-26 and Seyoon Kim, 'Paul as an Eschatological Herald' in Burke and Rosner, *Paul*, (9-24) 18-23.

17 We do not know whether there were the same or other problems involved for the donors in Galatia and Macedonia.

18 For a survey see Emil Schürer, Geza Vermes and Fergus Millar, *The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 B.C – A.D. 135)* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1973) I, 304-305, 308 and Bo Reicke, *The New Testament Era. The World of the Bible from 500 B.C. to A.D. 100* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1968) 200.

19 For surveys see Peter Lampe, 'Paul, Patrons, and Clients' in J.P. Sampley (ed.), *Paul and the Greco-Roman World. A Handbook* (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 2003) 488-523; Jonathan Marshall, *Jesus, Patrons, and Benefactors. Roman Palestine and the Gospel of Luke* (WUNT II.259; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009) 24-173 and Kunio Nojima, *Ehre und Schande in Kulturanthropologie und biblischer Theologie* (Wuppertal, Wien: Arco Wissenschaft, 2011) 143-246. In addition, David Garland, *1 Corinthians* (BECNT; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003) 752.

20 Richard S. Ascough, 'Translocal Relationships Among Voluntary Associations and Early Christianity' in *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 5 (1997) (223-241) 237.

21 See J.E. Burns, 'Conversion and Proselytism' in *The Eerdmans Dictionary of Early Judaism* (Grand Rapids, Cambridge U.K.: Eerdmans, 2010) 484-486.

22 For a survey see G. Bohak, 'Gentile Attitudes Toward Jews and Judaism', in *Eerdmans Dictionary*, 668-670. For more detail see Louis H. Feldman, *Jew and Gentile in the Ancient World. Attitudes and Interactions from Alexander to Justinian* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Peter Schäfer, *Judeophobia. Attitudes toward the Jews in the Ancient World* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1997) and Christoph Stenschke, 'Apologetik, Polemik und Mission. Der Umgang mit der Religiosität der „anderen"' in K. Erlemann *et al.* (eds), *Neues Testament und antike Kultur III. Weltauffassung, Kult, Ethos* (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2005) 244-253.

23 See Christoph Stenschke, *Luke's Portrait of Gentiles Prior to Their Coming to Faith* (WUNT II.108; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999) 78-79.

24 See Bohak, 'Gentile Attitudes', 669.

25 Juvenal, *Sat.* 15,105-106; Tacitus, *Hist.* 5.4; see R. Goldenberg, 'The Jewish Sabbath in the Roman World up to the Time of Constantine the Great',

ANRW II.19.1. (1979) 430-442.

26 See also the surveys of B. Nongbri, 'Greek Authors on Jews and Judaism' in *Eerdmans Dictionary*, 692-696 and M.H. Williams, 'Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism' in *Eerdmans Dictionary*, 870-874.

27 See Gordon D. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987) 4-19 and Scott J. Hafemann, 'Corinthians, Letters to the' in *Dictionary of Paul and His Letters* (Downers Grove, Leicester, 1993) (164-179) 174.

28 Hafemann, 'Corinthians', 174, who goes on to describe the origin of the problems in Hellenistic culture and an 'over-realised eschatology' which 'led to more boasting and disunity in the church, as well as to the eventual rejection of Paul's legitimacy as an apostle and of his gospel' (175). For Paul's opponents in Corinth see also Jerry L. Sumney, *Identifying Paul's Opponents. The Question of Method in 2 Corinthians* (JSNT.S 40; Sheffield, Sheffield Academic Press, 1990) and the essays in Stanley E. Porter (ed.), *Paul and His Opponents* (PAST 2; Leiden: Brill, 2005).

29 For several reasons, this would have been an embarrassment to the Corinthians; see Victor P. Furnish, *2 Corinthians* (Anchor Bible 32A; Garden City: Doubleday, 1984) 507.

30 Kathy Ehrensperger, *Paul and the Dynamics of Power. Communication and Interaction in the Early Christ-Movement* (LiNTS 325; London, New York: T. & T. Clark Continuum, 2007) 70: 'Patronage makes lower-ranked clients dependent on elite patrons not for the well-being of the client but for the enhancement of the status and power of the patron. ... Such acts maintained not transformed political, economic, and societal inequality and privilege.'

Eckhard J. Schnabel, *Urchristliche Mission* (Wuppertal: R. Brockhaus, 2002) 1389 notes that accepting patronage would have meant: '[Paul would have] die Botschaft, die er verkündigen wollte, unweigerlich kompromittiert, mindestens die Freiheit verloren, das Evangelium samt seinen Konsequenzen für das persönliche Verhalten auch dieser Bessergestellten zu verkündigen.'

31 Furnish, *2 Corinthians*, 507-508.

32 Schnabel, *Urchristliche Mission*, 1389.

33 Murphy O'Connor, *Paul*, 319; Ralph P. Martin, *2 Corinthians* (WBC 40; Waco: Word Books, 1986); Peter Marshall, *Enmity in Corinth. Social Conventions in Paul's Relations with the Corinthians* (WUNT II.23; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 1987) and J.K. Chow, *Patronage and Power. A Study of Social Networks in Corinth* (JSNT.S 75; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992); on Paul's financial policies see Stephen Walton, 'Paul, Patronage and Pay' in Burke and Rosner, *Paul*, 220-233, Schnabel, *Urchristliche Mission*, 1385-1390 (particularly in Corinth, 1389-1390) and the instructive study of C.R. Little, *Mission in the Way of Paul. Biblical Mission for the Church in the Twenty-First Century* (Studies in Biblical Literature 80; New York, etc.: Peter Lang, 2005).

34 Furnish, *2 Corinthians*, 507.

35 Furnish, *2 Corinthians*, 508.

36 Hafemann, 'Corinthians', 175.

37 Furnish, *2 Corinthians*, 451, for the limitation to Christians see 445.

38 Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 294 (italics CS).

39 Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 294.

40 It is unlikely that Paul refer by πάντας to the other churches involved in the collection. In that case the Corinthians might have contributed to a 'common fund'.

41 Possibly Paul refers to funds that he expected churches to contribute to his mission; cf. John P. Dickson, *Mission-Commitment in Ancient Judaism and in the Pauline Communities. The Shape, Extent and Background of Early Christian Mission* (WUNT II.159; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003) 178-213 ('Providing for the Gospel: Mission-Commitment as Financial Assistance').

42 For a detailed discussion of the passage see Garland, *1 Corinthians*, 750-757. On p. 751 Garland argues that Paul is responding to another issue raised by the Corinthians in their letter to him. He had previously solicited the Corinthians to participate. Now they only inquire about the best way to make this collection. 'Since he gives instructions only for the actual collecting of the money, they appear to have asked him how they should manage its implementation'.

43 Garland, *1 Corinthians*, 754.

44 Hafemann, 'Corinthians', 178.

45 Garland, *1 Corinthians*, 753. Regarding this stipulation, he observes: 'By taking up the collection in advance, they are completely free in what they give, and he will not know who contributed what. Possibly, he wanted to avoid being perceived as twisting arms to get money by asking in person (cf. 2 Cor 9:5) or did not want to take time from other labor to try to raise money' (754-755).

46 Garland, *1 Corinthians*, 755 notes: 'It is Paul's special project, but he does not infringe on the church's autonomy in choosing their representatives. As each individual decides how much to give, the church decides whom they will entrust to represent them in their mission.'

47 Garland, *1 Corinthians*, 755 writes that Paul 'also may be sensitive to possible accusations of chicanery (cf. 2 Cor 8:20; 12:14–18). He may have been aware of an event that made a collection of money for Jerusalem a touchy issue. Josephus (*Ant* 18.3.5 § 81) reports that a Palestinian Jew and three cohorts induced one of their notable Roman converts, Fulvia, to send valuables for the temple

in Jerusalem. Rather than conveying the goods to Jerusalem, they absconded with them. When their scam was discovered, it created such a clamour that the emperor Tiberius ordered all Jews to be banished.'

48 See Murphy O'Connor's (*Paul*, 319) plausible reconstruction of the response of the judaising opponents of Paul to the collection enterprise (quoted above).

49 Furnish, *2 Corinthians*, 413, also for the reasons of this poverty in Macedonia. Were the Thessalonians less poor than other Macedonian Christians in general and therefore able to help them financially? Was it through this display of love that their example in suffering (1 Thess 1:6–8) became widely known in Macedonia and Achaia?

50 Paul's sending of Titus and others to complete the collection among the Corinthians suggests that he did not rely only on his previous charge to the Corinthians and the good example of other Christians (2 Cor 8:6). Somebody trusted by Paul was to attend to the matter 'on site'.

51 On ancient notions of honour and shame see C. Janssen & R. Kessler, 'Ehre/Schande' in *Sozialgeschichtliches Wörterbuch zur Bibel* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher, 2009) 97-100; Victor H. Matthews (ed.), *Honor and Shame in the World of the Bible* (Semeia 68; Atlanta: SBL, 1996) and J. Plevnik, 'Honor/Shame' in Bruce Malina and John J. Pilch (eds), *Handbook of Biblical Social Values* (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2000) 106-115.

52 The giving of the Macedonian Christians is mentioned again in 2 Corinthians 11:9: Paul accepted from the Macedonians what he refused from the Corinthians; on the relation of Paul's refusal of support in Corinth and his urgent call to participate in the collection, Furnish, *2 Corinthians*, 508 notes: 'His promotion of this project at the same time that he was declining to let the congregation become his own patron evidently aroused the suspicion, or allowed his rivals to plant the suspicion, that the collection was but a subterfuge, a way of gaining the support from the Corinthians without obliging himself to them as their client (see 12:16). This, too, seems to be behind Paul's remarks in 11:5-15.'

53 The description of the collection in 1 and 2 Corinthians does not imply an elevated position of the church in Jerusalem over others. There is a different emphasis in Romans 15:27.

54 For the full force of this argument see Stenschke, 'Pebble'.

55 Murphy O'Connor, *Paul*, 315.

56 For discussion of his identity see William O. Walker, 'Apollos and Timothy as the Unnamed "Brothers" in 2 Corinthians 8:18-24', *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 73 (2011) 318-338. Murphy O'Connor, *Paul*, 315 suggests that '... in the light of the contacts between the Corinthian and Macedonian churches (1 Thess 1:7–9; 2 Cor 11:9), the simplest hypothesis is that he was a Corinthian Christian, who had gone to aid the spread of the church in Macedonia, and who there had established himself as an exceptional preacher of the gospel. When the Corinthians recognized him, and heard Paul's eulogy, they would have been both flattered and relieved. Their contribution to a sister church was publically praised, and Paul's emissary was not a critical Macedonian (9:4), but one of their own. *His specific role was to guarantee the integrity of the collection* (8:20f, italics CS).'

57 Perhaps this is in contrast to Paul: his writing of two full chapters, 2 Cor 8-9, to encourage the Corinthians in participating and sending *three* men to see to the successful completion of the collection suggests that Paul himself was not confident that the Corinthians would do as he requested of them.

58 Murphy O'Connor, *Paul*, 314 observes: 'The initial enthusiasm of the Corinthians for the collection for the poor of Jerusalem had evaporated in the heated atmosphere of the factional disputes within the community. Deeply offended by the way they had been pilloried in 1 Corinthians, the spirit-people, who were potentially the major donors, retaliated by refusing to take part in a project so dear to Paul's heart. Titus, however, had won the consent of their allies, the Judaizers, by a clever *ad hominem* argument, and Paul decided to exploit the opening.'

59 Murphy O'Connor, *Paul*, 314.

60 Furnish, *2 Corinthians*, 452. In view of early Jewish views of Gentiles, this longing of Jewish Christians for *Gentile* Christians is all the more remarkable. Did Paul misjudge the atmosphere and feelings by at least some Christians in Jerusalem? It is not clear whether Paul ascribes particular efficacy to the prayer of the Christians in Jerusalem.

61 The significance of the Old Testament for Paul's argument in 1 Corinthians has recently been emphasised by Roy E. Ciampa and Brian S. Rosner, *The First Letter to the Corinthians* (Pillar New Testament Commentary; Grand Rapids, Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, Nottingham: Apollos, 2010). See also Roy E. Ciampa and Brian S. Rosner, '1 Corinthians' in G.K. Beale and D.A. Carson (eds), *Commentary on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament* (Nottingham: IVP, 2007) 695-752.

62 The amount contributed to the collection was to reflect this divine generosity.

63 Paul's demonstration of his Jewish loyalty and of the thoroughly Jewish context of the gospel in Romans also serves as an antidote to the prevalent anti-Judaism in the Roman Empire. For the significance of the Jewish nature of Paul's gospel in Romans see Christoph Stenschke, 'Paul's Jewish Gospel and the Claims of Rome in Paul's Epistle to the Romans', *Neotestamentica* 46 (2012) 338-378.

64 In view of the length of Paul's argument in 2 Corinthians 8-9 it is noteworthy that Paul does not explain the reasons for the need of the Christians of Jerusalem, either as being the consequence of famine/increased cost-of-living (see Acts 11:28), of persecution (see 1 Thess 2:14) or of the particular circumstances which earlier on made the sharing of goods necessary according to Acts 2:44-45; 4:32 – 5:11, 6:1-7. For the time being, the Corinthians had to take Paul's word for it.

I Kneel Before the Father and Pray for You (Ephesians 3:14) Date and Significance of Ephesians, Part 3

Rüdiger Fuchs

SUMMARY

This three-part article argues that during the course of his ministry, Paul's thinking shows much development, and that Ephesians should be seen as a representative example of his mature theology. The first part (which appeared in *EJT* 23.1) discussed the dates of the letters of Paul and part 2 (*EJT* 23.2) expanded the dating proposal for Ephesians with reference to the Epistle's character. Part 3 now discusses arguments against the authenticity of the Letter to the Ephesians, partly in dialogue with Michael Theobald. Paul's eschatology, cosmology and ecclesiology as well as his view of marriage come under review.

* * * * * * * *

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Dieser dreiteilige Artikel vertritt das Argument, dass sich das Denken von Paulus während seines Dienstes beträchtlich weiter entwickelt hat und dass der Epheserbrief als ein repräsentatives Beispiel seiner gereiften Theologie anzusehen ist. Der erste Teil (erschienen in *EJT* 23.1) erörterte die Datierung der Paulusbriefe, und Teil 2 (*EJT* 23.2) führte die Datierungsvorschläge für den Epheserbrief fort mit Verweis auf den Charakter der Epistel. Teil 3 setzt sich nun mit den Argumenten gegen die Authentizität des Epheserbriefes auseinander, und dies teils im Dialog mit Michael Theobald. Dabei werden Eschatologie, Kosmologie und Ekklesiologie von Paulus ebenso wie seine Sicht der Ehe untersucht.

* * * * * * * *

RÉSUMÉ

Dans cet article en trois parties, l'auteur soutient que la pensée de Paul a connu un développement important au cours de son ministère, et que l'épître aux Éphésiens doit être considérée comme un exemple représentatif de sa théologie la plus mûrie. La première partie (*JET* 23:1) traitait de la date des lettres pauliniennes et la seconde (*JET* 23:2) élaborait la justification de la date proposée pour Éphésiens en se fondant sur le caractère de cette épître. Dans cette troisième partie, l'auteur examine des arguments qui ont été opposés à la thèse de l'authenticité de cette épître, notamment ceux de Michael Theobald. Il prend en considération l'eschatologie, la cosmologie et l'ecclésiologie de l'apôtre, ainsi que sa conception du mariage.

* * * * * * * *

3.1 Introduction

Intensive teaching took place in all the Pauline churches. A clearly defined doctrinal tradition was passed on as *paradosis.* This same *paradosis* Paul taught in word and deed as a model for his pupils.[1] According to the opinion of his time (e.g. Lk 10:16), Paul could also teach through his coworkers or even 'in' them (1 Cor 4:16-17, 16:10-11; cf 1 Thess 3:1-10, Phil 3:17 – 4:9, Col 1:7, 4:12), thus being 'present in spirit' (1 Cor 5:3). New experiences, questions from the communities, religious conversations with non-Christians, debates with opponents and the writing of letters all led to developments in Paul's teaching. How far could Paul go in changing his views?

Michael Theobald, a representative of the exegetical mainstream, reads Ephesians as a pseudonymous attempt to 'update' the Pauline theology.[2]

According to Theobald, Ephesians was a continuation particularly of Colossians. Compared to Colossians, the author of Ephesians brings more Pauline terminology and thoughts into his circular letter. This view comes close to that of scholars who argue for the authenticity of Ephesians. They believe that Ephesians is a further development of Pauline theology, written by Paul himself.[3] Proponents of pseudonymity believe, however, that the real Paul was less flexible. Theobald, for example, thinks that Paul could not have taught a *cosmic* Christology such as we find in Ephesians (1:10, 21-22, 3:9-10) or a *realised* eschatology (Eph 1:3, 9-10, 2:4-10) as a result of diminishing expectations of Christ's return. Paul could never say that Christians were already raised from the death (Eph. 2:6; cf. Rom 6). Unlike in the authentic Paul, in Ephesians *ēkklesia* is not a group of local churches but the Church as a whole (1:22, 3:10, 21, 5:23-25, 27, 29, 32). The distinct theology of community leadership (4:7-16) reflects a time after Paul, according to Theobald. The real Paul thought little of marriage, but according to Ephesians 5:21-33 the marital union of man and woman portrays the mystery of Christ and the Church; it is a portrayal of the saving love of God for all people. This, Theobald concludes, is an understanding of marriage that goes against the Pauline view of things.[4]

But the evidence can also be read differently. Pauline letters are occasional writings, not a 'doctrine of Paul'; this is also true for Ephesians. 1 Corinthians picks up and interprets only a few of the controversial aspects of Paul's catechesis (see 1 Cor 3:1-11, 11:23, 15:1-11) and 1 Thessalonians 3:12 – 5:23 only supplements lessons already taught orally. Almost literal parallels between 1 Thessalonians 5 and Ephesians 5-6 (e.g. 1 Thess 5:4-10 / Eph 5:6-14 or 1 Thess 5:8 / Eph 6:10-17) show that an identical Pauline *paradosis* was complemented and interpreted for different causes in both letters and thus possibly further developed in Ephesians some years – not decades – later, in different ways, for different addressees.

3.2 Eschatology

Likewise, in 1 Corinthians 15:1-28, Romans 1:18, 5-8, 13:11, 14:11-12, 16:20, Phil 2:5-11 and 3:20-21 we find only small and occasional elements of an eschatology. Only in Philippians does Paul use the short formula 'day of Christ (Jesus)' to allude to his – in Philippi – well known apocalyptic teachings (Phil 1:6, 10, 2:16, cf. 4:9). But in 1 Thessalonians and 1 Corinthians he has to teach beginners, 'infants in Christ' (1 Thess 3:10; 1 Cor 3:1), and thus he includes more details of his eschatology (1 Thess 4-5; 1 Cor 15). These passages show us an early form of his eschatology: God the Father enthroned Jesus Christ as his 'Son' (a title for the king of the Jews in the Old Testament) and as Lord of all creation. Through him, God will in the future also redeem the creation from all demonic powers, all God's enemies, and the 'last enemy', death. Then he will completely reunite all with himself through Christ.

Would not Paul himself have been able to formulate a more developed form of this part of his eschatology in a later conflict with 'philosophies' (Col 2:6-8) and in a circular for Christians whom he did not know, some of whom would live after his death (Eph 1:10,21, 4:12-16)? Also, in the not so (as Theobald and others believe) 'realised' eschatology of Ephesians, future expectations (e.g. the word 'hope' in Eph 1:18, 2:12, 4:4) do not disappear to the degree they do in Galatians or in Philemon (see the non-eschatological 'hope' of Gal 5:5 and Phlm 22).

Ephesians generally wants to help believers achieve victory in disputes with present and future opponents and the demonic powers behind them. It is a kind of compendium or 'handbook'. On the other hand, Galatians and Philemon address very particular situations in disputes with particular opponents (Gal) or addressees (Phlm).[5] It is easy to imagine that Paul, at the end of his life and following the death of many companions and apostles, can develop the (comforting) belief that Christians are completely secure in God's hands and thus in some ways already 'raised', even before death. Who would want to abandon such divine, fatherly protection? In Romans 6 Paul also represents a realised eschatology.[6] In a critique of the German exegetical mainstream, Klaus Haacker writes that even Paul argues for the view 'in Christ' = 'new creation'. Haacker criticises those for whom the alleged abandonment of the eschatological reservation is the most serious theological argument against the authenticity of Colossians and Ephesians. Too much weight has been given to Romans 6:1-11, which states that the believer died with Christ (v. 8) and is buried with him (v. 4), while speaking of his resurrection in the future tense (v. 5 and 8).

This overlooks or downplays that in Romans 6 'dead to sin' faces a 'but alive to God in Christ Jesus' at present (Rom 6:11). … This is further clarified by the words ἐκ νεκρῶν ζῶντα in v. 13 as participation in the resurrection reality.[7]

3.3 Christ and cosmos

Unlike what is often thought, we find a cosmic Christology not only in the late letters but also in the early letters of Paul. Not surprisingly, however, Ephesians formulates a more developed Christology after Paul's four years of house arrest and multiple conversations with political rulers (Acts 24:23 – 26:32, 28:28-31). Yet in the earlier letters we already find the following, albeit hardly developed thoughts: Through the human Adam sin came into the universe, and death with it (Rom 5:12; also 1 Cor 15). Since then the entire creation suffers from perishability (2 Cor. 7:10b) but it is redeemed by God through Christ together with the children of God (Rom 8; also 11:12-32). For Paul the truth is that,

> 'no idol in the world really exists' and 'there is no God but one'. Indeed, even though there may be so-called gods in heaven or on earth – as in fact there are many gods and many lords – yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist. (1 Cor 8:4b-6)

God is and remains the head of Christ, and the body of Christ is the community, which he rules as the Head through Christ (already 1 Cor 11:3). At the end of time Christ will unite all with God again, after God has put all his enemies, including death, under Christ's feet (1 Cor 15:20-28; Rom 16:20). Then Jesus will establish the Kingdom of God as Christ, as Saviour and as Lord (Phil 2:6-11, 3:20-21, 4:5). Yet Christians already experience a kind of present eschatology:

> So if anyone is in Christ, there *is* a new creation: everything old *has passed away*; see, everything *has become new*! All this is from God, who *reconciled himself* through Christ … in Christ God *was reconciling* the world to himself … (2 Cor 5:17-19, emphasis added).

3.4 Marriage

In discussions with dissenters Paul often pursued the strategy he outlines in 1 Corinthians 9:20-22 and 10:32-33.[8] He tries to gain, or to regain, dissenters for his vision, first by understanding their feelings and becoming almost like one of them. Then he starts to argue, apparently in a manner similar to his addressees. But he proceeds to question the arguments that he has formulated himself one by one, sometimes even using the language and slogans of opponents, and he finally concludes: I understand your desire, but under scrutiny your point of view (e.g. 'all things are lawful', 1 Cor 6:12, 10:23) shows itself as erroneous. I invite you (e.g. the 'strong') to adopt my point of view (e.g. love for the 'weak'). Such love is a higher goal for Christians (1 Cor 8:1 – 10:23, 10:33, 1 Cor 6:1-11, 12-17).

In the same way we can read the theology of marriage in Ephesians 5:21-33 as a continuation of 1 Thessalonians 3:10 – 4:12 and of the instructions regarding women and men in 1 Corinthians 5-14. In 1 Thessalonians Paul alludes to lessons already taught and also to lessons not yet taught. From the beginning of chapter 4, he chooses a commanding tone that occurs nowhere else in this letter, which tells us that what he teaches here is very important to him. This teaching includes, first and foremost, that baptised men should 'abstain from fornication' and 'should win *their own wife* (literally 'vessel')[9] in sanctification and honour, not with lustful passion, like the gentiles who do not know God' (4:3-5). In Ephesians 5 Paul presupposes this lesson for beginners and develops his teaching accordingly. His understanding of marriage follows the Scriptures of Israel as interpreted by Jesus. Only on this basis is his conception of marriage (Rom 7:1-3, 1 Cor 6:16) understandable. Paul therefore insists on monogamy for men and women in all communities.

It is interesting to see how Paul tries to enforce and defend monogamy as he confronts dissenters and opponents who practise or permit adultery of the worst kind (1 Cor 5:1-5) or who live in 'polygamy' with prostitutes (1 Cor 6:9-16).[10] In both these cases he is very direct, prohibiting such conduct with reference to the Scriptures and to Jesus. He threatens church discipline and the judgement of God (1 Cor 5:9-13, 6:9-20, cf. Eph 5). But otherwise in 1 Corinthians 7 he argues in a 'diplomatic' way and *invites* his readers to change their opinion. With regard to those who want to dissolve marriages with non-believers or seek divorces for other reasons, he emphasizes, first, that he himself lives a celibate life, almost living up to 'their' ideal! Because of the transitory nature of this world and because of their partners, married Christians suffer a conflict of loyalties: loyalty to God and loyalty to their partner. Thus, Paul argues, celibacy is the best choice; that is, Paul himself would advise all Christians to remain unmarried.

But subsequently he puts a question mark behind 'his' opinion, which is closely related to that of his opponents: What is the situation of those who, like you, want to live morally proper lives but have a strong sex drive? What about the commands in Scripture and from the Lord that they 'should not commit adultery'? What will become of the children of men and women already married to a non-Christian spouse, etc.? Paul concludes: Because sexual desires and the desires of the widowed are often strong, and because monogamy and 'you shall not commit adultery' are valid commands of the Lord, living in obedience to these rules should be normal practice in Corinth! And he argues further: 'the unbelieving husband is made holy through his wife, and the unbelieving wife is made holy through her husband... your children are holy...' and so on. As required by Scripture and by the teachings of Jesus, marriage should be sought as a shelter against sin and is to be respected. Later, Paul will add more arguments in passing; for example, that the other apostles must also live in monogamy (1 Cor 9:5) and that they are witnesses to the resurrection of Christ. These are all in harmony with his futuristic eschatology (1 Cor 15:1-11 plus 1 Cor 6:2a) but not with the thinking of those who deny the resurrection (1 Cor 15:12 plus 4:8).

So when we read 1 Corinthians 5-14, 1 Thessalonians 4 and Romans 7:1-3, we can only conclude that Paul, in harmony with God and Christ and all apostolic colleagues, argues for monogamy as the norm for all Christians, no matter how long it will be until the parousia. Colossians 3:22-25 and Ephesians 5:21-33 are thus not inconsistent with 'Paul', as far as we know him from a few occasional letters. And, as one should expect from a teacher of his calibre, Paul's thinking continued to develop between AD 50 and 60. Then, in his final circular letter (Eph 5:21-33) he developed an actual theology of marriage. We know from 2 Corinthians how he developed the successful reasoning he had begun in 1 Corinthians. Already in 1 Thessalonians 3:12 – 4:12; 5:1-15; 1 Corinthians 9:19 – 14:40 and Colossians 3:22 – 4:6, Paul led the Christian communities to his view that they were to live in a non-Christian world — prior to the parousia of Christ — as those who have contact with and are observed by non-Christians. In other words, they were always under scrutiny (1 Cor 14:23-25). Admittedly, 'in the Lord' Christians are free to live in a new manner (1 Cor 11:11-12; 14:35a; cf. 9:19), but surrounded by non-Christian Jews (whose views are 'cited' in 1 Cor 11:3-10 and 14:34) and non-Jews (whose views are 'cited' in 1 Cor 11:13-15 and 14:35b), Christians should 'give no offence to Jews or to Greeks or to the church of God ... so that they may be saved', as the 'headline' for 1 Corinthians 11-14 puts it in 1 Corinthians 10:31-33. And so Christians had to live their marriages and worship as a community of women and men who are both blameless and welcoming.[11] The conjugal union of man and woman, according to 1 Corinthians, should show the world the 'mystery' of Christ (cf. 1 Cor 2:1, 7, 4:1, 15:51), depicted in the Church as his body. Note the frequent use of the word *ēkklesia* from 1 Corinthians 10:32 onward and note especially 12:27-28 in the context of 1 Corinthians 11-14. The behaviour of Christian spouses and the public worship of the community must be evidence of the presence of the love of God among them (1 Cor 9:20 – 10:33). A central goal of the argument of 1 Corinthians 5-14 is that a non-Christian, when visiting their meetings, should 'worship God, declaring, God is really among you'. The Corinthians are the temple of the Holy Spirit and they represent the *universal* Church in public. This idea Paul later develops in Colossians 3:22 – 4:6 and Ephesians 4-5, complementing his earlier words in 1 Corinthians,

> Do all things for God's *doxa* [that is, God's glory/honour, reputation or reflection in the world]. Be blameless ... both for Jews and for Greeks and for the whole Church of God! Christ is the head of every man, the head of the woman is the man, the head of Christ is God ... the man is ... God's image and (public) luminous reflection (*doxa*), the woman is (before non-Christians) the shining reflection of the man (*doxa*)...

In the time of the New Testament, the behaviour of the woman was the means by which non-Christians evaluated the husband and his (new) religion. In their eyes, the husband was the ruler over his house and his wife. If this were not so, they would have despised the Christian faith in the way Paul 'quotes' them in 1 Timothy 3:4-5. I hear similar concerns in 1 Corinthians 5-14, Colossians 3:22 –

4:6 and also in Ephesians 5:1-21, where we read *inter alia*:

> Be imitators of God, as beloved children … For you were once darkness, but now you are light in the Lord. Walk as children of the light … Be subject to one another out of reverence for Christ. Wives be subject to your husbands as you are to the Lord! For the husband is head of the wife just as Christ is the head of the church, the body of which he is the saviour.

Paul continues in Ephesians 5:24:

> Just as the church is subject to Christ, so also wives ought to be, in every thing, to their husbands. Husbands, love your wives, just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up in order to make her holy by cleansing her with the washing of water by the word, so as to present the church to himself in splendour itself glorified (*endoxon*) [in parts my own translation] … In the same way, husbands should love their wives as they do their own bodies. He who loves his wife loves himself.

So the theme of love from 1 Corinthians 13 reappears here in Ephesians. Paul adds that a man who cares for his wife in this way follows the model of Christ's care for his body, the Church. And that 'we are members of his body' is still Paul's view in 1 Corinthians 10-12. His general opinion already in 1 Corinthians 6:16 (cf. Gen 2:24, Mt 19:5) was: 'a man will leave father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two will become one flesh.' Ideas from 1 Corinthians 3:16-17 and 6:16-20 are developed in Ephesians 5:21-33 but 1 Corinthians 3-6 already contain the thought: the temple which is built on the one foundation, Jesus Christ, is the Church, and she is represented in the world particularly in the proper behaviour of the husband towards the wife.

In short, Ephesians 4-5 is thoughtful and mature, but not contradictory to 1 Corinthians 5-14. It is a Pauline updating of his earlier thoughts in a direction also found in Philippians 1:27 – 2:16 and 3:17 – 4:9. The community, and the Christian women and men who are its members (Phil 4:1-5), should 'shine' publicly (2:16) through their behaviour and words, even in a time of conflict (4:2-3). They should reflect God's love in Christ in the non-Christian environment (Phil 2:5-16; 4:5, 8).

In 1 Corinthians and Ephesians, Pauline exhortation is based on the Old Testament and the Jesus tradition that he had already taught the Corinthians, who, to his surprise, acted as if they were uneducated in it. Thus, in 1 Corinthians Paul must cite the Old Testament and words of Jesus literally, while in Philippians he can teach without citing those basics; compare Philippians 2:9-11 (to known and well taught addressees) with Romans 14:11 (to unknown Jewish-Christian addressees – hence with an Old Testament quotation). His 'favourite community' in Philippi knows everything Paul taught (Phil 4:9), so in Philippians Paul only alludes occasionally to the traditions. Likewise in Ephesians he assumes that *all* communities reading this letter already know his teaching, and he also knows that earlier letters of his are available to them.

The further development of Paul's theology of marriage in Ephesians can be a result of debates with Christians in Corinth who had conflated Galatians 3:28 and Matthew 22:30, enthusiastically acting like 'angels', as 'risen' in the here and now, and justifying their behaviour with Jesus' words 'for in the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are like angels in heaven'. In their view, they were already ruling the world, acting as though they were already at the throne of God (cf. 1 Cor 4 and 15).[12] Because they tried to live in that way, oblivious of both the non-Christians and the Christians of the universal Church, they damaged the reputation of their faith. Paul must therefore reinterpret the unexplained short 'formula' of Galatians 3:28 ('There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, *nor is there male and female*'). He does this for the first time in the debates with those 'risen angels' in Corinth in AD 53-54 (1 Cor 7:17-24, 11:11-12, 12:12). Those who had propounded the free work of the Holy Spirit, like Paul himself and the Galatians (Gal 3:1-4), now require submission to Scripture, to the Jesus tradition and to community leadership. Years later Paul argues – superseding his Spirit-only based teachings in Galatians 3-6 – that Christian men and women should embody God's love in the world through their interaction with other people. The key words 'light' and 'salt' (Col 1:12, 4:6, Eph 5:8-9) can be allusions to a tradition as expressed in Matthew 5:13-16.

We close this section with a look to 2 Corinthians. In this occasional letter Paul writes 'to the church of God in Corinth with all the saints throughout Achaia' (2 Cor 1:1), which church he wants to build: 'I have promised you in marriage to one husband … the Messiah' (2 Cor 11:2). This sentence tells us three things: first, Paul had a high opinion of marriage and monogamy to use such imagery. Second, he derives this view from the Old Testament where the unity of husband and wife in monogamy is an image of God visible to the world (Gen 1:26) and God wants to be the 'husband' of his people (Hosea). Third, the same Paul could develop this imagery in the way Ephesians 5-6 does.

3.5 Ecclesiology

The ecclesiology of Ephesians is an evolution of the ecclesiology of 1 Thessalonians 5:11-15; 1 Corinthians 4:1-21, 12:28, 16:10-18, Philippians 1:1, 3:17 and other places. At the time of writing of Ephesians the Church was no longer a small group. Galatians is the only letter of Paul in which the geographical areas of mission are not clearly identified Roman provinces. This suggests that at the time of the writing of Galatians (AD 47-48), Paul did not have a strategy of evangelising Roman provinces, as he had later in the 50s (1 Thess 1, 1 Cor 16, 2 Cor 8-9, Rom 15-16). In the time of Ephesians, after Paul had carried out his mission work in the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire, he could in a circular letter recognise the Church as a larger whole. At the end of his life Paul now looked to all Christians as the body of Christ 'from Jerusalem and round about to Illyricum' (Rom 15:19). This development resulted from his view that Christians are the body of Christ and that Christ cannot be divided (1 Cor 1:13). His view is probably based on the words Christ spoke to him near Damascus, in which he identified himself with all Christians, i.e. – in Paul's view – with 'the church of God'. Later, Paul would understand the words 'Saul, Saul, why do you persecute *me*?' (Acts 9:4) to mean the whole Church, not Christ alone. After Galatians and 1-2 Thessalonians, in 1 Corinthians Paul begins to see Christians as the one indivisible body of Christ in the world (1 Cor 12:27-28), as the one 'church of God' (e.g.1 Cor 10:33, 15:9). It is only logical that Paul formulates this understanding explicitly and more deeply in a circular letter to all Christians in the eastern Roman Empire; in other words, to the 'church of God' in the Roman world.

That Paul formulates a more pronounced theology of leadership in Ephesians (2:20, 4:1-16; contrast 1 Thess 5:11-15, 1 Cor 12:28, 4:16-17, 16:10-18, Rom 12:6-8, Phil 1:1, 3:17) was also to be expected. In Ephesians he is writing at the end of the era of the apostles and in view of the death of the apostles and prophets of the first generation. Communities need to be protected and taught for the future, after Paul's death (Eph 1:21). After the 'holy apostles and prophets' (Eph 3:5) have died, responsible community leaders must be chosen to take their places. Luke and Clement testify shortly afterwards that the apostles and not least Paul (and Barnabas) made sure that not just anyone, but that *their* and their delegates' chosen leaders were present in the communities. We are then in AD 65-90, i.e. the time of the Christians of the *second* and third generation (Acts 14:23, 20:17-35, 1 Clem 42:4-5, cf. Gal 6:6, 1 Thess 5:12-13, 1 Cor 16:15-18, Phil 1:1),

3.6 Theobald again

So we see that Ephesians and Colossians sometimes go beyond earlier Pauline letters. Yet Ephesians also cites or interprets parts of the Pauline *paradosis* which was known to all churches (1 Cor 4:17; Rom 6:17; 16:17; Phil 4:9) in the time after Romans 15:19-24.[13] So we simply do not know in how far Ephesians creates new thoughts or is repeating (in a more developed way) the Pauline traditions for addressees who are unknown to Paul. The quotation from the tradition on the Lord's Supper and the resurrection *paradosis* in 1 Corinthians 11:23-27 and 15:1-12 appear only in 1 Corinthians, but they were certainly known in all Pauline churches, just like the Old Testament and Jesus traditions regarding marriage and divorce to which Paul alludes in 1 Thessalonians 4:3-8, 1 Corinthians 5-7 and Romans 7:1-3. We always need to remember that most of Paul's letters were occasional writings.

All of this should make us cautious regarding Theobald's views, for example concerning allegedly 'unpauline' statements or theological developments in Ephesians. If his argumentation were correct, we could say that the more detailed, longer 1 Corinthians 'continues' and 'develops' Galatians considerably. In the time of 1 Corinthians it was necessary for *salvation* to preserve tradition literally and the community had to submit itself to its leaders (1 Cor 4:16-17, 11:23, 15:1-11, 16:10-18). In Galatians we see a 'non-catholic', Spirit-only led church (e.g. in Gal 6:6-10), but later, in 1 Corinthians, the worldwide church (1 Cor 10:32, 12:28, 15:9) is on its way to 'Catholicism'. And later again, in Philippians, we see that the role of the Holy Spirit is reduced almost beyond recognition and that the church is no longer the body of Christ but governed by 'bishops and deacons' (Phil 1:1) who are images of the one apostle Paul and his very 'bourgeois' tradition (3:17, 4:8-9).

But if we watch, for example, the 'rise' of *love* in Paul's theology and ethics from its first modest appearance in Galatians 5 to its full development in later writings, we see that significant developments in Paul's teaching took place over the years: love soon governs the triad faith – hope – love (1 Thess 1:3, 1 Cor 13, Col 1:4-5),[14] which in Romans is evident throughout the letter.[15] *Love* finally appears, more frequently than in other letters of Paul, as a major theme in Ephesians and Philemon.[16] Thus, in the years AD 50-60 Paul became more and more a preacher of love. Ephesians 5 includes more love in the theology of marriage than 1 Corinthians and situates it expressly and directly between wives and husbands, while 1 Corinthians 13 has *agape* as the theological climax of 1 Corinthians 11-14.

There is one main difference between 1 Corinthians and Ephesians. The latter does not give instructions for behaviour in public worship or in marriages between Christians and non-Christians. Verses like 1 Corinthians 9:20-22, 10:32-33, 14:23-40 and Colossians 4:5-6 have no counterparts in Ephesians, a letter written mainly for internal instruction. It was written only for Christians in disputes with opponents and under satanic attack. This was not the case in Corinth for Satan was clearly outside of the community (1 Cor 5:1-5; in Paul's view this perhaps changed later, see 2 Cor 6:11-17, 11:3). So we see that Ephesians must solve different problems than 1 Corinthians and therefore has to take up, interpret and develop other parts of Paul's theology of marriage than 1 Corinthians.

3.7 Conclusion: the flexible Paul

Scholarship should pay more attention to the flexibility of Paul, who always tried to become a Jew to the Jews and a non-Jew to the non-Jews. He wanted and needed to formulate his theology afresh for each new student, for dissenters and opponents, for high-ranking personalities and for ordinary people, for beginners and for masters in Paul's teachings.

A further illustration of this thesis is that in the prison letters, above all in Philippians and 2 Timothy, many new words appear that he had not used in writing before. The proportion for *hapax legomena* in Ephesians (1.45% of 2422 words), which is sometimes rated as an index of its inauthenticity,[17] lies well below that in other letters to communities, e.g. Philippians (2.21% of 1629 words). Further letters to communities before the imprisonment have *hapaxes* up to the maximum of 2 Corinthians at 1.45%.

The style of writing in, among others, Ephesians, can be traced back to secretaries such as Timothy, Epaphras, Tychicus or Luke. Paul was interested in the contents of his writings, in his theology and ethics, but not in an authentic writing style, although the 'packaging' of the contents was not unimportant (1 Cor 9:20-22, 10:32-33 and 14:19). They had to be suitable for their readers in vocabulary and in style. Paul would have relied on his co-authors or secretaries for the final formulation of his letters because they were closer to the various addressees than he was himself (cf. the Roman Tertius in Rom 16:22 and the Corinthian Sosthenes in 1 Cor 1:1). Epaphras may well have put the finishing stylistic touches on Colossians[18] and perhaps also Ephesians; he may also have included his own teaching examples and his knowledge of the problems in Asia Minor.

Paul was flexible, he had a big heart and a mind which was able – after years of debates with non-Christians and in conversation with Christians and teachers of Christians like Epaphras and Timothy – to write a circular letter such as the letter 'to the Ephesians' for all Gentile Christians, to complement and develop what he had written in earlier letters. In this letter he both used his own language of earlier letters (Eph 4-6) and changed to a hymnic style for his last prayer (Eph 1-3). Of course, he did not simply repeat earlier views or carry on with what he had thought years before. He was, after all, a realist who could learn – from the 'afflictions' he mentioned in 2 Corinthians 1:8-11 on to the parousia of Christ – to take into account his own death. Thus he was able to teach with the Church as it would be after his death in mind, starting perhaps in Philippians.

Undoubtedly, the author who wrote a letter such as Ephesians was an important teacher of the first century Church. Ephesians is one of the most important documents in the New Testament. Could its author have written only this one letter (plus maybe Colossians) and afterwards disappear without a trace? It is much easier to suppose that Christ's one and only apostle of the gentiles, Paul, was the very teacher of the first century Church who wrote Ephesians. Thus I conclude with the words of Klaus Berger, Thomas Weißenborn and

Klaus Haacker. Berger writes:

> The assessment of Paul's versatility should not be limited a priori. Although this might make it easier to systematise, especially for the later theologian, it might also lead to a considerable underestimation of Paul's ability to change. Since it is all a matter of judgement, when in doubt, one should vote in favour of the accused … In my opinion there was no unified Pauline theology … There is no way around it, in Pauline theology we perceive different approaches and clusters.[19]

And I agree with Weißenborn:

> According to the now widespread prejudice of F.C. Baur, primitive Christianity in the entire Mediterranean basin 'developed' in a relatively uniform manner, from the unordered Jesus movement to an 'early Catholic' church, with its foundations of Scripture, office and tradition. From a simple witness to Jesus, a complex Christology developed. The Jewish Christian church of Palestine was replaced by the Hellenist Gentile church, including pagan conceptions of the gods. Separate house churches, with itinerant prophets travelling among them, grew into a hierarchical church with a superstructure that bound them together. A feverish and this-world critical expectation of Christ's imminent return was disappointed and the church turned more toward the world. Marriage, profession, etc. became important. It is into this scheme that modern exegetes arrange their sources, not according to historical, but rather to theological criteria. It is then not considered quite so important and can easily be overlooked, if one speaks of the theology or eschatology of 'Paul', even though the individual, uncontested letters fail to offer us a uniform Paul.[20]

Last but not least Haacker rightly demands:

> There are – as far as I know – no reliable, empirically based parameters for content uniformity and temporal stability of the theology of Paul! Arguments along this line presuppose a concept of theology that is applicable at most to dogmatists … [I] feel that the scholarly representations of the theology of Paul have a tendency to *hyper-* or *gnesiopaulinism* [italics his]. They over-emphasize certain key points, raising them as benchmarks against which the historical, documented Paul of the historical sources is to be measured … It would be better if theological arguments were excluded from the debate on the authenticity of the surviving letters of Paul, or they should at least be downgraded significantly.[21]

Rüdiger Fuchs is the Pastor of the Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirche in 23738 Lensahn, Ostholstein, Germany.

Endnotes

1 E. Weise, *Paulus, Apostel Jesu Christi, Lehrer der Gemeinden* (Inaugural Dissertation, Eberhard-Karls-Universität zu Tübingen 1997, unpublished).

2 Michael Theobald, 'Der Epheserbrief' in M. Ebner & S. Schreiber (eds), *Einleitung in das Neue Testament* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2008) 410-418; also e.g. Udo Schnelle, *Einleitung in das Neue Testament* (UTB 1830; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht [6]2007) 343-357; Ingo Broer, *Einleitung in das Neue Testament*: Studienausgabe Bd. 1 + 2 (Würzburg: Echter Verlag 2006) 2.515-518; Niebuhr, *Grundinformationen*, 250-253.

3 Guthrie, *New Testament Introduction*, 496-528; Carson, Moo and Morris, *Introduction*, 305-316; Hoehner, *Ephesians*.

4 Theobald, 'Epheserbrief', 410-418.

5 In Ephesians, eschatological 'hope' is only vaguely mentioned for well-taught Christians who know everything about this topic (1:18, 2:2, 4:4) because such 'hope' is no main theme; but in Galatians and in Philemon eschatological 'hope' is not mentioned at all.

6 Eckstein, 'Auferstehung und gegenwärtiges Leben', 8-23, esp. 22-23 incl. fn 69-70; 19 incl. fn 53.

7 See Klaus Haacker, 'Rezeptionsgeschichte und Literarkritik: Anfragen an die communis opinio zum Corpus Paulinum', *Theologische Zeitschrift* 65 (2009) 224-225.

8 See Henri Chadwick, 'All Things to all Men', *New Testament Studies* 55 (1954) 261-275; Klaus Haacker, ‚Urchristliche Mission und kulturelle Identität: Beobachtungen zur Strategie und Homiletik des Apostels Paulus', *Theologische Beiträge* 2 (1988) 61-72; K. Köhler, 'Allen bin ich alles geworden, um auf jeden Fall einige zu retten' (1 Kor 9,22b): Das Ende des Paulus und der Anfang der Kirche' in R. Hoppe & K. Köhler (eds), *Das Paulusbild der Apostelgeschichte* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 2009) 193-234.

9 I prefer the alternate translation of the phrase 'to control your own body', as noted in the NRSV comments on 1 Thess 4:4.

10 This problem contributed to (polemical?) formulations like: an elder, bishop or genuine widow 'must be someone who must be above reproach, *married only once*' (cf. Tit 1:5-6,1 Tim 3:2; 5:9).

11 Cf. already 1 Cor 9:20-23 moving toward 1 Cor 10:31 – 14:14, specifically 1 Cor 10:32 – 11:2 as the header of 1 Cor 11-14; see also the theme of the letter, starting in 5:1, 7:14-16.

12 See Towner, 'Gnosis', 95-125.

13 Paul knows very well what his readers had learned and what they did not yet know (Rom 1:8-17, 6:17, 16:17, 1 Cor 4:17, 11:1-2, 1 Thess 3:10; 1 Thess 4, 2 Thess 3:6, Phil 4:9; cf. Acts 20:20).

14 E.g. P. Wick, *Paulus* (UTB [basics] 2858; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2006) 124-158.

15 Romans 1-4: faith; Romans 5-8: love and hope; Romans 8: our love for God and love of God in Christ for the Christians; finally Romans 12-15: love among Christians and to all.

16 See the noun and verb in Eph 1:4, 6, 15, 2:4, 3:17, 19, 4:2, 15, 16, 5:2, 25, 28, 33, 6:23, 24 and Phlm 5, 7, 9 in only 335 words of this letter. See also the identical words in the prayers Eph 1:15 and Col 1:4 'faith and *love*', nearly identical to Phlm 5 '*love* and faith.' See also 2 Tim 1:7, Col 1:4, 8, 13, 2:2, 3:14.

17 For example Schnelle, *Einleitung*, 344.

18 Johannes Lähnemann, *Der Kolosserbrief: Komposition, Situation und Argumentation* (StNT 3; Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus 1971) 181-182 note 82.

19 Berger, *Kommentar*, 792.

20 Weißenborn, *Apostel*, 302-303.

21 Haacker, *Rezeptionsgeschichte*, 226.

Evangelical Historiography: May a Historian Legitimately Look for God's Hand in Church History?

T. J. Marinello

SUMMARY

This essay provides a qualified yes to the question of whether an evangelical historian can legitimately look for the hand of God in Church history. After noting that God is the master and creator of history, pneumatological reasons for this qualified yes are provided. Limits and cautions are then reviewed. First, the evangelical historian should not approach the interpretation of Church history with a triumphalist attitude. Second, he needs to be aware of how it is his theological and other assumptions may affect his historiography. Third, he should be cognizant that historians from different parts of Christianity (or even different evangelical historians) may indeed see the active hand of God as causing a particular historical outcome, but for very different reasons. Ultimately, while an evangelical historian may see the hand of God in Church history, it likely only will be a glimpse and is subject to a revisit when more data is discovered.

* * * * * * * *

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Dieser Aufsatz beantwortet die Frage, ob ein evangelikaler Historiker berechtigterweise nach der Hand Gottes in der Geschichte Ausschau halten darf, mit einem qualifizierten ‚Ja'. Nach der einführenden Feststellung, dass Gott Herr und Schöpfer der Geschichte ist, werden pneumatologische Gründe für dieses ‚Ja' angeführt. Dann folgt eine Untersuchung der Grenzen und Vorsichtsmaßregeln in diesem Bereich. Erstens, der evangelikale Historiker sollte nicht mit einer triumphalistischen Haltung an die Interpretation der Kirchengeschichte herangehen. Zweitens, er muss sich seiner theologischen und anderer Hypothesen bewusst sein, und wie diese seine Geschichtsschreibung beeinflussen können. Drittens, er sollte dessen eingedenk sein, dass Historiker aus unterschiedlichen Lagern der Christenheit (oder sogar aus unterschiedlichen evangelikalen Lagern) durchaus die tätige Hand Gottes als Urheber eines bestimmten historischen Ergebnisses wahrnehmen mögen, doch dies aus ganz unterschiedlichen Gründen. Und schließlich: Auch wenn der evangelikale Historiker die Hand Gottes in der Geschichte sehen mag, so wird dies vermutlich nur ein flüchtiger Blick sein, der bei umfangreicherer Datenlage auch weiterer Überprüfung bedarf.

* * * * * * * *

RÉSUMÉ

Cet ouvrage apporte une réponse positive nuancée à la question de savoir si un historien évangélique peut légitimement chercher à discerner la main de Dieu dans l'histoire de l'Église. Après avoir souligné que Dieu est le créateur et le maître de l'histoire, l'auteur avance des raisons pneumatologiques pour justifier cette réponse positive nuancée. Il indique ensuite les limites de cet exercice et les précautions à prendre. Tout d'abord, l'historien évangélique doit se garder d'une attitude triomphaliste dans son interprétation de l'histoire de l'Église. Il doit ensuite être conscient de la manière dont ses positions théologiques ou autres peuvent orienter sa démarche. Il lui faut encore savoir que des historiens d'autres confessions chrétiennes (ou même d'autres historiens évangéliques) pourront voir l'action divine comme la cause de tel ou tel aboutissement dans l'histoire, mais pour des raisons très différentes de celles qu'il croit lui-même discerner. Enfin, s'il est vrai que l'historien évangélique peut discerner la main de Dieu dans l'histoire de l'Église, ce ne sera que de manière fugitive et son appréciation sera sujette à révision en fonction de découvertes de nouvelles données historiques.

* * * * * * * *

1. Introduction

Exodus 33 and 34 record the renewal of the Mosaic Covenant after the failures of the nation of Israel as they worshipped the golden calf. These events of failure and renewal follow the record of the miraculous deliverance of Israel from 400 years of bondage in Egypt (Ex 7:4-5, 12:12).[1] At this juncture, Moses looks to the Lord for proof that he has indeed found favour in his sight and asks, 'Please show me your glory' (Ex 33:18).[2] With this event as a background, we come to the question, 'What can an evangelical expect to see when he examines Church history?'[3] Specifically, may an evangelical historian legitimately look for God's hand in Church history? While this is not a new issue, this is an appropriate venue to address it once again.[4]

Before proceeding, a definition and a disclosure are in order. First, an evangelical is defined here as someone who manifests the characteristics of an evangelical as commonly defined by Bebbington's 'quadrilateral of priorities', namely, '*conversionism*, the belief that lives need to be changed; *activism*, the expression of the gospel in effort; *biblicism*, a particular regard for the Bible; and what may be called *crucicentrism*, a stress on the sacrifice of Christ on the cross.'[5] Second, this essay is written from an evangelical perspective. Thus, this is a short study of the feasibility of a particular historical method which originates out of a particular segment of Christianity.

Returning to the matter at hand, what generally is seen when one examines the history of the Church? Jesus said in Matthew 16:18, 'I will build my Church, and the gates of hell will not prevail against it.' To study Church history, then, is to study the outworking of this promise. The second person of the Trinity said he will establish something and he guarantees its unassailable endurance. When one examines Church history, however, what actually is encountered? The examiner quickly becomes enveloped by the many and noteworthy failures of the followers of Jesus Christ to reflect his teachings and values. What constitutes a failure? That depends on the examiner. For example, if the historian comes from one particular background, failure may be found in the insistence of the Reformers and other early rebels not to be under the authority of *sancta mater ecclesia*. From this perspective, the Lord left only one Church, the one, holy, apostolic and *Roman* Catholic Church, whose fidelity is guaranteed in part by the organic link through the laying on of hands in the succession of bishops from the time of the apostles until today.[6] If the reader comes from one of the Orthodox churches – and especially the Russian Orthodox Church – the failure of fidelity by the Roman Catholic Church is confirmed in the fall of the first Rome for heresy, and the 'fall to the infidel' of the second Rome (Byzantium) for trying to reunite with the first Rome.[7] The subsequent shattering and fragmenting of the Western Church as a result of the Protestant Reformation is seen as further evidence of the failures of the Roman Catholic Church. If the reader comes from one of the many Protestant denominations, and especially from one with a 'gathered' ecclesiology,[8] the failure of both the Roman Catholic and the Orthodox churches may be traced to their departure from New Testament teachings regarding the content and practice of the Gospel. Accordingly, depending on from which part of Christianity one comes, failures are readily seen in the other sections, if not in one's own as well.

In addition to these divergent views of failure, however, there are similar views regarding the failures of the Church. For example, almost everyone within twenty-first century Christianity looks with disdain at the Inquisition's persecution of men like Galileo for supporting a heliocentric system as opposed a geocentric universe; many shun a favourable view of the era of the Christian Crusades; and some shrink back from the various church-state allegiances which have come to grief in the Roman Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant traditions.[9]

2. The Bible

Nonetheless, should an evangelical be able to study Church history and seek the face of God, to detect his hand at work in the unfolding history of his Church? If so, why can such a seemingly outrageous claim be made? What possible support for such a position can be found? The answer is found in the inerrant revelation of the character and conduct of God; it is found in the Bible. To find answers to our questions, then, we need to consult the text. As this is done, an important observation is in order.

God is both the master and creator of history. Karl Barth notes that 'there is an element in which [all history] is immediate to God and immediately posited by Him'. Accordingly, all historical study becomes 'soulless and intolerable' when God's perspective is not accepted or even considered.[10] More simply put, God is the maker of the world as well as the maker of time to include the unfolding of its sequence as its master.[11] Throughout the Old Testament we find examples of his activity in the history of Israel. Further, the incarnation of the Lord Jesus, or as one has called it the Intemporisation, recorded in the New Testament, clearly demonstrates a God who is active in his creation.[12] Repeatedly throughout the Old and New Testaments, God declares that the purpose of his actions is to bring glory to himself (e.g. the Exodus: Ex 7:5, 9:14, 10:2, 11:9; the humiliation and exaltation of the Lord Jesus: Phil 2:7-10). His outworking of his purposes happens in an orderly fashion which brings greatest glory to himself (e.g. Isa. 41).[13] Accordingly, the point of discussion is not whether God is purposeful and active in history; the Bible clearly says that he is as 'the Author and Guider of the world's history from the beginning'.[14] In fact, Claus Westermann rightly notes that 'God's deity is shown to be such by the continuity of his action in history.'[15] The Lord God as master and creator of history even challenges the 'idol gods' and their worshippers both to recount what has happened as well as to use this knowledge to predict the resultant, purposeful outcome (Isa. 41:21-24).[16]

3. The person

The question at hand, then, is whether or not an evangelical historian can detect God's purposeful, active hand when studying a portion of that history, the history of the Church. A qualified yes is offered in answer to this question. So how can this be?

First, the evangelical is indwelt by God the Holy Spirit (Jn 14:16-17; 1 Cor 6:19-20). This indwelling and simultaneous baptism into the body of Christ occurred at the time of the believer's justification (1 Cor 12:13). Secondly, the evangelical also benefits from the illuminating work of the indwelling Holy Spirit. The illuminating work of the Holy Spirit is defined here as providing wisdom and understanding not just when the text of Scripture is consulted, but in life's situations in general, including the acts of God in history.[17]

This pneumatological activity – the indwelling and baptism along with the illuminating work of God the Holy Spirit – underpins the conviction that an evangelical historian indeed has some capacity to detect the active, purposeful hand of God in the history of his Church. The inception of the Church was the result of the baptising work of the Holy Spirit, as recorded in Acts 2; this event bound the early believers and then subsequent believers into one body. Nonetheless, evangelical historians cannot claim free access to the mysteries of the actions of God in his Church; they are still sinners post-justification and they still suffer corruption of their faculties as a result (Rom 7). As Barth well wrote,

> As man's baptism with the Holy Spirit, the beginning of the new Christian life is and remains a real beginning. It is not perfect. It is not self-sufficient, definitive, or complete. It is a commencement which points forward to the future. It is a take-off for the leap towards what is not yet present. It is a start which involves looking to and stretching for a future. . . For those baptized with the Holy Ghost, the old has passed away and the new is already coming. Nevertheless, this carries with it a Forward. It intimates a work which goes further.[18]

4. Practice

If the above premises are accepted, how might this work in practice? What are ways in which the evangelical historian should approach a study of the history of the Church?

First, the evangelical historian should not approach the interpretation of Church history with a triumphalist attitude. Academic arrogance which pits one part of Christianity against another is neither helpful nor productive. While theological distinctions are and should be held in accordance with one's convictions, the interpretation of God's hand in Church history is less open to a definitive interpretation. Exactly why or how God has acted in the post-apostolic era is a much less precise issue than, for example, interpreting the biblical record concerning Paul's reason for leaving Titus on Crete (Tit 1:5). Accordingly, one's interpretation of God's actions should not be used as a cudgel with which to smash others or as a trump card flung on the table to end debate. The evangelical historian should not be guilty of the practice described in the mid-twentieth century by Cambridge professor Herbert Butterfield who wrote,

> It was often noted in the earlier decades of the present century how greatly it had become the habit of Protestants to hold some German

scholar up their sleeve – a different one every few years but always preferably the latest one – and at the appropriate moments strike the unwary Philistine on the head with this secret weapon, the German scholar having decided in a final manner whatever point might have been at issue in a controversy.[19]

Second, the evangelical historian needs to be aware how his theological and other assumptions might affect his historiography. In a methodological primer on the study of Church history, James E. Bradley and Richard A. Muller write of the concerns of Johann Lorenz von Mosheim, a man called the father of modern Church history:

> Mosheim was acutely aware of the characteristic dangers that face the historian such as anachronism, undue reverence for authority, and bias.[20]

However, Bradley and Muller also note that many of Mosheim's contemporaries, having benefitted from his observations, overreacted and went on to develop a contempt for the past as the result of their own methodological 'enlightenment'.[21] Perhaps a prominent example of the negative effects of theological assumptions might be the outlook of the prodigious Church historian, Kenneth Scott Latourette. While many applaud the valuable contributions Latourette made to the study of Church history in the twentieth century, some are less complimentary of his historiographical assumptions. As John Hannah wrote at the end of a lengthy critique of Latourette's work,

> [H]is theory of history stands upon contested foundations. His defence of a visually victorious, moral church is without historic, theological validation; his progressivism reflects nineteenth-century historicism; and his Christianity is a veiled pietistic moralism.[22]

Thus, the evangelical historian should work to eliminate his 'party prejudices', be aware of 'party preferences' and adopt an attitude akin to that found in Mosheim's introduction to his multivolume work *An Ecclesiastical History*:[23]

> It would betray an unpardonable assumption in me to imagine, that … I have never fallen into any mistakes, or let any thing drop from my pen, which stands in need of correction.[24]

Third, the evangelical historian should be conscious that historians from different parts of Christianity (or even different evangelical historians) may see the active hand of God as causing a particular historical outcome but for very different reasons. As David Bebbington noted, 'Historians of equal integrity can persist in holding opposite interpretations of what actually happened.'[25]

A contemporaneous record of responses of the participants in the Battle of the Boyne provides an illustration of this principle. Just prior to the formation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain in 1707, Britain had her Glorious Revolution of 1688. The Glorious Revolution was Parliament's overthrow of the Roman Catholic King James II and his replacement by his Protestant daughter, Mary, and her Dutch husband, William of Orange.[26] King James II fled the country for France but returned two years later in an attempt to regain his throne on the battlefield. His attempt culminated with the Battle of the Boyne in 1690, a battle fought near the River Boyne in eastern Ireland just north of Drogheda.[27] Both Roman Catholics and Protestants implored God for his hand of blessing as the battle was joined. The outcome was the victory of the Protestant forces of William over the Roman Catholic forces of James II. The Protestants were jubilant; as victorious William rode into Dublin, they 'ran about shouting and embracing one another and blessing God for his wonderful deliverance as if they had been alive from the dead'.[28] Further, William went to Dublin's St. Patrick's Cathedral and heard a sermon preached by the Dean of the Cathedral, Dr William King, 'on the great deliverance which God had wrought for the Church'.[29] How did the Roman Catholic Church respond? *Te deums* were offered in the Roman Catholic cathedrals of Vienna and throughout the realm of the Holy Roman Emperor at his behest.[30] Pope Alexander VIII is alleged to have held a special mass in Rome thanking God for his hand in the good outcome and 'had St. Peter's outlined in a blaze of celebratory candles!'[31] How can this be? Why would the Roman Catholic Church thank God for the victory of the Protestant King William? The Catholic leaders thanked God that the French allied forces under James II had lost, because this was a 'final triumph of Louis's [XIV] European enemies.'[32] The pope did not want a further spread of Gallican ideas such as found in the Declaration of Gallican Liberties of 1682 or for Louis XIV to be able to threaten the Papal States militarily, as he had threatened the lands of other members of the League of Augsburg.[33] Perhaps the pope also did not want a return to the days when the papacy was controlled by the French as it had been in the days of Avignon Papacy; he did not want a return to what was called the Babylonian Captivity of the Church. Likewise, the Holy Roman Emperor was glad to see off one of his most significant political-military rivals. Thus, both Protestant and Roman Catholic interpreters noted God's hand as the one who raises up and brings down kings and kingdoms (Dan 2:21). Both were on much shakier ground, however, as they saw the victory of William over James either as God's certain stamp of approval for Britain's brand of Protestantism or as God's condemnation of France's attempts to subjugate Roman Catholicism. Nonetheless, we can agree with Ronald Wells that

> [The Battle of the Boyne] ranks along with Tours, where, in 732 Christian forces under Charles Martel had stopped the advance of Islam into Europe. It is possible that Catholicism might have been restored universally and Protestantism marginalized had events turned out differently in central Ireland in the spring and summer of 1690.[34]

Even lacking certainty, however, an evangelical historian is correct to look for the active hand of God in the history of his Church, and thus to inquire about the purpose of these actions. To ask why God has purposed or allowed something to happen should be the question of any evangelical Christian in every realm. The study of Church history is not a domain which lies beyond this question because evangelical Christians should always ask this type of question for the purpose of understanding God and being conformed to his image (cf. 1 Cor 2:10–13).

When in the process should the evangelical historian look for God's purposeful hand, however? This is best accomplished at the end of a particular historical inquiry. The 'what' needs to be addressed before the 'so what'. Good historians, evangelical or not, do not and should not approach an investigation with a front-loaded determination of outcome or purpose. This does not ignore the fact that an evangelical historian's choice of topic, questions posed, and theories of academic inquiry will be affected by his evangelicalism in the same manner as other historians are affected by their perspective or interest.[35] Nonetheless, the evangelical historian must still gather and evaluate the data. In an absolute sense, history never changes; what has happened cannot be undone or redone. The discovery of what actually happened, however, is in constant flux as more information is made available. Consequently, the examiner should be willing to collect additional empirical data and to revisit its interpretation.[36] Thus, a healthy dose of humility is in order for the evangelical historian in the interpretive process. This reminder should be considered periodically because academic hubris can invade the pages of historical writing. As Butterfield wrote, 'There exists in historical writing … an appearance of definitiveness and finality which is an optical illusion.'[37] Going further, George Marsden says,

> My ideal for Christian scholarship is one that not only looks for the bearing of one's Christian convictions on one's academic thought, but also reflects some Christian attitudes that shape the tone of one's scholarship.[38]

5. Conclusion

This essay began with Moses making the request to see God's glory. The Lord responded,

> I will make all my goodness pass before you and will proclaim before you my name 'The Lord.' And I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will show mercy on whom I will show mercy. But, he said, you cannot see my face, for man shall not see me and live. (Ex 33:19–20)

So Moses got a glimpse of the Lord God as he passed by, a glimpse which caused him to bow his head and worship (Ex 34:8). His request to see God was met with success, albeit only partial as he never sees the face of God. In a similar fashion, the evangelical historian should seek to see the active work of God in the history of his Church, and like Moses, almost certainly will get only a glimpse of this activity. That glimpse seen, the evangelical historian should bow his head in worship as he tries to enunciate to others this glimpse of God's purposeful acts in the history of his Church.

Dr T. J. Marinello is Professor of Systematic and Historical Theology at Tyndale Theological Seminary, Badhoevedorp, Netherlands.

Endnotes

1 For a purpose of the plagues and destruction of Pharaoh's army, see David Livingston, 'The Plagues and the Exodus', *Bible and Spade* 4.1 (1991) 6-14; William McRae, 'The Finger of God: An Exposition of Exodus 7-10', *The Emmaus Journal* 4.2 (1995) 162-167.

2 Scripture quotations are from *The Holy Bible*,

English Standard Version (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2001).

3 Throughout the article, for 'he' and 'his' also read 'she' and 'her'.

4 For an examination and analysis of various schemes of historiography from an evangelical perspective, see David Bebbington, *Patterns in History: A Christian Perspective on Historical Thought* with new preface and afterword (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1990). For the possibility of an evangelical perspective to the study of history, see generally George M. Marsden, *The Outrageous Idea of Christian Scholarship* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) and more specifically Ronald A. Wells (ed.), *History and the Christian Historian* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998). For the application of this perspective, cf. Ronald A. Wells, *History Through the Eyes of Faith* (New York: HarperCollins, 1989), a usually measured work at one end within this perspective, and Peter Marshall and David Marshall, *The Light and the Glory* (Old Tappan, NJ: Revell, 1977), a work at the other end within this perspective which strongly advocates the active, purposeful role of God's hand of blessing in the details of the founding and forming of the United States – a 'providential history'.

5 David Bebbington, *Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1730s to the 1980s* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1992) 3.

6 Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, 'IV: Unicity and Unity of the Church' in 'Declaration "*Dominus Iesus*" on the Unicity and Salvific Universality of Jesus Christ and the Church,' Vatican, 06 August 2000, http://212.77.1.247/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_ doc _20000806_ dominus-iesus_en.html (accessed 2 March 2014).

7 Filofei of Pskov, 'Moscow the Third Rome (excerpts)', letter to Tsar Vassili 3, Durham University, accessed 31 December 2013, http://www.dur.ac.uk/a.k.harrington/3rdrome.html. Cf. 'ПОСЛАНИЯ СТАРЦА ФИЛОФЕЯ: Подготовкатекста, перевод и комментарии В. В. Колесова',Электронныепубликации, accessed 31 December 2013, http://www.pushkinskijdom.ru/Default.aspx?tabid=5105.

8 Cf. Timothy C. F. Stunt, *From Awakening to Secession: Radical Evangelicals in Switzerland and Britain 1815-35* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000) 208.

9 For a discussion of the Inquisition's condemnation of Galileo and his subsequent recantations, see John D. Woodbridge and Frank A. James III, *Church History Volume 2: From Pre-Reformation to the Present Day* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2013) 339-341. For a summary of views of the crusades over the years, see Thomas Madden, 'The Legacy of the Crusades' in *The New Concise History of the Crusades*, updated ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005) 213-222. For a discussion of the Byzantine church-state relationship and a critique of one of its main characterizers, see John A. McGuckin, 'The Legacy of the 13th Apostle: Origins of the East Christian Conceptions of Church and State Relation', *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* 47.3-4 (2003) 251-288.

10 These quotes come in the midst of Barth's discussion of history and '"non-historical" history' (or 'prehistory') with respect to the creation. He goes on to emphasize and explain the importance of God's role with respect to history subsequent to the creation. Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, vol. 3.1, *The Doctrine of Creation*, ed. by G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance (1958; repr. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2010) 78-80.

11 Augustine, *The City of God* 11.6. For a summary of this idea, cf. Wayne Grudem, 'Chapter 11: Incommunicable Attributes of God, 3. Eternity' in *Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994) 168-173.

12 Timothy George, 'St. Augustine and the Mystery of Time' (lecture, Dallas Theological Seminary, 3 February 2005).

13 For a discussion of the Christian belief in the purposeful linearity of history due to God's intervention in history, cf. Bebbington, 'Christian History', in *Patterns in History*, 43-67.

14 Franz Delitzsch, *Isaiah*, *Commentary on the Old Testament in Ten Volumes*, C. F. Keil and F. Delitzsch ([1866-91]; repr. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982) 157. For a more complete discussion, cf. Delitzsch, *Isaiah*, 157-174.

15 Claus Westermann, *Isaiah 40-66: A Commentary* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969) 85; cf. Geoffrey W. Grogan, 'Isaiah' in *The Expositor's Bible Commentary*, vol. 6, ed. Frank E. Gaebelein (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1986) 251.

16 J. Alec Motyer, *The Prophecy of Isaiah: An Introduction and Commentary* (Downers Grove: IVP, 1993) 315-316. For a more extended discussion, see Edward J. Young, *The Book of Isaiah vol. 3: Chapters 40 through 66* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972) 95-100.

17 Grudem, *Systematic Theology*, 645. Cf. Dan. 2:20-22.

18 Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, vol. 4.4, *The Doctrine of Reconciliation (fragment)*, eds. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance (1969; repr. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2010) 38.

19 Herbert Butterfield, *Christianity and History* (London: Bell and Sons, 1950) 9. Note the irony of this statement in light of the German authors cited at key points in this essay, albeit not the latest ones.

20 James E. Bradley and Richard A. Muller, *Church*

History: An Introduction to Research, Reference Works, and Methods (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995) 15.

21 Bradley and Muller, *Church History*, 15-16.

22 John D. Hannah, 'Kenneth Scott Latourette, A Trail Blazer: A Critical Evaluation of Latourette's Theory of Religious History', *Grace Theological Journal* 2.1 (1981) 22.

23 Bradley and Muller, *Church History*, 19.

24 John L. Mosheim, *An Ecclesiastical History: Ancient and Modern, from the Birth of Christ, to the Beginning of the Eighteenth Century* (London: W. Gracie, 1819) 1:xx.

25 Bebbington, *Patterns in History*, 13.

26 For an entertaining read of the events leading up to, during, and immediately after the Glorious Revolution, see Will Durant and Ariel Durant, *The Story of Civilization*, vol. 8, *The Age of Louis XIV: A History of the European Civilization in the Period of Pascal, Molière, Cromwell, Milton, Peter the Great, Newton, and Spinoza: 1648-1715* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1963) 276-311.

27 J.G. Simms, 'The Restoration and the Jacobite War (1660-91)' in T.W. Moody and F.X. Martin (eds), *The Course of Irish History*, rev. ed. (Cork: Mercier Press, 1984) 212. I am indebted, in part, to Dr. Timothy C.F. Stunt for his input concerning both the facts and interpretation of the facts surrounding the Battle of the Boyne.

28 Michael de Laval Landon, *Erin and Britannia: The Historical Background of a Modern Tragedy* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1981) 159.

29 Thomas B. Macaulay, *The History of England from the Accession of James the Second* (London: Longman, 1864) 3:643. Cf. Anthony Hewitson, *Diary of Thomas Bellingham: An Officer under William III, with complete transcript and notes, Social Life and National Movements in the 17th Century* (1688-89-90) (Preston: Geo. Toulmin & Sons, 1908) 133-134.

30 Simms, 'Restoration and Jacobite War', 213.

31 Terence Sheehy, 'The battle that marks the turning point', *Catholic Herald*, 18 July 1986, accessed 14 January 2014, http://archive.catholicherald.co.uk/article/18th-july-1986/7/the-battle-that-marks-the-turning-point. Cf. Landon, *Erin and Britannia*, 162 n.12, who disputes the pope's celebratory reaction but gives no sources for his assertion. See also Gerald Warner, 'King Billy on a white horse? Could Ulster's Orangemen at least get their own mythology right?', *The Telegraph*, 14 July 2010, accessed 17 June 2014, http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/geraldwarner/100047172/king-billy-on-a-white-horse-could-ulsters-orangemen-at-least-get-their-own-mythology-right/.

32 Edmund Curtis, *A History of Ireland*, 5th ed. (London: Methuen, 1945) 271.

33 'The Battle of the Boyne', *Grand Orange Lodge of Scotland*, accessed 17 Jun 2014, www.orangeorderscotland.com/The%20Battle%20of%20The%20Boyne.pdf. Antoine Dégert, 'Gallicanism' in *The Catholic Encyclopedia* vol. 6 (New York: Robert Appleton, 1909), accessed 17 Jun 2014, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06351a.htm.

34 Wells, *History Through the Eyes of Faith*, 107.

35 George M. Marsden, 'What Difference Might Christian Perspectives Make?' in Wells, *History and the Christian Historian*, 15-16.

36 Butterfield has a good rehearsal of many of the issues related to the effects of newly discovered historical material and its consequences for historical interpretation, using the example both of Leopold von Ranke's reappraisal of the Renaissance as well as historical summations constructed after the British Foreign Office opened its document archives for a particular period. Butterfield, *Christianity and History*, 12-15.

37 Butterfield, *Christianity and History*, 15.

38 Marsden, *The Outrageous Idea of Christian Scholarship*, 54.

EJT (2015) 24:1, 49–56 0960–2720

Master Jan Hus – Obedience or Resistance

Ján Liguš

SUMMARY

This paper focuses on Master Jan (John, Johannes) Hus (1371-1415), the Czech theologian and reformer who was condemned to death by the medieval Roman Catholic Church and burned at the stake in Constance on July 6, 1415, that is 600 years ago this year. We will look at the theme of 'obedience or resistance' in his life and work from several sides: after a sketch of his time and some biographical data, we review the church's situation at the time of Hus and his struggle. We describe his stay in Southern Bohemia and his treatment at Constance; finally, we look at Hus' main theological emphases including his personal understanding of *vocatio interna et externa*.

* * * *

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Dieser Artikel konzentriert sich auf Meister Jan Hus (1371-1415), tschechischer Theologe und Reformator, der von der mittelalterlichen Römisch-katholischen Kirche am 6 Juli 1415 in Konstanz zum Tode verurteilt und auf dem Scheiterhaufen verbrannt wurde, also vor genau 600 Jahre. In diesem Artikel werden wir das Thema Gehorsam oder Widerstand in seinem Leben und Werk von unterschiedlichen Blickwinkeln betrachten: Nach einer kurzen Skizze des zeitgenössischen Hintergrunds und einiger biographischer Daten wenden wir uns der Situation der Kirche zur Zeit von Hus und seinem Kampf für die Erneuerung Kirche zu. Zugleich geben wir eine kurze Beschreibung seines Aufenthaltes in Südböhmen und der Verhandlung seines Falls in Konstanz. Schließlich richten wir unser Augenmerk auf Hus' theologische Schwerpunkte einschließlich seines Verständnisses einer vocatio interna et vocatio externa [innere und äußere Berufung].

* * * *

RÉSUMÉ

Cette étude s'intéresse à Maître Jean Hus (1371-1415), théologien tchèque et réformateur, qui fut condamné à mort par l'Église catholique romaine et brûlé vif à Constance le 6 juillet 1415, il y a exactement 600 ans cette année. L'auteur considère, sous divers angles, ce que la vie et l'œuvre de Hus peuvent nous apprendre sur la question : « obéissance ou résistance ? ». Après un bref exposé sur l'époque de Hus et une présentation d'éléments biographiques, il considère quelle était la condition de l'Église et quel a été le combat de Hus. Il décrit son séjour dans le sud de la Bohème et ce qui lui est advenu à Constance. Il considère enfin les points principaux de sa théologie, notamment sa compréhension personnelle de la vocation interne et de la vocation externe.

* * * *

1. Three reasons for choosing Ján Hus[1]

My first reason for paying attention to Hus is the fact that Jan Hus, like Dietrich Bonhoeffer, spent his life in the church's ministry: in preaching, pastoral care, religious education and teaching at the Charles University in Prague. All his activities were directed to the restoration of the medieval church and society on the basis of God's Word. Therefore, the Czech theologian Lochman can say that 'the Reformation in Bohemia and Moravia really began a century earlier than it did in the other European countries'.[2]

The second reason for my choice is that Hus' theological and social emphases were also studied at secondary schools and theological faculties during the era of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia. At high schools instruction concentrated on Hus' linguistic contributions to the improvement of the Czech language and on his social struggle against the riches and luxury of the medieval clergy, prelates and bishops. The teaching at theological faculties largely focused on Hus' homiletics, hermeneutics and catechesis, because these were directed at the spiritual and social renewal of church and society, and they were acceptable for the communist regime.[3]

However, all these theological, social, preaching and teaching activities were lacking a broadly open ecumenical Christian theological dialogue about Jan Hus' theological legacy. This dialogue only began after the fall of the Iron Curtain in the European communist countries in 1989. That is why in 1993, four years after that event, the three theological faculties at the Charles University in Prague took the initiative to organise an open international ecumenical conference at Bayreuth in Germany on the theological legacy of Jan Hus as a reformer. Participants at this conference were theologians of the Catholic, Protestant and Hussite theological faculties in Prague as well as experts from the Czech Academy of Sciences and a number of Protestant, Catholic and evangelical believers. The main theme of the conference was *Jan Hus among Epochs, Nations and Confessions*; its findings and conclusions were published in Czech and in German.[4]

The third reason for choosing Hus is the fact that the Charles University in Prague and the Czech Academy of Science, together with other universities and Christian communities in Europe and all over the world, are organising significant celebrations on the occasion of the 600th anniversary of the death of Hus in 2015.

2.1 Birth, studies and occupation

Jan Hus is one of the most outstanding and important personalities in Czech history. He was born about 1371 in the South Bohemian village of Husinec. He received elementary and secondary education in the town of Prachatice and subsequently continued his studies at the Charles University in Prague, where he received a bachelor's degree in 1393 and three years later a master's degree as well. Hus lived during the reign of King Wenceslaus IV of Bohemia who succeeded his father, Charles IV (1346-1378), known as the Czech King and Holy Roman Emperor, and who was the founder of the Charles University in Prague. Jan B. Lášek points to Hus' good relationship with Wenceslaus, with whom he 'went on a journey to France in 1397-1398'. Lášek continues:

After his return he started to lecture at the university, and in 1400 he was ordained priest. In the winter semester of 1401-1402 he became Dean of the Faculty of Arts in Prague. Beginning in March 1402, he was for more than ten years active as a preacher at the Bethlehem Chapel in Prague which had been established in 1391 with the express stipulation that the word of God should be proclaimed in the Czech language.[5]

Those who listened to Hus' sermons in the Bethlehem Chapel between 1402 and 1412 were poor people, students, wealthy Czech citizens and craftsmen; occasionally members of the nobility appeared to hear his sermons as well, courtiers of King Wenceslaus IV, and even queen Sophie (Sofia) herself listened to the words of the local preacher. Hus soon became a well-known, popular and influential preacher of God's word throughout all of Bohemia. In his theological emphases Hus followed 'a reform movement which had begun in the fourteenth century with Konrad von Waldhauser, Jan Milič of Kroměříž and Mathias of Janov'.[6] This suggestion is confirmed by the fact that Hus compared and measured the daily life of the Christians and the church representatives by the Holy Scriptures as the only valid spiritual, moral and social norm for both Church and society.

2.2 The church at Jan Hus' time

The Czech church historian Lydie Čejpová emphasizes that Master Jan Hus was personally deeply shocked by the situation in the church at his time, because 'he saw that there were many unfaithful shepherds who led people to perdition'.[7] Another leading church historian at the Hussite Theological Faculty, Jan Lášek, characterises the situation of the church at that time thus:

> The church of those times had become secularized and in many respects decadent … the power and authority of the popes had declined, and there were two rival popes, one in Rome and one in Avignon. … Various reforming tendencies emerged in all parts of Europe. The conciliar movement denied papal authority and wanted to transfer it to an ecumenical council. … The powerful movement of Devotio moderna (the new devotion), inspired by the Dutchman Geert Groote (1340-1348), proclaimed the rebirth of man in Christ and spread into the Czech lands.[8]

Hus preached the word of God in the Bethlehem Chapel and thanks to his important positions as a priest and a university teacher he could influence the entire Czech public with his biblical sermons.

3. Hus' theological orientation and his efforts to reform the medieval church

Jan Hus' theology was deeply influenced by the well-known British philosopher and theologian Jan Wycliffe (or Wyclif; 1330-1384), whose writings began to circulate in Bohemia at the beginning of the fifteenth century. Lášek states that

> The main points in them to have an influence on Hus were the fervent desire to establish order in the church and the criticism of the actual state of the church.

Hus had strong views 'on the lack of order in the church, which had at first two, and later three popes'. Hus was also

> enthusiastic about Wyclif's view that the church is an invisible community preordained for salvation [*numerum praedestinatorum*] and that if the visible church is not capable of living in accordance with the Gospel on its own, then the secular authorities should restore order.[9]

The worldly authorities were qualified for this task by their moral qualities, Hus thought. He was also attracted by Wyclif's way of thinking because the philosophical and theological roots of the two men were similar.

3.1 Hus and the archbishop

At first, the archbishop of Prague, Zbyněk Zajíc of Hazemburg, supported Hus and he twice appointed him as a preacher at a congress of clergy of the Archdiocese in Prague. Hus enjoyed the support of the archbishop during the years 1403-1408, but when disputes over Wycliffe started at the University in Prague, Hus' situation began to change. As it happened, some Czech masters were defending Wycliffe while others made him out to be a heretic.

Matthew Spinka explains that at this time five students of Prague University sent an appeal to the cardinals of the council that was meeting at Pisa (March 25, 1409): 'They utilized this otherwise trivial occasion to put pressure on Archbishop Zbyněk, and initiated legal proceedings against him.' But the archbishop was fearful of the outcome and sent two canonists to Pisa to announce his submission to pope Alexander V, requesting an end to the process against him. In his message, the archbishop 'complained of the spread of Wyclifism both in Bohemia and Moravia, claiming that it had infected the hearts of many, and requested authority to proceed against it.' In response, the pope issued a bull that requested the archbishop to forbid that any preachers would carry on preaching or talking to people in other locations than in the cathedral churches, parish churches, monasteries or in their cemeteries. This papal regulation Hus refused to obey because he considered it to be inconsistent with the fact that Jesus had preached in all places and had sent his disciples into all the world, according to Matthew 28:18-19.[10]

On December 20, 1409, the pope issued a bull which stated that most of Wycliffe´s works were heretical. It authorized archbishop Zbyněk to appoint a six-member commission to examine Wycliffe's books, which he then had to remove from the eyes of the faithful. He was also required to uproot Wyclifism from the country and to punish all who would be found professing 'these damnable heresies'. The bull reached Zbyněk on March 12, 1410, but he did not make it public until the usual June meeting of the synod, on June 16, 1410. A few days later, Hus preached a sermon in which he charged the prelates with being more audacious than Christ himself, who said that 'He judges no one – while they dared to condemn Wyclif's works and forbade under pain of excommunication preaching in chapels'.[11]

Later in that same year 1410, the archbishop ordered Wycliffe's books to be burned. Hus protested against this in his sermons and as a consequence was anathematised by the archbishop. Hus' response to the archbishop's ban can be found in two of his sermons. On June 22, 1410, he preached on Luke 5:1 in the Bethlehem Chapel where, among other things,

> he pointed out, first of all that Jesus preached standing by the lake Gennesareth, thus demonstrating that preaching could take place anywhere, even though the Pharisees and the scribes opposed it.[12]

Hus called the church leaders of his time 'scribes' and added:

> Because our scribes desire the same, commanding that there be no preaching in chapels, even such as had been approved by the apostolic authority, therefore I, wishing to obey God rather than men, and to conform to the acts of Christ rather than to theirs, appeal from this

> wrongful command first of all to God, to whom belongs the principal authority to grant the power to preach ...[13]

After the ban on preaching and the condemnation of Wycliffe´s books, Hus appealed to pope Alexander V in 1410, but the meeting did not take place because the pope died suddenly. Hus subsequently made an appeal to the new pope, John XXIII, but the meeting was not positive for Hus. After two further unsuccessful attempts to have audiences, Hus did not obey the command to stop preaching and in his other sermon on December 20, 1410, to the text Acts 6:12, he exclaimed rhetorically:

> Someone will say, 'But you, Hus, do not wish to be subject to your prelates, do not obey the elders, not even the archbishop' ... I reply that I desire to be as Balaam´s ass. Because the prelates sit on me, wishing to force me to go against the command of God ... I will press the feet of their desire and will not obey them, for the angel of the Lord stands before me in the way.[14]

Hus also explained his refusal to be obedient to men in these words: 'I appealed to the head of the Church, the Lord Jesus Christ, because He is more sovereign than any pope.' If Hus had obeyed the church and stopped preaching, he would have been troubled by his conscience, which had experienced a personal calling of God to the ministry. He would also have disappointed the loyal listeners to his sermons and he would have been compromised in the eyes of all faithful Christians.[15]

After Hus' refusal to stop preaching, the archbishop strengthened the anathema against him and 'had it confirmed by the pope and had it proclaimed in all churches in Prague in March 1411'.[16] At this very critical time for Hus he published a treatise *De libris hereticorum legendis* – 'Concerning the reading of heretical books'.[17] The archbishop brought a complaint against Hus before the pope Jan XXIII, and Hus also appealed to this pope. But, as Hus wrote, 'Even after two years he did not give my attorneys and representatives any hearing and in the meantime I was affected by the continued prosecution.' In spite of this, Hus did not obey and was even more active in the university and the Bethlehem Chapel, writing a further tract entitled: *Replica contra occultum adversarium* (Response against hidden enemies).[18]

The next year, 1412, emissaries of the pope arrived in Prague with a papal bull authorising the sale of indulgences, the proceedings of which would help the pope to finance his war against the King of Naples. Hus wanted to be obedient to the law of Christ, so he stood firm in his resistance against this bull. He considered this indulgence trafficking in repentance and publicly proclaimed that even the pope, if he ignored the law of Christ, was not worthy of obedience. Riots broke out in Prague; three young men, Jan, Martin and Stašek, were arrested and later executed. Jan Hus led their public funeral as Christian martyrs on July 11, 1412. Immediately after it, Prague

> was placed under interdict (no church offices, including baptism, funerals and masses were allowed to be held in the city while Hus remained there) and the king was also threatened with a papal anathema.[19]

3.2 Hus in Southern Bohemia

Hus was aware of how difficult the situation had become for the Czech king and for the whole city. For this reason he decided to leave Prague on October 18, 1412, and he moved to South Bohemia where during the years 1412-1414 he stayed in the area of Kozí Hrádek near the town of Tábor. He still preached the word of God and served many listeners. Before he left Prague, he appealed to Christ:

> I, Jan Hus of Husinec, master of arts and formatus bachelor of sacred theology of the University of Prague, and an appointed priest and preacher of the chapel called Bethlehem, make this appeal to Jesus Christ, the most just judge, who knows, protects, judges, declares, and rewards without fail the just cause of every man ... walking from Prague to exile ... [20]

Hus used his residence in South Bohemia for publications such as *The Creed, The Ten Commandments and the Paternoster, Daughter, De ecclesia* (Concerning the Church) and *Sermo de pace* (Discourse on Peace). In 1413 he also wrote several responses in Latin to the accusations of his opponents, from which it is evident that for him obedience to Christ was more important than the institution of the church, its hierarchy and even the pope himself. Hus' obedience to God and disobedience to the church went hand in hand with his empathic, respectful behaviour towards those who might get into conflict with the leaders of the official church because of him.

3.3 Hus in Constance

Hus' presence was requested at the Council of Constance and on October 14, 1414, he decided to leave Prague and to travel to Constance in the company of leading Czech nobles; they arrived on November 3, 1414. Hus thought that it would be possible to have public discussions about his writings and teaching, in order to get to know what was wrong and unbiblical in his teaching. But instead of this, he was arrested on November 28, 1414 and kept in prison in various places. On several occasions he was called before the Council and put under pressure to withdraw everything previously taught and preached. 'The council wanted me to say that the articles selected from my books … are false. I did not unless they tell me their inaccuracy from Scripture.' Hus refused to recant and was condemned as an intractable heretic and burned at the stake on July 6, 1415; his ashes were scattered in the River Rhine.[21] Before his death he wrote on June 21, 1415:

> This is my final intention in the name of Jesus Christ: that I refuse to confess as erroneous the articles which have been truthfully abstracted and to abjure the things ascribed to me by false witnesses… For God knows that I have never preached those errors, which they have concocted …[22]

4. Between obedience and resistance

In this section we look at some of Hus' core convictions and their relevance for today.

4.1 The concept of the Holy Scriptures

Hus considers the Bible to be the absolutely valid standard for the life of the Church, for tradition and society. This is the main reason why all his sermons focus on a correct interpretation of the Scriptures. He uses diverse names for the Bible, such as 'the Holy Scriptures', which means the Old and New Testament, the biblical canon, as adopted by the early church. Both parts of the Bible are, according to Hus, 'the word of God, in which are contained all the necessary soteriological important objectives of God's commandments and actions'. In Hus' view, 'the Mosaic Law, the Pentateuch, teaches us what we are to do', 'the prophets teach what we believe' and Psalms bring us to the content of prayer, namely 'how we should pray properly'. It seems that with these words, 'Hus emphasizes three normative meanings of the Old Testament: doctrinal, ethical and practically religious'.[23]

In contrast, the New Testament proclaims Jesus Christ as 'the Creator and Lord of the World', the only begotten Son of God, who took the form of a servant; he is also called 'the eternal God' and other titles. Jesus Christ 'is the crucified, risen and glorified Lord and Judge, who will come again'. So the whole New Testament is about Jesus Christ as Saviour and Lord of the Church and the world. The testimony of all Christ's acts of salvation is confirmed by the Holy Spirit in the preaching of God's Word. In addition, Hus calls the Holy Scriptures '*Lex Christi*', '*Lex Dei*', 'The Word of Truth' and even 'Kingdom of God'.[24] These titles confirm the fact that for Jan Hus the whole Bible is God's Word and absolutely the only applicable standard for the life of the Church, its traditions, society, proclamation, liturgy, teaching and pastoral ministry. Hus also holds that the individual believers, churches and state authorities have to be obedient to the Holy Scripture.

4.2 Hus' inward calling to preaching and ministry

When the church forbade him to preach and teach, Hus disobeyed because he had known his personal inward calling by God, as revealed in Jesus Christ, to proclaim God's word everywhere. He considered this service to be a part of his struggle for the renewal of the church (*vocatio interna*). It was the Triune God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, who had called him to have a ministry in the church (1 Cor 12:28). Along with this, Hus also had a calling from the church to serve it as a priest, a *vocatio externa*. Both these callings and his knowledge of them helped Hus to overcome all obstacles, pressures and inner anxieties that he felt when he refused to be subjected to the regulations of the ecclesiastical authorities. God's calling to preach strengthened Hus internally to obey God in Jesus Christ and to be disobedient to the church hierarchy.

Hus' concept of call shows that even today God's call to serve the proclamation of the Word of God can help preachers to overcome all sorts of temptations, doubts, inner struggles, obstacles of incomprehension and misunderstanding from two sides: from believers within the church organisation and from non-believers outside it. Similarly the apostle Paul, in his difficult situation of being misunderstood and falsely accused, confesses: '… it would be agony for me not to preach' (1 Cor. 9:16). Hus' *vocatio interna et externa* led him to unconditional obedience to God and to disobedience to the secular and church authorities of his time.

4.3 Hus' understanding of the Church

Hus' concept of the Christian Church is largely based on Wycliffe's concept of the Church as the *numerum praedestinatorum* (predetermined number).[25] Following Augustine and the biblical text Ephesians 1:3-11, Hus talks about God´s twofold grace: 'the first is the grace of predestination to eternal life as we see in all the saints who belong to the Holy Mother Church'; the second grace 'is destined only for those who presently seem just' and who receive forgiveness of sins, but who 'backslide in faith' and lose their salvation, as we see in Judas Iscariot who 'never belonged to Holy Mother Church'. On this basis Hus rejects 'the thesis that the pope and the cardinals constitute the Roman Church, contends that no pope is the head of the Church catholic, but only Christ Himself … the pope is its head if he is one of the predestinate'.[26] *In puncto*, Hus discusses three aspects of the Church: militant, latent and triumphant.

The church militant is of a mixed character, 'comprising both the good and the wicked'. Hus' concepts of *ecclesia militans* and *numerum praedestinatorum* are based on Jesus' parables (Matthew 13:24-30 and 13:47), which are not concerned with fighting or with the latent church, but with the presence of God's Kingdom in the world.

Hus was also influenced by the apostle Paul, who describes the Church as *sōma tou Christou* – the body of Christ (1 Cor 12:12). Hus points to the reality of the church militant as a *corpus mixtum* in history, and he explains the metaphor with respect to the biological human body, saying that the human body 'contains elements that are foreign to it such as spittle, phlegm, excrements and urine that are eliminated from the body'. So 'on the Day of Judgment all three parts will be united into one: the Church triumphant' and 'the predestinate alone will remain being bound to the head Christ by predestinating love'. But the predestined may even now rely on the apostle's words which say: 'For those whom God knew before ever they were, he also ordained to share the likeness of his Son … and those whom he foreordained, he also called … justified and … glorified' (Rom 8:28-30).[27]

The concept of the Church as the *numerum praedestinatorum*, which is based on Wycliffe's theological explanations of Jesus' parables, we need to receive with some degree of caution. On the other hand, the concepts of *ecclesia militans* and *corpus mixtum* led the reformer Hus to the conclusion that true, faithful preaching of God's word automatically reveals the sinful life, wrongdoing, scandals and immorality of all, including church leaders. In this way Hus wanted to use the Word of God to serve a spiritual renewal so that the Church may become the actual body of Christ in the world. For this reason he refused to obey any ecclesiastical decisions that contradicted the Holy Scriptures, and he was ready to accept all the risks of suffering, contempt and even being sentenced to death. Besides, according to Hus, the spiritual renewal of the Church starts with love for God and our neighbours, which includes the restoration of our relationship to God and our interpersonal relationships (Mt 22:34-40). Hus' emphasis on true biblical preaching and on constant obedience to God's word is also essential for the contemporary church.

4.4. Obedience to the authorities

All main thoughts relating to the topic of obedience to the authorities occur in Hus' work *De ecclesia* (On the Church) which he wrote during his exile in South Bohemia (1412-1414). The decisions of the Council of Pisa (1378), chapters 17-21, included the obligation of obedience to the authority of the pope and the prelates. In contrast to that view, Hus talks about three states or groupings: clergy, nobility and lay people. All of them belong to the *ecclesia militans*; therefore, it is very important 'to be properly commingled into church militant'. All three states are members of the church and 'obedience is due to that which is good, disobedience to that which is evil'. Following what the apostle Paul writes in Romans 13:1-7, Hus 'teaches that obedience is due to superiors, both secular and spiritual, for they are ordained to encourage the good and punish the evil'.[28]

With respect to the three states Hus talks about threefold obedience: spiritual, secular and ecclesiastical. 'Spiritual obedience is due to God's law; the Saviour and the apostles lived under it and so should we.' This requirement of obedience is absolute. Secular obedience is due to secular rulers provided, however, that their laws do not conflict with those of God. The third is ecclesiastical obedience, which has to do with regulations of the priests of the Church which go over and beyond the expressed authority of Scripture.[29] Obedience to secular and ecclesiastical authorities only has relative importance because it is limited: their regulations apply only when they do not contradict God's laws. Jan Hus explicitly argues that 'when prelates or secular rulers command anything in accordance with Christ's teaching, we ought to obey'. But when they command what is contrary to God's law, it is not good to obey them. However, Hus is aware that 'many teach that we must obey our superiors in all things ... whether they be good or bad'.[30]

This threefold obedience is evident in his own situation; Hus writes 'that it is right to preach against wicked prelates and priests whose lives scandalize the people'. On the other hand, 'it is equally right to praise the priests when they strive to follow Christ and thus to encourage them in well-doing...'[31] Preaching the Word of God and appealing for obedience to God's word should be done in love because true faith in God and obedience always co-exist with love for God and neighbours as they are. In this context Hus explicitly says that 'It is just when God and Church authorities exclude someone for sinning mortally and openly. However, even in a such case he must first be warned and admonished three times, according to Christ's instruction to the disciples (Matthew 18:15-17).'[32] This point illustrates Hus' concept of the ecclesiastical discipline.

5. Summary and conclusion

We can summarise Hus' thoughts as follows:

1) Obedience to God's Word has absolute priority in relation to all three states: spiritual, secular and religious.

2) When these three states are not acting in accordance with God's Word, disobedience is a responsible Christian act. (Indirectly, Hus' theological-ethical conclusions also indicate how strong the temptation was, is and will remain for the church to have political, economic, religious and institutional power.)

3) In its history, the empiric, institutional church has seldom resisted the voice of the serpent in paradise which said: '... for God knows that, as soon as you eat it, your eyes will be opened and you will be like God himself...' (Gen 3:5), or the voice of the devil saying to Jesus: 'All this I will give you, if you will only fall down and do me homage' (Mt 4:8-10).

I am convinced that Hus' belief in the absolutely valid authority of the Holy Scripture, his love for God and neighbour, his inner conviction of being called by God to the proclamation of the Word of God, and his unconditional obedience to the Lord God in combination with disobedience of any human institution when it was acting against the Word of God, are valid parts of a healthy theology and ethics for Christian churches in the postmodern world, wherever similar or analogical situations may occur. For the institutional church the apostle's words. 'For our struggle is not against human foes, but against cosmic powers, against the authorities and potentates of this dark age, against the superhuman forces of evil in the heavenly realms. Therefore, take up the armour of God...' (Eph 6:12-18) were, are, and always will be valid. Master Jan Hus left us a testimony of love and of service to God by his obedient Christian faith and by his martyrdom.

Professor Dr Ján Liguš is chairperson of the Department of Practical Theology, Ecumenism and Communication at the Hussite Theological Faculty, Charles University, Prague.

Endnotes

1 Edited version of a paper presented at the biennial conference of the Fellowship of European Evangelical Theologians, 29 August – 2 September 2014, in Orsay near Paris.

2 Jan Mili Lochman, *Church in a Marxist Society. A Czechoslovak view* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970) 31.

3 Josef Smolík, *Kázání v reformaci* (Praha: Komenského evangelická bohoslovecká fakulta v Praze, 1957) 10-15; Rudolf Horský, 'Kazatelské a pastýřské dílo M. Jana Husi' in *Hus stále živý. Sborník studií k 55.výročí Husova upálení, uspořádal Miloslav Kaňák* (Praha: Blahoslav, 1965) 45-53.

4 Czech edition: *Ján Hus mezi epochami, národy a konfesemi. Sborník z mezinárodního sympozia, konaného 22.-26. září 1993 v Bayreuthu, SRN,* k vydání připravil Ján Blahoslav Lášek ve spolupráci se leny mezinárodního výboru sympozia (Praha: Vydala Česká křesťanská akademie ve spolupráci s Husitskou teologickou fakultou Univerzity Karlovy, 1995); German edition: Ferdinand Seibt (Hrsg.) *Jan Hus. Zwischen Zeiten, Völkern, Konfessionen. Vorträge des internationalen Symposions in Bayreuth von 22. bis 26. September 1993* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1997).

5 Ján Blahoslav Lášek, '1.2 Master John Hus (1371-1415)' in *Mistr Ján Hus v proměnách času a jeho*

poselství víry dnešku, 1. Vydání (Praha: Církev československé husitská, 2012) 14.
6 Lochman, *Church in a Marxist Society*, 31.
7 Lydie Čejpová, 'Mistr Ján Hus – hlas volající k obrodě církve' in *Kostnické jiskry* 78.25 (1993) 1.
8 Lášek, '1.2 Master John Hus', 13.
9 Lášek, '1.2 Master John Hus', 14.
10 Mistr Jan Hus, *O církvi*. Přeložili a poznámkami opat ili František M. Dobiáš a Amedeo Molnár (Praha: Nakladatelství Československé akademie věd, 1965), 159.
11 Matthew Spinka, *John Hus' Concept of the Church* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966) 94-95.
12 See Hus´ sermon on Luke 5:1-11 in *Jan Hus Postilla* (Praha: Komenského evangelická fakulta bohoslovecká, 1952) 305-308.
13 Spinka, *John Hus' Concept of the Church*, 95.
14 A. Cisařová – Kolářová, *Mistr Ján Hus, Betlémské poselství* (Praha, 1947), quoted in Spinka, *Hus' Concept of the Church*, 102.
15 For further studies see Hus, *O církvi*, 156-166; 'Wiclif's Forty-Five Articles. Condemned on July 10, 1412' in Spinka, *John Hus' Concept of the Church*, 397-400.
16 Lášek, '1.2 Master John Hus', 15.
17 Details in Paul de Voogt, *L'hérésie de Jean Hus* (Louvain: Publication Universitaires de Louvain, 1960) 127-131.
18 Hus, *O církvi*, 160.
19 Lášek, '1.2 Master John Hus', 16.
20 *Husova výzbroj do Kostnice*, K vydání připravili F. M. Dobiáš a Amedeo Molnár (Praha: Edice Kalich, 1965) 32.
21 *Sto listů Mistra Jana Husi*. Vybral, latinské přeložil a poznámkami doprovodil Bohumil Ryba. (Praha: Vydal Jan Laichter, 1949) 233.
22 Spinka, *John Hus' Concept of the Church*, 375.
23 Ján Liguš, ‚Hussens Schriftbegriff' in Seibt, *Jan Hus Zwischen Zeiten, Völkern, Konfessionen*, 127.
24 More details in Liguš, ‚Hussens Schriftbegriff', 128-131.
25 Hus, *O církvi* , 36. For further study of the Church as *numerum praedestinatorum*, see Viliam Judak, *Kristova Cirkev na ceste. Ilustrované cirkevné dejiny* (Trnava: Vydal Spolok svätého Vojtecha, 1998) 157-159.
26 Spinka, *John Hus' Concept of the Church*, 224.
27 Hus, *O církvi*, 148, see also 143-167.
28 Spinka, *John Hus' Concept of the Church*, 280.
29 Hus, *O církvi*, 150; see Romans 13:1-6; Titus 3:1.
30 Jan Hus, ‚Sermones in Bethlehem', in Spinka, *John Hus' Concept of the Church*, 299.
31 *Sebrané spisy české Mistra Jana Husi. Z nejstarších známých pramenůk vydání připravil Karel Jaromír Erben, III.* Díl. (Praha: Nákladem Bedřicha Tempského, 1868) 221.
32 Mistr Jan Hus, *Výklady* (Praha: Academia Nakladatelství Československé akademie věd, 1975) 286.

C.H. Spurgeon (1834-1892): A Lover of France

Ian M. Randall

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article retrace les relations de Charles Spurgeon avec la France, expose sa vision pour le progrès de la cause évangélique parmi les francophones, décrit le soutien qu'il a apporté aux baptistes français, et évoque comment Menton est devenu comme un second lieu de résidence pour lui. Il met en lumière certains des traits de caractères de Spurgeon et souligne sa préoccupation pour la classe ouvrière. Il fait ainsi apparaître Spurgeon comme un amoureux de la France.

* * * * * * * *

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Charles Haddon Spurgeon, ein prominenter Baptist im neunzehnten Jahrhundert, war in den christlichen Gemeinden europaweit sehr bekannt. Doch von allen Ländern Europas, mit denen er Beziehungen pflegte, knüpfte Spurgeon die stärksten Bande mit Frankreich. Die vorliegende Studie untersucht Spurgeons wachsende Beziehung zu Frankreich, seine Vision für die sich entwickelnde evangelikale Bewegung unter der frankophonen Bevölkerung, seine Unterstützung der französischen Baptisten sowie die Bedeutung dessen, was man als seine „zweite Heimat" bezeichnen kann, die er in Mentone gefunden hat. Sie vertritt einen Aspekt der Persönlichkeit Spurgeons, welcher noch nicht zuvor untersucht worden war: Spurgeon als ein Liebhaber Frankreichs.

* * * * * * * *

SUMMARY

This article describes Charles Haddon Spurgeon's relationship with France, his vision for evangelical advance among French-speaking people, his support of French Baptists and his finding a 'second home' in Mentone. It also shows some of his character traits and his concerns for the working classes. The author thus presents an aspect of Spurgeon that so far had not been investigated: Spurgeon as a lover of France.

* * * * * * * *

1. Introduction

Charles Haddon Spurgeon (1834-1892), the most famous Baptist minister of the nineteenth century, was well known to Christian communities across Europe.[1] By 1875 his sermons, the circulation of which reached millions, had been translated into a number of European languages. A special edition of his sermons translated into German was printed for the Leipzig Book Fair of 1861, and in the following decade there were translations into several languages, including French, Dutch and Russian. The sermons in Russian were approved by the Tsarist and the Orthodox Church.[2] Of all the countries in Europe with which he had connections, however, it was with France that Spurgeon developed the strongest links. Alongside his personal experience of the country, he greatly appreciated the French Huguenot heritage of the past, and he wrote in his *Autobiography*: 'England must have been a poor land until, in entertaining strangers [Huguenots], she entertained angels unawares.' He added: 'the Huguenot blood has had more to do with us than many suppose'.[3] This study examines Spurgeon's developing relationship with France, his vision for evangelical advance among French-speaking people, his support of French Baptists and his sense of finding what can be described as a 'second home' in Mentone. It argues for an aspect of Spurgeon that has not previously been investigated: Spurgeon as a lover of France.

2. Early visits to France

C.H. Spurgeon often visited France from 1856 onwards, beginning with Paris. He quickly came to a high opinion of Paris as a European city and that perspective remained with him. In the magazine, *The Sword and the Trowel*, which he produced from his church in London and which was very widely read, he offered some reflections in 1867 on his experiences of being in Paris. Spurgeon's thoughts about the city came after several visits. He wrote: 'As an educational city Paris is complete; it has large and well-arranged museums of every science and art'. He considered that 'all Europe' could not excel the art of Paris. He recommended, from his experience, museums of zoology, anatomy, geology, botany, agriculture, mining and electricity.[4] It was typical of Spurgeon to investigate all branches of knowledge and to take an educated interest in each place he visited. As an example of his concern for education, he started evening classes in London in 1862 which offered lectures that covered 'the Classics, Mathematics, Natural Science, and all the branches of a liberal English education', and the Pastors' College, the ministerial training institution which Spurgeon founded (later called Spurgeon's College), gave thorough theological and practical training, and at the same time fostered this wider outlook on the world.[5] It was visiting France that helped to broaden Spurgeon's own perspective.

Spurgeon's first visit to France was on his honeymoon, in the spring of 1856, when he was aged twenty-one. Susannah, Spurgeon's wife, had already visited Paris several times, and while learning the French language she had received hospitality for some months in the household of a well-known French Reformed Church pastor, Joel Audebez, Secretary-General of the Société Evangélique of France.[6] Susannah spoke of feeling 'quite at home' in Paris and she was delighted to introduce Charles to the city. The newly-weds stayed in the Hotel Meurice, a suite of rooms having been made available 'by special favour', said Susannah – but she gave no further explanation. Each day they visited museums, churches or art galleries. When they visited the Cathedral of Notre Dame, Susannah was able to boast to Charles that she had been present there among the crowds on the occasion of the marriage of Napoleon III to Eugénie three years before. The beauty of La Sainte Chapelle especially appealed to the Spurgeons, with Charles, who had definite views about church buildings and church design, finding in it 'a little heaven of stained glass'.[7]

In February 1860 C.H. Spurgeon returned to Paris, this time to preach. He was invited by William Blood, who was then temporary minister of the American Church, Rue de Berri.[8] Holden Pike, who assisted Spurgeon in the editing of *The Sword and the Trowel*, stated in his (six-volume) biography of Spurgeon:

> It was understood that the object of the visit to the French metropolis was simply to preach the gospel to the people – to such as understood English; for although Spurgeon could read French, I am not aware that he ever attempted to give an address in that language.[9]

William Blood was aware that Spurgeon's immense popularity was such that he had a diary full of engagements for two years to come, and that he had refused to go to America to speak, despite being offered £20,000 by Americans if he did go: a huge sum which would have made a very significant contribution to the building of the new Metropolitan Tabernacle (Spurgeon's church) in London.[10] However, William Blood knew Spurgeon personally, and had preached for him, and in consequence Spurgeon agreed to come to Paris to give mid-week addresses, with Susannah accompanying him. *Galignani's Messenger*, a Parisian daily paper in English, noted that the visit had to be a mid-week one since it was 'impossible for [Spurgeon] to be absent from the immense congregation of 10,000 persons in London to whom he preaches on Sundays'.[11] At that time Spurgeon was preaching in very large public buildings in London.

Over the course of three days Spurgeon gave five addresses in Paris, in the American Chapel and in the larger Église de l'Oratoire of the Reformed Church of France.[12] This visit was not arranged in connection with the French Baptists, who from 1852 had been suffering considerable repression and difficulty. They were beginning to recover confidence through some active French Baptist pastors and evangelism, however, and Spurgeon's visit also gave them fresh hope.[13] Those who came to hear Spurgeon in Paris in 1860 had connections with various denominations, including Baptists, but the core support for his visit came from leaders in the French Reformed Church (*L'Église Réformée)*. Frédéric Monod, a Reformed Church pastor in Paris and editor of the *Archives du Christianisme*, the largest French Protestant journal, wrote about Spurgeon's preaching in this way in February 1860: 'You are not tempted to applaud and say "Bravo" but you feel constrained to retire into yourself, to pray for yourself and for others, and to say from your heart, "Amen! Lord! Amen!"'[14] Another prominent and respected French Reformed pastor, Jean-Henri Grandpierre, said of the young Spurgeon (he was still only in his mid-twenties): 'I fervently pray that the Holy Spirit may bless ... our brother, Mr. Spurgeon, to the conversion of many souls, and the strengthening of the regenerate in the faith.'[15]

This hope was fulfilled. It seems that conversions took place.[16] Parisians who came to the meetings were impressed by Spurgeon's 'unaffected simplicity and freedom from pride'.[17] Many French evangelicals were encouraged. Grandpierre published a report in *L'Espérance*, speaking of Spurgeon as 'animated by the warmest piety' and as someone from whom 'there seems to shine the sacred fire of the love of souls'. He affirmed: 'One feels that he preaches especially for the salvation of unconverted sinners, and for the strengthening of the faith of those who are regenerate.' For Grandpierre, Spurgeon's theology in his preaching was clear:

> He is Calvinistic, incontestably, but moderately so. It was with peculiar satisfaction that we heard him proclaim, from the pulpit of the Oratoire, with a vigour and a clearness equalled only by his eloquence, the perfect Divinity of the Saviour, and redemption by the expiation of His death, the eternal election of the children of God, and other essential points.

Grandpierre added: 'One would willingly hear him for hours at a time.'[18] Frédéric Monod was impressed not only by the public preaching but also by the attitude of Spurgeon in private meetings. On two evenings Grandpierre opened his home to 'numerous friends who desired to be better acquainted with Mr. Spurgeon', and Monod noted that Spurgeon 'seemed not to be aware that he was the one object of interest to all present'.[19] Also, with his concern for students, Spurgeon was pleased to speak to students preparing for overseas service with the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society.[20]

A remarkable article about Spurgeon's visit to Paris appeared in the *Journal des débats*, by Lucien-Anatole Prévost-Paradol, who was its principal leader writer and an acclaimed French journalist. The *Journal des débats* had already noted Spurgeon's impending arrival.[21] The report by Paradol was later translated into English and published in the Baptist newspaper, *The Freeman*. Although Paradol was a Roman Catholic, he referred to the Protestant Spurgeon as an 'apostle'. The article spoke of Spurgeon's subject matter in preaching as 'often a common one and its development is foreseen; that which cannot be understood before having heard Mr. Spurgeon is the persuasive, familiar, and yet commanding manner' of his addresses, which Paradol saw as drawing the audience to follow closely the 'rich and solid tissues of his discourses'.[22] Paradol was quoted in Spurgeon's *Autobiography* as describing Spurgeon's preaching as 'the most inspired oratory we have ever had the pleasure of hearing'. In Paradol's view 'all disputes concerning religion ought to vanish before such an apostle', whom he saw as 'one of the most happy examples of what modern Christianity and liberty can produce' and with whom it had been 'an honour to come into contact ... and to exchange with him the grasp of friendship'.[23] Spurgeon's early visits to France had a significant impact.

3. Broadening connections

On his return home to England after his stay and his meetings in Paris, Spurgeon preached in the Exeter Hall in the Strand in London on the Sunday. Holden Pike commented on Spurgeon's preaching that the

> freshness and force with which he treated the subject [of his sermon] would not have led anyone to suppose that he had just gone through such an arduous week's work on the other side of the Channel.[24]

New experiences stimulated Spurgeon, and it is clear he was especially thrilled to have preached for the first time in France. Spurgeon wrote a letter to his French hosts with typically hearty and heartfelt greetings and thanks. He said:

> Mon Église a offert au Seigneur ses plus instantes supplications pour la prosperité et l'extension de l'Église de Christ en France. Nous vous porterons désormais sur nos coeurs, et nous espérons occuper aussi une place dans vos prières journalières ... Puis-je répondre toujours aux témoignages d'estime que vous avez bien voulu m'accorder! Je m'incline jusqu'à terre sous le poids des miséricordes dont le Seigneur a daigné me favoriser, et les marques d'affection que me

donnent Ses enfants penètrent mon coeur de gratitude.[25]

Spurgeon would continue to work and pray for the prosperity and extension of the Church of Christ in France.

Later in the same year as he and Susannah made this visit to Paris, C.H. Spurgeon spent a more extended time in mainland Europe, once more with Susannah. His travels offer insights into aspects of Spurgeon's attitude in first-hand encounters with Roman Catholicism. He was, for example, willing to attend a French-speaking Roman Catholic place of worship and, more widely, he appreciated some elements he found in Catholicism that he saw as authentically spiritual.[26] There were, of course, many Roman Catholic beliefs and practices that he strongly condemned, but he wrote affirmatively of a Sunday service he attended in Brussels:

> I heard a good sermon in a Romish Church. The place was crowded with people, many of them standing … and I stood, too; and the good priest, for I believe he is a good man, preached the Lord Jesus with all his might. He spoke of the love of Christ, so that I, a very poor hand at the French language, could fully understand him, and my heart kept beating within me as he told of the beauties of Christ and the preciousness of His blood, and of His power to save the chief of sinners.

Spurgeon noted that in his sermon the priest did not use the phrase 'justification by faith', but that he did talk of the 'efficacy of the blood', which for Spurgeon came to 'much the same thing'.[27] Spurgeon felt a similar affinity with Roman Catholic authors of 'deeply spiritual' books of devotion: he found in their writings a sense of 'fellowship in the precious blood, and in the risen life of our Lord Jesus Christ'.[28]

For a Protestant there were certainly some objectionable sentences in the Catholic sermon which Spurgeon heard in Brussels, but Spurgeon said that despite this he could have gone to the preacher and told him, 'Brother, you have spoken the truth', and he commented that if he had been handling the same biblical text he would have treated it in the same way as the priest did, 'if I could have done it as well'.[29] This was indeed high praise. Spurgeon was moved by genuine spiritual life, in whatever branch of Christian tradition he found it.

From the experience of French-speaking Catholicism in Brussels, Charles and Susannah made their way to Geneva, where the Reformed Church theologian Jean-Henri Merle d'Aubigné, who did much to foster evangelical unity in Europe, had invited Spurgeon to preach – from what had been John Calvin's pulpit.[30] This was probably the only time that Spurgeon preached in a gown. His comment relates to his sense of having recently been in a Catholic context:

> I did not feel very happy when I came out in full canonicals, but the request was put to me in such a beautiful way that I could have worn the Pope's tiara if by so doing I could have preached the Gospel more freely.

Before he left Geneva he was presented with a medal that had Calvin's likeness on one side and on the other the text, 'He endured as seeing Him who is invisible'. Spurgeon confessed that when he 'saw this medal bearing the venerated likeness of John Calvin' he immediately (in somewhat Catholic fashion) kissed it.[31]

From Geneva, the Spurgeons went to Chamouin, and they then crossed the Alps. They accepted the hospitality of a community of monks living up the mountain, and afterwards Spurgeon recounted that it had pleased him to find that they were Augustinian monks, because of his admiration of Augustine.[32] Spurgeon commented that 'next to Calvin I love Augustine'. He felt that the Augustinian monks, in their acts of charity, seemed to say: 'Our Master was a teacher of grace, and we will practise it, and give to all comers whatsoever they shall need, without money and without price.' 'Those monks', Spurgeon continued,

> are worthy of great honour; there they are spending the best and noblest period of their lives on the top of a bleak and barren mountain. … They go out in the cold nights and bring in those that are frostbitten; they dig them out from under the snow, simply that they may serve God by helping their fellow-men. I pray God to bless the good works of these monks of the Augustinian Order.[33]

This eight-week tour of Europe in 1860, with its many striking experiences, remained a vivid memory for Spurgeon. Further European journeys were to follow in succeeding years, with France being the most common destination for Charles and Susannah Spurgeon.

4. Baptists in France

During the 1860s C.H. Spurgeon gained more awareness of the situation of Baptists in France. In 1861 he visited the Baptist church in Rue St Roch in Paris. He had difficulty finding the church, but once he was there he was impressed by the fact that the Baptists were a predominantly working-class congregation. In his view the work of God was more long-lasting if it began among the poor.[34] In 1867 he was again in Paris and on this occasion he was more critical of Rue St Roch, writing in *The Sword and the Trowel*:

> We visited our French Baptist brethren in the obscure, out-of-the-way, and dirty room at the back of the church of [Rue] St Roch. We sincerely wish they would come out of that cave of Adullam.

He spoke of the lack of fresh air in the meeting room, which was (he commented) a special problem for some people who 'maintain the dangerous luxury of a nose'.[35] Spurgeon was always sensitive to lack of air. In the same year as this Paris trip, he went to Hamburg, Germany, to preach at the opening of a new building for the large Baptist congregation where his friend Johann Oncken was minister. Spurgeon also lamented the Hamburg building's poor ventilation. He was sure that 'unventilated, cave-like churches' were responsible for many fevers and deaths. He was delighted, however, that 'God has done a great work in this land [Germany].'[36]

There were also encouragements in France. An American Baptist Missionary Union report of 1863 spoke about steady Baptist growth in Paris.[37] But Spurgeon noted that a visitor still had to 'turn into a little courtyard and up a winding pair of stairs' before finding the Baptist church notice board. Spurgeon commented: 'The church of God in this case is not a city set upon a hill, but a hamlet hidden in a hole.'[38]

It might be thought that in making these comments Spurgeon was not sufficiently aware of the way Protestants had been persecuted in France. This history had contributed to their lack of visibility. However, he did know the Huguenot story well. On the other hand, he did not seem to take sufficient account of the recent restrictions French Baptists had suffered. For example, the Rue St Roch congregation was not allowed to have anything other than their small notice board because of the proximity of its meeting place to the Catholic Saint-Roch Church.[39] Spurgeon, in typically robust fashion, argued that the Baptists of the 1860s would be spiritual heroes if they were persecuted. He compared the small number of Baptists in Paris with his own huge Metropolitan Tabernacle (which had by now been built), with its thousands of members, and then went on to maintain that if the Tabernacle members were as few in number as the Parisian Baptists they would nevertheless take the view that preaching should be taking place in a large hall in Paris or in the Champs-Élysées. The comparison is hardly a fair one – it does not, for example, show an understanding of the 'spiritual psychology' of a tiny minority – but for Spurgeon the Baptists in Paris at that time needed to exchange their 'peaceful obscurity' for more 'courageous enterprise'. Although he acknowledged that the Baptist 'pastors and evangelists are indefatigable in their visitations and ministrations', he went on to say that 'it would give us unfeigned satisfaction to see a portion of the tremendous energy of our brother Oncken, of Hamburg, infused into them'.[40]

There was ongoing American financial support for the French Baptists in this period. American Baptists had been interested, as they put it, in 'attempting to diffuse' in France 'the blessings of an enlightened Christianity'.[41] Spurgeon wanted more funds to be available for Baptist advance, although he admitted that the Congregationalists and Wesleyans in Paris were spending more on their mission work but were not seeing much result. He spoke about funds that were in hand for a large Baptist chapel in Paris, but noted that 'the amount is scarcely a fourth of what will be required'. On the positive side, he reported that French Baptists who had previously been Roman Catholics created interest through their testimonies: there was persistent French anti-Protestant prejudice, but there was the possibility of witness. 'There appears to be among the French working classes', Spurgeon suggested – exhibiting his consistent concern for the working classes –

> a considerable amount of religiousness of a hopeful kind. They do not much frequent the churches or reverence the priests; they make a distinction between the church and religion, and prefer to be religious in their own way. The story of the love of Jesus is generally received with respectful tenderness, and evangelical truth, if not distinctly styled "Protestantism", usually commands a hearing.[42]

In the light of Spurgeon's comments in the 1860s about the need for a much larger Baptist building in Paris, he was pleased to publish in *The*

Sword and the Trowel in 1871 a letter from James Benham, of Bloomsbury Baptist Church, London, which reported that money had now been raised to buy ground at 48 Rue de Lille, Paris. The plan was to build a chapel to seat 550 people. Spurgeon urged support for the cause: 'We most earnestly commend the case of our dear Paris brethren to the sympathy of the Lord's stewards. We have worshipped with them and enjoyed their simple fervour.'[43] He did not repeat his previous criticisms, as he was now intent on encouraging support for the venture he had wanted to see happen. The Paris church, under the leadership of Pastor Alexandre Dez, took advantage of the opportunities open to them, and a large, elegant building in Rue de Lille was built, and opened in September 1873. It was immediately recognisable to passers-by as a church building. As well as the main hall for worship there were rooms for smaller meetings and for Sunday school classes. This massive step forward for Baptists in Paris, and indeed for Protestants in general, was seen as having been possible because of American help and British assistance, in particular that of Spurgeon.[44]

Although Spurgeon was encouraged by the Baptist progress in Paris and other parts of France the early 1870s, he was also deeply aware of the struggles of the French nation. The Franco-Prussian war in 1870-71, in which many Frenchmen were killed, was followed by the uprising of working people in Paris after France's defeat in the war. In January 1872 Spurgeon reported on the deep sadness he felt after visiting Paris and seeing the devastation caused by the uprising. He commented: 'The madness of the hour spared nothing on account of its sacredness, patriotic associations, antiquity or usefulness (serviceableness).'[45] He saw the bullet-holes in Paris as a warning to London that it needed to embark on reform and not assume that it could keep the poor in poverty without some reaction happening. Spurgeon attacked the so-called 'law of supply and demand' in the labour market which kept down wages, arguing that it was 'no law of God, but the reverse'. He called for proper provision for the poor, both economically and in terms of education. 'The Ragged-schools', he stated, referring to education for poor children, 'must go on till none are ragged'.[46] His reflections were entitled 'Paris and London'.

In this period Spurgeon's travels in mainland Europe meant that his interest in developments in Baptist life across the continent grew.[47] This included continuing interest in France but also in Baptists in other Latin countries. The Pastors' College report for 1871 stated that the College expected 'to receive a Portuguese evangelist for a time, and probably one or two young men from Rome'.[48] It seems possible, however, that they did only short courses. Language may have been a problem. In the following year Spurgeon visited Rome, a city which seems to have captivated him in much the same way as did Paris, and he spent time with Baptists who were working there. He was very aware of the problems of speaking through an interpreter, commenting. It is as murderous to all oratory as the old method of lining out the hymn was deadly to all music.' Spurgeon was inspired by the work of James Wall, an English Baptist minister who had felt a call to Italy. Wall had sold his furniture in England to cover costs incurred by himself and his family. Spurgeon, moved by what he saw, said:

> If we had to choose our life-work, we would prefer to labour in Rome. It is a clear site, no other man's foundation is there, and he who is first at work will be the architect of the future.[49]

Two students of the Pastors' College went to Spain, and Spurgeon hoped in 1873 that a 'noble army' of missionaries like them would go from the College.[50] Spurgeon also came to know a future influential Baptist leader, Reuben Saillens, who studied at the inter-denominational East London Missionary Training Institute under Gratton Guinness in 1873-74, before taking up significant ministry in Paris, initially with the McAll Mission.[51]

5. Spurgeon and Mentone

From 1872, Spurgeon's visits to France led him to the south of the country much more often than to the capital. From his mid-thirties, Spurgeon's health was not strong – he had chronic kidney disease and also suffered from depression – and he found it helped him to spend time in the winter in the French Riviera. From 1872 to his death in 1892, he made regular winter visits to Mentone, which is close to Monaco and was a very popular British holiday destination. He usually stayed a month, but sometimes as long as three months.[52] His brother, James Archer Spurgeon, was appointed co-pastor of the Metropolitan Tabernacle, and covered during Charles' absences. As well as gaining benefit from the Mediterranean weather, Spurgeon also enjoyed Christian fellowship with other visitors to Mentone. A volume of Spurgeon's addresses at Communion, *Till He Come*, notes that a number of these were delivered to 'the little companies of Christians, – of different denominations, and of various nationalities, – who gathered around the communion table in Mr. Spurgeon's sitting room at Mentone'.[53] The sitting room was in his hotel, normally the Beau Rivage. Spurgeon valued interdenominational fellowship and simple celebration of the Lord's Supper. In one address at Mentone he stated:

> In this room we have an example of how closely we are united in Christ. ... Our union in one body as Episcopalians, Baptists, Presbyterians or Independents, is not the thing which our Lord prayed for: but our union in Himself. That union we do at this moment enjoy; and therefore do we eat of one bread, and drink of one Spirit.[54]

These Communion addresses by Spurgeon at Mentone indicate his wide sympathies. The Communion sermons by the seventeenth-century Scottish Presbyterian, Samuel Rutherford, said Spurgeon, 'have a sacred unction on them'. He also appreciated 'the canticles of holy Bernard' (of Clairvaux), describing how they 'flame with devotion'.[55] On the other hand, Spurgeon considered that some beliefs about Communion were wholly unacceptable. 'The Romish church', he commented in one of his Mentone addresses, 'says much more about the *real* presence; meaning thereby, the corporeal presence of the Lord Jesus'. Spurgeon's reply was: 'Nay, you believe in knowing Christ after the flesh, and in that sense the only real presence is in heaven; but we firmly believe in the real presence of Christ which is spiritual and yet certain.'[56] But above all the Lord's Supper was for Spurgeon a place of meeting with Christ. Speaking at Mentone on the subject 'I will give you rest', Spurgeon said:

> By faith, I see our Lord standing in our midst, and I hear Him say, with voice of sweetest music, first to all of us together, and then to each one individually, 'I will give you rest.' May the Holy Spirit bring to each of us the fullness of the rest and peace of God![57]

Spurgeon's Mentone talks show clearly his high view of the Lord's Supper, his delight in having weekly Communion and his sense of rest and renewal.

Mentone also enriched Spurgeon through the people he met there. He found conversation with others spiritually stimulating. Among those with whom Spurgeon had fellowship at Mentone was George Müller, a German who became known for his remarkable ministry to orphans in Bristol. Müller's work, in Spurgeon's view, was a 'romance of Christian confidence in God in this prosaic, unbelieving, nineteenth century'.[58] When the second edition of the account of Müller's wider ministry was published in 1889, Spurgeon commended the book and commented:

> It was a great means of grace to hear and see our friend, some ten years ago, at Mentone. It was not only his word, but the man himself that spoke to our heart; for he has tried and proved the promises of God.

For Spurgeon, Müller's ministry was 'a reflection of the Acts of the Apostles'.[59]

When in Mentone Spurgeon also supported the work of the local Presbyterian Church and he would occasionally preach there. In 1890 he publicised the need for a new place of worship for the Mentone Presbyterians.[60] Mentone offered him continued opportunities to support Christian work in France and beyond.

In 1875 Spurgeon wrote an extended description of Mentone under the heading, 'Our Winter Retreat'. He covered the varied ways in which the town appealed to him. At times what he wrote sounded like a tourist brochure. He spoke about how someone

> may spend five weeks at the best hotel, and after paying the railway fares of both going and returning, will find that he has not expended more in the whole time of his absence from home than it would have cost him to reside in a corresponding hotel in Brighton.[61]

Others could go to Nice or Monaco, but Spurgeon enjoyed the 'quiet and repose' of Mentone. He even bought a few terraces on the mountain side about a mile from Mentone and employed a gardener to establish a winter garden. With his customary enthusiasm, he found out a great deal about gardening in southern Europe.[62] A sermon he preached in 1879 at the Metropolitan Tabernacle on 'The Beauty of the Olive Tree' was replete with references to Mentone. Most of these spoke of the beauty of the olives in Mentone, although Spurgeon also noted that the happiness of a Christian believer was longer-lasting than 'the anemones and wild tulips which grow in such profusion on the terraces of Mentone'.[63] The times in Mentone did Spurgeon good, although even there he was not free from pain, both physical and mental. Spurgeon was quite open about his mental suffering. In 1885 he wrote to his London congregation from Mentone to say that he was experiencing 'fits of deep depression', the result of 'brain weariness'.[64] Spurgeon died while in Mentone, in 1892.

6. Conclusion

It is clear that from his first visit to Paris, in 1856, Spurgeon found France fascinating. His introduction to Paris came from Susannah. From the 1860s, Spurgeon clearly wanted to respond to the spiritual needs of France and to offer support to French evangelicals. This vision never left him. He was also glad when he found elements in Roman Catholic life with which he had sympathy. Right to the end of his life, he maintained a concern for Christian witness in France. For their part, French evangelicals looked to him for inspiration. Ruben Saillens recommended young members of his Paris church who spoke English to study at the Pastors' College, London. They offered to give French lessons to members and friends of the Metropolitan Tabernacle in exchange for board and lodgings.[65] In 1891, a year before he died, Spurgeon was delighted to feature an encouraging report by Saillens regarding positive features of French Baptist life. Saillens reported on French Baptist growth which had been taking place from the late 1880s, with new churches being planted and congregations increasing. Of particular interest to Spurgeon was the fact that Alfred Barley, who had trained at the Pastors' College and been a pastor in England, was then working with the French Baptist Union.[66]

This study has argued that C.H. Spurgeon had a life-long interest in and love for France, a country in which he and Susannah had their honeymoon, which he visited many times, in which he died, and which can be seen as his second home.

Dr Ian M. Randall is a Senior Research Fellow of Spurgeon's College, London.

Endnotes

1 I am grateful to the French Baptist Historical Society for the invitation to give their annual lecture on the topic 'Spurgeon and France'. I was delighted to be able to give this lecture in Paris, a city Spurgeon loved.

2 See Peter J. Morden, *'Communion with Christ and his people': The Spirituality of C.H. Spurgeon* (Oxford: Centre for Baptist History and Heritage, 2010) 7-8.

3 See C.H. Spurgeon, *Autobiography: Compiled from his Diary, Letters and Records by his Wife and his Private Secretary*, 4 Volumes (London: Passmore and Alabaster, 1897-99) 1, chapter 2, 10.

4 *The Sword and the Trowel*, February 1867, 73.

5 *The Sword and the Trowel*, April 1870, 150.

6 For Pastor Audebez, see the *Annual Reports* of the American Tract Society and the *Evangelical Magazine and Missionary Chronicle* for the 1830s and 1840s.

7 Spurgeon, *Autobiography*, Vol. 2, 176-177.

8 Spurgeon, *Autobiography*, 2.344.

9 G. Holden Pike, *The Life and Work of Charles Haddon Spurgeon, 6 Volumes* (London, Paris & Melbourne: Cassell & Company, 1894), Vol. II, 330. It seems that Spurgeon might have given brief remarks in French while in Paris.

10 Spurgeon, *Autobiography*, 2.344.

11 *Galignani's Messenger*, quoted in *The British Standard*, 6 January 1860, cited by Pike, *Life and Work*, II.329.

12 Spurgeon, *Autobiography*, 2.344-345.

13 Sébastien Fath, *Une autre manière d'être chrétien en France. Socio-histoire de l'implantation baptiste (1810-1950)* (Genève: Labor et Fides, 2001) 175.

14 *Archives de Christianisme*, 20 February 1860, translated for *The British Standard*, 9 March 1860, cited by Pike, *Life and Work*, II.340.

15 Spurgeon, *Autobiography*, 2.345.

16 Spurgeon, *Autobiography*, 2,346-347; Pike, *Life and Work*, II.342.

17 Pike, *Life and Work*, II.341.

18 Spurgeon, *Autobiography*, 2.348.

19 Pike, *Life and Work*, II.341.

20 Spurgeon, *Autobiography*, 2.350. For background, see Jean-François Zorn, *Le grand siècle d'une mission protestante: la Mission de Paris, 1822-1914* (Paris: Karthala, 1993).

21 *Journal des débats*, 5 February 1860, 2.

22 Translated and quoted in *The Freeman*, 14 March 1860, from the *Journal des débats*, and cited in Pike, *Life and Work*, II.342-343.

23 Spurgeon, *Autobiography*, 2.350.

24 Pike, *Life and Work*, II.343.

25 Spurgeon, *Autobiography*, 2.351.

26 See Morden, *'Communion with Christ and his people'*, 168-172.

27 Charles Ray, *The Life of C. H. Spurgeon* (London: Passmore and Alabaster, 1903) 262. Ray also wrote the life of Mrs Spurgeon.

28 C.H. Spurgeon, 'Communion with Christ and His People', in *'Till He Come': Communion Meditations and Addresses by C.H. Spurgeon* (London: Passmore & Alabaster, 1894) 324.

29 Ray, *Life of C.H. Spurgeon*, 262.
30 Merle d'Aubigné was central to the organisation of an Evangelical Alliance international conference in Geneva in 1861. See I.M. Randall and David Hilborn, *One Body in Christ: The History and Significance of the Evangelical Alliance* (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2001) 30, 161.
31 Ray, *Life of C.H. Spurgeon*, 262-263.
32 For Spurgeon's indebtedness to Augustine, among other writers, see Morden, *'Communion with Christ and his people'*, 20, 110, 132.
33 Ray, *Life of C.H. Spurgeon*, 263-264.
34 C.H. Spurgeon, 'A Sabbath in Paris', *The Baptist Magazine*, February 1862, 85-89.
35 *The Sword and the Trowel*, February 1867, 73.
36 *The Sword and the Trowel*, September 1867, 424-425.
37 *Forty-ninth Annual Report*, American Baptist Missionary Union (Boston), May 1863, 96.
38 *The Sword and the Trowel*, February 1867, 73.
39 Fath, *Une autre manière d'être chrétien en France*, 191.
40 *The Sword and the Trowel*, February 1867, 74. For Oncken and German Baptist work see I.M. Randall, '"Every Apostolic Church a Mission Society": European Baptist Origins and Identity' in A. R. Cross (ed.), *Ecumenism and History: Studies in Honour of John H. Y. Briggs* (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2002) 281-301.
41 *The American Baptist Missionary Magazine* (Boston) 12 (1832) 329; cf. I.M. Randall, '"The Blessings of an Enlightened Christianity": North American Involvement in European Baptist Origins', *American Baptist Quarterly* 20.1 (2001) 5-26.
42 *The Sword and the Trowel*, February 1867, 74-75.
43 *The Sword and the Trowel*, December 1871, 35-36.
44 Fath, *Une autre manière d'être chrétien en France*, 234.
45 *The Sword and the Trowel*, January 1872, 5.
46 *The Sword and the Trowel*, January 1872, 8, 10.
47 For these European Baptist developments, see I.M. Randall, *Communities of Conviction: Baptist Beginnings in Europe* (Prague: European Baptist Federation, 2009).
48 *Annual Paper of the Pastors' College*, 1871, 7.
49 *The Sword and the Trowel*, January 1872, 35; cf. I.M. Randall, '"The World is our Parish": Spurgeon's College and World Mission' in I.M. Randall and A.R. Cross (eds), *Baptists and Mission* (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2007) 64-77.
50 *The Sword and the Trowel*, March 1873, 131; April 1873, 149.
51 Fath, *Une autre manière d'être chrétien en France*, 609.
52 Spurgeon, *Autobiography*, 4.198. I am grateful to Rod Badams for his help in clarifying the dates of Spurgeon's journeys and for copies of lists of guests staying at hotels in Mentone.
53 *'Till He Come'*, Preface.
54 'The Well-beloved', in *'Till He Come'*, 113.
55 'The Well-beloved's Vineyard', in *'Till He Come'*, 149.
56 'Mysterious Visits', in *'Till He Come'*, 17.
57 'I will Give you Rest', in *'Till He Come'*, 197.
58 *The Sword and the Trowel*, March 1884, 141.
59 *The Sword and the Trowel*, October 1889, 576: Review of S.G. Müller, *The Preaching Tours and Missionary Labours of George Müller, of Bristol* (2nd ed., London, 1889).
60 *The Sword and the Trowel*, February 1890, 92.
61 *The Sword and the Trowel*, February 1975, 52.
62 *The Sword and the Trowel*, February 1875, 53, 56.
63 C.H. Spurgeon, *Metropolitan Tabernacle Pulpit* (London: Passmore and Alabaster, 1855-1917, including the *New Park Street Pulpit* volumes), Vol. 55, 'The Beauty of the Olive Tree' (Hosea 14:6): A sermon published on Thursday, December 16, 1909, delivered by C.H. Spurgeon, at the Metropolitan Tabernacle, Newington, on Thursday Evening, April 17, 1879, 3.
64 Morden, *'Communion with Christ and his people'*, 261.
65 *The Sword and the Trowel*, August 1895, 447.
66 *The Sword and the Trowel*, May 1891, 241-243.

Three Concepts of Tolerance

Justin Thacker

SUMMARY

This article begins by briefly discussing two well-described concepts of tolerance, and offering some acknowledged critiques of both. It then highlights Jesus' counter-cultural practice of table-fellowship and draws on this to provide a third model of tolerance, based around the art and science of conversation. It suggests that the contemporary dinner party provides a concrete example of this tolerance which, with appropriate modifications, could be scalable to provide a paradigm for tolerance at the macro, public level of discourse.

* * * *

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG:

Dieser Artikel beginnt mit einer kurzen Diskussion über zwei gut erläuterte Konzepte von Toleranz und präsentiert einige anerkannte Kritiken zu beiden. Dann beleuchtet er die gegen die gängige Kultur laufende Praxis der Tischgemeinschaft, wie sie Jesus praktiziert hat. Auf dieser Grundlage stellt er ein drittes Modell der Toleranz vor, das sich an der Kunst und Wissenschaft der Konversation orientiert. Er schlägt als konkretes Beispiel dafür die zeitgemäße „Dinner Party" vor, die bei angemessener Veränderung als ein expansionsfähiges Modell für Toleranz auf der Makroebene des öffentlichen Diskurses dienen könnte.

* * * *

RÉSUMÉ

Dans cet article, l'auteur commence par exposer deux conceptions de la tolérance, ainsi que les critiques qui leur sont souvent opposées. Il s'appuie ensuite sur la pratique de Jésus qui pouvait manger en compagnie de toutes sortes de gens pour présenter un troisième modèle de tolérance, fondé sur l'art et la science de la conversation. Il suggère que la convivialité autour d'une table ou les repas en commun sont un exemple concret contemporain de pratique de la tolérance qui peut servir de modèle paradigmatique dans le discours public sur la tolérance.

* * * *

1. Introduction[1]

'Can you tell stories in a cabinet meeting? Advocate a cause in the barracks.'[2] What kind of conversation is permissible in the public square? The significance of this quotation from the late Jean-Francois Lyotard is that this question comes up in all kinds of settings. A rugby club and a church elders' meeting are very different, but both are governed by a set of unwritten rules that dictate the kind of speech that is allowed. We live by means of social conventions in which the rules of discourse are rarely discussed (or broken), but rather assimilated unconsciously by those attending. As C.S. Lewis pointed out in *The Inner Ring*, it is precisely by the acceptance of these unwritten rules that we often find ourselves admitted into the group in the first place.[3] In such settings, the issue of tolerance appears fairly straightforward. As long as people operate in public according to the group consensus, then whatever they do in their private lives is tolerated. Problems only arise when someone in the group plays according to a different set of criteria – 'tell stories in a cabinet meeting, advocate a cause in the barracks'.

Arguably, the situation in which this is most frequently experienced is the family home, especially a home populated by teenagers who have not quite learned that the rules of discourse with their friends do not necessarily obtain with their parents. In such a setting, a different kind of tolerance operates. This is not so much a tolerance of the private sphere – as within the home the public-private split has less meaning – but it is a pragmatic tolerance, in which parents and teenagers arrive at some kind of truce on a daily basis.

At the macro level of society we find these conventions as, what I will call, 'the liberal consensus' and 'agonistic politics'. According to the former, the public square must be a tightly controlled environment in which only certain forms of discourse are allowed. All other differences can be tolerated as long as they remain firmly in the private sphere. According to the latter, the public square should be a multiplicity of competing voices each speaking from within their own frame of reference, and the tolerance to be adopted is merely that which is pragmatically necessary to function. In milder forms, this latter kind of political arrangement is known as multiculturalism, and for a while it was celebrated in Britain as the way to organise society. However, its death knell was sounded by the then Prime Minister Tony Blair when in a speech addressing the issue he said,

> Obedience to the rule of law, to democratic decision-making about who governs us, to freedom from violence and discrimination are not optional for British citizens. They are what being British is about. Being British carries rights. It also carries duties. And *those duties take clear precedence over any cultural or religious practice* .[4] (Emphasis mine)

For many Christians, this statement is deeply problematic as it is our faith that leads us to obey the rule of law, to respect democracy and freedom. Our duties to one another and to the state arise in response to our faith, but can never take precedence over it. What has become clear, though, since Blair's speech is that, as a society, the British people have little idea how best to acknowledge (or celebrate) diversity, whilst maintaining some form of national identity. As one commentator put it,

> We are at sea without social norms, and yet who's to decide them? We're all confused, but we need to talk about it. It's not enough for us just to retreat from this issue, afraid of interfering with other people's lives.[5]

We have already alluded to the fact that our concepts of tolerance go hand-in-hand with our concepts of political organisation, and I would suggest that part of the reason for our conceptual murkiness in relation to diversity politics is that we do not have a sufficiently robust idea of tolerance to work with. One example will suffice. Tolerance is defined as the acceptance (in some sense) of that of which I would otherwise disapprove. But why is it good for me to accept what I consider bad? This is the 'paradox of toleration', and the reality of it means that our notions of tolerance cannot bear the conceptual (or real) weight that is placed upon them as we struggle with the reality of multicultural societies.

Against this background it may therefore be understandable, if regrettable, that notions of tolerance and equality have often been accompanied by responses of cynicism and mistrust. 'Political correctness' appears to many to assume that not only do I have to exercise a respectful attitude to others with whom I disagree, but that at the same time I have to accept other views as equally true, even though contrary to mine.

In this article, then, I would like to make a contribution to this discussion by offering an alternative concept of tolerance – beyond the liberal consensus or agonistic approaches – one that is based on the teachings and practice of Jesus Christ, and one that begins with the first-century practice of table-fellowship but ends with the contemporary phenomenon of the dinner party.

2. Table-fellowship

> Now all the tax-collectors and sinners were coming near to listen to him. And the Pharisees and the scribes were grumbling and saying, 'This fellow welcomes sinners and eats with them.' (Luke 15: 1-2)[6]

A remarkable feature of the gospel accounts of Jesus are his table manners. Who you ate with and how you ate were important issues in first-century Palestine. Jesus managed to upset everyone by how he did it. One New Testament scholar even says that Jesus got himself killed by how he ate.[7] Even if that is an exaggeration, it highlights the truth that Jesus' approach to eating was at odds with the societal norms. Joel Green writes:

> In the ancient Mediterranean world, mealtime was a social event whose significance far outdistanced the need to satisfy one's hunger. To welcome people at the table had become tantamount to extending to them intimacy, solidarity, acceptance; table companions were treated as though they were of one's extended family. Sharing food encoded messages about hierar-

> chy, inclusion and exclusion, boundaries and crossing boundaries. Who ate with whom, where one sat in relation to whom at the table – such questions as these were charged with social meaning in the time of Jesus and Luke. As a consequence, to refuse table fellowship with people was to ostracize them, to treat them as outsiders. It is against this backdrop that Jesus' table practices … are set in sharp relief.[8]

Jesus' table manners were significantly different from those of his contemporaries. Whilst their emphasis was on maintaining purity in terms of how you ate (washing ceremonies before eating, limitations on food preparation on the Sabbath), what you ate (kosher food), and who you ate with (only the ritually clean), Jesus challenges all these boundaries. In feeding large groups at once (Matthew 14:13-21 and parallels), he seems to pay no attention to the inevitable mix of Jews, Gentiles and outcasts that would have been present, or what the seating arrangement would be, let alone how they were all supposed to wash ceremonially before the meal.[9] Even more astonishing is the story in Luke 7 where during a meal at Simon the Pharisee's house, Jesus is joined by an ex-prostitute.[10] The account describes her washing Jesus' feet with her tears, then drying his feet with her hair, and kissing and pouring perfume on them. As Green comments,

> Within her cultural context … her actions on the whole would have been regarded (at least by men) as erotic. Letting her hair down in this setting would have been on a par with appearing topless in public… It is no wonder that Simon entertains serious reservations about Jesus' status as a holy man.[11]

Yet, Jesus' response is not to rebuke the woman or to say that her actions were inappropriate in this meal setting. Rather, he praises her as an example of faith:

> Then turning towards the woman, he said to Simon, 'Do you see this woman? I entered your house; you gave me no water for my feet, but she has bathed my feet with her tears and dried them with her hair. You gave me no kiss, but from the time I came in she has not stopped kissing my feet. You did not anoint my head with oil, but she has anointed my feet with ointment. Therefore, I tell you, her sins, which were many, have been forgiven; hence she has shown great love. But the one to whom little is forgiven, loves little. (Lk 7:44-47)

It is not that Jesus is somehow unaware of the societal norms. The very fact that a prominent Pharisee has invited him to his home demonstrates that Jesus, at least, was considered an appropriate guest, and therefore one who understood the normal conventions. It is, rather, that Jesus is deliberately and provocatively breaking those conventions. As Green says,

> Because the sharing of food is a 'delicate barometer' of social relations, when Jesus subverts conventional mealtime practices … he is doing far more than offering sage counsel for his table companions. Rather, he is toppling the familiar world of the ancient Mediterranean, overturning its socially constructed reality and replacing it with what must have been regarded as a scandalous alternative.[12]

Indeed, it is precisely this challenge to the norm that lends historical weight to this facet of Jesus' ministry,[13] prompting J.D. Crossan to acknowledge its veracity and in the process describe Jesus as 'the consummate party animal'.[14]

But the question remains, why Jesus behaves in this manner. What is his purpose, and what relevance does it have for us as we struggle with issues of tolerance at the beginning of the twenty-first century? An answer to these questions begins to appear if we consider the final few verses of the story regarding Simon and the prostitute:

> 'Therefore, I tell you, her sins, which were many, have been forgiven; hence she has shown great love. But the one to whom little is forgiven, loves little.' Then he said to her, 'Your sins are forgiven.' But those who were at the table with him began to say among themselves, 'Who is this who even forgives sins?' And he said to the woman, 'Your faith has saved you; go in peace.' (Lk 7:47-50)

There is a danger, evident in some circles, of merely interpreting Jesus' actions as a celebration of diversity, as if all he was interested in was wining and dining with as many different kinds of people as possible. If that were true, the description of him as 'the consummate party animal' would be entirely apt, and nothing more need be said. However, as Craig Blomberg has argued, Jesus' wider purpose is transformation by means of acceptance. Surveying the passages that describe Jesus' unusual table practices, Blomberg concludes:

> The unifying theme that emerges … is one that may be called 'contagious holiness'. Jesus

regularly associates with the various sorts of sinners on whom the most pious in his culture frowned, but his association is never an end in itself. Implicitly or explicitly, he is calling people to change their ways and follow him as their master. But unlike so many in his world (and unlike so many cultures throughout the history of the world), he does not assume that he will be defiled by associating with corrupt people. Rather, his purity can rub off on them and change them for the better. Cleanliness, he believes, is even more 'catching' than uncleanness; morality more influential than immorality.[15]

We see this pattern in the story above. At great personal cost, Jesus welcomes and accepts the prostitute, whilst still acknowledging her sin and the transformation that is made possible by her faith in him. Crucially, as Ben Witherington III has observed, Jesus does not insist on this transformation to have taken place *in advance* of his acceptance.[16] In enjoying table-fellowship with Jesus, the tax collectors and sinners are called to repentance and faith in him, but there is no evidence that a moral perfectionism is required before they can sit and dine. The door is open, the food is waiting, the invitation has been offered – and whilst the invite comes with a call to transformation, it is not dependant on that transformation having been realised before they sit and party. Indeed, how could it be? The message of the gospels is that personal transformation is only possible by means of our fellowship with Jesus. All attempts at transformation outside a relationship with him are doomed to failure. Hence, what Jesus offers is an open invitation to everyone, irrespective of background and social standing, and yet an invitation that is not just to fellowship, but also to transformation. That is Jesus' model of table-fellowship. Its relevance to contemporary issues of tolerance is where we now turn.

3. Tolerating tolerance

As already indicated, there are, roughly speaking, two concepts of tolerance evident in the contemporary political and cultural climate. These two concepts, in turn, relate to two distinct styles of political organisation. However, as the introduction has indicated, neither of these concepts is adequate for the serious social and political situations in which we find ourselves.

The first of these concepts conceives of tolerance as a substantive good (in contrast to a pragmatic necessity), and its political bedfellow is a consensual approach. This is the standard liberal paradigm for tolerance, in which we tolerate the differences that divide for the sake of a unity around some public consensus such as freedom, rationality or human rights.

Under this rubric, political discourse takes place within circumscribed boundaries – the notional public sphere. Tolerance is operative to the extent that we put up with those aspects of the individual that – even though we disapprove of them and disagree with them – we will not outlaw as long as they remain within the private realm. The language of tolerance in association with issues of sexuality is the classic example of this paradigm. What people do in their own bedrooms – so the argument goes – is of no relevance to their public performance, and so there must be no restrictions or infringements of their opportunities. Such tolerance operates in the privatised space, and it represents a substantive good to the extent that it fosters a public consensual space in which discourse can proceed along agreed lines. Kristen Johnson describes it thus:

> Liberal invocations of tolerance have their roots in a very distinct epistemology, which includes a belief that through the use of reason all people can be unified around a body of common truths and morals, regardless of their other differences. The goal is a unity that can stand despite and independent of differences, so that 'public' life engages only with that which is held in common, while 'divisive' differences are left in the 'private' sphere.[17]

Such a concept of tolerance as a substantive good is predicated on the good of individual freedom. In popular parlance it says, 'I can do whatever I like as long as I don't harm anyone else.' Indeed, this sentiment is the leitmotif of modern liberal democracies. The good of personal autonomy substantiates the good of tolerance. The only threat to this model is when some bring that which rightly should remain private into the consensual public sphere. So, Richard Rorty describes 'religion as a conversation stopper' in precisely this way.[18] According to Rorty, religion is just about acceptable in the private realm, but in the public realm all it does is inhibit conversation – as the other partners round the table have no way to respond.

As already indicated, at the local level this approach to society is the predominant one. In sport's clubs, church meetings and scientific conferences different conceptions of acceptable public speech may be operative, but in each of those settings some such conception *is* operative. Problems only arise when that convention is breached.

This is not, though, the only concept of tolerance, and certainly not the only form of political discourse that is evident in contemporary Western society. The second concept of tolerance to be described is tolerance as a pragmatic necessity, and its dining partner is an agonistic political theory. Kristen Johnson again explains,

> For agonistic theorists … difference is to be celebrated because it lies at the very heart of the way the world is and the way our identities are constituted. They bring to the conversation a concern that liberal tolerance is not sufficient because it still, by definition, involves disapproval rather than embrace of difference and, to work, it requires that differences not be recognized in any public way. By assuming that it is possible to keep difference and conflict out of our common political life, political liberalism overlooks the conflictual, agonistic nature of reality. The presence of conflict and power in all aspects of life, relationships, institutions, and structures means that attempts to find unity or to develop political theories in the name of unity always suppress or do violence to difference. Unity cannot, according to these agonistic or post-Nietzschean political theorists, be the goal, nor tolerance the way to get there. Instead, these theorists search for a way to move beyond tolerance and unity to a deeper and richer embrace of difference. For the sake of diversity, they relinquish the hope of unity.[19]

Philosophically, John Milbank has described this understanding in terms of the ontology of violence.[20]

More popularly, it is simply called the Big Brother house! Although these theorists abandon notions of tolerance, this is only the case at the ideal or principled level. As a pragmatic necessity, even such theorists adopt some form of tolerance. The important point is that it is not considered as itself a good, but merely a tool that enables us to survive in such an agonistic environment. Its pragmatism is evident to the extent that it is used instrumentally to protect diversity.

Numerous commentators have pointed out that both these concepts of tolerance and their attendant politics have a range of problems associated with them. The first relates to the boundary conditions that must be articulated. In other words, what precisely can and cannot be tolerated? We saw this recently in the debates over gay marriage in the UK. The Green Party was reported to have expelled someone from the party because of her views on gay marriage. The issue was not whether the party agreed with her views – they clearly did not – but whether someone representing the party could even be allowed to hold such views.[21]

The second problem affecting our contemporary conceptions of tolerance is the inevitable passivity that they engender. By definition, tolerance is to refrain from acting or speaking in situations where one might have acted otherwise. Yet, it is precisely this reticence to interfere that has arguably contributed to one of the more pernicious features of our culture: a walk-on-by mentality. Whilst those who challenge antisocial behaviour are rightly praised, the more common trait amongst the UK population is to turn a blind eye to even the most atrocious behaviour. Not long ago, in a busy tube station, I saw three large men clearly harassing a young woman. What I found shocking was not only the scores of people who simply ignored the plight of the young lady, but my own hesitation at getting involved. We prize the have-a-go-heroes precisely because they are not the norm. And yet, what we have failed to recognize is that this attitude is one that stems from our celebration of modern forms of tolerance. The obvious corollary of 'I won't interfere in your life, if you don't interfere in mine' is 'I won't help you, if you won't help me'. In 2003 an opinion poll found that whilst 78% of people in the UK said they would intervene if they saw someone mistreating or kicking their dog, only 53% of people would intervene if someone was mistreating or kicking their partner. What is the difference here? Presumably the danger of retaliation is the same in both cases. So, perhaps the only difference is that we do not think of animals as having a private life that is none of our concern.

Luke Bretherton, drawing on the work of David Hollenbach, comments,

> It seems tolerance acts as a break *[sic]* to any constructive action. Hollenbach notes that 'any form of genuine human action adds to or tries to change the direction of what is happening.' Yet, tolerance, understood as never challenging opinions [we might add 'or behaviours']

others hold, reduces us to silence and inactivity, because to add to and seek to change what others think is by definition intolerance. As Hollenbach notes, it is obviously a *reductio ad absurdum* to imply that a public philosophy built around tolerance aims to get people to stop talking and acting. However, this is the effect it has.[22]

It is worth pointing out that this passivity applies to both concepts of tolerance. In regard to tolerance as a substantive good, such passivity is evident when we fail to challenge behaviours that are directly harmful to those involved out of some misplaced notion that what they do in their private lives is none of our business. The support of some for decriminalisation of cannabis is probably a case in point here: the value of individual autonomy outweighs the cost of personal harm. In relation to a pragmatic conception of tolerance, a similar passivity has been evident in the way in which certain ethnic or religious communities in the UK have developed in isolation from the rest of society. Out of a desire to respect diversity, which in some cases has simply meant doing nothing to encourage integration, we have ended up with sections of the populace severely polarised.[23] Now, it is clear that this line of argument is frequently overstated – but that does not remove the fact that it has some validity. Tolerance as passivity does not solve social problems; in fact it creates them. As Hollenbach, in relation to the US scene, states,

> Acceptance or tolerance of difference will certainly not knit up the tears in the flesh of the American body politic today. When acceptance of difference becomes acquiescence in deep social disparities and human misery it becomes part of the problem, not part of the solution.[24]

Finally, our modern conceptions of tolerance fall short in respect of the individualism upon which they are based. Whilst many liberals like to think they have moved beyond former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's comment 'There's no such thing as society', they fail to see that they have simply taken an alternative branch up the Enlightenment tree. As Susan Mendus puts it,

> We need to understand how people are *inter*dependent as well as *in*dependent. We need to explain how autonomy is formed, not solely from the internal nature of individuals, but also from the nature of the society in which they find themselves.[25]

Neither of our two modern conceptions of tolerance recognises sufficiently the interdependence that characterises humans as social beings. They both work with a flawed conception of human nature. Tolerance as a substantive good fails to appreciate it because it is predicated on a notion of individual autonomy as *the social good*. However, even tolerance as a pragmatic necessity fails to recognise it as it assumes we can operate within a rarefied schema in which a continual antagonism does not fundamentally alter our state of being. It seems to believe that we maintain our identity in opposition to those around us, rather than by relating rightly to those around us. It is, if you like, the billiard ball version of society, rather than the web. We bounce off each other, rather than connect. We are hard, rather than sticky. The failure, then, of both conceptions is simply to fail to spot the wrong turn that Descartes and others took when they placed the individual at the centre of reflective thinking. If human beings, and therefore society, are inherently relational and interdependent, then any procedure for social and political interaction that fails to take this into account will have failed before it has begun. It is time for an alternative approach.

4. Jesus and politics[26]

In this paper, I want to contend that Jesus' example of table-fellowship is a model and example of tolerance. Moreover, this paradigm can be applied in our contemporary situation at both the local and macro scale. In the first place, Jesus' practice is an example of tolerance to the extent that he welcomes and accepts all into relationship with him. We must not lose sight of the fact that in opening the door to tax-collectors, prostitutes and outcasts, and inviting them to dine with him, Jesus was not just providing food. In fact, the provision of food was the least significant aspect of his actions. Rather, it was the social and religious acceptance that his actions indicated that would have had the main impact.[27] In welcoming these people, Jesus was making it clear to the rest of society that these groups were just as much part of God's kingdom as the religious elite. In fact, frequently they were ahead of the religious leaders in entering God's kingdom (Mt 21:31-32). Moreover, in accepting them irrespective of past behaviour – including behaviour of which Jesus disapproved – and in advance of moral transformation, Jesus exhibited what can only be described as tolerance. It is not the case that Jesus thought prostitution or avaricious tax collecting was acceptable. Jesus' point was that even though he disapproved of their behaviour, those people were still welcome at his table, and by extension in the kingdom of God.[28]

Yet, at the same time, Jesus' practice of tolerance avoids the pitfalls we mentioned earlier. In the first place, it has clear boundaries. Jesus is not saying, 'Come join the party and nothing more is expected.' He is saying, 'Join the party, fellowship with me, and by means of that fellowship expect to be transformed.' His only requirement, and yet it is a requirement, is a willingness to be changed. Blomberg has developed the notion that Jesus' role in these events was that of host. He was not always the host in the sense of providing the food, but he was the spiritual host, making it clear who was, and who was not acceptable at the party. The significance of this is that we see that the criterion for entering the party was not just openness to transformation, but also respect for the host, and especially the authority of the host. The people that Jesus rejected were precisely those who refused to recognise his authority by rejecting the invitation he had extended, and who, by extension, were unwilling to change (Lk 14:15-24). His was not, then, an entirely open invitation; it has conditions attached. The boundary, however, is clear: respect and recognition for the authority of Jesus Christ as religious host.

In the second place, Jesus' model of tolerance avoids the dangers of passivity. Once again, he is not saying, 'Come dine with me, and I will leave you as you are' but rather, 'Come dine with me, and I will change you.' As we have noticed, Jesus' goal was not diversity for diversity's sake, but rather the possibility of change by means of a relationship with him. Bretherton writes,

> Jesus relates hospitality and holiness by inverting their relations: hospitality becomes the means of holiness. Instead of having to be set apart from or exclude pagans in order to maintain holiness, it is in Jesus' hospitality of pagans, the unclean, and sinners that his own holiness is shown forth. Instead of sin and impurity infecting him, it seems Jesus' purity and righteousness somehow 'infects' the impure, sinners and the Gentiles.[29]

Finally, his table-fellowship is not based on a flawed conception of humanity. The substantive good that Jesus recognises is not the good of individual autonomy but the good of interdependence, in particular dependence on Christ himself. The good upon which his practice of tolerance is based is the good of knowing Jesus, and by means of that, the good of living in community with fellow believers. Jesus calls us to a true freedom, in which we are at liberty to accept responsibility, obey God and serve our neighbour. We have, then, a thick description of tolerance that arises from the practices of a first century preacher – but does it have relevance for our contemporary political arrangements?

We shall go on to suggest that it does, but not that there is a direct line from the practices of Jesus to contemporary politics. Rather, we are asking whether reflection on the practices of Jesus Christ might enable us to imagine a different kind of political arrangement in the present. It is possible that such a work may fail, but it is also possible that it may succeed, and nothing is lost by engaging creatively and constructively in the task. It is in that spirit that we proceed.

Given that in Jesus' model of table-fellowship the most important boundary condition identified was respect for the authority of the host, can we recognise a suitable host in our current situation? At first sight, we might consider the reigning government as the host; after all they have been democratically elected. However, let me propose that the true host we should recognise is the whole populace, or even possibly the global population.[30] In saying this, it is important to emphasize that by 'populace' I do not mean some abstract notion of the 'nation'. Rather, we would draw on Jesus' definition of our 'neighbour' to articulate the parameters of this conception.[31] According to Jesus, our 'neighbour' is not someone in geographical, social, religious, cultural or ethnic proximity. Rather, his point in the so-called parable of the Good Samaritan (Lk 10:25-37), in which this question is addressed, is that in respect of the love command all those boundaries are illegitimate, and that our neighbour is simply anyone and everyone.[32]

The populace, then, to whom we must show respect consists of our 'neighbours' in the sense outlined above, whether considered individually or corporately. What this means, though, is that the boundary marker between those we tolerate and those we do not, is defined by this attitude of respect. This does not mean that individuals, or groups, must agree with the majority opinion – for the majority is not the populace, but they must, as a whole, respect the populace. On these grounds, then, the terrorist or violent offender need not be tolerated whereas those who disagree with the majority, even by means of protest, should be. But what kind of tolerance are we talking about? What does it mean to tolerate all who respect the host of the populace?

As host, Jesus accepted lavish banquets from rich tax-collectors, cups of cold water from disgraced single women, and perfume from prostitutes. He did not put limits on the manner in which people demonstrated their respect, nor did he reject them purely because the guardians of the population rejected them. In like manner, might not our public square be characterised by a far greater plurality of voices, each of which speaks in its own terms, in line with its own categories? According to the consensual model of tolerance, we can only allow certain forms of discourse, thus negating at the outset the genuine concerns and modes of expression of some. However, by means of the agonistic approach, all we get is a loud shouting match that is insufficiently controlled until it spirals out of control. Given a robust concept of a boundary condition of respect for the host, namely the populace, why could we not have a public square characterised by a multitude of voices all speaking in their own categories, and in their own terms? Why is it that Descartes or Kant or Epicurus can be referenced in the town hall, but not Jesus or Mohammed? Now admittedly, the former are not usually quoted by name, but that is not the point – their philosophies and presuppositions are prevalent in the discourse. As we have indicated, this is not, though, merely a return to an agonistic politics, in which tolerance is no more than a pragmatic construct. Rather, the tolerance we need here is a deliberate, intentional tolerance that welcomes this multitude of voices on the basis of respect for the whole populace. It is tolerance as table fellowship.

When we apply the example of Jesus' table fellowship to the requirements of a just political community, the thrust is towards a much more open system of representation. The goal, unlike Jesus' dinner parties, is not the religious transformation of those admitted into the representative system, but something much less, though still vital: basic respect for their rights as fully equal citizens to participate fully in the public realm, which may also have the benefit of elevating the level of political debate and the opening up of new solutions to policy questions that the dominant groups cannot see.

Utilising such a conception, the problem of passivity is also avoided. Precisely because there is a single public sphere in which all modes of discourse are allowed, including those that usually take place within the conventional private sphere, the existence of that passively accepted sphere becomes irrelevant. Precisely by being allowed to have a genuine voice at the public table, it is likely that the isolation that we perceive in certain communities would be diminished.

This point has recently been argued by the chief executive of the (English) National Association for Voluntary and Community Action (NAVCA) in responding to government proposals to restrict funding for community groups that only represent one sector of the population. He wrote:

> The commission's report … took the view that funding minority groups increases segregation and should become the exception. I disagree. During my career I have worked with community groups in Hull, Newcastle and Derby, and I am now in touch with Navca's members throughout England. That experience has convinced me that, far from reinforcing segregation, funding for faith and minority ethnic groups often helps them become effective advocates on behalf of their communities… By helping minority ethnic groups build their self-sufficiency we enable them to take an active part in civil society.[33]

Clearly, this is not precisely the same as the active stance that Jesus took in relation to his dinner guests, but it is certainly a more active approach than we currently enjoy.

In a similar vein, this approach is not based on a flawed conception of the individual in isolation from society. The paradigm we are working with is one in which all voices are allowed at the table, because all voices are necessary for the sustenance of a healthy community. It is not I as an individual, or my freedom, that grounds this conception, it is *us* and *our* good. That is the ultimate basis for such tolerance.

But the question remains, whether we have any concrete examples in which this kind of paradigm has been practised. Well, there are none at the macro level for the simple reason that it has never been adequately tested. However, at the local level, it happens all the time in a social setting that strangely enough is very similar to the one in which Jesus was engaged: the dinner party.

5. The dinner party

At the typical British dinner party, there exists a very free approach to discourse. Not only might the topic of discussion range from the latest scientific discovery to politics to sport to sex to children to foreign travels, the mode of conversation is similarly varied depending on who is sitting round the table. At times, someone will state authoritatively what the latest academic research on a topic is. Someone else will provide a piece of insider information. Another might conduct a conceptual analysis, and another will reflect with a personal reminiscence or experience that is relevant to the topic. No one mode of discourse is privileged above the rest. Indeed, the person who dogmatically considers their own view as the only one worthy of merit is usually considered a bore – and may find that the invites dry up.

Whilst this kind of conversation can end up in post-modern relativism, it is often the case that a genuine consensus can emerge that has taken into account the whole range of views as they have been expressed in their own terms. In other words, the academic is allowed to speak *as* academic, and their contribution is evaluated on those terms. The personal experience is shared *as* a personal experience, and is similarly evaluated with its own integrity. Human beings are generally rational enough to know that these different kinds of speech are all of value, and whilst they cannot be directly compared, they can both contribute to a wider vision of reality. The dinner party, then, allows all participants to be heard – and to be heard in their own terms. In addition to this, the dinner party does not invent or baptise the artificial notion of a public-private split. Giving space to all participants to share means that whatever each person wants to contribute, they are allowed to contribute. It is not, then, the same as the scientific convention, or indeed the parliamentary Select Committee on Science and Technology where certain forms of discourse are explicitly barred. And the notion of tolerance that is operative is precisely not the notion of tolerance as a substantive good based on individual autonomy. Something else is going on here.

But the dinner party is also not the same as the kind of agonistic politics evinced in the Big Brother house. Whilst all topics and modes of discourse are allowed – whether private or public – there remain some boundaries. Respect for one another is the first of these. Even at the dinner party, there is a line that can be crossed and at which point the guest is asked to leave. If, for instance, someone was unnecessarily rude, threatening or violent, the rest of the party would support the one at the receiving end of that behaviour and demand that the perpetrator leave. It is important to note that this would happen whether or not the rest of the party agreed or disagreed with the point the perpetrator was making. The requirement to maintain a certain level of civility outstrips the issue at question. Yet, at the same time, this is a minimal commitment. It is not there to stifle conversation, or even vehement disagreement; it is there to ensure that conversation can continue, rather than be stifled. Whilst this social convention applies in respect of one's fellow guests, it applies particularly in respect of the host. Whilst one might ignore someone else in the party asking you to leave, if the host says your time is up, then it really is.

This is all part of the unwritten contractual arrangement with the host. In accepting their invitation, and receiving their generosity, you are also agreeing to abide by their code of conduct in respect of dinner party manners. Respect for the host, then, becomes the guide to the nature of the dinner party boundaries.

Hence, in the contemporary dinner party, tolerance is evident to the extent that all modes of discourse are allowed, none are rejected at outset. Yet, at the same time, the boundary marker is clear: respect for the other guests and especially respect for the host, including their authority. Passivity is avoided in that all guests come with an expectation that they might learn something from one another. It is certainly a less passive environment than our macro, public approach to social engagement. In addition, the ultimate good at stake is not the good of individual autonomy, but the good of the shared social space that is the dinner party.

There are, of course, some points of divergence between Jesus' practices and our contemporary setting, but my purpose in drawing attention to the dinner party is heuristic. The fact that as twenty-first-century people from a wide range of backgrounds and experiences we manage to negotiate successfully that social space suggests that if we applied a similar approach to our public macro discourse, we might discover a richer, fuller concept of tolerance, as well as a richer, fuller model for society. This, at least, is what Jesus' example suggests. It is also what another rabbi – this time from the twenty-first century – seems to have had in mind:

The answer … is *conversation* – not mere debate but the disciplined act of communicating (making my views intelligible to someone who does not share them) and listening (entering into the inner world of someone whose views are opposed to my own). Each is a genuine form of respect, of paying attention to the other, of conferring value on his or her opinions even though they are not mine. In a debate one side wins, the other loses, but both are the same as they were before. In a conversation neither side loses and both are changed, because they now know what reality looks like from a different perspective. That is not to say that either gives up its previous convictions. That is not what conversation is about. It does mean, however, that I may now realize that I must make space for another deeply held belief, and if my own case has been compelling, the other side may understand that it too must make space for mine. That is how public morality is constructed in a plural society – not by a single dominant voice, nor by the relegation of moral issues to the private domain of home and local congregation, but by a sustained act of understanding and seeking to be understood across the boundaries of difference.[34]

Dr Justin Thacker is Academic Dean and Lecturer in Practical and Public Theology at Cliff College, UK

Endnotes

1 An earlier version of this article was part of the 7th Temple Address, an event hosted by the UK Evangelical Alliance on 13 November 2007.

2 Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984) 17.

3 C.S. Lewis, 'The Inner Ring', Memorial Lecture at King's College, London, 1944, at http://www.lewissociety.org/innerring.php (accessed 18 October 2014).

4 Tony Blair, 'The Duty to Integrate: Shared British Values', speech delivered on Friday 8 December 2006, at http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/26685/ipriadoc_doc/a8bc50ed-bf39-443b-a269-49b6bcd681cf/en/1147_blairimmigration.pdf (accessed 5 July 2013).

5 Jenni Russell, 'Basic civility is about social solidarity, not priggishness', *The Guardian*, 3 May 2007.

6 All scripture quotations are taken from the New Revised Standard Version.

7 Robert J. Karris, *Luke: Artist and Theologian* (New York: Paulist Press, 1985) chapter 4.

8 Joel Green, *The Theology of the Gospel of Luke* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 87.

9 J.R. Edwards, *The Gospel According to Mark* (Leicester: IVP, 2002) 193; W.C.K. Poon, 'Superabundant Table Fellowship in the Kingdom: The Feeding of the Five Thousand and the Meal Motif in Luke', *Expository Times* 114 (2003) 224-230 (226-228).

10 Joel Green, *The Gospel of Luke* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997) 309. The Greek term is of a sinner in the town.

11 Green, *Luke*, 310.

12 Green, *Luke*, 550.

13 This is the case because it passes the double dissimilarity criterion for authentic sayings of Jesus; see Craig Blomberg, *Contagious Holiness: Jesus' Meals with Sinners* (Downers Grove: Apollos, 2005) chapter 1.

14 Blomberg, *Contagious Holiness*, 97.

15 Blomberg, *Contagious Holiness*, 128.

16 Blomberg, *Contagious Holiness*, 102.

17 Kristen Johnson, *Theology, Political Theory and Pluralism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 2.

18 Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and Social Hope* (London: Penguin, 1999) 168-174.

19 Johnson, *Theology*, 3.

20 John Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990). For Milbank, such 'violence' is evident whenever we view society as a sphere of necessary conflict.

21 'The Green Party has an unpleasant way of dictating matters of conscience', *Telegraph* 23 November 2012.

22 Luke Bretherton, *Hospitality as Holiness: Christian Witness amid Moral Diversity* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006) 147.

23 Incidentally, the same phenomenon is evident in our unwillingness to challenge certain forms of family life irrespective of whether they harm the child or not. Our passive valuing of adult autonomy seems to outweigh our active safeguarding of children.

24 David Hollenbach, *The Common Good and Christian Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 41.

25 Susan Mendus, *Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism* (London: Macmillan, 1989) 67-68.

26 Much of this section is derived from or inspired by Bretherton, *Hospitality;* Blomberg, *Contagious Holiness* and Johnson, *Theology.* A number of the ways in which I describe 'tolerance' parallel, in particular, Bretherton's description of 'hospitality'. My reasons for choosing the nomenclature of tolerance rather than hospitality are heuristic. While

Bretherton is right to point out that the concept of 'hospitality' brings with it a biblical and theological depth that is perhaps missing from 'tolerance', that depth does not pertain for non-theologians who are liable to misunderstand its connotations. I would suggest that the concept of 'tolerance', appropriately amended – as I believe I have done in this paper – brings a greater degree of meaning for a non-theological audience, and that is why I have chosen it. Cf. Bretherton, *Hospitality*, 121-126.

27 Poon, 'Table Fellowship', 228.

28 Bretherton, *Hospitality*, 131-135.

29 Bretherton, *Hospitality*, 130.

30 Given the reality of climate change, one could even argue that the host to be respected is the *future* global population.

31 See also the recent report by the British group Theos which draws a distinction between 'nation' and 'neighbour' as two alternative paradigms for building the civil society. The Theos report makes a strong case for the latter as the more effective approach. Stephen Backhouse, *Red, White, Blue... and Brown: Citizens, Patriots and the Prime Minister* (London: Theos, 2007), available at www.theosthinktank.co.uk (accessed 10 February 2013).

32 A point that Richard Dawkins completely fails to see. Richard Dawkins, *The God Delusion* (London: Bantam Press, 2006) 254-257.

33 Kevin Curley, 'Response: Minority and Faith Groups Can Help Cohesion', *The Guardian* 17 October 2007.

34 (Chief Rabbi) Jonathan Sacks, *The Dignity of Difference* (London: Continuum, 2002) 83.

EJT (2015) 24:1, 77–84 0960–2720

Social Representations of Call and Vocation Among Portuguese Evangelical Christians: An Exploratory Study

Thomas Arabis

RÉSUMÉ

Cette étude esquisse les contours des représentations sociales des concepts d'appel et de vocation professionnelle dans les milieux évangéliques portugais, au moyen de quatre questions : 1) Les deux concepts représentent-ils deux réalités différentes ou une seule ? 2) Représentent-ils une expérience universelle ou se limitent-ils à certains individus ? 3) Offrent-ils une orientation générale ou une direction spécifique et individualisée ? 4) Un concept est-il tenu en plus haute estime que l'autre ? Après une description des représentations sociales, l'article présente une brève analyse des données bibliques, afin de montrer les différences entre les deux concepts. Il se termine par quelques conclusions pratiques.

* * * *

SUMMARY

This study traces the contours of the social representations of the concepts of call and vocation in the Portuguese evangelical community, using four questions: 1) Do the terms represent two realities or one? 2) Do they represent a universal experience or are they limited to certain individuals? 3) Do they offer generic orientation or individualised and particularised guidance? 4) Is one esteemed more highly than the other? Following the description of the social representations, a brief analysis of the biblical data concerning the concept is offered as a means of highlighting variances between the two. The article concludes with implications derived from the study.

* * * *

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Diese Studie skizziert anhand von vier Fragen das Konzept von Ruf und Berufung, wie es innerhalb der portugiesischen evangelikalen Gemeinschaft und ihres kognitiv-sozialen Interpretationsrahmens vertreten wird: 1. Beziehen sich diese Begriffe auf zwei oder nur auf eine Realität? 2. Stehen sie für eine allbekannte Erfahrung oder treffen sie nur auf gewisse Personen zu? 3. Bieten sie eine allgemein gültige Orientierung oder eine detaillierte Wegführung und Anweisung für Einzelpersonen? 4. Steht der eine Begriff über dem anderen? Nach einer Beschreibung der kognitiv-sozialen Verständnisrahmens folgt eine kurze Analyse der biblischen Daten zu dem Konzept, um die Unterschiede zwischen beiden Begriffen herauszustellen. Der Artikel endet mit praktischen Schlussfolgerungen, die sich aus der Studie ergeben.

* * * *

1. Introduction

For followers of Christ, the biblical concept of calling[1] has the potential of serving as an aid in the construction of their self-identity and consequently for the interpretation of their vocational life.[2] Calling can function as a key descriptor of the forms by which God interacts with his people: he calls them, and through that call he involves them in his salvific purposes and orients them toward a life that becomes integrated into his covenantal plans. Responding to that call constitutes the fundamental commitment by which a person decides to build their identity and life purpose on God and his plans. As the following words illustrate, call has the potential of dramatically impacting one's vocational life:

> You are called. You were not born by chance; you do not exist just by existing. There is a divine purpose for your passage on this earth... You are called. There are no exceptions. He brought man into being ... to make him useful. He created us to work, to be busy, to execute his personal will, to put ourselves [in his hands] as an instrument for the realization of his sovereign purposes and intents ... We all have a call (especially we, the children of God), a calling, an order to fulfil. Indeed, the call to serve is intrinsic to man, it is part of his personality, it is the plan of God for the believer. We are all to be committed to the kingdom of God.[3]

It is true that the concept of call has the potential of orienting the construction of a life project and its resulting vocational dimensions, thereby allowing people to encounter profound significance in what they do. However, I would propose that this same concept has the potential to limit their ability to construct a life plan. This is due to the possible interpretations of the concept within the evangelical community, some of which create potential obstacles to considering one's life as being participative in God's work and thus significant. The following study will explore a variety of interpretations found among Portuguese evangelical Christians of the concepts of call and vocation; it will also propose some potential implications for how believers shape their vocational life.

The present article summarizes key elements of an unpublished thesis that was based on a qualitative investigation carried out by the author.[4] One of the study's principal objectives was to understand the diversity of perceptions within the evangelical community concerning the concepts of call, vocation, work and ministry, along with their interaction in interpreting vocational aims and options. Fifteen semi-structured interviews were carried out, each one lasting on average 45 minutes. The study resulted in a database of 277 responses to questions with a total of 53,489 words. The participants were youth and young adults who identified themselves with evangelical Christianity, all in an active phase of making vocational choices. They included students attending secondary school (grades 9-12), university, evangelical seminary or Bible institute, along with recent graduates who had started their professional career in the previous year. Among the participants some were preparing for professional church-related ministry and some preparing for 'secular' careers.

The theory of social representations was adopted to orient the analysis and description of the perspectives.[5] Summarizing, this theory deals with the question of how the incomprehensible and strange becomes comprehensible and familiar for a social group. According to the theory, a social group makes use of the known to explain an unknown new reality within the context of its social interactions, thereby creating new cognitive and social constructions of that reality. The study attempted to identify the Portuguese evangelical community's cognitive and social constructions – their social representations – of the concepts of call and vocation, along with those of work and ministry.

In what follows, the contours of the social representations of call and vocation will be presented under four questions: 1) Do the terms call and vocation represent two realities or one? 2) Do they represent a universal experience or are they limited to certain individuals? 3) Do they offer generic orientation or individualised and particularised guidance? 4) Is one esteemed more highly than the other? Following the description of the social representations, a brief analysis of the biblical data concerning the concept will be offered as a means of highlighting variances between the two. The article then concludes with implications derived from the study.

2. Two realities or one?

The first question is whether the two words, call and vocation, are used as synonyms to represent one reality or whether they are used to represent two distinct phenomena, even though possibly interrelated.[6] The study concluded that the representations mark a clear distinction between the two concepts. In the Bible, vocation and call are two ways of translating one theological concept.[7] However, the people interviewed clearly affirmed the existence of two phenomena based on these two words.

Vocation is identified as the contours of an individual's vocational makeup formed by God and other agencies such as genetics and social shaping. In the responses of those being interviewed concerning the meaning of vocation, frequently used words were abilities, capacities, aptitudes, personality, desires, likes and dislikes. This vocational self-identity should ideally function as an orientation for vocational choices. Another interesting point brought out in the study is that vocation is not considered as static but rather as somewhat fluid and able to be developed and reformed throughout one's life.

There exists a second representation attributed to the term vocation: the occupations which have the potential of fulfilling the believers' vocational self-identity and about which they therefore feel good in that they would be a good match for them. One can infer that not any job necessarily qualifies as a vocation, rather only those that potentially translate into the fulfilment of one's vocational identity.

Call represents a very different reality. Whereas vocation speaks of a reality inside of the person, call represents a communicative activity on the part of God toward individuals through which he orients believers toward a vocational objective. The interviewees used the following terms in their descriptions of call: speak, reveal, communicate, orient, invite. And, as we noted in the discussion of vocation, the term may also be used to represent the goal itself, as in the phrase, 'Being a missionary is my calling.'

A comparison of the representations of the two concepts reveals similarities and differences. The two concepts are similar in that both are considered means used by God to orient the believer toward an appropriate vocational objective. Both are forms of divine orientation for the believers' vocational life.

However, there are also differences. The first is obvious: the source where one seeks divine orientation is different, and as a result the obligation placed on the person changes in their pursuit of that orientation. With vocation, people seek orientation inside themselves, in their self-identity; this implies an obligation of self-understanding. They must grow in their self-awareness, discover likes and dislikes, and determine strengths and weaknesses. But with call, believers seek orientation outside of themselves, with the hope of receiving divine guidance; call therefore requires a spiritual listening, an ability to read the signs that God uses to communicate his will.

The second difference between vocation and call concerns the desired outcome. Generally speaking, those interviewed spoke of vocation as offering orientation toward work – an occupation or profession – and not normally of ministry, while call offered orientation toward ministry. That is, one is called to the ministry, whereas one discerns what would be a potential fit for future work through understanding one's vocational makeup. This distinction, however, requires nuancing because the areas of work and ministry oftentimes overlap. Those who pursue a profession based on their understanding of how God has made them (i.e., vocation) will oftentimes embrace their professional work as ministry to some degree or another. And the opposite is also true: those who follow a call to ministry also accept it as their occupation. Nevertheless, in general, vocation is more strongly linked with work whereas call points to ministry. In this aspect of the social representations one begins to see signs of a dichotomy between the sacred and secular.

3. A universal or limited experience?

The second question explores whether what is experienced through call and vocation is universally offered to all believers or limited to select people.[8] Maintaining the distinction identified in the previous section, all interviewees affirmed that vocation is universal: each and every person has a vocational self-identity that reflects the creative work of God. Their perspective concerning call was different and revealed a certain amount of ambivalence.

A majority, but not all, affirmed that not all believers experience a call. This view was represented particularly among those who believe that call applies only to God calling people to a particular ministry, that is, ministry in the more restricted sense of ecclesiastical service through ministerial roles such as pastor, evangelist, youth leader and missionary. Others affirmed that call is an experience that all believers could theoretically experience and that God uses it to orient believers to any vocational area.

Whatever position was taken concerning this question, what was unanimously affirmed in the responses was a belief that God actively desires to lead all believers in their vocational life. The participants verbalised the conviction that God offers everyone a supernatural orientation for their vocational life that goes beyond their discernment of vocational self-identity. Some used the word call to designate this sort of orientation, while others – those who limited call to traditional ministry – considered that this universal orientation is something distinct from call.

4. General or person-specific orientation?

The third question examines whether call and vocation offer a general orientation or specific, personal guidance toward one's vocational life.[9] An initial observation to be made here is that the object of the orientation offered by both call and vocation is the vocational life. Both are considered means used by God to orient individuals in their vocational life, in contrast with other life areas such as personal relationships (for example, who should I marry) or ethics (for example, how should I respond in a certain situation).

The majority of the interviewees understood that call offers specific, individualised guidance. Through call God offers orientation that will lead to a particular vocational objective. For example, God may call someone to a specific ministerial role such as being a pastor, to a defined project such as active involvement in a particular social issue, or even to a specific location such as service as a missionary in Taiwan.

The self-identity described through vocation offers important clues for appropriate, potential vocational futures, but this sort of guidance is more generic in nature. This self-understanding marks out a variety of forms of work that would be appropriate for the person. As people grow in their awareness of their strengths and weaknesses, their likes and dislikes, a number of vocational outcomes surface as potentially adequate in responding to their makeup. This, of course, sounds very much like what one encounters in the world of vocational assessment and testing.

5. Level of esteem

In considering these two concepts, receiving a call was generally esteemed more highly than discerning one's vocation.[10] In other words, the interviewees expressed the value of vocation and appreciated the orientation it offered, but they very much desired to experience a call. There appear to be various explanations for this result.

One explanation is that experiencing a call is considered to be a more intense supernatural experience than discerning one's vocational makeup.[11] There may be a variety of reasons for this belief. First, when talking of call God is viewed as taking an active role in communicating his will to the believer. Call is defined as a form of supernatural communication in which God takes the initiative and speaks, sometimes very directly and clearly, at other times more indirectly.[12] It is always God who initiates the process and is actively communicating. On the other hand, in vocation God's active role is not as clear or visible. He is seen as operating through the creation of a person's vocational makeup, but at the present moment he does not appear to be actively involved. Rather, it is the person himself who must take the initiative to discover their vocational makeup. Connected with this is the recognition that one's vocational makeup involves forces normally considered to be natural, such as heredity and social shaping. There may be an unconscious assumption that these forces, being natural in nature, are therefore not necessarily directly controlled by God. That being the case, one's vocational orientation would be somewhat influenced by chance or something untouched by God's superintendence.

Another explanation for the high esteem placed on call focuses on the fact that not everyone experiences a call; it is generally considered to be limited to certain individuals, as indicated above. Consequently, someone who believes they are being called senses that they are the object of God's special attention.

Also, the goal of a call is typically considered to be more spiritual. The interviewees generally held the belief that ministry is tightly linked to call as its goal, whereas vocation typically focuses on work.

Finally, there appears to be the belief that the result of a call places before the person a more specific vocational future. Being more specific, the call's guidance lessens ambiguity and therefore affords a higher degree of assurance in following God's will. In call, the roadmap has a higher definition and the route is highlighted.

6. Call in the Bible

The previous sections dealt with the social representations created by Portuguese evangelicals of the concepts of call and vocation. The following section will present an outline of the biblical testimony and compare it with those representations.[13]

A foundational quality of call is that it is relational and affects the believers' identity. It is God who calls in Christ (Gal 1:6; 1 Tim 5:24) and summons the believer to belong to him, to become part of his community and to assume a new identity in Christ (Rom 1:6; 9:26; 1 Cor 1:9; 1 Jn 3:1). Through call the believer becomes properly grounded in God rather than through any sort of self-grounding.[14] God invites the person to sanctify themselves to him (Rom 1:7; 1 Cor 1:2), to live a life worthy of him (1 Thes 2:12), to become part of his people and to live in community and union before him. This relational and identifying quality is foundational for the other aspects of call, whether in its universal or particular aspect.

The call of God is primarily to salvation. God calls the person from darkness to light (1 Pet 2:9); he calls them to salvation (Mt 9:13; Mk 2:17; Lk 5:23; Rom 8:29-30) which is understood to be an eternal inheritance (1 Tim 6:12; Heb 9:15), a heavenly calling (Heb 3:1), an eternal glory (1 Pet 5:10) and a future hope (Eph 1:18; 4:4). It is a call into God's kingdom and glory (1 Thes 2:12).

This salvation to which believers are called has a future quality, but not exclusively. It is also experienced in one's present reality. A call to salvation implies a way of living that is ethically different, one that is worthy of the God who calls us (1 Thes 2:12). The believer assumes a form of being and acting that expresses their new identity. Therefore, they should lead a life worthy of the gospel (Eph 4:1; 2 Thes 1:11), one that reflects unity and peace with others (Eph 4:4; 1 Cor 7:15; Col 3:15) along with holiness (1 Thes 4:7; 2 Tim 1:9; 1 Pet 1:15). They should live in liberty (Gal 5:13), enduring any suffering because of being identified with Jesus (1 Pet 2:21; 3:9). This transformation ought to influence a person's entire life and bear fruit in all of one's assumed life roles (2 Pet 1:10).

A final aspect of the call of all believers speaks to one's collaboration with God's work. While there is no doubt about the reality of God inviting his people to collaborate with him in his work,[15] it is rare to find the word call or vocation used in expressing this reality.[16] Rather call is a word primarily used in regards to salvation and its resulting identity and ethic.[17]

7. Implications

There are a number of divergences between the representations identified through the interviews and the biblical testimony concerning the concept of call. All of these have implications for the vocational life of believers and, more generally, for the life of the Church.

7.1 Limiting call to the vocational area: broken links

The first divergence deals with the domain in which the representations of call and vocation operate.[18] They focus almost exclusively on the vocational life, while the biblical testimony speaks primarily of salvation in general and its resulting identity in Christ along with a new ethic that accompanies and exemplifies this identity. Call, in its biblical vision, does include the vocational life as an aspect of its operational domain, but it deals with it in the wider context of salvation and its resulting identity and ethic. The representations communicated within the interviews lost this direct connection between salvation, identity and ethic and the vocational life, thereby isolating and emphasizing the latter as the almost exclusive domain in which call operates.

Two possible consequences may result. The first and most obvious is that the evangelical community has stopped using call terminology in the way it occurs in the Bible: referring to salvation and its resulting identity and ethic. Without doubt evangelicals in Portugal have adopted other forms of talking about these themes, but the use of call has unfortunately fallen into disuse. One wonders what is lost in the community's perception of salvation through the sparse usage of some key terminology.

Secondly, one wonders what limiting call to the vocational domain has done to the community's perception of their vocational life. Could it be that a career is more easily kept separate from one's identity in Christ and its resulting ethic? A career choice may represent God's will for the believer if accompanied by a sense of call or by the fulfilment of one's vocational self-understanding, but it may not necessarily be a reflection of one's identity in Christ since the larger context of call has been generally dropped from the community's representations. Since vocational guidance through call and vocation is no longer a subset of the biblical richness of call, but isolated from it, the critical context of seeing that guidance as part of the call to salvation and identity along with its resulting ethic is probably lost.

7.2 Creation of two distinct concepts of call and vocation: a perception of second-rate guidance

A second divergence between the community's social representations and the biblical testimony is the clear distinction between call and vocation within those representations.[19] As a result, believers are going to pursue orientation for their vocational life in two places, so to speak. The first is internal, inside themselves. Believers will seek to understand their vocational makeup, the way in which God created them: talents, skills, likes, dislikes. They will, as a result, attempt to select vocational ends that are in consonance with their discovered makeup. The second place is outside of themselves, as they seek to listen for a supernatural orientation from God through divine calling.

It is important to note that this second type of orientation is more highly esteemed and desired, as presented above. While not disparaging vocational self-understanding, the interviewees strongly desired to receive a personal word from God that would define the key elements of their future vocational life. There was a sense that without such guidance a vocational self-understanding alone was of mediocre or inferior quality, something welcomed but not necessarily something that had a strong ministry orientation. This emphasis on individual call tends to create the hope (and perhaps the expectation) that believers ought to experience the kind of guidance described by individual call.

There are possible consequences. One may question what happens to believers who never experience a supernatural, individualised call but desire to follow God and serve him. They may experience negative emotions such as frustration or doubt. The interpretation of surrounding events may be affected, so that they are made to serve as indicators of a call.

A key question in these circumstances is whether the person's vocational self-understanding is sufficient for them to embrace their vocational life as being God's will for them and, as such, imbibed with significance. Or will that only happen when those vocational choices are based on a supernatural call? In other words, is vocational self-understanding strong enough by itself to translate one's vocational life into ministry? The sense that was regularly – although not exclusively – communicated in the interviews was that a supernatural call was given to certain people and resulted in a special life of ministry. A vocational self-understanding was considered to be good, but it was available to everyone and when followed simply resulted in appropriate choices for an occupation, something that is just part of daily life.

Another scenario deals with persons who do not necessarily desire that their vocational life be part of God's call over them. They are not seeking a supernatural call; instead they prefer a certain level of freedom to separate their life in God and their vocational activity. One wonders whether the creation of a distinction between supernatural call and vocational self-understanding can create a platform from which this posture becomes more easily assumed. One interviewee felt this might be the case. In general her perspectives on work and ministry were quite holistic in nature, affirming an almost complete overlap between the two. During the interview she began musing on why so many of her Christian friends did not desire to live out their vocational life as ministry. She felt that some believers who chose to work in the secular world actually did so in order to avoid their responsibility of being involved in ministry. According to her, this could occur in two ways. First, believers may choose to avoid fulltime ministry and feel justified to do so since they did not receive a supernatural call. Second, believers may choose secular work to avoid being accountable; they choose not to embrace their work as ministry but rather to enjoy the liberty secular work affords to have a part of their life not come under the lordship of Christ. Here are her words:

> [In the secular work context] no one points a finger at us, no one reproves us [for not exemplifying a Christian lifestyle] because we are in 'normal life'. In 'normal life' there is a lot of liberty [to live and act as one pleases]. Therefore it is much easier to adopt this lifestyle [of not being salt and light] because there I do not need to be accountable to anyone [for my Christian testimony].[20]

Her belief is that this desire not to be accountable for a life of testimony, a disregard for the work of God and an aversion to the sacrifice involved in professional ministry, explain in part why there are not more young people pursuing fulltime Christian ministry.

Another scenario for vocational choice occurs when the person has no choice but is 'stuck' with a job: personal and economic pressures force them to accept or keep a job that is not intrinsically fulfilling. What are the implications for embracing that sort of vocational activity as significant when it is not accompanied by a call nor does it fit with one's vocational self-identity? When none of the processes for vocational guidance have resulted in something that is fulfilling, what is one left with? How does one negotiate the connection of their tiresome work to God's will? One wonders whether the social representations of call and vocation as outlined in the study exacerbate this situation.

7.3 Understanding the individual call as a call to ministry: missed opportunities

A third point of divergence is found in the emphases placed on call as being either an individual or universal call.[21] The biblical evidence clearly highlights the universal aspect of call while the representations emphasise an individualised experience. Throughout the interviews call was represented primarily as an individualised process, as a subcategory of personalised, divine guidance specifically concerned with the vocational life of the individual. Beyond this and more specifically, in the majority of cases the interviewees identified call to be dealing primarily with a call to ministry, normally fulltime ministry.

The vast majority of those interviewed were firm in their belief that one needs to experience a call in order to enter the ministry, and this position is regularly heard and taught within the Portuguese evangelical community.[22] From the standpoint of vocational psychology this belief can create a barrier for believers who desire to pursue a career in professional ministry, particularly when they have not experienced such a call.

There are many biblical instances of individual and specific calls to ministry; Moses, various prophets, the twelve disciples and the apostle Paul serve as examples. However, when examining Paul's teaching on the selection of ecclesial leadership, a personal call to ministry is not put forward as a prerequisite to serving in a pastoral ministry. Rather two compatible processes surface. First, the simple desire on the part of the individual can be a legitimate motivation for involvement in church ministry, as one sees in 1 Timothy 3:1: 'Here is a trustworthy saying: Whoever aspires to be an overseer desires a noble task' (NIV). The individual bases the decision on desire, not on a supernatural call. Second, the selection of appropriate people for ministry is carried out by the community and its existing leadership (Tit 1:5). This presupposes that candidates need to be examined and evaluated based on certain qualifications. Interestingly, however, experiencing a call to ministry is not found on the lists of qualifications in 1 Timothy 3 and Titus 1.

I suggest that while God continues to call certain individuals to a particular ministry or to a particular circumstance, the normal process by which persons pursue ministry is that, sensing the desire to pursue church ministry, they enter into dialog with their ecclesial leadership in order to be assessed as to their qualifications. One should not feel excluded from the possibility of ministry simply due to the absence of a call to ministry. We must consider whether in some cases believers unduly exclude themselves from a life of service in professional ministry due to the creation of an unwarranted prerequisite.

8. Conclusion

As already stated, the Christian concept of call is a precious gift which can guide the construction of a life project based on the plans of God and thus serve as a means of finding deep and universal significance in one's life. However, it is necessary to identify exactly what call is and is not. The biblical testimony points to God calling people to salvation and to a new identity in Christ. On the basis of this new identity, he calls his people to a new ethic and to participating in his work in this world. Such a view of calling is vital to building a life guided by and for God. As Guinness puts it:

> Calling is the truth that God calls us to himself so decisively that everything we are, everything we do, and everything we have is invested with a special devotion and dynamism lived out as a response to his summons and service.[23]

The question arises, however, whether the social representations created by the Portuguese evangelical community encourage the pursuit of a vocational life full of divine significance or whether they become counterproductive to that pursuit.

Thomas Arabis has served in theological education in Portugal since 1990. He is Director of Teófilos (www.teofilos.org) and Academic Dean of the Seminário Teológico Baptista (www.seminariobaptista.com.pt).

Endnotes

1 There are two word groups in the Bible to express this concept: *qārā'* and its derivatives in the Old Testament and *kaleō* and its derivatives in the Septuagint and the New Testament. Not all occurrences of these words represent the theological concept of call and other words are also used to refer to the concept. There are also other biblical-theological constructs that are related to the concept of call such as 'the will of God'.

2 I am using vocational life to represent instrumental activity, namely employment, the implied activities linked to one's various life roles, and life projects. I

use employment as a representative and non-technical term for a conglomerate of concepts such as paid work, occupation, profession and career.

3 K.M.L. César, *Vocação: perspectivas bíblicas e teológicas* [*Vocation: biblical and theological perspectives*] (Viçosa, MG: Editora Ultimato, 1997) 17-18, author's translation.

4 T. Arabis, *Chamada e vida vocacional: representações sociais do conceito cristão de chamada e sua influência sobre a vida vocacional do crente evangélico em Portugal* [*Call and vocational life: social representations of the Christian concept of call and their influence on the vocational life of the evangelical believer in Portugal*], unpublished master's thesis (Lisboa: Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Instituto de Educação, 2005).

5 For an introduction to the theory, see R.M. Farr and S. Moscovici (eds), *Social representations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); S. Moscovici, 'Notes towards a description of social representations', *European Journal of Social Psychology* 18 (1988) 211-250; S. Moscovici, *Social Representations: Explorations in social psychology* (New York: New York University Press, 2001).

6 Further discussion in Arabis, *Chamada e vida vocacional*, 146-149.

7 Vocation is derived from the Latin word *vocatio* which was used to translate the biblical texts referring to call.

8 Further discussion in Arabis, *Chamada e vida vocacional*, 150-151.

9 Further discussion in Arabis, *Chamada e vida vocacional*, 149, 163-164, 170.

10 Further discussion in Arabis, *Chamada e vida vocacional*, 172-175.

11 Further discussion in Arabis, *Chamada e vida vocacional*, 147-148, 173-174.

12 While affirming that call is considered to be supernatural communication, it should be stated that the interviewees also held the position that God may choose to use natural means along with supernatural. God reveals his call to the individual through means such as the Holy Spirit, the Bible, specific circumstances, the Christian community and key individuals. In all of this, an intimate relationship with God, especially through prayer, is central to discerning or hearing his will.

13 This section must be brief. Its general outline was primarily developed through an inductive study of biblical passages dealing with call. See Arabis, *Chamada e vida vocacional*, 13-15 for a more thorough summary. A similar summary can be found in A. Geense-Ravestein, 'The beneficient appeal – the other side of vocation', *International Review of Mission* 89.355 (2000) 529-538.

14 See, for example, Walter Brueggemann, 'Covenanting as human vocation: A discussion of the relation of Bible and pastoral care', *Interpretation* 33.2 (1979) 115-129.

15 Various passages speak of the believers' participation with God in his work without specifically mentioning call, for example 1 Cor 3:9, 12:4-6; 15:58; Jn 9:4; Mt 9:37-38.

16 The major uses in the NT would be the following: Jesus called to be high priest (Heb 5:4), Paul called to be an apostle (Rom 1:1, 1 Cor 1:1), Paul and Barnabas called to their missionary work (Acts 13:2) and later to a specific place to preach the gospel (Acts 16:10). On the reference to social position in 1 Cor 7:17, Fee comments: 'Although [Paul] comes very close to seeing the setting in which one is called as "calling" itself, he never quite makes that jump. At most "calling" refers to the circumstances in which the calling took place.' Gordon D. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians* Logos Edition (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987) 309.

17 N.T. Wright identifies call as the central Pauline term used to represent conversion: 'I have already described how Paul understands the moment when the gospel of Jesus as Lord is announced and people come to believe it and obey its summons. Paul has a regular technical term for this moment, and that technical term is neither "justification" nor "conversion" (though he can use the latter from time to time): the word in question is "call".' N.T. Wright, *New Perspectives on Paul* (paper given at the Rutherford House 10th Edinburgh Dogmatics Conference: 25-28 August 2003, see http://ntwrightpage.com/Wright_New_Perspectives.pdf); retrieved 22 March 2014.

18 Further discussion in Arabis, *Chamada e vida vocacional*, 169.

19 Further discussion in Arabis, *Chamada e vida vocacional*, 170.

20 Arabis, *Chamada e vida vocacional*, 127-128, author's translation.

21 Further discussion in Arabis, *Chamada e vida vocacional*, 170-171.

22 For example, an article by a high profile evangelical leader in Portugal: L. Reis, 'A chamada para o ministério' [The call to the ministry] in *Liderança Hoje* 3ª Série, Ano II (2003) 22-23.

23 Os Guinness, *The Call: Finding and fulfilling the central purpose of your life* (Nashville, TN: W Publishing Group, 1998) 4. See from a developmental perspective, J.W. Fowler, *Becoming Adult, Becoming Christian: Adult development and Christian faith* (revised ed.) (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000) 75: Christian faith, in its classic story and vision, tells us that human fulfilment means recognising that we are constituted by the address and calling of God and responding so as to become partners in God's work in the world.

Book Reviews – Recensions – Buchbesprechungen

* * * * * * * *

Methodenlehre zum Neuen Testament: Biblische Texte selbständig auslegen 6. Auflage

W. Egger, P. Wick

Freiburg, Basel, Wien: Herder, 2011; 300 pp., pb, € 20; ISBN 978-3-451-30924-3

SUMMARY

The approved oeuvre on exegetical methods by the Catholic New Testament scholar Wilhelm Egger has been completely revised by the Protestant New Testament scholar Peter Wick. The synchronic, interdisciplinary approach, highly influenced by insights from linguistics and literary sciences, has been preserved and further developed. This comprehensible, well-arranged volume represents an excellent addition to German and Anglophone evangelical books, respectively an alternative to historical-critical volumes on exegetical method in German.

RÉSUMÉ

Voici une nouvelle édition du manuel méthodologique de Wilhelm Egger, un spécialiste catholique du Nouveau Testament, complètement remanié et adapté par Peter Wick, spécialiste protestant de la même discipline. L'approche synchronique, interdisciplinaire, largement influencée par l'apport de la linguistique générale et des sciences littéraires, a été conservée et davantage élaborée. Cet ouvrage accessible et bien agencé constitue un supplément excellent aux livres évangéliques en allemand et en anglais, qui présente une tout autre approche que celles qu'a engendré la méthode historico-critique allemande.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Mit der Neuauflage wurde die bewährte Methodenlehre des katholischen Neutestamentlers Wilhelm Egger durch den evangelischen Neutestamentler Peter Wick völlig neu bearbeitet. Der synchronische, stark von Einsichten der Linguistik und Literaturwissenschaften geprägte interdisziplinäre Ansatz wurde beibehalten und ausgebaut. Der allgemeinverständliche, übersichtliche Band ist eine hervorragende Ergänzung zu deutschen und englischsprachigen evangelikalen Bänden bzw. eine Alternative zu den historisch-kritischen deutschsprachigen Methodenlehren.

* * * *

Das kleine Bändchen zur neutestamentlichen exegetischen Methodik von Wilhelm Egger (gestorben 2008) hat mit seiner starken sprachwissenschaftlichen Orientierung seit seiner ersten Auflage im Jahr 1987 vielen Studierenden (auch als deutschsprachige Alternative bzw. Ergänzung zur klassischen historischen Kritik) gute Dienste geleistet. Daher ist es zu begrüßen, dass es jetzt in ganz neuer Bearbeitung vorliegt. Zur Ausrichtung dieser Methodenlehre schreibt Peter Wick, Neutestamentler in Bochum, der die Neuauflage zusammen mit der Germanistin Dominique Wagner bearbeitet hat:

> Sie hat als erste die synchronen Methoden, die den Text als Ganzes untersuchen, in einem deutschen neutestamentlichen Methodenbuch eingeführt und diese dem klassischen historisch-kritischen Methodenkanon (diachrone Methoden) konsequent vorgeordnet. Dadurch hat sie eine Anschlussfähigkeit geschaffen, die es Studierenden der Theologie ermöglicht, Methoden aus den neueren Literaturwissenschaften kennen zu lernen und anzuwenden. Diese Methoden halfen und helfen weiterhin, den Fokus nicht mehr wie mit den historisch-kritischen Methoden auf die Wahrheiten hinter dem vorliegenden Text zu richten, sondern auf die dem Text immanenten Aussagen und Sinnpotentiale. Dies ist von größter theologischer Relevanz. Die Aufwertung der synchronen Methoden bleibt in den neueren Methodenlehrbüchern bis jetzt uneingeholt (13).

Grundlegend ist ein relationales Textmodell, das Lesen und die Entstehung von Sinn als Beziehungsgeschehen versteht (16). Ziel ist dabei, „der Versuch, die Methoden der historisch-kritischen Exegese und eine Auswahl aus den neueren, von der Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaft herkommenden Methoden anhand eines texttheoretischen Modells und anhand hermeneutischer Überlegungen zum Akt des Lesens in einen organischen Zusammenhang zu bringen" (34).

Nach einer Einführung („Methodenlehre als Anleitung zum strukturierten Lesen": Lesen als Leser-Text Beziehungsgeschehen, exegetische Methoden als Hilfen zum wissenschaftlichen Lesen und Verstehen, Charakteristika des eigenen Ansatzes – Schwerpunkte, Leserkreis, Aufbau) geht es im *ersten Teil* um Texte als Produkte ihrer internen Beziehungen und ihrer Einbettung in kommunikative Systeme. Behandelt werden Texte als strukturierte Beziehungsgeflechte, Texte als Teile von kommunikativen Beziehungen (Kommunikation durch Texte, besondere Herausforderungen antiker Texten, die Rolle der Verfasser, Rezeption des Textes, Lesen als Weg zur Rekonstruktion des Kommunikationsgeschehens) sowie Texte als Ergebnis von Rezeption und Überarbeitung vorliegender Bezugsgrößen (Entstehung der neutestamentlichen Texte, Lesen als Suche nach Spuren der Textentstehung).

Teil zwei stellt drei vorbereitende Schritte der Analyse vor: Sicherung der Textgestalt, erste Orientierung über den Text (Abgrenzung, Gliederung, Einheitlichkeit, Objektivierung und Reflexion über das erste Textverständnis) und Übersetzung bzw. die Verwendung von Übersetzungen.

Im *dritten Teil* geht es um „Lektüre unter synchronem Aspekt: Das Ganze aus den Beziehungen der Einzelteile zueinander verstehen": Vorstellung des Text-modells der synchronen Lektüre, das Textmodell und die Semiotik und das „close reading" – die sorgfältige, respektvolle Lektüre – als erster Auslegungsschritt synchroner Textwahrnehmung. Dazu gehören ferner die sprachlich-syntaktische Analyse: die kleinsten Textbausteine und ihre Verbindungen, die semantische Analyse: Sinn durch Beziehung, die pragmatische Analyse: der Text als Mittel für ein Beziehungsgeschehen und die Analyse der Textsorten (das Textmodell und sein Fokus auf formprägende Bezüge zwischen Textsorten und wiederkehrenden Lebensvollzügen der Gemeinde, Durchführung der Textbestimmung).

Der *vierte Teil* gilt der Lektüre unter diachronen Aspekt (so der Schwerpunkt der traditionellen kritischen Exegese): die Beziehungen eines Textes zu seinen Vorstufen, nämlich in der Literarkritik (Textrelationen zu schriftlichen Vorstufen), in der Traditionskritik (Textrelationen zu mündlichen Vorstufen) und in der Redaktionskritik (neue Beziehungen älterer Texte durch redaktionelle Verbindungen). Der abschließende Teil beleuchtet sehr knapp Texte in ihren Beziehungen zu ihrer Entstehungszeit, in ihrer Beziehung zur Gegenwart (Hermeneutik) und in ihrer Beziehung zum alltäglichen Leben.

Durchweg wird allgemein verständlich formuliert, so dass sich niemand von den sprachwissenschaftlichen Termini abschrecken lassen braucht. Die einzelnen Fragestellungen und ihre konkrete Durchführung werden an verschiedenen Texten verdeutlicht. Zu kurz kommen die Interpretation der biblischen Texte auf ihrem historischen und soziokulturellen Hintergrund, die starken intertextuellen Bezüge der neutestamentlichen Texte zum AT und die Fragen der Hermeneutik und Aktualisierung. Die Autoren bieten eine klare und anregende Einführung in die wissenschaftliche Exegese (die sich auch leicht auf alttestamentlichen Texte anwenden läßt) für Studierende (Proseminare) aber auch für alle anderen, die sich reflektiert, unter Aufnahme von Einsichten aus der Germanistik/Literaturwissenschaft und methodisch auf der Höhe der Zeit biblische Texte auslegen möchten oder ihre bisherige Praxis ergänzen oder kritisch reflektieren möchten.

Christoph Stenschke
Bergneustadt and Pretoria

Die Apostelgeschichte des Lukas in ihrem historischen Kontext – drei Fallstudien

Studien zu Theologie und Bibel 10

Jacob Thiessen (Hrsg.) mit Beiträgen von Marius Reiser und Alexander Weiss

Münster/Zürich: LIT, 2013; 149 pp, € 18,90, pb;
ISBN 978-3-643-80160-9

SUMMARY

This book contains a long contribution by Thiessen on the authenticity of Stephen's speech in Acts 7; there are shorter essays by Reiser on the story of Paul's shipwreck (Acts 27) and by Weiss on local detail in the canonical and apocryphal Acts of Apostles. It is a defence of Luke's reliability and as such a worthwhile contribution for the subject specialists.

RÉSUMÉ

Cet ouvrage contient une étude développée de Jacob Thiessen sur l'authenticité du discours d'Étienne en Actes 7, ainsi que des contributions plus courtes de Marius Reiser sur le récit du naufrage de l'apôtre Paul (Ac 27) et de Alexander Weiss sur les détails locaux que l'on rencontre dans les Actes des apôtres canoniques et les Actes apocryphes. Il présente ainsi une défense de la fiabilité de l'œuvre de Luc et constitue une contribution de valeur pour les spécialistes de cette question.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Dieses Werk enthält einen ausführlichen Beitrag von Thiessen über die Authentizität der Stephanus-Rede in Apostelgeschichte 7. Es bietet ferner kürzere Aufsätze, einen von Reiser über die Geschichte vom Schiffbruch des Paulus (Apostelgeschichte 27) und einen von Weiss über ortsbedingte Details in der kanonischen sowie den apokryphen Apostelgeschichten. Das Buch stellt eine Verteidigung lukanischer Verlässlichkeit dar und als solche einen wertvollen Beitrag für Spezialisten zu diesem Thema.

* * * *

The present volume contains three of the papers read at a conference at the (conservative evangelical) Staatsunabhängige Theologische Hochschule Basel in 2013. The first and the last paper are some twenty pages each: Alexander Weiss (Leipzig) looks for local details in the Acts of the Apostles as well as in the later Apocryphal Acts of Andrew, Peter, Paul and John, whereas Marius Reiser (Mainz) discusses if the story of the shipwreck in Acts 27 is historical or novelistic. In the central paper Jacob Thiessen (STH Basel) argues that the speech of Stephen in Acts 7 was not made up by Luke but contains the actual words of the historical Stephen. All three authors had previously published on the subjects they are discussing here; in that sense this book is typically the proceedings of a day conference. But whereas two of the papers are relatively short, Thiessen has worked his contribution up to 96 pages with 535 footnotes. The book was published as volume 10 in the STH's own series.

The Apocryphal Acts of Apostles are writings from the second century and later, which contain legendary materials about the apostles and their activities after Pentecost. The Church did not accept these texts and, consequently, most of them have not been preserved in their entirety. Weiss shows effortlessly that their anonymous authors do not show any knowledge of the places and people they are describing, whereas Luke displays an excellent local knowledge. With regard to Luke Weiss has to limit himself to some examples, for which he builds largely on Colin Hemer, *The Book of Acts in the Setting of Hellenistic History* (1989) and Peter Pilhofer, *Philippi 1. Die erste christliche Gemeinde Europas* (1995).

Whereas Weiss quotes key publications, Reiser's scope is less comprehensive and he omits much literature in English. The reason for this is that he interacts critically with two recent dissertations: Peter Seul, *Rettung für alle. Die Romreise des Paulus nach Apg 27,1-28,16* (2003) and Jens Börstinghaus, *Sturmfahrt und Schiffbruch. Zur lukanischen Verwendung eines literarischen Topos in Apostelgeschichte 27,1-28,6* (2010). Both books classify Acts 27 as fictional but Reiser is not convinced. The most interesting part of his contribution is the historiographic introduction which blurs the boundaries between novel and history by showing that almost all ancient historiography contained some novelistic elements. The same conclusion – on a more secure foundation – can already be found in Loveday Alexander's *Acts in its Ancient Literary Context* (London: T&T Clark, 2005), of which Reiser seems unaware.

Thiessen displays a wide knowledge of Jewish sources such as Philo, Josephus and the rabbinic literature, and refers to many parallels – so much so that his essay is not always easy to read. After an introduction he discusses the linguistic aspects of Stephen's speech; then follow elements of its contents such as the calling of Abraham, Moses' education and eloquence, and the promised land and the temple. There is special attention to apparent discrepancies between Stephen's words and the Old Testament. At the end, after a Summary of four pages, there is some additional discussion of the previous research, but overall Thiessen does not interact much with the leading commentaries.

Thiessen's conclusions are that Stephen lived outside the land of Israel, that he knew Hebrew so that he did not depend on the Septuagint alone, and that his speech is a coherent literary unity which is best interpreted without too much attention to its present context in Acts. My concern is that, for all attention to the Hellenistic-Jewish character of Stephen's speech, Thiessen does not discuss the identity of the author of Acts. Luke not only writes as a Hellenistic Jew, he may well have been a Jew himself. Thus, it would be harder to distinguish between Luke and Stephen. Thiessen limits himself to saying that Luke is more a historian than a theologian (125), a conclusion which goes somewhat beyond what he shows in the present essay.

This interesting book contains bibliographies but no list of abbreviations or indexes.

Pieter J. Lalleman
London

Remember the Poor: Paul, Poverty, and the Greco-Roman World

Bruce W. Longenecker

Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010; xi + 380 pp, £17 / $25, pb; ISBN 978-0-8028-6373-7

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Dieses Buch bietet eine Neubewertung eines bedeutenden, aber vernachlässigten Aspekts der Ethik von Paulus. Für Paulus war die Unterstützung armer Christen und anderer Mitmenschen keine Option, aber ein wichtiger Bestandteil christlicher Verantwortung. Longenecker stellt die paulinischen Aussagen (unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Galater 2,10) in einen größeren Zusammenhang in Frühjudentum und griechisch-römischer Welt. Das Werk schenkt bedeutende Einblicke in den Galaterbrief und die Theologie von Paulus, aber auch wichtige Einsichten für all jene, die ihre Geldmittel in Übereinstimmung mit dem Evangelium von Jesus Christus einzusetzen suchen.

RÉSUMÉ

Voici une présentation nouvelle d'un aspect important, mais négligé, de l'éthique paulinienne. Aux yeux de l'apôtre, l'aide matérielle aux chrétiens pauvres et à d'autres personnes n'était pas une option, mais une responsabilité importante incombant aux chrétiens. L'auteur situe les recommandations de Paul (en accordant une attention particulière au texte de Ga 2.10) dans le contexte plus large du judaïsme ancien et du monde gréco-romain. L'ouvrage apporte une contribution importante à l'étude de l'épître aux Galates et de la théologie paulinienne, et sera utile à tous ceux qui cherchent à gérer leurs biens matériels en accord avec l'Évangile de Christ.

SUMMARY

This volume offers a fresh appraisal of a significant, but neglected aspect of Paul's ethics. For Paul, support for poor Christians and other people was not an option, but a significant ingredient of Christian responsibility. Longenecker places the Pauline charges (with particular focus on Galatians 2:10) in the wider context of Early Judaism and the Greco-Roman world. The volume offers important insights into Galatians and Paul's theology for all who seek to use their material means in accordance with the Gospel of Christ.

* * * *

The present monograph is a much needed contribution on an important aspect of the world of early Christianity and of Pauline ethics. When it comes to concern and help for the poor, few Christians would think of a Pauline passage, but Longenecker persuasively shows that this is mistaken. He aims to show that care for the poor is

> an integral part of the 'good news' that Paul preached. For Paul, economic assistance of the poor was not sufficient in and of itself, nor was it exhaustive of the good news of Jesus; but neither was it sup-

plemental or peripheral to that good news. Instead, falling within the essentials of the good news, care for the poor was thought by Paul to be a necessary hallmark of the corporate life of Jesus-followers ... (1).

The introductory essay offers a survey of research, describes the outline of the investigation, and explains the terminology which is employed. *Part one* surveys poverty in the ancient world in order to establish the historical and theological contexts for understanding Paul and the poor. The individual chapters discuss poverty and charitable initiatives in the Greco-Roman World as well as Judeo-Christian theological traditions (Jesus, the early Jesus-movement and James). Longenecker highlights the 'elite acquisitiveness that so easily transpired in the advanced agrarianism of the ancient world'.

Part two examines the place and role of the poor in Paul's theology and in the communities that he founded. The author presents the evidence that care for the poor was an essential element of Paul's theology as well as a requirement within the communities of Jesus-followers. He surveys different interpretations of Galatians 2:10 in the patristic period and in modern scholarship. His own interpretation is informed by the earliest patristic paradigm as he examines Paul's collection and Galatians 2:10, the charge to remember the poor in its close rhetorical context, the present tense of the charge, the structure of Galatians 2:6-10 and 'remembering the poor' as a mission strategy. The author concludes that 'remember the poor' in Galatians 2:10 'was stipulated in order to obligate gentile Jesus-groups to care for the needy within their local orb of responsibility, thereby ensuring that Jewish and gentile Jesus-groups would be identical in certain key respects, even if they went their separate ways with regard to circumcision' (207).

Subsequently Longenecker places this fresh understanding of the charge within the theological emphases of Galatians as a whole, arguing that it is *not* peripheral to the issues at stake in Jerusalem and Galatia. He presents the economic profiles of Paul's churches and of certain individuals, including a consideration of Paul's rhetorical construct of his communities' economic level, and he describes the potential attractions of Christian churches for people of different economic levels and means in the cities of the Greco-Roman East. (See also the instructive study of E. Ebel, *Die Attraktivität früher christlicher Gemeinden: Die Gemeinde von Korinth im Spiegel griechisch-römischer Vereine* [WUNT II, 178 Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004] and my review in *Novum Testamentum* 53 [2011] 300-306.) He assembles 'the data pertaining to economic relations within Jesus-communities' and places them within the context of Paul's theology of gifting, difference and enhancement within groups of Jesus-followers. The discussion includes the resourcing and 'ownership' of Jesus communities, economic levels of well-being and Paul's theology of the 'body of Christ'. The author argues that Paul teaches neither communism nor charity, but community.

A Summary of the main argument appears in the final chapter, which includes a discussion of Paul's socio-economic location. I quote from Longenecker's Summary of the conclusions:

> Paul, the follower of Jesus and apostle to gentiles of the Greco-Roman world, was concerned about the plight of the poor in the urban contexts in which he operated. ... Communities of Jesus-followers that Paul established were expected to offer care for the poor – albeit in their own groups, in the first instance, although theoretically beyond those confines as well, if/as resources permitted. ... Paul imagined care for the poor among gentile communities of Jesus-followers to be an expression and embodiment of the invading triumph of the deity of Israel who had made himself known in the scriptures of Israel, in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus, and now through the Spirit/spirit that enlivened small groups of Jesus-followers. Proto-orthodox forms of Christianity from the second through fourth centuries are known to have enormously augmented the strategies and institutions for caring for the poor to an unprecedented extent in the Greco-Roman world (298-299).

There are three instructive appendices, a detailed bibliography and indices of modern authors and of ancient sources.

This challenging monograph is important for an understanding of Galatians, Paul's ministry and a significant aspect of the attitude and behaviour which he required of believers. It is also important for all who seek guidance and inspiration for their own existence and ministry among the poor of this world and/or seek to involve others in a biblically balanced way.

Christoph Stenschke, Wiedenest and Pretoria

The Throne Motif in the Book of Revelation
Library of New Testament Studies 487
Laszlo Gallusz

London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014; xxii + 396 pp, hb, £85.00; ISBN 978-0-567-33941-6

SUMMARY

This is an excellent dissertation by an Evangelical from central Europe. Dr Gallusz argues convincingly that the throne (of God) is a core motif in Revelation, which is essential for comprehending the message of the Book. He discusses its background, the passages in which it occurs, its contents, and its role in the historical situation and the theology of Revelation. His careful analyses enable a better understanding and use of the Book.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Bei vorliegendem Buch handelt es sich um eine ausgezeichnete Dissertation eines evangelikalen Wissenschaftlers aus Zentraleuropa. Dr. Gallusz tritt überzeugend dafür ein, dass der Thron (Gottes) ein Kernmotiv im Buch der Offenbarung darstellt, was von grundlegender Bedeutung für das Verständnis der Botschaft dieses biblischen Buches ist. Er erörtert den Hintergrund und die Passagen, in denen das Motiv auftritt, sowie dessen Inhalt und Rolle in der geschichtlichen Situation und Theologie der Offenbarung. Seine sorgfältigen Analysen ermöglichen ein besseres Verständnis und eine vermehrte Nutzanwendung dieses biblischen Buches.

RÉSUMÉ

Cette thèse de doctorat d'un évangélique d'Europe centrale est excellente. L'auteur montre de manière convaincante que le motif du trône (de Dieu) est un élément thématique essentiel du livre de l'Apocalypse qu'il est nécessaire de prendre en compte pour comprendre ce livre. Il traite de l'arrière-plan de ce motif, examine les passages dans lesquels il apparaît, étudie son contenu et son rôle dans la situation historique et la théologie du livre. Cette analyse rigoureuse permet une meilleure compréhension de l'Apocalypse.

* * * *

It is a particular pleasure to review in the *European Journal of Theology* the dissertation of a scholar from Serbia, Dr Laszlo Gallusz, which was written under the auspices of a scholar from Hungary, Prof Peter Balla, at the Karoli Gaspar University of Budapest. The pleasure is genuine because it is an excellent book, although it is partly spoiled by the book's price, which will keep it beyond the reach of most individuals, especially in the less affluent parts of Europe and the Majority World. Dr Gallusz is a Seventh Day Adventist who teaches at Belgrade Theological Seminary, Serbia. His English is good; the few unhelpful expressions never diminish the book's value and clarity of expression. Gallusz has consulted almost all the available literature, including numerous unpublished American dissertations as well as works in French and German. The index of authors and the bibliography show the dominance of Western Europe and the USA in (the publication of) theological research: I found only two titles in Hungarian and none in other languages from 'the rest of Europe'.

Gallusz looks deeply into the motif of the throne in Revelation. The published book still has the typical structure of a thorough dissertation. The Introduction argues that the preceding studies of this motif were inadequate and states that it is central both to the literary structure and the theology of the Apocalypse (10). Gallusz then offers a brief study of what a motif is and how it should be studied, plus an overview over the book's structure (17).

Part I is dedicated to the background to the throne motif and discusses the Old Testament (the ark, the temple, Jerusalem and 'heaven'), later Jewish literature and Graeco-Roman sources. Part II contains textual analyses of Revelation 4, 5, 7:9-17 and 22:1-5. Those who sit on thrones in Revelation include God, the Lamb, God's allies and his adversaries. In parts I and II details receive ample attention, including references to the relevant literature. Gallusz is not afraid to allow that certain elements of Revelation remain unclear or disputed; one straightforward example is the sea of glass in front of the throne (Rev 4:6; 107).

Part III is the 'substantial analysis' of the structure of the motif and includes a brief discussion of the structure of the Book of Revelation as a whole (226-229); the author concludes to a basically sevenfold structure, in which chapters 12-14 (called 'the cosmic conflict vision') are central. (Later on he adds that all seven parts end with the throne motif, 267.) Next Gallusz argues that the Ark of the Covenant (11:19), the cloud in 14:14 and the Zion scene in 14:1-5 are equivalent concepts which have the same role as the throne of God. The fact that God is always depicted as seated (not standing, for example) evokes his sovereignty. Gallusz states: 'Theologically, the throne-room vision [ch.4-5] establishes the rightful cosmic rulers, picturing them as taking their place on their thrones' and says that all other throne references build upon this perspective of reality (263). The short section 14:1-5 is declared the centre of the book (269).

Part IV begins with an analysis of Revelation's rhetorical situation in the province of Asia with its pervasive emperor cult. Without arguing his case, Gallusz takes Revelation as basically referring to John's own time and to the Roman Empire in general, and as written under Domitian. He states that Revelation's 'countercosmos, with God's throne at the centre' has ethical force because it commands allegiance (294). The final chapter assesses the contribution of the motif to the theology of Revelation, arguing that the book's doctrine of God is far more important than its eschatology. Here Gallusz discusses other ways in which God's kingship is signified, and the role of the throne motif in the book's theology of judgment. The conclusions in parts III and IV are reached quicker, without all the previous circumspection, and some are less close to the throne motif. After a brief but helpful Conclusion, pages 336 to 396 are taken by excellent indexes and the bibliography; the latter is divided into many sections, which makes it hard to handle.

Throughout, the author uses evangelical literature in a positive way. Greek words are not translated or transliterated. Slightly arduous is the author's habit to call many passages 'central', 'strategic', etc. In parts I and II the conclusions are never surprising – although well-founded – but parts III and IV are more groundbreaking. All in all, Gallusz clearly shows how the throne motif is the 'central principle' or 'master motif' (268) of Revelation. One does not have to agree with every conclusion to recognise that this book is a major contribution to the understanding of Revelation as fully Christian Scripture. Let it be preached in the churches!

Pieter J. Lalleman
London

Acts of God in History: Studies Towards Recovering a Theological Historiography
Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 317
Roland Deines, edited by Christoph Ochs and Peter Watts

Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013; xxi + 502 pp., € 149, hb; ISBN 978-3-16-152181-2

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Dieser anregende Band beinhaltet elf Studien von Roland Deines, welche die Überzeugung verbindet, dass Gott in der Geschichte handelt und dass infolgedessen eine theologisch motivierte Geschichtsschreibung nicht nur möglich, sondern auch nötig ist. Deines bietet nicht nur eine ausgewogene Begründung für seine Überzeugung, sondern zeigt auch deren Vorteile auf. Somit schlägt er erfolgreich die Brücke zwischen historischer und theologischer Wahrheit.

RÉSUMÉ

Cet ouvrage stimulant regroupe onze études de Roland Deines qui ont pour dénominateur commun la conviction que Dieu agit dans l'histoire et, par conséquent, qu'une historiographie motivée par des considérations théologiques est non seulement possible mais aussi nécessaire. L'auteur argumente en faveur de cette conviction et montre quels bénéfices on peut tirer d'une telle approche. Il bâtit ainsi un pont entre la vérité historique et la vérité théologique, de façon convaincante.

SUMMARY

This stimulating volume consists of eleven studies by Roland Deines that are connected by the conviction that God acts in history and that, as a consequence, a theologically motivated historiography is not only possible but also necessary. Deines both provides a reasonable defence of this conviction and demonstrates the benefits. He thus successfully bridges the gap between historical and theological truth.

*   *   *   *

This volume is a collection of eleven previously presented and/or published studies by Roland Deines, currently Professor of New Testament in the Department of Theology and Religious Studies in Nottingham. These papers have been gathered under the theme 'Acts of God in History' by two of Deines' former doctoral students, Christopher Ochs and Peter Watts, who were credited with editing the volume, a task which included translating some of the contributions from the original German. The papers have been revised from their original publications to varying degrees. Following the introductory chapter, the collection is divided into three sections: 'Historical Studies' (4 chapters), 'Responses to the God who Acts' (3 chapters) and 'Methodological Probings' (3 chapters). Since it is impossible to do justice to each of the individual chapters in a brief review, we will focus on two chapters.

The opening chapter, 'God's Role in History as a Methodological Problem for Exegesis: Towards a Historical-Critical Assessment of the Conviction that God Acts in History' (1-26), sets the stage and provides the rationale for the development of a historiography that takes seriously the conviction that God acts in history. Deines' overall theological objectives are on full display here, which makes this both a useful introduction to the volume and a helpful interpretive lens through which to read the subsequent contributions. This chapter also allows Deines to situate his viewpoint within modern (secular) scholarship, which has largely embraced a dichotomy of faith and reason. In light of Christian scholars' frequent capitulation to this sharp division, Deines challenges the scholarly community in general to allow space for the probing of what Thiselton has called 'transempirical realities' (see p. 2 n. 4), that is, those realities that cannot be tested by traditional empirical methods but which are, despite this, equally 'real'. Differently put, Deines seeks to bridge the gap between historical and theological truth or, to use a concrete example, to reconnect the historical Jesus with the theological Christ. Moreover, he wishes to do so in a responsible and sophisticated manner, which is why he concerns himself with questions of methodology.

The following studies are united by these underlying objectives – although some contribute to the development of the theme more self-consciously than others – and serve either as test cases for the application of a theological historiography or as interactions with other scholars who are wrestling with similar methodological concerns (Joseph Ratzinger / Pope Benedict XVI and Martin Hengel). The interaction with modern scholarship is substantial in all contributions, in particular through extensive footnotes, which contributes greatly to the usefulness of the volume.

In his chapter 'The Apostolic Decree: Halakhah for Gentile Christians or Christian Concession to Jewish Taboos?' (121-188), Deines discusses the position of Jakob Jervell, followed by Jürgen Wehnert, that the Decree in Acts 15:19-21 implies that for Luke the Gentile Christian churches remain, in principle, liable to a form of Torah obedience, despite the exemption for circumcision. In this view, the purity laws of the Old Testament would be reduced to a minimum, in order to establish on the basis of Torah that Jewish and Gentile Christians could live together in the apostolic church.

Deines carefully examines the narrative context, the primary orientation and the four individual regulations of the Apostolic Decree. He shows that idolatry has to be seen as the dominant element in the Decree, inasmuch as idolatry is the most obvious and damaging consequence of having lost the relationship to the one creator God. His conclusion is that 'the Decree obliges Gentile Christians to live a life according to the most basic elements of God's order of creation'. It follows, says Deines, 'that this does not denote submission to the Torah … but it is an expression of their faith and their relation to the God of Israel, who has called them in Jesus to be his people' (186).

It is worth considering the following addition to Deines' argument. The decision of the council in Jerusalem was taken in a unique redemptive-historical situation in which two Christian cultures – an older (the mother church in Jerusalem) and a younger (the daughter church at Antioch) – had to match with each other. The younger had to respect the older, the older had to accept the younger. As early Christianity developed, however, things rapidly changed. Jewish Christians became a small minority and the traditional distance between believers of Jewish and non-Jewish backgrounds faded away. This explains why, already in the time of Augustine, the need to keep the Apostolic Decree was no longer felt in the Christian church (*Contra Faustum* XXXII 13).

In our opinion, the author has achieved his goal of offering contributions to a theologically motivated historiography that is methodologically open to the conviction that God acts in history. Our own (Reformed) tradition also stresses the importance of reflecting on the past in terms of redemptive history, which is essentially parallel to what Deines explores as 'salvation history' or '*Heilsgeschichte*'. We regret, however, that, despite his acknowledgement of the revelatory character of Scripture (263-308), he speaks disparagingly about scholars who hold the view of the apostle John being eyewitness and author of the Fourth Gospel as fundamentalists (373-374). In conclusion, we think that Deines has provided contemporary scholarship with a reasonable defence of a theological historiography and a way forward in applying this methodology to our study of the past.

William den Hollander, Hamilton, Canada
Rob van Houwelingen, Kampen, Netherlands

Union with Christ in the New Testament
Grant Macaskill

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013; 353 pp., hb., £75; ISBN 978-0-19-968429-8

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Der Autor untersucht kompetent die Darstellung des Einswerdens von Menschen mit Gott im Neuen Testament. Er legt großen Wert auf vorangegangene Studien und Hintergrundmaterial. Dabei präsentiert er eine tiefgehende Analyse des gesamten Neuen Testamentes und zeigt dessen theologische Einheit auf. Jedoch stellt das Buch keinen originären Beitrag dar.

RÉSUMÉ

L'auteur livre ici avec compétence une étude de la conception du Nouveau Testament sur l'union des êtres humains avec Dieu. Il accorde une grande attention aux études précédentes et aux données concernant l'arrière-plan. Il considère l'ensemble du Nouveau Testament de façon approfondie, montre son unité théologique, mais, finalement, ne propose aucun apport original.

SUMMARY

Macaskill competently studies the portrayal of the union of human beings with God in the New Testament. He gives much attention to previous studies and to background materials. The entire New Testament is surveyed in some depth, and its theological unity shown, but the book does not make an original contribution.

*   *   *   *

This is a detailed academic study by an evangelical scholar who teaches New Testament at St Andrews University in Scotland. It is an important contribution to the ongoing debate which is being pursued both in the narrower arena of Reformed theology and also in the wider constituency of Pauline scholarship. This author, however, is not confined to the Pauline evidence but asks questions about the motif of participation in the New Testament as a whole. What does this concept signify? What are the other ways of expressing the relation between God and his people? And to what extent is this particular motif a unifying factor in New Testament theology? The brief Introduction aptly sums up the conclusion that there is 'a remarkably cohesive portrayal of the union of human beings and God' in the New Testament.

The monograph follows the time-honoured pattern of beginning with a survey of past scholarship, paying particular attention to works on Paul from Deissmann onwards and offering brief critiques where required. This panorama broadens out to take in patristic and modern Orthodox theology followed by Lutheran and Reformed theology, with some attention being given to the more Reformed and the more Barthian traditions. The author is particularly concerned with the danger of reading and (mis)understanding the New Testament in the light of these later developments.

A different kind of preliminary to the topic is a critical survey of background material in the New Testament era, especially in the area of speculations concerning Adam, that is often thought to have provided the terminology and framework of thinking, but which the author finds to be of dubious value.

We are now almost exactly halfway through the book and at last get down to the New Testament. If the book has been somewhat tedious so far and the comments brief and not always adequately substantiated, there is now a change in character. The tone and the style do shift somewhat, and the author enters his own area of expertise with a fuller treatment of topics and fresh discussions of familiar passages. He commences with the use of temple and body language, citing Ephesians as a kind of mature example or benchmark, against which examination of the earlier Pauline letters can proceed. He then draws in texts from all over the New Testament which can be understood as expressions of this motif.

The real humanity and divinity of Jesus belong within this interpretation of the New Testament teaching. The next stage is to consider the relationship of believers to Christ in terms of participation, especially in baptism and the Lord's Supper with their covenantal framework. This topic leads us back to the death of Christ and the nature of the believer's relationship to Christ. Paul's most characteristic theological term, the tiny preposition *en*, receives some attention, but perhaps needed fuller attention. Readers may be surprised by the sheer amount of New Testament material that is covered in the book and found to be germane to the theme; this is done at the price of what the author himself labels as a patchy treatment. The overall result is a comprehensive study of the topic leading to a plausible hypothesis regarding the uniting category that finds expression throughout the New Testament.

The book is worthy to stand beside the even more detailed work of Greg Beale (*A New Testament Biblical Theology*); the two scholars both find a unity in the theologies of the early church and the especial contribution of this one is to show how the underlying theology can have influenced the surface teaching. This is a remarkable reading of the New Testament. Beside it one could place the detailed, comprehensive exposition of New Testament theology by Udo Schnelle; his index of subjects contains only seven page-references to 'temple, the', and the thought of Jesus as himself the new temple is scarcely recognised, although, of course, he discusses the concept of Jesus as high priest in Hebrews. A debate between these two estimates of the role of this motif in the New Testament must be put on the agenda.

My impression is that Macaskill offers less in the way of new interpretations of the texts and more of the construction of a synthesis expressing the common theology of the early church. It would have been helpful if he had returned to the wider world of the contemporary theologians in the conclusion so as to demonstrate how their work is to be evaluated in terms of its biblical basis. In particular the use of participation language and similar motifs is being discussed vigorously in Reformed circles. Macaskill was able to mention the major work of Constantine Campbell, *Paul and Union with Christ* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2012) but not to engage with it in any detail. Here, then are three areas where the contribution of Macaskill needs to be brought more fully into the arena.

At my age I may be allowed to let your mind wander from the academy. The second in the series of Tyndale Lectures, delivered in 1943, was given by Basil Atkinson, on *The Theology of Prepositions*; the author was a Librarian based in the Cambridge University Library and a much respected elder friend of the CICCU (Cambridge Inter-Collegiate Christian Union). He pioneered our topic. We still need spare-time theologians to mediate the insights of academic works like this one to the church.

But we also need preaching inspired by deep theology. One of the best sermons I ever heard was by Roderick Finlayson, Professor of Theology in the Free Church of Scotland College in Edinburgh. The text was Galatians 2:20: 'I am crucified *with* Christ; nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth *in* me; and the life which I now live in the flesh I live *by* the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself *for* me.' The sermon had four points, identified by the four prepositions: with, in, by, for. But then homiletic genius entered into the sermon construction when the preacher treated them in reverse order! There is no copyright on this structure; I myself have used the framework but not the original wording to develop the text. Try it.

Grant Macaskill belongs to the same tradition as Roderick Finlayson. May his book play its part in helping preachers to find fresh ways to understand the theology of the early Christians and to present it to their congregations.

I. Howard Marshall, Aberdeen

Creation, Power and Truth: The gospel in a world of cultural confusion

Tom Wright

London: SPCK, 2013; xii + 110 pp, £9.99, pb; ISBN 978-0-281-06987-3

SUMMARY

In this book the well-known British New Testament scholar addresses what he sees as the main challenges for Christians today. At the heart of it lies the Enlightenment, which according to Tom Wright represents a neo-Gnostic separation of God from the world. The Western societies' arrogant self-understanding over against the rest of the world ('New Imperialism') is an offspring of this heritage. And even if Postmodernism claims to have seen through the power play at the bottom of Modernism, it supports it by rejecting truth as a possibility. Instead of supporting this culture by separating God from this world, Christians are to confront it, by means of faith in God as Creator, Christ as Lord, and the Spirit as the Truth. The book thus represents a profiled picture of what church and Christianity should be in relation to the society of today.

RÉSUMÉ

Dans cet ouvrage, le spécialiste du Nouveau Testament bien connu qu'est Tom Wright traite de ce qu'il considère comme le problème majeur auquel les chrétiens doivent faire face aujourd'hui. L'état d'esprit des Lumières constitue le cœur du problème : d'après Wright, il y a là une conception néo-gnostique qui sépare Dieu du monde. Les sociétés occidentales se conçoivent elles-mêmes de manière arrogante comme étant supérieures au reste du monde (une nouvelle forme d'impérialisme) et c'est là un produit de l'héritage légué par les Lumières. Même si la postmodernité prétend avoir discerné les jeux de pouvoir qui ont été à l'œuvre dans la modernité, elle lui emboîte le

pas en niant la possibilité de la vérité. Au lieu d'acquiescer à cette culture en séparant Dieu du monde, les chrétiens ont pour responsabilité de lui opposer la foi en Dieu le Créateur, en Christ le Seigneur et en l'Esprit de vérité. Ce livre fournit ainsi un poteau indicateur de ce que l'Église et le christianisme devraient être au sein de la société contemporaine.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

In diesem Buch greift der wohlbekannte, britische Neutestamentler auf, was seiner Meinung nach die hauptsächlichen Herausforderungen für Christen von heute sind. Im Zentrum liegt dabei die Aufklärung, welche nach Tom Wright eine neo-gnostische Trennung Gottes von der Welt darstellt. Das arrogante Selbstverständnis der westlichen Gesellschaft gegenüber dem Rest der Welt („Neuimperialismus") ist ein Kind dieses Erbes. Und selbst wenn die Postmoderne behauptet, das Machtspiel zu durchschauen, das der Moderne zugrunde liegt, so unterstützt sie es doch gleichzeitig, indem sie Wahrheit als eine Möglichkeit ablehnt. Christen sollen statt diese Kultur noch zu stützen, indem sie einen Keil zwischen Gott und diese Welt treiben, sie lieber konfrontieren durch ihr Vertrauen auf Gott als Schöpfer, Christus als Herrn und den Heiligen Geist als die Wahrheit. Somit bietet das vorliegende Buch eine ausgeprägte Darstellung dessen, was Kirche und Christenheit in Bezug auf die Gesellschaft von heute sein sollten.

* * * *

Tom Wright's numerous books can be divided into three categories: groundbreaking scholarly work, popular exegesis, and applications of exegetical insights to current theological discussions. This book definitely belongs to the last category. It originates in a series of lectures (Noble Lectures) given at Harvard University in 2006, with the aim of addressing 'the challenge of today's and tomorrow's culture' by means of 'the resources in the Christian gospel, and the scriptures Christians read' (1).

The main challenges that Church and Christians face today are summarized under three headings: Neo-Gnosticism, New Imperialism and Postmodernism. Neo-Gnosticism is identified with the culture of the Enlightenment – which not only encompasses the secular culture but also, according to Wright, a good deal of the religious culture, both liberal and conservative. The traits that support this categorisation are, among others, the hostility of the Enlightenment towards the notion of a creator God, the almost religious belief in the Enlightenment as a story of liberation that renders the enlightened superior to others, the pervasive dogma of self-realisation, and the total separation of faith from the world of politics. Instead of challenging this neo-Gnosticism, much of today's church supports it in its dualistic separation of faith and world, either by way of a (liberal) identification with the world or a (fundamentalist) separation from it.

By 'New Imperialism' Wright is thinking of the Western societies and their politics. Like the Roman Empire, they/we look upon ourselves as the realisation of a new level of civilisation, with 'a duty to share it with the world' (38). By aligning to our economy, our political structures, our ways of life etc., prosperity and happiness will fill the earth. Instead of challenging these arrogant presumptions, and this heretic eschatology, pointing at its inbuilt blindness over against its victims, churches and Christians support it.

And, finally, even if Postmodernism has seen through the power play that stands behind Modernism, it is incapable of doing anything about it. In its rejection of any truth it is only capable of standing by, barking at it as the ancient cynics did.

According to Wright, this tree-headed monster is to be met by the Christian proclamation of God as the creator (chapter 1), Christ as the Lord (chapter 2), and the Spirit as the Spirit of truth (chapter 3). As creator, God cares about this world. Even if sin has corrupted it, God has not given up on it. Wright rejects any kind of dualistic eschatology. We are to proclaim the future resurrection and judgment of *this* world, a judgment that has 'putting things to rights' as its primary goal.

In the same way, the Lordship of Christ means that *Christ* is the Lord of this world, not Caesar. (The book gives a good impression of Wright's anti-empire understanding of the New Testament.) Emperors and kings, and modern democracies alike, do not represent a religiously neutral and independent realm, separated from the interests of the Christian faith. They are a part of the world that has turned against God. But at the same time they represent a structure that comes from God, and that he wants to use. Christians are therefore to hold worldly authorities responsible, not only as stewards of a preliminary creational order (as it has often been understood in the Doctrine of the Two Regiments) but as servants of Christ and the Kingdom of God.

And it is this truth, i.e. the truth of the Lordship of Christ, that the Spirit is giving testimony to. In a climate of postmodern resentment against any truth – a resentment that fits New Imperialism's preference for power as a glove – Christians are to proclaim this truth to the powers, and live by it.

Once again, Tom Wright has written a passionate and provocative book. In parts, especially where he treats today's culture, he paints with an irritatingly broad brush. Where Wright is on home ground you are more inclined to listen. His exegesis of John, this seemingly dualistic gospel, is especially worth reading. But even so, evangelicals, and Lutherans like me, will hesitate at his lack of distinction between the two Regiments and his one-sided focus on the Lordship of Christ at the expense of his role as Saviour.

Asger Chr. Højlund
Aarhus, Denmark

The Theology of Augustine: An Introductory Guide to His Most Important Works

Matthew Levering

Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2013; 224 pp., $24.99, pb; ISBN 978-0-8010-4848-7

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Mit dem Werk *The Theology of Augustine* bietet Matthew Levering eine flüssig lesbare und prägnante Einführung in die bedeutendsten Werke von Augustinus. Durch die Zusammenfassung der Hauptargumente von Augustins zentralen Werken stellt Levering dem Leser das große Bild seines theologischen Projektes vor; dabei vernachlässigt er aber nicht den historischen Kontext und die Feinheiten seiner besonderen Erkenntnisse. Sowohl theologisch interessierte Laien als auch theologische Experten werden beträchtlich von diesem Band profitieren und dazu angeregt werden, erneut oder, vielleicht gar zum ersten Mal, in die Primärquellen einzutauchen.

RÉSUMÉ

Dans cet ouvrage consacré à la théologie de St Augustin, l'auteur produit une introduction succincte et très accessible aux œuvres les plus importantes de St Augustin. En résumant les arguments principaux de ces œuvres, il présente au lecteur une vue d'ensemble du projet théologique de l'évêque d'Hippone, sans toutefois ignorer leur contexte historique et les nuances de leurs apports particuliers. Le laïc ayant un intérêt pour la théologie et l'expert pourront l'un et l'autre tirer un profit considérable de cet ouvrage et se trouveront encouragés à creuser encore les œuvres de St Augustin, ou, peut-être, à les lire pour la première fois.

SUMMARY

With *The Theology of Augustine* Matthew Levering offers a highly readable and succinct introduction to Augustine's most significant works. By summarising the main arguments of Augustine's central works, Levering introduces the reader to the big picture of his theological project, yet without ignoring Augustine's historical context and the nuances of his particular insights. Both the theologically interested lay person and the theological expert will benefit considerably from this volume and they will be stimulated to delve again, or, perhaps for the first time, into the primary sources.

* * * *

Augustine of Hippo (354–430) undoubtedly remains one of the most influential figures in the history of Christianity. Roman Catholic scholar Matthew Levering, professor of Theology at the University of Saint Mary of the Lake in Mundelein (Illinois, USA) offers the reader a helpful tool to access Augustine's works today. The book clearly delivers on what it promises to do in its subtitle, namely to provide 'an introductory guide' to Augustine's 'most important works'. Of Augustine's significant corpus, Levering chose to focus on the following works: *On Christian Doctrine*, *Answer to Faustus, a Manichean*, *Homilies on the First Epistle of John*, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, and Augustine's three major works, *Confessions*, the *City of God* and *On the Trinity*. Given this considerable challenge one would surely expect a bulky volume to emerge. However, Levering manages to present his results on merely 224 pages. And he does so in a highly effective way as he achieves a balance between attention to detail and a clear focus on the overarching elements of Augustine's theological thought. Hence the book's seven chapters are brief yet not shallow, condensed yet not cumbersome.

As Levering expounds the major building blocks of Augustine's theological thought, set against the backdrop of his life and history, the reader gets a clear picture of Augustine's big ideas, such as the virtue of interpreting Scripture, of discovering God's action in concrete history, of human participation in the life of the Triune God, the notion of love and of happiness, combined with his distinct God-centeredness, and, in particular, his profound Christ-centeredness. 'We are made to love the Triune God and to participate in his life', writes Levering, '[t]his is the message of these seven works of Augustine' (190). The particular advantage of a large synopsis such as this is that it clearly reveals Augustine's significant influence on subsequent generations of theologians. One thinks, for example, of John Calvin who quoted Augustine more than any other scholar, or of Jonathan Edwards, who has frequently been labelled the 'American Augustine'. The book's fourth chapter, 'On Predestination', is a special highlight in terms of particular depth and theological reflection; apparently, Levering is here able to draw on previous research, such as his *Predestination: Biblical and Theological Paths* (Oxford University Press, 2011). The last chapter, 'On the Trinity', is relatively complex, which, of course, is largely due to the subject matter's intrinsic complexity.

Levering offers a very helpful bibliography for further reading and he refers to a whole range of relevant (yet mostly Anglo-Saxon) secondary sources. Overall, this comprehensive yet concise presentation of Augustine's major works and his thought life will stimulate both the lay person interested in historical theology and the theologian alike to move into the primary sources and pick up Augustine (again): *Tolle lege*!

Michael Bräutigam
Edinburgh

Publikationen

Handbuch des Antisemitismus: Judenfeindschaft in Geschichte und Gegenwart Band 6

Wolfgang Benz (ed.)

Berlin, Boston: de Gruyter Saur, 2013, 816 pp., € 200, hb; ISBN 978-3-11-025872-1

SUMMARY

The sixth volume of *Handbuch des Antisemitismus* [*Compendium of Anti-Semitism*] offers an excellent overview on anti-Semitic single publications, journals and publishing houses. In addition, publications are mentioned which intend to fight and refute anti-Semitism. Although a few works from Antiquity and Middle-Ages are dealt with, the emphasis is on the modern era and the present age. Next to books from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, several works of Islamic origin are covered. Studies coming from theological and church backgrounds are of particular interest.

RÉSUMÉ

Ce sixième volume de la série consacrée à l'antisémitisme passe en revue les ouvrages, les journaux et les maisons d'édition antisémites. Il mentionne en outre des publications qui visent à combattre et à réfuter l'antisémitisme. Quelques ouvrages de l'antiquité et du moyen-âge sont considérés, mais l'accent est mis sur la période moderne et l'époque actuelle. À côté de livres provenant d'Europe de l'est et de l'ex Union Soviétique, des ouvrages d'origine islamique sont aussi pris en compte. Les études provenant de milieux théologiques et ecclésiastiques présentent un intérêt particulier.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Der sechste Band des *Handbuch des Antisemitismus* gibt einen hervorragenden Überblick über antisemitische Einzelpublikationen, Organe und Verlage. Zudem werden auch Publikationen aufgeführt, die Antisemitismus bekämpfen und widerlegen wollen. Auch wenn einzelne Werke aus Antike und Mittelalter behandelt werden, liegt der Schwerpunkt auf der Neuzeit und Gegenwart. Neben Publikationen aus Osteuropa und der ehemaligen Sowjetunion wurden auch mehrere Werke islamischer Herkunft behandelt. Von besonderem Interesse sind Werke aus dem theologischen und kirchlichen Kontext.

* * * *

Nach Bänden zu *Länder und Regionen* (Band 1), *Personen* (2), *Begriffen, Theorien und Ideologien* (3), *Ereignisse, Dekrete, Kontroversen* (4) und zu *Organisationen, Institutionen, Bewegungen* (Band 5) behandelt der vorliegende sechste Band des *Handbuchs des Antisemitismus* in rund 450 Beiträgen antisemitische Publikationen aus aller Welt, seien es Periodika oder Einzelschriften, die den Antisemitismus maßgeblich beeinflusst und geprägt haben. Zu begrüßen, aber auch verwirrend ist, dass zugleich auch Publikationen aufgenommen und behandelt werden, deren Absicht die Bekämpfung und Widerlegung des Antisemitismus war. Insofern ist mit der Aufnahme einer Publikation in diesen Band nicht automatisch ihre Einschätzung als antijüdisch gegeben. Das knappe Vorwort skizziert die Vielfalt des Inhalts. Für Definitionen von Antisemitismus muss man auf die früheren Bände zurückgreifen. Die inhaltliche Spannbreite reicht von historischen, literarischen Mythen wie der Legende von Ahasver bis hin zu den aktuellen Publikationen zur Leugnung des Holocausts und des Antizionismus. Neben den einschlägigen Verlagen erscheinen auch Organe und Medien, die nicht primär Judenfeindschaft verbreiten wollten, die aber in deren Kontext eine Rolle gespielt haben.

Von besonderem Interesse sind hier die Einträge zu Werken, die im Kontext der Kirche oder der Theologie entstanden sind und hier in Auswahl aufgeführt werden: *Adversos-Judaeos Traktate* (M. Blum); *Ains Juden Büechlins Verlegung* von Johannes Eck aus dem Jahr 1541 (R. Kampling, R. Koch); die Übersetzung des Neuen Testaments durch die Deutschen Christen (*Die Botschaft Gottes*, O. Arnold); W. Grundmanns *Christentum und Judentum* aus dem Jahr 1940 (Arnold); von Grundmann ebenfalls *Die Entjudung des religiösen Lebens* (1939; Arnold), die *Epistolae obscurorum virorum* (1515-1517; K. Hasdorf), *Errores Judaeorum in Thalmut* (13. Jahrhundert; C. Cardelle de Hartmann), Evangelium im Dritten Reich (1932–1937; M. Gailus); W. Grundmann, *Jesus der Galiläer und das Judentum* (1940; W. Reinbold); G. Kittel, *Jesus und die Juden* (1926; Reinbold); G. Kittel, *Jesus und die Rabbinen* (1914; Reinbold); Abraham a Santa Clara, *Judas der Erz-Schelm* (1686-1695; C. Aicher); Michael Kardinal Faulhaber, *Judentum, Christentum, Germanentum* (1934; M. Thurau); *Die Kirche Christi und die Judenfrage* (1937; E. H. Füllenbach); Papst Pius XI, *Mit brennender Sorge* (1937; R. Kampling). F. Buchholz, *Moses und Jesus* (1803; P. Fasel); Päpstliches Aufhebungsdekret der Amici Israel (1928; E. H. Füllenbach); W. Grundmann, K. F. Euler, *Das religiöse Gesicht des Judentums* (1942; Arnold); F. Schleiermacher, *Über die Religion* (1799; Blum); W. Grundmann, *Die völkische Gestalt des Glaubens* (1943; O. Arnold); Martin Luther, *Von den Juden und ihren Lügen* (1543; T. Kaufmann); A. von Harnack, *Das Wesen des Christentums* (1899/1900; Blum); und Martin Luther, *Wider die Sabbather* (1538; T. Kaufmann).

Neben antijüdischen Texten west- und osteuropäischer sowie nordamerikanischer Provenienz ist auch eine ganze Reihe islamischer antijüdischer Texte aufgenommen worden, die man unter ihren zumeist arabischen Titeln über das Inhaltsverzeichnis findet.

Aus theologischer Sicht ergeben sich mehrere Anfragen und Wünsche an Auswahl und Gewichtung. Angesichts der intensiv und kontrovers geführten Debatte über möglichen Antisemitismus bereits im Neuen Testament, wäre zumindest ein Forschungsüberblick hilfreich gewesen. Neben den kurzen Eintrag zu den altkirchlichen *Adversus-Judaeos* Traktaten (angesichts ihrer Wirkungsgeschichte wäre eine umfassendere Darstellung wünschenswert gewesen) wäre zu prüfen, welche altkirchlichen Schriften auch aus anderen Gattungen und mit anderen Titel aufgenommen werden müssten. Man denke etwa an die massiv antijüdischen Passagen (72-99) in der Paschahomilie von Melito von Sardes (vermutlich 160-170), die zum ersten Mal den Vorwurf des Gottesmordes erhebt.

Neben den aufgenommenen judenkritischen Schriften Luthers sollte auch seine zumindest in Ansätzen judenfreundliche Schrift *Dass Jesus Christus ein geborener Jude sei* (1523) mit behandelt werden (vgl. dazu T. Kaufmann, *Luthers „Judenschriften": Ein Beitrag zu ihrer historischen Kontextualisierung* [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011] 13–80; vgl. meine Rezension in *Jahrbuch für evangelikale Theologie* 28 [2014] 290-292; jetzt auch T. Kaufmann, *Luthers Juden*; Stuttgart: Reclam, 2014).

Von neueren Publikationen wäre auch Adolf Schlatters mehrdeutiges Heft *Wird der Jude über uns siegen? Ein Wort für die Weihnachtszeit* (1935) einen Eintrag wert gewesen.

Angesichts der Debatte der letzten Jahre um das Karfreitagsgebet für die Juden der Römisch-Katholischen Kirche wäre zumindest ein Überblick über antijüdische Tendenzen in verschiedenen Liturgien interessant gewesen. Aufnahme hätten auch Texte verdient (zumindest im Überblick), die im Kontext des jüdisch-christlichen Dialogs der letzten sechzig Jahre erschienen sind und sich bemühen, den spezifisch christlichen Antijudaismus zu überwinden und in der Wertschätzung des Judentums ganz neue Wege einschlagen. Ein weiterer, wenn auch heute unliebsamer Bereich aus dem christlichen Erbe wären Texte, die im Kontext verschiedener judenmissionarischer Initiativen entstanden sind.

Angesichts der hier behandelten Schriften theologischer Provenienz ist man für die Tatsache und erzielten Ergebnisse des jüdisch-christlichen Dialogs dankbar, durch den Vorurteile überwunden werden konnten. Freilich zeigen die Artikel auch, dass in Kirche und Theologie, zumal angesichts der teilweise massiv Israel-kritischen Stimmung in Europa (die schnell an den traditionellen Antijudaismus anknüpfen könnte), weiterhin Wachsamkeit geboten ist. Der Band zeigt die ganze Bandbreite antijüdischer Publikationen sowie deren unterschiedlichen Charakter und Motivation.

Ein detailliertes Personenregister und Register von Orten und Regionen erscheinen im Anhang. Der noch ausstehende siebte Band des *Handbuch des Antisemitismus* gilt Film, Theater, Literatur und Kunst. Erstellt wird das Handbuch am Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung der Technischen Universität Berlin (www.tu-berlin.de/fakultaet_i/zentrum_fuer_antisemitismusforschung).

Christoph Stenschke,
Wiedenest und Pretoria

Letters to London: Bonhoeffer's previously unpublished correspondence with Ernst Cromwell, 1935-6

Stephen J. Plant and Toni Burrowes-Cromwell (eds)

London: SPCK, 2013, xv + 107 pp., £9.99, pb; ISBN 978-0-281-06669-8

RÉSUMÉ

Cet ouvrage présente des lettres de Dietrich Bonhoeffer récemment découvertes, adressées à son catéchumène Ernest Cromwell, à l'époque où il exerçait le ministère de pasteur à Londres. Ces lettres ont un apport intéressant sur la manière dont Bonhoeffer jouait le rôle de mentor spirituel auprès de jeunes gens. L'auteur introduit les lettres en précisant le contexte dans lequel elles ont été rédigées et montre ce que l'approche de Bonhoeffer peut nous apprendre pour l'accompagnement pastoral des jeunes aujourd'hui. C'est une contribution utile pour la recherche sur Bonhoeffer.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Dieses Buch präsentiert erst unlängst aufgefundene Briefe von Dietrich Bonhoeffer an Ernest Cromwell, seinem ehemaligen Konfirmanden aus der Zeit seines Londoner Pastorats. Die Briefe gewähren einen zusätzlichen Einblick in die Art und Weise, wie Bonhoeffer als geistlicher Mentor mit jungen Menschen umgegangen ist. Das Werk legt die betreffenden Briefe vor, in ihren jeweiligen Zusammenhang eingebettet, und zeigt auf, wie relevant Bonhoeffers Art des „Mentoring" für die Jugendarbeit heute ist. Das Buch stellt einen wertvollen Beitrag zur Bonhoeffer-Forschung dar.

SUMMARY

This book presents recently discovered letters from Bonhoeffer to Ernest Cromwell, his confirmand in the time he served as a pastor in London. The letters provide additional insight in how Bonhoeffer exercised spiritual mentorship in dealing with young people. The book presents the letters, providing their background and also indicating the relevance of Bonhoeffer's approach to mentorship for youth ministry today. The book forms a valuable contribution to Bonhoeffer-research.

*   *   *   *

The present book is the result of the recent and rather unique discovery of a set of letters from Dietrich Bonhoeffer, written in the period 1935-36. The letters were written to Ernest Cromwell (who later changed his first name to Ernst), the son of a German family which moved to England in 1933. There the family met Bonhoeffer, who from 1933 till 1935 served as pastor to two German-speaking church communities in London. Ernest became Bonhoeffer's confirmand and despite the age difference the two became friends and even went on a brief holiday in Scotland together – facts that were hitherto unknown. After Bonhoeffer left England, he and Ernest continued corresponding for about a year until March 1936, when Bonhoeffer wrote his last – and clearly conclusive – letter to Ernest. The letters were carefully preserved by Ernest, who chose to keep them to himself, even though he was cognizant of Bonhoeffer's growing fame after the war. When the letters were found in 2010, however, he gave the responsibility for their publication to his daughter-in-law and Bonhoeffer-enthusiast Toni Burrowes-Cromwell, who then worked together with Stephen J. Plant to publish them.

The book does much more than simply present the letters. It opens with a careful introduction by Plant. It describes the background of the letters, sketching the context of Bonhoeffer's life and work in London, the nature of the confirmation classes Ernest took with Bonhoeffer, their joined holiday, and the subsequent development of their relationship. The second part of the book consists of the transcription of an interview by Plant with Ernst Cromwell, in which the latter recollects the confirmation classes and his friendship with Bonhoeffer. The third part contains the actual letters, translated into English and carefully annotated by an international team of Bonhoeffer scholars. These letters form the core of the book, even though there are only twelve of them, some of them very short and none longer than three pages. They deal with practical issues, such as arrangements for the Scottish holiday, but they also show how Bonhoeffer continued to mentor his friend in the Christian faith. In a letter dated June 8, 1935, for example, he reflects on the feast of Pentecost, making the observation that the Holy Spirit is the spirit of community, not just of any human community, but the spirit of brotherly love, a spirit that comes from 'above' and not from 'below'. Bonhoeffer-readers will recognise in this statement an echo of his first published work, *Sanctorum Communio*. But to Ernest it is presented not in convoluted theological jargon, but clearly and succinctly.

The fourth and final part of the book consists of an Afterword, written by Ernst's daughter-in-law. From her background in student ministry and social policy reform she describes the contribution Bonhoeffer's approach to spiritual mentorship can make to contemporary youth ministry. She emphasizes the value of Bonhoeffer's relational approach which focused on spiritual formation rather than on impassionate presentation of 'religious principles'. She also places much emphasis on the call to 'earthly responsibility' which she detects in the letters. She translates this call in today's world, emphasizing the importance for young people to be involved in social work.

In evaluating this book, first of all thanks should be expressed to Ernst Cromwell for making these letters available to the wider public and for commenting on his relationship with Bonhoeffer. The letters, as well as the personal story behind them, shed more light on Bonhoeffer as a spiritual mentor of the young. They also add to our knowledge of Bonhoeffer's time in Great-Britain. The book is carefully edited, placing the discovery in the context of the Bonhoeffer-research. The Afterword by Burrowes-Cromwell continues an important tradition of Bonhoeffer-research, namely the effort to translate his legacy, indicating its relevance for contemporary debates.

Yet the Afterword also gives rise to some critical questions. First of all, Burrowes-Cromwell recognises in Bonhoeffer's mentoring a call to help young people develop a Christian worldview. In working out this worldview, she leans on the Reformed tradition. This is peculiar because Bonhoeffer's theology has a distinctive 'worldview' of its own: one in which the concept of *Christuswirklichkeit* is central. Yet Burrowes-Cromwell does not refer to this deeper structure. It can also be asked if she does not go too far in her eagerness to make Bonhoeffer's approach relevant for today's youth ministry, for example when she commends his method of writing letters for youth work, arguing that this will help to instil the virtue of patience (in waiting for the mail to arrive). These are only minor criticisms, however, as on the whole this is a fine volume that will make a notable contribution to Bonhoeffer-research.

Steven van den Heuvel
Elburg, Netherlands

Cross and Kremlin. A Brief History of the Orthodox Church in Russia

Thomas Bremer

Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013; 178pp., pb, $26; ISBN 978-0-8028-6962-3

SUMMARY

This is the English translation of a German book from 2007. It does a good job as a basic introduction to the Russian Orthodox Church, its history and theology, but the author brings nothing that is new and he shows no awareness of recent research in Russia itself. Bremer looks at the positive aspects of his subject and the reviewer misses attention to the dark sides.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Hier handelt es sich um die englische Übersetzung eines deutschen Buches aus dem Jahr 2007. Als eine grundlegende Einführung in die russisch-orthodoxe Kirche, ihre Geschichte und Theologie leistet es einen guten Dienst. Allerdings bringt der Autor nichts Neues und erwähnt auch nicht die neuere Forschung in Russland selbst. Bremer betrachtet die positiven Aspekte seines Themas und lässt die eher negativen Seiten vermissen.

RÉSUMÉ

Voici une édition anglaise d'un ouvrage paru en allemand en 2007. Il constitue une bonne présentation de base de ce qu'est l'Église russe orthodoxe, de son histoire et de sa théologie. Mais il n'apporte rien de nouveau et l'auteur ne

manifeste aucune connaissance de la recherche récente en Russie même. Il considère les aspects positifs de l'orthodoxie orientale et l'on peut regretter qu'il n'en relève pas les côtés plus sombres.

* * * *

'Russia is endless and Moscow far. Who is able to grasp our history and culture, our Orthodox faith and the faithless praxis of our pseudo-religious life?' These words of a good Russian Orthodox friend in Moscow set the parameters for anyone interested to write on any aspect of Russian Orthodox past and present. Thomas Bremer, a recognized German specialist on Ecumenical theology from the Roman-Catholic Faculty of Theology at the University of Münster wrote his *Brief History of the Orthodox Church in Russia* originally in 2007 in German. The book has been translated into a number of Eastern-European languages and appears now surprisingly unchanged in English.

After a short Introduction, the author covers thematically historical, structural and theological issues of Russian Orthodox Christianity through centuries of history. In brief chapters he divides the history of the ROC into five epochs (chapter 2), names the missionary expansion (chapter 3), discusses the ecclesiastical structure and the relationship of the church to the state (chapters 4-5), theological developments in the church (chapter 6), monasticism and spirituality (chapter 7-8) and closes his book with a chapter on the relationship of the church to the West and the history of dissent and splits (chapter 9-10). This thematic rather than chronological approach is highly interesting and helpful for what the author offers. The reader screens Russian Orthodoxy again and again with each new theme. In this regard the short introduction to the five epochs in chapter 2 is most helpful. The informed reader will, however, ask why these five epochs and not others; the divisions seem somewhat artificial, probably due to the brevity of the book.

The shortness of the book limits the author to a very broad introduction to the themes, which allows him to underline basics and to highlight a few historical figures and events. No in-depth discussions are given. Some paragraphs come across as impulses inviting to study more. The author seems first and foremost interested in providing an overview. He does his work well, but only for those less informed about the subject. The book does not offer anything new or raise any questions for ongoing discussion. Academic discourse is widely avoided; where it appears, it follows the pattern of older German scholarship. Contemporary historical research from Russia is nowhere mentioned. The publications cited cover knowledge available before the turn of the last millennium. This is the greatest disappointment with this book. Russian historians and church historians in other Orthodox countries have just started to recover the ecclesiastical memory of their church; significant research has been done since the year 2000 but none of this is reflected in the book. A revision of the first German edition, which was published in 2007, would have been very helpful.

Writing from a non-Orthodox perspective, Bremer seeks to cover the positive sides of the well-known history. Tensions and splits are mentioned, but in such a way that the overarching positive impression stays with the reader from the beginning to the end. Laudable as such an approach might be, readers in Russia and elsewhere who discover the very complex history of the ROC with her heroic and dark sides may find such praises shallow and superficial. Russia and its church face enormous challenges. What they need is less repetition of the known facts, but a discussion of the hidden ones, uncovered and unjustifiably glorified. Bremer seldom points to the problems of Orthodox historiography with its immanent tendency of sacralisation on the one hand and forgery on the other. But if the project of recovering of memory in the ROC is to be successful, historians will have to ask deeper questions than Bremer does. The ROC seeks her future and the last chapter shall never be on splits and religious dissenters. This is how the first millennium of the ROC ended, but there are new signs on the horizon. This chapter of reform and revival, and of recovery of the beauty of her Trinitarian theology, must be added to Bremer's book. The book as written offers an easy read, but leaves the reader with many unanswered questions.

Johannes Reimer
Ewersbach, Germany

Christology and Evil in Ghana: Towards a Pentecostal Public Theology

Joseph Quayesi-Amakye

Amsterdam / New York: Rodopi, 2013; xi + 363 pp., € 80.00; ISBN 978-90-420-3753-3

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Dies ist die veröffentliche Dissertation eines pfingstkirchlichen Theologen, der christologische Ansätze innerhalb der Pfingstkirche in Ghana im Umgang mit dem Bösen untersucht. Der Autor steht seiner eigenen Tradition nahe und zeigt, wie die Kirche in Ghana zum Wohlergehen der Nation beitragen kann. Europäische Leser seines Buches werden ein tieferes Verständnis gewinnen für das Denken der zahlreichen Christen aus Ghana in unserer Mitte.

RÉSUMÉ

Voici la thèse de doctorat d'un théologien pentecôtiste, qui traite des approches christologiques de la question du mal dans les Églises pentecôtistes du Ghana. L'auteur a une perception positive de cette tradition et tente de montrer comment les Églises ghanéennes peuvent contribuer au bien-être de leur pays. Les lecteurs européens acquerront une meilleure compréhension de la pensée de nombreux chrétiens ghanéens présents parmi nous.

SUMMARY
This is the published dissertation of a Pentecostal theologian, who studies Christological approaches to evil within the Pentecostal Church in Ghana. The author is sympathetic to his tradition and shows how the church in Ghana can contribute to the welfare of the nation. European readers of his book will gain a deeper understanding of the thinking of the many Ghanaian Christians among us.

* * * *

This book is the product of sustained PhD research into the themes of Christological approaches to evil within the tradition of the Pentecostal Church in Ghana. Latterly, it focuses on what this study may contribute to the development of what is, at present, a nascent public theology. The author, Joseph Quayesi-Amakye, writes from within the Pentecostal tradition and his research reveals that he is both sympathetic to the tradition and a constructive critic of it.

The book is generally well written and is certainly readable. At points, I must confess, I found the transitions somewhat repetitive and strained, and in the process of editing I think this could certainly have been redacted; however, the consistency and clarity of thought is helpful and sustained my interest throughout.

As someone within the field of practical theology, Quayesi-Amakye has adopted an intentionally practical theological approach and this seems sound, although I found the hymnody and interviews that he used as his main sources somewhat limited. The thrust of the material at points seems to lean towards the anecdotal, and yet there are strong themes that present themselves and are vitally important to the global church. What is the meaning of suffering? What does suffering reveal of the nature of God? Who is the author of suffering? (See page 162, for example.) How are poverty and suffering interpreted in a world where both are manifest? Is there a way of engaging with the demonising of poverty and the sense that poverty can be unmerited or merited?

The ideas of universalising understandings of healing, health, identity and the nature of change, redemption and restoration are also significant and the author wrestles with that from within an African context.

It is in this area, contextualising, that some of the strengths of the work emerge. The focus on Ghana is significant – and the author does not claim to be speaking for the wider African community. The deep engagement with indigenous ideas, religion and practices of religion is interesting and insightful. It is also, as far as I am aware, quite unique in its attempt to explore the development of a Pentecostal theology of the soil alongside engaging with the contribution and otherness of indigenous Ghanaian religious culture to traditional, more European Christological perspectives.

I do not think that the public theology dynamic promised in the title fully emerges – as I read it, it seemed much more the embryonic stage of a Ghanaian Pentecostal theological approach to the public. However, there are clear insights into the significant contribution the church can, should and must make to the future of a nation and the various spheres – business, politics, economics, education, media and the arts – that must be engaged with for the church to take its place as a Christ-centred participant in the world for the sake of the Kingdom.

A particularly welcome element of the book from my perspective is the insights it also offers for people within my setting (European non Pentecostal) in understanding some of the emphases that increasingly appear from African churches within a British context. The tendency towards expressions of faith that are related to healing, prospering, prophecy, leadership and culture are insightful and challenging – not least because (at least in the UK) these evangelical and Pentecostal churches are clearly making inroads into communities and lives that other evangelical churches are struggling to meet.

There are enormous questions that continue to linger after a first reading: is the leadership model sufficiently critiqued? To what extent can the leaders be seen as representative of the wider congregational understandings? Is the liturgical consideration offered deep enough to truly demonstrate a genuine Christological understanding? Is there sufficient evidence to support the claims made in the book?

Certainly I would argue that this book is a helpful contribution to those people seeking to understand the Pentecostal church at large alongside offering insights into its Ghanaian expression.

Deirdre Brower Latz
Manchester

Nationhood, Providence, and Witness. Israel in Protestant Theology and Social Theory

Carys Moseley

Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books, 2013; 267 pp, £22; ISBN 978-1-61097-942-9

SUMMARY
This book is a plea for a positive 'theology of nationhood'. The author argues that anti-Zionism is often due to a negative theology of nationhood, which is why a rethinking is necessary. Four major theologians, Reinhold Niebuhr, Rowan Williams, John Milbank and Karl Barth, are discussed very critically in relation to this subject.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Dieses Buch ist ein Plädoyer für eine positive „Theologie der Nation". Die Autorin argumentiert, dass Antizionismus in vielen Fällen auf eine negative „Theologie der Nation" zurückzuführen ist. Aus diesem Grund ist ein Umdenken erforderlich. Die vier bedeutende Theologen Reinhold Niebuhr, Rowan Williams, John Milbank und Karl Barth werden zu diesem Thema sehr kritisch befragt.

RÉSUMÉ
Ce livre est un plaidoyer pour une théologie positive de l'appartenance nationale. L'auteur tente de montrer que l'anti-sionisme est souvent la conséquence d'une théologie négative de l'appartenance nationale. Elle y voit là une raison de la nécessité de repenser la chose. Elle considère les positions sur cette question de quatre théologiens influents, Reinhold Niebhur, Rowan Williams, John Milbank et Karl Barth.

* * * *

Dr Carys Moseley, researcher at Edinburgh University, is the author of *Nationhood, providence and witness*, which can be seen as an urgent and sophisticated plea for a theology of nationhood. The book explores three interrelated themes. First, that anti-nationalism and anti-Zionism are often two sides of the same coin, and involve taking leave of a serious, providential reading of the Bible as well as a willingness to understand history in broadly providential terms. Second, that such an approach also tends to involve a reluctance to recognise subordinated Gentile nations, especially those that have lost independence. Third, how 'social theory' has handled the same issues. Moseley discusses four major theologians: Reinhold Niebuhr, Rowan Williams, John Milbank and Karl Barth.

Moseley has a polemic, critical approach which results in a reactionary and sometimes chaotic argument. She is very critical of the – in her words – apophatic approach of Rowan Williams, but she suffers from the same symptoms. Her line of thinking is negative, most of the book is spent on what is wrong in the approaches of the theologians under discussion, and the many other theologians she refers to, but there are hardly any constructive suggestions for a theology of nationhood. In this sense the book is not very helpful if you need an overview of theologies of nationhood or a decent exegetical or systematic-theological exposition. For example, Moseley opens the Introduction with the bold statement 'Nationhood and nations lie at the very heart of the biblical meta-narrative that forms the framework for Christian theology, with the one nation of Israel represented as chosen by God to further his purpose of redemption for the whole world' but she does not take any time to back this statement up. The book merely provides a very critical perspective on four theologians of the twentieth and twenty-first century and their reception. Moseley is most affirmative of Karl Barth's approach and she finishes the book by showing how Barth's approach illuminates approaches discussed in the book.

The main focus of the book is a Christian theology of nationhood, and it focuses on the State of Israel as the theological mirror for selected theologians and socialists. So *Nationhood, Providence and Witness* does not offer an overview of Zionist or anti-Zionist argument either. At the heart of 'the issue of nation-state and stateless nation' Moseley uses Wales as a case study.

Although after reading this book you will feel the necessity to formulate a theology of nationhood, this heavily documented study also raises a lot of questions about Christology, eschatology, biblical theology and the theological task. For example, is it the task of Christian theology to develop a 'politics of recognition' or a 'theology of nationhood' in such a way that we can declare the state of Israel or the stateless nation Wales legal or illegal? Although Moseley mentions that she is speaking from a 'free church' tradition and perspective, her argument sounds indeed 'Protestant' (as the subtitle mentions) or, as the free church theologian John Howard Yoder would call it, 'Constantinian'. 'To understand history in broadly providential terms' leaves little space for criticising the course of history, which is often forced in a certain direction by the powerful and the violent.

A second example of the kind of questions raised: the already-mentioned quote 'Nationhood and nations lie at the very heart of the biblical meta-narrative that forms the framework for Christian theology' is highly questionable from a viewpoint of biblical studies. Moseley's references to Acts 17 (recapitulating Genesis 10) or Acts 2 ('We can see this clearly in the outpouring of the Spirit on Jewish and gentile members of the nations in Acts 2') are not helping either.

Should you read this book? On the one hand *Nationhood, Providence, and Witness* is a highly scholarly book in which – in an antithetic way – a theology of nationhood is unfolded. If you like to immerse yourself in a richness of bold, provocative theology, you may like this book. On the other hand, the book suffers from a lack of clear argument and has a tendency to be chaotic because of the immense volume of literature to which Moseley refers and reacts. She dismisses many scholars and publications in a few sentences and this polemic style can be tiring, also because it often does not contribute to the main argument (if there is any). Although the last chapter is called Conclusion, it lacks a summarising overview of the argument and a proposal for a theology of nationhood. If you are looking for a low level introduction to the subject, look elsewhere.

Daniël Drost
Amsterdam

Instructions to Authors of Articles

The following are brief instructions but intending authors are encouraged to write to the Editor Rev. Dr Pieter Lalleman, Spurgeon's College, South Norwood Hill, London SE25 6DJ, UK, email: p.lalleman@spurgeons.ac.uk. All such material will be subject to peer-review before acceptance. Referees may recommend alterations (full details from the Publishers and Editors upon application).

Submission of Manuscript. Contributions are welcome in French, German or English; contributions in other languages (especially Spanish and Russian) will be considered for occasional publication.

Abstract. All final copy must be accompanied by a summary of approximately ten per-cent of the wordage.

Author Affiliations. A suitable note of the author's position, in no more than 25 words, should be included at the end of the manuscript.

Instructions to Book Reviewers

Full instructions to reviewers will be included together with each book sent out for review. Book reviews are normally solicited by the Reviews Editor. We are grateful for information regarding books which readers consider should be reviewed in the journal.

* * * *

Directives pour les auteurs

Les remarques suivantes sont de brèves directives et il est conseillé aux auteurs intéressés d'écrire au rédacteur Rev. Dr Pieter Lalleman, Spurgeon's College, South Norwood Hill, London SE25 6DJ, UK, email: p.lalleman@spurgeons.ac.uk. On emploiera normalement des guillemets simples. Tous les textes feront l'objet d'un examen par nos conseillers qui peuvent recommander des changements. (tous renseignements à ce sujet seront fournis par les éditeurs et rédacteurs sur simple demande).

Soumission de manuscrits. Des textes en français, allemand ou anglais sont acceptés ; des contributions en d'autres langues, en particulier l'espagnol ou le russe, seront acceptées de temps à autre.

Résumé. Toute copie définitive doit être produite avec un résumé d'une longeur d'environ dix pour cent du texte.

Notes sur l'auteur. Un bref commentaire sur la situation de l'auteur ne comprenant pas plus de 25 mots doit figurer en fin de manuscrit.

Consignes pour les recensions

Des instructions détaillées seront envoyées aux auteurs avec chaque ouvrage à considérer. Les recensions de livres sont normalement sollicitées par le rédacteur chargé des recensions. Cependant, nous aimerions aussi recevoir de nos lecteurs des propositions d'ouvrages susceptibles d'etre recensés dans cette publication.

* * * *

Hinweise für Autoren

Die folgen Hinweise dienen Autoren als Richtlinien. Artikel sind bei Rev. Dr Pieter Lalleman, Spurgeon's College, South Norwood Hill, London SE25 6DJ, UK, email: p.lalleman@spurgeons.ac.uk einzureichen. Alle Artikel werden redaktionell durchgesehen und gegebenenfalls mit der Bitte um Überarbeitung zurückgegeben. Nähere Einzelheiten beim Herausgeber.

Sprachen. Die Beiträge sollen in Französisch, Deutsch oder Englisch verfaßt sein. Artikel in anderen Sprachen, vor allem in Russisch oder Spanisch, können gelegentlich auch übernommen werden.

Zusammenfassung. Allen Artikeln muß für den Druck eine Zusammenfassung beigelegt werden (etwa zehn Prozent des Wortumfangs).

Zur Person des Autors. Eine Notiz zur derzeitigen Tätigkeit des Autors sollte am Ende des Manuskripts stehen, nicht mehr als 25 Wörter.

Hinweise für Buchrezensenten

Eine Anleitung für Buchbesprechungen wird mit jedem zur Rezension vorgesehenen Buch zugesandt. Rezensionen erfolgen normalerweise auf Anfrage der Redaktion. Anregungen von Lesern hinsichtlich Büchern, für die sie eine Besprechung als wichtig erachten, werden dankbar angenommen.

* * * *

Abstracts / Indexing: Resumés / Zusammenfassung / Indexierung: This Journal is abstracted in / Les articles de notre journal sont résumés dans / Dieses Journal wird zusammenfasst in: Religious and Theological Abstracts, 121 South College Street (PO Box 215) Myerstown, PA 17067, USA. It is also included in / Ils sont également répertoriés dans / Es ist auch enthalten in: ATLA Religion Database, published by the American Theological Library Association, 300 S. Wacker Dr., Suite 2100, Chicago IL 60606 USA, E-mail: atla@atla.com Website: http://www.atla.com/
It is also included in / Ils sont également repertories dans / Es ist auch enthalten in SciVerse Scopus, Elsevier's abstract and citation database of peer-reviewed literature.

Microform / Microfiche / Mikrofiche: This journal is available on Microform from / On peut obtenir les articles de ce journal sur microfiche en s'adressant à / Dieses Journal ist erhältlich auf Mikrofiche von: UMI, 300, North Zeeb Road, PO Box 1346, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346, USA

Contents / Table des matières / Inhalt

Articles / Articles / Artikel

Book Reviews / Recensions / Buchbesprechungen

0960-2720(201504)24:1;1-V

Paternoster: thinking faith

ISSN 0960-2720

EJT (2015) 24:1, 1–100

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY
JOURNAL EUROPÉEN DE THÉOLOGIE
EUROPÄISCHE THEOLOGISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT

Theme: Christian Ethics

XXIV (2015) : 2
ISSN 0960-2720

Editorial Policy

The Editorial Board and Publishers, while commending the content of the journal to our readers, take no responsibility for particular opinions expressed in any part to the journal.

Politique de rédaction

Tout en recommandant le contenu de la revue à ses lecteurs, le comité de rédaction et les éditeurs laissent aux auteurs la responsabilité des opinions exprimées dans les articles qui y sont publiés.

Anmerkung des Herausgebers

Trotz grundsätzlicher Empfehlung übernehmen Redaktion und Verlag keine Verantwortung für individuell vertretene Meinungen innerhalb der Zeitschrift.

Typeset by Toucan Graphic Design,
25 Southernhay East, Exeter, Devon.
Printed and bound in Great Britain for
Paternoster Periodicals,
by Alpha Graphics 8-9 Vanguard Court
Preston Farm, Stockton-on-Tees TS18 3TR

ISSN 0960-2720

Contents/Table des matières/Inhalt

Articles/Articles/Artikel

* * * * * * * *

Availability and Subscription Rates / Diffusion et abonnements / Erscheinungsweise und Abonnement

The *European Journal of Theology* is published by Paternoster Periodicals twice annually.

Le *Journal Européen de Théologie* est publié par Paternoster Periodicals deux fois par an.

Die *ETZ* erscheint zweimal jährlich bei Paternoster Periodicals.

	Institutions			Individuals		
Period	UK	USA and Canada	Elsewhere	UK	USA and Canada	Elsewhere
One Year						
hard copy	£60.00	$108.00	£65.00	£32.00	$58.00	£34.00
electronic version	£60.00	$108.00	£65.00	£32.00	$58.00	£34.00
joint subscription	£73.00	$129.00	£78.00	£38.00	$69.00	£41.00
Two/Three Years, per year						
hard copy	£55.00	$97.00	£59.00	£29.00	$52.00	£31.00
electronic version	£55.00	$97.00	£59.00	£29.00	$52.00	£31.00
joint subscription	£65.00	$116.00	£70.00	£34.00	$62.00	£37.00

Deutschland
Brunnen Verlag GmbH, Gottlieb-Daimler-Str. 22,
D-35398 Giessen, Germany
Jahresbezugspreis: 29.90 Euros
Für Studenten: 19.50 Euros

All subscriptions to:
Paternoster Periodicals, c/o AlphaGraphics, 3.2 Clarendon Park,
Nottingham, NG5 1AH, UK
Tel UK: 0800 597 5980 • Fax 0115 704 3327
Tel: Overseas +44 (0)115 704 3315 • Fax: +44 (0)115 704 3327
Email: periodicals@alphagraphics.co.uk

Subscriptions can be ordered online at:
www.paternosterperiodicals.co.uk/european-journal-of-theology
All orders placed via our websites will receive a 5% discount off the total price. Rates displayed on the website will reflect this discount.

Important note to all postal subscribers
When contacting our Subscription Office in Nottingham for any reason, always quote your Subscription Reference Number. This appears on the address label used to send your copies to you.

From the editor

1. Readers are advised that the website has been renewed; see www.paternosterperiodicals.co.uk/european-journal-of-theology. The website contains a featured author and a blog.
2. Readers are also advised that *EJT* is available electronically as well as in printed format; see above for details.
3. God willing, the next FEET conference will be held in Lutherstadt Wittenberg on the theme of the contemporary relevance of the Reformation. The dates are 26-30 August 2016.

EJT (2015) 24:1, 103–104

0960–2720

Editorial

Horst Afflerbach

Im Blick auf die weltweite Situation kann man wie der deutsche Außenminister F.W. Steinmeier sagen, dass „die Welt aus den Fugen" geraten ist. Herkömmliche Verstehens- und Handlungs-Kategorien zerbrechen, neue sind noch im Entstehen. Die Folgen sind Irritationen, Ängste und Orientierungsbedarf.

Dass islamistische Terrormilizen wie der IS ganze Ethnien drangsalieren und die größte religiöse Säuberungswelle aller Zeiten im Sinn haben, ist schlimm. Dass westliche radikalisierte Kämpfer mittlerweile nach Europa zurückkehren, stellt ein gefährliches Potential dar. Die destabilisierte politische Situation in der Ost-Ukraine und das Erstarken von Großreichs-Phantasien in Russland (Nova Russia, Putin) und der Türkei (Osmanisches Reich, Erdogan) bringen westliche Politiker an den Rand ihrer diplomatischen Fähigkeiten. Wirtschaftliche Gegenmaßnahmen zu Willkür und Menschenrechtsverletzungen schaden nicht nur dem Gegner, sondern beeinflussen auch die eigene Wirtschaft. Die Gefahr zunehmender Radikalisierung unter Palästinensern und jüdischen Siedlern lässt eine auskömmliche Lage – etwa die von den UN seit Jahren geforderte Zwei-Staaten-Lösung – im Nahen Osten immer unwahrscheinlicher werden. Instabile politische Situationen in Afrika (Nigeria, Sudan) und Asien (Pakistan, Afghanistan) lassen große Migrationsströme über Libyen in Süd-Europa, besonders in Italien und Griechenland landen und bringen die EU in vielfacher Weise an ihre Grenzen.

Menschrechtsverletzungen in reichen arabischen Ländern stellen die Glaubwürdigkeit westlicher (Handels-) Gesellschaften in Frage. Geschäfte zur Sicherung der Arbeitsplätze in Europa scheinen keine andere Möglichkeit zuzulassen, als Menschenrechtsverletzungen diskret zu verschweigen. Der internationale Drogen- und Menschenhandel sowie das organisierte Verbrechen zeigen, dass ihre Macht trotz der Anstrengungen der Regierungen ungebrochen ist. In der Folge werden unzählige junge ost-europäische Frauen versklavt, Kinder missbraucht und Menschen in die Abhängigkeit getrieben. Das alles zeigt unmissverständlich, dass humanitäre Katastrophen mitten in unseren europäischen Gesellschaften konkrete Wirklichkeit geworden sind. Neue Paradigmen wie Gender-Mainstreaming finden mit ihren neuen sexuellen Rollenverständnissen Eingang in die Bildungspläne der Länder Deutschlands. Pädagogen und Elternverbände sind besorgt wegen der Frühsexualisierung der Kinder.

Was hat die Theologie (und speziell evangelikale Theologie), was hat die Kirche angesichts dieser massiven Herausforderungen an Lösungen beizutragen? Werden sie überhaupt gefragt und erwartet man Lösungsansätze von ihnen? Schreibt man ihnen Kompetenzen zu, sich um die Probleme der Welt zu kümmern? Oder sollten sie nicht bei dem reinen Evangelium und den geistlichen Themen bleiben?

Es gibt viele – externe wie interne – Stimmen im Chor der Kritiker an Theologie und Kirche. Unübersehbar ist, dass beide seit Jahren dramatisch an Einfluss verlieren. „Das Christentum in Deutschland ist ideell bankrott" bilanziert Markus Günther beeindruckend plausibel in der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung von 29.12.2014. Nur die festen (landes-)kirchlichen Strukturen und noch fließenden (Steuer-) Gelder verhindern bisher eine totale Erosion und – verbunden damit – eine radikale Neuorientierung.

Wie kann angesichts der beschriebenen Wirklichkeit ansatzweise eine Neuorientierung in Theologie und Kirche aussehen? Bei den vielen – hier nicht zu erörternden – Themen scheinen mir dabei drei essentielle Aspekte unumgänglich zu sein:

1. Die Wieder-Entdeckung der Vitalität des Evangeliums

Evangelische Theologie und Kirche muss sich wieder neu am Evangelium selbst orientieren, um relevant zu sein. Das Evangelium von der „heilsamen Gnade Gottes, die allen Menschen erschienen" ist (Tit 2, 14), hat die inhärente Kraft, Menschen aus unterschiedlichen Kulturen Anteil zu geben am Evangelium und es in einer neuen Weise zu leben. Die Botschaft von der „Menschenfreundlichkeit Gottes" (Tit 3, 4) muss angesichts menschenverachtender Ideen und Praktiken wieder neu gehört und ins Leben transformiert werden. Dass Gott „die Welt so sehr liebt, dass er seinen eigenen Sohn sendet" (Joh 3, 16) muss zum Kern einer inklusiven Theologie und Gemeindepraxis führen, die diese Welt nicht aufgibt, sondern in sie eingeht, ohne in ihr aufzugehen. Das – gerade heute postmodern relativierte – „Wort vom Kreuz" (1Kor 1, 18) im interkulturellen Kontext sensibel und klar zu formulieren und anzuwenden, ist die – nicht nur missionswissenschaftliche – Haupt-Aufgabe von Theologie und Kirche. Bis an die Grenze der eigenen Identität und Selbstaufgabe muss diese Mission der Kirche gehen, um ja nur etliche zu gewinnen. Die Haltung des Paulus „Ich bin allen alles geworden, damit ich auf alle Weise einige rette" (1Kor 9, 22) muss dabei wieder die dienende und demütige Leidenschaft von Theologie und Kirche werden. Kirchen haben nur eine Chance, wenn sie ihre strukturellen Erstarrungen aufbrechen und sich zu einer Glaubensgemeinschaft von Menschen entwickeln, die Heil und Gnade suchen und leben. Westliche Kirchen können und müssen von jungen außereuropäischen Kirchen lernen und bereit sein, deren Missionare gerne aufzunehmen und mit ihnen zusammenzuarbeiten, um den zukünftigen gesellschaftlichen und interkulturellen Herausforderungen begegnen zu können.

2. Die Erneuerung von Ethik und Nachfolge

Die neu gewonnene Lehre des Evangeliums führt zu einem Leben der Glaubenden, das von Christus und seinem Wort geprägt ist. Ethik ist Auswirkung des Evangeliums und darf nicht zur Gesetzlichkeit oder Moralisierung des Christentums führen. Die prägnante Definition K. Barths hat bis heute nichts an Relevanz verloren: „Das Gesetz ist nichts anderes als die notwendige Form des Evangeliums, dessen Inhalt die Gnade ist" (Evangelium und Gesetz, München 1935).

Ethik als Reflexion auf das „vollkommene Gesetz der Freiheit" (Jak 1, 25) kann Menschen den schmalen Weg der Freiheit zwischen Beliebigkeit und Gesetzlichkeit weisen, um zielführend zu sein. Dabei kann sie als „trinitarische Ethik" auf schöpfungstheologische (siehe Mt 19, 3ff) und Reich-Gottes-theologische Kriterien ebenso wenig verzichten wie auf die Leitung und Bevollmächtigung des Heiligen Geistes. Letztlich ist sie gekennzeichnet von dem, was Jesus selbst attraktiv gemacht hat: Gnade und Wahrheit (Joh 1, 14). Das prophetische Element radikaler Nachfolge, die auf Gerechtigkeit und Wahrheit achtet, darf dabei nicht verloren gehen.

3. Die Leidenschaft zu guten Werken

Und schließlich muss eine Erneuerung von Theologie und Kirche den finalen Aspekt christlicher Existenz immer im Blick behalten, der neben der Ehre Gottes die konkrete Tat des Glaubens, das gute Werk im Blick hat. In Christus hat nur der „Glaube, der in der Liebe wirksam wird" Bestand (Gal 5, 6). Als Christen und Theologen sind wir nicht zum Selbstzweck da. „Wir sind sein Werk, geschaffen in Christus Jesus zu guten Werken, die Gott zuvor bereitet hat, dass wir in ihnen wandeln sollen" (Eph 2, 10). Eine Fülle guter Werke säumt den Weg der Christen durch die Zeiten. Evangelium und soziale Verantwortung, Anbetung und Weltverantwortung, Zeugnis und Dienst, Gottes- und Nächstenliebe gehören für eine glaubwürdige Theologie und Kirche untrennbar zusammen. So hat die Kirche seit ihren Anfängen immer die transformative Kraft des Evangeliums gelebt und dadurch auch die Welt verändert.

Ohne diese drei Aspekte einer evangelischen und evangelikalen Theologie kann eine Erneuerung der Kirche und Gemeinde meines Erachtens nicht gelingen. Dass unsere Theologie dazu beiträgt, ist mein Wunsch.

Horst Afflerbach ist Leiter der Biblisch-Theologischen Akademie, Forum Wiedenest.

The New Issues in Bioethics – and Ethics of Reproduction

Knut Alfsvåg

SUMMARY

Modern biotechnology seems to presuppose that it has the ability to distinguish between the essentially human and its physical manifestations in a way that allows the latter to be treated as a means for the well-being of the former. This would suggest a dependence on Cartesian mind – matter dualism, and also that some of the most important bioethical issues may be related to problematic aspects of this particular worldview. Arguing that this position is both inherently inconsistent and at variance with the Christian doctrines of creation and incarnation, the article suggests that Christian ethics should maintain a critical position in relation to modern biotechnology for the sake of maintaining the integrity of the Christian community and the rationality of society.

* * * *

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Moderne Biotechnologie scheint vorauszusetzen, dass sie zwischen dem Wesen des Menschen und seinen physischen Manifestationen auf eine Weise zu unterscheiden vermag, die es gestattet, den Körper des Menschen als Mittel für das Wohlbefinden seines Geistes zu behandeln. Dies setzt sowohl eine Abhängigkeit vom kartesischen Geist-Materie-Dualismus voraus als auch eine Verknüpfung von einigen der wichtigsten Fragen der Bioethik mit problematischen Aspekten dieser besonderen Weltanschauung. Der Aufsatz zeigt auf, dass diese Position sowohl in sich widersprüchlich ist als auch im Widerspruch steht zur christlichen Lehre von Schöpfung und Inkarnation. Der Verfasser besteht deshalb darauf, dass die christliche Ethik eine kritische Position einnimmt, was die moderne Biotechnologie angeht, und zwar im Interesse der Integrität der christlichen Gemeinschaft wie auch der Vernunft der menschlichen Gesellschaft.

* * * *

RÉSUMÉ

La biotechnologie moderne suppose la capacité de distinguer entre l'essence humaine et ses manifestations physiques d'une manière qui permette de traiter le corps humain comme un moyen pour le bien-être de l'esprit. Cela suggère, d'une part, que l'on adopte le dualisme cartésien distinguant la matière et l'esprit, et, de l'autre, que certaines des questions les plus importantes en bioéthique peuvent être considérées comme des aspects problématiques de cette position. En arguant que le dualisme cartésien est intrinsèquement incompatible et en contradiction avec la doctrine chrétienne de la création et de l'incarnation, l'article suggère que l'éthique chrétienne doit maintenir une position critique face à la biotechnologie moderne, à la fois dans l'intérêt de l'intégrité de la communauté chrétienne et de la rationalité de la société humaine.

* * * *

1. Introduction

As technologies develop, they confront us with new and sometimes difficult ethical challenges.[1] Modern medicine is no exception to this rule; on the contrary, some of the more thorny issues in today's ethical debates are created by recent developments in biotechnology. Which are these issues, and why are they considered as ethical challenges? One would expect work towards improvement of the health of humans to be as close as possible to an undisputed good, irrespective of one's worldview and ethical persuasion, but this is obviously not the case. Why not? What causes the trouble, and how should ethics which takes the Christian faith as its basic point of orientation respond to these challenges?

In this article, I will approach these issues in the following way. First, I will give an overview of recent developments in biotechnology that have received the attention of ethicists. Then I will investigate how far this aspect of modern medicine can be said to be conceived within the framework of a specific worldview, and, if that is the case, whether this worldview has implications which are problematic from an ethical point of view. Finally, I will reflect on these issues from a Christian point of view. Will the answers given by Christian ethics tend to be different from those provided by the society at large? Should Christian communities thus consider themselves as a kind of counterculture in opposition to the attractions of modern technology? Or should we, in relation to these issues, rather strive for consensus across religious and cultural boundaries?

2. Biotechnology and the health of humans[2]

Abortion can hardly be counted among the recent challenges. However, the development of prenatal screening technologies, which enable parents to decide if they want to let the baby be born on the basis of what they know about its gender and health prospects early in the pregnancy, has undoubtedly placed the whole issue in a new light. It is one thing to decide not to have the child on the basis of an evaluation of the life situation of the mother, and, in some cases, also the father; different issues are raised by making that decision because of wanted or unwanted features of the child.

But foetuses are not only disposed of, they may also be tailor-made. One way of doing that is somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) or cloning. This technology, which is used to create an embryo that is genetically identical to the person from whom the cell nucleus is taken, can be used for two purposes: 1) therapeutic cloning, which produces embryos for the sake of research or treatment, after which the embryos are destroyed; 2) reproductive cloning, which aims at actually producing children. Reproductive cloning has successfully been done with mammals, the sheep Dolly having being produced in this way already in 1996. Cloning of humans is, however, illegal in most countries, and there are no known cases.

Different from cloning, artificial reproduction technologies (ART) copy nature by making use of genetic material from both father and mother, but still manipulate the process in various ways. Among the less invading technologies is artificial insemination, where sperm from the father is artificially inserted into the uterus of the mother. In vitro fertilisation (IVF) takes eggs from the body of the mother and lets fertilisation take place in a Petri dish, after which one or more of the fertilised eggs are returned to the uterus for normal development. These technologies may be modified through gamete donation, where either sperm or egg comes from another person than the couple who are supposed to care for the child. Sperm donation through artificial insemination is a technology which has been in use since the end of the nineteenth century; the development of IVF has made even egg donation possible. This introduces the added complication of surrogacy, which is the bearing of the child by another woman than the one who is to be the social mother; the egg, depending on the problem that has caused the surrogacy in the first place, may then come from the social mother (who then is also the biological, but not the child-bearing mother) or from a third woman.

Embryos created through IVF may be tested for genetic quality before being placed in the uterus. This technology, which is called pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), can be used to eliminate unwanted embryos, which in this case may be embryos with a genetic disease, or embryos with unwanted characteristics like the wrong gender. The technology may also be used for the creation of so-called designer babies, which are children who have particularly good genes in some area or another, and for the creation of so-called saviour siblings: children produced for the sake of providing cells wanted for the treatment of siblings with a hereditary disease. The ability to control the reproduction process which is achieved through the combination of IVF and PGD thus represents one of the more obvious ethical challenges created by modern biotechnology.

Genetic diseases can also be treated by manipulating the genes in the adult individual directly. In so-called somatic cell therapy, this is done in a way that does not involve permanent change in the DNA of the person who is treated in this way; the change thus dies with the patient. This differs from germ call therapy, where one tries to eradicate hereditary diseases, or to enhance the human genome, by permanently changing the genes as transmitted to later generations. The ethical issues involved are obviously much more serious in the latter case. Common to the technologies are, however, the questions of what counts as enhancement, and who are to give the answer to that question. We probably all agree that the eradication of hereditary disease is a commendable goal. But what about the creation of stronger, more intelligent and creative humans? Is that necessarily an undisputed good? Is there an ethically relevant difference between treatment and enhancement, and if so, where is the line to be drawn, and by whom?

Making our lives healthier and happier may not always involve genetic therapy, though. Much of the work is still done through technologies that have been in use for many years: Pain killers, mood and cognition enhancers, drugs that improve performance in sports or other activities, treatment for various kinds of developmental problems. These technologies are obviously less invading than (permanent) changes to the human DNA; still, they raise similar ethical challenges: Which means are acceptable for which goals, and who are eventually to give the answers to questions like these?

However, we do not only expect to have healthier and happier lives; due to the development of modern medicine, we also expect to have longer lives than previous generations.[3] Does this development in the direction of the longer and healthier have any kind of inherent limit, or could it go on until we have conquered death altogether? Some scientists and their supporters, who often identify themselves as transhumanists, seem to think that this goal might not be as far-fetched as it has usually appeared to be; the possibility of controlling the human DNA created by ART, better control of the biochemistry involved in aging, the use of nanotechnology to keep cells in good shape, and the combination of computer technology and biotechnology may open possibilities we still do not quite understand.[4] The day may therefore not be far off when we actually have to take even this problem seriously: Is the very long, possibly even unending, healthy life the goal we want to achieve? Which means are necessary for taking us there, and do we accept the costs, ethical and others, associated with these means?

3. Mind – matter dualism and its ethical implications

Modern biotechnology seems to presuppose that it has the ability to distinguish between the essentially human and its physical manifestations in a way that allows the latter to be treated as a means to the well-being of the former. Neither abortion, prenatal diagnosis, ART nor PGD would work without the ability to distinguish between the creation of the embryo and the formation of the human being.[5] This distinction is strengthened by the possibility of gene manipulation, and completed when one, like some transhumanists, speaks of the ability of (endlessly?) prolonging human existence by means of brain uploading or artificial intelligence.

This seems to suggest that modern biotechnology, like modern science in general, is heavily dependent on Cartesian mind – matter dualism, according to which there is a strict distinction between thought and matter to the extent that the latter has no inherent value apart from being used by human intelligence for the sake of understanding and manipulating it to improve our life conditions.[6] This assumption has undoubtedly paved the way for the exploration, and thus the cure, of human disease in an unprecedented way. At the same time, this approach creates some disturbing questions. What constitutes the human subject if the body is reduced to an instrument which is not part of the essential human who supposedly enjoys the fruits of the improvement of its condition? What exactly is the norm of human dignity if the materiality of the human is reduced to a tool for the experience of disembodied satisfaction? Might this reduction of the human to its ability to think and feel, which arguably is the essence of the anthropology of modernity, even influence the way one thinks about and acts in relation to other human beings? Can a human who is conceived as disembodied intelligence actually love its neighbour?

During the twentieth century, asking precisely these questions, voices from different backgrounds have become quite critical of the way in which we allow ourselves to manipulate the givenness of the natural. Among the earlier representatives of this criticism was C.S. Lewis, who in his 1943 essay 'The Abolition of Man' criticised modernity's one-sided focus on the mathematical relationship between facts, which in Lewis' view entails precisely the implication that nature has no value apart from its being an object for humans exercising their power over it. But power is not something humans always exercise in ways that are just and righteous; hence Lewis's well-known statement that 'what we call Man's power over Nature turns out to be a power exercised by some men over other men with Nature as its instrument.' When Lewis then anticipates, on the basis of what he knows of the ideology of scientific progress, what he calls the final stage in 'Man's conquest of nature', his essay reads like a summary of the contemporary issues in bioethics. 'This final stage is come', he writes, 'when Man by eugenics, by pre-natal conditioning, and by an education and propaganda based on a perfect applied psychology, has obtained full control over himself.'[7] The situation will then be different from any other situation experienced in the history of humankind. Not only will the ability of the select few to control the many have been greatly increased, the rulers (who Lewis calls the Conditioners) will 'have sacrificed their own share in traditional humanity in order to devote themselves to the task of deciding what "Humanity" shall henceforth mean'. In Lewis' view, the understanding of human dignity as a universal value is not compatible with assigning to a select few the decision about what constitutes the essentially human.

3.1 The Gnosticism of modernity

After World War II, arguments along these lines have for obvious reasons tended to be used by Germans in particular. According to the historian and philosopher Eric Voegelin, modernity's Cartesian dualism implies a sense of alienation from the world that is supposed to be overcome through science and social action.[8] For Voegelin, modernity is essentially a religious movement whose main characteristics he gathers under the label of Gnosticism. As its Messianic figures he mentions the nineteenth century prophets Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche. The fulfilment, however, of the Gnostic religiosity of modernity Voegelin finds in the totalitarian ideologies of Nazism and Communism, whose adherents proclaim that the fact that they have discovered the scientific solution to the ills of the world entitles them to dominion over those who have not been so fortunate. This belief in the transformation of the world for a better future, which is also typical of all kinds of millennialism, Voegelin calls the immanentising of the eschaton,[9] and it leads naturally to the leadership being entrusted to the informed elite, i.e. the Übermensch.

In his book *Das Prinzip Verantwortung* ('The Imperative of Responsibility', German original 1979) the German philosopher Hans Jonas argued that, since we do not know where the scientific endeavour may take us, the only responsible option is always to consider the worst possible implications of our actions. Informed by his studies of ancient and modern Gnosticism, which was also an important source and inspiration for Voegelin's research, Jonas was highly critical of the implications of what he saw as the modern infatuation with technology, and suggested the following modification of Kant's categorical imperative: 'Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life.'[10]

3.2 The problem of transhumanism

The defenders of the idea of human enhancement through ART and PGD are aware that their views on this subject place them in the ideological vicinity of the eugenics which were employed by the Nazis and others in the first half of the twentieth century. While admitting that control of the reproduction process is essential for realising the goal of enhancing human health and happiness, and arguing that society therefore has an obligation 'to subsidise the birth of healthy children', they still assert that they differ from earlier representatives of this kind of eugenics by thinking that the birth of the not so healthy should not be made straightforwardly illegal. This is the position of the organisation Humanity+,[11] which brings together the supporters of the ideology called transhumanism or posthumanism.

Others are not convinced that the difference is significant. Jürgen Habermas has been particularly critical of the dangers inherent in assisted reproduction and pre-implantation diagnosis.[12] To see the production of designer babies as 'liberal eugenics regulated by supply and demand'[13] he considers a contradiction; as he sees it, one simply cannot mention eugenics and liberalism in the same context. For Habermas, liberalism is founded on the principle of equal opportunities and it is therefore incompatible with making decisions on behalf of future generations as implied in genetic engineering.[14] In his view, human dignity can only be upheld through upholding reciprocity in all morally relevant discussions;[15] modern biology thus threatens the idea of the human as understood in classical liberal thought by nullifying the possibility of informed consent as far as future generations are concerned.[16] The very idea of permanently changing the understanding of what it is to be human introduces an asymmetry in our relationship with our descendants which is incompatible with the idea of human dignity on which the modern liberal project is founded. In this respect, Habermas essentially agrees with C.S. Lewis.

In North America, the Jewish ethicist and physician Leon Kass has also argued that human cloning and technological life extension are incompatible with the ideals of liberal humanism. Kass maintains that extending human life beyond its natural limit is not an undisputed good; on the contrary, life as we know it is dependent on having a limit for inducing in us the kind of responsibility that is necessary for realising the truly human.[17] An even more influential opponent of the transhumanist idea of human enhancement by means of technology is Francis Fukuyama.[18] In his well-known work *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992) he argued that liberal democracy and Western market economy represent the best possible models for human societies; with the end of the Cold War, the time of battles between competing ideologies was over. The problem that now confronts us is the problem of controlling technology. In his view, the idea of technological enhancement of humans is therefore the one outcome of the liberal democracy that may contain the seeds of its undoing. In *Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution* (2002) Fukuyama therefore argues that biotechnology endangers the liberal project by possibly introducing alterations to the human nature that entail new forms of inequality.[19] In the long run, the victory of liberal democracy is therefore dependent on the end of science and technology as we know them today.

The transhumanists' rejection of Fukuyama's critique is explicitly based on the view that there is no human essence; we are therefore free to go where technology takes us.[20] The idea of unrestricted human development is thus clearly dependent on a strict separation between fact and value that will not let the world or any part of it – including humans – retain any inherent value which is not open to change by means of human (or artificial) intelligence. We are free to go where we want to go to the extent that it is, or will ever be, technologically possible.

Not all proponents of SCNT, ART and PGD subscribe to the ideology of transhumanism. Still, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that in so far as we actually allow ourselves to control human reproduction to the extent that we permanently change the human genome, we reduce the value of the naturally given to raw material for human manipulation, the outcome of which is that what eventually will count as the essentially human is left for the scientists to decide. Is this actually where we want to go?

Added to this is the problem of the allocation of resources for medical research. Given the lack of money needed for the treatment of fairly basic medical issues in large parts of the world, is the prioritising of research for the sake of prolonging the lives of the healthiest part of the world population a reasonable decision? Is not even this decision unduly determined by the fact that science is governed by the worldview of the more or less secularized Western world? Would not even a fairly basic consideration of issues of justice and equality in a global perspective suggest that we should rather go elsewhere for our scientific ideals?

4. The Christian worldview and mind – matter dualism

To the Christian worldview, Cartesian mind – matter dualism is highly problematic. For one thing, it is hardly consistent on its own terms, subscribing to the idea of human equality while in fact leaving the decision of what it is to be human to the powerful and the intelligent. In addition, it is obviously at variance with the doctrines of creation and incarnation as commonly received in Christian theology. According to the doctrine of creation, humans are at home in the world as it is, and are therefore not dependent on technological manipulation to overcome their feeling of alienation. Even as sinners humans are supposed to be able to fulfil God's charge of becoming the lords of creation without destroying it. The Gnosticism of modernity, which has shown itself so clearly through the abuse of nature which has landed us in the problems of pollution and climate change, and which increasingly shows itself in the liberation from the naturally human as implied in ART, is therefore something Christian theology should meet with consistent critique. This critical attitude is strengthened by the story of the incarnation, which emphatically confirms the value of human nature in its physical manifestation through its being selected as the arena for the revelation of the divine.

Living in a world tainted with evil, sin and death, work for the improvement of the human situation clearly is not the problem. On the contrary, this should, and has always been, considered as an important aspect of the basic Christian commandment of loving one's neighbour. Christian ethics even agree with the transhumanists in maintaining that illness and death are problems that eventually will be solved. Rather than seeing enhancement of the human condition as a problem, as critics of modern biotechnology like Habermas, Kass and Fukuyama tend to do, the idea of human improvement beyond what is known today is built into the very core of the Christian hope; the New Testament explicitly states that 'it is not yet made manifest what we shall be'.[21] The idea of improving the human condition even to the extent of conquering death is therefore not a problem for Christian ethics.

In two ways, however, the Christian vision for human improvement differs from the one maintained by biotechnology. In the first place, the Christian idea of improvement does not entail liberation from embodiment. On the contrary, and consistent with faith in an incarnated Saviour, embodiment is essential even in Christian eschatology.[22] For Christians, the human body in its frailty and perishability is not 'a flawed piece of engineering';[23] it is an area of divine creativity and revelation that will be maintained even in the eschaton, which thus is seen as embodiment without illness and frailty. In the second place, this improvement is not for humans to achieve on their own; it is to be expected as a gift in exactly the same way as the world we experience today is to be received as a gift.[24] In so far as it takes its core doctrines of creation and incarnation seriously, Christianity is therefore neither Gnostic (seeking liberation from embodiment) nor millennialist (realising the eschaton on one's own), while Cartesian mind – matter dualism tends to be both.

Christianity thus basically thinks of illness as a solvable problem and it has no interest in preserving the vestiges of frailty and death for the sake of maintaining the truly human. A Christian worldview will, however, be deeply sceptical of the idea that humans on their own will be able to provide the final solution; from a Christian point of view, this is essentially a reassertion of 'the Pelagian heresy of perfectibility.'[25] The reason for this scepticism is that the attempt at doing so must presuppose the ability of humans to transcend embodiment for the sake of penetrating the world by means of their own intelligence, and this is a position that is both philosophically problematic and at variance with the Christian doctrines of creation and incarnation. In addition, it is easily misused by people who merely pretend to know and who for the maintenance of their position are dependent on the suppression of all others; it is therefore hardly a coincidence that the inherent millennialism of modernity so easily lends itself to totalitarian ideologies. For this reason, it is an important task of Christian ethics to 'witness to the freeing of the world from salvific pretensions in order that it may embrace its proper temporality'.[26]

5. Christian ethics and the problems of ART

How should we then handle the concrete challenges of modern biotechnology in general and ART in particular? On the one hand, both the development and the application of many of the artificial reproduction technologies require an extensive use of human embryos later to be discarded, and thus presuppose a fairly liberal attitude toward the problem of abortion, which is at variance with a Christian understanding of the dignity of the human embryo. On the other hand this technology certainly represents an attractive possibility of solving both the problem of childlessness and the problem of hereditary disease. At the same time, however, this particular technology clearly plays into the idea of freeing the conception of children from the constraints of ordinary sexual activity as a means of controlling the process and its outcome. If one does not want to lend support to the project of realising a disembodied and immanentist eschatology, are artificial reproduction technologies at all acceptable? The answer of the Roman-Catholic Church is a rather emphatic 'no',[27] and while not all Protestants may find this answer immediately convincing, it is at least consistent in a way most of the alternatives are not.

In addition to the problems related to all kinds of ART, gamete (cell) donation severs the link between biology and family and thus clearly presupposes an instrumental view of nature. Admittedly, this link is already severed in many cases through adoption. It is, however, one thing to do one's best in a difficult situation; it is something quite different to create it wilfully in the first place. This problem is exacerbated through surrogacy, which often also has the uncomfortable side-effect that women in the poorer parts of the world bear the children of the rich and affluent.

The problem of having children tailor-made through PGD is also deeply problematic for a number of additional reasons. Children are usually loved unconditionally by their parents; how will it influence the parent-child relationship if the children instead are loved for their being made just so? How will it influence the liberation process through which all children find their own identity if they know that their own identity is in fact not their own, but something their parents chose for them? And what about the relation between the society-at-large and the children made through PGD for the sake of bodily, artistic and/or mental excellence? Will they be allowed to excel while the rest of world sits back and applauds? Or will they find themselves being discriminated against by the not-so-excellent who fear for their positions? This is Habermas' asymmetry problem brought down to the level of the practical and the concrete. Not all humans will have their genes improved simultaneously. This thus adds to the human potential for conflict a new difference which we have no experience in handling. Could there be any good reasons at all for doing such a thing?

Technologies for having longer and healthier lives are considerably less problematic as long as one maintains an understanding of the human body in its frailty as an object of both cure and care, not a problem to be left behind.[28] The aspiration of developing technologies for conquering death has, however, obvious eschatological implications that hardly seem compatible with the 'embrace' of our 'proper temporality'.[29] This idea comes in two variations, considering the conquest of death as either dependent on techniques focussing on the material (technological enhancements of the human body) or on the mental (uploading of brain content to a more durable medium, thus presupposing that the contents of our minds are reducible to digital patterns with an exact physical representation).[30] Particularly in its latter form, this project transforms mind – matter dualism into a doctrine of material reductionism that seems strangely inconsistent; if all mental processes are reducible to their physical representation, the very concept of truth, upon which all science including biotechnology builds, dissolves. In this particular area of research, then, the disembodied eschatology of the modern Gnostic appears as a mere contradiction.

The idea of human equality as understood both by secular liberalism and the Christian faith thus tells us to be extremely careful in relation to modern biotechnology, in particular as far as ART is concerned, and this attitude is reinforced by what we have learned from the eugenics experiments performed in the first half of the twentieth century. Still, I think there can hardly be any doubt that these technologies will be used. The combined interests of capitalism looking for a potential market and humans wanting to make use of the full potential of advanced technology are hardly resistible in the long run. The undisputable advantage of ART is its potential for curing hereditary disease. In principle, it is something quite different to use PGD for the sake of promoting excellence. In practice, however, the line will sometimes be vague, and it is improbable that we will have one completely without the other.

If this is the situation, what should Christian ethics aim for? Should it limit itself to catering for the Christian minority and concentrate on maintaining its integrity in an increasingly hostile world? Or should it also be a critical voice in the public debate, fighting for the integrity and dignity of the human embryo and the biologically given, even if nobody will listen? According to the Christian faith, the Christian position is a reasonable position; its corroboration by more or less secular liberals without a clear Christian allegiance is at least a partial confirmation of this principle. Christian ethics can then hardly allow itself to care for the Christian minority alone; it must, for the sake of its own consistency, aim for universality and address all potentially reasonable humans, which are all humans, irrespective of ideological and religious persuasion. It will never meet universal acceptance and will always remain highly disputed, but, as long as the idea of human equality is considered an idea worth fighting for, so will the unlimited application of the possibilities of modern biotechnology. Through this quandary we will have to find our way forward.

6 Conclusions

Science has succeeded in giving us both considerably longer and considerably healthier lives; for this we should be forever grateful. Still, modern biotechnology is tainted by its dependence on Cartesian mind – matter dualism to the extent that some of its implications point in the direction of the Gnostic and the irrational. Nevertheless, its apparent success and the powerful positions of its adherents make it likely that its findings will be both used and further developed. In this situation, Christian ethics should aim at maintaining the consistent and the rational both for the sake of the integrity of the Christian community and for the sake of preserving the rationality of society to as large an extent as possible. As far as experience can tell, this is a position that will meet with heavy opposition as well as find unexpected allies from time to time.

Knut Alfsvåg is professor of Systematic Theology at the School of Mission and Theology, Stavanger, Norway.

Endnotes

1 This article is based on a lecture held at the biennial conference of the Fellowship of European Evangelical Theologians (FEET) in Orsay near Paris in 2014.

2 My overview of ethically relevant aspects of contemporary biotechnology is dependent on Marianne Talbot, *Bioethics: An introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

3 While children born about 1950 had an average life expectancy of 45 years, it is now almost 70 ('The Evolution of Life Expectancy in the World', 2014, available at www.inequalitywatch.eu/spip.php?article106, accessed 16 February 2015); in the more developed countries, it is well above 80 (Wikipedia, 'List of countries by life expectancy', available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_life_expectancy, accessed 16 February 2015).

4 For a defence of the view that the conquest of death is not only possible but desirable, see Nick Bostrom, 'Why I Want to be a Posthuman When I Grow Up' in Max More and Natasha Vita-More (eds), *The Transhumanist Reader* (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013) 28-53.

5 This is also a main point of orientation in Gilbert Meilaender, *Bioethics: A primer for Christians* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013).

6 On the Cartesian emphasis on the malleability of the material, see Derk Pereboom, 'Early modern philosophical theology' in Philip L. Quinn and Charles Taliaferro (eds), *A Companion to Philosophy of Religion* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999) 103-110 and Gavin Hyman, *A Short History of Atheism* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010) 19-46.

7 C.S. Lewis, *The Abolition of Man* (New York: HarperCollins, 2009) 59. In Lewis' time this critique was not commonly accepted among Christians; on the contrary, eugenics was generally seen as uncontroversial among Protestants in the first half of the twentieth century; see Amy Laura Hall, 'To Form a More Perfect Union: Mainline Protestantism and the Popularization of Eugenics' in John Swinton and Brian Brock (eds), *Theology, Disability and the New Genetics* (London: T&T Clark, 2007) 75-95.

8 His most important works in this context are *The New Science of Politics*, originally published 1952, and *Science, Politics and Gnosticism*, originally published in 1958; both to be found in Eric Voegelin, *Collected Works 5: Modernity Without Restraint* (Columbia: University of Missouri, 1999). For a summary of his position, see Mark T. Mitchell, 'Personal participation: Michael Polanyi, Eric Voegelin, and the indispensability of faith', *Journal of Religious Ethics* 33 (2005) 65-89 and Lee Trepanier and Steven F. McGuire, 'Introduction' in Lee Trepanier and Steven F. McGuire (eds), *Eric Voegelin and the Continental Tradition: Explorations in Modern Political Thought* (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 2011) 1-13.

9 Russell Blackford, 'Trite Truths about Technology: A Reply to Ted Peters' in Gregory R. Hansell and William Grassie (eds), *Humanity V: Transhumanism and Its Critics* (Philadelphia: Metanexus, 2011) 176-188, provides an interesting glimpse of how this immanentising of the eschaton appears from the perspective of one who actually favours the idea of limitless human enhancement.

10 Hans Jonas, *The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984) 11. For an introduction to Jonas's thought that places it in its philosophical context, see Richard Wolin, *Heidegger's Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

11 Quotations from the website *Humanity+*, 2015, available at http://humanityplus.org/ [accessed 16 February 2015].

12 Jürgen Habermas, *The Future of Human Nature* (Cambridge: Polity, 2003). For a critical summary of his position, see Elaine Graham, 'Bioethics after posthumanism: Natural law, communicative action and the problem of self-design', *Ecotheology* 9 (2004) 178-198, 188-191.

13 Habermas, *Future of Human Nature*, vii. Liberal eugenics ('designer babies') is here distinguished from 'negative' eugenics, i.e., genetic manipulation for the sake of treatment of inherited disease.

14 Habermas, *Future of Human Nature*, 13-14.

15 Habermas, *Future of Human Nature*, 33.

16 Habermas, *Future of Human Nature*, 51-52.

17 Leon R. Kass, *Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls*, 2003, available at www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/ageless-bodies-happy-souls [accessed 27 January 2014] and Leon R. Kass, *L'Chaim and Its Limits: Why Not Immortality?*, 2007, available at www.firstthings.com/article/2007/01/lchaim-and-its-limits-why-not-immortality [accessed 27 January 2014].

18 For a critical presentation of his position, see Graham, 'Bioethics after posthumanism', 181-185; for Fukuyama's own summary, see Francis

Fukuyama, *Transhumanism*, 2004, available at www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/09/01/transhumanism [accessed 9 April 2014].

19 'If we start transforming ourselves into something superior, what rights will these enhanced creatures claim, and what rights will they possess when compared to those left behind?' Fukuyama, *Transhumanism*. According to Graham, 'Bioethics after posthumanism', 184, this amounts to a secular version of natural law theology.

20 See Nick Bostrom, *Transhumanism: The World's Most Dangerous Idea?*, 2004, available at www.nickbostrom.com/papers/dangerous.html [accessed 9 April 2014].

21 1 John 3:2 (ASV). This point is also emphasised in Brent P. Waters, 'What is Christian about Christian bioethics?', *Christian Bioethics* 11 (2005) 281-295, 288 and 293, and in Ted Peters, 'Transhumanism and the Posthuman Future' in Hansell and Grassie, *H V: Transhumanism*, 147-175, 148.

22 See 1 Corinthians 15:35-49.

23 This is the expression used in Max More, 'The Philosophy of Transhumanism' in More and Vita-More, *The Transhumanist Reader*, 3-17, 15.

24 Cf. the distinction between futurology and eschatology in Peters, 'Transhumanism and the Posthuman Future', 161.

25 So Waters, 'What is Christian about Christian bioethics?', 292. The difference between the Christian emphasis on healing and the modern attempt at 'eliminating the burdens of finitude and suffering' is also heavily emphasized in Robert Song, 'Christian bioethics and the church's political worship', *Christian Bioethics* 11 (2005) 333-348, 342.

26 So Song, 'Christian bioethics and the church's political worship', 333.

27 The Roman-Catholic Church rejects even artificial insemination techniques because 'they dissociate the sexual act from the procreative act'; see *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (London: Chapman, 1994) section 2377; the very idea of disembodied reproduction is thus seen as deeply problematic.

28 One should, however, be aware of the problem of allocation of resources in a North-South perspective that is closely related to this approach; not all research that is determined by the white man's wants and illnesses is defendable from a global perspective.

29 Cf. the critique in Brent P. Waters, *From Human to Posthuman: Christian Theology and Technology in a Postmodern World* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006) 118-119, of techniques founded on the modern and postmodern 'fear of finitude'.

30 This is, e.g., clearly presupposed in the computations in Ralph C. Merkle, 'Uploading', in More and Vita-More, *The Transhumanist Reader*, 157-164. For a critique of the idea of 'cybernetic immortality' as heavily dependent on reductionist Enlightenment anthropology, see Andrew Pickering, 'Brains, Selves, and Spirituality in the History of Cybernetics' in Hansell and Grassie, *H V: Transhumanism*, 189-204.

The Theological Foundation of Christian Ethics: Methodological issues

Henri A. G. Blocher

Mè suschèmatizesthe tô aiôni toutô, alla metamorphousthe tè anakainôsei tou nous, eis to dokimazein humas ti to thelèma tou Theou, to agathon kai euareston kai teleion (Rom 12:2).

RÉSUMÉ

L'étude proposée part de la conviction que la théologie et la réflexion chrétienne sur les questions fondamentales de la construction de l'éthique ne peuvent se séparer, ni la méthode du contenu. Comme toutes deux reposent sur le roc sous-jacent de la foi évangélique (*fides quae*), la théologie peut éclairer les décisions de premier rang sur le principe constitutif de ce qu'on qualifie d'éthique (le devoir, le Bien ?), la cible de l'évaluation et formation morale (l'acte ou l'*habitus* ? l'individu ou la communauté ?, et les sources des normes (quelle herméneutique ? le culte, la théologie – révélée ou naturelle – ou le contexte historique ?). Les partenaires du présent dialogue comprennent O. O'Donovan, P. Ricoeur, H. Burkhardt ; on prête attention au débat autour du livre récent de B. Brock.

* * * * * * * *

SUMMARY

The proposed inquiry starts from the conviction that theology and a Christian reflection on basic issues in ethical theory cannot be separated, nor can method from content. Since both rest on the bedrock sub-foundation of evangelical faith (*fides quae*), theology may comment on first-rank decisions concerning the constitutive principle of the ethical (duty, goodness/happiness?), on the target of moral evaluation and training (act or habitus, individuals or communities?), and on the sources of guidance (proper hermeneutics, worship, theology – revealed or natural -, historical context?). The main partners in the dialogue include Oliver O'Donovan, Paul Ricoeur and Helmut Burkhardt, while some attention is devoted to the debate around Brian Brock's recent book.

* * * * * * * *

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Die vorliegende Untersuchung geht von der Überzeugung aus, dass Theologie und eine christliche Reflektion über die grundlegenden Fragen von Ethiktheorie ebenso wenig voneinander getrennt werden können wie die Methode vom Inhalt. Weil beide Paare auf dem Fundament des evangelikalen Glaubens fußen (*fides quae*), ist Theologie in der Lage, über die wichtigsten Fragen aufzuklären zum konstitutiven Prinzip dessen, was Ethik ausmacht, (Pflicht/Gutes/Glück?), zum Ziel von moralischer Bewertung und Bildung (Handlung oder Habitus? Individuum oder Gemeinschaft?) sowie zu den Quellen für Normen (eigentliche Hermeneutik? Gottesdienst? Theologie – geoffenbarte oder natürliche – oder historischer Kontext?). Bedeutende Partner im Dialog sind hier Oliver O'Donovan, Paul Ricoeur und Helmut Burkhardt; ebenso ist die Andacht auf die Debatte um das jüngste Buch von Brian Bock gerichtet.

* * * * * * * *

1. Introduction

My topic is important at all times and its relevance in our late modern context is obvious.[1] The introduction can therefore concentrate on the clarification of the way the words of the title should be understood.

1.1 Theological

The author of this essay is a theologian without special expertise on ethics. I can only offer a theologian's observations on the foundation of ethics. This is slightly different from what the wording of my title would suggest. I excuse this (modest) departure with the consideration that Christian thinkers are called to participate in the larger debate: they grapple with the foundational problems that 'philosophers' also attend to. Oliver O'Donovan denounces the claim that Christian ethics have nothing to do with moral philosophy as a profitless 'bravado': 'At best it meant a theological abandonment of the field...'[2] The 'modern' partition between theology and philosophy is a porous one. I will keep in mind the general problem of ethical foundations – from a theological angle.

1.2 Foundation

Attacks on 'foundationalism' make many shy of using the word – but we should go free of the spell of *taboo* words! Whatever retains some force in anti-foundationalist arguments targets the Cartesian *Cogito* and the naïve assurance of pure empiricists; but the 'soul' of evangelical theological method is radically different. Of finer interest is Helmut Burkhardt's remark that the image of the building – which 'foundation' recalls – corresponds to the Greek word *èthos* (from which, of course, 'ethics' derives), which means first residence, whereas the biblical image, a more dynamic one, is that of the *way*.[3] Although some scholars, in the wake of Martin Heidegger, are happy to exploit the etymology of 'ethics',[4] it should not rule our use of words,[5] and, in the present case, bind the metaphor of foundations to a Greek *versus* a biblical perspective. Burkhardt wisely adds that one should not exaggerate the distinction he has highlighted.[6] After all, the image of building, with an emphasis on foundation, looms large in Scripture. It concludes our Lord's Sermon on the Mount (Mt 7:24-27), whose relevance for Christian ethics is undeniable.

My real problem relates to the *depth* of the foundations to consider. In a legitimate sense, the theological foundation of Christian ethics requires the whole biblical world-view, all the basic theological tenets of the faith. I feel, however, that dealing with such a wide deployment of truth would far exceed my embrace. I choose, therefore, to locate the said theological deposit of faith *below* foundation: it constitutes the bed-rock level upon which the foundation is laid; in other words: the presuppositions that form the 'fiducial framework' (Polanyi's phrase), the source of light and criteria.

Concretely, I mean the contents of classical 'evangelical' theology, as expressed, e.g., by John Stott in his beautiful 'testament'.[7] It includes, as most relevant to our topic, Trinitarian creational monotheism, the anthropology that goes with it (*imago Dei*, original sin, the doctrines of grace), the 'already and not yet' scheme of eschatology, and the total reliability of canonical Scripture, which is the Word of God written. I may insist on two features of created reality. God has established *laws* that govern the phenomena of this world (e.g. Jer 31:35), regularities that show his *wisdom* (Pr 3:19-20; 8:30, translating *'àmôn* 'craftsman, master-builder').[8] At the same time, we should recognise the 'granular' constitution of that reality: though none of them can subsist in isolation, creatures retain a distinct identity, a relatively enduring consistency, and should not be considered as mere intersections, knots or functions. This is the truth that the time-honoured metaphysical doctrine of *substance* tried to safeguard, and which the mighty critic of that doctrine, Herman Dooyeweerd, maintained under the name *typical individual structures* – how successful he was, I let others appreciate.[9]

1.3 Method

Choices of method often decisively orientate the development of arguments, and not seldom without being scrutinised carefully enough; I am inclined to focus on such. Yet, I am also in sympathy with Brian Brock's warning against 'the modern obsession with method'.[10] One of the meanings of *methodeia* is 'trickery', the clever manipulation of evidences, and both New Testament occurrences are pejorative (Eph 4:14; 6:11). The key consideration here is that method can never be separated from content: scientific procedures must adapt to the object of study. A methodological concern implies some measure of a reflective distance; it spurs vigilance as to the chains or reasoning, the adequacy of concepts, hidden assumptions, unwarranted disjunctions and symmetries, *principles* at stake and at work. The exercise could be called 'metaethics', the word which Paul Ramsey used.[11] I feel it grants me the freedom not to pursue the lines I will indicate, to suggest preferences without setting forth corresponding proof, to leave some issues 'open'. This may pass for a methodological decision!

2. The object of our study: the contours of 'ethics'

What referent[12] do we aim at when we say 'ethics'? The disjunction between *ethical* (doctrine, etc.) and *moral* is familiar. Paul Ricoeur gives it title-rank in one of his articles and it determines the architecture of its richest development in the field.[13] Helmut Burkhardt describes the same disjunction as a well-established phenomenon among Protestants.[14] Ethical is roughly equivalent to *teleological*, focussing on ends or goals, on the Good we are to pursue, and moral to *deontological*, focussing on duty, norms and obligation. Primacy goes to the ethical; Ricoeur labours hard to establish that primacy, and then to find a necessary place for the moral level, but many despise the latter and would destroy it altogether. Some, according to Burkhardt, attach ethics to inwardness (though one would rather find the reverse in Hegel). Another writer, the Catholic philosopher Nikolaus Lobkowicz, would use the word 'moral' for the norms which actually guide us in our daily lives, and 'Ethik' for the philosophical critique and grounding of these norms.[15]

'From the proper meaning of the words', Burkhardt firmly adjudicates, 'there is no real difference between the two concepts, and, above all, no reason for disparaging the "moral" concept.'[16] Between Greek *e/èthos* (plural *-è*) and Latin *mos* (plural *mores*), the roots whose presence is still being felt in the use of the words, a quasi-perfect equivalence of current meaning obtains. Ricoeur acknowledges that 'nothing in etymology and historical use requires making a difference'.[17] We may only allow that 'moral' retains a more Roman Catholic flavour, simply because of the larger place of Latin in Catholic education! The disjunction is not innocent: it participates of the culture's deep resentment against the thought of a superior authority, a Lawgiver and Judge – a God worthy of the name. It operates against what is left of the biblical imprint (*dei*, from which 'deontology' derives, occurs 104 times in the New Testament!). We shall not accept the disjunction.[18]

2.1 Deontology

The vocabulary debate resonates with the chief issue confronting us: what is the decisive trait that makes ethics to be ethics? What is the feature that specifies a moral consideration as such? To speak Dooyeweerdian, what is the 'nuclear moment' and kernel of meaning of that modality of human experience? Not all science of *mores* or *e/èthè* is eligible: *ethology* is not ethics!

Common sense will probably answer, still today: ethology is *descriptive*, but ethics *prescriptive*. The one deals with what *is*, and the other with what *ought* to be. Such is, basically, the deontological emphasis, though O'Donovan distinguishes between deontic and prescriptive.[19] The key notions that belong to the same constellation would be duty, obligation, norms, law and command, imperative, authority (which O'Donovan rightly defines, in earthly relationships, as 'the capacity of one human being to command the obedience of another through speech'[20]). The reference is to God's *will*; he decides what is *right* and what is wrong. Our position, Jochem Douma writes, 'is known as the Divine Command Theory. An act is right because and only because God so wills it.'[21] The thought of judgement is near: moral agents are *responsible* before the Judge (they give an account to the Authority above them); actions that conform to the law are morally praiseworthy, and those which do not deserve blame and condemnation, the agent incurs guilt; conscience accuses the agent who has broken the moral law in the role of an inward representative of the moral Judge. Most writers choose Immanuel Kant as the purest representative of the deontological view of ethics.[22] Although not all features are found with him, his supreme concern that duty be done for the sake of duty alone, the centrality of the 'categorical imperative', his emphasis on will as the locus of morality, the rational necessity he stressed to *postulate* a Lawgiver and Judge, do compose a paradigm of the deontological option. Maybe Emmanuel Levinas could also be named, despite his rejection of all rational order: the absolute intensity of the moral demand rips apart the cohesion of being,[23] the unconditional imperative cuts across all indicatives, the ethical requisition (whose epiphany shines on the face of the other human being) constitutes the subject, whom it summons and binds like a hostage – one may hear in such a preaching the paroxysm of the sense of obligation, *infinite* obligation.

Those who disagree find the deontological concentration lacking in 'humanity'. The teleological views start with humans as they are. People engage in purposive activities; their *e/èthè* are directed towards goals. The role of ethics is to shed light on the goals worth pursuing, to point to what is *good* for the agent. The Good is the central thought.

Ethical doctrines differ primarily through their rival identifications of the good. The ancient Greek philosophers did not doubt that human beings desire and seek *happiness*, the enjoyment of the good. Their moral teaching showed the way to happiness (including Socrates' message that one is happier if one suffers from injustice than if one behaves unjustly). While some located the supreme good in pleasure, or, at least, untroubled tranquillity, the most influential doctrines closely allied goodness and *being* (what is evil for humans is death, decline, destruction – non-being), the pure being of heavenly Ideas or the all-encompassing being of the divine-cosmic whole. Christian tradition accepted the legacy and wrought a new synthesis: a *transcendent eudemonism*, as it has been called, became the dominant view. In teleological perspective, God, who is *ipsum esse* (being-itself), is the *summum bonum*, the supreme Good, whose enjoyment (in beatific vision) is the End of human existence; it is at the same time the fulfilment of the being of human persons, the full flowering of their nature in the richer possession of being. While Bentham's utilitarianism is often put forward as the example of teleological ethics (with such glaring weaknesses and opposition to Christianity that it is not an option for us), the Catholic version is worth more attention. John Paul II's encyclical *Veritatis splendor* (1993) offers evangelical theologians a concise and conservative expression of that traditional model.[24] The other teleological example with high credentials and arguments worth pondering would be that of the liberal Protestant Paul Ricoeur, who starts with the desire and effort *to be* (Spinoza's *conatus*).

One can hardly deny that the first impression, when one reads Scripture, leans on the deontological side. The emphasis on command, precept, law and judgement is overwhelming. John Murray candidly observes: 'When we examine the witness of Scripture itself as to the origin of the canons of behaviour which the Scripture approves, we do not find that love is allowed to discover or dictate its own standards or patterns of conduct' – rather we are led by 'objectively revealed precepts, institutions, commandments…'[25] Burkhardt, who notices the contrast between the biblical emphasis on the divine will, expressed in commands to be obeyed (a structure which sinners may abuse) and modern 'autonomy', easily disposes of grammatically unsound objection that the Decalogue prohibitions are in the indicative mood.[26] The New Testament does not produce another sound: even in Paul's epistles – not to mention Matthew or James whom many would charge with legalistic tendencies – '[t]he just requirement of the Law, which is in tune with love, remains a standard of righteous living'.[27] One might add that 'bond' is a likely meaning of *b^erît*, that which binds – at any rate, 'covenant' implies *obligation*. May we relate Kant's sensitivity in this matter to his pietistic upbringing? And Levinas' to what remains of biblical substance in talmudic and hasidic tradition?

Analysis appears to corroborate biblical impressions. Since David Hume, thinkers cannot ignore the difficulty of deriving what *ought* to be from what *is*. The 'naturalistic fallacy' has been exposed. Karl Barth shrewdly observed that promoters of the thesis that identifies what is natural biologically and what is moral offer the best refutation of it: they feel compelled to *preach* it.[28] With those who flatly deny obligation, dialogue is difficult: they resemble blind men, unable to perceive a basic, irreducible, ingredient of experience, a human *Urphänomen*.[29] Actually, I believe it is there (Rom 2:15), but repressed in ways that resemble the mechanisms psychoanalysis calls negation and disavowal (*Verneinung* and *Verleugnung*).[30] Yet, more honourable theories which try to extract 'oughtness' from being are found, under closer inspection, wanting. Why should the tendencies of my nature impose upon my freedom the obligation of fulfilment? Why should I feel guilty if I do not strive towards the fullness of my being? Why *ought* I to pursue my happiness (and/or that of others)? What 'is' can only yield the *ought* of duty, the authority of rightful command, if the principle of obligation has previously and surreptitiously been introduced into it. Even the fact of God's absolute power can crush creatures of dust but not obligate them: might does not make right, as Karl Barth perceived.[31] It is not obvious that the fullness of being entails being the moral End of created life: that thought has been called 'the supernaturalist fallacy'.[32] If we say: we *owe* our Maker everything we are, and if we do not simply mean the fact of our origin, we already presuppose obligation. The same with *reciprocity*, which has been proposed as a foundation of ethics: it answers to the taste of reason for symmetry, and can be attached to the Golden Rule.[33] Whence the moral force of reciprocal treatment? Barth himself, in the interest of his Christological grounding (a fact!), writes of our 'obligation which ensues [*sich ergibt aus*] from his [God's] gift, beyond measure and comprehension, of himself to us'.[34] But this requires the prior acceptance of the rule: we ought to render thanks for a gift!

Even the ablest treatments fail to convince. The critical move in Ricoeur's patient demonstration is made when he claims that the 'standards of excellence' confer 'the properly ethical qualification' to the rules of an art or trade, which, in themselves are merely technical norms.[35] He claims it, but he does not show how a technically good physician becomes, as such, a morally good one. The self-assured tone of the statement conceals a *metabasis eis allo genos*. The standards of technical excellence acquire an ethical quality only when one assumes the prior obligation to strive for technical excellence. Another of Ricoeur's theses also deserves mention: *evil*, he argues, makes it necessary that ethics should be supplemented by moral doctrine (deontological): 'Because evil *is there*, aiming at the "good life" must undergo the trial of moral obligation...'[36] To this claim I would oppose that evil presupposes the norm which it violates, as the very construction of the word *anomia* testifies – and Ricoeur himself had come near this insight: 'I can only think of evil as evil when I start with that from which it is a defection.'[37] The entrance of sin into the picture only makes coercion necessary, while obligation in moral perfection is nothing but pure delight.[38] As to Roman Catholic traditional understandings, *Veritatis splendor* openly, though briefly, acknowledges that the principle of obligation precedes the construction of moral theory, through a quotation from Leo XIII: 'These prescriptions of human reason could not wield legal force were it not the organ and interpreter of a higher reason, to whom our mind and our freedom ought to obey.'[39]

2.2 Bible and santification

And yet, while we should maintain at all costs the deontological dimension of ethics, unpopular though it may be – *Mè suschèmatizesthe tô aiôni toutô* – we should also pay attention to the diversity of the biblical presentation. Already in its vocabulary: the will of God is defined as 'the good, what pleases him (and, presumably, those who live in the harmony of his fellowship), what is whole and fulfilling' (a possible paraphrase of Rom 12:2). As the Decalogue impressively reminds us, the issuing of God's commands is part of a most factual reality. 'Setting the Old Testament law in this perspective (God's redemptive action and human response to it)', Chris Wright aptly describes, 'is helpful in softening the otherwise starkly deontological flavour of the law.'[40] We should not reduce Old Testament ethics to commandments and precepts, apodictic or casuistic: the wisdom books are important, and the apparent 'consequentialism' of the warnings and advices of Proverbs. The first theme of Jesus' preaching and teaching is the 'kingdom of God' – God's rule, but also the reality that embodies the rule.[41] That God be the End of human actions agrees with the statement that all things are 'for him' (Rom 11:36). The biblical God deserves to be called the *summum bonum*: he is the only One absolutely good (Mk 10:18); he is the fountain of all goodness or good things (Jas 1:16); he gives himself as the good to be enjoyed by his faithful (Ps 16:2, 5, 11; cf. 1 Pet 2:3; Gen 15:1, if one understands, with NIV, that the Lord is himself Abraham's reward). It is of interest that Cornelius Van Til chose as the organising theme of his ethical teaching the Kingdom of God as humanity's *summum bonum*.[42]

Analysis concurs. It is impossible ultimately to separate between being and obligation. What *ought* to be ought *to be*! Norms are intended to apply in a real context, and would lose all meaning otherwise; pure dualism would forbid them even to meet. There must be a link between the two main meanings of 'good'. This may be discerned in the major defenders of obligation. In Levinas' case, the opposition is so acute between ethical demand and all ontology and rational coherence that a link is difficult to find, unless one considers the opposition itself as the link! The paradox in which he glories, that we are 'constantly to unsay what is said, to go back to the act of saying which is always betrayed by what is said',[43] may be a symptom of embarrassment.[44] Even more significant: Levinas feels the need to make room for a rational, consistent, discourse on *justice*,[45] and he reaches that goal through the introduction of the *third* person. But how? In the book, 'furtively. Not just once, but twenty, thirty times, and each time incidentally, as if there was no reason.'[46] One may seriously doubt the adequacy of this move, which Ricoeur labels a 'coup de force'.[47] Kant's claims have been scrutinised by many. O'Donovan underlines Kant's recourse to the idea of 'humanity' to show that he had 'to appeal to some teleological determinant situated outside the rational will'.[48] Dooyeweerd argues that 'the Kantian conception of the moral motive, that of duty or respect for the moral law, if it is to have any moral meaning, presupposes a moral feeling-drive'.[49] Ricoeur offers the same argument in other words: respect is an affection, autonomy is affected.[50] Lobkowicz sees in the third *Critique* (§ 63) a resurgence of ontological concerns,[51] and, at any rate, the doctrine of the postulates of Practical Reason shows that the moral will is concerned with realisation. Ricoeur also highlights Kant's confessed starting-point: 'the *fact* of reason'.[52]

O'Donovan has authored a magnificent attempt at a balanced synthesis, under biblical auspices.[53] He nowhere denies our obligation to submit to God's will, but the 'enemy' of his unrelenting struggle is 'modern voluntarism', the grounding of ethics on the pure choices of free-will, free from any norm or pattern that reality could lay upon humans. O'Donovan's central theme is that of *created order*, the order of the world or reality[54] which was established in creation and vindicated (therefore confirmed) by Christ's resurrection. In this order 'kinds' (*genera*) and 'ends' are combined and these have an *ethical* import. Morality is defined as 'man's participation in the created order'.[55] O'Donovan criticises sixteenth-century tendencies:

> Natural Law thinkers of the Renaissance and Counter-Reformation showed themselves under the sway of voluntarism when they asked what it was that gave the natural order its authority, and replied that it was authorized by the command of God. The creation thus appeared to them to be an inert thing, meaningless for human action until assigned by divine command a significance that it did not otherwise have. Our aim is simply to contradict this. The created order carries its authority for action in itself, because agents, too, are a part of the created order and respond to it without being told so.[56]

Such a weighty statement could cause some concern if it were not clear that O'Donovan fights against a view that completely disconnects ethics from the order of creation: as when Helmut Thielicke labels the divine command 'extraplanetary material.'[57] When O'Donovan asks 'How does God's word engage our obedience…?' he answers that two lines are found in Scripture (and follows them): 'God speaks *through* the order which reason perceives' and, as he remains free above that order, 'God's command *cuts across* our rational perceptions.'[58] This seems to correct what is found on the same page: 'divine authority will prevail only because it belongs to that first reality in which truth is grounded.' Contrary to the impression made by such words, O'Donovan does not draw obligation from the mere fact of being, and divine authority from ontological fullness as such: God's will in the first place produced that 'reality'. Actually, he also seems to yield to nominalist influence (!) when, dealing with Christ's authority, he objects to the view that this authority comes from Jesus' identity with the Logos: 'In its use of the Logos-concept as a bridging-notion between God and creation, is it not hinting that the moral order is not a *created* order at all, but an expression of the character of divinity?'[59] His powerful reply to Ockham demonstrates that it is not the case, and he affirms that 'God's freedom is exercised in congruence with itself',[60] a statement which implies (as I understand it) that it expresses God's character.

Compared with what I gather from Scripture and the synthesis of Burkhardt, O'Donovan's seems too much to stress world-order and to underplay the reflection of God's *nature* in his *tôrâ* and revealed wisdom (that enable humans to think God's thoughts after him), as well as the human calling to transcend the wordly horizon in moral union/fellowship with our Creator. Is 'created' the best qualification for the moral order established in creation and for creation? Yet, he does not deny them, and he provides a precious counter-weight to ruinous modern tendencies.

The key issue, it appears, is the relationship of being and obligation (or the right to obligate, to command). The upshot of the work we have surveyed, I suggest, is that we may neither identify nor separate the two. They are one, without confusion and in a way we cannot fathom, in God, in God alone. To God belongs ontological fullness, *ipsum esse*, as tradition has affirmed. 'Only the absolute *I Am*', Van Til teaches, 'can say, "I Am," without needing to say anything more.'[61] Despite widespread opinion, Exodus 3:14 so implies, and Ricoeur was happily open to this truth.[62] And *that* God is the Good, absolutely, in the normative, moral sense (Mk 10:18). Therefore the creation that proceeds from him (and reveals what we may know of him) has ethical import – yet without any confusion of fact and obligatory force: only according to God's free purposes, as he speaks through and in creation, to the only earthly creatures endowed with responsibility (ability to respond). Maybe the biblical concept of *holiness* corresponds to the intimate union of being and goodness – since the Lord himself, the King of the universe, is holy, and holy, and holy, so his images ought to be, so his people; their fulfilment of the righteous demand of the law will become effective in reality through the process of their *sanctification*.

From a methodological viewpoint, we observe that the popular concept of *value* would combine reality and the authority of norms. This is why it is so attractive – and it suits a pluralistic outlook. But it could be a snare, though I do not deny that it may be useful. When the value of love is made the prominent concept, as Patrick Nullens realistically observes, one can be suspicious of the *vagueness* introduced.[63] Ricoeur strikes to the root when he writes: 'I hold the quasi concept of value to be a term of compromise…'[64] 'Value' is a mongrel concept: *neither* truly real *nor* clearly authoritative. When one lacks the courage of clarification, one can talk of values…

O'Donovan's formidable concentration on the created order of natural kinds and ends enables him to circumscribe the field of ethics in an original way – a methodological *plus*. Only *generic* duties, he shows, are properly moral, not the duty born of individual vocation (which proceeds from God's historical providence, not from the order of creation). 'Of course, there is a moral duty that we should follow our vocations – but that is a *generic* duty, not a particular one!'[65] It reminds us of Dooyeweerd's effort to pinpoint the kernel-meaning (or nuclear moment) of the ethical modality or law-sphere. It must be love, but love is not confined to the ethical modality, it characterises the central religious relation above or beyond the modal diversity. Distinguishing Christian religion and ethics is 'the "Cape Horn" of every Christian view of the "moral sphere"'.[66] A very careful progression, including a critical evaluation of W.J. Aalders' and Emil Brunner's proposals, reaches the conclusion: 'In the modal ethical relation love manifests itself on the normative law-side only in a balanced proportion between self-love and love of one's neighbour.'[67] Worth pondering, though it expels duties towards God out of the moral field.

One more issue relates to the definition of ethics. If, as we just said, moral obedience is a fruit of sanctification, should the doctrine of sanctification be a part of moral theology? Burkhardt almost vehemently calls for the inclusion of teaching on spirituality within the study of ethics.[68] His *Einführung in die Ethik* offers as its last and substantial part an exposition which corresponds to the soteriology of theology textbooks; actually, I have found it closely parallel to the third part of my *Doctrine du péché et de la rédemption*, which deals with the application of saving grace![69] In his own way, O'Donovan also includes a significant amount of soteriological material in his 'evangelical ethics': he can devote a page to baptism, or mark some sympathy for the theme of 'divinisation'.[70] Romans 12:2 might be quoted in support: the transformation and renewal of the mind belongs to the work of sanctification.

I see no theological objection to defining ethics so that it incorporates the working of grace in Christian life: the latter, I confess, provides the dynamic of moral behaviour. Yet, chiefly for practical reasons, I would prefer a narrower circumscription. It follows historical precedent, and makes dialogue with other persuasions easier. Theological permission can be found in the difference of viewpoints: dogmatics focus on God's work for us and in us, while ethics still focus on the works which we are called to accomplish. Soteriology and spirituality are primarily interested in our fellowship with God, whereas in the moral field we think first of discharging our responsibilities.

3. The object of ethics: what is to conform to God's will?

Exploring the contours of what we call 'ethics' was the first methodological step we had to make, of greatest complexity and import. There are, however, other issues which we are to consider – though it must be done more briefly. We must leave to the side Rainer Mayer's stimulating call for a reflection on 'the tension between Being, Duty [*Sollen*] and Will [*Wollen*]' and on the relationship between motive, means and goal.[71] The next question concerns that which ethical norms and moral orientations are to bring into conformity with God's will. *Mores* or *e/*ēthè: yes, but more precisely? The object shows the polarity of 'act' and 'character', on the one hand, and individual and social ethics on the other; a word must be added on 'institutions' seen from a moral angle.

3.1 Acts

Act has been considered as the primary object of moral appreciation (and deliberation). Ethics is interested in *praxis* (which is distinct from *poièsis*[72]). As O'Donovan shows, even Thomas Aquinas, who emphasised *habitus* and virtue, 'is much more inclined to an act-analytical approach'[73] when it comes to moral appreciation. But the act itself is not a 'monad', a perfectly simple thing: an act is born from intention, it embodies it and makes it 'real'; whatever the intention, however, it is also something done in the moment with its own features which may conform or conflict with norms; and it produces consequences, some of them intended, some of them not at all. To which of these elements should ethical judgement attach itself?

Can anyone bring a rigorous answer? Scripture in its general tenor and common sense seem to favour a 'this, but not forgetting that' approach. Intention is important – which is normally of one piece with the act – and it must be taken into account, as in the case of unintentional homicide, when a mortal accident happened only through God's decretive will (Ex 21:11-14), though the murderer had not planned or willed it so. Even in this case, however, the act carries guilt, with judicial consequences. The focus in most biblical passages, e.g., in the lists in apostolic epistles, is on acts, *erga* (cf. 1 Cor 6:9-10; very precise, Rom 2:21-22). Judgement targets things done through the body (2 Cor 5:10). But consequences may not be ignored, the fruit that remains. No moral deliberation may be indifferent to consequences – a 'rigorism' that proclaims *Fiat iustitia, pereat mundus* should be deeply abhorrent to Christians.[74] Agents seem to be responsible for the foreseeable consequences of their acts, but not for longer-term effects, which are beyond their control. O'Donovan also recalls the important *Principle of Double Effect*, which helps us to distinguish between intended and unintended effects, foreseeable or not.[75]

Acts take time to perform, but themselves are inserted in the texture of more enduring realities: recent ethical reflection has pushed forward the permanent disposition in the subject which the scholastics called *habitus* (more than 'habit') and, if moral and praiseworthy, *virtue*. (*Virtus* is originally the force and courage of a valiant *vir*, and translates Greek *aretè*, excellence.) The trend has been hailed as a return to Aristotle: ethics should focus on these. O'Donovan writes of 'policies' we frame 'for the conduct of our lives'[76] and Donald D. Evans has coined (or borrowed) the word 'behabitives' for the basic attitudes which shape 'habitus, behaviour'.[77] The whole pattern of set dispositions and attitudes can be named 'character'. The whole progression may be described in the words of the quasi proverb: 'Sow a thought, you'll reap an act; sow an act, you'll reap a habit; sow a habit, you'll reap a character; sow a character, you'll reap a destiny.'

3.2 Character

Scripture and, again, common sense and experience, testify to the importance of character. Our Lord himself stressed that bad fruits grow on bad trees. Hebrews 5:14 confirms that through exercise (*hexis,* to which Latin *habitus* corresponds) a disposition may be strengthened and sharpened that plays a great part in behaviour – interestingly, as in Romans 12:2, the primary aspect is intellectual (an encouragement for cognitive psychology).

Yet, should character be a reference-point in moral deliberation? Ethical authors like Alisdair MacIntyre and Stanley Hauerwas apparently think along such lines, but O'Donovan brilliantly refutes them. Character is not known directly but through the acts of the person – exactly as Jesus taught: 'the tree is known by its fruit'; I should not consider my character when I have to deliberate, for it will twist my decision[78] – '[t]he inappropriateness of character-knowledge to the tasks of deliberation is the clearest demonstration of the epistemological priority of acts in disclosing character.'[79] Above all, the argument that makes character the ground of moral choice deserves to be called an 'argument of impenitence': for it rules out that the new situation I face may be the occasion for me to *repent* from ways that have entered my character.[80] Actually the 'neo-Aristotelians' are *not* faithful to Aristotle:

> The conception of moral decision as conscious projection of one's character really arises from the modern voluntarist conception of the self as historical project, the very conception to which many representatives of this school boast that they have found an alternative.[81]

3.3 Community

Christian ethics, in former times, mainly addressed the individual agent. The last decades have witnessed the spread of a strong reaction: the *community* is the true moral subject which through its life-style shapes the attitudes and sensitivities of its members; above all it is competent to interpret the ethical tradition it carries on in our days. This is true of each community, however diverse from its neighbour, in our pluralistic world. Many factors have fostered the flowering of this 'communitarian' mood and mindset: the late modern distaste for modern individualism (at the level of discourse: many who talk in that way behave as hyper-individualists, at least towards family or nation); the impact of the social sciences, sometimes with an active Marxist residue; in literary studies and hermeneutics, the influence of reader-response theories; among Christians, ecumenical openness… The most famous among the intellectual leaders, an original theologian, Stanley Hauerwas, has also imbibed a free church ecclesiology (mediated through his former colleague, the mennonite theologian John H. Yoder), with a stark contrast between the 'world', ruled by the powers of darkness and full of violence, and the church – the church is the community of the 'Peaceable Kingdom' whose ongoing history draws the ethical line.

In several respects, the communitarian perspective agrees with 'politically correct' preferences; many critics in the academy, however, have voiced their concerns. Roman Catholic scholars, as one could expect, consider Hauerwas' pessimism excessive: he underestimates the theology of creation and cultivates an unwarranted suspicion of human reason and freedom.[82] Evangelicals will react otherwise, but some will fear the temptation of Manichean over-simplification. The main burden of Catholic criticisms is even more central: the loss of universality.[83] This appears to be the most disquieting problem. The authority attributed to the community makes it immune for correction from outside. Brian Brock complains:

> To restate my reservation about the communitarians, they are so sure that they are the Church that close reading of Scripture seems to fade in importance'; their 'insulation… suggest a trajectory of domestication of Scripture and the God to whom it witnesses.[84]

How can the emphasis on community moulding escape relativism? Gordon J. Wenham summarises Brock's common sense question: 'Where there are differences of view, how do we judge who is being led by the Spirit?'[85] Communities, even 'Christian' communities, have been able, no less than individuals, of the most monstrous moral aberrations…

We should aim at a biblical balance. Reversing the idolatry of individual interest which is characteristic of aging modernity seems to be sound: a reaction of the immune system. Human nature, indeed, includes the need to belong, an essential social dimension, and we cannot deny that communities, *de facto*, shape the ethics of their members, in a holistic fashion, and orientate their reading of the sacred texts. To the Kantian question 'What ought I to do?' the wider question may gain priority: 'How shall we live?' But the anthropology of Scripture also highlights individual responsibility, together with the irreducible reality of the individual person, who may be said to transcend the group: not a more clog in the machine, not a mere cell in the body. Actually, all cultures were *communitarian*, until the breakthrough of the sense of the individual *in the Bible* – modern individualism being a corrupting secularisation of that sense! *De facto* individuals do rebel or criticise their community's *ethos*, and if they don't, it is still their choice. And *de jure*? They are answerable, ultimately, not to the community to which they do not belong *absolutely*, but to the God only Good who made them for himself, who put in their hearts 'eternity' (Ec 3:11) and has written there his moral law (Rom 2:15). The emphasis on individual terms of judgement in the New Testament is overwhelming: everyone will bear his/her own burden (Gal 6:5). As O'Donovan maintains with lucid courage, Jesus criticised the expropriation of the individual by the community:

> This criticism affirms the individual agent, in his secret chamber and apart from all observing eyes, as the recipient of God's moral demand; he is not merely a conforming member of the community which God addresses.[86]

3.4 Institutions

Since human life, as created, is irreducibly individual *and* social, a special paragraph must be added to the doctrine of norms and ends: on *institutions*. Ricoeur was careful to underline the point: ethics aim at 'the good life, with and for the other person, *in just institutions*'.[87] Under the word, he understands 'the structure of *life-together* of a historical community – people, nation, region, etc. –, a structure which cannot be reduced to interpersonal relations and yet tied with them in a remarkable way…'[88] Definition, precisely, is difficult! A number of scholars use the term to translate *ktisis* in 1 Peter 2:13, where political offices are in view, but this is disputed. I tend to use 'institutions' for stereotyped manners of proceeding among persons, which acquire a kind of objective existence (signified by tools and symbols, such as a palace) and a relative permanence in social life, invested with a measure of ethical authority.[89] They used to have an aura of prestige, indeed of sacred dignity – the moral crisis of our culture is to a great extent due to the loss of this aura. Theologically, they seem to correspond 'roughly' to the classical 'orders of creation', *Ordnungen*,[90] and to Bonhoeffer's 'mandates' work, family, authority, church.[91] I would resist putting the church, the New Creation humanity, in the same category as the orders of the first creation. The New Testament *Haustafeln* (codes listing household duties, e.g. in Eph 5-6) are also relevant. The topic surely invites further exploration. Methodologically, the trap to be avoided is a treatment of the various institutions as if they had the same status, in society, and before God.[92]

Debates have been most passionate on the institutions of family and political authority. I suggest that we should clearly distinguish, within the family, the institution of marriage and that of parenthood. Regarding the state, I only mention that O'Donovan has worked intensively on the subject, and authored the important book *The Desire of the Nations*.[93] His thesis, a bit surprisingly, changes the function of political authority with the advent of Christ, which is *reduced* to the righting of wrongs – leaving a more important role to the church in the ordering of society. This may correspond to tendencies in his overall view, and to his Anglican identity. Jonathan Chaplin's sympathetic critique is the best treatment I have read.[94]

4. Sources of moral truth: whence the guiding light?

Method is also about the identification of the guides we are to follow. Issues are legion... We can only offer sketchy comments on a number of them.

4.1 Scripture

Jean-Marie Aubert feared that pessimism relative to contemporary culture should lead ethical students to Scripture as their source, thus running 'the risk of falling into a new concordism or, even, the Lutheran fundamentalism of "sola scriptura"'.[95] Evangelicals, if they are consistent, will rather be attracted by that risk... Yet I confess some unease when I chance across statements that smack the fear of being labelled a 'fundamentalist' or use 'biblicist' with a pejorative slant.[96] The light on our path is the light of his Word, which, in God's providence, has entered the circle of our wanderings as God's Word *written*. Even in Eden, as Van Til loved to stress,[97] God expressed his will through a specific command (Gen 2:16). Any weakening of the authority of Scripture affects the foundation of Christian ethics.[98] But I must now leave this problem aside.

The 'hot' issue today concerns the way we *read* Scripture. There has been a rather vocal dissatisfaction with the alleged way of previous generations, with their concentration on law objectively studied. The new emphasis falls on the diversity of biblical genres, and, above all, on *narrative*. Even beyond the ranks of communitarians, narratives – of which the Bible is full – are considered the most potent factor in the moral shaping of a community. More recently, the language of worship, communal praise, has been the focus, in Brian Brock's important book *Singing the Ethos of God*.

The *locus* of possible dissent must be clearly identified. The use of all the kinds of biblical literature, and for ethical guidance, is welcome indeed. Beyond *tôrâ*, prophecy, wisdom, poetry – as when Chris Wright sums up the import of the Song of Solomon's celebration of legitimate sex: 'In this case, the Wisdom tradition adorns what the law protects.'[99] Narrative is morally instructive and a powerful vector of moral influence. There is a place for meditation, beyond rigorous exegesis, and communal worship is a precious context of ethical renewal. All this may be granted, and applauded. Problems begin when narrative becomes, in practice or even in theory, the only medium. Ricoeur himself warned that it should not engulf all the other genres: especially the mutual determination of story and *law* as a major Old Testament feature (already in the Yahwist document, as he accepts the theory).[100] Bartholomew agrees with O'Donovan that 'thought cannot live *sola narratione*'.[101] Gordon Wenham observes the obvious: narrative is often ambiguous. 'It is essential that *description* of behaviour is not confused with *prescription*' and we need the other texts to discern.[102] After all, giving ethical direction and making known the will of Authority is the very function for which the genres of law and wise admonition exist! Without them the risk that the servant mixes his own preferences with what the text says cannot be denied. The same with imaginative meditation! If the summary of Brock's 'relocation of hermeneutics' is correct: 'away from seeking the meaning of the text, toward encountering the text through lived, intimate, generative relationship',[103] one wonders what is left of the Word. Narrative, meditation, yes – provided the revelation of God's will in its more direct expression and least susceptible of human manipulation *controls* the experience.

It looks *as if* Christians wished to get rid of this control. Wenham does not see the warrant for Brock's sentiment 'that principles and rules, models and virtues, cannot be derived from Scripture'[104] for such is the import of the 'relocation'. Donald Wood resists being 'forced into deciding between scriptural transparency and systematic cogency'[105] since he feels the pressure. Brian Brock himself replies and explains: 'if Christian ethics is a matter of applying or choosing to obey a set of principles we have in hand, we become like Hercules at the crossroads, reinstated as judges of our own destiny, which is to sever ourselves from God's dealings.'[106] *Prôton pseudos*! If we brush off the minor traits of caricature, we must say that for a servant to possess objective directions from his master, a set of 'principles' he is responsibly to apply, is the very condition of obedience; thus can he ratify his dependence on the master!

Brock, whose example is telling because of the high quality and evangelical substance of his contribution, puts forward another argument: 'The search for a hermeneutical "centre" of Scripture or a master-concept must always prove a failure and a distraction, for Scripture is a grammar, and a grammar has no "centre".'[107] The word 'grammar' occurs several times in the special issue of the *European Journal of Theology* devoted to Brock's book, and everyone seems to accept it. It is a remarkable symptom: for grammar has nothing to do with *truth*! Applying the same grammar, you can tell lies or tell the truth! Grammar may help us to understand the Word; this formal science can only be a tool in the service of the Word of Truth. This remark may be extended to George Lindbeck's thesis that assimilates the doctrines of the various churches to idioms, such as French, English… It ignores the basic Saussurian distinction between *langue* and *parole*; it betrays how lukewarm the passion for truth has grown in Christendom… If one claims that depriving the objective witness of Scripture of its determinative role in the search after ethical truth happily opens the space required for the Spirit's leading, this is nothing else than the old *illuministic* temptation, whose pernicious effects are so conspicuous throughout history and among present churches and cults.

There is no sound interpretation of Scripture without the Holy Spirit. We desperately need his help at least on three counts: he must remove the veil upon our hearts, he must heal our distorted spiritual sight; he grants to experience, to 'taste', the realities of which the texts speak; he adds *charismata*, special gifts to the church of Christ. But, since we are to *test* the spirits, the touchstone being the apostolic instruction (1 Jn 4:1-6; cf. Calvin's *Institutes* I,9) – if the Spirit is God's 'finger' (Lk 11:20), Scripture is his finger-print – the Spirit's leading can be discerned through the interpretation of Scripture *semetipsam interpretans*. Any insinuation that such a rule mutes the voice of the Spirit should be repelled as slanderous.

Interpreting Scripture as Scripture itself requires is synonymous with doing so *according to the analogy of faith*.[108] This validates O'Donovan's 'assertion of the need for an *architectonic hermeneutic*, or one that does justice to the shape of the edifice of Scripture as a whole'.[109] It also supports Patrick Nullens' call for a hermeneutic that takes seriously our Lord's saying in Matthew 22:40, and follows Augustine.[110] A central 'architectonic' problem is the relationship of Old and New Testaments, which impinges on many ethical problems.[111] We are made aware of the relevance of the debate when we read that Brock charges communitarian ethics, with apparent justification, with Marcionite tendencies.[112] We may note O'Donovan's learned defence of the Christian (already patristic) hermeneutical principle of the distinction between components of Old Testament law.[113] A clarification of the structure of the biblical history of dispensations or covenant(s) is important for Christian moral doctrine.

4.2 Theology

Reflecting on the analogy of faith already belongs to theology, but theology may be considered a source for ethics in two principal ways: as the legacy of *tradition* and as the systematic exposition of the *credendum*, providing locations and connections. Tradition should be treasured as an immensely useful assistant, a gift of God through the men and women he has excellently gifted. Though fallible, it is likely less so than our own brainchildren – being understood that we must wisely choose our tradition! It may protect us from the sway of fashion, and more broadly of the *Zeitgeist*. In Brock's proposal there is nothing more heart-warming than his desire to converse 'with the Saints Past and Present'. He dares attack the belief that one is bound to one's *epoch*, he wishes to think and read against the *schemata* of the age, he draws his inspiration from Augustine and from Luther:[114] Amen!

Karl Barth offers the superlative example of theology as a source. He insisted that ethics belongs *within* dogmatics and he ended each of the volumes of his *Kirchliche Dogmatik* with a (sometimes lengthy!) ethical section – among them the last 'fragment', IV/4 on baptism. The problem with Barthian ethics is the problem with Barthian dogmatics. His 'christological concentration' leads him to enclose everything in the unique Event Jesus Christ, ethics as everything else: it concerns Jesus Christ as the sanctified man.[115] 'Man' never becomes 'subject' and remains a mere predicate.[116] God's command is *never* general and requires no interpretation.[117] Law does not precede but is the form of the Gospel, the one thesis that aroused much discussion (already put forward in 1936, in *Evangelium und Gesetz*). One cannot effectively distinguish creation from reconciliation. A telling illustration of Barth's shortcoming, despite the wealth of his insights, is the way he reduces all the options, apart from his own, to the two alternatives of legalism (obligation without the power) and antinominianism (power with no duty left).[118] The biblical situation is more complex: humans as created had both obligation and power; sinners remain under obligation, they retain power as the creational faculty of choice but have lost the actual power of full obedience (through self-love, etc.); regenerate sinners still remain under obligation (though they are accepted by God on the basis of Christ's obedience) and gradually receive the power to please God. This corresponds to the concrete pattern creation – fall – redemption which sound method will follow.

Barth touches on the *imitatio Christi*.[119] The theme, so central in the history of spirituality, also belongs to theology. The implications for ethics are obvious. The danger that it eclipses the central proclamation of atonement, Christ for us, once for all, is real. But this danger should not, in turn, lead to the erasing of an important New Testament truth. If due care is taken to 'sift', in Christ's behaviour, what belongs to his unique mission and depends on his deity, his moral model is a vital source for Christian ethics.

4.3 Nature and conscience

The question of natural law has been abundantly debated for centuries. Theologically, it runs parallel to that of natural revelation and natural theology, and the key methodological distinction is precisely that of revelation and theology: of the objective communication on God's part, and the perception, reception and interpretation on the human side. His christological concentration led Barth to the flat denial of any revelation before the incarnate Christ, the *only* Word of God: hence his famous *Nein* to Brunner; if he later mellowed his position, I believe his basic stance remained the same.[120] The creation – fall – redemption scheme enables us better to appreciate biblical data. As O'Donovan's entire work demonstrates, God establishes in creation an order with moral directions. Romans 1-2 can hardly bear any other reading. Burkhardt aptly notices the parallelism of *para ton ktisanta* in 1:25 and *para phy[u]sin* in 1:26.[121] Claus-Dieter Stoll pens a fine summary of the evidence:

> The various indications in the Old Testament as well as in the New of a morality expressing God's will and according to creation standards, and the fact that the prophets call to account also foreign peoples who do not know Israel's law, allow us to understand that the creation itself witnesses to a universal moral law, as it points to God's good purposes with his creation. This universal ethics is not only accessible to Israel but also to the peoples, though in a limited way for them because of the absence of the necessary criteria of interpretation and correction given in the explicit revelation of God's will.[122]

Yet, because of the noetic effects of sin (darkened intelligence), natural theology is not reliable, and the recognition of 'natural law' is corrupted by the concomitants of idolatry, human lies in the service of lust and greed. O'Donovan himself speaks of 'misknowledge'.[123] He even refers to 'Antichrist' for modern and late-modern corruption of a tradition informed by Christianity.[124] This explains why evangelical Protestants have not been convinced by many conclusions which Catholics draw in the name of natural law. It also enables us to account for the common elements between current ethics in most cultures and biblical teaching:[125] this should cause no embarrassment for these elements proceed from God's creation and may be retrieved – purged and inserted in new contexts.

One of these is the notion of *conscience*. It plays an important role in Paul's epistles and that to the Hebrews. We should be wary of its 'hypostatisation': as if conscience were the 'voice of God' on its own. Romans 2:14-15 may safely be interpreted of the reactions of the inner person in its relations with the world and with others, *coram Deo*. O'Donovan beautifully traces the history of the growing isolation of 'conscience', with an unfortunate separation from 'will'.[126]

4.4 History

The last issue on which I shall touch is that of ethical change *in time*. Does Christian ethics change as history runs its course and brings to the fore new insights and new problems, as one usually thinks? Evangelicals have been on the alert against the inroads of historical and cultural relativism, with ample justification in my eyes; the cult of novelty all around (based on the spectacular advances of natural sciences and technology) is often openly directed against the Christian heritage. O'Donovan does a splendid job of refuting the most sophisticated *historicism*. He reminds us that in the strict sense of the word, we *do* live in the same world as Abraham, and H.-G. Gadamer's *Horizontverschmelzung* may be a misleading metaphor.[127] He convincingly shows that the 'new' questions which arise because of new technical possibilities, such as *in vitro* fertilisation, are not really new *ethically*:

> If a moral 'issue' has arisen about this new technique, it has arisen not because of questions the technique has put to us, but of questions we have put to the technique.[128]

As we read so often the praise of God's immutable statutes, of the stability of the world which he guarantees – 'the earth is fixed…',[129] it is surprising to hear what Brock asserts: 'the tenor of Christian ethics is therefore appropriately focused on changes, on surprising appearances, in short, on advent'.[130] How typical of the 'epoch'!

And yet the God of creation is the God of history, who makes things new. If we confuse the two, we lose both, but we must avoid at all costs an ultimate dualism. Under the influence, maybe, of a disputable idea of divine eternity as pure a-temporality, classical and evangelical thought has not always seen the danger. There must be a way to accommodate the diversity of times, and therefore novelty, in the stability of God's revealed will. Rainer Mayer argues that the presence of casuistry in the law shows sensitivity to time-bound situations, and therefore legitimates change.[131] Even the Thomist thinker Jacques Maritain affirmed that 'humankind passes under historical skies *varied*' with, each time, a different 'moral physiognomy'.[132] The combination of unity and diversity in God's plan, in which he fore-ordains whatever comes to pass, provides the theological foundation for the corresponding character of ethics – but who can fathom the Lord's counsel?

In addition to the treatment of the changes between Old and New Testaments, already mentioned, a special issue deserves mentioning. Is the idea of moral *trajectories* helpful in ethical discussions? It is used for slavery: the abolition of slavery, though not found in the New Testament, is the end of a trajectory which starts in the New Testament and receives its impetus from the message. Should it be applied to women's roles and status?

Biblical history is determined by eschatology. As I conclude with a question-mark it is proper that I should add: on that Day, all the issues shall be solved. And more: on that Day, we shall be like him, sin being no more. We shall perfectly conform to His will. We shall joyfully embrace what is good, well-pleasing and fulfilling, we shall enjoy Him for ever who is the Good as the Three-Personed-God.

Dr. Henri Blocher is professor emeritus of systematic theology at the Faculté Libre de Théology Evangélique in Vaux-sur-Seine, France.

Endnotes

1 This article is based on a lecture held at the biennial conference of the Fellowship of European Evangelical Theologians (FEET) in Orsay near Paris in 2014.

2 Oliver O'Donovan, *Resurrection and Moral Order: an outline for evangelical ethics* (Leicester/Grand Rapids: IVP/Eerdmans, 1986[1]) 182 [henceforth *RMO*]. I will often refer to this book, which I treasure as the deepest and richest treatment of Ethics I have seen in several decades.

3 Helmut Burkhardt, *Einführung in die Ethik. Teil I: Grund und Norm sittlichen Handelns (Fundamentalethik)* (TVG; Gießen: Brunnen, 1996) 17 [henceforth *EE*].

4 So Hans G. Ulrich, 'On Finding Our Place: Christian Ethics in God's Reality' in *European Journal of Theology* 18.2 (2009) 139: *ethos* is the *habitat* 'in which people belong. Martin Heidegger has preserved the Greek grammar of the term, translating *ethos* as "the place of dwelling", the place where people are at home. This reflection about the term *ethos* should not be seen as a linguistic sophism, but as a hint' in the direction of Brock's proposal. The reference to 'sophism' shows Ulrich aware of possible criticisms… Concerning Heidegger's philology, it is titillating to compare two translations of Heraclitus' Fragment 119: *èthos anthrôpô daimôn*. Heidegger interprets: 'Man dwells, inasmuch as he is man, in the nearness of God.' (*Lettre sur l'humanisme* to Jean Beaufret, German text and French translation by Roger Munier [Paris: Aubier-

Montaigne, 1966rev] 144, transl. 145). But E.R. Dodds interprets the same words: 'character is destiny' (*Les Grecs et l'irrationnel*, French transl. Michael Gibson [Champs 28; Paris, Flammarion, 1977] 182; since I had no access to the English original, I translated back from French into English; unless otherwise indicated, I translate my quotations from sources in other languages).

5 Against the 'etymological fallacy', James Barr, of course, but also Sylvain Romerowski's important synthesis, *Les Sciences du langage et l'étude de la Bible* (Charols: Excelsis, 2011), see references in the index, p.601. Etymology is a historical discipline which traces the semantic evolution of a word through centuries: the *etumon* reveals the older, not necessarily the truer, meaning. Knowing about the older meaning and the way it changed in time may enrich the understanding of present uses, stimulate meditation and provide preachers with illustrations. It may determine contemporary meaning inasmuch as the presence of the older sense, especially of the 'root' in derivatives, is still being felt (at least by the speaker or writer).

6 Burkhardt, *EE*, 17.

7 John R.W. Stott, *Evangelical Truth: A Personal Plea for Unity, Integrity & Faithfulness* (Downers Grove: IVP, 1999).

8 On the laws 'of nature' as created, see Lydia Jaeger's many books, especially *Lois de la nature et raisons du coeur. Les convictions religieuses dans le débat épistémologique contemporain* (Bern, etc.: Peter Lang, 2007), from her doctoral thesis, and at a more popular level, *Vivre dans un monde créé* (Marne-la-Vallée/Nogent-sur-Marne: Farel/Institut Biblique, 2007). Part of her work is now available in English translation.

9 Herman Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought* Vol. III (s.l.: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1969) Part 1, chapter 2, 53-103, esp. 61-76. He interacts with the Thomist critique of the Jesuit Michael Marlet (72-74) and with Hendrik Stoker, who doubted the adequacy of Dooyeweerd's solution and who, with Cornelius Van Til, vainly tried to induce the change of Dooyeweerd's title to 'the philosophy of the creation idea', according to C. Van Til, 'Response to Robert D. Knudsen' in E.R. Geehan (ed.), *Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on the Theology and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til* (s.l.: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1971) 303-304. One must register Dooyeweerd's confession: 'Let me begin with repeating that our Christian cosmonomic Idea contains the Idea of creation and is completely permeated with it' (*New Critique* III, 66), and: 'Theoretical thought here reaches its limits and thereby reveals that it is not self-sufficient' (66) – a sympathetic modesty. He makes clear that the 'substance' he rejects has an absolute character ('an absolute point of reference', 65; 'an independent *bearer* of meaning', 69). When he denies 'being' (Dutch: *zijn*) to creatures, he means 'independent being' and when he affirms them as 'meaning' (Dutch: *zin*) he does not deny reality (74); whether he has found all the means to carry out his intention is another story. As to Stoker, after listening to Dooyeweerd's critique, he saw fit to drop the word 'substance' and coined, instead, the word 'idiostance' (note to his 'Letter' to Van Til, in *Jerusalem and Athens*, 456 n. 35).

10 Brian Brock, *Singing the Ethos of God: On the place of Christian Ethics in Scripture* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007) xiii, as quoted by Bernd Wannenwetsch, 'Conversing with the Saints as they converse with Scripture: In conversation with Brian Brock's *Singing the Ethos of God*' in *EJT* 18.2 (2009) 129.

11 According to O'Donovan, *RMO*, 8.

12 This term, borrowed from linguistics, has been widely accepted, though conformity to the Latin origin would lead to the form 'referend' (from the gerundive), a form I have found (years ago!) used by a few French authors.

13 Paul Ricoeur, 'Ethique et morale' (1990), reprinted in *Lectures 1: Autour du politique* (Paris: Seuil, 1991) 256-269; *Soi-même comme un autre* (Gifford Lectures; Paris: Seuil, 1990) 199-344, a development he calls his 'petite éthique' (337).

14 Burkhardt, *EE*, 18-19.

15 Nikolaus Lobkowicz, 'Überlegungen zur philosophischen Begründung der Ethik' in Helmut Burkhardt (Hrsg), *Begründung ethischer Normen* (TVG; Wuppertal/Basel: R. Brockhaus/Brunnen, 1988) 8-9.

16 Burkhardt, *EE*, 19.

17 Ricoeur, 'Ethique et morale', 256. In 1991, in his 'Postface au *Temps de la responsabilité*', reprinted in *Lectures 1*, 272, he uses both terms synonymously ('comme Frédéric Lenoir').

18 I already commented on the issue in Henri Blocher, 'Pour fonder une éthique évangélique' in *Fac-Réflexion* 40-41 (1997) 21-22, also with reference to Abraham Kuyper. I cannot avoid overlap between this article and the present paper, but I tried to keep it within bounds.

19 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 138. In order to do so he paints the deontic with unpleasant colours (a burden, it cuts across natural aspirations, 137) and understands 'prescriptive' of 'the action-directing function of all moral speech' – an entirely legitimate understanding, but many would take 'prescriptive' more narrowly, with a nuance of binding authority which non-deontological views of ethics find hard to sustain.

20 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 125. He avoids the common 'etymological fallacy' which appeals to the Latin root, *augere*, *auctor*, to blot out the normal, bur unpopular, meaning of the word.

21 Jochen Douma, 'The Use of Scripture in Ethics' in *EJT* 1.2 (1992) 110.

22 E.g., Lobkowicz, 'Überlegungen', 12.

23 This is the meaning of the title of (perhaps) Levinas' most significant book: *Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence* (The Hague: Martin Nijhoff, 1974[1] / Livre de poche Kluwer Academic, 1990).

24 Little known, a symposium deserves a mention here: Joseph A. Selling and Jan Jans (eds), *The Splendor of Accuracy: An Examination of the Assertions made by Veritatis Splendor* (Kampen/Grand Rapids: Kok Pharos/Eerdmans, 1994 and 1995). Modernists fire back! They are able, apparently, to uncover surprising inaccuracies in the magisterial document. Their motive is clear in Jans' words (167): the authors reject the view of 'God as ruling king and human beings as obedient servants' and understand 'God as the transcendental mystery of involved love and the human person as categorical moral subject'.

25 John Murray, *Principles of Conduct: Aspects of Biblical Ethics* (London: Tyndale Press, 1957) 24; cf. 106: 'The ethic of the New Testament is one of obligation; it requires obedience; it recognises authority…'

26 Burkhardt, *EE*, 50-52, 57.

27 Stephen C. Mott, 'Ethics' in Gerald F. Hawthorne, Ralph P. Martin and Daniel G. Reid (eds), *Dictionary of Paul and his Letters* (Downers Grove and Leicester: IVP, 1993) 271, who goes on: 'It provides a pattern, warning, instruction and exhortation, including matters as specific as sexual immorality and remuneration of elders…' The antinomian exploitation of statements about the 'law' in the defence of gratuitous justification and of Christian freedom is refuted by Paul's use of *entolè*, his quotations from the Torah, the *Haustafeln*… One benefit (maybe the only one!) of the 'New Perspective' is that it has deprived the antinomian misinterpretation of its credibility. On Paul's use of Hellenistic elements, cf. Helmut Burkhardt, 'Der Naturrechtsgedanke im hellenistischen Judentum und im Neuen Testament' in *Begründung ethischer Normen*, 81-97.

28 Karl Barth, *Die Kirchliche Dogmatik* II,2 (Zollikon-Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1946[2]) 570 (near the beginning of § 36/1).

29 Burkhardt, *EE*, 91, borrows the word (the phrase *ethischer Urphänomen*) from Romano Guardini – in his context, of the concept of the Good; Burkhardt adds the implication of the unconditional opposition of Good and Evil.

30 On these two concepts, cf. Jean Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, *Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1981) 112-117. Freud started to differentiate between the two terms in the mid 1920s; basically, *Verneinung* (a few times *Negation*) refers to a presence of something in the Unconscious which its express denial, at the conscious level, betrays, while *Verleugnung* refers to the denial of an external fact of reality, whose perception is being suppressed. Laplanche and Pontalis, however, suggest (116) that *Verleugnung* may affect 'a foundational element of human reality' rather than a mere fact of perception: this would suit the sense of obligation well!

31 Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik* II,2, 613 (beginning of § 37/1).

32 Merold Westphal, 'Theism and the Problem of Ethics' in Ronald H. Nash (ed.), *The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark: A Festschrift* (Philadelphia: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1968) 177.

33 Cf. Olivier du Roy, 'L'Explosion de la règle d'or au XVIIe siècle anglais' in *Revue d'éthique et de théologie morale* 278 (2014) 35-56.

34 Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik* II,2, 618 (§ 37/1, a little before middle part). Cf. 726: 'we are first subject to obligation [*erst sollen wir*], as distinct from all willing, because we owe this debt to God' (§ 38/1, about two/thirds after beginning).

35 Ricoeur, *Soi-même comme un autre*, 207.

36 Ricoeur, *Soi-même comme un autre*, 254.

37 Paul Ricoeur, *L'Homme faillible (Philosophie de la volonté II/ Finitude et culpabilité I)* (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1960) 160; this 'reference to the originary constitutes evil as offence, i.e. as de-parture, as de-viation.'

38 Ricoeur could have quoted 1 Tim 1:9: I suggest that *keitai* should be interpreted of the *promulgation* of the law, not of the existence of the moral principle itself.

39 § 44; my translation from the French version, presented by Jean-Louis Bruguès (Paris: Mame, 1993) 71. Other statements in the Encyclical seem more favourable to rational autonomy and a bit weak on the need for special revelation.

40 Chris Wright, 'Ethical Decisions in the Old Testament' in *EJT* 1.2 (1992) 135.

41 Lincoln D. Hurst wisely mitigates Gustav Dalman's choice of 'reign' over against 'realm': 'That it could not be both is hardly evident from Jesus' teaching. Even in English the word *kingdom* does service for both…' 'Ethics of Jesus' in Joel B. Green and Scot McKnight (eds), *Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels* (Downers Grove and Leicester: IVP, 1992) 210.

42 Cornelius Van Til, *Christian Theistic Ethics (In Defense of the Faith III)*, a syllabus (Dulk Christian Foundation; Philadelphia: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1974).

43 Levinas, *Autrement qu'être*, 278.

44 Commenting on Levinas' deliberately broken and excessive language, Ricoeur asks: 'Is this not the avowal that ethics severed from ontology has no direct, proper, appropriate language?' (*Autrement: Lecture d'*Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence *d'Emmanuel Levinas* [les Essais du Collège International de Philosophie; Paris: Presses

Universitaires de France, 1997] 25).

45 Levinas, *Autrement qu'être*, 33 (announces the theme), *passim*, especially 146 n.1.

46 Ricoeur, *Autrement*, 26.

47 Ricoeur, *Autrement*, 27 (he develops his remarks on the following pages). Cf. also the treatment by Jean-Louis Chrétien, 'La Dette et l'élection' in Catherine Chalier and Miguel Abensour (eds), *Emmanuel Lévinas* (Biblio Essais 4173; Cahier de L'Herne, 1991) 273 (his whole essay 257-277 is remarkably perceptive).

48 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 47-48.

49 Herman Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought* vol. II (s.l.: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1969) 150.

50 Ricoeur, *Soi-même*, 249.

51 Lobkowicz, 'Überlegungen', 16.

52 Ricoeur, *Soi-même*, 247.

53 In addition to *RMO*, I mention O'Donovan's beautiful summary 'Christian Moral Reasoning' in David J. Atkinson and David H. Field (eds), *New Dictionary of Christian Ethics and Pastoral Theology* (Leicester & Downers Grove: IVP, 1995) 122-127.

54 I presume that O'Donovan would welcome the connotations of the German word *Wirklichkeit* (more than the etymological flavour of *res*, 'thing'). What Eric Gaziaux reports of Alfons Auer's views could also be written of O'Donovan's: 'every duty has its foundation in being, and the good is what conforms to reality in the sense of effectiveness (*Wirklichkeit*). ... The realist epistemology that is put to work requires an ascetic exercise to eliminate prejudices and to make reality into the measure of knowledge. There is correct knowledge when the human mind agrees with what is effective. ... Ethics may be understood as the 'yes' given to reality-effectiveness (*Wirklichkeit*)'. Eric Gaziaux, 'Morale "autonome" et éthique "communautarienne": Quels rapports pour quelle éthique chrétienne?' in *Revue d'éthique et de théologie morale* 251/hors-série 5 (2008) 194; note 6 stresses that 'being' is replaced by *Wirklichkeit*, which Meister Eckhart used to translate 'actualitas'.

55 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 76.

56 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 127.

57 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 143.

58 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 132.

59 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 147.

60 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 136 (on Ockham, 134-136).

61 Van Til, *Christian Theistic Ethics*, 200.

62 Paul Ricoeur, 'De l'interprétation à la traduction' in the book he wrote with André Lacoque, *Penser la Bible* (Paris: Seuil, 1998) 335-371, especially 365ff. I would argue that the interest for the question of being is not absent from Old and New Testaments.

63 Patrick Nullens, '*Theologia caritatis* and the Moral Authority of Scripture: Approaching 2 Timothy 3:16-17 with a hermeneutic of love' in *EJT* 22.1 (2013) 44.

64 Ricoeur, *Soi-même*, 336 n.1. The compromise he thinks of is between universality and historicity.

65 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 43, cf. 157.

66 Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, II, 143.

67 Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, II, 160.

68 Helmut Burkhardt, 'Spirituality and Ethics' in *EJT* 19.1 (2010) 45-49, 48.

69 Some coincidences are striking. E.g., the interpretation of Romans 7 (Burkhardt, *EE*, 142-143) is practically the same, though it is not common, as the one I offered in 1972, in an *Ichthus* article!

70 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 259 (baptism), 56 and 65 ('The dangerous but exciting term "divinization"...'). This sounds a little surprising, given the accent on the restoration of created order. Could it be that the emphasis on the mere createdness of the moral order called for a compensation when supernatural grace became the theme?

71 Rainer Mayer, 'Ethik ohne Normen? Herkunft, Wesen und Kritik der Situationsethik' in *Begründung ethischer Normen*, 148. The chapter (147-167) offers a vigorous theoretical structure.

72 Lobkowicz, 'Überlegungen', 15.

73 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 208.

74 Lobkowicz, 'Überlegungen', 13. He brands Max Weber's distinction of an ethic of responsibility and an ethic of conviction as 'absurd'.

75 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 192-193.

76 O'Donovan, 'Christian Moral Reasoning', 124.

77 Quoted by Gordon J. Wenham, 'Reflections on *Singing the Ethos*', in *EJT* 18.2 (2009) 123.

78 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 206-207.

79 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 215.

80 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 216-217.

81 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 217.

82 Gaziaux, 'Morale autonome', 207-208. The article compares Auer and Hauerwas. Henri-Jérôme Gagey, 'Le Christianisme est-il une alternative? La tentation communautarienne en théologie', in the same issue of the *Revue d'éthique et de théologie morale* 251/hors-série 5 (2008) 233-234 emphasises that 'Jesus is not alone'; he also reports Jeffrey Stout's critique and uses the word 'dualism' (230). Incidentally, he quotes Hauerwas disclaiming the label 'communitarian': 'I am not a communitarian. I am a Christian' (224, cf. 220).

83 Gaziaux, 'Morale autonome', 202-206, 210-214; Gaziaux would opt for a 'dialectical' combination of historical rooting and universalising reason: 'Historically transmitted ethical norms are open for a critical assumption by reason' (211) – but whence the criteria for a critical assumption?

84 Brian Brock, 'Attunement to Saints Past and Present: Clarifications and Convergences' in *EJT* 18.2 (2009) 158.

85 Wenham, 'Reflections', 117. Though Wenham prefers to remain soft or weak on the issue, he

acknowledges 'the problem of schism, so that every ecclesiastical body claims it has the right to interpret Scripture in its own way, with a multitude of conflicting interpretations then being advocated.' Wannenwetsch, 'Conversing with the Saints', 128, notices the influence of 'postmodern aesthetics of perception' and concurs with Brock: 'To the degree in which the perspective of the latter was adopted, the turn to community appeared to suggest that the believing community itself was to "bestow" authority on the book it took to be normative.' But the church is *creatura verbi*.

86 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 156.

87 Ricoeur, *Soi-même*, 202 (the whole quote in italics in original).

88 Ricoeur, *Soi-même*, 227.

89 Mayer, 'Ethik ohne Normen', 151, writes: 'Values, through norms and models of behaviour find their expression in the social category, their enter firm, enduring, forms: we speak of *institutions*.'

90 On this, see Friedrich Beißer, 'Biblischer Schöpfungsglaube und die Begründung ethischer Normen' in *Begründung ethischer Normen*, 34-36 (wise indeed).

91 Mayer, 'Ethik ohne Normen', 153, differentiates between these 'mandates' and 'institutions'.

92 Cf. Burkhardt's admonition that we recognise various degrees of obligation when we apply Natural Law to social life, *EE*, 102.

93 Oliver O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations. Rediscovering the roots of political theology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

94 Jonathan Chaplin, 'Political Eschatology and Responsible Government: Oliver O'Donovan's "Christian Liberalism"' in Craig G. Bartholomew *et al.* (eds), *A Royal Priesthood: The Use of the Bible Ethically and Politically. A Dialogue with Oliver O'Donovan* (Scripture and Hermeneutics Series 3; Cheltenham/Carlisle/Grand Rapids: University of Gloucestershire/Paternoster/Zondervan, 2002) 265-308.

95 J.-M. Aubert, 'Foi et morale. Parcours de morale fondamentale' in *Le Supplément (Revue d'éthique et de théologie morale)* 155 (1985) 79.

96 Wannenwetsch, 'Conversing with the Saints', 127, seems to accept the charge that 'biblicist accounts tend to' ignore the estrangement of the Word. Of course, who the biblicists are is not specified.

97 E.g., the excerpt from his *Christian Theory of Knowledge* in the Readings gathered by Greg L. Bahnsen, *Van Til's Apologetic* (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1998) 203-204; in his *Christian Theistic Ethics*, 130, Van Til reflects on the external character of this pre-redemptive special revelation.

98 I regret to read that O'Donovan, in one of his 'responses', 'makes full use of biblical criticism', a phrase which in ordinary parlance refers to a way of handling the text of Scripture which detracts from its full authority (Craig G. Bartholomew, 'Introduction' in *A Royal Priesthood*, 37; R.W.L. Moberly in the same book, 'The Use of Scripture in *The Desire of the Nations*', 46-64, finds inconsistencies in this regard, especially on the history of Israel – reconstructed or not?).

99 Wright, 'Ethical Decisions in the Old Testament', 128.

100 Paul Ricoeur, 'Biblical time', published in an English translation in Mark I. Wallace (ed.), *Figuring the Sacred. Religion, Narrative, and Imagination* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995) 171-172.

101 Bartholomew, 'Introduction', *A Royal Priesthood*, 38.

102 Wenham, 'Reflections', 117.

103 Simon Woodman, 'An "Alien in the land": A Summary of *Singing the Ethos of God* by Brian Brock' in *EJT* 18.2 (2009) 112.

104 Wenham, 'Reflections', 119.

105 Donald Wood, 'Some Comments on Moral Realism and Scriptural Authority' in *EJT* 18.2 (2009) 150.

106 Brock, 'Attunement to Saints', 159.

107 Donald Wood's summary (with reference to p.252 of *Singing the Ethos*), 'Some Comments', 151; Brocks's response, 'Conversing with the Saints', 158 also uses 'grammar'.

108 Henri Blocher, 'The "Analogy of Faith" in the Study of Scripture' in Nigel M. de S. Cameron (ed.), *The Challenge of Evangelical Theology: Essays in Approach and Method* (Edinburgh: Rutherford Books, 1987) 17-38.

109 Bartholomew, 'Introduction', *A Royal Priesthood*, 37.

110 Cf. the whole of Nullens' '*Theologia caritatis*', especially 42-43.

111 Douma, 'The Use of Scripture', 114, 116-118.

112 Wenham, 'Reflections', 118.

113 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 159-160.

114 Wannenwetsch, 'Conversing with the Saints', 130-132.

115 Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik* II,2, 598 (§ 36.1).

116 Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik* II,2, 611 (§ 36.2).

117 Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik* II,2, 740, 741, 750, 760 (despite misleading appearances, Barth claims, '*dieser Schein trügt*'), 785-786 (§ 38.2).

118 Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik* II,2, 671 (§ 37.3), the key words being *sollen* and *dürfen*.

119 Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik* II,2, 632-634 (§ 37.2).

120 Beißer, 'Biblischer Schöpfungsglaube', 30, reports that Barth sent a visitor to Brunner with the message 'Tell him – tell him: JA.' But the witness of creation is to be understood *post Christum*, inasmuch as creation, not independent of incarnation-reconciliation, reflects his glory.

121 Burkhardt, *EE*, 64. Also his 'Der Naturrechtsgedanke im hellenistischen Judentum und im Neuen Testament' in *Begründung ethischer Normen*, 90-91.

122 Claus-Dieter Stoll, 'Partikularität und Universalität in der Ethik des Alten Testaments' in *Begründung ethischer Normen*, 74.
123 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 82, 88.
124 Quoted by Bartholomew, 'Introduction', 34, and Chaplin, 'Political Eschatology', 283, in *A Royal Priesthood.*
125 See Burkhardt, *EE*, 90.
126 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 114-120.
127 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 161-162.
128 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 93 (92-93).
129 Wright, 'Ethical decisions', 126.
130 Brock, 'Attunement to Saints', 162.
131 Mayer, 'Ethik ohne Normen' in *Begründung ethischer Normen*, 151.
132 Jacques Maritain, *Humanisme intégral. Problèmes temporels et spirituels d'une nouvelle chrétienté* (Foi vivante 66; Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1968) 146.

EJT (2015) 24:2, 132–145 0960–2720

Values in our Society – With Social, Historical and Anthropological Aspects

Ad de Bruijne

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Dieser Artikel bezieht sich auf die empirische, sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung und zeichnet zunächst ein Bild der vorherrschenden Werte in der gegenwärtigen Gesellschaft Europas. Auf dieser Grundlage erläutert ein historisch-philosophischer Ansatz (MacIntyre) den fragmentarischen und inkohärenten Charakter dieses Bildes, wie es sich aus dem nachchristlichen Zustand ergibt. Allerdings decken anthropologische Überlegungen (wie Moralbiologie, Moralpsychologie, kulturelle Anthropologie) einige gemeinsame und dauerhafte moralische Überzeugungen der Menschheit auf. Diese sollten Christen lehren, sich nicht nur über den Verfall zu beklagen, sondern auch offen zu sein für einen möglichen Fortschritt. Darüberhinaus bringt die theologische Analyse der (Post-)Moderne gleichzeitig sowohl die besten kulturellen Früchte der christlichen Wahrheit als auch deren schlimmste nachchristliche Entstellungen ans Licht (Kuyper, O'Donovan). Die Moderne mit ihrem hohen Selbstwertgefühl kommt einer säkularisierten Eschatologie gleich, der Christen mit Vorsicht begegnen sollten, damit sie nicht diesem aufgeblähten Optimismus einen einseitigen Pessimismus entgegensetzen. Vorherrschende Werte stellen sich als moralisch widersprüchlich heraus, wie man z.B. an individueller Selbstverwirklichung, Freiheit, Toleranz, Gleichstellung, Privatsphäre, Demokratie, freiem Unternehmertum und Mitgefühl sieht. Der Artikel endet mit möglichen Ansätzen einer christlichen Ethik und mit den besonderen Herausforderungen für Christen, was die Werte eines (post-)modernen Europa angeht. Christen sind dazu berufen, Propheten zu sein, und zwar nicht nur zu kritisieren, sondern vielmehr die besonderen moralischen Systemblockaden unserer Gesellschaft zu präzisieren.

* * * * * * * *

RÉSUMÉ

À partir de recherches empiriques en sciences sociales, l'auteur dresse un tableau des valeurs dominantes dans les sociétés européennes contemporaines. Une approche historico-philosophique (MacIntyre) permet d'en comprendre le caractère fragmenté et incohérent comme le produit de la condition post-chrétienne. Des considérations anthropologiques (de biologie morale, de psychologie morale et d'anthropologie culturelle) laissent cependant percevoir certaines convictions partagées et durables dans l'humanité. Ceci devrait conduire les chrétiens à ne pas se contenter de déplorer la décadence de ces sociétés mais aussi à être ouverts à la possibilité d'un certain progrès. En outre, une analyse théologique de la (post-)modernité permet de détecter à la fois les meilleurs fruits culturels de la vérité chrétienne et leurs distorsions post-chrétiennes les plus déplorables (Kuyper, O'Donovan). La modernité, qui se considère elle-même de manière très optimiste, est une sorte d'eschatologie sécularisée et les chrétiens devraient se garder de répondre à cet optimisme excessif par un pessimisme unilatéral. Les valeurs qui prévalent paraissent moralement ambiguës, comme on le constate pour des valeurs comme la réalisation de soi individuelle, la liberté, la tolérance, l'égalité, la préservation de la sphère privée, la démocratie, la libre entreprise et la compassion. L'auteur considère diverses approches éthiques chrétiennes possibles, ainsi que des problèmes spécifiques auxquels les chrétiens doivent faire face en rapport avec les valeurs de l'Europe (post-) moderne. Les chrétiens ont une vocation prophétique, non seulement pour critiquer mais aussi pour montrer précisément dans quelles impasses morales notre société s'est engagée.

* * * * * * * *

SUMMARY

Drawing on empirical social scientific research, this article first presents a picture of the dominant values in contemporary European societies. Building on this, a historical-philosophical approach (MacIntyre) explains this picture's fragmentary and incoherent character as resulting from the post-Christian condition. However, anthropological considerations (moral biology, moral psychology, cultural anthropology) uncover some shared and lasting moral convictions in humanity, which should teach Christians not only to complain about decay but also to be open to the possibility of progress. Furthermore, a theological analysis of (post-)modernity detects both the highest cultural fruits of the Christian truth and their most deplorable post-Christian distortions at the same time (Kuyper, O'Donovan). Modernity with its high self-esteem is secularised eschatology, which should make Christians careful not to mirror its inflated optimism with one-sided pessimism. Prevalent values turn out to be morally ambiguous, as is shown in values such as individual self-realisation, freedom, tolerance, equality, privacy, democracy, free enterprise and compassion. The article concludes with a discussion of possible Christian ethical approaches and specific challenges for Christians with respect to the values of (post-) modern Europe. Christians are called to be prophets, not only to criticise but precisely to clarify the specific moral deadlocks of our society.

* * * *

1. Introduction

Some recent examples will serve to indicate what our society values:

a A Dutch Christian police-officer was severely criticised after publishing a tweet in which he called the Amsterdam Gay Pride a dirty happening;[1]

b Members of the Italian parliament from Berlusconi's party engaged in a physical fight because of a sarcastic remark from a social democrat;[2]

c Highly educated women increasingly give up their careers and opt for motherhood;[3]

d The recent novel, *The Circle*, by Dave Eggers shows a terrifying picture of our society being obsessed with social media and webcams and caught in a movement towards hyper-transparency;[4]

e Some years ago, the Dutch neuro-scientist Dick Swaab declared: I want to decide the moment of my death myself, since it irritates me that I have not been able to choose the moment of my birth.[5]

I will return to these five examples later. This article consists of four parts.[6] After the introduction, I will build on social research in order to present a sketch of our society's values. Then I will interpret that image from a historical, an anthropological and a theological perspective. In conclusion, I will draw some lessons for Christian ethics.

This article was originally a paper at a conference aimed at the development of a Christian ethic for contemporary Europe. How we conceive of our society's moral condition affects our choice between possible routes for Christian ethics. With the Dutch ethicist Gerrit de Kruijf, I distinguish three possible routes for Christian ethics today, and I would add a fourth one of my own.[7] The first is that Christian ethics could follow the German ethicist Trutz Rendtorff and take an anthropological route in order to connect with non-theological ethics. An alternative would be the ecclesiological ethics of the American ethicist Stanley Hauerwas, who stresses the particularity and the counter-cultural character of the Christian narrative. The British theologian Oliver O'Donovan represents the third possibility. From an exclusively Christological starting point he has developed a concept in which the knowledge of reality and history plays an important role, resulting in residual possibilities for a critical dialogue with non-Christian ethics. I add a fourth route that is common among many evangelicals, such as the reformed Dutch ethicist Jochem Douma. Its focus is to find the ethical building blocks contained in the Bible and to apply these today.[8]

To form a picture of our society's morality, I will use the concept of 'values'. It is debatable whether this concept is suitable for Christian ethics.[9] During the nineteenth century, it entered ethics from the context of economics. Hence, it could enhance today's dangerous dominance of economic categories in non-economic life-spheres. For example, in ethics this is reflected in the appropriation of expressions like 'social' or 'moral capital'.[10] Besides, the concept of value originates in the Kantian separation between morality and knowledge of reality. Alongside the world of hard facts, a separate world of subjective values was postulated. Values are constructs with an elusive and vague character,[11] a feature that became all the more manifest with the inversion of all values that Nietzsche was able to advocate.[12] Despite these objections, however, the concept of values is useful for our aims. Already in itself it illustrates some traits of modern ethics, namely its subjectivism and post-Christian zeal.[13] Moreover, it forms the central concept that social and empirical sciences use when exploring the moral state of affairs in societies.[14] When we consider the integration of non-theological findings indispensable for theological ethics, as I do, we cannot escape interacting with the concept of values.

2. The moral situation of our society: an impression in the light of social science

We now turn to a social-scientifically informed exposition of the values in our society. One of the most prominent social-scientific research programmes in this field is the *European Values Project*, which began to survey European citizens periodically in the seventies. It has produced dozens of studies and even spread to other continents so that we now also witness a *World Values Project*.[15] Interestingly, in its early days, the project was instigated by Christian social scholars who were concerned about the impending disappearance of traditional Christian values in Europe.[16] As a matter of fact, complaints about the lack of Christian values have been voiced by successive generations of Christians since the Enlightenment.[17] The symptoms they mention include sexual morality, abortion and euthanasia.[18] In recent decades a comparable moral unease has spread to non-Christians as well. They refer to hassles in neighbourhoods; aggressive behaviour in schools, public transport and sport stadiums; increase of sex and violence in the media; weakening decency; and excessive greed among corporate executives.[19] Are complaints like these confirmed by the facts?

Europe's core value today turns out to be 'individual self-realization', a value connected with the pursuit of happiness.[20] The achievement of this aim has become the project of many lives. Other values, often with older roots, take on the features of this new central narrative. Values such as freedom, autonomy, equality, justice, human rights, democracy and tolerance thus all become servants to this higher aim. Meanwhile other early modern values persist, like rationality, progress, privacy, transparency and relativising authority. Communitarian philosophers and social scientists in particular[21] have predicted that social values will not be able to survive the late-modern individualist narrative. However, research points in the opposite direction. Values like compassion, solidarity, respect for life, commitment to a greater good, and faithfulness remain in esteem as ever.[22] The centrality of the stress on individual self-realisation is reflected in the popularity of the so-called 'four principles ethics' of Beauchamp and Childress, which was developed for the context of medical ethics but is now advanced in most fields of professional ethics.[23] Beauchamp and Childress' combination of the values of autonomy, benevolence, non-maleficence and justice turns out to be neatly tailored towards an ethic that does not prescribe the personal choices of individuals but only regulates and guarantees the co-existence of such individuals.

From a Christian perspective we could register radical moral shifts and even moral decline in the form of hedonistic individualism and the accompanying diminishing weight of given institutions and moral frameworks, such as churches, families and traditional moral codes.[24] Another intriguing and perhaps problematic change to Christians concerns the concept of conscience.[25] Rather than an inner compass through which good and evil are sensed and guilt is felt, conscience has turned more and more into a kind of radar: we pick up various signals from people in our surroundings, and combine these into a resulting direction. During this process we are driven by our longings to preserve our good relations with those who are important to us. An internally oriented ethic of guilt turns into an externally driven ethics of shame. Acting immorally is often experienced and characterised as stupid rather than as sin. Nevertheless, guilt continues to play its part, not in the form of one's personal burden but as something one transfers to others. This is reflected in the widespread tendency towards scapegoating and in an encroaching culture of claiming and blaming.

Yet, despite such – probably worrying – transitions, much continuity and even progress can be noticed, while countries also differ substantially from each other.[26] For example, volunteering has not really decreased.[27] On some themes, moral indignation has even been strengthened rather than weakened. Here we could think of themes like animal rights; rejection of discrimination, violence and abuse; indignation about prostitution, drugs, joyriding; concern about human rights, the environment and food (biotechnology); and forms of dishonesty such as social security fraud and tax evasion. Therefore, we can conclude that, from a Christian perspective, our society's values and moral condition are best characterised as ambivalent.[28]

In particular the domain of family, relationships and sexuality serves to illustrate this combination of continuities and changes.[29] Here radical shifts have occurred, raising serious concerns for many Christians. Stressing individual self-realisation and the pursuit of happiness have caused a privatisation of relationships into a domain of free individual choices, which leaves the community irrelevant. Sexuality took on new meanings such as the expression of the romantic unity between two selves or even as a basic human need and means of enjoyment. Single life has become an accepted choice. New types of partnership have developed, forms like cohabitation, 'living apart together', being 'friends with benefits', one-night stands, self-chosen communal structures, multiple parent families and gay marriage. Traditional role-definitions between men and women have faded away. Producing children has become an option. On the one hand technology is required to make impossible pregnancies possible, while on the other abortion has become an honourable way to end unwanted pregnancies.

However, despite those changes most Europeans still consider 'family' to be of utmost importance for their lives. Moreover, the appreciation of marriage has not really decreased, as cohabitation is more and more reinterpreted as a kind of pre-marriage; in the words of Adrian Thatcher, it is a modern version of the traditional betrothal.[30] Further, within relationships faithfulness still counts as highly important and adultery as unacceptable, notwithstanding the acceptance of divorce and of serial monogamy. Mutual communication and togetherness are even valued more than in the past. Most couples still want children. For most citizens even sexual hedonism does not completely reduce sexuality to a means of enjoyment. According to a majority, it still requires mutual familiarity and confidence. We even witness the development of new taboos, perhaps as a counterbalance to the prevalent sexual freedoms. With regard to incest, pedosexuality and sexual harassment, moral attitudes have become less tolerant and are now even stricter than in most periods of history. Researchers conclude that there is no convincing empirical support for the often repeated complaints about an impending breakdown of the family or an underlying general moral decline.[31]

However, at a second glance, such lasting traditional moral accents appear to be founded on new justifications, which reflect the new core values of our society that we came across.[32] Why do highly educated women today return to motherhood? Not because they find shelter in traditional moral frameworks, but because they have come to conceive of motherhood as a possible mode of self-realisation.[33] Why is marriage making a comeback today? Not because it is honoured again as a creational structure, but because creating a unique personal experience on your wedding day suits the wide-spread longing for authentic self-expression. Why is volunteering even more popular than some decades ago? Not because we have departed from our individualist orientation, but because in our post-materialist context we yearn for meaningful ways to spend our increased spare time.[34] Even the new sexual taboos do not mark a renewal of traditional moral standards. They circle around the central value of respect for individual autonomy. As Foucault has articulated, sexual harassment is not so much considered problematic for its sexual dimension but because it implies abuse of power.[35] In this light we should interpret the moral ambivalence that we noticed in our society. This ambivalence does not relativise the transition towards individual self-realisation but it exists within that context.[36]

3. Interpretation of our society's values

3.1 Historical-philosophical

We now turn to the interpretation of this moral ambivalence from three perspectives: the history of ideas, anthropology and theology.

Today no less than 30 years ago, no one can bypass Alisdair MacIntyre's proposal for understanding modern morality.[37] This prominent philosopher has constructed a historical narrative that proposes a convincing interpretative framework of our society's moral ambivalence. According to MacIntyre, the Enlightenment departed from the classical and Christian teleological framework. Within that framework every creature and phenomenon possessed a well-defined place where it should serve a specific divine purpose. Good was what suited this aim; bad what contradicted it. In the mechanistic universe of modernity, which moreover denied religion a public function, this foundational framework collapsed so that only rootless moral fragments were left. Initially, the consequences of this development remained hidden, because faith in God survived in the private sphere and most citizens shared an optimistic vision of human goodness and the potential of universal human reason. However, with

Nietzsche, God, goodness and rationality became deconstructed, so that the already present hidden moral decay became apparent. Only individuals with their free choices could serve as possible uniting bodies for the many faces of morality. These individuals are no longer thought of as being guided by universal reason but, to the contrary, as being driven by subconscious and emotionally defined preferences dominated by a will towards self-realisation. If necessary, this goal could even be strived for at the expense of others. Ethics, traditionally directed towards good and evil, became aesthetics, circling around authentic self-expression. This new end reshapes individuals into consumers who select their personal portions from the menu card of ethical possibilities. They differ from each other and lack the instruments to communicate about these differences in a meaningful way. Ethical debates thus change into discussions about procedures to regulate unbridgeable rifts of opinion. Today, far-reaching decisions about ending severely disabled new-born lives are made by faithfully following existing protocols and without an exchange of genuinely ethical considerations. In sum, MacIntyre typifies modern morality as voluntaristic, emotivistic, pluralistic, relativistic and trapped in proceduralism. Even within the individual himself we notice a split. Given the many unconnected spheres in our highly differentiated modern society, our selection of 'moral snacks' often becomes inconsistent in itself.[38] The same person can both passionately advocate animal rights *and* consider abortion to be fully normal. I may be a good father *as well as* a ruthless manager at the same time. Likewise, we notice the acceptance of divorce *together with* a new stress on marital fidelity. People who passionately defend democracy against Islam, sometimes sympathise with authoritarian leaders, who in fact could cause the end of democracy.

From his analysis of Western culture, MacIntyre himself arrives at pessimistic conclusions. He expects Western societies to collapse and disappear as once was the fate of ancient Rome. In his view, only a return to pre-modern morality and a retrieval of monastic practices could turn the tide. Others, however, have taken up this challenge and display a more hopeful attitude.[39]

3.2 Anthropological

The pessimism of MacIntyre, indeed, seems at least one-sided when we remember the moral continuities and the moral ambivalence that social research has uncovered. Therefore, our historical-philosophical interpretation has to be supplemented with anthropological insights. Here, in particular new fields like moral biology and moral psychology offer intriguing insights, which can be connected with earlier results of the more traditional discipline of cultural anthropology. Operating from an evolutionary perspective, they suggest the existence of moral constants in humanity during the course of its development. These moral constants survive cultural shifts and historical transitions, and therefore also religious changes. Prominent and at the same time controversial researchers like Richard Dawkins and Frans de Waal have uncovered the development of moral traits in monkeys and bees.[40] According to them, in their ambition to survive, organisms – having originally been solitary and selfish – have discovered the importance of cooperating in more complex groups. From this arose the need for morality and its development was triggered. Social and good behaviour turns out to be stimulated since it contributes to profitable relations with others. Even altruism and forgiveness become explained as survival strategies in which organisms adapt to changing circumstances.[41] For example, through a long practice of failures, humanity has learned that forgiveness in the end produces more cohesion than retaliation does. Likewise, to return to our third example, pregnancy hormones predispose even highly educated women to caring behaviour and thus influence their moral views and choices with respect to their careers. Despite the new cultural narrative of individual self-realisation, this anthropological reality is alive and growing in strength.[42] As far as cultural anthropology is concerned, the earlier relativistic tendencies of the discipline have given way to more sophisticated conceptions.[43] Cultural contrasts at the surface turn out to hide corresponding values at a deeper level.[44] The seemingly barbaric practice of some Eskimo tribes, namely the killing of their elderly, on a closer look contains the same value that Westerners respect. Within their cultural framework, this practice of killing is meant to improve the position of parents in the hereafter. So it is a way to honour father and mother.[45] Another cultural anthropological finding even seems to confirm one of the main theses of Immanuel Kant. Generally speaking all humans in all cultures trust that sooner or later doing good will be rewarded. Notwithstanding deep conflicts about the content of what is good, this is the basis of the basic moral imperative, without which human life would be impossible, namely: good should be done.[46] This unmasks Nietzsche's deconstruction of good and evil as an unconvincing play of words.

Another important strand of contemporary research concerns the moral function of basic human emotions. Brain research has uncovered that emotions rather than reason are decisive in making moral choices.[47] This relativizes MacIntyre's criticism of today's emotivism. Fashionable justifications of behaviour as feeling good or not feeling good contain at least a grain of truth. Research even suggests that, generally speaking, Christians who help their fellow humans remain emotionally more at a distance than others. A possible explanation would be that by basing their acts on external divine commands, Christians in a way 'spoil' their primary emotional moral reactions.[48] The American philosopher Martha Nussbaum has done extensive work on the emotion of compassion.[49] She accepts a biological foundation for compassion that is connected to so-called 'mirror neurons'. When humans and some animals are confronted with the sufferings of other organisms, they experience these as if they were their own. Precisely that motivates them to act and to help. In this light, it is no wonder that – as we saw earlier – social researchers could conclude that despite the centrality of the value of individual self-realisation, social values have not substantially weakened.

Contrary to MacIntyre's pessimistic outlook, these kinds of anthropological findings lead many contemporary ethicists to overt optimism. The Australian philosopher Peter Singer, founder of modern bioethics, has partly noticed the same moral ambivalence that MacIntyre uncovered, but he interprets this ambivalence in a completely contrarian manner. Singer considers it to be the birth-pain of the next stage of humanity's moral evolution and he even rejoices in the fact that Christianity is now dying off. This frees us to acknowledge our kinship with animals on the hand and on the other it offers the context for genuine autonomy to develop better versions of the good life.[50]

Christian ethicists can only be very critical of this kind of self-conscious atheist evolutionism. However, at the same time, the anthropological substrate of such expectations should remind us of the fact that despite worrisome moral decay even a post-Christian culture could display points of moral continuity and even moral progress as well.

3.3 Theological

From this background of a historical-philosophical and an anthropological interpretation, we now proceed towards a theological hermeneutics of our society's values and their ambivalence. The existence of moral constants can be explained with and founded on the doctrines of creation, providence and common grace.[51] Despite sin, God remained faithful to his world and – as some reformed confessions state[52] – it is precisely the surviving human grasp of good and evil which witnesses to that reality. However, faithfulness is a relational and personal thing, which entails that we should not conceive of this moral continuity as a self-evident and self-sufficient reality. Even anthropological constants depend on God's continuing action, which is new every morning (Lam 3:22-23). According to Psalm 104:29, creatures will disintegrate as soon as God's spirit retreats. The dark destructive periods of Europe's post-Enlightenment history only confirm this truth.

Traditional Roman-Catholic as well as (often) Protestant ethics have distinguished a timeless fixed substructure of well-defined self-evident virtues and values that are universally shared. However, some of the radical changes in our post-Christian world undermine such an assumption. Especially radical changes in the domain of marriage and sexuality show how supposedly universal values can be completely reversed within a few decades. Therefore, in hindsight we should acknowledge that many of these 'universal' moral truths simply reflected Christianity's history of cultural dominance. However, we must be careful not to overreact and adopt the opposite position of an exclusively historicist approach. Neither MacIntyre nor Hauerwas escapes that danger. This overreaction does no justice to the undeniable fact that God's providence grants moral constants to humanity, which can even survive incisive religious transitions. Which constants these will be cannot be decided beforehand; this must be discovered through a combination of revelation, tradition, scientific research and experience. Because of the dialectical interaction between cultural transitions and anthropological constants the resulting outcome in a particular period of history or a specific context will often be unpredictable and provisional. However, while not forgetting this caution, building on our present knowledge, we can suspect which constants could be found. For example the deep bond between mother and child remains in force under God's providence and cannot be suppressed. 'Would a mother ever forget her child', asks the prophet.[53] Even our highly emancipated Western society reflects the moral implications of this reality, as is shown in our third example, about educated women giving up careers and offering culturally acceptable justifications for it. Other candidates for the qualification of 'moral constant' are humanity's God-given social nature, which proves itself despite individualist modern narratives; respect for property, life and honesty, albeit in sometimes estranging cultural forms; compassion, which mobilises even individualized Western people to support mass actions of humanitarian aid; the golden rule of mutuality, which in some way appears to be respected in all societies; the awareness that sexuality contains a mystery, even if this awareness hides itself behind postmodern rhetoric about power transgressions; and the general conviction that, however defined, good has to be done.

The Dutch theologian Abraham Kuyper has proposed an interesting refinement of these doctrines of creation, providence and common grace.[54] He distinguishes between a general and a progressive dimension within God's common grace. With the former God prevents us from falling below the bottom line of what counts as human, while the latter serves to grant a movement of development to fallen creation, in which initial creational possibilities are continually disclosed during the unfolding of history. According to Kuyper, this progressive common grace has been influenced substantially, though indirectly, by the gospel. Since its entrance in the Roman Empire God's revelation has become a formative factor for cultural history. Especially after the Reformation it generated many cultural fruits that at least partly display a Christian character. However, at the same time, Kuyper allows for an antithesis that intensifies as history goes on and the gospel proceeds. As its parasite, sin indissolubly follows every good. The greater the good, the more devastating sin will be. Against this background, according to Kuyper, modern Enlightenment culture displays a breath-taking paradox, namely the coexistence of the highest Christian fruits side by side with their most deplorable spoilage. Both moral progress and moral degeneration reach a climax.[55] Oliver O'Donovan moves in a similar direction, albeit in a less speculative manner. He analyses how the moments of the Christ event have defined the historical identity of the church. This church in turn has become an influential force in Western society, thereby causing societal reflections of its own characteristics. However, modernity's departure from God and the accompanying privatisation of the church have rendered these reflections rootless and distorted. With these thoughts, Kuyper and O'Donovan offer satisfying theological interpretations of the ambivalence that we identified in the values of our society.[56]

Building on both Kuyper and O'Donovan, I tend to see modernity as claiming an innerworldly eschaton, thereby surpassing the abandoned Christian eschatology. From its early days up till today – from Hegel to Fukuyama – modernity has considered itself the end of history and the beginning of the empire of freedom.[57] This end stage of human civilisation would return the lost paradise to humanity. The former Christian eschatology became historicised, so that achieving the end of history became seen as a human project to be realised in this world. No longer had a new world to be awaited as a divine gift. Moreover, the biblical eschatological aim of the full-grown, independent free human in Christ became secularised in the modern claim of autonomous freedom and self-realisation.[58] Interestingly, this overestimation of modernity clothed itself in two forms. Not only a wide-spread faith in progress, but also its periodically emerging pessimistic counterpart of complaints about imminent decline witness to this inflated self-conception. This should make us cautious in joining viable complaints about moral decay among both Christians and others because such complaints could reflect an unconscious dependence on modernity's overestimation of itself and they would then only mirror exaggerated expectations of progress.[59]

Social scientific research unexpectedly illustrates this possible mechanism.[60] The ever higher demands for quality in a consumerist society have also affected so-called 'post-materialist values'. This means that our moral ideals too have become caught up in a perfectionist quest for quality. As a matter of fact, they seem to be higher than elsewhere and earlier in history. Precisely this could explain the increasing discomfort and uneasiness that have characterised Western societies for some decades. If this analysis is justified, orthodox Christians should also be prepared to acknowledge the possibility that their repeated complaints about moral decline in fact pay tribute to modernity's eschatological narrative. This, in turn, could challenge them into a more open-minded evaluation of contemporary moral ambivalence. Even under the present conditions, fruits of Christianity remain interwoven with our post-Christian society. For example, Kuyper stressed that only after the separation of church and state – with all its accompanying anti-Christian sentiments – freedom of religion could develop.[61] Moreover, Charles Taylor suggests that only the (in itself regrettable) abandonment of a framework of transcendent divine justice has paved the way for the valuable and nowadays indispensable concept of inalienable individual rights. Taylor likewise suggests that today's syncretistic revival of spirituality also includes the continued influence of the Christian tradition and even offers new chances to its spirituality and morality.[62]

3.4 Ambivalent values

Using the preceding insights as a kind of lens, we are now able to interpret some core values of our society. When evaluating each of these, we will endeavour to uncover how they display both the legacy of the Christian truth and its anti-Christian distortion.

Individual self-realisation

Today's central value of individual self-realisation originates in genuinely Christian convictions. Pannenberg has shown how much the emergence of the modern individual was rooted in Biblical and Christian accents, such as:

- God's love for each of his children.
- The fact that every church member may contribute to the whole with specific gifts.
- Our growing up in Christ to find our ultimate identity in his future.
- The development of personhood in the wake of the doctrine of the Trinity.
- Augustine's exploration of the inner life before God's eyes.
- Luther's stress on personal freedom and conscience.[63]

This modern accent on individuality has resulted in many fruits. No longer do we require persons to adjust to fixed prescribed roles. Class society with its unjustified hereditary privileges has been ended. The position of women has improved. Even Christians who remain opposed to homosexual relationships acknowledge the specific identity and circumstances of homosexuals. However, forgetting the rootedness of such insights in God's truth, we have turned self-realisation into a human project, which has to be accomplished in this life, while at the same time we have lost the connection between personal growth in Christ and sharing in his cross and sacrifice.

Freedom

Similarly, freedom is rooted in God's liberating acts and flourishes under his authority, since the latter denies all other powers any authority of their own. However, without God, freedom emancipates itself from authority as such and therefore leaves behind given creational structures that were meant to be our natural life condition.[64] This becomes clear, for example, in medical engineering that surpasses the bond between fertility and heterosexual marriage and tends to 'produce' children by means of artificial donor insemination or uses reproductive techniques to grant offspring to gay couples. Besides, the ambivalence of modern freedom becomes apparent in a dialectics of revolution and authoritarianism, which has become typical for modern societies.

Equality

Likewise equality can be founded upon our equal positions before God, as we are all creatures, sinners and potential addresses for his salvation.[65] Thus, equality should include the structures into which God has embedded our lives and allow for differences in gifts and callings. However, without the relation to God we cannot understand any difference whatsoever anymore and we neglect the 'pluriform' character of human society.[66] Besides, we contribute to a reaction mechanism, which once more becomes obsessed with differences to such an extent that equality starts to suffer again.

Tolerance

Clearly, tolerance bears the mark of the above-mentioned ambivalence.[67] Originally, this value depended upon everyone's personal responsibility towards God and the acknowledgment that only he will judge. As a consequence, we renounce our own judgments of others and leave room for visions and practices that we consider to be wrong. This is experienced as painful and even a form of suffering, as already is indicated by the word tolerance itself. However, without this reference to God, tolerance finds new ground in our society's denial of universal truth. Elaborating upon a pluralist dogma, it turns into a demand for indifference to other lifestyles. At least implicitly, we feel obliged to affirm all opinions and practices as long as they do not hurt others. This is revealed in our first example about the policeman's critical utterances on the Amsterdam Gay Pride. As a matter of fact, he was tolerant when measured by the old standards, expressing his opinion but at the same time leaving room for other practices that felt painful to him. However, the changed logic of modern tolerance is not satisfied with such a stance and demands the implicit approval of a gay lifestyle. While we remain free to make different personal choices, we are not free to publicly express critical opinions that would spoil the choices of others.

Privacy

Originally, the value of privacy meant to protect personal life in its natural relationships and structures, such as family and work, from the supervision of the state.[68] Humans have a personal relationship with God and their neighbours, in which governments have no right to interfere. Rooted in this private sphere, citizens participated in the developing public sphere of upcoming nation states. However, without God, privacy has shifted towards the fencing off of self-enclosed and unpredictably authentic individuals. At the same time, the public sphere lost its moral input and ordering towards a common good. It fostered a secret ambition to interfere with private morality in order to guarantee its own safety. As a consequence, public morality progressively reshapes private choices. At first, for many people, public tolerance for practices such as abortion, voluntary euthanasia and homosexual marriage could co-exist with a less (or even non-) liberal morality in their private lives. Allowing others to opt for euthanasia, they would never consider such a choice for themselves. However, in the long run, personal morality tends to adapt to public tolerance, a mechanism which can also be noticed in many churches that started to tolerate practices which they still officially opposed at the same time.[69] Another consequence becomes clear in the manifest inconsistency that has caught the private sphere. Lonely individuals have developed an aesthetic longing to realise themselves and need an audience for that. This seduces them into voluntary transparency, as is shown in the popularity of Twitter. As a result, the cherished domain of the individual has begun to destroy itself. This again is related to a third consequence. Without dependency on God the public domain has become obsessed with its own security.[70] It feels obliged to protect itself against the unpredictable private morality of free individuals by enforcing forms of total transparency. However, both total security and total transparency are eschatological categories for which we depend on God being all in all. Without God such ambitions will summon the kind of social dictatorship that Dave Eggers has portrayed in his novel *The Circle*, our fourth example.

Democracy

This observation connects to the value of democracy. Increasingly, historians have uncovered the Christian – early modern Calvinist or Medieval – roots of Western democracy.[71] O'Donovan has even suggested that its background could be found in the church of Pentecost, where the voices of slaves were allowed to participate in the shared conversation about God's truth. Reflecting this, every citizen received a voice in public deliberation about the common good. However, without God, trust in truth and the expectation of shared insights have vanished. Therefore, having a voice has degenerated into voting, which at the same time adopted the character of exercising individual will power. The political arena is often just a stage to realise as much of one's own private ambitions as possible. Debates turn into ritual exchanges of arguments, mainly aiming to impress audiences and to mobilise support for this power play without the expectation to convince and unite.[72] Thus, modern politics contains a germ of violence that takes away courtesy and civility. It is not by coincidence that over the last few decades political rhetoric has become more extreme, rude and offensive. This sheds light on our second example. A physical fight in parliament seems shocking, but it reveals the hidden violence in all post-Christian politics. Even Christians could fall prey to this style, when they use forms of power and take on a rather aggressive style to achieve their public concerns and ambitions in the context of a post-Christian society. The police-officer in our first example had the right to express his opinion indeed, but his choice of words did not serve mutual understanding and betrayed a trace of public Christian aggression.

Free enterprise and maximising growth

A comparable ambivalence can be detected in prevailing economic values like free enterprise and maximising growth. These became possible only after our culture's discovery of everyone's freedom to act under God's moral authority. They presupposed a given moral framework and the acknowledgment of the fact that real happiness will only be found in the world to come.[73] However, this earlier capitalism under God degenerated into a secularised modern version of capitalism that strives for individual happiness in this life, while claiming freedom to serve that aim. From this, well-known deadlocks have resulted such as the opposition between capitalism and collectivism, and between saving and spending. For example, early modern Christians saw the virtue of frugality in the light of 1 Corinthians 7, which implied eschatological restraint. Collecting money had to serve earthly purposes that did not contradict the expectation of a world to come.[74] After the eclipse of this spiritual framework, frugality first secularised to serve the purpose of maximising happiness in this world and later deteriorated into post-World War II consumerism. This consumerism even lost the patience to wait in order to realise our human desires so that saving gave way to a practice of reckless borrowing, which enabled us to satisfy our longings immediately.

Compassion

The value of compassion reflects the historical victory of Christian love in Western culture.[75] The Roman world considered compassion as a weakness. This value has induced many moral characteristics of our society, like health care, attention to the weak, moderation of criminal justice, humanisation of war and even a readiness to sacrifice oneself for others. However, today, for example Martha Nussbaum's post-Christian re-interpretation of compassion judges it to be inappropriate when suffering is caused by someone's own fault. Moreover, while Christian compassion refers primarily to the sharing of sufferings in the expectation that sooner or later God will help, modernist compassion aims at fixing these sufferings by ourselves. As a result, unresolvable problems and pain become unthinkable and unbearable. In one way or another, sufferings have to be ended. Here we discern a background to the contemporary justification of euthanasia as an act of compassion, which sheds light on the fifth example, Swaab's ambition to rule over his own death. At first sight, such a claim of human autonomy over death sounds shockingly provocative[76] but as a matter of fact, it can be interpreted as a distorted reflection of something genuinely Christian. In Western culture Christ's triumph over death has indeed changed the traditional fear of death and the fatalist attitudes with which illness was accepted. Medical science developed, which bravely combatted the powers of illness and death. Besides, the courage developed to accept and – if necessary – even to choose death in the service of God and men. Swaab's boasting words of autonomy signal remnants of this typically Christian attitude towards death.

4. Tasks for Christian ethics

4.1 General direction

We return briefly to the challenge of developing a Christian ethics for today's society and we evaluate the four proposed directions. The *anthropological* approach of Trutz Rendtorff does justice to the observed moral constants and the implicit Christian values of our late-modern society. However, it deals insufficiently with the radical shifts and distortions that we noticed. As a result, such an ethics will remain vulnerable to adaptation, corruption and dilution.

The *ecclesiological* approach of Stanley Hauerwas honours the decisive moral significance of the particular story of Christ and its radical antithesis to the prevailing narrative of Western culture. However, this approach ignores the moral constants and the hidden Christian core of many modern values. Therefore it is unjustifiably unwilling to bear moral responsibility today.

The *Christological* approach of Oliver O'Donovan combines the strengths of both. Christ not only rules the Church, but also upholds and renews creation and has granted Western society historical blessings that are still effective. Firmly positioning ourselves in the context of gospel and Church, we may yet expect God-given contingent possibilities of communality and moral communication with post-Christian fellow-citizens. MacIntyre's fragments should not only be considered signs of impending decay but by God's grace also hopeful demonstrations of divine patience and potential occasions for a Christian contribution to society's moral condition. Thus it becomes an important Christian calling to clarify the many deadlocks that result from our society's post-Christian condition. Such clarification is included in the Church's prophetic calling.

The evangelical *biblical approach* of Douma runs the risk of neglecting conceptual implications of God's revelation in Christ and not engaging the specific ethical hermeneutics that today's post-Christian context requires. However, in the end ethics centre on God's will, as the third quest of the Lord's Prayer indicates. This will is revealed in God's word. Being too preoccupied in our hermeneutics with the presumably special character of our context could result in yet another version of modernity's historicised eschatology and exceptionalism. Even when we acknowledge its specific character, we should not forget that modernity is just one of the many earthly contexts in which God's will has to be done as it is in heaven. God's word itself is able to pave its way through human lives in any given context.

4.2 Specific challenges

I see at least five more specific challenges that result from my analysis of our society's values. *First*, Christians should not oppose individualisation, as they often do,[77] but transform it by reconnecting it to Christ's sacrifice. Whoever wants to find himself should be prepared to lose himself. *Secondly*, the values of freedom and autonomy challenge Christian ethics to acknowledge a moment of relative autonomy and creativity. Knowing God's will requires maturity in Christ and a ripened exercise of the mind of Christ. Christians must learn to judge for themselves, albeit as a communal activity. This is indispensable to find answers to the majority of today's ethical questions, which after all are not explicitly dealt with in the Bible.

Thirdly, Christians should not only criticize emotivism, but also incorporate the newly discovered central role of emotions in their ethics. However, all emotion is formed emotion and contains implicit cognitions. Therefore, we should persist in publicly exchanging reasons for our choices, especially after they have been made. This will set the stage for new decisions and guide their emotional character.

Fourthly, the typical post-modern transition from ethics to aesthetics should remind us of the aesthetical character of the Christian life itself. Being an anticipation of the life-style of the Kingdom, our pattern of life will not be exhausted in choices between good and evil. As Jonathan Edwards and Augustine have already seen, our lives are destined to reflect God's beauty in a way that pleases God himself. Like in paradise, this call goes beyond the ethical.[78]

Lastly, Christian ethics should welcome possible fruits of the gospel that appear to be implied in the values of our society. In the past, non-Christians rather than Christians were often the first to uncover certain consequences of the gospel. This has been the case for example with the acceptance of democracy, the separation of church and state, the acknowledgment of human rights, protests against social inequalities, the critique of colonialism, the improved position of women, the abolition of slavery, resistance against racial discrimination and apartheid, and taking environmental responsibility.

Rooted in Christ, Christians should be prepared not only to criticise our society when necessary but also to receive what God still offers in it. Confronted with the values in our society, we have to be – in the words of Peter – 'watchful and sober' (1 Pet 5:8).

Dr A.L.Th de Bruijne is professor of Ethics and Spirituality at the Reformed Theological University in Kampen, Netherlands.

Endnotes

1 www.metronieuws.nl/binnenland/2014/08/tweet-politieman-geeft-noodzaak-gay-pride-aan [accessed 11-02-2015].

2 www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/8851408/Italian-MPs-in-fist-fight-over-pensions.html [accessed 11-02-2015].

3 Ruben van Galen, *Veranderingen in relatie- en gezinsvorming van Generatie X naar Y. Demografische profielen van 30-jarigen naar geslacht en opleidingsniveau*, Bevolkingsonderzoek Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, juli 2014, at www.cbs.nl/NR/rdonlyres/7D858527-3901-4BF7-8EEE-FA5D19977D81/0/008416BT201412.pdf [accessed 11-02-2015].

4 Dave Eggers, *The Circle* (New York: Vintage Books, 2013).

5 www.uitvrijewil.nu/index.php?id=1003 [accessed 06-02-2015].

6 This article is based on a lecture held at the biennial conference of the Fellowship of European Evangelical Theologians (FEET) in Orsay near Paris in 2014.

7 G.G. de Kruijf, 'Fundamenteel ethisch onderzoek vanaf 1980 in het perspectief van de protestantse theologie. Een overzicht', in *Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift* 51.2 (1997) 117-139, 132-138.

8 Jochem Douma, *Responsible Conduct. Principles of Christian Ethics* (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian & Reformed, 2003); Jochem Douma, *The Ten Commandments. Manual for the Christian Life* (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1996).

9 Jonathan Dancy, 'Intuïtionism', in Peter Singer (ed.), *A Companion to Ethics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991) 411-419, 417-419; positive are e.g. L.L.E. Bolt, M.F. Verweij, J.J.M. van Delden, *Ethiek in Praktijk* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 2003), 13, 33-34, 36; Patrick Nullens and Ronald T. Michener, *The Matrix of Christian Ethics. Integrating Philosophy*

and Moral Theology in a Postmodern Context (Colorado Springs: Paternoster, 2010) 131-148, 211-214; negative: David S. Cunningham, *Christian Ethics. The End of the Law* (London: Routledge, 2008) 153ff, 235ff; Christopher Frey, *Theologische Ethik* (Neukirchen: Neukirchener Verlag, 1990) 23, 110, 179-180.

10 Will Arts, Jaques Hagenaars and Loek Halman (eds), *The Cultural Diversity of European Unity. Findings, Explanations and Reflections from the European Values Study* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003) 147ff; Will Arts and Loek Halman (eds), *European Values at the Turn of the Millennium* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2001) 84; John Field, *Social Capital* (London: Routledge, 2008) 2; Alejo G. Sison, *The Moral Capital of Leaders. Why Virtue Matters* (Cheltenham: E. Elgar, 2003).

11 Peter Ester, Michael Brown and Peter Mohler (eds), *Globalization, Value Change, and Generations* (Leiden: Brill, 2006); G. de Vries, 'Politiek van preken en praktijken: het "normen- en waardendebat" als reactie op de "verplaatsing van de politiek"' in P.T. de Beer and C.J.M. Schuyt (eds), *Bijdragen aan waarden en normen* (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid; Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2004) 39-54.

12 Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, *Waarden, normen en de last van het gedrag* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2003) 9-13, 41-43; Carlo van Praag, 'Enkele gedachten over de morele crisis' in Paul de Beer, Hans Boutellier and Carlo van Praag, *Bindingsloos of Bandeloos. Normen, waarden en individualisering* (Den Haag: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2004) 29-38, 30-31; Lesslie Newbigin, *Foolishness to the Greeks. The Gospel and Western Culture* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986) 20; Ester c.s., *Globalization*, 25, 48; Eugene Kelly, *Material Ethics of Value. Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011); F.W. Nietzsche, *Werke Band 6: Der Wille zur Macht. Versuch einer Umwertung aller Werte* (Leipzig: Kröner, 1930).

13 Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, *Waarden*, 28.

14 Ester c.s., *Globalization*, xvii-xviii, 4-5, 7, 9, 20, 30, 33; Arts c.s., *Diversity*, 4.

15 Loek Halman, Inge Sieben and Marga van Zundert, *Atlas of European Values. Trends and Traditions at the Turn of the Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2011) 135; Ester c.s., *Globalization*, 14-15, 23; Arts and Halman, *Millennium*, 13.

16 Ester c.s., *Globalization*, 14; Arts and Halman, *Millennium*, 10.

17 Arts c.s., *Diversity*, 372; Edmund Burke, Paul Langford, William B. Todd, *The Writings of Edmund Burke, Vol. 8: The French Revolution 1790-1794*; Isaäc Da Costa (ed. K. Exalto), *Bezwaren tegen de geest der eeuw* (Bleiswijk: Tolle Lege, 1974).

18 For example H.J.G.Zandman, 'The 1960's – long hair, flowers and morality mash: ethical appraisal of the clash that helped shape today's Western society', *In die Skriflig* 43.1 (2009) 77-93.

19 Ester c.s., *Globalization*, 18; Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, *Waarden*, 22, 26, 69-70, 87; De Beer and Schuyt, *Bijdragen*, 9; Gert-Jan van Panhuis, Johan van de Worp, 'De morele crisis van de consumptiemaatschappij', in *Zicht* (2011) 19-23 (referring to individualism and brokenness in family-life that were also mentioned by the British prime minster Cameron and the conservative thinker Dalrymple after riots in London, Birmingham and other cities); even the revival of Christian Democratic politics after World War II can be seen against this background, see Mary Anne Perkins, *Christendom and European Identity. The Legacy of a Grand Narrative since 1789* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004) 72-76, 106-109, 112.

20 Halman *Atlas*, vii; Ester c.s., *Globalization*, 9, 13, 16, 32, 35, 126, 151; Arts and Halman, *Millennium*, 17; Arts c.s., *Diversity*, 30-31, 67-85; 'Waardenverandering in Nederland. Resultaten van de SOCON-enquète 1980-2011', *Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek* 8-11-2012 (www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/bevolking/publicaties/bevolkingstrends/archief/2012/2012-bt-waardenverandering-art.htm [accessed 4-2-2015]), par 1, par 4.2, par 4(=6); Margo Woord, 'Ethics Today. An Exploration of Values in Our Society', *Boston Ethical Community* 2012 (http://bostonethical.org/memblog/ethics-today-an-exploration-of-values-in-our-society [accessed 4-2-2015]); Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, *Waarden*, 142, 146-147; Herman Vuijsje and Cas Wouters, *Macht en gezag in het laatste kwart. Inpakken en* wegwezen (Den Haag: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 1999) 9, 22, 25-26; slightly different from the official narrative as embodied in the Treaty of Lisbon, which mentions human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, human rights ('Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007', in *Official Journal of the European Union. Information and Notices* 50 [accessed 17-12-2007] 10 [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL&from=EN; accessed 11-02-2015]); European moral identity and core-values are explored from a historical point of view in Perkins, *Christendom*, e.g. 1, 5, 8, 61, 72-74, 115-118, 331-332.

21 Ester c.s., *Globalization*, 17, 39-42; Arts c.s., *Diversity*, 217-219, 287; Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone. The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001) 277-286.

22 Halman, *Atlas*, vii, 35, 51-52, 92, 99-100, 104.

23 Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, *Principles of Biomedical Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

24 Ester c.s., *Globalization*, 9; Andrew Rosen, *The Transformation of British Life, 1950-2000: A social history* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003).

25 Vuijsje, *Macht*, 27, 29, 31.

26 Arts c.s., *Diversity*, 47, 290, 384, 390, 398-399; Arts and Halman, *Millennium*, 22, 47, 97-98; Furio Cerutti and Sonia Lucarelli (eds), *The Search for a European Identity. Values, policies and legitimacy of the European Union* (London – New York: Routledge, 2008) 83, 97-98, 159-161.

27 Ester c.s., *Globalization*, 197-199; additional proof in Douglas Baer, James Curtis, Edward Grabb, 'Has Voluntary Association Activity Declined? Cross-national Analysis for Fifteen Countries, *Canadian Review of Sociology* 38.3 (2008) 249-274.

28 Halman, *Atlas*, 113-114, 122; Arts c.s., *Diversity*, 41, 244, 411, 414, 421; Vuijsje, *Macht*, 42; Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, *Waarden*, 10; Van den Brink, in De Beer and Schuyt, *Bijdragen*, 15-38.

29 G. Höver, G.G. de Kruijf, O. O'Donovan and B. Wannenwetsch, *Die Familie im neuen Europa. Ethische Herausforderungen und interdisziplinären Perspektiven* (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2008); Halman, *Atlas*, vii, 35; Ester c.s, *Globalization*, 61-72, 84-111; Arts c.s., *Diversity*, 311-314. 336-337, 349; Arts and Halman, *Millenium*, 168-170, 205-207; *Vuijsje*, *Macht*, 25-26.

30 Adrian Thatcher, *Living Together and Christian Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 211-236.

31 Arts c.s., *Diversity*, 398; Arts and Halman, *Millennium*, 186, 195-198, 202, 218, 227; Waardenverandering (CBS), par 1, par 4, par 6.

32 Halman, *Atlas*, 99-100, 135.

33 Ester c.s., *Globalization*, 63.

34 Ester c.s., *Globalization*, 36, 175; Robert Whutnow, *Acts of Compassion. Caring for Others and Helping Ourselves* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) 22; Arts c.s., *Diversity*, 33.

35 Amy Allen, in Susan J. Hekman (ed.), *Feminist Interpretations of Michael Foucault* (University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 1996) 271-272; Vuijsje, *Macht*, 41-42.

36 Arts c.s., *Diversity*, 474; Arts and Halman, *Millenium*, 152.

37 Alisdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory* (2nd edn, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984) 1-78.

38 F. de Lange, 'Moraal, een kwestie van smaak? Verschuivingen in de hedendaagse moraal' in D. Koelega and H. Noordegraaf (eds), *Moet moraal weer? Voorbij de vrijblijvendheid en zedenmeesterij* (Kampen: Kok, 1994) 11-38, 11-14, 23-25, 33; F. de Lange, 'God en de publieke moraal' in P.B. Cliteur e.a., *Cultuur, politiek, christelijke traditie. Welke plaats is er voor het christelijke verhaal in onze samenleving?* (Nijkerk: Callenbach, 1996) 163-178, 163, 169-172; Harry Kunneman, *Postmoderne moraliteit* (Meppel: Boom, 1998); Maarten van Buuren and Joep Dohmen, *Van oude en nieuwe deugden. Levenskunst van Aristoteles tot Nussbaum* (Amsterdam: Ambo, 2013) 9-13; Vuijsje, *Macht*, 54-55; Newbigin, *Foolishness*, 37.

39 Jonathan R. Wilson, *Living Faithfully in a Fragmented World. From After Virtue to a New Monasticism* (Eugene: Cascade Books, 2010) 1, 12, 14, 16, 32, 56.

40 G.W. van der Pol, *De auteur zij met ons. Cognitief-psychologische studie naar de ervaring van de toeschouwer bij het waarnemen van een auteursfilm*, Amsterdam: Faculty of Humanities, 2009 (www.google.nl/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCEQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdare.uva.nl%2Fdocument%2F128527&ei=LQDSVNvtNcurU8uYgcgH&usg=AFQjCNFFG3R9Ad6Z1gAuYGXuoZp54_f87w [accessed 4-2-2015]), chapter 5; F.B.M. de Waal, Patricia Smith Churchland, Telmo Pievani, Stefano Parmigiani, *Evolved Morality. The Biology and Philosophy of Human Conscience* (Leiden: Brill, 2014); Arts and Halman, *Millennium*, 98 (social research raises the hypothesis that 'people are fundamentally social in nature').

41 Van der Pol, *Auteur*, 212, 215, 217; Hal Fishbein, *Peer Prejudice and Discrimination. The Origins of Prejudice* (2nd edn, Mahwah: Laurence Erlbaum Associates, 2002).

42 Van der Pol, *Auteur*, 215-216, 224; Jonathan H. Turner, *Face to Face. Toward a Sociological Theory of Interpersonal Behavior* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002) 41-42.

43 Arts c.s., *Diversity*, 88; Signe Howell, *The Ethnography of Moralities* (Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, 1996); Yilmaz R. Esmer and Thorleif Petterson, *Measuring and Mapping Cultures. 25 Years of Comparative Value Surveys* (Leiden: Brill, 2007); Monica Heintz, *The Anthropology of Moralities* (New York: Berghahn, 2009).

44 Georg Silberbauer, 'Ethics in small-scale societies' in Singer, *Companion to Ethics*, 14-28, 15, 17-18, 26-27; Van der Pol, *Auteur*, 217; De Lange, God; Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, *Waarden*, 57-58.

45 Robert L. Holmes, *Basic Moral Philosophy* (Belmont, Ca: Wadsworth, 2003) 171-172.

46 Van der Pol, *Auteur*, 221-223

47 Van der Pol, *Auteur*, 213-215, 225-226, 228; Robert McShea, *Morality and Human Nature* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010).

48 L.R. Saslow c.s., 'My Brother's Keeper? Compassion

Predicts Generosity More Among Less Religious Individuals' in *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 4.1 (2013) 31-38.

49 Martha C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 297-456; Martha C. Nussbaum, *Political Emotions. Why Love Matters for Justice* (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press, 2013) 200-398.

50 Peter Singer, 'Introduction', in Peter Singer, *Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 3-13, 5-6; Gordon Preece (ed.), *Rethinking Peter Singer. A Christian Critique* (Downers Grove: IVP, 2002) 39-40, 43, 50, 59-67, 95-105.

51 John Calvin, *Institutes*, I.v.3; I.viii.1; II.ii.17; II.iii.3.

52 E.g. *Westminster Larger Catechism* Question and Answer 2, 60, 121, 151; *Canons of Dordt* III/IV. 4.

53 Isaiah 49:14-15.

54 A. Kuyper, *De Gemeene gratie* II (Amsterdam: Höveker & Wormser, 1903) 601-602; Abraham Kuyper, *Lectures on Calvinism* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1931) 38-39.

55 Kuyper, *Calvinism*, 11-12, 19, 41 (typifying modernism as an 'atheist imitation' of Christianity).

56 Oliver O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations. Redicovering the Roots of Political Theology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 243-284; Arts c.s., *Diversity*, 16.

57 Chris Hughes, *Liberal Democracy as the End of History* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012); Eric Michael Dale, *Hegel, the End of History and the Future* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

58 Nullens, *Matrix*, 173-177.

59 Perkins, *Europe*, 151-153, 299-300 (even Nietzsche depended on Christendom), 333, 345-346.

60 Gabriël van den Brink, in De Beer and Schuyt, *Bijdragen*, 10, 15-38 (esp. 31-33); G. van den Brink, *Schets van een beschavingsoffensief. Over normen, normaliteit en normalisatie* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2004) 65-66; Arts c.s., *Diversity*, 33.

61 Kuyper, *Lectures*, 85-86, 192-193.

62 Charles Taylor, 'A Catholic Modernity?' in J.L. Heft c.s. (eds) *A Catholic Modernity? Charles Taylor's Marianist Award Lecture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) 13-37; Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2007) 488-489, 532, 681.

63 Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Gottesgedanke und menschliche Freiheit* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972) 9-13, 75, 114-128; Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Grundfragen Systematischer Theologie. Gesammelte Aufsätze* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967) 210-214; Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Grundfragen Systematischer Theologie. Gesammelte Aufsätze. Band 2* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980) 81-82.

64 Abraham Kuyper, *Sphere Sovereignty 1880*, in James D. Bratt, *Abraham Kuyper. A Centennial Reader* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998) 461-490.

65 Arts c.s., *Diversity*, 75.

66 Kuyper, *Lectures*, 27.

67 Ester c.s., *Globalization*, 151, 174-201; Arts c.s., *Diversity*, 294, 421, 427, 429; Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, *Waarden*, 141.

68 Vuijsje, *Macht*, 37.

69 F. de Lange, 'God en de publieke moraal', in P.B. Cliteur, A.Th. van Deursen e.a., *Cultuur, politiek en christelijke traditie* (Baarn: Ten Have, 1996) 163-178, 168-169.

70 Arts and Halman, *Millennium*, 34.

71 Philip Benedict, *Christ's Churches Purely Reformed. A Social History of Calvinism* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002) xvii, 531-537; Philip S. Gorski, *The Disciplinary Revolution. Calvinism and the rise of the State in Early Modern Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003) xv-xvii, 165-166, 170; Graeme Murdock, *Calvinism on the Frontier 1600-1660* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000) 7; Graeme Murdock, *Beyond Calvin. The Intellectual, Political and Cultural World of Europe's Reformed Churches* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004) 3-4, 75; Eric Nelson, *The Hebrew Republic. Jewish Sources and the Transformation of European Political Thought* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2010) 2-4, 24, 26, 122-130, 153; Irene Dingel and Herman J. Selderhuis, *Calvin und Calvinismus. Europaïsche Perspektiven* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011) 376.

72 O'Donovan, *Desire*, 270, 281-284.

73 Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Until Justice and Peace Embrace* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983) 133.

74 W.B. Patterson, *William Perkins and the Making of a Protestant England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 135-142.

75 Govert Buijs, *Publieke liefde: agapè als bron voor maatschappelijke vernieuwing in tijden van crisis* (Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit, 2012).

76 O'Donovan, *Desire*, 276; Vuijsje, *Macht*, 17, notes a kind of emancipation of dying citizens in contemporary society.

77 Schnabel rightly claims that individualisation is not a moral choice but an inevitable feature of today's world. Being against it is as odd as being against the fact that it rains; see Paul Schnabel (ed.), *Individualisering en sociale integratie* (Den Haag: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2004) 7, 11-30.

78 Jonathan Edwards, *The Works of Jonathan Edwards, Vol. 2: Religious Affections*, ed. John E. Smith (New Haven: Yale University, 1959); De Lange, 'Moraal', 35-36.

EJT (2015) 24:2, 146–159 0960–2720

The Present Context in the Light of the New Testament and Its Background: The Case of Homosexuality

Reidar Hvalvik

SUMMARY

Few questions are more heatedly discussed in modern Western society than the issue of homosexual practice and same-sex marriage. Traditional positions have been challenged not only in the secular society but also in the churches. In this article it is suggested that the rapid change of views within most churches is partly due to the allegedly 'new exegetical insight' going back to influential books by John Boswell and Robin Scroggs in the 1980s. Attention is given to their exegesis of Romans 1:26–27 and 1 Corinthians 6:9; their interpretations are discussed and contested. Particular emphasis is given to the widespread suggestion that Paul did not know about stable homosexual relations among equal, adult partners – as we do today. The article presents several ancient texts which demonstrate that this assertion is most questionable. Finally, the article has some reflections on the biblical prohibition against same-sex marriage within the broader context of Christian ethics.

* * * * * * * *

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Es gibt wenige Fragen, die in der modernen westlichen Gesellschaft heißer diskutiert werden als die Frage nach praktizierter Homosexualität und gleichgeschlechtlicher Ehebeziehung. Traditionelle Positionen wurden auf den Prüfstand gestellt, und dies nicht nur in der säkularen Gesellschaft, sondern auch in den Kirchen. Dieser Aufsatz vertritt die Anschauung, dass der rasche Wechsel der Meinungen innerhalb der meisten Kirchen teilweise auf die sogenannten „neuen exegetischen Einsichten" zurückzuführen ist, die auf einflussreiche Bücher von John Boswell und Robin Scroggs aus den 1980er Jahren zurückgehen. Entsprechende Aufmerksamkeit ist ihrer Exegese von Rö. 1,26-27 und 1.Kor. 6,9 gewidmet; ihre Auslegungen werden erörtert und in Frage gestellt. Ein besonderer Schwerpunkt liegt dabei auf der weitverbreiteten Ansicht, dass Paulus nichts von stabilen, homosexuellen Beziehungen zwischen gleichgestellten, erwachsenen Partnern gewusst habe im Gegensatz zu uns heute. Die Studie legt verschiedene antike Texte vor, die aufzeigen, dass diese Annahme höchst fragwürdig ist. Abschließend stellt sie einige Überlegungen über das biblische Verbot gleichgeschlechtlicher Ehebeziehungen in den weiteren Rahmen christlicher Ethik.

* * * * * * * *

RÉSUMÉ

Il n'y a pas de question plus chaudement débattue dans notre société occidentale moderne que celles de la pratique homosexuelle et du mariage entre personnes de même sexe. Les positions traditionnelles sont remises en question, non seulement dans le monde séculier, mais aussi dans les Églises. L'auteur suggère que le changement rapide de point de vue dans de nombreuses Églises est en partie dû au soi-disant « nouvel éclairage exégétique » qui remonte à la publication d'ouvrages influents de John Boswell et Robin Scroggs dans les années 80. L'auteur considère leur interprétation de Romains 1.26-27 et de 1 Corinthiens 6.9 et en conteste la validité. Il réfute en particulier l'idée répandue selon laquelle l'apôtre Paul n'aurait pas connu de relation homosexuelle stable entre partenaires adultes et égaux, telles qu'on les rencontre de nos jours : il présente plusieurs textes anciens qui montrent que ce point de vue ne correspond pas aux faits. Enfin, l'auteur apporte quelques réflexions à propos de l'interdiction biblique du mariage entre personnes de même sexe dans le contexte plus large de l'éthique chrétienne.

* * * * * * * *

1. Introduction

There can be no doubt that the question of homosexual practice and same-sex marriage is one of the most debated moral questions in Western society today. Certainly there are other topics that seem to be more urgent, for example poverty, inequality and oppression of women, which affect many more people around the world. These questions do not, however, create similar theological discussions as the question of same-sex marriages. The latter issue has in fact created huge problems in several Western churches and is more or less splitting them. Besides, this issue is special due to the rapid change in opinions – both inside and outside the churches.

This article deals with a chapter of the history of the exegetical discussion about homosexuality.[1] The reason for doing so is that so-called new exegetical insights have been crucial for the reorientation in this question. Let me start with a few comments about the present context. I will take the situation in Norway as my starting point because this is the society I know best. Besides, Norway has often been on the front line in questions of liberalisation and secularisation, and may thus give an indication of what is going on in present day Western Europe. Here are some facts: In Norway male homosexual practice was forbidden and punishable until 1972 and until the middle of the last century homosexuality was in fact not a prominent issue in public debate. Homosexuality was a totally marginal phenomenon. Today the situation is quite different. Homosexual relations are celebrated and given much positive attention in the mass media, in film and literature. This change has taken place in a very short period of time. In 1993 the Norwegian parliament approved a partnership law for gay and lesbian couples, and in 2008 the parliament adopted a common marriage law that gives them the opportunity to marry – like heterosexual couples. In other words, from a legal point of view heterosexuality and homosexuality are now treated in the same way by the authorities, with a few exceptions.

Besides, during the last decades the attitude among the Norwegian population towards homosexuality has changed dramatically. What earlier was a marginal phenomenon is today seen as something within the range of the normal. We can say that in Norway (and probably in the rest of the Western world) there is an ever-increasing majority which seems to regard homosexual relations as normal and acceptable – as expressions of love which always must have right of way.

As far as I can see this is one of the most noticeable cultural changes in Western society due to the very short time in which it took place. The same change is visible within the Western churches. Until rather recently the Church of Norway (with approximately 75% of the population as members) had a traditional standpoint on the question of homosexuality. In 1995, 8 out of 11 bishops argued that sexual relations only belonged within the marriage between a man and a woman. In 2014, by contrast, only 3 of 11 bishops argued for the traditional view. The majority seems to be ready to accept same-sex marriages. The question has been discussed in the General Synod of the church several times, but no clear decision for the new view has so far been taken. This is in fact somewhat surprising, and liberals are upset and disappointed. They are campaigning for a change the next time the General Synod will be assembled.

This change in the church is undoubtedly a result of the massive pressure from the secular society. In Norway, as in many other Western countries, the gay and lesbian lobby has been extremely efficient. I do think, however, that the change in the church of Norway was only possible because biblical scholars and other theologians provided arguments for a new view on same-sex unions. In the following I will therefore focus on scholars who, in my opinion, provided the main arguments and set the agenda for the debate, and now I am thinking internationally. This brings us back to around 1980.

2. The most important purveyors of premises for the debate

The first book to question the traditional Christian view on homosexuality, however, was published already in 1955: *Homosexuality and the Western Christian tradition* by the Anglican priest Derrick Sherwin Bailey.[2] Bailey argues that the Bible had been wrongly interpreted to condemn modern homosexuality. This point of view was taken up by John Boswell in *Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality: Gay People in Western Europe from the Beginning of the Christian Era to the Fourteenth Century*, published in 1980.[3] It seems that Bailey's ideas provided Boswell with a springboard for his own arguments, which may be summarised in four points:

First, that Christianity had come into existence in an atmosphere of Greek and Roman tolerance for same-sex eroticism. Second, that nothing in the Christian scriptures or early tradition required a hostile assessment of homosexuality; rather that such assessments represented a misreading of scripture. Third, that early medieval Christians showed no real animosity toward same-sex eroticism. Fourth, that it was only in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that Christian writers formulated a significant hostility toward homosexuality, and then read that hostility back into their scriptures and early tradition.[4]

This particular book has had an enormous impact. It won a US National Book Award in the category of history, and was celebrated among liberals, especially in the popular press. It is interesting, however, that it was met with scepticism within the gay community. Only a few months after its publication the book was heavily criticised by a forum organised by the New York Chapter of the Gay Academic Union, who decried what they saw as a whitewash of Christian persecution of homosexuals and rejected Boswell's notion that it might be possible to square Christianity with homosexuality.[5]

Among scholars, Boswell's book was praised by some and criticised by many, both historians and theologians. J. Robert Wright, a professor of Christian history in Oxford, entitled his review article of the book: 'Boswell on Homosexuality: A Case Undemonstrated'.[6] Later research has, among other things, qualified Boswell's presupposition that the Greek and Roman society in general accepted same-sex eroticism: 'There was, in fact, no more consensus about homosexuality in ancient Greece and Rome than there is today.'[7]

In the following overview of the biblical texts on homosexuality, I will take Boswell's arguments as my starting point. It may seem strange to use such an old book, but the fact is that much subsequent writing on this subject – from a liberal point of view – depends on Boswell, at least to a certain extent.

Another, likewise influential book should also be mentioned, namely Robin Scroggs, *The New Testament and Homosexuality: Contextual Background for Contemporary Debate*, published in 1983.[8] One of Scroggs' main theses is that the only form of homosexuality known to and banned by Paul was pederasty, the love for young boys. Until quite recently this position was repeated by Christian pastors and scholars – making it easy to propagate liberalisation of the churches' standpoint to homosexuality. Let us now move on to the most relevant New Testament texts, starting with Romans chapter 1.

3. Romans 1:26–27

In Romans 1 Paul writes about how God has revealed himself through his creation. 'For what can be known about God is plain to them', i.e., all humanity, 'because God has shown it to them.' Then he continues from verse 21:

> 21 For although they knew God, they did not honour him as God or give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking, and their foolish hearts were darkened. 22 Claiming to be wise, they became fools, 23 and exchanged [*ēllaxan*] the glory of the immortal God for images resembling mortal man and birds and animals and creeping things.
>
> 24 Therefore God gave them up [*paredōken*] in the lusts of their hearts to impurity, to the dishonouring of their bodies among themselves, 25 because they exchanged [*metēllaxan*] the truth about God for a lie and worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed forever! Amen.
>
> 26 For this reason God gave them up [*paredōken*] to dishonourable passions. For their women [*thēleiai*] exchanged [*metēllaxan*] natural relations [*tēn fysikēn chrēsin*] for those that are contrary to nature [*para fysin*]; 27 and the men [*hoi arsenes*] likewise gave up natural relations [*tēn fysikēn chrēsin*] with women [*tēs thēleias*] and were consumed with passion for one another, men committing shameless acts with men [*arsenes en arsesin*] and receiving in themselves the due penalty for their error. (ESV[9])

In this text Paul speaks about unnatural sexual relations; but what does he refer to? John Boswell has an answer: 'What is even more important, the persons Paul condemns are manifestly not homosexual: what he derogates are homosexual acts committed by apparently heterosexual persons.'[10]

In passing Boswell admits that the idea that some people were born as homosexual was known in antiquity, but he is pretty sure that Paul did not know the idea. In other words, Paul does not speak about homosexual persons but about homosexual acts – committed by heterosexual persons.

With regard to the term 'natural' (*fysikos*), Boswell claims that this has nothing to do with morality. In his opinion, nature in this text refers to the Gentiles' personal nature, i.e. what is characteristic for an individual or a group. The phrase *para fysin* does not mean 'against nature' but rather something like 'unexpected', 'unusual'.[11] The sexual acts described in the text are thus something that was unusual according to people's own nature as heterosexual persons.[12]

Robin Scroggs has a very different approach. He is clear about what *para fysin* means: 'The use of the "argument from the nature" is a commonplace of Greco-Roman attack on pederasty and has nothing to do with any theories of natural law or with interpretation of the Genesis stories of creation.'[13] A little bit later in his book he elaborates his argument:

> The verses attacking homosexuality seem dependent on Hellenistic Jewish propaganda against Gentiles. While the phrase 'male with males' relates to the law of Leviticus, the likelihood is that Paul is thinking only about pederasty, just as Philo. There was no other form of male homosexuality in Greco-Roman world which could come to mind. … Since that is so, then it is not too hard to see how he might have considered it unnatural. Perhaps he was impressed by the lack of mutuality, the physical and emotional humiliation suffered by youths who were forced into slavery or who accepted the degradation of the prostitute. Perhaps it was those particular conditions he had heard of that made him consider homosexuality unnatural, rather than some overarching abstract theological conviction, or even some fiat in the Bible.[14]

In these quotations from Boswell and Scroggs, we can see some important arguments which are repeatedly used in the debate:

1) In Romans 1 Paul speaks about heterosexual people involved in homosexual acts;
2) Paul did not know about homosexuals as we do;
3) What Paul condemns is pederasty, and his reason for doing so is the fact that it is linked to exploitation of young boys;
4) Whatever the meaning of *para fysin* – here Boswell and Scroggs disagree – the phrase has nothing to do with the biblical view on creation and the story in the first chapters of Genesis.

3.1 The meaning of *para fysin* and *fysikos*

With regard to the meaning of *para fysin* and *fysikos*, I do not think it is necessary to go into a detailed discussion. It is clear that these words were used in many and various contexts. What is interesting in our connection is the fact that they were also used about sexual relations, and not only about pederasty. This can be illustrated with a few quotations.

The stoic Dio Chrysostom (c. AD 40–120) writes that by keeping human beings in brothels, one dishonoured the goddess Aphrodite 'whose name stands for the normal [*tēs kata fysin*] intercourse and union of the male and female' (*Disc.* 7.135). The words he uses for the 'normal' are *tēs kata fysin*, 'that which is according to nature'.

Plutarch (c. AD 46–120) makes a contrast between the natural [*tē fysei*] love between man and woman and the unnatural [*para fysin*] between men:

> But I count this as a great argument in favour of women: if union contrary to nature [*para fysin*] with males does not destroy or curtail a lover's tenderness, it stands to reason that the love between men and women, being normal and natural [*ton gynaikōn kai andrōn erōta tē fysei chrōmenon*], will be conducive to friendship developing in due course from favor. (Plutarch, *Erotikos* 751c–d)[15]

When we move to Jewish authors, we find an interesting passage in Josephus, *Against Apion*:

> What are our marriage laws? The Law recognizes only sexual intercourse that is according to nature [*kata fysin*], that which is with a woman, and that only for the procreation of children. But it abhors the intercourse of males with males. (Josephus, *Against Apion* 2.199)[16]

Even more relevant for the study of Romans 1 is the *Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs*, probably written in the second century before Christ. The author speaks about God's creation, saying that 'God made all things good in their order [*panta gar en tachei epoiēsen ho theos kala*]' (2.8). I quote from the continuation:

> The gentiles, because they wandered astray and forsook the Lord, have changed the order, and have devoted themselves to stones and sticks, patterning themselves after wandering spirits. But you, my children, shall not be like that: In the firmament, in the earth, and in the sea, in all the products of his workmanship discern the Lord who made all things, so that you do not become like Sodom, which departed from

(or: changed [*enēllaxe*]) the order of nature [*tachin fyseōs*]. Likewise the Watchers departed from (or: changed [*enēllaxan*]) nature's order [*tachin fyseōs*]; the Lord pronounced a curse on them at the Flood. On their account he ordered that the earth be without dweller or produce. (*Testament of Naphtali* 3:3–5).[17]

What is important in this text, is that *fysis* is directly connected with God's creation of the world. The 'order of nature' is the order given by the Creator – who can be seen in all he has done. The way of thinking is surprisingly close to what we read in Romans 1. Contrary to the views of Boswell and Scroggs, it is thus most likely that *fysis* in Romans 1 is directly linked to creation as it is told in the opening chapters of Genesis. This assumption can be supported by the obvious intertextuality between Romans 1 and Genesis 1 in the Septuagint version – as can be seen from this comparison:

Genesis 1 LXX (NETS)[18]	Romans 1 (ESV)
1 In the beginning, God made the heaven and the earth … 26 Then God said, 'Let us make humankind according to our image [*eikona*], and according to likeness [*homoiōsin*], and let them rule the fish of the sea and the birds [*peteinōn*] of the sky and the cattle and all the earth and all the creeping things [*herpetōn*] that creep on the earth.' 27 And God made humankind; according to divine image he made it; male and female [*arsen kai thēly*] he made them. 28 And God blessed them, saying, 'Increase, and multiply, and fill the earth, and subdue it, and rule the fish of the sea and the birds [*peteinōn*] of the sky and all the cattle and all the earth and alle creeping things [*herpetōn*] that creep upon the earth.'	20 ever since *the creation of the world*… 23 …and exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images [*eikonos*] resembling [*en homoi mati*] mortal man and birds [*peteinōn*] and animals and creeping things [*herpetōn*] … (25 … because they exchanged the truth about God for a lie and worshipped and served the creature rather than *the Creator* …) Cf. the use of *arsēn* and *thēlys* (male and female): *hai thēleiai* (v. 26) and *hoi arsenes* (v. 27)

In the first text God gives humankind dominion over the creation, exemplified by, among other things, birds and reptiles. In the second text Paul speaks about how fallen humanity changed the order created by God, and started to worship creatures, exemplified by birds and reptiles, instead of the Creator.

3.2 Fallen humanity

What Paul is describing is the fall of humanity. It is far more than a polemical denunciation of some selected gentile vices. In fact the text is much more theological than ethical. According to Paul, the whole history of humankind is governed by the primal sin of rebellion against the Creator, a sin that finds repeated and universal expression in every new generation.[19] When Paul brings same-sex relations into his exposition, it is as an illustration of the fact that humans have rejected the Creator's design. It is worth noticing that when Paul speaks about men and women in this text, he does not use the most common Greek words, *anēr* and *gynē*, but *arsēn* and *thēlys*, exactly the same words that we find in Genesis 1:27: 'So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them.' There is thus an allusion not only to God's order of creation in general, but also to the complementarity between man and woman.

The basic issue in Romans 1 is humanity's rejection of the Creator – a fact that leads to Paul's conclusion in 3:9 'that all men, both Jews and Greeks, are under the power of sin'. The fundamental rejection of God comes to expression in idolatry: humans worship the creature instead of the Creator. The key word here is 'exchange'. It is used of idolatry in verses 23 and 25, and then taken up again in verse 26 in connection with unnatural sexual relations. This means that the change about which Paul speaks has nothing to do with heterosexuals starting to have same-sex relations. Paul is not referring to an individual change, but to a universal change in the history of humankind. Boswells' exegesis is clearly at variance with the plain sense of the text. It is wishful exegesis or rather eisegesis, reading a meaning into the text.

The same holds true with regard to Robin Scroggs' claim that Paul is referring to pederasty, with a special focus on the exploitation and humiliation of young boys. Two factors show that this is not the case. First, when Paul speaks about homosexual practice, he says in verse 27: 'they were consumed with passion for one another'. The word used here (*orexis*) is not compatible with the idea of coercion; it means desire, passion or longing,[20] and it is stressed that it is reciprocal. These words can hardly be used about pederasty, for example in master-slave relationships.

Besides, and that is the second argument against Scroggs: In this text Paul also speaks about lesbian sex. Even if this is mentioned only here, it was a well-known phenomenon in antiquity, not in the form of adult exploitation of young girls, but as mutual relations between adult women.[21] To say that Paul only knew about pederasty is thus in direct contradiction to what this text actually says.

This leads me to the last objection against Boswell and Scroggs, about what Paul actually knew of homosexuality. I will comment on that question in connection with the second most important New Testament text related to our topic, namely 1 Corinthians 6:9–10.

4. First Corinthians 6:9–10

In these two verses Paul gives a list of people who will not inherit the kingdom of God. The New International Version (NIV) translates as follows:

> 9 Or do you not know that wrongdoers will not inherit the kingdom of God? Do not be deceived: Neither the sexually immoral nor idolaters nor adulterers nor *men who have sex with men* 10 nor thieves nor the greedy nor drunkards nor slanderers nor swindlers will inherit the kingdom of God.

The NET (New English Translation) gives another translation:

> 9 Do you not know that the unrighteous will not inherit the kingdom of God? Do not be deceived! The sexually immoral [*pornoi*], idolaters [*eidōlolatrai*], adulterers [*moichoi*], passive homosexual partners [*malakoi*], practicing homosexuals [*arsenokoitai*], 10 thieves, the greedy, drunkards, the verbally abusive, and swindlers will not inherit the kingdom of God.

The phrase 'men who have sex with men' (NIV) is in fact a translation of two different Greek words, *malakoi* and *arsenokoitai*. What is the meaning of these words? Traditionally, as in these translations, they have been understood as referring to homosexual actions, but this has been disputed.

4.1 Malakos

Let us start with the word *malakos*. This is a rather common word, meaning soft or weak. Boswells claims:

> The word is never used in Greek to designate gay people as a group or even in reference to homosexual acts generically, and it often occurs in writings contemporary with the Pauline epistles in reference to heterosexual persons or activity.[22]
>
> So many people are denigrated as '*malakos*' in ancient literature, for so many reasons, that the burden of proof in this case must be on those who wish to *create* a link with gay people. In the absence of such proof, the soundest inference is that '*malakos*' refers to general moral weakness, with no specific connection to homosexuality.[23]

Boswell is right when he says that *malakos* is used in a great variety of contexts, but not when he excludes references to homosexuality. In texts about homoeroticism we certainly find authors speaking about males who behave like women and thus are characterized as soft – using the adjective *malakos* or the equivalent noun (*malakia*) or verb (*malakizesthai*). This can be illustrated with a quotation from Philo of Alexandria, in a text where he writes about pederasty. He writes about men who behave like women. They have their hair curled and adorned, their faces painted, and their skins anointed with fragrant perfumes:

> Moreover, another evil, much greater than that which we have already mentioned, has made its way among and been let loose upon cities, namely, the love of boys [*to paiderastein*], which formerly was accounted a great infamy even to be spoken of, but which sin is a subject of boasting not only to those who practise it, but even to those who suffer it, and who, being accustomed to bearing the affliction of being

treated like women. … And let the man who is devoted to the love of boys [*paiderastēs*] submit to the same punishment, since he pursues that pleasure which is contrary to nature [*para fysin*], and since, as far as depends upon him, he would make the cities desolate, and void, and empty of all inhabitants, wasting his power of propagating his species, and moreover, being a guide and teacher of those greatest of all evils, unmanliness and effeminate [*malakias*] lust … (Philo, *Spec. leg.* 3.37–39)[24]

Let me add another quote, this time from Lucian of Samosata who lived in the second century AD. In his *Amores*, which is a comparison between the love of women and the love of boys, he speaks about the goddess of love, Aphrodite, referring to men and women:

> she linked them to each other, ordaining as a sacred law of necessity that each should retain its own nature and that neither should the female grow unnaturally masculine nor the male be unbecomingly soft [*malakizesthai*]. (Lucian, *Amores* 19)[25]

These two texts should be sufficient to show that *malakos* (or derivate words) may refer to a person in a homosexual relationship. As is always the case, the context is essential for the translation of this word. In 1 Corinthians 6 two of the three preceding words refer to sexual sins, namely *pornoi* (people who practise sexual immorality) and *moichoi* (people who commit adultery). But even more important is the subsequent word *arsenokoitai*. What does it mean? Admittedly this is not quite obvious due to the fact that we lack parallels in writings that are older or concurrent with 1 Corinthians. Boswell comments:

> Perhaps the most extensive evidence that '*arsenokoitai*' did not connote 'homosexual' or even 'sodomite' in the time of Paul is offered by the vast amount of writing extant on the subject of homoerotic sexuality in Greek in which this term does not occur. It is extremely difficult to believe that if the word actually meant 'homosexual' or 'sodomite', *no* previous or contemporary author would have used it in a way which clearly indicated this connection.[26]

This argumentation may sound convincing, but it is not. Boswell's horizon seems to be limited to the Greco-Roman world, not taking into account that Paul was a Jew, with knowledge of Hebrew and capable to draw on a Jewish tradition.

4.2 *Arsenokoitēs*[27]

The second word, *arsenokoitēs*, is obviously a compound word: *arsēn* (male, man) is linked with *koitē* (bed; euphemism for *sexual intercourse*); the suffix *-ēs* indicates masculine. It is, however, not clear how the two parts are related. Boswell mentions another but similar composite word *paidofileō* where it is obvious that *paido* is the object of *fileō*, but this is not always the case. To illustrate the problem Boswell mentions the English expression 'lady killer'. Does this mean a lady who kills or a person who kills ladies? Consequently *arsenokoitēs* is ambiguous, according to Boswell, though he leans towards seeing *arsēn* as subject and claims that it means a male prostitute, or more precisely: an 'active male prostitute … capable of the active role with either men or women'.[28] This means, according to Boswell (and some other scholars), that the word does not necessarily refer to homosexual intercourse.

This conclusion is questionable – to say it gently. First, it is more likely that *arsēn* is the object than the subject. This can be claimed on the basis of other Greek words where *koitēs* is the second part. The most interesting examples are *doulokoitēs* (*doulos* + *koitēs*) and *mētrokoitēs* (*mētēr* + *koitēs*), both found in Liddel and Scott's Greek-English lexicon. The first refers to a man who has intercourse with a slave, the second to a man who has intercourse with his mother. Consequently it is most likely that *arsenokoitēs* refers to a man who has intercourse with another man, *arsēn* stressing that the person is male.

Secondly, this interpretation is strongly supported by the fact that the word seems to be coined on the basis of the Septuagint (LXX). In Leviticus, in the so-called Holiness Code (Lev 17–26), we find two laws that forbid sexual intercourse between men:

> Leviticus 18:22: 'And you shall not sleep with a male as in a bed with a woman (*meta arsenos ou koimēthēsē koitēn gynaikos*); for it is an abomination.' (LXX/NETS)
>
> Leviticus 20:13: 'And he who lies with a male in a bed for a woman (*hos an koimēthē meta arsenos koitēn gynaikos*), both have committed an abomination.' (LXX/NETS)

Here we have a phrase where both the word *male* (*arsenos*, genitive of *arsēn*) and the word *bed* = *intercourse* (*koitēn*) occur; in the second case next to each other. It is thus most likely that the word has been coined in a Jewish setting with these texts in mind, possibly by Paul himself. This is, however, of less importance. The important point is that Leviticus 18 and 20 offer a most plausible background for the word *arsenokoitēs*, which clearly refers to a man having sexual intercourse with another male person.

Can we be more precise? According to Scroggs, the combination of *malakos* and *arsenokoitēs* makes it likely that the first word refers to a feminine 'call boy' and the second to the active person in the relationship who has a young boy as his mistress. The text thus refers to pederasty, but without further argumentation Scroggs claims that 'a very specific dimension of pederasty is being denounced with these two terms'.[29]

Let us disregard the last comment for a moment, and simply ask: What can be said about this interpretation? Does 1 Corinthians 6:9 refer to the form of homosexuality known as pederasty, love for young boys? It is interesting to see that this interpretation is presupposed in several European Bible translations, especially German versions, as can be seen from this list:

> *Einheitsübersetzung der Heiligen Schrift*: 'noch *Lustknaben*, noch *Knabenschänder*'
>
> *Lutherbibel* (1912): 'noch *die Weichlinge* noch die *Knabenschänder*'
>
> *Neue LutherBibel* (2009): '*Lüstlinge* oder *Knabenschänder*'
>
> *Elberfelder Bibel* (revidierte Fassung 1993): 'noch *Lustknaben*, noch *Knabenschänder*'
>
> *Traduction Œcuménique de la Bible* (1988): 'ni les *efféminés*, ni les *pédérastes*'

There is no doubt that pederasty was a well-known practice in antiquity, especially in Greece,[30] but it is hardly what Paul refers to here. If he did, he could have chosen another term, for example the unambiguous *paiderastēs* or *paidofilēs*. Instead he uses a new and unknown word, which seems to cover all forms of homosexual relations toward another male. There is no basis for limiting this word to pederasty or to limit it to relations to a male prostitute, as several English Bible translations in fact do:

> *New International Bible* (1984): 'nor *male prostitutes* nor homosexual offenders'
>
> *New Living Translation*: 'or are *male prostitutes*, or practice homosexuality'
>
> *New Revised Standard Version* (1989): '*male prostitutes*, sodomites'
>
> *New American Bible*: 'nor *boy prostitutes* nor sodomites'

Both these solutions, limiting what Paul speaks about to pederasty or to homosexual intercourse with male prostitutes, are based on an important assumption, i.e. that these were the only forms of homosexual practice that Paul knew of and consequently the only forms of homosexuality that he condemned.

4.4 What did Paul know?

This is in fact the trump card of homo-liberal scholars and activists: Paul did not know of stable homosexual relations among equal, adult partners. Therefore his texts about homosexuality are not relevant for modern times. In the words of Martti Nissinen, author of *Homoeroticism in the Biblical World: A Historical Perspective*:

> The modem concept of 'homosexuality' should by no means be read into Paul's text, nor can we assume that Paul's words in 1 Corinthians 6:9 'condemn all homosexual relations' in all times and places and ways. The meanings of the words are too vague to justify this claim, and Paul's words should not be used for generalizations that go beyond his experience and world.[31]

Here Paul's experience (a word I take in a broad sense) and his world set the limits for what the words in 1 Corinthians 6:9 can refer to. Without accepting this premise, let us test the assumption of Paul's limited knowledge. What could a well-educated person, who had travelled extensively in the Roman Empire, living for long periods in great cities like Antioch, Corinth and Ephesus, know about homosexuality?

To be provocative, I could claim that he did not know pederasty – simply because he did not use the common technical term for such relationships. Someone could then protest and say: Of course he knew it; it was very common. Yes, but it was not the only form of homoerotic relationship known in antiquity, not even in the classical Greek period. This can be seen in Plato's well-known text *Symposium*. The setting is, as the title indicates, a symposium, i.e. an aristocratic drinking party at which men met to discuss philosophical and political issues and recite poetry. In Plato's famous *Symposium*, an imaginary dialogue takes place between representatives of the intellectual elite of the day, including Socrates, Aristophanes and Pausanias. Each guest delivers a speech in praise of Eros, the god of love.

When Pausanias starts his speech, he comments that there are two different kinds of Eros or Love. The Greeks had two different stories about the birth of Aphrodite, the goddess who always accompanies Eros. Thus Pausanias claims that there are two different goddesses named Aphrodite. One is the heavenly Aphrodite and the other is the common or ordinary Aphrodite. The love which is connected with the Common Aphrodite is the love that inferior people experience, i.e. men who love women quite as much as boys, and their bodies more than their souls. Pausanias continues:

> However, the Love who accompanies the heavenly goddess (and who does not descend from the female but only from the male) is the love of boys, and that goddess is older and entirely free from wantonness. Hence those who are inspired by this love incline to the male, preferring what has by nature more vigour and intelligence. Moreover, even among men who love younger members of their own sex it is possible to recognise those who are motivated purely by this heavenly love, in that they do not love boys before the stage when their intelligence begins to develop, which is near the time when they begin to grow a beard. I believe that those who wait until then to embark on a love affair are prepared to spend their whole life with this individual and to live in partnership with him. They will not take him at a time when he is young and inexperienced, and then deceive him, contemptuously leaving him and running off to someone else. (Plato, *Symposium*, 181a–181d)[32]

It is clear that Pausanias' ideal form of love is the lifelong partnership between men. And this is not the kind of love where an adult man looks for the feminine and soft in a young boy. On the contrary, it is a love that is attracted to the strength and intelligence of a grown-up male. Consequently he says:

> There ought really to be a law against starting a love affair with mere boys, to prevent a great deal of effort being spent on something of uncertain outcome, because with young boys it is uncertain how well or badly in body or soul they will turn out. (181d)

With regard to common lovers, i.e. those who are influenced by the Common Aphrodite, he says:

> It is men like these who have given rise to disapproval and caused some people to go so far as to state that gratifying[33] lovers is wrong, but their disapproval is based on the ill-judged and improper behaviour of this latter kind of lovers, since certainly no activity that is carried on in a decent and lawful manner can justly be called blameworthy. (182a)

This sounds astonishingly modern, and one could guess that this is the background for Scroggs' thinking. It is the exploitation of young boys that Paul knew of and which he spoke against, not the mature love between men that Pausanias recommended. But one has to ask: If Paul knew the first-mentioned kind of homosexuality, could he not also have known the last-mentioned?

It is often claimed that Paul (and people in antiquity in general) knew nothing about what we would call homosexual orientation. Admittedly they did not know and use our terminology and categories, but this does not mean that they did not know that some people had an inclination or attraction towards persons of the same sex – and that they were born like that. In the words of Thomas K. Hubbard, editor of *Homosexuality in Greece and Rome: A Sourcebook of Basic Documents*:

> Close examination of a range of ancient texts suggests, however, that some forms of sexual preference were, in fact, considered a distinguishing characteristic of individuals. Many texts even see such preferences as inborn qualities and thus 'essential' aspects of human identity.[34]

Let us return to Plato's *Symposium*. In his speech Aristophanes starts to talk about the nature or anatomy of human beings, and claims that far back in time there were not merely two sexes, male and female, but three, the third being a combination of the other two. He continues:

> This sex itself has disappeared but its name, androgynous, survives. At that time the androgynous sex was distinct in form and name, having physical features from both the male and the female, but only the name now exists, and that as a term of insult. (189d–e)

Aristophanes then goes on describing what human beings looked like in ancient times; they had four arms and four legs, they had two faces and two set of genitals. They were all awesome in strength and might, and their ambition was great too. The gods, led by Zeus, were frightened by them and decided to split each man, woman and androgyne person in two. When the original nature of every human being had been severed in this way, the two parts longed for each other and tried to come together again. They were not, however, able to have children. Therefore Zeus adjusted the human body, placing the genitals on the front of the body. Thus Zeus caused them to reproduce by intercourse with one another through these organs, the male penetrating the female. He continues:

> He did this in order that when couples encountered one another and embraced, if a man encountered a woman, he might impregnate her and the race might continue, and if a man encountered another man, at any rate they might achieve satisfaction from the union and after this respite turn to their tasks and get on with the business of life. (191c-d)

Due to the split of human beings in ancient times, we are all continually searching for our other half, Aristophanes continues:

> Those men who are sliced from originals which comprised both sexes (formerly called androgynous) are lovers of women, and most adulterers originate from this sex, as do adulteresses and all women who are lovers of men. Women who are sliced from the wholly female sex are not at all interested in men but are attracted towards other women, and female homosexuals come from this original sex. Men who are sliced from the wholly male original seek out males, and being slices of the male, while they are still boys they feel affection for men and take pleasure in lying beside or entwined with them. In youth and young manhood this sort of male is the best because he is by nature the most manly. Some people say such males are without shame, but that is not true. They do what they do not out of shamelessness but out of confidence, courage and manliness, and they embrace that which is like themselves. And there is good evidence for this in the fact that only males of this type, when they are grown up, prove to be the real men in politics. Once they reach manhood, they become lovers of boys and are not naturally inclined to marry or produce children, though they are compelled by convention. They are quite content to live out their lives with one another and not marry. In short, such a male is as a boy a lover of men, and as a man a lover of boys, always embracing his own kind. (191d–192b)

Despite the mythological 'wrapping', the text makes clear that people in antiquity were aware of different sexual 'orientation' as something innate and even natural. According to this text, the youngsters involved with older men were not exploited or forced to do so. They did so because of an innate orientation to and longing for the same sex. Again, this sounds very modern, and shows that people in antiquity had knowledge of relationships between men of a kind not unlike what we see in modern Western society. Our terminology and explanations are different, but the phenomenon seems to be the same. And these texts make it perfectly clear that pederasty was far from the only form of homosexuality known to ancient people.

The salient question, however, is the following: Did Paul know about these things? There are good reasons to believe that he did. Firstly, Paul indicates that he knew people who were 'passive homosexual partners' (*malakoi*) and 'practising homosexuals' (*arsenokoitai*) – to use what I think is the most adequate English translation of the key terms.[35] After listing such people in 1 Corinthians 6:9, he says, 'Some of you *once lived* this way' (v. 11). In other words, there were former practising homosexuals in the Corinthian church, a church Paul knew better than any other. He had a close relation to them and visited them several times; according to Acts (18:11) he lived there for one and a half year when he first visited the town. There are thus very good reasons to think that he personally knew men who formerly had practised sex with other men.

Secondly, Paul's Roman environment witnessed various homoerotic relations between adult men, some of them even formalized in marriage. I shall offer some examples, close to New Testament times.[36]

The Roman historians Tacitus (c. 55–117), Suetonius (69–c. 122) and Dio Cassius (c. 150–235) all record that the emperor Nero publicly celebrated at least two wedding ceremonies with males, one in which he was the groom and one or perhaps two in which he was the bride. According to Tacitus, in AD 64 Nero was formally married to his slave Pythagoras:

> A veil was placed over the emperor, the interpreters of the auspices were sent; a dowry, a wedding bed and marriage torches – in the end, everything that is concealed by night even in the case of a woman was on display. (Tacitus, *Ann.* 15.37)[37]

Suetonius mentions a wedding in which Nero was the bride to his freedman Doryphoros, adding that a certain Sporos earlier 'had been wedded to Nero himself' (Suetonius, *Nero* 29). The same Suetonius also writes about the Roman general Galba, who was emperor for three months after Nero's death:

> As for his sexual desires, he was more inclined to males, and among males only to the very strong and experienced. They said that in Spain, when Icelus, one of his long-time kept men, announced Nero's death to him, he not only received him publicly with intense kisses, but begged him to have himself depilated immediately and then took him aside. (Suetonius, *Galba* 22)[38]

One may be tempted to think that what an emperor did was exceptional, but other sources confirm that marriages between men took place in Rome. This is witnessed by the first century Roman poets Martial (c. 40–103) and Juvenal (late first to early second century), who both used satire as a literary genre. As a rule Martial and Juvenal appropriate actual practices in their satirical commentary on Roman society, and it seems that weddings between males, though certainly not officially sanctioned, were a feature of the social landscape.[39] On this topic, Craig A. Williams, author of *Roman Homosexuality*, concludes as follows:

> In sum, it seems clear that some Romans did participate in formal wedding ceremonies in which one male was married to another … and that these men considered themselves joined as spouses.[40]

Certainly this was an anomaly according to Roman standards; this is clear from the fact that if two males were joined together, one of them had to be 'the woman'. This is ridiculed by the satirists, as in an epigram of Martial:

> The bearded Callistratus became a bride to the rigid Afer on the same terms with which a maiden is wedded to her husband. Torches led the way and a veil concealed his face; nor did you, Talassus, miss out on being invoked.[41] Even a dowry was established. O Rome! Don't you think this is enough already? Or are you waiting for him to give birth too? (Martial 12.42)[42]

Similarly Juvenal records:

> Gracchus has given a dowry of four hundred [thousand] sesterces to a trumpeter – or maybe he blew on a straight horn. The documents were signed and sealed; people shouted 'Best wishes!'; they sat down to an enormous dinner; the newly wed bride lay in her husband's lap. (Juv. 2.117–120)[43]

Such relations would certainly have been the topic of conversation and gossip in a Roman colony like Corinth. Paul could also have got knowledge of such relations from persons within the Christian community in Corinth, as he got knowledge of a man who was cohabiting with his father's wife (1 Cor 5:1). After leaving Corinth Paul wrote several letters to the church there, commenting on problems raised in letters from the community and in orally information (cf. 1 Cor 1:11). In 1 Corinthians Paul addresses different forms of sexual immorality, particularly the incest case and the practice of visiting a prostitute; both are strongly denounced. It is thus no surprise that he also mentions homosexual practice – since he knew that some men in the Corinthian church earlier had had sex with other men. Both the specific words Paul uses in 1 Corinthians 6:9 and the homosexual practice he must have known, make it more than likely that he actually denounces all kinds of homosexual activity between males. And, as we saw from the letter to the Romans, he also knew about women having sex with other women, and condemned it as something at variance with God's creational order.

Against this background we must conclude that the idea of so-called new knowledge that sets aside the New Testament texts is far from convincing. Paul's letters show that he was acquainted with various forms of sexual practices but that he only blessed the monogamous marriage between a man and a woman – in line with the teaching of Jesus himself. The horizon of Jesus – like Paul in Romans 1 – is God's creation of humans as male and female to lifelong union:

> Have you not read that from the beginning the Creator made them male and female, and said, 'For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and will be united with his wife, and the two will become one flesh'? (Mt 19:4–5; NET).

In the words of the late Wolfgang Pannenberg:

> According to Jesus' teaching, human sexuality as male and as female is intended for the indissoluble fellowship of marriage. This standard informs Christian teaching about the entire domain of sexual behavior.[44]

5. Ethical challenges in present day societies and churches

Early on in the modern debate about Christianity and homosexuality John Boswell argued that the Bible does not speak against homosexuality. According to him, the traditional view was based on misinterpretation of the texts. More than three decades later there has been a certain change. Among classical historians and biblical scholars, I think, a majority will say that texts from both the Old and the New Testament speak clearly against homosexual practice. This is made clear by several scholars, among whom Robert Gagnon[45] and Richard Hays[46] should be mentioned. And the interesting thing is that even those on the liberal wing agree that Paul condemns homosexual practice, both among men and women. As Bernadette Brooten writes, 'I see Paul as condemning all forms of homoeroticism.'[47]

If this really is the case, one could expect a change towards the 'traditional' position on homosexual practice. This is, however, most unlikely. For one thing, there are very few pastors and lay activists within the churches who read the most up-to-date books on the Bible and homosexuality. For that reason many will still refer to Boswell or Scroggs (or other scholars with similar positions) and believe that they know what 'the scholars' say on this subject. Thus there is a great need to educate churchgoers and active Christians about the results of modern exegetical scholarship – confronting the massive flow of direct and indirect propaganda for a more liberal attitude to homosexual practice. There is hardly any possibility to change the attitude in the broader society, but in many churches the debate continues – and sound, solid arguments are needed. If arguments for the 'traditional' view shall have a future, I think they have to be treated within a much broader context. I could have listed several issues; I will briefly mention only two areas which should not be forgotten – even if they are well-known:

a) *The prohibition against same-sex marriage within the broader context of Christian ethics.* As I have tried to demonstrate, the biblical prohibition against homosexual practice is part of the biblical view on sexuality and marriage, which means that sexual intercourse belongs to the monogamous marriage between a man and a woman. This view is, however, heavily challenged both in the broader society and in the churches. We all know that sex before marriage is common also in Christian circles. Do preaching and teaching in evangelical churches mention that this too is violation of God's commandment, and that this sin is also covered by what Paul is talking about in 1 Corinthians 6:9–10? In other words, is evangelical teaching equally clear and consistent in other ethical questions as in the question of same-sex marriages?

If we once more take a look at 1 Corinthians 6, we could for example stop at the word 'the greedy'. What is preached about greed in our churches and communities? If we look at the situation in Europe today, we see that the gap between rich and poor is increasing. And in a broader global context we are all rich. Is this a problem that is taken seriously? Clement of Alexandria once wrote a book on the question, *Can a rich man be saved?* Does anyone ask this question today? If we take a look at Jesus' many words about the danger of being rich, we should be worried. This worry is strengthened by Paul's words in Colossians 3:5, where he says that greed is idolatry. In my opinion this is the greatest challenge to Christians in the Western world today. What do evangelical Christians say and do with reference to this question? Is it possible that the traditional view on sexual ethics would gain greater credibility if the ethical teaching were more consistent and less one-eyed?

b) *What would Jesus do?* This is a popular slogan among young Christians. It is also popular among liberals. I have met pastors and bishops who changed their view on same-sex marriage based on the question 'What would Jesus do?' and I know of scholars who agree that Paul speaks against homosexual practice, but still argue strongly for a liberalisation based on the example of Jesus: Jesus had fellowship with tax collectors and sinners; he welcomed the outcasts in society and gave them dignity. In our days the homosexuals belong to this group. Thus Christians have to welcome them without conditions and show them love and care.

Surely something can be learnt from this attitude, and Jesus is certainly a model to be followed in Christian ethics. But liberals should not be alone in focusing on this aspect. On the other hand, the ethics of Jesus is not taken seriously if one only says, 'Neither do I condemn you.' The following words have to be added, as Jesus did: 'Go, and from now on sin no more' (John 8:11, ESV).

One of the most pressing challenges for the church today is to speak rightly and honestly of Jesus and of God. It is true that 'God is love', but his love included suffering and sacrifice – aspects that often are forgotten when we speak about love.

As Paul says about love, 'It does not insist on its own way' (1 Cor 13:5, ESV).

Focusing on love is important, but an unqualified reference to love is unbiblical and dangerous.[48] Today we often meet the 'love justifies' hermeneutic – which actually may be used to justify practice that, according to the New Testament, is sin, for example sex outside marriage or divorce. The church is called to teach and preach God's unconditional forgiveness. And at the same time to talk about commitment to those who will be followers of Jesus.

According to the Gospel of Matthew, Jesus' last words to his disciples were the following: 'Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you' (28:19–20, ESV). This clearly shows that Jesus not only spoke about liberation; he also gave commandments. And notice that the disciples are not only asked to *teach* what Jesus had commanded. They should teach new disciples to *keep*, to *observe*, what he had commanded. All Christian ethical teaching should be seen in this broader context: between commandments and commitment on the one hand, and the gospel of forgiveness on the other.[49]

Dr Reidar Hvalvik is professor of New Testament at the MF Norwegian School of Theology, Oslo

Endnotes

1 This article is based on a lecture held at the biennial conference of the Fellowship of European Evangelical Theologians (FEET) in Orsay near Paris in 2014.

2 Derrick Sherwin Bailey, *Homosexuality and the Western Christian Tradition* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1955).

3 John Boswell, *Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality: Gay People in Western Europe from the Beginning of the Christian Era to the Fourteenth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

4 Matthew Kuefler, 'The Boswell Thesis', in Kueffler (ed.), *The Boswell Thesis: Essays on Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006) 1–31¸ 2.

5 Alastair J. L. Blanshard, review of *The Boswell Thesis: Essays on Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality* in *Journal of Sociology* 44 (2008) 209–211, 210.

6 J. Robert Wright, 'Boswell on Homosexuality: A Case Undemonstrated', *Anglican Theological Review* 66 (1984) 79–94; see also, e.g., Lynne C. Boughton, 'Biblical Texts and Homosexuality: A Response to John Boswell', *Irish Theological Quarterly* 58 (1992) 141–153.

7 Thomas K. Hubbard, 'Introduction', in Hubbard (ed.), *Homosexuality in Greece and Rome: A Sourcebook of Basic Documents* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003) 1–20, 7–8.

8 Robin Scroggs, *The New Testament and Homosexuality: Contextual Background for Contemporary Debate* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983).

9 ESV = English Standard Version (London: Collins, 2002).

10 Boswell, *Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality*, 109.

11 Boswell, *Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality*, 112.

12 For a refutation of this view and an evaluation of many other interpretations of Romans 1:26–27, see John Nolland, 'Romans 1:26–27 and the Homosexuality Debate', *Horizons in Biblical Theology* 22 (2000) 32–57; see also Richard B. Hays, 'Relations Natural and Unnatural: A Response to John Boswell's Exegesis of Romans 1', *Journal of Religious Ethics* 14 (1986) 184–215.

13 Scroggs, *The New Testament and Homosexuality*, 114–115.

14 Scroggs, *The New Testament and Homosexuality*, 116 and 117.

15 Quoted from Plutarch, *Moralia*, vol. 9 (trans. E. L. Minar, F. H. Sandbach and W. C. Helmbol; Loeb Classical Library 425, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961).

16 Quotation from Robert A.J. Gagnon *The Bible and Homosexual Practice: Texts and Hermeneutics* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2001) 326. The translation in Josephus, *The Life. Against Apion* (trans. H. St. J. Thackeray; Loeb Classical Library 186; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926) is unfortunate, rendering the last sentence with one single word ('sodomy').

17 Quotations from James H. Charlesworth (ed.), *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha* (2 vols.; New York: Doubleday, 1983–1985).

18 NETS = *A New English Translation of the Septuagint and the Other Greek Translations Traditionally Included under That Title* (ed. Albert Pietersma and Benjamin G. Wright; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

19 See Richard B. Hays, *The Moral Vision of the New Testament: Community, Cross, New Creation: A Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics* (San Francisco: Harper, 1996) 385. The chapter on Homosexuality is on pages 379–406.

20 See F. Danker, W. Bauer, W. F. Arndt and F. W. Gingrich, *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*

(3rd ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), s.v.

21 See, e.g. Bernadette Brooten, *Love between Women: Early Christian Responses to Female Homoeroticism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

22 Boswell, *Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality*, 107.

23 Boswell, *Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality*, 340.

24 Quotation from *Philo*, vol. 7 (trans. F. H. Colson; Loeb Classical Library 320; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1937).

25 Quotation from *Lucian*, vol. 8 (trans. M. D. Macleod; Loeb Classical Library 432; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967).

26 Boswell, *Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality*, 345.

27 For a detailed treatment of this word, see David F. Wright, 'Homosexuals or Prostitutes? The Meaning of ΑΡΣΕΝΟΚΟΙΤΑΙ (1 Cor. 6:9, 1 Tim. 1:10)', *Vigiliae Christianae* 38 (1984) 125–153.

28 Boswell, *Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality*, 344.

29 Scroggs, *The New Testament and Homosexuality*, 108.

30 Note, however, Hubbard's reminder: 'Greek homosexual activity, despite popular misconceptions, was not restricted to man-boy pairs. Vase-painting shows numerous scenes where there is little or no apparent difference in age between the young wooer and his object of courtship...' ('Introduction', 5).

31 Martti Nissinen, *Homoeroticism in the Biblical World: A Historical Perspective* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998) 118.

32 This and the following translations are from Plato, *The Symposium* (ed. M. C. Howatson and F. C. C. Sheffield; trans. M. C. Howatson; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

33 In Plato's Greek a youth is euphemistically said to 'gratify' (*charizesthai*) his lover when he grants him sexual favours.

34 Hubbard, 'Introduction', 2.

35 On 1 Corinthians 6:9 see also the thorough study of Bruce W. Winter, 'Roman Homosexual Activity and the Elite (1 Corinthians 6:9)' in Winter, *After Paul Left Corinth: The Influence of Secular Ethics and Social Change* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001) 110–120.

36 For these and other examples, see Craig A. Williams, *Roman Homosexuality* (2nd ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) appendix 2: 'Marriage between Males' (279–286).

37 Translation from Williams, *Roman Homosexuality*, 284.

38 Translation from Hubbard, *Homosexuality in Greece and Rome*, 422.

39 See Williams, *Roman Homosexuality*, 280.

40 Williams, *Roman Homosexuality*, 286.

41 *Talassio*: a congratulatory exclamation to a bride when she entered her new house. Its meaning was unknown to the ancient writers themselves, but it was probably the name of the god of marriage.

42 Translation from Williams, *Roman Homosexuality*, 281–282.

43 Translation from Williams, *Roman Homosexuality*, 282.

44 'Revelation and Homosexual Experience: What Wolfhart Pannenberg says about this debate in the church', in *Christianity Today* 40.13 (November 11, 1996), available at www.christianitytoday.com/ct/1996/november11/6td035.html.

45 See Robert A. J. Gagnon's thorough treatment of the subject in *The Bible and Homosexual Practice: Texts and Hermeneutics* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2001). Note also his extensive review articles which evaluate some recent books on homosexuality: 'A Comprehensive and Critical Review Essay of *Homosexuality, Science, and the "Plain Sense" of Scripture*', in *Horizons in Biblical Theology* 22 (2000) 174–243 and 25 (2003) 179–275; 'Are There Universally Valid Sex Precepts? A Critique of Walter Wink's Views on the Bible and Homosexuality', *Horizons in Biblical Theology* 24 (2002) 72–125.

46 See notes 12 and 19.

47 Brooten, *Love Between Women*, 244.

48 As Pannenberg (cf. note 44) reminds us, love can be sinful: 'The entire tradition of Christian doctrine teaches that there is such a thing as inverted, perverted love. Human beings are created for love, as creatures of the God who is Love. And yet that divine appointment is corrupted whenever people turn away from God or love other things more than God.' And he continues: 'The will of God – Jesus' proclamation of God's lordship over our lives – must be the guiding star of our identity and self-determination.'

49 A valuable, sensitive treatment of the use of the Bible in the homosexuality debate is found in Craig R. Koester, 'The Bible and Sexual Boundaries', *Lutheran Quarterly* 7 (1993) 375–390.

Protestantism and the Secularisation of Marriage in France: Historical and Ethical Approaches

Michel Johner[1]

RÉSUMÉ

Michel Johner présente un bref aperçu historique des formes de mariage en France dans les 400 dernières années, avant de considérer la question de savoir si un mariage religieux sans mariage civil est possible. On peut avancer les arguments suivants à l'encontre d'un tel affranchissement : outre le fait que le mariage est conçu en théologie protestante comme un acte de nature civile et politique, il est nécessaire que l'union soit reconnue par le droit commun (en cas de divorce et de remariage) et que la filiation des enfants soit reconnue comme légitime (en matière de succession notamment). L'auteur considère ensuite comment les chrétiens peuvent combiner un mariage civil et un mariage chrétien, de sorte que, quand ils se marient, ils honorent à la fois les lois nationales et les lois de Dieu. Les façons dont les chrétiens peuvent compléter les mariages civils sont suggérées. Dans la mesure où certains chrétiens sont susceptibles de s'opposer à cette approche de l'accommodation, qui repose sur une stricte distinction entre ce qui est autorisé et ce qui est imposé, l'article conclut en envisageant d'éventuelles objections.

* * * * * * * *

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Michel Johner präsentiert einen kurzen, historischen Überblick über Ehemodelle während der letzten 400 Jahre in Frankreich, bevor er die Frage erörtert, ob eine religiöse Trauung ohne eine zivile Eheschließung überhaupt möglich ist. Zu den stichhaltigen Argumenten, dass dies nicht geht, zählen der rechtliche Status von Kindern, und das Potential von Konflikten. Danach untersucht der Autor, auf welche Weise Christen zivile und kirchliche Trauung miteinander verbinden können, sodass sie bei ihrer Heirat sowohl die zivilen Gesetze respektieren als auch Gottes Gebote ehren. Möglichkeiten werden aufgezeigt, wie Christen eine zivile Eheschließung komplementieren können. Da manche Christen vermutlich mit dieser Vorgehensweise von Anpassung nicht einverstanden sind, die auf einer strikten Unterscheidung zwischen Erlaubtem und Gebotenem beruht, diskutiert der Artikel abschließend mögliche Einwände.

* * * * * * * *

SUMMARY

Michel Johner provides a brief historical overview of the forms of marriage in France in the last 400 years, before discussing the question whether a religious marriage without a civil marriage is at all possible. He defends a negative answer to that question with the following arguments: in Protestant theology, marriage is seen as a civil and political act; in the case of divorce and remarriage, the marriage bond has to be recognised in civil law; the filiation of children who inherit needs to be properly ascertained. The author then examines how Christians can combine a civil marriage and a Christian marriage so that when they marry, they honour both the national laws and God's laws. Ways in which Christians can supplement civil weddings are suggested. As some Christians are likely to object to this approach of accommodation, which relies on a strict distinction between what is authorised and what is imposed, the article concludes with a discussion of possible objections.

* * * * * * * *

1. Introduction[2]

1.1 Historical background: an 'objective alliance' between French Protestantism and civil marriage?

1.1.1 Is marriage just a 'civil matter'?[3]

In their critique of the sanctity of marriage, since the beginning of the sixteenth century, Protestant theologians have acknowledged that earthly rulers (and the civil authorities that act for them) have the authority to define the general laws of marriage and to arbitrate any contentious issues relating to them. In these matters Protestantism upholds that submission is due to the rulers as to God. This stance, however, does not confer upon the state the authority to conduct marriages. Contrary to common belief, before the eighteenth century few Protestants had thought or even imagined that the right to conduct marriages might be the state's prerogative. With few exceptions, only ordained ministers were authorised to exercise this authority, which, while being free of 'sacramentality', still maintained a degree of 'sacredness'.

The fact that it is acknowledged that the ruler has jurisdictional authority does not in any way eliminate the existence, alongside civil law, of a kind of 'constitutional' framework that Protestants called 'Divine Law' or the 'Word of God', the text of *Discipline ecclésiastique* being its guarantor. Hence the existence of two types of marriage law, civil and ecclesiastical, which Protestants have always kept separate and which, at different times (or on different subjects), have been at variance or even in opposition.

How did the churches deal with this conflict in the past? To answer this question, it is important to distinguish between what civil law permits and what it imposes. Not all that the law authorises is mandatory. It is only in the domain of what the law imposes (or forbids) that conflict might arise.

1.1.2 Before the French Revolution

The Edict of Nantes (1598-1685) for the first time gave the French Protestants some legal recognition and religious freedom. In this period, civil law was more *restrictive* than ecclesiastical law; it forbade what biblical doctrine authorised, such as the right to divorce (i.e. an unfaithful spouse) and the right of first cousins to marry. In such cases, the pastors and synods exhorted the faithful to submit willingly to the authority of the ruler 'as unto the Lord', but at the cost of traumatic self-denial.

After the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685-1787) civil law extended its requirements *beyond* what religion tolerated. The validity of marriage was subjected to religious observances that Protestants deemed intolerable.[4] After the reorganisation of the semi-clandestine synods this scenario gave rise to rebellion, resistance and civil disobedience on a large scale as with the *mariage du désert* (see 3.5 below).

The next stage of history began with the 1787 *Edict of Toleration*, which was patterned on the *Patente autrichienne* signed by Emperor Joseph II in 1781 and which applied to various countries in the Holy Empire and its dependents: the inhabitants of the Austrian Lowlands, Germans, Slavs, Hungarians, Belgians, Luxembourgers and Italians.[5] In ushering in the *secularisation* of marriage,[6] the 1787 edict created a third scenario for Protestants in which civil law became more 'liberal' or permissive than ecclesiastical law. Examples of what was allowed are marriage between uncle and niece, and even bigamy,[7] which civil law may well authorise, but are prohibited in the Pentateuch.

Equally astonishing, during this period, is the energy with which the synods themselves sought to enforce practical regulations in the churches; they rendered the new legal declarations mandatory, while also upholding the pre-eminence of Protestant marriage.

A parallel matrimonial discipline was set up, or rather maintained, after 1787, with the publication of banns, an enquiry into the marital status of both parties, and the consultation of ecclesiastical registers. The synod of April 1789 made it clear that this was to be able to 'prove that religious marriage was being upheld in churches' and especially that the synod was to 'take into account anything that could be an obstacle to the legitimacy of the marriage'. These rulings show that the Reformed authorities were not prepared to give way to the movement of secularisation that the Edict of Tolerance had ushered in, much in the same way that they had resisted 'catholicisation'.

Among the freedoms authorised by the law of 1787 was the possibility, unheard of in the history of marriage, that after their marriage was registered by the civil authorities, Protestants might dispense with the church blessing or consider it as merely optional. To stem the tide, the synods declared it mandatory that religious ceremonies in church precede civil registration (just the opposite of what is practised today), under the threat of excommunication.

1.1.3 The turning point: the French Revolution

After the Revolution the large-scale injustices (even tyranny) to which the French Protestants had been subjected under the Ancien Regime gave way to a situation in which an ecclesiastical institution held sway over the jurisdiction of marriage. No one would have been surprised if the Protestants had been among the first to support civil marriage in this era, but this was not the case. In the archives we find no evidence that Protestant representatives played an active part in the parliamentary debates (1791-1792) that brought the Republic into violent conflict with the Roman Catholic Church during the era of the 'Civil constitution of the clergy'. The case of the Protestants is not mentioned in any speech, either because it was not worthy of note or because it was simply considered as settled by the Edict of November 1787. As Fontez points out, the Protestant doctrine of marriage would not be brought up again until the speeches of Portalis under the Consulate (1802-1804).[8]

The question raised by Dufour remains unanswered, however, as to whether the philosophy of natural law had any bearing on these deliberations, because intellectuals of Protestant training such as Grotius, Pufendorf and Burlamaqui had been thinking along these lines since the seventeenth century.[9] The same question can be asked of the influence of the political thought of Rousseau. According to Dufour, it seems as though, contrary to the ideas widely disseminated by Conrad's thesis in the 1950s,[10] this influence was much more obvious in the development of civil marriage in German law than in French law. Dufour writes:

> Without contesting the role of the French Revolution in bringing in mandatory civil marriage, we do not think France should be held responsible, as was postulated by H. Conrad, of being the exclusive motivating force in the secularisation of marriage during the Enlightenment. On the contrary, we are convinced, as R. Derathé has demonstrated with respect to the sources of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's political thought, that the principal themes of the 18th century in the realm of natural law originated in Germany.[11]

Between 1791 and 1804, French Protestants were only passive observers of the secularisation of marriage. If they supported it at all, it was only tacitly, in a rather ambiguous way. Did they support the secularisation of marriage for purely political reasons? According to Jean Carbonnier, under the Revolution a form of 'objective alliance' was established between French Protestantism and the institution of civil marriage, for political and empirical reasons: civil marriage was what stood in the way of a return to marriage as a sacrament.[12] Or did they support it out of theological and ideological kinship? It seemed as if the Protestants were giving their 'blessing' to the secularisation of marriage, something that the provincial synods of 1788-1789 had radically opposed.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, under the Empire, during the consultations for the drawing up of the civil code of law by Portalis (1802-1804), the process of the secularisation of marriage was finalised in the ruling that civil formalities take precedence. None of the Protestants continued to defend the doctrine of church marriage that had been proposed by the synods just before the Revolution. It is worth noting that through the 1804 'Code civil' (Napoleonic code), which was adopted by several European countries during the nineteenth century, the French version of the secularisation of marriage was exported to several European countries of Protestant leanings, notably the Netherlands and Switzerland. In France under the Revolution, therefore, the Protestant marriage procedure disappeared, giving way permanently to civil law, and thus the secularisation of marriage seems to have been finalised.

On the face of it, the figures seem to indicate that the Protestants had capitulated: in the eighteenth century only 164 synods or 'ecclesiastical assemblies' out of the 503 known to us, working semi-clandestine between 1715 and 1796, deliberated on the discipline of marriage (voting on nearly 413 measures). But after the French Revolution, the Empire and the resumption of synods, we find hardly any significant work on marriage before the synod of Dourdan in 1984.

1.2 Contemporary period: the downside of secularisation and the reactions of Protestant churches

After the secularisation of marriage, there was, in most Europeans countries, progressive separation between legal marriage (civil marriage) and Christian marriage (as the churches define it). In the contemporary period (i.e. over the last thirty years) this withdrawal has gained momentum, mostly because divorce has become commonplace and quite recently because marriage is no longer the prerogative of heterosexual couples.

This abrupt development later led the Protestant evangelical churches to ask questions, previously unheard of, concerning the continuation of the 'objective alliance' which had formerly linked Protestantism to the institution of civil marriage. But has this development not taken on such proportions that it is more proper to speak of opposition, or even of 'divorce' between the two? And, in church discipline, can the traditional position, which makes civil marriage obligatory, be held any longer? It is, of course, a legal requirement in France, but does Protestant theology support this? If a young couple were, for reasons of conscience, to request to make a commitment in church without contracting a civil marriage, could the church refuse to perform it?

In the realm of faith, which is caught between the concessions required by the duty to submit to temporal authorities and a wholesale sell-out (which would be a betrayal of God's law), what might lead the churches to adopt different modes of resistance, if not engage in civil disobedience? Has the time now come for Christians in Protestant churches to work towards the (re)creation of an ecclesiastical alternative to civil marriage[13] or for the setting up of parallel marriage ceremonies like the *mariage du désert* which would be justifiable in view of the problems we face in our times?

Faced with this development, which some see as a major turning point, how can the churches react? Unless they obey the national law and align their teaching on marriage with civil mores, following the example set by several Reformed churches with liberal tendencies (for instance, in the Netherlands and Switzerland), Protestant churches will have the choice between two stances. The first possible stance is to yield to the *temptation of withdrawal*, to distance themselves from the world or from society at large, and to separate notions of Christian marriage from civil society. By way of analogy, the church seems to be sailing in a kind of little dinghy that is still attached to the stern of the great ship, and it is in the process of discussing whether it should sever its moorings. The second stance could be to undertake a kind of audit or critical evaluation of civil marriage (which has not been practised in Protestant churches), which might allow churches to find some harmony between the legal requirements and church marriage; that could overcome some of the shortcomings so that Christians might marry in a way that honours *the national law and God's Law* in a satisfactory manner.

2. First stance: the church breaks away

2.1 The absence of legal recognition: the civil effects of marriage

If our churches adopted the first stance and yielded to the temptation to withdraw from society, the immediate practical problem to emerge would be that marriage (even between two Christians) *cannot dispense with legal recognition*. In order to have any 'civil effects' (see below), a marriage must be recognised by law and protected by a national legal system. Marriage may take on diverse forms at different times and in different cultures, but it has always been recognised as the fundamental structure of the social bond. Huguenots, more than other Protestants, know the value of this civil right, because for more than a century (i.e. after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes) they were denied it, a situation that they called 'civil death'.

So what are the civil and legal consequences of marriage? In the first place, it constitutes *a specific legal bond between the spouses* which varies in scope according to the country, and includes:

- the passing on of the surname (the rules on this issue are subject to change)
- the right of inheritance between spouses (total or partial)
- the right of the surviving spouse to receive pensions and other funds
- in France, the joint appointment of couples (for government appointees such as civil servants, teachers, military personnel, etc.) which is only done for legally married couples (or legal equivalents)

In the second place – this point would come first for French law – *the legal consequences of civil marriage are to establish the bond of direct descent* between each of the spouses and the children born of their union so that the children have a double filiation, both maternal and paternal. The main legal effect of marriage is what legal texts call 'the presumption of legitimate paternity', the *a priori* link for *all* the children who might be born to this couple (and not *a posteriori* on a case-by-case basis). Long ago Augustine noted that marriage was not merely about assuring the continuity of the human species, because for this purpose marriage would not be necessary:

> You deceive yourselves completely, if you think that marriage was instituted to compensate for the death of some by the birth of others. Marriage was instituted so that by means of the

faithfulness of women, sons might be known by their fathers, and fathers by their sons. Certainly, children could be born of chance relationships, of any partner, but then there would have been no bond of paternity between fathers and sons.[14] Marriage can be seen as guaranteeing the survival of the species, but it is especially a covenant which allows fathers and sons, or fathers and daughters, to recognise each other as such, and to live accordingly.

This is why, from time immemorial, a distinction has been made between legitimate and illegitimate children. This is an anthropological fact, maybe not universal, but at least a very widespread practice,[15] and biblical theology fully supports it. Human filiation is always more than a biological reality. It implies the decisive bond of adoption: though the biological bond might be absent, the legal bond cannot be.

2.2 Marriage by a state official?

Therefore, if Christians decided not to go through with the formalities of civil marriage, is there an alternative which could give their union the modicum of legal recognition which it needs? One could well imagine, for example, that a legal procedure could be carried out by a solicitor at the same time as a marriage ceremony in church, if the state accepted to delegate this authority to solicitors, in a similar way to handling probate. But in this case a difficulty would arise, which would quickly have a crippling effect on churches and what they are striving for: in most Western countries – and especially France – it is inconceivable that marriage rights would not be the same for all citizens. (The principle of the oneness and universality of republican law applies here.) In France, in particular, there has been a backlash, sometimes expressed violently, against any concessions to minorities or any legislation in favour of specific groups. This is why in 1999 the French government refused to entertain the possibility of a specific legal partnership for homosexuals, such as there is in other European countries. The government took the same stance more recently when passing specific legislation on same-sex marriage. By definition, marriage is 'one', the exclusive prerogative of the state.

There is another reason why the oneness of marriage law is important in Western countries, partly because of the problems posed by immigration and the rising influence of Islam. Imagine that, in a court of law in the French Republic, one of the parties should plead to being married on the basis of the law of another country. This is also a question of international law: in the case of 'mixed' marriage, or of immigration, which marriage law is to be applied to the settlement of conflicts or to social entitlements? What are the limits of the mutual recognition of marriages between nations? In the eyes of the law, marriage is not a private contract, but a social institution and its legal definition is the same for all. It is only in the manner of managing material goods that there are several options or 'matrimonial regimes'. Apart from this practical aspect, the marriage contract cannot be customised. If I were to introduce you to 'my wife', even though you didn't know her or anything about us, you would know precisely what was the nature of the bond that united us. This is not the case with a civil partnership, known in France as a Pacte Civil de Solidarité or PACS.

In concrete terms, this means that even if the members of our churches were to obtain the right to be married by a solicitor, their union would not be founded on marriage law. If specific clauses were included in the contract but not covered by common law (for example, should the couple exclude the possibility of divorce), they would not, in case of conflict, be recognised by any tribunal. The intended goal would thus not be reached.

Counterbalancing the idea of specific marriage for Christians is the reality of *mixed* marriage (meaning that the spouses are of different religions), which is of some importance from a sociological point of view, even if Protestant churches have always frowned upon it and their discipline condemns it. It was, for example, a major drawback of the Edict of Toleration of 1787 not to have taken the following question into consideration: Under which legal regime should two people of different denominations be married? Therefore, calling for our pluralistic society to recognise several types of matrimonial law is a process which is inevitably doomed to run into major political difficulties, and it is likely this would bring with it ramifications that churches would come to regret, notably with respect to Islam.

2.3 Can Christians dispense with legal formalities altogether? Human nature and the Christian condition

Should not vows alone suffice, in that they are made in the presence of God and in church in front of witnesses?[16] Why should we wish to involve the state and public law in this 'matter'? Can Christian marriage not be 'privatised' totally or partially, that is, confined to the spheres of the family and the church?

With regard to society, first of all: marriage, as has been stated, is not simply an individual matter, but also a collective affair which has meaning beyond the sphere of the church. It has concrete consequences for the children, grandchildren, brothers and sisters of the couple, who may or may not or no longer be members of the church. For a marriage to be valid, it has to be recognised and legally protected outside the sphere of the church. We need to examine in greater detail the present health of civil marriage, which is in rather bad shape, and to analyse in what way civil marriage and Christian marriage could be combined so that when Christians marry they might honour both the laws of the land and God's laws. To ensure civil validity (for several generations), a marriage must be recognised and protected by common law.

Next, Christians must not delude themselves concerning human nature and the human condition by any form of spirituality, idealism or eschatological anticipation. Believers have not become angels nor are they exempt from the risks that render legal oversight necessary: they cannot live as if dashed hopes, the temptation of infidelity, the souring of conjugal relations, wandering from the faith, spiritual coldness, becoming lax in church attendance or even apostasy were impossible to those who today are committed Christians.[17] In the world and in the times in which we live, still marked by the Fall and the corruption of sin, marriage law must have clear rulings on the question of divorce.[18] Legal formalities may seem superfluous before the event, in the optimism that goes with a wedding or when people are deeply in love. But they become important, sometimes unexpectedly, *when conflict arises or when there is a deterioration in the relationship*, a situation that Christians are not spared even if they start off with the best of intentions.

The underlying soteriological and eschatological issue is that Christians remain human, subject to all the frailties of humanity, so their promises need to be reinforced by legal commitments, of which they might need to be reminded. We must accept Luther's perspective of *simul peccator et justus (et penitens)*. If we were angels, it would perhaps be otherwise, but in this age the church has not yet been perfected, so the legal framework has not yet been rendered obsolete or superfluous.

God himself, whose promise alone would have been sufficient and whose Word is perfectly trustworthy, added an oath to his promise (Hebrews 6:13-20) in order to 'give us a supplementary proof of the immutable character of his promise', 'in order that by two immutable acts, by which it is impossible that God might lie, we should have a powerful encouragement, we whose only refuge is to seize the hope which is offered us'. Why bypass legal commitment? Is the word of Christians more trustworthy than that of God?

3. Second stance: complementarity

3.1 Can a complementary solution be found?

The second approach – which I believe to be more promising, as stated in the introduction – would consist in carrying out a kind of audit or critical evaluation of civil marriage in all the countries in which we live, which might permit churches to find a new harmony between the legal requirements and religious marriage so as to overcome some shortcomings.

We need to examine in greater detail the present health of civil marriage, which is in rather bad shape, and to analyse how civil marriage and Christian marriage could be combined so that when Christians marry they might honour both national laws and God's laws. In the matter of marriage, what does it mean for Christians to be 'in the world' without being 'of the world' (John 17:16,18)?

We might represent the evolution in the relationship between Christian marriage and civil marriage in the modern era through the picture below: two concentric circles, then two secant circles, then two separate circles:



In phase A, the circle which represents the obligations of Christian marriage (dark grey) is larger than that of legal marriage, as it has greater demands. There have always been discrepancies between church and state in the jurisdiction of marriage, in both Catholic and Protestant countries. In phase B, civil marriage gives up some of the requirements of Christian marriage and adds others of its own, which are in opposition to the Christian faith. In the hypothetical phase C, there would be a break and radical opposition between the two.

Our evaluation must take into account the following question: In our respective countries, where on the socio-cultural time scale is the secularisation of marriage located? Is it in phase A (civil law requires less than ecclesiastical law) or phase B (civil law imposes obligations which the Christian conscience reproves)? The question supposes a clear distinction, along the lines of traditional French Protestantism, between what public law authorises and what it imposes. It is only in the realm of what it imposes that conflict might arise.

3.2 The breakdown of civil law

There is no space to enter into detail concerning everything that has been modified in marriage law since it was taken over by the state after the French Revolution, namely, matters concerning parental approval, parental authority, the rights of women, divorce, adultery, age discrepancy between the partners, engagement, the legal age of marriage, etc. But over the last fifty years civil marriage law has been stripped of several factors to which Christian doctrine formerly attached fundamental value. Most of these factors concern the development of the *right to divorce*. (An essential part of marriage law is written in reverse, like a photographic negative, with the possibility of divorce in mind.) I mention four such developments:

1. The abolition of the obligation of fidelity (marriage being about partnership not fidelity) means that the notion of fault-based divorce no longer exists. Conjugal infidelity or adultery is no longer *de facto* treated as a breach of contact but rather as conjugal discord. This considerably relativises the notion of conjugal rights.
2. The legalisation of divorce on the basis of incompatibility or conflict, without any particular wrong having been committed. Couples divorce because they no longer love each other or no longer get along, which is a relatively new concept in law.
3. The removal of divorce from the jurisdiction of the courts: in some countries divorce can be pronounced by a brief administrative procedure. In France there is opposition to this administrative route; divorce still requires legal proceedings. But the fact that it can be obtained 'by mutual consent' means that the judge does not need to delve into the private lives of the petitioners. He only ratifies a decision on which the two parties have previously agreed.

Taken in isolation these three developments are not all negative; we must not darken the picture and we should remember where we came from and how society has evolved. (Remember the way in which adultery was handled in the nineteenth century, or the hypocrisy and tyranny that existed when divorce was not possible.) But one thing is certain: together these developments have made divorce a commonplace which casts a shadow over the institution of marriage. Even if marriage is still intended to be of lasting duration (this is made clear in the French Code Civil, formulated by Portalis, among others) it is seen more and more, practically speaking, as a contract (not unlike a business contract), and either party can annul it unilaterally at any time, by simply cancelling it (as with civil partnership or repudiation). In this way it has more and more come to resemble the 'contracts of limited duration' in French labour law rather than the 'contracts of unlimited duration'.

4. Finally, of course, the latest reform to date, and not the least important (many people see it as a real anthropological revolution): the suppression of *the distinction between the sexes* which brings with it a (downward) redefinition of marriage as a mere 'social recognition of love' (all former distinctions being discarded).

3.3 Christian theology can still endorse what remains

Such are the principal changes and modifications in civil marriage law, which Evangelical Protestant churches have had cause to regret. Yet this does not mean that civil marriage law, such as we know it today, does not retain some elements, even some positive elements, to which Christian theology can subscribe, even if same-sex marriage has become law. (In phase A these elements are represented by the central segment of the two concentric circles, since they are common to civil ideology and religious teaching.)

1. The requirement of *public announcement* and a background investigation, made public by the

publication of wedding 'banns', which amounts to a kind of *investigation into moral character* that mainly seeks to prevent bigamy and to make the information available to families, even if their formal consent is not required. We find ourselves here at the opposite end of the spectrum from secret marriage, a practice that Protestants have opposed for a long time.

2. The legal requirement of *monogamy* (in Western society, in any case): if it is discovered that a previous marriage has been concealed or that a prevenient divorce has not yet been officially finalised, a second marriage is considered null and void.
3. *Prohibition of incest*, a ban which still remains in effect today in spite of fears expressed recently by opponents of same-sex marriage. The definition of incest (and the prohibited degrees of kinship) has given rise to numerous differences of opinion and controversies especially between Catholic and Protestant teachings, for example regarding marriage between first cousins. However, the prohibition in its most restricted definition (that is, the nuclear family such as also found in the Pentateuch)[19] is not challenged in principle by either confession.[20]
4. The legal requirement of a *minimum age* (a fixed age of consent which excludes children) without which the freedom of consent would be deemed invalid; thus the need for free and conscious consent.
5. The legal requirement of *mutual assistance* between the two spouses, that is, mutual support, shared liability of debts, etc.
6. The legal requirement *to live together*. In France, marriages of convenience are subject to scrutiny when they are suspected of being a way to get over the immigration hurdles.
7. Finally, *commitment for life* ('until death do you part', in the British phrase; 'of lasting duration', to use the term coined by Portalis in the French Code Civil) and even beyond. This element might be surprising after what we have said about *divorce having become commonplace*, but the statute still exists in law: a marriage continues to be valid until the death of both spouses (as regards pensions, annuities… for the surviving partner) and even beyond, with regard to inheritance and the line of succession. The legal consequences of marriage are in effect permanent.

So we see that seven elements of marriage still survive in Western civil law which are also recognised as fundamental by Christian theology. It is in fact the Judeo-Christian tradition itself that inspired their presence in Western law. These requirements are a kind of residual continuation of its influence. Christians, having no real quarrel with these principles, have no *a priori* reason to refuse to observe them or even to consider that observing them might be optional. As and when on these seven points any national law is in conformity with that of God, it must be observed.

3.4 Churches can supplement civil marriage

The Christian ethics of marriage would certainly appear to be *more* demanding to believers than civil morality, not *less* demanding. What civil law imposes, however little, Christian ethics also imposes, but it adds further obligations that spring from its profession of faith and from its understanding of the analogy between earthly marriage and that of Christ and his Church.

Nothing would prevent churches from performing additional ceremonies of a specifically Christian nature for couples wishing to reinforce or renew their marriage vows; this would of course be in addition to the legal commitment made through the civil authorities and would in no way replace it. It would have to be understood – and this shows the limitations of the proposition – that anything going beyond the legal requirements is valid only on moral or spiritual grounds. No church ceremony could be presented as evidence in a court of law in the case of conflict.

In other words: Christians may deplore the fact that civil law has widened the scope of marriage, that it does not require more of marriage, that divorce has been made commonplace, that conjugal fidelity is no longer a legal requirement, or that marriage is no longer reserved for two people of opposite sex. But none of these liberties which we as Christians deplore is in any way incumbent on us – and so they would not in any way compel us to sin.

3.5 When civil law requires what faith forbids

The approach under consideration, namely, a kind of negotiation or compromise solution, is possible in cases where civil marriage is insufficient and requires nothing, officially, that faith reproves. But what if the reverse situation arises? This situation has already come about in history: in France, in the era of the *Désert* after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, legal marriage entailed observing Roman Catholic practices which Protestants deemed unacceptable for reasons of conscience. They were forced to deny the faith, to attend mass and to take the sacrament which Protestant tradition regards as a form of idolatry ('this cursed idolatry', as the Heidelberg Catechism puts it).

In that period the obedience due to the ruler was in direct opposition with the obedience due to God (cf. Acts 5); obedience to the fifth commandment of the Decalogue (in deference towards the King as father of the nation) was in conflict with obedience to the first commandment, the commandment against worshipping idols. In this situation the Protestants in France resorted to civil resistance with regard to marriage. Between 1720 and 1787 their secret synods organised on a large scale what has been called the *mariage du désert*. I discovered that between 190,000 and 470,000 marriages were performed illegally in the *désert* during the period in question.[21] No civil rights were recognised for couples married in secret. The law did not recognise Protestant marriages so the couples were simply seen as cohabiting couples, with the result that their children were considered illegitimate and found themselves, by the same token, deprived of their right to inheritance in favour of their Catholic counterparts.

Rendering the *mariage du désert* obligatory, the secret synods called the Reformed people of France to singular forms of courage: to live in legal insecurity, accepting that the rights of the family would no longer be assured, as the price for their religious commitment, as an aspect of the cross they were called to bear, in keeping with the sacrificial spirituality of Huguenot martyrs. It was not just that these marriages had no legal validity, but even more significantly, couples entering into forbidden marriages were liable to prosecution, punishable by the strictest of sanctions. At best, these couples were subjected to heavy fines for 'flagrant cohabitation' and obliged to separate until they could be married (with proper accreditation) by a Catholic priest. In the worst cases, during the period of the most severe repression (circa 1750), they were hit with heavy penalties: the men were condemned to be galley slaves until death, the women had their heads shaved and were imprisoned for life, their children taken away by force and brought up in the Catholic faith in convents, their goods seized and sold in order to finance their Catholic upbringing. All for the crime of Protestant marriage!

The refusal to accept Catholic marriage came to be associated with the Protestant refusal to partake in the Eucharist; the refusal to abjure became a reason for the persecution of the Huguenots. But this civil disobedience, once again, arose from the fact that the law had required a commitment contrary to that which they thought to be genuine faithfulness to God. In particular, the law tried to force them into what they considered to be idolatrous practices in the worship they owed to God.

3.6 The future: developments in marriage law

If we try to look into the future, without trying to second-guess what might come about in ethics, we wonder what future marriage laws might require that would justify Christians refusing to submit to them. In the eighteenth century, royal law made the validity of marriage subject to religious obligations which Protestants deemed idolatrous, but these days we are far removed from a return to this type of confessional requirement, even if no legislation is ever truly neutral on the spiritual and ideological front.

In recent debates, some have expressed fears about future developments, for example, that…

- marriage will be legitimised for what are now considered incestuous relationships: between brothers and sisters, or in the direct line of descent;
- marriage will be redefined in terms of a 'community of choice and kinship', as a unit whose composition could vary, potentially open to all configurations; recognition of (multi)partnerships of every sort, the opening of marriage to a form of multisex polygamy;
- marriage will be transformed from a 'permanent contract' to a contract of limited duration, say for five years (renewable) or, more probably, that it becomes similar to a commercial contract, which either party could decide to terminate at any moment without needing the consent of the other partner;
- administrative divorce: the court of law could no longer mediate between spouses in conflict to protect the interests of those in a weak position, notably the female spouse (and especially with children) or the party who is lacking in financial means. The 'privatisation' of the couple would thus be complete.

But we note that in all these cases, except for the last, we remain in the sphere of permission or authorisation. So none of these developments would become, strictly speaking, mandatory.

4. Answers to criticism of the second position

Some Christians would object to this second approach, which relies on a strict distinction between what is authorised and what is imposed, for being based on rather superficial analyses and for affirming too rashly that what is required by civil law is in conformity with the law of God. I will look into these objections.

4.1 Has the residual content been misrepresented?

Should we Christians not be more radical and admit that the entire marriage law has been corrupted by the reforms discussed above? For example:

- Does the extension of marriage to two persons of the same sex not imply a *de facto* redefinition of marriage, for example as a 'social recognition of love'? Does this not corrupt legal marriage for all, whether homo- or heterosexual?
- If in the near future we were to see permanent contracts replaced by contracts of limited duration, we could say, superficially, that nothing forbids Christians from renewing them indefinitely. But we could maintain that, more to the point, the idea of a life-long commitment is from the very outset foreign to the contract, and is of another nature. The spouses, in this case, *lend* themselves momentarily to one another, but do not *give* themselves truly to one another. We have passed here from the evangelical notion of the 'gift' to the economic notion of the 'loan'. A life-long commitment is, from the start, something other than just a series of temporary commitments.
- If one day the family were to be redefined as a 'community of choice' or an 'association of kinship', the line of direct descent would lose an element of the legal objectivity which is essential to it. In the case of remarriage, for example, a step-father (the second spouse of the mother) would progressively take the place previously held by the legal, biological father. In case of dispute or of conflict, the wronged father could always claim his rights and object that such was not, from the outset, their conception of marriage. But in vain.

In all these cases, real or imaginary, we could object that the aspect of the commitment that is still possible in the framework of civil law is in reality of *another nature* than the commitment that was previously more extensive. A life-long commitment, from the outset, is something other than a series of temporary commitments.

4.2 Theology and politics

However, in closing, I am concerned about the conclusions that could be drawn from this radical criticism, if they were applied to the political sphere without any further adjustment. Christians cannot reason in absolute terms or ideals when it comes to politics, as they could regarding church discipline, for example. To distinguish between the state and the church implies allowing that the discipline of the church may be more demanding than that of civil society; on the other hand, submission to temporal authority could be seen as a relativistic compromise. Our society has no other vocation than to allow believers and unbelievers to live together in relative peace until the second coming of Christ, during which time the Gospel may be preached.[22]

A Reformer once said that there is no political law that could not be enriched by the Word of God (the salt of the earth). It is the vocation of Christian politicians to ensure that their voices be heard, to promote what they believe to be for the promotion of the common good. But that in no way means that they see the Bible as a sort of 'sharia' or Islamic law, or that they wish to submit the whole of society to ecclesiastical discipline. In the present time there is a fruitful dialogue between theology and politics, but no mingling. Theology and politics are not seen as one and the same thing in either the Koran or the Bible. This is not because of weakness on the part of Christians, as if they were going along with the de-christianisation of society, but it comes from a clear vision of what the Bible itself teaches concerning the nature of the present time in the eyes of God and *the distinct roles that he entrusts to the church and the state*. We must not confuse the present with what belongs to the age to come, or confuse the 'already' and the 'not yet' in our eschatological thinking.

Keeping in mind these distinctions, it will not come as a surprise to churches if marriage contracts, in the civil law of contemporary society, are not written in black and white, but rather in pastel shades, in relativistic terms that are out of sync with the law of God and ecclesiastical law. And this is not new! We must neither demonise the recent reforms nor idealise previous laws, as if an unprecedented revolution had taken place.

4.3 Limits to our duty to obey the civil authorities

In the theology of politics there is another question relating to the discipline of marriage: how do we as Christians consider the authority entrusted by God to temporal rulers and the civil authorities (who represent them) in the social sphere, and what is the nature of the submission due to them (Rom 13:1-7; 1 Tim 2:1-4)? In respecting the authority of civil government, is it not in some ways the authority of God that is respected? And how far does this duty of submission go? Where are the limits in Protestant thought that makes resistance to the authority of a king (should he turn tyrant) a duty of conscience?

The classic response, in what has been called Protestant 'monarchomachy',[23] is that God requires that Christians submit to temporal rulers in principle, as long as they do not impose acts or behaviour that God's law condemns. As long as the national law does not require disobedience to God's law and, in particular – and this is a sensitive point in Protestant tradition – as long as it does not interfere with freedom of worship, submission is due 'as unto the Lord'. It is only when this limit is transgressed that the rule of Acts 5:29 applies, 'We must obey God rather than men.'

For Protestants who see things from this classic perspective, the simple fact of having to make a critical evaluation of the marriage law, and feeling saddened by its impoverishment, and deploring its laxness and restrictions, does not exempt them from submitting to it for conscience's sake (Rom 13:5), that is, to honour the authority which God has given to the ruler in temporal things. In upholding the authority of the law, Protestants are also respecting the authority of God, even in such complex issues.

While saying this, I am fully aware that this political doctrine has been a subject of controversy amongst Protestants. Reformed people of orthodox leanings and those with a more radical stance have differed on the subject, even vigorously, which may explain the diversity of attitudes to the authority of the State in matters of marriage law in the Protestant groups represented at the present conference.[24] After several years of research on the Protestant discipline of marriage, I have come to the conviction that the very question of the duty of submission to the civil authorities plays a more important role than at first appears, perhaps even a decisive role. It is, in any case, one of the theological keys to the topic.

5. Conclusion

By way of conclusion, I pose some questions as starting points for debate.

- We all know, in our respective countries, of discrepancies (of more or less significance) between civil conceptions of marriage and religious/biblical ones; in some countries they may be on different points from the examples from France presented here. How do we cope with or manage these discrepancies today in pastoral ministry and church discipline?
- Do the members of our churches feel free to use all the freedoms which civil law affords them? Or do they want to adopt a more rigorous marriage discipline in the Church, to add stricter moral commitments to their civil commitments?
- How do we find a balance between the fine art of compromise (which the duty of submission to civil authorities authorises, or even imposes) and wholesale surrender (which would be a way of denying the evangelical ideal)?
- Where is the point at which Christians might be justified in breaking with civil marriage law and re-introducing the *mariage du désert*?

Michel Johner is Dean of the Faculté Jean Calvin in Aix-en-Provence and Professor of Ethics and History.

Endnotes

1 Michel Johner, *Les protestants de France et la sécularisation du mariage à la veille de la Révolution française. Rabaut Saint-Étienne et l'édit de tolérance de 1787*, doctoral thesis in modern history, under the direction of Hubert Bost, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, December 2013. The thesis may be consulted at the Bibliothèque de la Société d'Histoire du Protestantisme Français in Paris (rue des Saint-Pères) or at the Bibliothèque de la Faculté Jean Calvin in Aix-en-Provence. Other publications by the author on the theme of marriage and the family: Michel Johner, *A quoi sert le mariage?* (Aix en-Provence: Kerygma, 1997); Michel Johner, *La célébration religieuse du mariage étendue au PACS et au concubinage?*, Collection Etincelles no 1 (Aix-en-Provence: Kerygma, 2002), also in *La Revue Réformée* 216 (2002) 1-22; M. Johner, 'La famille, produit culturel ou ordre créationnel fondateur?', *La Revue Réformée* 220 (2002) 27-52; M. Johner, *Divorce et remariage*, Collection Etincelles no 7 (Aix-en-Provence: Kerygma, 2006); M. Johner, 'La vocation chrétienne de la sexualité' in Paul Wells (ed.), *Bible et sexualité* (Cléon d'Andran / Aix-

en-Provence: Excelsis / Kerygma, 2005) 97-118, Italian translation by Antonio Morlino, 'Sessualità' in P. Bolognesi, L. De Chirico and A. Ferrari (eds), *Dizionario di teologia evangelica, Marchirolo* (Varese: Edizioni Uomini Nuovi 2007) 667-669.

2 This article is based on a lecture at the biennial conference of the Fellowship of European Evangelical Theologians (FEET), in Orsay near Paris, August 2014; English translation by Damon Di Mauro and Alison Wells.

3 To echo the phrase attributed to Luther in his *Table Talk*, 'marriage does not pertain to the Church, it is outside it, it is a secular matter, temporal, which pertains to the domain of officialdom'. Martin Luther, *Propos de table* (Paris: Éditions d'Aujourd'hui, 1975) II.347. For a more extensive analysis, see E. Doumergue, 'La pensée ecclésiastique et la pensée politique de Calvin' in *Jean Calvin, les hommes et les choses de son temps* (Lausanne: Georges Bridel, 1889-1927) V.394, 458-459; E. Stoquarte, *Le mariage des protestants de France* (Bruxelles, 1903) 291; P. Bels, *Le mariage des protestants français jusqu'en 1685, fondements doctrinaux et pratique juridique*. Bibliothèque d'histoire du droit et droit romain XII (Paris: Librairie générale du droit et de la jurisprudence, R. Pichon et R. Durand-Auzias, 1968) 89.

4 This measure, in force for more than a century, was tantamount to outlawing marriage for a group representing 5% of the nation.

5 Between 1781 and 1788 Joseph II adopted several different positions: 1) October 13, 1781: *La patente autrichienne de tolérance*; 2) January 16, 1783: *Mariages, Première ordonnance de l'empereur pour les états héréditaires d'Allemagne, Bohême, Autriche*; 3) September 28, 1784: *Second édit de l'empereur concernant le mariages pour les Pays Bas, Édit de l'empereur concernant les mariages du 28 sept 1784, signé à Bruxelles par Joseph II*, et *Ordonnance concernant les mariages considérés comme contrats civils et leurs conséquences pour toutes les sectes chrétiennes de nos États*; 4) in 1788: *l'Édit prussien de religion* de 1788. For a detailed study, see Ch. Lebeau, 'La patente autrichienne de tolérance (1781) et l'édit prussien de religion (1788): vers la constitution du Saint-Empire?' in G. Saupin, R. Fabre and M. Launay (eds), *La Tolérance. Colloque international de Nantes (mai 1998). Quatrième centenaire de l'édit de Nantes* (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes et Centre de recherche sur l'histoire du monde atlantique, 1999) 171-179.

6 When speaking of the 'secularisation' of marriage, we mean the process by which, in modern Western history, the formation of legal marriage (the 'matrimonial competence' as it is expressed in legal texts) is progressively withdrawn from the ecclesiastical authority and handed over to (or given back to, according to one's viewpoint) the temporal authority of the ruler (represented by the civil authorities) and the validity of legal marriage disconnected from all religious consideration.

7 The former marriages of the *désert* not being recognised by the new law, separated Protestants could seek to legalise their marriage with a new partner. In such cases, the synods said, divine law had to take precedence. Out of obedience to civil law Protestant Churches were to refuse to bless any union which had not been conducted by the suitable authorities. But not all the marriages legalised by the authorities were automatically recognised as 'blessable' by the church. The churches had no say in the legal definition of marriage, but they remained sovereign in 'imparting the nuptial benediction' on which the authorities had no say.

8 F. Fontez, *Les diverses étapes de la laïcisation du mariage en France*, the abridged text of a thesis on canonical law defended at the Gregorian university of Rome (Marseille: P. Fontez, 1972) 41.

9 A. Dufour, *Le mariage dans l'école allemande de droit naturel moderne au XVIIIe siècle*, Bibliothèque d'histoire du droit et du droit romain tome XVIII (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1972) 6.

10 H. Conrad, 'Die Grundlegung der modernen Zivilehe durch die französische Revolution', *Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte* GA (1950) 336-372.

11 Dufour, *Le mariage dans l'école allemande*, 6; cf. F. Gauthier, *Triomphe et mort du droit naturel en Révolution, 1789-1795-1802* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992).

12 In the history of France, which was marked by long painful conflicts, and in a society with a great disparity in numbers between the denominations, French Protestantism, he says, was 'forced to make an objective alliance with civil marriage'. Civil marriage was not an idol, but it was a victory. J. Carbonnier, 'La vertu du mariage civil' in *Couples d'aujourd'hui, réflexion protestante* (Paris: Les Bergers et les Mages, 1983) 37, 42, 45, 46; cf. J. Carbonnier, 'L'évolution contemporaine des mœurs', *Fac Réflexion* 16 (1990) 5-17; J. Carbonnier, 'L'amour sans la loi. Réflexions de psychologie sociale sur le droit de la filiation, en marge de l'histoire du protestantisme français', *Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire de Protestantisme Français* 125 (1979) 45-75; J.Carbonnier, 'Terre et ciel dans le droit français du mariage' in *Le droit privé français au milieu du XXe siècle: Etudes offertes à Georges Ripert, Mélanges*, Vol. I (Paris: R. Pichon et R. Durand-Auzias, 1950) 325-345.

13 This would also be a return to a Catholic notion of ecclesiastical marriage.

14 Augustine, *De bono conjugali* 24.32, ed. by Patrick Gerard Walsh (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001); cited by E. Fuchs, *Le désir et la tendresse* (Genève:

Labor et Fides, 1999) 114.

15 Cf. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Les structures élémentaires de la parenté* (1948); English *The Elementary Structures of Kinship* (1949). In this vast comparative fresco, Lévi-Strauss attempts to reunite under a single explanatory schema (the Testament) the great variety of marriage practices observed in human societies. According to Françoise Héritier, more liberal in her conclusions, there are six possible combinations of systems of filiation, of which four have been realised by human societies: unilinear (patri- or matrilinear), bilinear, cognation (ours). Every ideal system of filiation represents a particular montage of possible combinations, and eludes any necessity perceived as natural. Cf. www.humanite.fr/tribunes/francoise-heritier-rien-de-ce-qui-nous-parait-natu513170#sthash.td62Q7Ba.dpuf [accessed 18-07-2014].

16 Cf. the warnings in James 5 against oaths.

17 The assurance of salvation is not accessible without personal faith.

18 Or of its annulment/dissolution in the periods when there is no legal divorce.

19 The law against incest in the Pentateuch: Leviticus 18:6-18 mentions among the prohibited sexual relations: in verse 7 those of a son with his mother; in verse 8 those of a son with another wife of his father; in verse 9 with his sister or half-sister; in verse 10 with his grandchildren; in verse 11 with the children of another wife of his father; in verse 12 with his aunt; in verse 14 with his uncle's wife; in verse 15 with his son's wife; in verse 16 with his brother's wife; in verse 17 with a woman and her daughter concurrently; and in verse 18 with his wife's sister. Deuteronomy 27:20-23 mentions the relation with a father's wives (verse 20), with a half-sister and with a wife's mother (verse 23). The biblical law of the Levirate (Gen 38:6-10 and Deut 25:5-10) might seem to contradict the rule of Leviticus in commanding a man to take as his wife the wife of his deceased brother (cf. Lev 18:16), but this provides a key to the taboo on marriage between uncle and niece in that the uncle is presented as a sort of substitute father by default.

20 Before the legalisation of same-sex marriage, marriage was defined as the institution which makes a link between the joining of the sexes and successive generations.

21 See my doctoral research, cf. note 1 above, p. 625.

22 1 Timothy 2:1-2: 'First of all, then, I urge that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings be made for everyone, for kings and all who are in high positions, so that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and dignity.'

23 'The 'monarchomachs' (literally 'those who fight against the Sovereign') were Protestant theologians such as François Hotman (1573), Theodore de Beza (*Du droit des magistrats*, 1574) and Nicolas Barbaud (1574) who protested against religious tyranny. Soon after the Saint Bartholomew massacre they sought to define the limit beyond which it would be legitimate for people to oppose an unworthy government in open rebellion. They were agreed that there are cases when a sovereign must be impeached. They particularly promoted the idea that power must not be absolute, but accountable to the representatives of the people (later developed in the Puritan idea of a conventional foundation of political power) and resting on the basis of a Protestant understanding concerning the right and duty to resist. Cf. E. Doumergue, 'La pensée ecclésiastique et la pensée politique de Calvin', in *Jean Calvin, les hommes et les choses de son temps* (Lausanne: Georges Bridel, 1889-1927) V; M. Cottret, *Tuer le tyran. Le tyrannicide dans l'Europe moderne* (Paris, Fayard, 2009), chapter 3; I. Bouvignies, 'Monarchomachie: tyrannicide ou droit de résistance?' in N. Pique (ed.), *Tolérance et Réforme* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1999) 71-98.

24 Cf. note 2 above.

EJT (2015) 24:2, 173–182 0960–2720

Obedience or Resistance: The Legacy of Bonhoeffer

Ján Liguš

SUMMARY

This article surveys the life and thought of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the eminent German theologian, distinguishing three periods in his life and theological development. The first period is called *Bonhoeffer Theologian* (paragraph 1 below) and covers his youth, his study of theology, his vicariate in Barcelona and teaching at the University of Berlin (1906-1931). The second period, *Bonhoeffer Christian* (paragraphs 2-7), shows his new understanding of the Bible (including the Sermon on the Mount) and the relationship between Church and State. It also discusses his rejection of the Aryan paragraph and his concept of Christianity, theology and the Church as demonstrated in the theological works written in the Confessing Church (1932-1939). The third period, *Bonhoeffer Contemporary* (1939-1945; paragraphs 8-10), shows the theological and ethical background of his involvement in the attempts at violent removal of Hitler and the importance of non-religious interpretation for Christian churches behind the Iron Curtain. It expresses Bonhoeffer's hope in the future renewal of the Church and his personal feelings, coping with the death in prison.

* * * * * * * *

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Dieser Aufsatz befasst sich mit dem Leben und der Theologie des bedeutenden deutschen Theologen Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Es werden dabei drei Perioden seines Lebens und seiner theologischen Entwicklung unterschieden: Die erste Periode heißt *Bonhoeffer als Theologe* (Teil 1) und schließt seine Kindheit, Studium der Theologie, Vikariat in Barcelona und theologische Lehrtätigkeit an der Universität von Berlin ein (1906-1931). Die zweite Periode, *Bonhoeffer als Christ,* ist in den Teilen 2-7 enthalten. Sie zeigen Bonhoeffers neues Bibelverständnis (einschließlich der Bergpredigt), sein Verständnis der Beziehung zwischen Kirche und Staat sowie seine Ablehnung des Arierparagraphen; sie bezeugen auch sein Verständnis des Christentums, der Theologie und der Kirche anhand der theologischen Werke geschrieben in der Zeit der Bekennenden Kirche (1932-1939). Teile 8-10 handeln über *Bonhoeffer als Zeitgenosse* und zeigen die theologischen und ethischen Voraussetzungen seiner Beteiligung am Versuch einer gewaltsamen Beseitigung Hitlers. Sie beleuchten auch die theologische Bedeutung der nichtreligiösen Interpretation biblischer Begriffe für die christlichen Kirchen hinter dem Eisernen Vorhang, Bonhoeffers Hoffnung auf die zukünftige Erneuerung der Kirche und seine persönlichen Gefühle während er im Gefängnis auf den Tod wartete.

* * * * * * * *

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article présente la vie et la pensée de l'éminent théologien allemand qu'était Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Trois périodes de sa vie et de sa maturation théologique sont distinguées. La première, qu'on peut désigner comme celle du *Bonhoeffer théologien*, couvre sa jeunesse, ses études de théologie, son poste de vicaire à Barcelone et son professorat à l'université de Berlin (1906-1931). La deuxième période, celle du *Bonhoeffer chrétien*, fait état de sa compréhension nouvelle de la Bible (notamment le sermon sur la montagne) et de sa nouvelle approche de la relation entre l'Église et l'État. L'auteur traite alors de son rejet du manifeste aryen et de ses conceptions relatives au christianisme, à la théologie et à l'Église telles qu'elles apparaissent dans les ouvrages théologiques rédigés dans le cadre de l'Église confessante (1932-1939). Dans la partie de l'article correspondant à la troisième période, celle du *Bonhoeffer contemporain* (1939-1945), l'auteur expose l'arrière-plan théologique et éthique qui a conduit Bonhoeffer à participer à des tentatives d'attentats contre Hitler et montre l'importance d'une interprétation non religieuse pour les Églises chrétiennes derrière le rideau de fer. Il présente l'espoir d'un futur renouveau de l'Église entretenu par Bonhoeffer, ainsi que les sentiments qu'il a éprouvés alors qu'il attendait la mort en prison.

* * * * * * * *

1. Introduction

Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945) is a widely known German Protestant theologian, whom I regard as a second Jan Hus,[1] because like Hus he sought the spiritual, moral and political renewal of Church and society on the basis of the Holy Scriptures as they understood it in their time.[2] Both theologians faced conflicts with the church, but whereas Hus struggled to restore the powerful medieval church in Bohemia, Bonhoeffer struggled for spiritual renewal of the churches of the Reformation, which had departed from the heritage of Martin Luther and whose nature and mission were endangered by the racist, anti-Semitic ideology of National Socialism. Hus and Bonhoeffer both died as martyrs: Hus was condemned to death mainly by the church's powers but Bonhoeffer was executed by the state.

Bonhoeffer was born in Breslau (then in Germany, now in Poland) as the last of eight children. Shortly after his birth the Bonhoeffer family moved to Berlin where Dietrich's father, Karl Bonhoeffer, was professor of psychiatry and neurology until his death. Bonhoeffer's mother Paula, née von Hase, devoted herself completely to the upbringing of her children. She instilled in them a deep love for Christian values. She had 'spent the period of her youth in Herrnhut and she has opened here to the spiritual ideals of the Moravian Church with a youthful passion'. She mediated to young Dietrich basic biblical knowledge by 'telling him biblical stories by heart' and she also acquainted him with church history.[3]

In his theological studies, Bonhoeffer was initially influenced by the biblical scholar Adolf Schlatter. At the University of Berlin (1923-1927) he had to deal with the prominent liberal theologians Adolf von Harnack and Reinhold Seeberg. At this time, the dialectic theology of Karl Barth began to develop[4] but Bonhoeffer was most influenced by Martin Luther's theology: the justification by faith and grace alone as the article by which the Church stands or falls (*articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae*), Luther's understanding of the Holy Scriptures, and his concept of the Church as Christ's presence on earth. Later, when he was active in the Confessing Church, Bonhoeffer discovered the connection between justification, obedience and the priesthood of all believers which is present in his teaching at the Preachers' Seminary of the Confessing Church in Finkenwalde.

In his *Ethics* he critically interacts with Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms (die Lehre von den zwei Reichen) and points out that Jesus Christ is the Lord of both kingdoms (Mat 28:18-20, Col 1:15-20, Eph 1:22-23). In prison, Bonhoeffer wrote:

> One wonders why Luther's action had to be followed by consequences that were the exact opposite of what he intended, and that darkened the last years of his life, so that he sometimes even doubted the value of his life's work. He wanted a real unity of the church and the West – that is, of the Christian peoples, and the consequence was the disintegration of the church and of Europe; he wanted the ' freedom of the Christian man', and the consequence was indifference and licentiousness…[5]

In 1927 Bonhoeffer completed his theological studies in Berlin with the thesis *Sanctorum Communio*.[6] After a year's vicariate in Barcelona (1928-1929), he returned to Berlin where he began lecturing in systematic theology. In 1930 he defended his habilitation entitled *Act and Being* and qualified as assistant professor of systematic theology.[7] His lectures focused on Christology, ecclesiology, anthropology and contemporary ethical problems.[8] The years 1932-1939 are often called *Bonhoeffer Christian*; the period called *Bonhoeffer Contemporary* started with his return from the United States in 1939.

2. Search for a new theological-ethical orientation (1928-1932)

Shortly after Bonhoeffer completed his dissertation, he began to deal with theological-ethical issues and to look for a new theological orientation. His search started in Barcelona and ended in 1932. In a lecture in Barcelona entitled *Jesus Christ and the Essence of Christianity* he mentions the crisis of human ideals that shaped the European cultural, pedagogical and philosophical tradition:

> The great internal split of our ideals, of our human establishments and structures brings us daily the question: What should we do? Daily we have to make decisions between one and the other ideal, no matter whether of political or educational nature, or in questions of forming our own life. Political statements of any ideals are deeply shaken in their foundations.[9]

In his view, the crisis also affects society and politics. In the same lecture he asks regarding the fate of Europe: 'Who among us dares to give a definite answer as to the purpose of the present fate of Europe, who dares to say that he found the only valid answer to this question?'[10] In a sermon on 8 May 1932 he explicitly says that there is a time of 'great dying of Christianity' and that European Christianity has lost its purpose.[11]

There are three main symptoms of crisis in Christianity: theological incompetence to understand the ethical meaning of God's commands for the Christian life, inability to apply God's commandments to a life of different occupations, and inability to cope with the theological significance of the Sermon on the Mount. In a public lecture in 1929 Bonhoeffer emphasised that 'the greatest misunderstanding of the Sermon on the Mount is when we apply it literally to the present'. That is 'meaningless because it is not feasible' and 'it is against the Spirit of Christ, which brought freedom from the law'. Such an attempt overlooks that the apostle Paul said, 'for the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life' (2 Cor 3:6).[12]

His years of searching for a new theological orientation resulted in a personal change which is known as *Bonhoeffer Christian*. In his own words to a female co-worker in the church in 1936:

> I plunged into work in a very unchristian way. An … ambition that many noticed in me made my life difficult. … Then something happened, something that has changed and transformed my life to the present day. For the first time I discovered the Bible … I had often preached, I had seen a great deal of the church, spoken and preached about it – but I had not yet become a Christian. … I know that at that time I turned the doctrine of Jesus Christ into something of personal advantage to myself … I pray to God that will never not happen again. Also I had never prayed, or I prayed only very little. For all my loneliness, I was quite pleased with myself. Then the Bible, and in particular the Sermon on the Mount, freed me from that. Since then everything has changed. … It was a great liberation. It became clear to me that the life of a servant of Jesus Christ must belong to the church, and step by step it became clearer to me how far does that must go. Then came the crisis of 1933. … The revival of the church and of the ministry became my supreme concern. … I suddenly saw the Christian pacifism that I had recently passionately opposed as self-evident…[13]

This change Bonhoeffer considered as an inseparable part 'of God's good and provident guidance.'[14]

3. Three boundaries of the Church

The topic of boundaries comes up in Bonhoeffer's small publication *Das Wesen der Kirche* (*The Essence of the Church*), which consists of his lectures at the University of Berlin in the summer semester of 1932. The booklet contains a short section called 'The boundaries of the Church'.[15] Here he states that the Church is located in a world that 'knows nothing of God's revelation in the Church'. Therefore it is important to talk about the inner boundaries of the Church which are expressed by the terms predestination, the Kingdom of God and the state.

The *doctrine of predestination* is based on the a priori assumption that God has from eternity chosen certain people to eternal salvation, others to damnation. Against this understanding Bonhoeffer emphasises that 'the church is built on the word of the Cross of Christ', which also includes God's love for all humankind as it is confirmed in Jesus' Great Commission (Mat 28:18-20), according to which 'the Church must preach the word of God without reservation' and call all people to Christ.[16] The doctrine of predestination a priori limits the breadth of God's love for sinful humans.

With respect to the second boundary, *the Kingdom of God*, Bonhoeffer refuses to identify Church and Kingdom, although the Church 'knows who it belongs to'. She knows the will of God, 'who desires everyone to be saved' (1 Tim 2:4). Therefore the Church does missionary work in the world; 'the Church does not know who belongs to the Kingdom of God', 'she hopes that God can do great and mysterious things with those who do not belong to the Church', but she does not know, 'when, where and how God's will arrives to its ultimate goal'.[17] In Bonhoeffer's view, the Kingdom of God is a term that includes in itself all human races, cultures, religions, Christian churches and state institutions. It is present in the Church in Christ through the Holy Spirit, but it transcends the visible organisational and institutional structures of the Church.

With regard to the third boundary, *the state*, Bonhoeffer argues that the state tells the Church that God has not given her the judicial sword of violence. Her sword is Word and prayer alone. Thus the Church serves the state. Even though the state might threaten her, she fights only with the weapons of Word and prayer, and her goal is 'the proclaiming of God's rule over the whole world through word and faith'. But Bonhoeffer speaks of a limit to obedience 'where the state threatens the word'. In such a situation, the 'church's criticism of the state is needed'.[18] Bonhoeffer does not yet develop this thought here.

In summary, Bonhoeffer's short treatise on the boundaries of the Church emphasises God's sovereign rule over the Church and the state in the world. Both institutions have to exercise their tasks responsibly and peacefully. If the state prevents the proclamation of the Word of God, conflict will arise and the Church can criticise and disobey the state. These thoughts could have helped the state and the Church to coexist peacefully in the turbulent situation in Germany in 1932; they also have a profound significance for our present situation.

4. The Aryan paragraph (1933)

A few months after Hitler's electoral success in 1933 he began to enforce the infamous Aryan Paragraph which was passed by the Reichstag on 7 April 1933. It banned from public service all Jews and persons whose parents or grandparents had been Jewish. The 'Brown Synod' of Prussian church leaders soon adopted it as a condition for acceptance into church ministry.[19]

On the Sunday of the church elections in 1933 Bonhoeffer preached in the Holy Trinity Church in Berlin on Matthew 16:13-18 on the topic 'Peter's Church'. In his sermon he categorically asserted that no organisation builds the Church but only Jesus Christ, the Son of the living God.[20]

When the entire Evangelical Church in Germany accepted the Aryan Paragraph, Bonhoeffer informed the Anglican bishop George K.A. Bell about the situation; Bell invited him to come to England, where he became pastor at the German Evangelical Church in Sydenham (London) and the Reformed Church of St. Paul in London (1933-1934). From London Bonhoeffer wrote to his friend Rößler in 1934: 'National socialism has brought an end to the church in Germany.'[21] He began to think about joining the Free Church, but it did not happen. Bonhoeffer's words at this time do not point to resistance but rather express his feelings of personal disappointment.

5. Obedience and disobedience to the state in his Bethel Confession (1934)

Approximately a month after the Protestant Church had adopted the Aryan Paragraph, Bonhoeffer again reflected on the relationship between Church and state in the first draft of the Bethel Confession which influenced the Barmen Confession of 1934. In August 1933 he quotes the *Confessio Augustana*, article 16, and writes about authorities that 'we Christians are bound to be submissive and obedient to the authority'. This does not depend on 'whether the authority is Christian or pagan' but it depends 'on a fair and responsible exercise of its authority', i.e. 'whether it properly exercises its secular office'. Here Bonhoeffer refers to the *Clausula Petri*: when the high priest forbade the apostles to preach Christ, Peter responded with the words, 'We must obey God rather than any human authority' (Acts 5:29).[22]

We see that Bonhoeffer's understanding of obedience and disobedience to the authorities depends on the proper and responsible exercise of secular office as well as on the freedom to proclaim God's Word. If the state prevents this, we pass the limit of obedience. This idea is still relevant in the world today.

6. The Confessing Church

Less than a year after the adoption of the Aryan Paragraph by the church, Protestant church leaders met in Barmen, Westphalia (May 1934). 'Here 139 delegates … coming from twenty-six land and provincial churches, representing Reformed, Lutheran, and United Church bodies', constituted the Confessing Church in Germany. The American Nelson Burton notes:

> The initial draft of the confession, written by Karl Barth, was directed against Nazi interference in church affairs and the idolatrous destruction of the gospel through racist policies approved by the German Christians. The primary motif of the confession was the acknowledgment that Jesus Christ alone is Lord and his Word alone saves. The confession repudiated the false teaching that there are areas of … life in which we belong not to Jesus Christ, but to other lords.[23]

Encouraged by a letter from Barth, Bonhoeffer returned from England and joined the Confessing Church, serving as a leading theologian in the

Preacher Seminary in Finkenwalde during the years 1935-1937. In September of 1937 the seminary was dissolved by the Gestapo.[24] In the beginning Bonhoeffer saw the Confessing Church as the 'one true church of Jesus Christ' in Germany, the continuation of the Reformation, and said that 'after four hundred years of Protestantism the spirit of reformation moves again'. The Confessing Church fought against 'the false Church of Antichrist'.[25] He was convinced that the struggle of the Confessing Church was paradigmatic for Christianity throughout the world: '... we do not fight for the Christian churches in Germany but for the whole world, too. Everywhere can be found the same pagan and antichristian forces...'[26]

7. *The Cost of Discipleship*

Bonhoeffer's theology of obedience for the Confessing Church is contained in two theological works: *The Cost of Discipleship* and *Life Together*. In this essay I will mainly deal with the concept of obedience as we find it in *The Cost of Discipleship*, which is based on the Sermon on the Mount. From the Sermon Bonhoeffer derived his definition of obedience: '... we could understand and interpret the Sermon on the Mount in a thousand different ways. Jesus knows only one possibility: simple surrender and obedience, not interpreting it or applying it, but doing and obeying'.[27] I will show that his theological-ethical concept of obedience has connections with Christology, faith, soteriology, ecclesiology and state authority.

7.1 Obedience to Jesus Christ

In Jesus Christ 'God was made man, and ... that means that he took upon him our entire human nature with all its infirmity, sinfulness and corruption, the whole of apostate humanity', he is 'the Second Adam or the last Adam (1 Cor 15:45)'. Here Bonhoeffer interprets Luther's kenotic Christology in which Jesus Christ proved his divinity and humanity by obedience, i.e. by 'taking a form of slave ... and became obedient to the point of death (Phil 2:6-11).'[28] Jesus realised his obedience to God as he 'came to fulfil the law of the old covenant' and so he 'manifests his perfect union with the will of God as revealed in the Old Testament law and prophets'. His obedience led him to death on the cross and it means also that 'Jesus was the only Man who ever fulfilled the law...'[29] He is present in his Church today as 'the incarnate, crucified, risen and glorified Christ, and he meets us in his word', which the Holy Spirit actualises.[30]

7.2 Faith and obedience

Faith as a personal obedient relationship with God has its origin in Christ: 'It is only the call of Jesus which makes it a situation where faith is possible.' At this point Bonhoeffer emphasizes the mutuality of faith and obedience: 'Only he who believes is obedient, and only he who is obedient believes'.[31]

7.3 Soteriology

Bonhoeffer speaks in this context about 'costly and cheap grace'.[32] These two concepts do not characterise the quality of God's grace but they express the two potential attitudes of individual Christians as well as the Church towards God's gift of forgiveness of sins in Jesus Christ. Church history confirms the presence of both attitudes. 'Costly grace' is the adequate response by which the Church should live. It is the personal faith which has in itself a life in obedience to Jesus Christ as a responsible answer to God's grace. Costly grace forces us to accept the yoke of following Jesus Christ and it brings fellowship with Christ in all life situations including suffering because of Christ.

'Cheap grace', on the other hand, is inadequate and unpardonable. 'Cheap grace means grace as a doctrine, a principle, a system. It means forgiveness of sins proclaimed as a general truth.'[33] In a cheap relation to Christ, the Christian does not find justification; it talks about it and offers it but it is a false offer – a ruining of the unique opportunity God gives to all people. 'Cheap grace means grace as a good below cost, wasted forgiveness, consolation and holiness.' A cheap attitude towards the gospel is 'the main enemy' of every church, Bonhoeffer argues.[34]

Bonhoeffer's emphasis was indispensable for Christian proclamation in the past and it is still relevant. Firstly because true faith in Jesus Christ as a permanent relationship with God can never be inherited or learned, but it can be only accepted through the preached word of God in the Church as the place of Christ presence. Secondly, each person's relationship to God permanently evolves. It is necessary to understand the will of God as revealed in Scripture, as well as its application to concrete life.

7.4 Ecclesiology *(nota verae ecclesiae)*

Obedience is a sign of the true Church of Christ, a *nota verae ecclesiae*. Bonhoeffer understands the

Church as a community of believers where 'Christ is present through the Holy Spirit'.[35] Jesus Christ is present in preaching and in the sacraments, for 'the word of preaching is insufficient to make us members of Christ's Body; the sacraments also have to be added'. True obedience always includes the cross, love, intercessory prayers for believers and non-believers, church discipline, and the expectation of the second coming of Jesus Christ. By the cross Bonhoeffer understands the shame, humiliation and ridicule we have to bear from the world 'as a consequence of our binding with Jesus Christ. The cross is not an accidental but a necessary suffering'; it is not a wilfully chosen suffering (*passio activa*) but it is 'honourless suffering' and 'self-denial', connected with suffering and condemnation 'because of Jesus Christ and not of any attitude or a confession'. All Christians who follow Christ must take up their cross.[36] It seems that the cross becomes the principle of Church life in the world.

The obedient visible Church has a deep love towards all people, friends and enemies alike (Mat 5:43-48). To love our enemies means that 'we are to serve our enemy in all things without hypocrisy and with utter sincerity' and that 'we are willing to sacrifice goods, honour and life for our enemies' as for our brothers. Whether the enemy is 'religious, political or personal', Christians 'consider all in love as their Lord had done it'. This love also includes spiritual service to our enemies: 'Bless them that persecute you' because 'their curse can do us no harm'. In intercessory prayer we approach the enemy: 'Through the medium of prayer we go to our enemy, stand by his side, and plead for him to God.' Praying for them means that 'we are taking their distress and poverty, their guilt and perdition upon ourselves, and pleading to God for them'.[37]

During the era of the atheist Communist regime Jesus' words about loving our enemy taught us to receive them with love as ours neighbours, to pray for them and thus show them Jesus Christ without words. The relationship of love could even overcome our enemy.[38] In 1958 this was also my personal experience. At the age of 15-16 years I began to seek God and to study the Bible. As a result I was expelled from high school three weeks before graduation because I was suspected of hostility towards the state ideology. I could do nothing but pray. After four years of hard work in a steel works and as a coal miner, I requested permission to study theology. The Communist officer who had not allowed me to finish high school said to me: 'I hurt you several times, but I do not want to repeat it!' I received a recommendation to study theology in 1962.

7.5 The state

Relations between Church and state were, are and will always be complicated. From the time of the Enlightenment onwards, European governments are secularised, governed by their own laws. In this context I recall Günther Dehn who wrote: 'The state that focuses solely on political power and knows nothing about its responsibility before God will require either total obedience of the Church or declare it to be dangerous for the state.'[39]

Bonhoeffer's understanding of the state is based on Romans 13 ('Let every person be subject to the governing authorities') and Mark 10:42-45 ('the Son of man came not to be served, but to serve, and give his life a ransom for many'). He thinks that Paul's words require Christians to accept that the authority of the state comes from God and that 'to resist the power is to resist the ordinance of God'. For this reason Christians should obey, 'wherever they may be and whatever conflict should threaten them', because 'rulers are not a terror to the good work, but to the evil.'[40] This even applies when a Christian has to endure 'punishment and persecution' for 'If he meets with suffering instead of praise, his conscience is clear in the sight of God and he has nothing to fear.' 'He obeys the power not for material profit, but "for conscience's sake"'.[41] In this context Bonhoeffer explicitly writes that 'The starting-point of St Paul's thinking is always the Church, and his sole concern is its well-being and manner of life.' He interprets the apostle's words on the basis of Jesus' words in Mark 10: 'The world exercises dominion, the Christian serves, and thus he shares the earthly lot of his Lord, who became servant.'[42]

In *The Cost of Discipleship* Bonhoeffer explicitly rejects rebellion and resistance against the state[43] and the same voice can be heard in his *Ethics*.[44] Both publications clearly show the pacifist theological-ethical orientation which he later gave up. Bonhoeffer condemns violence, injustice and anti-Semitism. The concept of Christ's dominion over the whole world and creation (Col 1:15-20) is still missing in *The Cost of Discipleship*.

8. The structure of responsible life (*Ethics*)

In this part, I will deal with ethical concepts that are related to Christian life in the world and specifically to Bonhoeffer's activity in the conspiracy against Hitler. His *Ethics*, the incomplete work which he began in 1940, has a universal Christological emphasis. Christ is Lord of the Church, of the world and all creation. This universal dominion of Christ points to the doctrine of the mandates. Bonhoeffer distinguishes four mandates, labour, marriage, government and the Church, which he regards as divine 'by virtue of their original and final relation to Christ'.[45] This means that the life of all humans in Church, at work, in marriage and under governments, is ultimately subject to the reign of Christ.

8.1 Deputyship (Stellvertretung)

Bonhoeffer's concept of deputyship has two aspects: the life of Jesus and human interpersonal relationships. Regarding the first, Bonhoeffer says: 'Jesus as the incarnate Son of God lived in deputyship for us'; 'all His living, His action and His dying was deputyship' for humankind. 'And through Him all human life is in essence a life of deputyship…' Christ's deputyship restored communion between God and humans, and it is in force today in Christ's Church for all who want to meet him as their Saviour.[46]

As to the human aspect, the deputyship relates to human co-existence in family life and in society, for instance: 'The father acts for the children, working for them, caring for them, interceding, fighting and suffering for them.' In civil professions one person helps the other by deputyship in their place.[47]

8.2 Responsibility

Bonhoeffer starts with 'Christ who became man, and He thereby bore responsibility and deputyship for men.' This responsibility is inseparable from freedom inasmuch as 'responsibility and freedom are corresponding concepts' and 'responsibility presupposes freedom and freedom can consist only in responsibility'.[48] Our responsibilities concern our relationship to God, the Word of God, to the Church, to the state and to ourselves. Both responsibility and freedom are part of the ethics of following Christ: 'The responsible man acts in the freedom of his own self, without the support of men, circumstances or principles, but with a due consideration for the given human and general conditions and for the relevant questions of principle.'[49]

Obedience and responsibility are interlinked, which means that 'obedience is rendered in responsibility'. Both obedience and responsibility also relate to freedom, for 'obedience without freedom is slavery, freedom without obedience is arbitrary self-will'. This connection is confirmed by Jesus Christ 'who stands before God as the one who is both obedient and free. As the obedient one He does His Father's will in blind compliance with the law which is commanded Him, and as the free one He acquiesces in God's will out of His own most personal knowledge, with open eyes and a joyous heart'. And 'a man who acts in the freedom is precisely the man who sees his action finally committed to the guidance of God'.[50]

Larry L. Rasmussen sees in Bonhoeffer's understanding of free responsibility the possibility of a theological-ethical justification for conspiracy; he writes: 'This was the deed of free responsibility, the undertaking of a courageous venture that simultaneously violates the laws of the civil order and conforms to the form of Christ in the world (reality). Here is Bonhoeffer's rationale for conspiracy.'[51]

8.3 The acceptance of guilt

According to Bonhoeffer, Christ is not concerned with his own goodness but solely with his love for humanity. For this reason 'He is able to enter into the fellowship of the guilt of men and to take the burden of their guilt upon Himself.' Jesus' sinlessness and his voluntary acceptance of guilt stem from his love for sinful humans. Jesus freedom from sin and his acceptance of the guilt of others also point to the Christian life as responsible acting for other people.[52] This realisation encourages Bonhoeffer to enter actively into the plot aimed at the violent removal of Hitler. Larry Rasmussen explains that 'essentially it is such an understanding that stands behind Bonhoeffer's move away from the ascetic direction of his earlier pacifism to the new direction of actively sharing in the guilt of his fellowmen and his nation through conspiracy'.[53] But some of his other publications also show that it was not easy for Bonhoeffer to take the decision to be involved in preparations for the assassination of Hitler.[54]

9. Faith and trust in God's help in prison

Bonhoeffer's letters from prison were intensively studied, interpreted and discussed in Czechoslovakia in the years 1950-1988. The focus was on his theological emphases such as the non-religious interpretation of biblical concepts, his prognosis of the end of religion, and the concepts of *Etsi deus non daretur* (as if there was no God) and *Deus ex machina*. The theology he developed in prison helped the churches behind the Iron Curtain to cope with the atheistic communist ideology.[55]

As far as Bonhoeffer's personal Christian faith and spirituality in prison is concerned, he studied the Holy Scripture intensively, he prayed for his relatives and his fellow prisoners, and he studied theological and philosophical books until his situation in prison became unbearable. He recalls his understanding of Christian obedience toward the state authorities, as demonstrated by a letter to his attorney:

> I still cannot believe that this charge has really been made against me. … If anyone wants to learn something of my conception of the duty of Christian obedience towards the authorities, he should read my exposition of Romans 13 in my book *The Cost of Discipleship*.[56]

Although Bonhoeffer looked for God's presence in prison, he had no doubt that in his further life 'It depends on a God who demands responsible action in a bold venture of faith'. He expected that God would meet him in this situation 'no longer as Thou [You] but also "disguised" in the It', i.e. in the obscurity of current events.[57] Despite the difficulties, he trusted in God's love and forgiveness whatever turn the situation would take.

Bonhoeffer dealt with actual, ethical and social emphases in human relationships in *After Ten Years* (Nach zehn Jahren, 1942-1943).[58] Here we find concepts such as 'evil deeds', 'constant presence of evil', 'problem of distrust' and other symptoms of the crisis in human relationships. These terms indicate the negative influence of the political dictatorship on the interpersonal coexistence in the church and in society. Good, harmonious interpersonal relationships remain a constant struggle even in religious communities.[59] Such constructive, communicative human relations are very relevant in the present situation of the Church in postmodern Europe in order to be able to do mission and social work, and to enable a good international European community.

10. Hope for the future

Despite many disappointments in the Confessing Church, Bonhoeffer continued to hope that God would guide and help him in the future. His hope is expressed in the following words:

> I believe that God can and will bring good out of evil, even out of the greatest evil. For that purpose he needs men who make the best use of everything. I believe that God will give us all the strength we need to help us to resist in all time of distress. But he never gives it in advance, lest we should rely on ourselves and not on him alone. … I believe that even our mistakes and shortcomings are turned to good account, and that it is no harder for God to deal with them than with our supposedly good deeds. I believe that God is no timeless fate, but that he waits for and answers sincere prayers and responsible actions.[60]

In addition to faith in God's gracious help and guidance for his personal life, Bonhoeffer expressed hope for the renewal of the Christian churches in the future through prayer, through right actions and through relevant, responsible, non-religious proclamation of the Word of God:

> All Christian thinking, speaking, and organizing must be born anew out of this prayer and action. … It is not for us to prophesy the day (though the day will come) when men will once more be called so to utter the word of God that the world will be changed and renewed by it. It will be a new language, perhaps quite non-religious, but liberating and redeeming – as was Jesus' language … it will be the language of a new righteousness and truth, proclaiming God's peace with men and the coming of his kingdom.[61]

Our religious, cultural and political situation is no longer that of Bonhoeffer. Postmodernism is the new reality in which Europe finds itself. Our Europe it is not completely atheistic, secularised and irreligious, but the vast majority of people regard the church as irrelevant. It is a huge challenge for us to give people new confidence in the church.[62] May God help us!

Professor Dr. Ján Liguš is chairperson of the Department of Practical Theology, Ecumenism and Communication at the Hussite Theological Faculty, Charles University, Prague 1.

Endnotes

1 Cf. my 'Master Jan Hus – Obedience or Resistance' in *EJT* 24.1 (2015) 49-56.

2 This article is based on a worskshop presented at the FEET conference in Orsay near Paris, August 2014.

3 For more details see Eberhard Bethge, *Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Theologe – Christ – Zeitgenosse* (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1967) 35-59. English translation *Dietrich Bonhoeffer. A biography* (London: Collins, 1970; revised edition Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000).

4 Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 80, 95-107. For Harnack see Carl-Jürgen Kaltenborn, *Adolf von Harnack als Lehrer Dietrich Bonhoeffers* (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1973).

5 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Widerstand und Ergebung. Briefe und Aufzeichnungen aus der Haft. Herausgegeben von Eberhard Bethge* (2. Auflage; München und Hamburg: Siebenstern Taschenbuch, 1965) 132-137; English: *Letters and Papers from Prison, ed. Eberhard Bethge* (enlarged edition; London: SCM, 1971) 123; see note 54 below.

6 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Sanctorum Communio. Eine dogmatische Untersuchung zur Soziologie der Kirche, Dritte, erweiterte Auflage* (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1960).

7 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Akt und Sein. Transzendentalphilosophie und Ontologie in der systematischen Theologie,* 3.Auflage (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1964). For Bonhoeffer's ecclesiology in relation to Martin Luther's theology, see Ján Liguš, *CHRISTUS PRAESENS. Ekleziologie Dietricha Bonhoefrfera mezi liberalismem a nacionalismem* (Deus et Gentes Vol. 10; Brno: L.Marek, 2008).

8 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Seminare – Vorlesungen – Predigten 1924 bis 1941. Gesammelte Schriften 5. Herausgegeben von Eberhard Bethge* (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1972) 181-413 [abbreviated as *GS 5*].

9 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ‚Jesus Christus und vom Wesen des Christentums' in *GS 5*, 416-478, 135.

10 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ‚Not und Hoffnung in der religiösen Lage der Gegenwart. Gemeindevortrag des Winters in Barcelona 13.11.1928' in *GS 5*, 114, 116-117.

11 ‚Exaudi Predigt 8 Mai 1932 in Dreifaltigkeitskirche, Berlin, Bibeltext: 2.Chron.20,12', in Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Ökumene: Briefe, Aufsätze, Dokumente 1928 bis 1942. Gesammelte Schriften 1, Herausgegeben von Eberhard Bethge* (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1958) 74 [abbreviated as *GS 1*]; Bonhoeffer, *GS 5*, 117. In other words (117): 'Wir alle, die wir uns noch irgendwie der Kirche verbunden fühlen, die wir uns den Fragen der Sittlichkeit verantwortlich wissen, – wir stecken noch mitten drin in der Not, im Suchen, in der Ratlosigkeit.'

12 Bonhoeffer, *GS 5*, 166; also Bonhoeffer, *GS 1*, 142, 41.

13 Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*, 248-249; quoted from the 2000 English edition, 204-205.

14 Bonhoeffer, *Widerstand und Ergebung*, 130, 98, 83.

15 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Das Wesen der Kirche. Aus Hörernachschriften zusammengestellt und herausgegeben von Otto Dudzus* (München: Chr. Kaiser 1971) 74-76.

16 Bonhoeffer, *Wesen der Kirche*, 74.

17 Bonhoeffer, *Wesen der Kirche*, 74-75.

18 Bonhoeffer, *Wesen der Kirche*, 75-76.

19 Geffrey B. Kelly and F. Burton Nelson (eds), *A Testament to Freedom. The Essential Writings of Dietrich Bonhoeffer* (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1990) 561. For the complete contents and Bonhoeffer's arguments against the Aryan Paragraph, see Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Kirchenkampf und Finkenwalde: Resolutionen, Aufsätze, Rundbriefe 1933 bis 1943. Gesammelte Schriften 2 Herausgegeben von Eberhard Bethge* (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1959) [abbreviated as *GS 2*] 62-69: 'Die Kirche darf die Ordnungen Gottes nicht auflösen oder missachten. Solche Ordnung aber ist die Rasse, darum muss die Kirche rassisch bestimmt sein.' (63). ‚Der Ausschluss der Juden-Christen aus der kirchlichen Gemeinschaft zerstört die Substanz der Kirche Christi … zweitens richtet die Kirche … ein Gesetz auf, das erfüllt sein muss bevor man zur kirchlichen Gemeinschaft gehören darf, nämlich das Rassengesetz.' Also Bonhoeffer, *GS 1*, 140-158.

20 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Auslegungen – Predigten 1933 bis 1944. Gesammelte Schriften 4. Herausgegeben von Eberhard Bethge* (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1961) 130-136 [abbreviated as *GS 4*].

21 Bonhoeffer, *GS 1*, 39-40, 278, 194, 192-193; for details see also Bonhoeffer, *GS 2*, 159, 186, 194, 155. Bonhoeffer's London Sermons in Forest Hill are in Bonhoeffer, *GS 4*, 154-182.

22 Bonhoeffer, *GS 2*, 102.

23 *A Testament to Freedom. The Essential Writings of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Edited by Gefferey B. Kelly and F. Burton Nelson*, 561-562.

24 See the letters in Bonhoeffer, *GS 2*, 131-132, 283-284.

25 Bonhoeffer, *GS 4*, 399, 390, and Bonhoeffer, *GS 1*, 233.

26 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Theologie – Gemeinde: Vorlesungen, Briefe, Gespräche 1927 bis 1944. Gesammelte Schriften* 3, *Herausgegeben von Eberhard Bethge* (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1960) 233-234.

27 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Nachfolge* (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1937), English *The Cost of Discipleship* (complete edition; London: SCM, 1959) 111.

28 Bonhoeffer, *Cost of Discipleship*, 213-214.

29 Bonhoeffer, *Cost of Discipleship*, 111.

30 Bonhoeffer, *Cost of Discipleship*, 203, 205.

31 Bonhoeffer, *Cost of Discipleship*, 54.

32 Bonhoeffer, *Cost of Discipleship*, 35-47.
33 Bonhoeffer, *Cost of Discipleship*, 35.
34 More details in Liguš, *CHRISTUS PRAESENS*, 89-98.
35 Bonhoeffer, *Cost of Discipleship*, 219.
36 Bonhoeffer, *Cost of Discipleship*, 219, also 80, 207, 110, 217-219.
37 Bonhoeffer, *Cost of Discipleship*, 133-134.
38 For the impact of Bonhoeffer's theology on the fall of the Iron Curtain, see Ján Liguš, ‚Vlivy Bonhoefferovy teologie na rozpad Železné opony' [‚The Influence of Bonhoeffer´s Theology on the Disintegration of the Iron Curtain'] in *Víra a teologie Dietricha Bonhoeffera* (Second edition; Bratislava: Pedagogická fakulta Univerzity Mateja Bela, Katedra evanjelikálnej teológie Banská Bystrica, vydal ECM s.r.o. 1996) 102-106.
39 Günther Dehn, *Kirche und Völkerversöhnung. Dokumente zum Halleschen Universitätskonflikt* (Berlin: Furche, 1931), quoted in Christoph Strohm, *Theologische Ethik im Kampf gegen den Nationalsozialismus. Der Weg Dietrich Bonhoeffers mit den Juristen Hans von Dohnanyi und Gerhard Leibholz in den Widerstand* (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1989) 81.
40 Bonhoeffer, *Cost of Discipleship*, 235-236.
41 Bonhoeffer, *Cost of Discipleship*, 237.
42 Bonhoeffer, *Cost of Discipleship*, 236, 235.
43 Bonhoeffer, *Cost of Discipleship*, 23.
44 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Ethics, Edited by Eberhard Bethge* (Fifth impression; London: SCM, 1985) 315; compare Bonhoeffer, *Cost of Discipleship*, 23.
45 Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 179.
46 Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 179, 195. On deputyship in Bonhoeffer see Noemi Bravená, *Ježíš Kristus, bratr a bližní jednají na m,ém míst . Zástupnost v teologii Dietricha Bonhoeffer*a [*Jesus Christ, brother and neighbour act in my place. Deputyship in the theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer*] Pontes Pragensis Vol. 56 (Brno: L. Marek, Centre for religious and cultural dialogue at the Hussite Theological Faculty of Charles University in Prague, 2010).
47 Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 194.
48 Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 217.
49 Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 196, 217.
50 Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 220, 218.
51 Larry L. Rasmussen, *Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Reality and Resistance* (Studies in Christian Ethics series; (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1972) 45.
52 Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 209-210.
53 Rasmussen, *Bonhoeffer*, 51.
54 Gotthard Fuchs, *Glaube als Widerstandskraft: Edith Stein, Alfred Delp, Dietrich Bonhoeffer* (Frankfurt am Main: Josef Knecht, 1986); Strohm, *Theologische Ethik*. Compare the outlines of the letter to Dr. Roeder in Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers from Prison*, ed. Eberhard Bethge (enlarged edition, sixth impression; London: SCM, 1986) 60 [cf. note 5 above].
55 For details see Jan Mili Lochman, *Church in A Marxist Society. A Czechoslovak view* (New York-Evanston and London: Harper and Row, 1970).
56 Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers from Prison*, 60.
57 Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers from Prison*, 6, 217.
58 Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers from Prison*, 3-17.
59 Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers from Prison*, 16, 4-5, 16-17.
60 Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers from Prison*, 11.
61 Bonhoeffer, 'Thoughts on the Day of the Baptism of Dietrich Wilhelm Ruediger Bethge, May 1944' in Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers from Prison*, 300.
62 See the dissertation of my student Petr Živný, *Theoretical, Practical and Research Aspects of Homiletic Communication. Catholic and Protestant Approach*. Dissertation Charles University Prague – Hussite Theological Faculty (2013) 130.

EJT (2015) 24:2, 183–193 0960–2720

Christliche Identität und neue Schöpfung: Das Evangelium von der Rechtfertigung des Gottlosen als Zentrum der kirchlichen Homosexualitätsdiskussion

Christoph Raedel

SUMMARY

The discussion in the churches about a positive re-evaluation of homosexual relationships is mainly handled as a moral debate. The basic issues of Christian anthropology and the theological question as to how the evaluation of homosexual practice relates to the Gospel of justification of sinners through Jesus Christ are neglected in this discussion. The present contribution first explicates that through the Gospel of justification as the 'centre of Scripture' the believer receives a new identity 'in Christ'. It then demonstrates that this eschatological identity of being a 'new creature' in Christ does not eliminate a person's biological identity, but transforms it by virtue of the promise. Finally, it elucidates that the realisation of this new identity occurs in the tension between creation and completion and thus in brokenness. This is why clarity in doctrine needs to go hand in hand with compassion in the counselling of persons concerned.

* * * * * * * *

RÉSUMÉ

Le débat dans les Églises sur une reconsidération positive des relations homosexuelles est principalement mené comme un débat de morale. Les questions fondamentales d'anthropologie chrétienne ainsi que celle du regard qu'on peut porter sur la pratique homosexuelle à la lumière de l'Évangile de la justification accordée à des pécheurs en vertu de l'œuvre de Christ sont souvent ignorées dans ce débat. L'auteur du présent article rappelle que, par l'Évangile de la justification qui est au centre de l'Écriture, le croyant reçoit une nouvelle identité « en Christ ». Il montre ensuite que cette identité eschatologique qui fait de lui une « nouvelle créature » en Christ n'oblitère pas l'identité biologique d'une personne, mais qu'elle la transforme selon la promesse. Enfin, il souligne que la réalisation de cette nouvelle identité intervient en tension entre la création et l'achèvement du plan rédempteur divin, ce qui implique une certaine fracture. C'est pourquoi la clarté doctrinale doit aller de pair avec la compassion lorsqu'on accompagne les personnes concernées.

* * * * * * * *

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Die kirchliche Diskussion um eine positive Neubewertung gleichgeschlechtlicher Beziehungen wird weithin als moralische Debatte geführt. Zu wenig Beachtung finden die Grundfragen der christlichen Anthropologie und die theologische Frage, in welchem Verhältnis die Beurteilung praktizierter Homosexualität zum Evangelium von der Rechtfertigung des Sünders durch Jesus Christus steht. In diesem Beitrag wird zunächst erläutert, dass im Evangelium von der Rechtfertigung als „Mitte der Schrift" den Glaubenden eine neue Identität „in Christus" zueignet wird. Sodann wird gezeigt, dass diese eschatologische Identität, in Christus eine „neue Kreatur" zu sein, die biologische Identität eines Menschen nicht auslöscht, aber kraft der Verheißung verwandelt. Abschließend wird verdeutlicht, dass die Verwirklichung der neuen Identität in der Spannung von Schöpfung und Vollendung nur gebrochen zur Darstellung kommt, weshalb Klarheit in der Lehre und Barmherzigkeit in der Begleitung Betroffener Hand in Hand gehen müssen.

* * * * * * * *

1. Einleitung

Während sich die Haltung der Mehrheitsgesellschaften in der westlichen Welt zu praktizierter Homosexualität und der rechtlichen Ausgestaltung gleichgeschlechtlicher Partnerschaften innerhalb weniger Jahrzehnte rapide gewandelt hat, versuchen die evangelischen Kirchen sich in schmerzhaften und andauernden Prozessen diesen Veränderungen zu stellen, denn die Frage nach der Akzeptanz von homosexuellen Partnerschaften stellt sich ihnen nicht nur von außen, sondern wird in den Kirchen und Gemeinden selbst zum Thema. Stellungnahmen der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland (EKD) und einzelner Landeskirchen haben sich dabei seit den 1970er Jahren in vorsichtiger Annäherung an die Thematik über mehrere Jahrzehnte hinweg auch mit dem zur Frage praktizierter Homosexualität durchweg negativen biblischen Befund auseinandergesetzt.[1] Die dieser Einschätzung zugrunde liegende Interpretation der biblischen Texte in den Bibelwissenschaften hat bis heute eher bestätigt, dass insbesondere die Ablehnung in den paulinischen Texten sich nicht lediglich auf bestimmte antike, nämlich ausbeuterische und gewaltbesetzte (päderastische) Beziehungsformen bezieht, sondern vor dem Hintergrund einer generellen Ablehnung sexueller Beziehungen außerhalb einer monogamen, lebenslangen Ehe zwischen einem Mann und einer Frau im Neuen Testament grundsätzlicher gemeint ist.[2]

In den kirchlichen Stellungnahmen wird dieser Befund hermeneutisch dergestalt eingeordnet, dass das Thema nur am Rande der Bibel vorkomme, dass die Antike verantwortlich gelebte gleichgeschlechtliche Partnerschaften nicht gekannt habe und die in Frage stehenden ethischen Urteile der Bibel von der Mitte der Schrift her zu kritisieren seien.[3] Aus der Systematischen Theologie wird dieser Interpretationsansatz mit dem Hinweis unterlegt, dass die neuzeitliche Bibelkritik und das Autonomiestreben des modernen Menschen notwendig zum Abschied vom Verständnis der Bibel als *auctoritas normativa* führen musste, genauer noch: dass die Autorität der Schrift „allenfalls in strenger Konzentration auf die in Christus gegründete Soteriologie entfaltet werden“ könne.[4] Dabei werden unter Rekurs auf die lutherische Rechtfertigungslehre soteriologische und ethische Fragen kategorial voneinander unterschieden. Die biblischen Texte zur Homosexualität treten in der Folge überhaupt in den Hintergrund, während anderen Bibeltexten – unter denen Galater 3,28 der im Zusammenhang des Themas am häufigsten zitierte sein dürfte – als Summarien der Schriftmitte unbedingte Geltung zugesprochen wird, häufig ohne dieses Vorgehen hermeneutisch näher zu klären.[5] Die, wie mir scheint, wenig aufgeklärte „Mitte der Schrift“ hat in der ethische Orientierung von der Bibel her also die Funktion, „Ordnung“ in die Vielzahl der biblischen Stimmen zu bringen. Die entscheidende Frage aber ist, welcher theologische Impetus von der Schriftmitte her für Fragen der Lebensführung ausgeht. Einer neueren Orientierungshilfe aus der Vereinigten Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche (VELKD) zufolge stellt das theologisch leitende Prüfkriterium die Frage dar, „ob eine ethische Entscheidung der Verwirklichung der biblisch bezeugten *Bestimmung des Menschen* und seiner Welt dient oder ihr im Wege steht“.[6] Daran ist richtig, dass es in der Homosexualitätsdiskussion in letzter Konsequenz um eine Frage der *theologischen Anthropologie* geht, also das Verstehen von Gottes Weg mit den Menschen in Schöpfung, Erlösung und Vollendung, wie er im Wirken Jesu Christi unüberbietbar erschlossen ist.

Von dieser Einsicht her möchte ich im Folgenden erläutern, dass im Evangelium von der Rechtfertigung des Gottlosen als „Mitte der Schrift“ den Glaubenden eine neue Identität „in Christus“ promissional zueignet wird (2), diskutieren, in welchem Verhältnis diese neue Identität zur vorfindlichen biologischen Orientierung eines Menschen steht (3), und zeigen, dass die Verwirklichung der neuen Identität in der Spannung von Schöpfung und Vollendung nur gebrochen zur Darstellung kommt (4). Ich schließe mit einigen Konsequenzen, die sich aus dem Gesamtbefund dieser Erörterungen für die Einordnung der aktuellen Diskussionen ergeben (5).

2. „Was Christum treibet“: Das Evangelium von der Rechtfertigung des Gottlosen und die Identität als neue Schöpfung „in Christus“

In der Perspektive reformatorischer Theologie gehört es zum Selbstverständnis der Schriftauslegung, die Bibel von ihrer Mitte her und auf diese Mitte hin zu lesen. Diese Mitte („was Christum treibet“) lässt sich als Gottes gnädige Initiative bestimmen, das verzweifelte Bemühen des Menschen um Selbstrechtfertigung, wir könnten auch sagen: um Anerkennung, dadurch zu überwinden, dass Gott den Menschen um Christi willen allein aus Glauben ins Recht setzt und ihm seine Gerechtigkeit zu Eigen werden lässt. Der Sünder meint sich sein Recht *nehmen* zu können und wird gerade damit unfähig, empfangen zu können, was Gott schenken möchte. Karl Barth spricht davon, dass die Sünde des Menschen „darin ihr Wesen und ihren Ursprung [hat], daß der Mensch sein eigener Richter sein will",[7] und darum Gott, der allein gerecht richtet, nicht anzuerkennen bereit ist. So lebt der Mensch im Unglauben an dem vorbei, der durch den Tod hindurch ins Leben ruft.

Der Versuch, sein eigener Richter zu sein, ist nun aber schon deshalb aussichtslos, weil der Mensch ein soziales Wesen ist, das Anerkennung vor allem in den Augen anderer finden möchte. Oswald Bayer stellt fest: „Zwischen dem Urteil anderer über mich und dem Urteil meiner selbst werde ich unaufhörlich hin und her geworfen – bis zum Tod."[8] Im Tribunal der Rechtfertigungen vor anderen und vor mir selbst seine Identität zu finden, ist ein zum Scheitern verurteiltes Unterfangen. Das befreiende, das Leben ins Recht setzende Wort wird allein im Glauben an das Evangelium empfangen. So wirkt der Glaube „als Befreiung vom Zwang der Selbstvergewisserung und damit als Befreiung aus der Ungewißheit; er geschieht als Befreiung vom Zwang der Identitätssuche und Identitätsfindung".[9] Das Wort der Rechtfertigung und Vergebung, des Neuanfangs und Neuwerdens stellt das Leben aus Glauben auf einen neuen Grund: „Ist jemand in Christus, so ist er eine neue Kreatur. Das Alte ist vergangen, etwas Neues hat begonnen" (2 Kor 5,17). Was aus dem Glauben „kriecht", ist die neue Person „coram Deo".

Diese neue Person „coram Deo" ist das *wahre* Sein der menschlichen Person, die dem Urteil irdischer Instanzen und Personen entzogen ist. Denn „über das Sein der Person kann kompetent nur derjenige urteilen, der die Person zur Person macht"[10] – und das ist Gott in seiner Recht schaffenden Gnade. Die neue Identität „coram Deo" ist daher relational zu verstehen, das heißt aus dem Verhältnis der Zugehörigkeit des Glaubenden zu Gott heraus. Die Frage nach der Identität „in Christus" hat sachgemäß nicht die Form des „Wer bin ich", sondern des „Zu wem gehöre ich?" Dietrich Bonhoeffer hat diese relationale Struktur des Personseins sehr schön in seinem während der Haft in Berlin-Tegel entstandenen Gedicht zum Ausdruck gebracht, das mit der Frage beginnt: „Wer bin ich?". Er meditiert dann, inwieweit menschliche Zuschreibungen, seien es die eigenen oder seien es die anderer Menschen, die Frage nach der Identität zu beantworten vermögen. Das tastende Fragen findet seinen Gewissheit stiftenden Zielpunkt in der das Gedicht beschließenden Einsicht: „Wer ich auch bin, Du kennst mich, *Dein bin ich*, o Gott."[11] Anders gesagt: Die neue Identität „in Christus" hat responsorische Struktur. Sie verdankt sich dem Empfangen aus dem schöpferischen und rechtfertigenden Anruf Gottes.[12]

Worin liegt das Befreiende dieser neuen Identität? Befreiend ist diese neue Identität, weil sie von den Lebenslügen befreit und über die Gotteserkenntnis in die unverstellte Selbsterkenntnis führt. „Wie der Kranke, der seine Krankheit erkennt, sich in die Hände des Arztes gibt, so gibt sich der Mensch mit dem Bekenntnis der Sünde in Gottes Hand."[13] Dabei ist Sünde als Verkehrung des Gottesverhältnisses zu verstehen, die aber immer auch einhergeht mit der Verkehrung der Verhältnisse zu anderen und zu sich selbst[14] und von daher auch die Weise des Umgangs mit der eigenen Leiblichkeit und Geschlechtlichkeit nicht ausschließt. Befreiend ist die neue Identität „in Christus", weil der Glaubende durch das Wort gewandelt, genauer: dem Ebenbild des Sohnes Gottes anverwandelt wird. Hans-Joachim Iwand hat eindrücklich markiert, um welche Alternative es Luther dabei geht, wenn er schreibt: „Und so wandelt uns (Gott) in sein Wort, nicht aber sein Wort in uns."[15] Und weiter: „Will sich aber der Mensch nicht verwandeln, sondern will er bleiben, was er ist, dann wird er versuchen, Gottes Wort zu verwandeln, es umzudeuten in menschliche, sich wandelnde Meinung und Lehre."[16] Die Weigerung, sich dem neu schaffenden Wirken des Wortes auszusetzen, führt also unweigerlich dazu, dass der Mensch das Wort gar nicht wirklich vernimmt, sondern es „auflöst und zerstört, ehe es ihn trifft".[17] So ist es also gerade die Öffnung für das schöpferische Wort Gottes, das den Glaubenden zu einem Leben nach dem Willen Gottes befreit.

Die neue Schöpfung, von der Paulus in 2 Korinther 5,17 spricht, ist zwar eine *eschatologische*, eine als Verheißungswort ergriffene, aber dennoch keine erfahrungsjenseitige Wirklichkeit, wandelt sie doch den geschaffenen irdischen, sterblichen Leib, und zwar nicht mit dem Ziel der Auslöschung des Leibes, sondern mit der Verheißung, dass der *irdische, vergängliche* Leib seiner Verwandlung in einen himmlischen, unvergänglichen Leib entgegengeht (1 Kor 15,44). Die Lehre von der Rechtfertigung als im Glauben ergriffene Teilhabe an der neuen Schöpfung in Christus lässt sich daher nicht von der Schöpfungslehre ablösen und kann daher auch nicht absehen von der ursprünglichen Bestimmung des Menschen, die eben in der neuen Schöpfung ihr Ziel hat.[18] Folglich ist zu erörtern, in welchem Verhältnis die eschatologische Verheißungswirklichkeit zur geschichtlichen Wirklichkeit des Menschen in seiner auch biologisch-sexuellen Verfasstheit steht und was dies für die Homosexualitätsdiskussion bedeutet.

3. Biologische Orientierung und die neue Identität in Christus

3.1 Die ekklesiale Identität des Christen (Zizioulas)

In seiner Untersuchung zur Sozialgestalt der Person und deren Bedeutung für Gotteslehre und Ekklesiologie unterscheidet der orthodoxe Theologe John Zizioulas zwischen der biologischen und der ekklesialen Existenz der (christlichen) Person.[19] Die *biologische* Existenz ist durch die Geburt eines Menschen konstituiert und ihrer Natur nach davon bestimmt, dass der Leib das Medium individueller Selbstdurchsetzung wird, am Ende aber dennoch der Tod steht. Das liebende Begehren („Eros") und der Leib sind ihm zufolge einer tragischen Ambivalenz unterworfen. Sie ermöglichen kommunikative Akte der Beziehung und sind doch zugleich von der Sünde verderbt. Sie bedürfen daher nach Zizioulas der Verwandlung, und genau diese Verwandlung vollzieht sich in der Übernahme der *ekklesialen* Existenz, die durch die (ich ergänze: im Glauben bejahte Verheißung der) Taufe konstituiert wird. Diese neue Identität in Christus realisiert, vermittelt über das Gottesverhältnis, ein neues Verhältnis zur Welt und zu sich selber. Entscheidend ist daran für unseren Zusammenhang, dass die unter der Signatur der Sünde stehende geschöpfliche Natur die neue Existenz nicht länger *bestimmt*, sondern sie der verwandelnden Kraft Gottes anheimstellt:

> [T]he Christian through baptism stands over against the world, he exists as a relationship with the world, as a person, in a manner free from the relationships created by his biological identity.[20]

Zizioulas will damit keineswegs sagen, dass der Empfang der neuen ekklesialen Identität einer Verleugnung der menschlichen Natur gleichkommt, sondern vielmehr, dass die biologische Natur auf ihre wahre Bestimmung hin ausgerichtet wird, dass, wie wir sagen könnten, die Natur des irdischen Lebens die Natur des ewigen Lebens anzieht.[21] Für Zizioulas ist in grundlegender Weise die Eucharistie der Ort, an dem dies erfahrbar wird. Wesentlich ist jedoch auch für die von ihm entwickelte Ontologie der Person die eschatologische Struktur der Glaubensexistenz:

> [T]he encounter between the ecclesial and the biological hypostases creates a paradoxical relationship in human existence. Man appears to exist in his ecclesial identity not as that which he is but as that which he *will* be; the ecclesial identity is linked with eschatology, that is, with the final outcome of his existence.[22]

Man wird an dieser Bestimmung die ontologische und die epistemologische Ebene noch genauer unterscheiden müssen: Der *Sache* nach ist die ekklesiale Identität schon jetzt Wirklichkeit, der *Erkenntnis* ist diese Verheißungswirklichkeit aber noch nicht in letzter Tiefe zugänglich: „Wir *sind* schon Gottes Kinder; es ist aber noch *nicht offenbar* geworden, was wir sein werden" (1 Joh 3,2). Daher bleibt die ekklesiale Existenz angefochten, sie hat ihren unerschütterlichen Grund aber in der „neuen Schöpfung", die mit dem eschatologischen Kommen Christi offenbar werden wird.

Vermag man in dieser Analyse wesentliche Einsichten des Apostels Paulus wiederzuerkennen, dann wird deutlich, dass die neue Identität „in Christus" sich nicht aus einer bestimmten biologischen einschließlich sexuellen Orientierung ableiten lässt, sondern von der „neuen Schöpfung" her bestimmt ist.[23] Die „neue Schöpfung" bringt am Menschen zu Tage, wozu er „von Beginn der Schöpfung an" (vgl. Mk 10,6) bestimmt war und wovon die Leibmuster von Mann und Frau zumindest Zeugnis geben. Der Hinweis auf eine der eigenen Natur eingeschriebene, als unveränderlich erfahrene homosexuelle Orientierung, die nun eben in die Christusnachfolge integriert werden müsse, verkennt demgegenüber, dass die als Verheißung ergriffene Identität „in Christus" nicht einfach die Summe der Strebungen einer „gefallenen" menschlichen Natur ist, dass die „neue Schöpfung" also nicht dem „Anfang" zuwiderläuft, sondern auf dessen Vollendung, auf den *Telos* der Schöpfung, zugeht.[24]

Eine Verneinung der homosexuellen Wünsche, Gedanken und Gefühle bedeutet nur dann, „mich selbst in meiner Identität zu verleugnen",[25] wenn vorfindliche empirisch-biologische Begierden als konstitutiv für die Identität als „neue Schöpfung" in Christus aufgefasst und damit in einen ihnen in *dieser* Hinsicht nicht zustehenden Rang eingerückt werden. Die nüchterne anthropologische Bestandsaufnahme der biblischen Überlieferung über die Reformatoren bis hin zur modernen Verhaltensbiologie stellt die dahinter stehende Annahme in Frage, wonach menschliche Triebe sich schon dadurch als moralisch gut ausweisen lassen, dass sie der menschlichen Konstitution einwohnen und sich selbst nachhaltigen Veränderungswünschen zu widersetzen vermögen. Vielmehr ist mit der biblischen Überlieferung davon auszugehen, „dass unsere wahre Identität, das uns von Gott gegebene Lebensziel, oftmals quer liegt zu unseren stärksten inneren Trieben"[26] und der Weg der Nachfolge biblisch auch deshalb mit der Metaphorik des Kreuzes in Verbindung gebracht wird.

3.2 Sünde als Unfreiheit (Hays)

Bevor Paulus im Römerbrief das Evangelium von der Rechtfertigung des Gottlosen entfaltet, arbeitet er zunächst heraus, dass sich gerade die menschliche Begehrensstruktur zutiefst verkehrt hat, weil Gott die Menschen, da sie ihn nicht erkennen wollten, an ihre Leidenschaften dahingegeben hat. Richard Hays kommentiert:

> [T]he Bible's sober anthropology rejects the apparently commonsense assumption that only freely chosen acts are morally culpable. Quite the reverse, the very nature of sin is that it is not freely chosen.[27]

Anthropologie und Rechtfertigungslehre berühren sich in dieser Analyse: Erst die Teilhabe an der „neuen Schöpfung" befreit von der Selbstrechtfertigungsmaxime, wonach eine vorhandene sexuelle Neigung schon deshalb entschuldbar sei, weil sie nicht gewollt oder gewählt worden sei.[28] Folglich ist auch die Frage nach der Identität von Christen „so lange falsch gestellt, wie wir damit nach unserm empirischen Ich" fragen.[29] Das empirische Ich ist, wie Helmut Thielicke schreibt, theologisch vor allem relevant „als Kampfplatz zwischen dem Geist Gottes und dem fremden Geiste, in dem wir befangen sind. Unsere eigentliche Identität ist nun die vom Pneuma gewirkte neue Kreatur".[30] So ist der „vom [Heiligen] Geist erschlossene, ins Heilsgeschehen gerissene Geist der wahre, von Gott gemeinte und seinem Schöpfungsentwurf analoge Mensch".[31]

Es ist von daher richtig, wenn Sexualität und auch die Ehe als „Vorletztes" vom „Letzten", also dem schöpferischen Verheißungswort Christi, unterschieden werden.[32] Die Gemeinschaft derer, die zu Christus gehören, ist nicht aus menschlichem Samen, sondern aus dem Wort geboren, das zu hören und dem zu gehorchen ist. Haben aber Christen ihre Identität in einem Verhältnis der Zugehörigkeit, dann ist dies nicht eine ganz erfahrungsjenseitige Zugehörigkeit zu Christus, sondern – als „ekklesiale Existenz" (Zizioulas) die Teilhabe am geistgewirkten und erhaltenen *Leib Christi*. Dieses Zugehörigkeitsverhältnis ist nicht eine Option neben der Zugehörigkeit zu Christus, sondern mit dieser mitgesetzt. In der Zugehörigkeit zum Leib Christi ist der eigene Leib nun nicht länger autonomer Besitz, sondern vielmehr Ort der – eucharistischen – Hingabe an Gott (Röm 12,1). Das „Ein-Geist-Sein" mit dem Herrn (1 Kor 6,17) bedeutet unter den irdischen Verwirklichungsbedingungen der Zugehörigkeit zum Leib Christi nach Paulus, sich aller Formen sexueller Gemeinschaft außerhalb der monogamen heterosexuellen Ehe zu enthalten und so den Leib als Tempel des Heiligen Geistes zu ehren (1 Kor 6,19).

Dies mag inkonsequent erscheinen, wurde zu Beginn doch herausgearbeitet, dass das neue Sein „in Christus" *nicht* durch Leistungen des Menschen konstituiert wird, sondern durch das in der Taufe (Zizioulas) bzw. im Glauben (Luther) vernommene Wort Gottes. Für den Apostel der Rechtfertigungslehre, Paulus, beschreiben Ethik und Lebensführung jedoch nicht eine kategorial von der im Glauben erlangten Freiheit abgelöste Sphäre, sondern, wie Udo Schnelle es ausdrückt, die „Handlungsdimension der Christusteilhabe".[33] Das Leben des Christen im irdischen Leib ist Leben als Glied am Leib Christi, also ein Leben in der Entsprechung zum neuen Sein in Jesus Christus. Auch bei Luther sind die Gestaltungsweisen des neuen Lebens nicht *konstitutiv* für Gottes Urteil, wohl aber *konsekutiv* zu diesem, ist doch Gottes Wort ein schöpferisches Wort. Auch der menschliche Eros wird dann von der göttlichen Agape umfangen und verwandelt werden, denn nur

> solche Menschenliebe kann mit Christus auferstehen, die in ihrer Art seinen Tod geteilt hat, indem sich das natürliche Element in ihr – jahrein jahraus oder in plötzlicher Agonie – einer Umwandlung unterzogen hat.[34]

Entscheidend dafür, die paulinische Einordnung praktizierter Homosexualität nicht einfach als zeitbedingtes Urteil beiseite zu schieben, ist nicht allein die Einsicht, wie eng das Evangelium von der Rechtfertigung in der Argumentation des Römerbriefes mit der anthropologischen Analyse verwoben ist, sondern auch die in letzterer aufleuchtenden Fundamentalbestimmungen theologischer Anthropologie. Die leiblich-biologische Existenz des Menschen, so lässt sich unabweislich feststellen, konstituiert den Zusammenhang von Zeugung, Schwangerschaft und Geburt, anders gesagt: das Verhältnis der Herkunft von Mutter und Vater.[35] Die Form der Frage nach der ekklesialen Identität hat daher ihre Entsprechung in der Form der Frage nach der biologischen Identität: Zu fragen ist auch hier nicht „Wer bin ich?", sondern „Zu wem, zu welchen Menschen, gehöre ich?" – im Übrigen eine Frage, die insbesondere Menschen umtreibt, bei denen soziale und biologische Elternschaft auseinanderfallen. Im Blick auf das Herkunftsverhältnis findet sich jeder Mensch – ungefragt – immer schon als Teil einer Familie vor.[36] Die Tatsache des Geborenseins stellt das eigene Leben radikal unter das Vorzeichen äußerster Passivität, inhaltlich gefüllt: unter die Signatur des Werdens durch andere und der Zugehörigkeit, aus der ich mein Leben empfange. Das Eintreten in eine Generationenfolge infolge der sexuellen Gemeinschaft von Mann und Frau ist somit Bedingung der Möglichkeit von Leben und dem Leben nicht akzidentiell. Das Verknüpfungsmoment zwischen der neuen Identität „in Christus" und einer – davon zu unterscheidenden – vorhandenen oder nicht vorhandenen heterosexuellen Orientierung liegt exakt in der Bereitschaft, mich als in diesem Herkunftsverhältnis begründet anzunehmen und nicht länger – wie Kierkegaard es formuliert hat – „verzweifelt nicht man selbst sein wollen",[37] also das auch in seiner Leiblichkeit von Gott gesetzte Selbstverhältnis nicht anzuerkennen.[38]

Die Zuordnung von Sexualität und Ehebund ist von daher nicht primär eine Frage der Ethik, sondern der Fundamentalanthropologie.[39] Auf dieser Ebene hat unter anderen Bonhoeffer das Miteinander von Adam und Eva nach Genesis 2 interpretiert. Für ihn verdeutlicht die Erzählung, dass im anderen Menschen die dem Geschöpf gesetzte *Grenze* Gestalt annimmt, und zwar als ein *lebendiges* Gegenüber. Weil Grenze und Leben in der Erschaffung der Frau als Gegenüber zum Mann zusammenfallen, so ist darin nach Bonhoeffer Gottes Absicht ausgesprochen, dass „die beiden, die [doch unaufhebbar] *zwei* bleiben, als Geschöpfe Gottes, *ein* Leib werden, d.h. in der Liebe einander gehören.[40] Die Wahrheit über den Menschen liegt hier also in seiner Bestimmung dazu, einem *anderen* zu gehören und so seinen Selbststand in der Hingabe an den anderen zu haben, über sich selbst hinauszuwachsen und gerade darin sein Selbst zu sein. Das Einander-Gehören in der Geschlechtsgemeinschaft trägt jedoch einen Sinnüberschuss in sich, auf den Bonhoeffer sofort zu sprechen kommt, obwohl er jenseits der Autorenintention liegt:

> Die Gemeinschaft von Mann und Frau ist die aus Gott genommene, ihn als den Schöpfer verherrlichende, anbetende Gemeinschaft der Liebe. Sie ist darum Kirche in ihrer ursprünglichen Gestalt.[41]

Das dem anderen *Menschen* gehören ist Ausdruck eines Zugehörigkeitsverhältnisses, das die irdische Ordnung des Ehebundes transzendiert: nämlich der Zugehörigkeit zu *Gott*.

Die Ehe ist damit nicht lediglich eine unter verschiedenen im Prinzip gleichrangigen Lebensformen, sondern Gottes freie Einladung, „sich in den vorgegebenen ‚sozialen Daseinsstrukturen der geschaffenen Welt' (Ernst Wolf), die Gott in die Schöpfung hinein gestiftet hat, aufzuhalten" und zu beheimaten.[42] Als diese Einladung Gottes wird der Bund der Ehe zwischen einem Mann und einer Frau biblisch darin ausgewiesen, dass der menschliche Ehebund in Analogie gesetzt wird mit dem Bund, den Gott mit seinem Volk schließt (Jer 2,2; Mal 2,14; Eph 5,21-33). In einer aus menschlicher Perspektive kaum fassbaren Weise wird hier „die Ehe als dauerhafte und verläßliche Beziehung durch den Widerspruch menschlicher Treulosigkeit hindurch ein Gleichnis der Treue Gottes zu Menschen".[43] Dieses Gleichnis wird durch die Menschen immer wieder verdunkelt, und so erscheint erst im Licht der Botschaft Jesu (vgl. dazu Mk 10,1-9) „die Unverbrüchlichkeit der in der Schöpfung des Menschen angelegten ehelichen Gemeinschaft als Hinweis auf die Bestimmung des Menschen zur unvergänglichen Gemeinschaft des Reiches Gottes".[44] Der Hinweis auf die Ehe als ein „weltlich Ding" ist also nur solange richtig wie gesehen wird, dass der Bund, der durch menschlichen Willensentschluss besiegelt wird, kraft göttlicher Stiftung über sich hinausweist auf ein Verhältnis der Zugehörigkeit des Menschen zu Gott, worin die Bestimmung des Menschen liegt.

Die der Leibsignatur eingeschriebene Polarität von Mann und Frau weist darauf hin, dass in der sexuellen Begegnung – analog zur Nichtaustauschbarkeit der Partner im Bundesschluss Gottes – jeder Partner das je *Eigene* einbringt und im Geheimnis des „Ein-Fleisch-Werdens" (Gen 2,24) auf das Eigene des je *anderen* angewiesen ist.[45] In diesem Hinweis liegt kein naturalistischer Fehlschluss, vielmehr ist damit ausgesagt, dass die Sozialität des Menschseins dem Menschen bis in seine geschlechtliche Leibsignatur hinein eingeschrieben und dass diese Signatur von fundamentaler Bedeutung ist. Die Polarität der sexuellen Beziehung aber bildet sich im Gegenüber zweier *generisch*, nicht lediglich zweier *individuell* verschiedener Menschen ab. Gerade in der sexuellen Begegnung soll nicht das eigene Geschlecht verdoppelt, sondern es soll das eingebracht werden, was der andere Partner gerade *nicht* verkörpert. So treten in der heterosexuellen Ehe Differenz und Gemeinschaft gleichursprünglich zueinander.

Der Bezug auf die im Evangelium von der Rechtfertigung bestätigte Einladung Gottes, in der Daseinsform der Ehe zu leben, kann nicht für sich stehen bleiben, soll daraus nicht aus einer Einladung ein Gesetz werden. Ist die neue Identität „in Christus" Anbruch der neuen Schöpfung, dann muss auch die darin liegende Spannung zwischen der gegenwärtigen Verheißungsgegenwart des schöpferischen Wortes Gottes und seiner geschichtsjenseitigen Vollendungsgestalt thematisiert werden.

4. In Christus leben: Nachfolge auf dem Weg zur Vollendung der neuen Schöpfung

4.1 Auferstehung

Das neue Leben „in Christus" vollzieht sich in der Spannung zwischen dem im Sterben und Auferstehen Jesu angebrochenen und der mit seiner Wiederkunft noch ausstehenden Vollendung der neuen Schöpfung. Jürgen Moltmann hat mit Recht den dynamisch-eschatologischen Charakter der Auferweckung Jesu betont. In der Aufweckung des Gottessohnes ist nicht lediglich das Bestätigungsurteil über Jesu Tod am Kreuz gesprochen, der Vergebung der Sünden schenkt, vielmehr hat die Auferstehung ihre eigene Bedeutung im Heraufbringen der neuen Schöpfung und der ihr folgenden Ausgießung des Heiligen Geistes. Die Wahrheit der Auferstehung ist angemessen nur als „unsere Ermächtigung zum neuen Leben" erfasst.[46] Dass Jesus den Tod überwunden hat, heißt nicht weniger als dass „mitten in dieser Welt der Gewalt und des Todes" die neue Schöpfung beginnt.[47] Der Glaubende erhält Zugang zu diesem schöpferischen Handeln Gottes, dessen erster Akt die Auferweckung Jesu als ein leibliches Geschehen ist.[48] Moltmann schreibt:

> Der leiblich auferstandene Christus ist der Anfang der Neuschöpfung des sterblichen Lebens in dieser Welt. Der leiblich auferstandene Christus führt in seinem Leib die menschliche Natur in das Reich Gottes hinein.[49]

Dabei ist Moltmann klar, dass die Auferstehung eines Toten unter den Bedingungen jetziger Raum-Zeit eine logische Unmöglichkeit ist. Allerdings erschließt für ihn gerade der Blick auf das uns möglich Erscheinende die Bedeutung der Auferweckung Jesu, meint sie doch *nicht* eine „Möglichkeit von Welt, Existenz und Geschichte überhaupt".[50] Sie erweist sich aber gerade angesichts ihrer Unmöglichkeit nach den Gesetzmäßigkeiten der vergehenden Welt als ein „geschichts-stiftendes Ereignis", „von dem her alle übrige Geschichte erhellt, in Frage gestellt und verändert wird".[51]

Mit dem geschichtsstiftenden Ereignis der Auferweckung Jesu und der Ausgießung seines Geistes ist der geschichtliche Grund dafür gelegt, dass die Gemeinschaft der Glaubenden Anteil bekommt an Gottes Geschichte mit seiner Welt. Der Gott entsprechende Mensch muss für die „Handlungsdimension der Christusteilhabe" (U. Schnelle) nicht mehr Maß nehmen an dem, was allgemeinmenschlich für möglich, für richtig und geboten gehalten wird, sondern darf sich in seiner der neuen Identität gemäßen Lebensgestaltung an dem ausrichten, was der Schöpfer in Jesus Christus als „neue Schöpfung" eröffnet hat. Nur von dem alle Lebenslügen sprengenden, in der Dynamis seines Geistes gegenwärtigen Versöhnungswerk her kann eine Sexualethik, die sich dem Grundsatz „faithfulness in marriage and abstinence in singleness"[52] verpflichtet weiß, überhaupt als *befreiend* erfahren werden.[53] Nur in der Kraft der Auferstehung Jesu, der das neue unvergängliche Leben schenkt, kann auf befreiende Weise die Verwandlung einer Sexualität erlebt werden, der gegenüber eine hochsexualisierte Welt suggeriert, es könne jenseits der genitalen Sexualität keine Erfüllung des erotischen Begehrens geben.

In einer solchen Welt muss die Einladung zu einer Sexualität, die die Geschlechtsgemeinschaft ausschließlich der Ehe zwischen einer Frau und einem Mann zuordnet, als Zumutung erscheinen und kann nicht als Gewinn ansichtig werden. Aber ließe sich ein solcher Gewinn, ein solcher Mehrwert theologisch-anthropologisch fassen?

4.2 Begrenzung der Ehe

Von den teilweise apokalyptisch geprägten Endzeittexten der Bibel her lassen sich nur sehr begrenzt Aussagen der theologischen Anthropologie gewinnen. Soviel aber wird deutlich: „Ehen werden für immer geschlossen, nicht für ewig."[54] Verheiratete wie unverheiratete Christen gehen *gemeinsam* auf diejenige Vollgestalt des Reiches Gottes zu, in dem die sexuelle Kommunikation aufgehoben sein wird in die ungeteilte, keiner Störung mehr zugänglichen Anbetung Gottes hinein. Die – von Paulus nur angedeutete – Unterscheidung der himmlischen von den irdischen Leibern (1 Kor 15,39-49) verweist auch auf die irdische Begrenzung der Ehe. So erfährt die monogame heterosexuelle Ehe ihre theologische Relativierung – relativiert wird sie jedoch nicht im Verhältnis zu anderen menschlichen Lebensformen, sondern dadurch, dass sie zur Verheißung der neuen Schöpfung in Beziehung gesetzt wird. Die Signatur des Gottesreiches in seiner Vollendungsgestalt wird die „Auf-Hebung" der Ehe zwischen Mann und Frau in die „Ehe" zwischen Christus und der verherrlichten Gemeinde hinein sein (Apk 19,7). So ist die Gemeinde Jesu Christi, die auf dieses Fest zugeht, hier auf Erden der Raum versöhnter Gemeinschaft zwischen denen, die den Bund der Ehe eingegangen sind, und denen, die in gewählter oder nichtgewählter Ehelosigkeit ihr gemeinsames Ziel in der ungeteilten Anbetung des dreieinigen Gottes finden werden.[55] In der solcherart versöhnten Gemeinschaft erkennen Verheiratete und Unverheiratete, gewissermaßen auf einer höheren Ebene, das je Eigene des Anderen an, was es ermöglicht, die Bedeutung nichtgenitaler Ausdrucksformen sich selbst verschenkender Liebe gerade auch darin zu sehen, dass sie im Unterschied zur ehelichen Sexualität nicht nur auf *einen* Menschen, sondern auf eine prinzipiell nicht begrenzte Gruppe von Menschen ausgerichtet sind.

Auf dem Weg hin zu diesem Ziel der Vollendung sind christliche Gemeinden „Hospize", also Orte, an denen Verwundete Arznei erhalten und dem Arzt, Christus, begegnen. Zeit ihres Lebens bleiben Christen, wie Luther nicht müde wurde zu betonen, auf die von Christus geschenkte Vergebung angewiesen. Sie vertrauen auf das, was der Heilige Geist auch weiterhin an ihnen bewirken wird, „worin er das alte Ich zunehmend überwindet und uns mit dem neuen Leben beschenkt".[56] Das Unterwegssein des Christen bleibt bestimmt vom Ineinander der „mortificatio" und „vivificatio".[57] Die neue Identität bleibt angefochten durch Neigungen und Begierden, die sich vielleicht nur allmählich oder gar nicht umstellen lassen, die aber dem Herrschaftsanspruch Christi unterstellt und denen somit das Recht verwehrt wird, die Identität des Christen bestimmen zu lassen, und das selbst dann nicht, wenn ihnen nachgegeben wurde.[58]

5. Schluss: Anthropologische Klarheit und seelsorgliche Nähe

Kirchliche Stellungnahmen zur Homosexualität verorten das Thema weithin auf der Ebene der Ethik. Am deutlichsten wird dies dort, wo Lebensformen anhand bestimmter Kriterien beurteilt werden, als die zumeist „Freiwilligkeit, Ganzheitlichkeit, Verbindlichkeit, Dauer und Partnerschaftlichkeit" genannt werden.[59] Diese Kriterien werden nicht nur in impliziter Absicht ausgewählt (so entfällt die Offenheit für eigene Kinder, der homosexuelle Paare aufgrund fehlender biologischer Voraussetzungen nicht zu genügen vermögen),[60] sie entgrenzen – gewollt oder ungewollt – den Bereich der überhaupt zu bewertenden Beziehungskonstellationen auf problematische Weise. So impliziert keines der erwähnten Kriterien notwendig die *Zweizahl* der Partner,[61] was bedeutet, dass diese Kriterien auch in polyamoren Beziehungen als erfüllt anerkannt werden können.[62] Kein Kriterium schließt zudem die Anwendung auf enge Blutsverwandte (Geschwisterinzest) aus. So führt die Diskussion immer tiefer in die Moralisierungsfalle hinein, in der Partnerschaften aller Couleur anhand von – unsicher bestimmten – Qualitätskriterien auszuweisen haben, dass sie tatsächlich Partnerschaften sind, und es wächst ein diese Beziehungen erst recht destabilisierender Rechtfertigungsdruck. Von diesem Druck entlastet werden Menschen dagegen, wenn sie der Ehe als Einladung Gottes für ein Leben in partnerschaftlichen Ordnung folgen bzw. sich außerhalb der Ehe vom Verheißungscharakter einer Lebensform bestimmen zu lassen, in der die

Sexualität in der Vielfalt gelebter Beziehungen beherrscht wird.[63]

Geht man vom Evangelium von der Rechtfertigung des Gottlosen als „Mitte der Schrift" aus, dann wird deutlich, dass es in der Homosexualitätsdiskussion tatsächlich um Fundamentalbestimmungen der Theologischen Anthropologie geht, die zunehmend in Frage gestellt werden und die Kirchen zu zerreißen drohen. Nur von dieser Erkenntnis her lässt sich verstehen, warum die Diskussion an dieser Stelle eine Härte und Entschiedenheit bekommen hat, die bei – tatsächlichen – ethischen Fragen häufig vermieden werden konnte. In Lehre und Verkündigung sind die Kirchen der Reformation gerade von ihrem im Evangelium von der Rechtfertigung wurzelnden Selbstverständnis her zur Klarheit in Lehre und Verkündigung zu rufen. Wenn darauf verzichtet würde, mittels öffentlicher Segenshandlungen oder gar einer Gleichstellung von Ehe und gleichgeschlechtlichen Lebenspartnerschaften die der Sache nach unmögliche Kategorie „*bekennend* homosexuell lebender Christen" zu etablieren, eröffneten sich Räume und würden Kräfte freigesetzt für die unabweisbar gebotene seelsorgliche Begleitung homosexueller Menschen, an denen die Kirchen ohne Zweifel schuldig geworden sind und die angesichts erfahrener Missachtung und Verächtlichmachung nur um Vergebung gebeten werden können.

Dr. Christoph Raedel ist Professor für Systematische Theologie an der Freien Theologischen Hochschule Gießen und Vorsitzender des Arbeitskreises für evangelikale Theologie (AfeT), die Deutsche Schwesterorganisation von FEET.

Anmerkungen:

1 Wichtig in dieser Hinsicht bleibt: *Mit Spannungen leben. Eine Orientierungshilfe des Rates der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland zum Thema ‚Homosexualität und Kirche'*, EKD-Texte 57 (1996).

2 Ich verweise dafür exemplarisch auf zwei neuere Untersuchungen, die jeweils in der hermeneutischen Schlussreflexion gleichwohl für eine kirchliche Akzeptanz gleichgeschlechtlicher Partnerschaften plädieren: Martti Nissinen, *Homoeroticism in the Biblical Word. A Historical Perspective* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998); Angelika Winterer, *Verkehrte Sexualität – ein umstrittenes Pauluswort. Eine exegetische Studie zu Röm 1,26-27 in der Argumentationsstruktur des Römerbriefes und im kulturhistorisch-sozialgeschichtlichen Kontext* (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2005). Die gründlichste Untersuchung bleibt Robert A.J. Gagnon, *The Bible and Homosexual Practice. Texts and Hermeneutics* (Nashville: Abingdon, 2001). [Herausgeber: Siehe auch den Beitrag von Professor Hvalvik in diesem Heft.]

3 Eine eingehende Untersuchung evangelisch-kirchlicher Stellungnahmen findet sich bei Hedwig Porsch, *Sexualmoralische Verstehensbedingungen. Gleichgeschlechtliche PartnerInnenschaften im Diskurs* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2008) 103-138.

4 Michael Haspel, „Homophober Biblizismus. Vom sola scriptura zum tota scriptura bei der ethischen Urteilsbildung in bezug auf sexuelle Orientierung und gleichgeschlechtliche Lebensgemeinschaften", in Siegfried Keil und Michael Haspel (Hg.), *Gleichgeschlechtliche Lebensgemeinschaften in sozialethischer Perspektive. Beiträge zur rechtlichen Regelung pluraler Lebensformen* (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2000) 123-149, hier 141.

5 Sehr eindrücklich dazu z.B. das Vorgehen von Peter Dabrock, „Zum Gebrauch der Bibel in der Theologischen Ethik. Erörterungen angesichts der aktuellen Debatte um Homosexualität", *Ökumenische Rundschau* 61 (2012) 275-286, bes. 284. Zu meinem Versuch (allerdings mit exemplarischer Durchführung anhand der Frage der Ehescheidung) vgl. „Die Bibel in der ethischen Urteilsbildung. Konzeption und exemplarische Konkretion", *Jahrbuch für Evangelikale Theologie* 27 (2013) 69-122.

6 „Orientierungslinien zur ethisch-theologischen Urteilsbildung am Beispiel der strittigen Bewertung von Homosexualität in christlicher Perspektive", Texte aus der VELKD 170 (Hannover 2014) 3; Hervorhebung im Original.

7 Karl Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik* IV/1 (Zürich: Zürcher Theologischer Verlag, 1960) 241.

8 Oswald Bayer, *Aus Glauben leben. Über Rechtfertigung und Heiligung*, 2., überarb. Aufl. (Stuttgart: Calwer, 1990) 15.

9 Bayer, *Aus Glauben leben*, 35.

10 Vgl. Eberhard Jüngel, *Das Evangelium von der Rechtfertigung des Gottlosen als Zentrum des christlichen Glaubens* 2. Aufl. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999) 210-212.

11 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Widerstand und Ergebung. Briefe und Aufzeichnungen aus der Haft*, DBW 8 (Gütersloh: Gütersloher, 1998) 514; Hervorhebung C.R.

12 Vgl. Wilfried Joest, *Ontologie der Person bei Luther* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1967) 137-139.

13 Hans-Joachim Iwand, *Glaubensgerechtigkeit. Lutherstudien*, hrsg. v. Gerhard Sauter (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1980) 33.

14 Vgl. Christine Axt-Piscalar, „Sünde VII",

Theologische Realenzyklopädie 28 (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2001) 428.

15 Martin Luther, zitiert nach Iwand, *Glaubensgerechtigkeit*, 28 (lateinisch in WA 56,227,4-5).

16 Iwand, *Glaubensgerechtigkeit*, 29.

17 Iwand, *Glaubensgerechtigkeit*, 29.

18 Diese Neigung lässt sich jedoch in Teilen der protestantischen Theologie beobachten; vgl. Eberhard Jüngel, *Das Evangelium von der Rechtfertigung des Gottlosen als Zentrum des christlichen Glaubens*, 6. Aufl. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011); zur Kritik an der Ablösung der Erlösungs- von der Schöpfungslehre vgl. Colin Gunton, „The Doctrine of Creation", in Gunton (Hg.), *The Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 141-157.

19 John D. Zizioulas, *Being as Communion. Studies in Personhood and the Church* (Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1985) 49-51.

20 Zizioulas, *Being as Communion*, 57.

21 Zizioulas, *Being as Communion*, 63.

22 Zizioulas, *Being as Communion*, 59.

23 „[…] never within the canonical perspective does sexuality become the basis for defining a person's identity or for finding meaning and fulfillment in life", Richard B. Hays, *The Moral Vision of the New Testament. A Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics* (San Francisco: Harper, 1996) 391.

24 Diese These liegt auch der Theologischen Ethik bei Oliver O'Donovan zugrunde, vgl. *Resurrection and Moral Order. An Outline for Evangelical Ethics*, 2. Aufl. (Leicester: Apollos/ Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994).

25 Valeria Hinck, *Streitfall Liebe. Biblisches Plädoyer wider die Ausgrenzung homosexueller Menschen*, überarb. u. erg. Aufl. (Mering: pro literatur, 2007) 12.

26 Robert A.J. Gagnon, „Biblische Perspektiven zum Verhältnis von Homosexualität und sexueller Identität", in *Jahrbuch für Evangelikale Theologie* 24 (2010) 153-174.

27 Richard B. Hays, "The Biblical Witness Concerning Homosexuality", in Maxie D. Dunnam and H. Newton Malony, *Staying the Course. Supporting the Church's Position on Homosexuality* (Nashville: Abingdon, 2003) 65-84, hier 74.

28 "The plight of the homosexual who has desires and passions that he or she did not choose is in fact the common plight of humanity. We all face the same challenge: how are we to live when what we want is out of accord with what God tells us we should want in this life?", Stanton L. Jones and Mark A. Yarhouse, *The Use of Scientific Research in the Church's Moral Debate* (Downers Grove: IVP, 2000) 181.

29 Helmut Thielicke, *Der evangelische Glaube. Band 3: Theologie des Geistes* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1978) 52.

30 Thielicke, *Der evangelische Glaube*, 52.

31 Thielicke, *Der evangelische Glaube*, 52; im Original kursiv.

32 Die Unterscheidung von „Letztem" und „Vorletztem" findet sich bei Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Ethik*, DBW 6, 2. Aufl. (Gütersloh: Gütersloher, 1998) 137.

33 Udo Schnelle, *Paulus. Leben und Denken* (Berlin/ New York: De Gruyter, 2003) 632; dort kursiv.

34 C.S. Lewis, *Was man Liebe nennt. Zuneigung – Freundschaft – Eros – Agape*, 5. Aufl. (Basel/ Gießen: Brunnen, 1995) 136; Original C.S. Lewis, *The Four Loves* (London: Fontana, 1963).

35 Zumindest theoretisch könnte die Möglichkeit, einen Menschen durch reproduktives Klonen zu zeugen, als Einschränkung dieser Formel in Betracht gezogen werden. Allerdings basiert der Klonvorgang auf dem Einfügen von Körperzellen in eine entkernte Eizelle, die zuvor einer *Frau* entnommen wurde und dann von ihr (oder einer Leihmutter) in mehrmonatiger Schwangerschaft ausgetragen wird. Ein hypothetischer Klon wird in seinem Herkunftsverhältnis also auf eine „unvollständige Dualität" stoßen, insofern er oder sie um das Geborensein von einer Mutter weiß, die sich auch darin von den in der Lebensumwelt vorhandenen, zu Eizellenspende und Schwangerschaft nicht fähigen Männern unterscheidet. Zum Stichwort Intersexualität nur so viel: Auch intersexuelle Menschen können in der Fortpflanzung nur als Träger von Ei- *oder* Samenzellen in Erscheinung treten, sofern nicht überhaupt eine Unfruchtbarkeit vorliegt. Selbst die genetische Intersexualität generiert klar zuzuordnende Jungen (Klinefelders-Syndrom) oder Mädchen (Turner-Syndrom), weshalb der Deutsche Ethikrat in seiner Stellungnahme zur Intersexualität die Träger dieser genetischen Disposition ausdrücklich nicht weiter berücksichtigt, vgl. Deutscher Ethikrat, *Intersexualität. Stellungnahme* (Berlin 2012) 12.

36 Zum Ganzen vgl. Karin Ulrich-Eschemann, *Vom Geborenwerden des Menschen. Theologische und philosophische Erkundungen* (Münster: Lit, 2000).

37 Sören Kierkegaard, *Die Krankheit zum Tode*, übers. v. Emmanuel Hirsch, 4. Aufl. (Düsseldorf / Köln: Eugen Diederichs, 1992) 8.

38 Für eine eingehende Analyse des Gedankengangs bei Kierkegaard vgl. Christiane Tietz, *Freiheit zu sich selbst. Entfaltung eines christlichen Begriffs von Selbstannahme* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2005) 27-126.

39 So im Blick auf die Familie auch Karin Ulrich-Eschemann, *Lebensgestalt Familie – miteinander werden und leben. Eine phänomenologisch-theologisch-ethische Betrachtung* (Münster: Lit, 2005) 25.

40 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Schöpfung und Fall*, DBW 3

(München: Chr. Kaiser, 1989) 92.

41 Bonhoeffer, *Schöpfung und Fall*, 94.

42 Ulrich-Eschemann, *Lebensgestalt Familie*, 99.

43 Oswald Bayer, „Zeit zur Antwort. Ehe als freie Lebensform, Elternschaft und Beruf", in Bayer (Hg.), *Ehe. Zeit zur Antwort* (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1988) 12-28, hier 21.

44 Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Systematische Theologie Band 3* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht 1993) 396.

45 Der Begriff der Polarität ist dem der Komplementarität vorzuziehen, da Komplementarität ein präexistentes Ganzes voraussetzt, eine Vorstellung, die eher Platons Mythos von der ursprünglichen Androgynität des Menschen entspricht. Biblisch-anthropologisch markiert die Polarität von Mann und Frau ein Bezogen-Sein in geschlechtlicher Differenz in der Einheit des gemeinsamen Bezogen-Seins auf Gott.

46 Jürgen Moltmann, *Erfahrungen theologischen Denkens. Wege und Formen christlicher Theologie* (Gütersloh: Chr. Kaiser/Gütersloher, 1999) 105.

47 Jürgen Moltmann, *Der Weg Jesu Christi. Christologie in messianischen Dimensionen* (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1989) 243.

48 Nach Moltmann, *Der Weg Jesu Christi*, 279, wird der Glaube an die Auferweckung der Toten zerstört, wenn diese vergeistlicht wird.

49 Moltmann, *Der Weg Jesu Christi*, 280.

50 Jürgen Moltmann, *Theologie der Hoffnung. Untersuchungen zur Begründung und zu den Konsequenzen einer christlichen Eschatologie* (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1965) 162.

51 Moltmann, *Theologie der Hoffnung*, 163.

52 Ich entnehme diese prägnante Formulierung dem *Book of Discipline* der United Methodist Church 2012 (Nashville: Abingdon, 2012), 118 (dort als Leitbild der Sexualerziehung genannt).

53 Die griffige Formel vermag in ihrer Knappheit nicht deutlich zu machen, dass Enthaltsamkeit bzw. Keuschheit Tugenden sind, die es sowohl außerhalb wie in der Ehe zu leben gilt.

54 Bernd Wannenwetsch, *Die Freiheit der Ehe. Das Zusammenleben von Frau und Mann in der Wahrnehmung evangelischer Ethik* (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1993) 227; dort kursiv.

55 Wannenwetsch, *Die Freiheit der Ehe*, 229, spricht in diesem Zusammenhang von einer „Durchdringung der Lebensformen in der Dringlichkeit des Reiches Gottes"(dort kursiv).

56 Thielicke, *Der evangelische Glaube*, 101.

57 Johannes Calvin, *Unterricht in der christlichen Religion*, hg. v. Matthias Freudenberg (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2008) 322 (§ III.3.3).

58 Vgl. Hays, *The Moral Vision of the New Testament*, 393-394.

59 *Mit Spannungen leben*, 35.

60 Dies wird gelegentlich damit begründet, dass auch nicht alle Ehepaare offen für Kinder seien, ohne dass damit ihr Status als Ehepaar in Frage gestellt würde; vgl. *Zwischen Autonomie und Angewiesenheit. Familie als verlässliche Gemeinschaft stärken. Eine Orientierungshilfe des Rates der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland* (Gütersloh 2013) 66-67.

61 Das Kriterium „Partnerschaftlichkeit" wird als (nichthierarchische) Gegenseitigkeit interpretiert.

62 Meines Erachtens wird die Frage der Inklusion polyamorer Partnerschaften die nächste Stufe der sexualethischen Diskussion in der EKD bestimmen. Erste Initiativen in diese Richtung – auf dem Evangelischen Kirchentag in Hamburg 2013 erhielten sie bereits ein Forum – gibt es; vgl. Michael Hollenbach, „Mehr als die monogame Ehe. Wie die evangelische Kirche mit der Vielfalt sexueller Identitäten umgeht", www.deutschlandradiokultur.de/mehr-als-die-monogame-ehe.1278.de.html?dram:article_id=260748.

63 Zu Letzterem vgl. Patrick Riley, *Civilizing Sex. On Chastity and the Common Good* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000).

Book Reviews – Recensions – Buchbesprechungen

* * * * * * * *

Guide pour l'exégèse de l'Ancien Testament: Méthodes, exemples et instruments de travail
Collection Interprétation
Matthieu Richelle

Vaux-sur-Seine: Édifac / Charols: Excelsis, 2012; 360 pp., € 25.00, pb, ISBN 987-2-904407-54-3 / 978-2-7550-0175-4

RÉSUMÉ

Cet ouvrage présente toutes les méthodes exégétiques, avec un accent particulier sur les approches synchroniques. Comme le livre s'adresse surtout aux étudiants en théologie et aux pasteurs, la présentation est très pratique. Il peut être recommandé pour sa clarté, l'enthousiasme et la compétence de son auteur, ainsi que ses listes de ressources très riches et utiles pour tous ceux qui font de l'exégèse de l'Ancien Testament. Pour les prédicateurs évangéliques, son utilité aurait été encore plus grande si l'auteur avait traité plus à fond de l'analyse du rôle du texte dans l'histoire de la révélation divine.

SUMMARY

This book presents all current exegetical methods, especially those belonging to synchronic approaches. It is a practical guide, written in particular for theological students and ministers. It can be recommended because of its clear style, the enthusiasm and expertise of its author and its lists of exegetical resources (which include numerous English books and websites). The book would have been even more helpful for evangelical preachers if the author had paid more attention to the analysis of the function of the text in the history of God's revelation.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Das vorliegende Buch bietet eine Darstellung aller üblichen Methoden der Exegese, namentlich jener, die sich zur synchronischen Verfahrensweise bekennen. Es handelt sich um ein praktisches Handbuch, das vor allem für Theologiestudenten und Pastoren geschrieben wurde. Das Werk empfiehlt sich durch seinen klaren Stil, den Enthusiasmus und das Sachverständnis des Autors, sowie die Verzeichnisse reichhaltiger exegetischer Hilfsmittel, die für alttestamentliche Exegeten von Nutzen sind (einschließlich zahlreicher englischer Bücher und Webseiten). Das Buch wäre für evangelikale Prediger noch hilfreicher gewesen, wenn der Verfasser sich gründlicher mit der Analyse der Funktion des Textes in der Geschichte von Gottes Offenbarung befasst hätte.

* * * *

Dans son *Guide pour l'exégèse de l'Ancien Testament*, Matthieu Richelle (professeur d'Ancien Testament à la Faculté Libre de Théologie Évangélique de Vaux-sur-Seine, France) présente tout d'abord les approches synchroniques des textes, comme l'analyse du genre littéraire, de la structure, du contexte littéraire et du contexte canonique. À son avis, ces approches peuvent également être mises en œuvre par ceux qui n'ont pas de connaissance des langues bibliques. Ensuite, il traite d'un « second niveau » (supérieur au premier), où il s'agit d'établir le texte par la critique textuelle, de le traduire, puis d'adopter une approche diachronique (par l'analyse rédactionnelle). L'ouvrage se termine par quelques annexes qui dressent un inventaire des outils, comme les dictionnaires, les commentaires et les revues.

Il se veut un guide pratique, à l'usage des étudiants en théologie et des pasteurs. Il ne s'aventure pas dans une discussion théorique des méthodes, mais explique comment elles peuvent être utilisées. L'auteur illustre leur usage au moyen de nombreux exemples. Il offre en outre une documentation très riche et abondante des ressources dont les lecteurs peuvent tirer profit dans leur travail personnel, y compris un grand nombre de sites internet en libre accès. Réaliste, Richelle se rend bien compte que l'étudiant ou le pasteur ne disposent généralement pas du temps nécessaire pour appliquer toutes les méthodes. Il se contente donc de les informer et de les encourager, afin qu'ils puissent faire leurs propres choix.

L'auteur adhère à la théologie évangélique et le manifeste à plusieurs reprises. Néanmoins, il a voulu écrire ce guide de façon à ce qu'il puisse aussi être lu et utilisé par des non-évangéliques. Il ne cherche donc pas à présenter une méthode d'exégèse qui serait typiquement évangélique. En règle générale, les méthodes présentées ont été élaborées par des biblistes non évangéliques, mais cela ne devrait pas empêcher les évangéliques de les pratiquer.

À mon avis, ce point de vue est largement justifié. Dans toutes les méthodes, on formule des questions qui peuvent être légitimement posées dans l'étude des textes. Cela vaut aussi pour les méthodes diachroniques, dont Richelle recommande un usage modéré. La spécificité d'une approche évangélique réside plutôt dans la façon dont on procède dans le cadre de chaque méthode. Autrement dit, l'identité évangélique ne relève pas de ce qu'on cherche à savoir, mais du respect envers l'enseignement communiqué par les textes bibliques.

Ceci dit, à la différence de Richelle, j'aurais insisté davantage sur le fait que le choix et l'utilité de telle ou telle méthode dépendent du but que l'on fixe au travail exégétique. Le plus souvent, les lecteurs visés font l'exégèse d'un texte biblique en vue de la préparation de leur prédication ou de leur méditation biblique. Il s'ensuit que, pour eux, la question centrale sera : « Qu'est-ce que Dieu veut communiquer à son peuple au moyen de ce texte ? » À mon avis, l'utilité de chaque méthode dépend de sa capacité à contribuer à l'apport d'une réponse à cette question.

Par ailleurs, l'auteur souligne que l'ordre dans lequel il présente les méthodes n'a rien d'obligatoire. Pourtant, j'aurais préféré qu'on invite le lecteur à commencer par l'analyse du contexte littéraire au lieu de celle du genre littéraire. En procédant de cette manière, on peut éviter le risque de fragmenter un livre biblique, un risque réel si la première démarche est de lier le texte choisi à ceux qui appartiennent au même genre littéraire. Le chapitre sur le contexte littéraire est le plus bref de tout le livre. Il aurait été plus utile s'il avait traité plus à fond de l'analyse de la place du texte dans l'histoire de la révélation de Dieu ou de son œuvre (notamment lorsqu'il s'agit d'un récit). Comme la signification d'un texte peut se développer en fonction de la dynamique historique, cette analyse est indispensable si l'on veut entendre la parole de Dieu pour l'Église aujourd'hui.

En résumé, mes remarques critiques concernent avant tout le traitement de quelques aspects que j'estime pertinents pour la prédication (un sujet abordé brièvement à la fin du livre). À part cela, et hormis quelques petites nuances ou quelques désaccords plus ou moins inévitables, j'apprécie beaucoup cette contribution enrichissante de Matthieu Richelle. L'enthousiasme de l'auteur ainsi que sa connaissance quasi exhaustive des ressources existantes sont très stimulants. Même les spécialistes y trouveront beaucoup de choses intéressantes, tant au niveau des références que dans les exégèses présentées à titre d'exemples. Nous recommandons donc chaleureusement cet ouvrage aux étudiants en théologie et aux pasteurs, mais aussi à beaucoup d'autres.

Gert Kwakkel
Aix-en-Provence, France ; Kampen, Pays-Bas

The Theme of Hardening in the Book of Isaiah. An Analysis of Communicative Action
Forschungen zum Alten Testament 2. Reihe 39
Torsten Uhlig

Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2009; xiii + 423 pp, pb, € 84,00, ISBN 978-3-16-150143-2

SUMMARY
This Gloucestershire dissertation is a most fascinating study on the crucial idea of hardening in the Book of Isaiah. Starting from Isaiah 6 and informed by aspects of the speech act theory, Uhlig demonstrates the importance of this theme for the entire book of Isaiah. On a methodological level, this dissertation studies a prophetic book as mediating communication and thereby points out important aspects for the study of Isaiah. It also makes a valuable contribution to reflection on the unity of the book of Isaiah.

RÉSUMÉ
Cette thèse de doctorat est une étude fascinante du thème de l'endurcissement dans le livre d'Ésaïe. En s'appuyant sur le chapitre 6 de ce livre et en tirant partie de la théorie des actes de langage, Uhlig montre l'importance du thème de l'endurcissement pour l'ensemble du livre. Au plan méthodologique, il aborde un livre prophétique comme un moyen de communication et met ainsi en lumière des aspects importants pour son étude. Il apporte aussi une contribution pertinente au débat sur la question de l'unité du livre.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Bei dieser Doktordissertation aus Gloucestershire handelt es sich um eine höchst faszinierende Studie über das wichtige Thema der Verhärtung im Buch Jesaja. Beginnend mit Jesaja 6 und auf dem Hintergrund von Sprechakttheorie demonstriert Uhlig die Bedeutung dieses Themas für das gesamte Jesajabuch. Auf methodologischer Ebene analysiert die Dissertation ein prophetisches Buch als Kommunikationsmedium und zeigt dabei wesentliche Aspekte für die Untersuchung von Jesaja auf. Sie stellt gleichfalls einen wertvollen Beitrag zur Reflektion über die Einheit des Jesajabuches dar.

* * * *

Torsten Uhlig legt mit dieser überarbeiteten Version seiner durch Gordon Wenham and Hugh Williamson betreuten und in Gloucestershire eingereichten Dissertation eine faszinierende Studie zum Buch Jesaja vor. Sie nimmt ihren Ausgangspunkt bei den herausfordernden Versen aus Jesaja 6,8-10 und diskutiert die Frage der Kommunikation im Buch Jesaja unter verschiedenen Aspekten der Sprechakttheorie.

Uhlig geht von der weichenstellenden Annahme aus, dass prophetische Bücher Kommunikation vermitteln. Deswegen wählt er die Sprechakttheorie als theoretischen Ausgangspunkt, um die vielfältigen Aspekte von Kommunikation für die Auslegung eines prophetischen Buches fruchtbar zu machen. Er schließt an rhetorische Analysen biblischer Texte an und will mit seinem methodischen Zugang insbesondere alle illokutionären und perlokutionären Aspekte bei der Untersuchung einschließen. Dieser methodische Ansatz macht den Reiz dieser Studie aus, weil sie den Leser dazu einlädt, Uhligs Annahme von prophetischen Büchern als vermittelte Kommunikation durchzubuchstabieren. Dabei werden viele wertvolle neue Aspekte aufgedeckt und manches Altbekannte erscheint in einem neuen Licht. Damit leistet diese Dissertation, was man von einem wertvollen Buch erwartet: sie fordert zum Nach- und Weiterdenken heraus. Man muss nicht alle Beobachtungen und Schlussfolgerungen Uhligs teilen, um das Reizvolle an seinem methodischen Ansatz schätzen zu lernen.

In Kapitel 1 „Encountering Hardening in the Present Situation: Hermeneutical and Methodological Considerations" legt Uhlig einzelne Aspekte seines methodischen Zugangs vor. Dabei hebt er hervor, dass prophetische Bücher nicht einfach nur von Gelehrten verfasst wurden, um gelesen zu werden. Vielmehr wurden sie teilweise, wenn nicht überwiegend, zusammengestellt, um mündlich vorgetragen zu werden (20-21). Die Verschriftlichung dient der Überbrückung von räumlicher Distanz (wenn die Adressaten nicht „direkt" erreichbar waren) und zur Aufbewahrung für spätere Generationen. Wenn das Ziel häufig die mündliche Präsentation der Texte ist, dann ist es bei der Beschäftigung mit prophetischen Texten notwendig, die verschiedenen Aspekte von kommunikativen Handlungen auszuloten.

Bevor Uhlig sich einzelnen weichenstellenden Abschnitten in Jesaja 40-66 zuwendet, beschreibt er im zweiten Kapitel, „Encountering Hardening in the Past: The Communicative Situation of the Book of Isaiah", die für ihn maßgebliche Situation des Buches Jesaja. Mit der Stimme aus Jes 40,1-11 werden die Worte von Jesaja ben Amos eingeschlossen, bevor sich diese Stimme dann an seine Adressaten in Jesaja 40-66 wendet. Dabei richtet er sich in Kap. 40-55 an die Exulanten in Babylonien und in Kap. 56-66 an diejenigen, die im Heimatland verblieben sind. Diese elf Verse in Kap. 40 sind also hermeneutisch und inhaltlich von zentraler Bedeutung für das Verständnis von einzelnen Teilen von Jesaja und dem Gesamtverständnis. Diese anregende Gesamtschau könnte dann im Lichte mancher Thesen zu der Bedeutung von Jesaja 1 oder den ersten Kapitel von Jesaja, wie sie in den vergangenen Jahren vorgetragen wurden, noch einmal reflektiert werden. Schließen sich diese Perspektiven gegenseitig aus oder weisen sie gemeinsam auf unverzichtbare Aspekte für die Gesamtschau auf das Buch?

Uhlig stellt in Kapitel 3, „The Disposition of Hardening in Isaiah 6 and the Effect of Isaiah's Proclamation", insbesondere den perlokutionären Aspekt der Kommunikation heraus. Jesaja 6 *verkündigt* nicht nur die Verhärtung des Volkes, sondern mit diesem Kapitel und der weiteren Verkündigung von Jesaja ben Amos *vollzieht* er die Verhärtung des Volkes. Der Vollzug dieser Verhärtung ist ein wesentlicher Aspekt von Jesaja 1-39. Entgegen mancher Auslegungen von Jesaja 40-66 arbeitet aber Uhlig sehr treffend heraus, dass diese Verhärtung des Volkes ein wichtiges Thema bleibt. Sie bestimmt immer noch die Lebenswirklichkeit der Adressaten, was viele Stellen belegen (42,18-25; 43,8; 48,8; 56,9-57,2; 59,10; 63,17). Das Thema der Verhärtung wird also über die in Jesaja 6 anvisierte Zeit hinaus ausgedehnt, so dass es letztendlich auch die impliziten Leser umfasst. Die Verhärtung als nachvollziehbares und in der Kommunikation vollzogenes Gericht an Jerusalem wird somit Teil des umfassenden Gerichtes Gottes.

Diese Stellen spielen dann auch eine wesentliche Rolle bei der Auslegung einschlägiger Abschnitte aus Jesaja 40-66 in den folgenden fünf Kapitel: „Appointing the Hardened as Witnesses: Isaiah 42:11-44:23"; „Characterizing the Hardened before the Return: Isaiah 44:24-49:13"; „The Individual Servant and the Overcoming of the Hardening: Isaiah 49:14-55:13"; „The Hardened in the Homeland – Characterization and Reversal: Isaiah 56:9-59:21"; and „Disclosing the Still Hardened: Isaiah 63:7-64:11". Hier werden diese Stellen jeweils unter vier Gesichtspunkten betrachtet: a. Identifizierung relevanter Terminologie; b. Diskussion der Struktur der Perikope; c. Analyse der kommunikativen Handlung; d. Genauere Betrachtung des Themas der Verhärtung, welches dann auch in den weiteren Zusammenhang gestellt wird (vgl. 27).

Sicherlich gibt es viele Aspekte, die auf einer inhaltlichen oder methodischen Ebene mit Uhlig zu diskutieren wären. Für die Beschäftigung vieler alttestamentlicher Bücher, aber gerade auch für das Buch Jesaja, ist die historische Verortung des gesamten Buches und/oder einzelner Teile von besonderer Bedeutung. So könnte man fragen, welche Auswirkungen eine Veränderung dieser Verortung für das von Uhlig vorlegte Verständnis von einzelnen Abschnitten in Jesaja 40-66 und für das Gesamtverständnis hätte. In der Lektüre der Kapitel gewinnt man an mehreren Stellen den Eindruck, dass der Unterschied nicht so groß wäre. An anderen Stellen wäre nicht nur Uhligs Deutung zu modifizieren, sondern auch noch einmal manche grundlegende Annahme.

Wie auch immer man zu den einzelnen Aspekten der Arbeit oder der Gesamtschau auf das Buch Jesaja Stellung bezieht, eines scheint mir unumgänglich: auf methodischer Ebene regt Uhligs Studie zur Reflexion über das Wesen prophetischer Literatur und zum Nachdenken über diese Literatur als kommunikatives Medium an. Dafür ist dem Verfasser zweifellos zu danken.

Heiko Wenzel
Gießen

The Message of Jeremiah: Grace in the End
The Bible Speaks Today
Christopher J.H. Wright

Nottingham: Inter-Varsity Press, 2014; 444 pp., pb, £12.99; ISBN 978-1-78359-032-2

SUMMARY

Christopher Wright offers an excellent commentary on the Book of Jeremiah. It is accessible to the general reader and highlights the theology of the Book. Its particular strength is in the many practical applications that the author suggests.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Christopher Wright legt einen hervorragenden Kommentar über das Buch Jeremia vor, der dem allgemeinen Leser leicht zugänglich ist und die Theologie des Buchers herausstellt. Seine besondere Stärke liegt in den vielen praktischen Anwendungsvorschlägen des Autors.

RÉSUMÉ

Voici un excellent commentaire du livre de Jérémie. Il est accessible au grand public et fait ressortir la théologie du

livre. Les nombreuses applications pratiques suggérées par l'auteur constituent son point fort.

* * * *

For the well-known series The Bible Speaks Today Christopher Wright had already written a very helpful commentary on the prophet Ezekiel. Now there is his exposition of Jeremiah as well and again this is a very good addition to the many commentaries on Jeremiah that have been published in the last two decades (including my own in the series of Tyndale Old Testament Commentaries). The present series indeed focuses on 'the message of…' and does not pretend to offer a detailed academic commentary, but Wright's book is very useful in its own right.

In *The Message of Jeremiah* Wright shows that he has investigated the text thoroughly. He provides some discussions of the meaning of Hebrew words (which are always printed in transcription), for instance of the word play in Jeremiah 1:11-12 (56) and the meaning of the verb in Jeremiah 20:7 ('deceived, seduced, duped, made a fool of me'?, 226). The main focus of the commentary is, however, on the *theological* implications of the text and in this area Wright provides the reader with fascinating insights into the text and with many practical points for application, not least in the political and social area. This is Wright's *forte*, for his main interest is in applying the Old Testament to the area of mission and ethics. (See books from his hand like *Old Testament Ethics for the People of God*, 2004, *The Mission of God: Unlocking the Bible's Grand Narrative*, 2006, and *The Mission of God's People: A Biblical Theology of the Church's Mission*, 2010).

On the issue of the fulfilment of prophecies, Wright distinguishes between three horizons in the text: the historical context of the prophet, the New Testament and the eschatological horizon when Christ returns and God will create everything new. Not everyone will agree with some specific explanations. Wright does not accept the view that the fact that in our time the Jewish people once again live in the land of Israel is a fulfilment of promises such as Jeremiah 33 (353). On the other hand, he clearly states in an extensive footnote (335) that he is certainly not a 'supersessionist', i.e. someone who thinks that the Church has replaced Israel. On the contrary, Wright states: 'The Bible does not portray Israel being "replaced" by the church, but rather (and very emphatically in both Testaments) of Israel expanding to include the Gentiles. When I, as a Gentile, became a believer in Jesus, I did not *replace* anybody. I *joined* God's people and became a child of Abraham, as Paul told the Galatians.'

On the whole Wright has made a very good contribution to understanding the Book of Jeremiah, on the basis of the fact that he accepts it both as the word of the human prophet and as the Word of God.

Hetty Lalleman
London

The Holy Spirit: In Biblical Teaching, through the Centuries, and Today

Anthony C. Thiselton

London: SPCK, 2013; xiv + 565 pp., pb, £30, ISBN 978-0-281-06939-2

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Dies muss das aktuell beste Handbuch über den Heiligen Geist sein. Es bietet einen enzyklopädisch umfassenden, aber nicht unkritischen Überblick über die Stellung des Heiligen Geistes in biblischer Lehre (AT und NT); dabei werden die Positionen leitender Theologen über die Jahrhunderte hinweg bis in die Gegenwart dargestellt. Das Buch ist sehr gut geschrieben und enthält eine detaillierte Exegese von Schlüsselversen wie auch wohlausgewogene, ausgereifte Einsichten.

RÉSUMÉ

C'est là le meilleur ouvrage sur le Saint-Esprit que je connaisse. L'auteur passe en revue de manière encyclopédique, mais non sans évaluation critique, l'enseignement biblique sur le Saint-Esprit (dans l'Ancien et le Nouveau Testament), les points de vue des théologiens influents au cours des siècles et à l'époque contemporaine. Il est bien écrit et présente à la fois une exégèse détaillée des textes clés et des remarques pertinentes, profondes et équilibrées.

SUMMARY

This is the best textbook on the Holy Spirit that I know. It offers an encyclopaedic but not uncritical overview over the place of the Holy Spirit in biblical teaching (OT and NT), in the views of leading theologians through the centuries, and in contemporary theology. It is very well written and contains both detailed exegesis of key verses and balanced, mature insights.

* * * *

Beautifully written, this cross-disciplinary study on the Holy Spirit is one of the most comprehensive on the topic to date. Anthony Thiselton, Emeritus Professor of Christian Theology at the University of Nottingham, here succeeds in spanning biblical teaching, historical investigation and contemporary thought in one coherent account. Part I discusses 'The Holy Spirit in Biblical Teaching', Part II 'The Holy Spirit through the Centuries' and Part III 'The Holy Spirit in Modern Theology and Today'. The twenty-four chapters are equally distributed between these three Parts.

Already in the opening pages, which particularly highlight the 'transcendence' of the Spirit, it is clear that many of the book's emphases are meant to serve not only the academic conversation but also the life of the Church. The design of the book cover – with a flame of fire in the shape of a dove (or bird) – well illustrates the author's biblical- and practical-theological concerns.

Part I devotes one chapter to the Spirit of God in the Old Testament, one to the Spirit in Judaism and six chapters to the Holy Spirit in the various portions of the

New Testament. A selection of debated texts is commented on. In the opening chapter, Thiselton develops his discussion from previous work (*The Hermeneutics of Doctrine*, Eerdmans, 2007, 418) on the rendering of the Hebrew word *ruach* in Genesis 1:2 as either 'Spirit of God' (KJV/AV, RSV, NIV, along with the majority of scholars) or, less likely, 'wind from God' (NRSV, NJB). Heads-on theological guidance is provided by C.K. Barrett's biblical-theological leanings, associating God's creative Spirit (seen as 'the brooding or hovering of a bird') with 'the Spirit who will initiate the new creation in the conception of Jesus in the Virgin Mary'. As for the specific Old Testament contribution, it is argued that a major aspect of *ruach* is clearly the 'Spirit of God as *creative, dynamic, and transcendent*' (8). Old Testament themes that became the practical bases for the gift of the Holy Spirit to Christians in the New Testament include the Spirit being an agent or extension of God, perceived through the Spirit's effects, with the capacity for being '"shared out" from one figure to others' (5; cf. e.g. Num 11:25, Deut 34:9 and 2 Kings 2:15). From a systematic-theological vantage point, yet in a critically informed tone, the Old Testament writers are said to have laid the foundation for a doctrine of the Holy Trinity 'by associating God's Spirit with God himself' (4); thus understood, the Holy Spirit is not a substitute for God, but conveys God's very presence, power and love (477).

Moving on to the New Testament, the translation of another disputed text, Acts 2:4 ('All of them were filled with the Holy Spirit and began to speak in other languages, as the Spirit gave them ability', NRSV), also receives special attention. NIV here retains 'other tongues' (*heterais glōssais*), while NRSV renders 'other languages' (so also Kirsopp Lake, Donald A. Carson and Janet Everts Powers) – the implication of which by some is understood as a form of reversal of Babel. James D.G. Dunn, on the other hand, interprets 'other tongues' as *glossolalia*. An interesting compromise position is found both among certain church fathers and a few more recent interpreters, who read the passage as a miracle of hearing rather than of speaking (so H.B. Swete and George Montague; cf. Acts 2:6, 8). Thiselton indicates that we cannot in the end be certain of Luke's intention (52-54).

Biblical-theological issues continue to surface, such as suggestions concerning the compatibility of Acts 2 with 'the Johannine Pentecost' in Jn 20:19-23 (52), and, more broadly, pneumatology in Luke-Acts with that in John (131-135). The Johannine Pentecost is presented as tying 'the experience of the Holy Spirit more closely to Jesus Christ than even Luke-Acts' (144). With reference to the Johannine writings, Thiselton moreover notes, quoting Friedrich Horn, that the Spirit manifests himself '*not* in ecstatic or charismatic phenomena, but in the area of the proclamation of the word, specifically in remembrance (John 14:26), doctrine (14:26), imitation (16:13), and prediction (16:13)' (145).

Chapter 2, on the Spirit in Judaism, observes that in Greek-speaking Judaism the Spirit of God becomes increasingly *immanent*, or overlaps with the rational spirit in human beings (similar to contemporary Greek philosophy). The discussion of scholarly assertions as to whether the Spirit of prophecy was expected to be silent during the intertestamental period (cf. *Tosefta Sotah* 13:2-4) would have benefited from consideration of Flavius Josephus' important account in *Against Apion* 1.41, a passage which the book does not mention (22, 30).

Thiselton's *The Holy Spirit* typically brings a plethora of biblical and scholarly voices into sublime combinations, as in the opening section of Chapter 5 on key themes in Paul, where the Spirit's *Christ-centeredness* is addressed (Rom 8:9-11, 1 Cor 12:3-6, Gal 4:6 and Jn 16:13-14).

The historical overview in Part II treats the Holy Spirit in the Ante- and Post-Nicene Fathers, the Medieval Period, the major Reformers and the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, from Owen to Edwards. The author rightly notes how the Trinitarian formula, repeated twice in the Didache (7:1-3), 'stresses both the unity and distinction of the Trinity' (168). One of Thiselton's own major points concerning the Spirit (469-470) is already repeatedly stressed by the fourth-century church teacher Ambrose of Milan, namely that the Holy Spirit is not a creature, 'not a thing (today, not an 'it'), but a being who is of God' (197).

In Part III, Thiselton offers an exposé of representative writers on the Holy Spirit from various church traditions. Among scholars/church leaders from the early part of the twentieth century we note Henry Barclay Swete, Karl Barth, representatives of the Pentecostal movements, and J. E. Fison; from the later twentieth century to 1985 Geoffrey Lampe, Lindsay Dewar, Eduard Schweizer, John V. Taylor, James D.G. Dunn and representatives of the earlier phase of the Renewal or 'charismatic' movement. In the following two chapters, Thiselton discusses three Pentecostal or Renewal New Testament scholars (Gordon Fee, Roger Stronstad and Max Turner) and five major theologians (Georges-Yves Congar, Jürgen Moltmann, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Vladimir Lossky and John Zizioulas). Following a brief treatment of the blossoming of the Renewal movement and its 'Third Wave', other writers from the end of the century (1986-2000) are discussed (Gerd Theissen, Friedrich W. Horn and Christopher Forbes). In the penultimate chapter, a selection of twenty-first-century authors rounds off the ambitious engagement: Michael Welker, Harvey Cox, Amos Yong, Jim Purves, Frank D. Macchia, Eugene Rogers, Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, Finny Philip and Arie Zwiep.

In the constructive concluding final chapter, Thiselton's own views come to the fore in summary form. Special attention is devoted to dialogue with the Pentecostal and Renewal movements in both an appreciative and critical manner. Critical remarks include the risk of undervaluing tradition and of losing the Spirit's Christ-centeredness, but also of false prophecy (cf. Deut 18, pp. 16, 479), splits and power struggles. On the other hand, '[a]t their best, Pentecostalism and the Renewal Movement have gifts that can be shared with the *whole* Church, *if only they are shared sensitively*' (482).

Although the reader may not agree with every word of this encyclopaedic-style overview (e.g. on the inspiration of Scripture, 499-500), centuries of wisdom is collected, compared and analysed in this uniquely fabricated book, characterised by balanced exegesis and mature theological judgement. I hope it will be widely read and enjoyed.

Tomas Bokedal
Aberdeen

Sensitivity towards Outsiders: Exploring the Dynamic Relationship between Mission and Ethics in the New Testament and Early Christianity
Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 2.364
Jacobus Kok, Tobias Nicklas, Dieter T. Roth und Christopher M. Hays (Hg.)

Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014; vi + 665 S., € 114, ISBN 978-3-16-152176-8

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Der Sammelband *Sensitivity towards Outsiders* befasst sich in 30 Aufsätzen mit der dynamischen Beziehung zwischen Mission und Ethik im Neuen Testament und dem frühen Christentum. Ein spezieller Fokus liegt dabei auf der Sensibilität gegenüber Außenstehenden. Dabei wird nicht zuletzt unter Berücksichtigung verschiedener sozialpsychologischer Ansätze gefragt, wie sich Identitätsbildungsprozesse, ethische Perspektiven und das missionarische Wirken der frühen Kirche zueinander verhalten.

Trotz vereinzelter Kritikpunkte enthält der Band insgesamt ohne Frage eine ganze Reihe wertvoller und informativer Beiträge, deren Ergebnisse nicht nur das Feld der Bibelwissenschaft bereichern, sondern gerade hinsichtlich ihrer praktisch-theologischen und missiologischen Implikationen ausgewertet und angewendet werden sollten.

SUMMARY

The volume *Sensitivity towards Outsiders* includes 30 essays about the dynamic relationship between mission and ethics in the New Testament and Early Christianity. The sensitivity towards outsiders is particularly emphasised. By taking into consideration various social-psychological approaches, the question is asked as to how processes of identity formation, ethical perspectives and the missionary activity of the early church relate to each other.

In spite of some critical aspects, the entire volume contains unquestionably a broad range of valuable and instructive contributions, the results of which do not only enrich the domain of biblical scholarship, but which should be evaluated and applied with regard to their practical-theological and missiological implications.

RÉSUMÉ

Cet ouvrage contient trente contributions sur la relation dynamique entre la mission et l'éthique dans le Nouveau Testament et l'Église chrétienne ancienne. La préoccupation pour ceux du dehors y est particulièrement soulignée. En prenant en compte diverses approches socio-psychologiques, les auteurs posent la question de savoir comment l'Église ancienne considérait les relations entre le processus de formation de l'identité, ses perspectives éthiques et son activité missionnaire. Malgré certains aspects regrettables, les contributions offrent un large apport instructif et de valeur. Ainsi, non seulement elles viennent enrichir le domaine des sciences bibliques, mais elles méritent d'être évaluées et prises en compte pour leurs implications dans les domaines de la théologie pratique et de la missiologie.

* * *

Der vorliegende Sammelband geht in seinem Kern auf Vorträge zurück, die im September 2011 an der Universität von Pretoria (Südafrika) im Rahmen der „Prestige FOKUS Lectures on Mission and Ethics" gehalten und jeweils in einer früheren Fassung bereits in der südafrikanischen Zeitschrift *HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies* veröffentlicht wurden. Der von Jacobus Kok (Universität Pretoria, Südafrika), Tobias Nicklas (Universität Regensburg, Deutschland), Dieter T. Roth (Universität Mainz, Deutschland) und Christopher M. Hays (Biblical Seminary Medellin, Kolumbien) herausgegebene und annähernd 700 Seiten umfassende Band enthält darüber hinaus fast zwanzig weitere, bisher unveröffentlichte Aufsätze zum Thema. Die genannte Konferenz „revolved around the dynamic relationship between mission and ethics in the New Testament and early Christianity with a focus on sensitivity towards outsiders". Die zentrale Forschungsfrage der enthaltenen Beiträge „centered on the role that identity, ethos, and implicit ethics played in the missionary dimension of the early church" (1).

In ihrer Einleitung nehmen die Herausgeber zunächst Bezug auf einige Konzepte aus der Sozialpsychologie, deren grundlegende Unterscheidung zwischen „Insidern" und „Outsidern" bzw. zwischen „Eigengruppe" und „Fremdgruppe" vielversprechende methodische Ansätze für ein besseres Verständnis frühchristlicher Bekehrungs- und Identitätsbildungsprozesse (im Neuen Testament und darüber hinaus) liefert. Merkwürdig mutet es allerdings an, dass dabei die Grundlagen der *Social Identity Theory* (SIT) in der Einleitung lediglich gestreift werden, während die aus einer gewissen Unzufriedenheit mit SIT heraus entstandene *Dialogical Self Theory* (DST) als potentiell besonders hilfreich für die Beantwortung der Forschungsfragen eingeführt wird. Merkwürdig ist dies deshalb, weil in der Folge in einzelnen Beiträgen wiederholt an die bahnbrechenden SIT-

Studien von Henri Tajfel und John Turner angeknüpft wird, die von Hubert Hermans begründete DST aber (zumindest laut Index) an keiner weiteren Stelle Erwähnung findet. (Dass die Einsichten aus der Theorie der sozialen Identität nicht nur innerhalb der neutestamentlichen Forschung, sondern gerade auch im praktisch-theologischen bzw. missiologischen Bereich hilfreich und anschlussfähig erscheinen, habe ich andernorts angedeutet; vgl. Philipp F. Bartholomä, „The Ecclesiological Self and the Other: Concepts of Social Identity and Their Implications for Free Churches in Secular Europe", *Ecclesial Practices* (2015) [im Druck]).

Im ersten Teil des Bandes widmen sich zunächst Ehrhard Gerstenberger, Dirk Human und Gert Steyn verschiedensten Manifestationen der im Alten Testament und bei Philo von Alexandrien wahrzunehmenden Sensibilität gegenüber den „Anderen". Der zweite, umfangreichste Hauptteil umfasst dann 16 Beiträge unter der Überschrift „Sensitivity towards Outsiders, Mission, and Ethics in the New Testament". Im Fokus stehen vornehmlich die Evangelien und die Paulusbriefe, darüber hinaus werden der Hebräerbrief, Jakobus und die Offenbarung einzeln hinsichtlich ihres Beitrags zum übergeordneten Thema befragt. Der neutestamentliche Teil beginnt mit Dieter Roths Untersuchung der missionarischen Ethik in Q, daran anschließend arbeitet Ernest van Eck (unter expliziter Bezugnahme auf die Erkenntnisse der SIT) das Verhältnis von Mission, Identität und Ethik im Markusevangelium heraus. Andries van Aardes Aufsatz widmet sich trotz des Titels „Righteousness: Paul and Matthew" hauptsächlich dem paulinischen Gerechtigkeitsbegriff im Römerbrief als Hinweis auf Gottes Intervention im Interesse der Armen und Ausgestoßenen. Ebenfalls dezidiert aus der Perspektive der SIT untersucht Heike Omerzu die Sensibilität gegenüber „Outsidern" im lukanischen Doppelwerk und stellt fest, dass hier ungläubige Außenstehende für die „Christusgruppierung" als identitätsstiftende Fremdgruppe fungieren. In seinem Aufsatz zum Verhältnis von Mission und Ethik in den johanneischen Schriften wendet sich Andreas Köstenberger gegen die verbreitete Lesart, wonach die „johanneische Gemeinde" eine eher „sektenhafte" Identität pflegte und von wenig missionarischem Interesse durchdrungen war. Dagegen argumentiert Köstenberger schlüssig, dass wir es in den johanneischen Schriften mit einer Liebesethik zu tun haben, innerhalb derer Liebe nicht nur in der eigenen Gemeinschaft gelebt sondern darüber hinaus an die umgebende Welt weitergegeben wird: „(…) at the heart of John's moral vision is a call to evangelistic mission that is motivated by God's love for the world and supported by communal love and unity" (171).

Von den restlichen Aufsätzen hauptsächlich zur neutestamentlichen Briefliteratur seien lediglich die folgenden genannt: Bert-Jan Lietaert-Peerbolte sowie Tobias Nicklas und Herbert Schlögel beschäftigen sich jeweils allgemeiner und grundlegend mit der Entstehung christlicher Identität im Kontext paulinischer Ethik. Andrie du Toit stellt in seiner Untersuchung frühchristlich-paraenetischer Texte heraus, dass Christen in der Formung ihres Lebensstils mit der Reaktion Außenstehender zu rechnen hatten. Daher müsse gerade auch in unserer Zeit, wo die Botschaft des Evangeliums unter Beschuss stehe, das beispielhafte Leben als *sine qua non* gelten. Volker Rabens diskutiert die „rätselhafte" Beziehung zwischen paulinischer Inklusion und gleichzeitiger Abgrenzung von „Outsidern" im zweiten Korintherbrief. Dabei kommt er zu dem Schluss, dass das universale Handeln Gottes in Christus die Basis dafür bildet, dass die ganze Welt in die „Eigengruppe [in-group] des Heils" eingeschlossen werden kann. Gleichzeitig heißt Paulus explizit nur diejenigen Außenstehenden willkommen, die das von ihm gepredigte, göttliche Versöhnungsangebot annehmen.

Im dritten Teil („Sensitivity towards Outsiders, Mission, and Ethics in Early Christianity") finden sich sieben Aufsätze, die sich jeweils mit Stimmen aus der nach-neutestamentlichen Zeit beschäftigen, namentlich mit den Perspektiven des ersten und zweiten Klemensbriefs (Chris de Wet), der Didache (Jonathan Draper), dem Brief an Diognetus (Tobias Nicklas), den Ignatiusbriefen (Paul Foster), den Märtyrerakten (Candida Moss) und Johannes Chrysostomos (abermals Chris de Wet). Die drei Beiträge des vierten Teils arbeiten schließlich einige Implikationen für die Gegenwart heraus. So reflektiert Christopher Hays über die Beziehung des neutestamentlichen Missionskonzepts zur bleibenden Verantwortung christlicher Gemeinschaften für die Armen. Dabei treten bedenkenswerte Aspekte zu Tage angesichts gegenwärtiger Diskussionen über das Zueinander von sozialem Engagement und missionarischem Auftrag von Kirchen und Gemeinden. Nelus Niemandt gibt einen hilfreichen Überblick über aktuelle Trends im Bereich der missionalen Ekklesiologie, bevor Johann Meylahn abschließend in einem interessanten Beitrag der Frage nachgeht, welche Rolle die jüdisch-christlichen Heiligen Schriften bei der Konstruktion einer dezidiert christlichen Identität spielen können, die sich inmitten einer pluralistischen, globalisierten Welt gerade auch für den „Anderen" verantwortlich zeigt.

Der Band enthält ohne Frage eine ganze Reihe wertvoller Beiträge, deren Ergebnisse nicht nur das Feld der Bibelwissenschaft bereichern, sondern meines Erachtens gerade hinsichtlich ihrer praktisch-theologischen und missiologischen Implikationen ausgewertet und angewendet werden sollten. Naturgemäß ist bei einer derartigen Bandbreite ein gewisser Mangel an Kohärenz nicht zu übersehen. Wie oben bereits festgestellt, ziehen sich beispielsweise sozialpsychologische Anknüpfungspunkte sehr ungleichmäßig durch die verschiedenen Aufsätze und vermutlich hätten sich klarere methodische Vorgaben (auf die allerdings *bewusst* verzichtet wurde) in dieser Hinsicht positiv ausgewirkt. Als Ziel hatten die Herausgeber lediglich formuliert, „[that] this volume is to illustrate and explore the plurality of early Christian voices and the dynamic relationship between mission and ethics (inclusivity, exclusivity, and sensitivity to outsiders or the lack thereof)" (10). Diese „Pluralität der frühchristlichen Stimmen" kommt in der Tat zum Ausdruck, doch lässt sich vermuten, dass eine zusammenfassende Synthese, wenn auch herausfordernd, so doch nicht unmöglich gewesen wäre. Es hätte den Zugang zu dieser wichtigen Thematik und den (praktischen) Nutzen des Bandes nicht nur für all diejenigen Interessierten erleichtert, die vor der intensiven Lektüre eines derart umfangreichen Buches zurückschrecken. In dieser Hinsicht wird allerdings dankenswerterweise der Service eines jeweils den Aufsätzen vorangestellten „Abstracts" geboten.

Philipp F. Bartolomä
Landau, Deutschland

Reading the First Century. On Reading Josephus and Studying Jewish History of the First Century
Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament I, 300
Daniel R. Schwartz
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013; xviii + 204 pp., € 39.00, pb, ISBN 978-3-16-153331-0

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Das Buch stellt eine methodologische Debatte dar, wie eine Untersuchung über die Geschichte der Antike aussehen könnte und sollte, damit ein ausgewogener und sensibler Umgang mit antiken Texten gewährleistet ist. Anhand von Josephus als primärer Fallstudie argumentiert Schwartz, dass Diskrepanzen im Text nicht vermieden oder geglättet werden sollen, sondern dass sie bei näherer historischer Untersuchung weitreichende Einblicke in die antike Geschichte und ihrer Autoren vermitteln können.

RÉSUMÉ

Cet ouvrage traite de la méthode à adopter pour une recherche historique sur une époque ancienne et en particulier de la façon de prendre en compte les textes de l'époque. Les écrits de l'historien juif Josèphe lui servent d'étude de cas principale et l'auteur tente de montrer que les divergences ou contradictions internes ne doivent pas être ignorées ni minimisées ; elles peuvent au contraire, dans le cadre d'une étude historique minutieuse, fournir des informations intéressantes sur l'histoire et les auteurs anciens.

SUMMARY

This book is a methodological discussion on how one can and should engage in ancient historical inquiry in a way that is balanced and sensitive to ancient texts. Using Josephus as his primary case study, Schwartz argues that discrepancies within the text are not to be avoided or smoothed over, but can, through close historical investigation, provide great insights into history and ancient authors.

* * * *

Reading the First Century is devoted to the study of Jewish history in the first century AD through texts, specifically focusing on the 'questions we must ask and the conditions we must impose when deciding whether and to what extent, to accept what those sources offer' (viii). For this investigation, Schwartz takes Flavius Josephus as a case study, applying his philological-historical and source-critical (*Quellenkritik*) methodology to Josephus' extant texts. The goal of this work is to demonstrate that, while there are real difficulties in determining/reconstructing what 'really happened', the view held by many who employ the literary approach, that reasonable certainty is beyond our reach, is overly pessimistic.

The introductory chapter provides a general orientation to the reader in which Schwartz identifies the rationale for this book and his methodology. Chapter 2, 'Beneath the Text: What Text Shall We Read?', explores the process of text reconstruction and its impact on readers. Here Schwartz examines issues such as insufficient evidence, doubtful unanimous evidence, conflicting evidence, and scholarly disagreement, showing that much scholarship takes place behind the text and that there are a number of considerations needed to navigate textual difficulties successfully.

Having established the text, Chapter 3 ('Within the Text: Meaning in Context') looks to determine its meaning both in its immediate context and within the context of the work as a whole. Schwarz provides a few choice examples from Josephus in which linguistic and literary contexts from Josephus' corpus shed light on how one could and should interpret the text. The next chapter ('Behind the Text: Josephus' Use of Sources') argues that it is possible for readers to learn a lot about Josephus through an evaluation of his sources and how he used them.

Chapter 5 ('Among Texts: Rubbing Sources Together') is the longest and most in-depth part of the work. Schwartz argues that our understanding of Josephus is illuminated by reading Josephus in parallel with other texts such as Tacitus and Philo. Equally valuable is reading the parallel passages in Josephus' own work to see how his thinking changed to accommodate a diaspora perspective during his time in Rome. The difference between Josephus and other authors (including Josephus himself), Schwartz emphasises, does not undermine our ability to determine 'what really happened'. Rather, we can continue having confidence knowing that other authors concurrent with Josephus also act as witnesses to similar events (166).

As the title suggests, the final chapter ('Above the Texts: The Big Picture') provides the macro perspective to Schwartz's discussion. Here he presents his basic presupposition regarding the first century: 'It was full of conflict and contradicting tendencies, so this is to be expected in our sources as well' (168). Following from this Schwartz implores his readers to allow tensions and contradictions to remain in our interpretations and not to try to iron them out and so impose potentially foreign and damaging frameworks onto the text.

The work closes with an appendix, a translation of Arnaldo Momigliano's engaging essay, 'The Rule of the Game in the Study of Ancient History', and three small but useful indices. Unfortunately, there is no full bibliography.

This work displays a solid knowledge of Josephus, with a majority of the examples drawn from *Antiquities* 18-20. New Testament and Rabbinic scholars will also find items to engage with as Schwartz regularly seeks to understand Josephus in light of his contemporaries and later Jewish authors.

This work is very helpful for those who are interested in reconstructing history and gaining a better understanding of how one should engage sources. However, the composition of the work, which often reads like a series of discrete investigations, raises the question of whom this book is for. Although the main themes and discussion of methodology are ideal for students, it is likely that lecturers in ancient history will benefit most due to its clear progression and large number of classroom-ready examples.

One potential criticism of the book is Schwartz's depiction of scholarly positions, which he often presents as strongly polarised: those interested in historical-critical questions and those who focus on the individual views of an author (e.g. literary perspective). True, there are some (potentially many) scholars who hold extreme positions, but Schwartz is clearly not alone in attempting to walk on nuanced middle ground. I am sure that Schwartz is knowledgeable of this and it would have been a benefit to the reader for him to acknowledge those scholars who have gone before who have modelled a balanced approach and so provide positive examples of historiography in action.

Overall, this was an interesting read, and teachers and scholars engaging with Josephus and ancient Jewish history will no doubt benefit from its insights.

Sean A. Adams
Glasgow

Die Geburt des Judentums aus dem Geist des Christentums. Fünf Vorlesungen zur Entstehung des rabbinischen Judentums

Peter Schäfer

Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010; xi + 210 pp; pb, € 24,00, ISBN 978-3-16-150256-9

SUMMARY

One of Schäfer's main theses is that Rabbinic Judaism finds itself by engaging Christian doctrines and stories, by integrating some stories and ideas and rejecting others. Some Jewish ideas are reclaimed and reinterpreted. Five intriguing studies illustrate this thesis and might challenge some familiar distinctions. At least, they confirm the idea that Judaism and Christianity engage each other.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Eine der Hauptthesen von Schäfer besteht darin, dass das rabbinische Judentum sich selbst findet, indem es sich mit christlichen Lehren und Geschichten auseinandersetzt. Dabei integriert es einige Geschichten und Ideen und verwirft wiederum andere. Manches jüdische Gedankengut wird kultiviert und neu gedeutet. Fünf spannende Fallstudien illustrieren diese These und stellen bekannte Unterscheidungen in Frage. Zumindest bestätigen sie den Grundgedanken, dass Judentum und Christentum im Austausch miteinander stehen.

RÉSUMÉ

L'une des thèses principales de Schäfer est que le judaïsme rabbinique s'est élaboré en considérant les doctrines et histoires chrétiennes, en intégrant certaines histoires et idées et en rejetant d'autres. Certaines idées juives sont récupérées et réinterprétées. Cinq études intriguantes servent d'exemples pour cette thèse et pourraient remettre en cause certaines distinctions familières. Ils montrent au moins que le judaïsme et le christianisme sont en dialogue l'un avec l'autre.

* * * *

Das vorliegende Buch geht auf Vorlesungen zurück, die Peter Schäfer im Jahre 2009 an der Universität in Jena gehalten hat. Seine Forschungen zu diesem Thema gehen davon aus, dass man das erst sich langsam herausbildende rabbinische Judentum in einem „Prozess der Selbstfindung" nicht unabhängig von der Entstehung des Christentums diskutieren und verstehen kann (ix). Der „Austausch" mit dem Christentum erfolge mittels Abstoßung und Anziehung, in dem christliche Interpretationen abgelehnt und manche jüdische Elemente wieder für das Judentum reklamiert werden. Für die Beschreibung dieses Austausches ändert Schäfer im Laufe seiner Präsentation den ursprünglichen Titel der Vorlesungsreihe „Geburt des Christentums aus dem Geist des Judentums" in den vorliegenden Buchtitel.

Schäfers Schlüsselbegriff „counter-narrative" zieht sich durch seine Beschäftigung mit fünf Stellen: vom verschwundenen Messiasbaby (jBerakhot 2,4/12-14; Ekha Rabba 1,16, §51), von Rabbi Simlais Aussagen zu den Häretikern (Bereschit Rabba 8,9; Parallele jBerakhot 9,1/9-10, fol. 12d), von der Rede vom alten und jungen Gott (Mekhilta de-Rabbi Jischma'el, ba-chodesch 5 und schirata 4), von Rav Idit und den Häretikern (bSanhedrin 38b; Parallele Schemot Rabba 32,4) sowie dem leidenden Messias Efraim (PesR 34, 36, 37, §8).

Schäfers Argumentation soll an zwei Beispielen veranschaulicht werden. Die eigenartige Verkündigung der Geburt des Kindes durch eine Kuh, die Rolle des Arabers, die unübliche Erwähnung der Mutter, der ungewöhnliche Name Menahem, Sohn des Hiskijas, die Suche des Bauern bzw. Händlers nach dem Baby, sein Gespräch mit der Mutter und das sonderbare Verschwinden des Babys haben zu manchen Überlegungen Anlass gegeben. Schäfer verweist zunächst auf anerkannte mantische Fähigkeiten mancher Araber, auf mögliche Verbindungen zur Elija-Tradition (Kuh/ Ochse, dem Auffahren Elijas) und auf kontrastierende Aspekte zu der einzigen anderen Stelle, wo die Mutter des Messias erwähnt wird (Serubbabel-Apokalypse). Nach Schäfers Lesart will die Mutter Menahems ihren Sohn nicht beschützen, sondern töten. Diese Beobachtungen bringt er ins Gespräch mit Offenbarung 12, Lukas 2 und Matthäus 2 und kommt zur Schlussfolgerung, dass „die Jeruschalmi-Erzählung eine vollständige und ironische Umkehrung des Neuen Testaments ist: die muhende Kuh gegenüber dem Stern; der Araber gegenüber dem Engel des Herrn und/oder den Magiern; Windeln gegenüber Gold, Weihrauch und Myrrhe; und die mörderische Mutter gegenüber dem mörderischen König. Auf diese Weise zusammengefasst, ergibt sich eine eindrucksvolle Liste, die fast komisch klingt, wie eine Parodie der neutestamentlichen Geburtsgeschichte" (24-25). Theologisch wäre dies sicherlich bedeutsam, denn damit würde nicht weniger als der zentrale Kern der christlichen Botschaft abgelehnt. Jesus Christus kann nicht der Messias sein, „weil der Messias durch Wirbelwinde weggerissen wurde und verschwand" (25).

Der singuläre Überlieferungskomplex zum Messias Efraim weist an mehreren Stellen eine erstaunliche Nähe zu neutestamentlichen Texten auf, wie beispielsweise dem Gedanken, dass die Sünden aller Menschen und Generationen auf dem Messias liegen, die Festlegung auf diesen Weg vor der Schöpfung oder einem Thron der Herrlichkeit für den Messias als Belohnung für das Sühneleiden. Dann gibt es auch eigene Gedanken wie Gottes Vereinbarung mit dem Messias über seine Leidensbereitschaft als Vorbedingung für seine Berufung oder Gottes Warnung, die Schöpfung rückgängig zu machen, wenn der Messias nicht bereit, die Sünden der Menschen auf sich zu nehmen.

Aber vor allem gibt es bei allen Anklängen an Jesaja 53, Psalm 22 oder Johannes 1 einen weichenstellenden Unterschied: der Messias stirbt nicht. Angesichts der Bedeutung von Psalm 22 für den neutestamentlichen Bericht über Leiden und Tod Jesu und der anderen Beobachtungen sind diese Parallelen nach Schäfer kaum zufällig. Der Verfasser setzt sich vielmehr bisweilen über rabbinische Auslegungsgrenzen hinweg und übt Kritik an einer „Vernachlässigung der messianischen Erwartung" (141). Vor allem aber sieht Schäfer darin eine spätere jüdische Wiederaneignung jüdischer Traditionen, die von christlicher Seite übernommen worden waren, also eine selbstbewusste „Antwort des Judentums auf ein politisch und dogmatisch etabliertes Christentum" (178).

Vielleicht kann man Schäfers Herangehensweise nur angemessen im Kontrast zu Johann Maiers Behandlung einzelner Fragestellungen im vorgegebenen Themenkreis verstehen. Schäfer stimmt mit Maier darin überein, dass „die aussagekräftigsten Jesus-Texte (jene, die von der Person Jesu handeln) erst im babylonischen Talmud vorkommen und frühestens um das Ende des dritten bzw. den Beginn des vierten Jahrhunderts n.Chr. zu datieren sind" (*Jesus im Talmud*, Tübingen 2007, 17). Sein Forschungsinteresse richtet sich aber nicht wie bei Maier auf die Identifizierung des ursprünglichen Textes und Kontextes (also auf Fragen der Historizität; vgl. *Jesus von Nazareth in talmudischer Überlieferung*, Darmstadt 1978, 192-193), sondern auf die Wirkungsgeschichte der neutestamentlichen Berichte, also darauf „wie diese sich in den talmudischen Quellen widerspiegeln und wie die Rabbinen sie gelesen und verstanden haben mögen" (Schäfer, 18 Fn. 25).

Die beiden Deutungsmöglichkeiten zeichnen sich also nicht zuletzt durch verschiedene Forschungsinteressen, Fragerichtungen und damit verbundenen Voraussetzungen aus. Maier richtet sich in erster Linie auf den Quellenwert des Talmuds für die Erforschung der historischen Jesus sowie darauf, den ursprünglichen Text des jeweiligen Abschnittes im Talmud zu identifizieren. Sein Vorgehen ist von der Überzeugung geprägt, dass „jüdischerseits grundsätzlich kein Anlaß zu einer besonderen Beschäftigung mit dem Christentum" besteht (Maier, 6). Er kommt zu der Schlussfolgerung, dass kein Hinweis auf Jesus im Talmud für die tannaitische Zeit (also bis ca. 220 n.Chr.) als gesichert gelten kann, wenn es um den ursprünglichen Text und Kontext geht (Maier, 268-269). In seiner Rekonstruktion der Traditionsgeschichte geht er von späteren Zuspitzungen vieler „Jesus"-Stellen aus, welche aber ursprünglich nicht aus einer Konfrontation mit Christen entsprungen sind. Spannungen und Ungereimtheiten stellt er der mangelnden Intelligenz der Handelnden in Rechnung und setzt voraus, dass bisweilen „die Redaktoren des Talmud Babli nicht recht wußten, was sie taten", als sie den Namen Jesu eintrugen (271).

Auf der anderen Seite konzentriert sich Schäfer auf die Wirkungsgeschichte der Talmudstellen und vor allem auf die Frage, was die Hinweise auf Jesus bzw. mögliche Jesus-Stellen inhaltlich kommunizieren wollten. Schäfer setzt dabei „eine wesentlich ungebrochene Textgeschichte" (*Jesus im Talmud*, 283) voraus, wogegen Maier mit der rekonstruierten Traditionsgeschichte einen größeren Bruch im Mittelalter annimmt. Nach Schäfer ist es schwer nachzuvollziehen, dass nahezu zeitgleich Redaktoren sich frei fühlten Jesus in die Manuskripte aufzunehmen, während christliche Zensoren alles taten, um eine Identifizierung zu verhindern.

Die vorliegenden Studien stellen dabei eine Art Zwischenbericht dar, da Schäfer an diesen Themen noch weiter forscht. Er spricht von einem Versuchsballon, den er der Öffentlichkeit vorlegt (xi). Diese Studien erreichen wohl vieles: sie provozieren, weil sie etablierte Meinungen und „bewährte" Denkmuster und Verbindungen hinterfragen. Sie regen auch zur Diskussion an, weil hier einer querdenkt. Auf jeden Fall liegt mit diesem Buch eine Einladung vor, das Verhältnis von entstehendem Judentum und Christentum aus einem anregend anderen Blickwinkel zu betrachten.

Schäfer beschreibt komplexe Prozesse, dynamische Entwicklungen. Demgegenüber wirkt Maiers Rekonstruktion oft linear, stringent und leicht nachvollziehbar. Dies mag als wissenschaftliche Rekonstruktion überzeugen, aber Schäfers Herangehensweise mag die subtilere Wirklichkeit besser abbilden. Auf jeden Fall wirft dieses Buch die Frage auf, wer die Beweislast trägt: muss man den Bezug auf Jesus beweisen oder widerlegen?

Judentum und Christentum stehen auf jeden Fall nicht als statische Größen nebeneinander, „sondern als dynamische, lebendige Kräfte, die in ständigem Austausch miteinander standen" (178). Unter diesem Gesichtspunkt lohnt es sich Schäfers anregenden Veröffentlichungen immer wieder zu Rate zu ziehen.

Heiko Wenzel
Gießen

Evangelicalism and Fundamentalism in the United Kingdom during the Twentieth Century

David Bebbington and David Ceri Jones (eds)

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013; xi + 409 pp., £75, hb / Kindle £39.48; ISBN 978-0-19-966483-2

SUMMARY

The essays contained in this book concern the relationship between UK fundamentalism and evangelicalism in the twentieth century. Some fascinating insights and characters emerge in these pages. The main argument is well captured in the introductory essay: 'that while fundamentalism certainly existed in the United Kingdom in the twentieth century, it would be a mistake to see evangelicalism as merely the local expression of global fundamentalism'. Bebbington and Ceri Jones conclude that fundamentalism was only a small part of 'the broad spectrum of British evangelicalism'.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Die in diesem Band enthaltenen Aufsätze betreffen die Beziehung zwischen britischem Fundamentalismus und Evangelikalismus im 20. Jahrhundert. Dabei tauchen in den Seiten anziehende Einblicke und Charaktere auf. Das Hauptargument wird im einführenden Aufsatz treffend ausgedrückt: „dass, während es gewiss in Groß Britannien im 20. Jahrhundert Fundamentalismus gab, es falsch wäre, Evangelikalismus nur als lokale Spielart eines globalen Fundamentalismus zu sehen". Bebbington und Ceri Jones schlussfolgern, dass der Fundamentalismus nur einen kleinen Teil „des breiten Spektrums des britischen Evangelikalismus" ausmacht.

RÉSUMÉ

Les contributions produites dans ce livre portent sur la relation entre le fondamentalisme et le mouvement évangélique en Grande-Bretagne au xx^e^ siècle. Des remarques perspicaces et des personnages fascinants apparaissent au fil de ces pages. L'argument principal est bien exposé dans l'introduction : bien que le fondamentalisme ait été réellement présent en Grande-Bretagne au xx^e^ siècle, il serait erroné de considérer le mouvement évangélique comme la simple expression locale du fondamentalisme. Bebbington et Ceri Jones concluent que le fondamentalisme ne constituait qu'une petite partie du spectre plus large du mouvement évangélique britannique.

* * * *

It is always fascinating to read a work of church history that covers a well-known period – and all the more so for one who has lived through some of it. The twentieth century is already far enough removed to be viewed as a distinct period for study; for some of us it is living history as well. This reviewer, like many who will read this volume, was himself a participant observer in at least some of the debates and events recorded here and even discussed them with several of the contributors.

Bebbington and Ceri Jones collected a team of 18 authors and tasked them with reflecting on the relationship between UK fundamentalism and evangelicalism in the twentieth century. What a good and interesting job they make of it! The catalyst was a research project in 2008-2009 under the auspices of the Religion and Society Programme of the Arts and Humanities Research Council and the Economic and Social Research Council. On another level, however, these essays are also a response to growing concerns in the media and political life about the term 'fundamentalism' – particularly by religious groups which wish to dissociate themselves from its pejorative connotations. The vexed relationship between fundamentalism (viewed as bad) and evangelicalism (seen as much better) is explored through apt soundings from the histories of several UK denominations: the Church of England (Atherstone and Chapman), Methodism (Wellings), Baptists (Bebbington), the Brethren (Grass), Free Methodism (Tidball), Pentecostalism (Kay) and the newer churches (Goodhew). Accounts of some of the higher profile evangelical leaders of the century also feature, including Martin Lloyd Jones (Ceri Jones), Billy Graham (Randall) and John Stott (Chapman). Graham's journey to embrace an inclusive evangelical ecumenism is well documented by Randall who observes: '… It was to be his wholehearted commitment to evangelism that would, to a large extent, cause him to question the fundamentalism in which he had been nurtured.' The influence of John Stott's personal theological journey, including his growing commitment to social action, on a generation of post-war evangelicals, is also well tracked here. One consequence of Stott's engagement with critics such as Michael Ramsey and James Barr was, it is well argued, the emergence of a more thoughtful evangelicalism; one which happily differentiated itself from fundamentalism.

Some fascinating insights emerge in these pages. Among them are the following: 1) The concept of 'biblical inerrancy' has largely remained a US phenomenon which has not transferred well to the UK scene. 2) There are some disturbing examples of a frankly racist linking of the Kaiser's war machine with German schools of higher criticism – both seen as 'proofs' of German arrogance. 3) Some UK Brethren churches shipped off into backwaters leaders whose fundamentalism might otherwise have been far more damaging to the gospel's credibility in the UK. 4) Elizabeth Morton's somewhat naïve conviction that problems in the realms of agriculture, finance business and religion could all be solved by 'a rediscovery of the Bible and a revival of Bible belief'. 5) The persistent influence of anti-Catholicism and of campaigns against its 'dark and manipulative influences' over the period. 6) The emotive force of aggressive, anti evolutionary presuppositions. 7) 'World-class scholars' such F.F. Bruce, George Beasley-Murray, I. Howard Marshall and N.T. Wright were 'completely unembarrassed by either their evangelical faith or their higher critical tools' (Holmes). Other essays paint interesting pictures of such diverse characters as the forthright Ulster evangelist W.P. Nicholson, the writer Elizabeth Morton and the suffragette Christabel Pankhurst. For me the highlight of the book was a beautifully written piece that brilliantly brings to life one Thomas Whitelaw of Kilmarnock (Dickson).

The common strand throughout this volume is well captured in its introductory essay: '... [W]hile fundamentalism certainly existed in the United Kingdom in the twentieth century, it would be a mistake to see evangelicalism as merely the local expression of global fundamentalism'. Warner, in a perceptive analysis of 'fundamentalizing tendencies' within UK evangelicalism, examines the many Evangelical Alliance bases of faith and argues convincingly that: '... While all fundamentalists are evangelical, not all evangelicals are fundamentalist.' Holmes' summary of fundamentalism as '... suspicion of higher biblical criticism; an unwavering commitment to separatist ecclesiology; a basically reactive theological method; and a form of culture-denying eschatology' is convincing. Especially when weighed against the many examples to be found in these pages of evangelicals demonstrating quality scholarship, healthy ecumenism, creative apologetics and world-affirming social action, Bebbington's and Ceri Jones's conclusion is sound: 'The fundamentalists occupied only a narrow space towards one end of the broad spectrum of British evangelicalism.'

Michael Bochenski
Rugby, England

Mothering the Fatherland: A Protestant Sisterhood Repents for the Holocaust
George Faithful

New York: Oxford University Press, 2014; 270 pp, hb, £ 42.99, ISBN 978-0-19-936346-9

SUMMARY

This book provides a critical history of the Protestant Sisterhood of Mary (Marienschwester) in post-war Germany. Faithful portrays the founder, Basilea Schlink, and analyses her theology of guilt which became the basis for the movement. The in-depth book is also relevant for its insights into post-war Germany and into modern monastic movements.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Das vorliegende Buch präsentiert eine kritische Deutung der Geschichte der Evangelischen Marienschwesternschaft im Nachkriegsdeutschland. Faithful porträtiert die Gründerin, Basilea Schlink, und analysiert ihre Theologie der Schuld, welche zur Grundlage für die Bewegung wurde. Das sorgfältige Werk ist gleichfalls von Bedeutung wegen seiner Einblicke in das Deutschland der Nachkriegszeit und in jüngere monastische Bewegungen.

RÉSUMÉ

Voici un ouvrage d'histoire critique consacré à la communauté des sœurs protestantes de Marie (*Marienschwester*) dans l'Allemagne de l'après-guerre. Faithful dresse un portrait de la fondatrice, Basilea Schlink, et analyse sa théologie de la culpabilité qui a été fondamentale pour le mouvement. Cette étude approfondie présente aussi l'intérêt de porter un regard pénétrant sur l'Allemagne de l'après-guerre, ainsi que sur les mouvements monastiques modernes.

* * * *

This is a compelling examination by George Faithful of the Evangelical Sisterhood of Mary (Marienschwester) which was formed in Germany in 1947. Under the leadership of Mother Basilea Schlink (born Klara Schlink) and Erika Madauss the members of this German Protestant sisterhood took vows of poverty, chastity and obedience to do penance for Christian anti-Semitism. They saw themselves as embracing lives of radical repentance for the sins of the German people. Schlink had taught German, psychology and church history, and had subsequently studied philosophy, before taking her vows. From the 1950s she became a prolific author, and a number of her books have been very widely read.

George Faithful is a historical theologian with an interest in tracing the interrelationship between different branches of Christianity and between Christianity and other religions. He studied German and religion at Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, USA, and his PhD, on which this book is based, is from Saint Louis University.

The book is in three parts. The first part, 'Protestant Guilt', has chapters which examine guilt in Klara Schlink's thought, 1920-1947; public confessions of

German national guilt, 1945-1947; and Mother Basilea Schlink's theology of guilt. The second part, entitled 'They, the Peoples', has two chapters, on the development of *Volk* and on Schlink's pseudo-Judaic, Germanic vision of nationhood. Part three, 'Repenting for others', has chapters that deal with defining repentance in Schlink's theology; Schlink and the Sisters' repentance as a priestly and monastic service; the place of gender in Schlink and the Sisters' repentance; and the creation of sacred space in Schlink and the Sisters' repentance. There are seventeen helpful photographs of the history of the community, including the early years of the founding mothers.

Faithful has a short 'Caution to the Reader' in which he says that his conclusions have met with some controversy in the Evangelical Sisterhood of Mary. At the same time he makes clear his standpoint with these words: 'My argumentation, analysis and methodologies should not distract from this work's heart: the story of a handful of women who courageously and creatively pursued love and peace in a time of hatred and war.'

Other books about the Sisterhood have been produced, some overly sympathetic and some overly hostile. Faithful is particularly to be recommended for the thoroughness of his research and for his sympathetic, yet not uncritical analysis of Basilea Schlink's spiritual vision and the development of the community. The study is set in the context of post-war German religious life and illuminates that period in a fresh way.

The subject of guilt and repentance is a central theme in the Sisterhood and that is rightly reflected in the book. However, the subtitle, 'A Protestant Sisterhood Repents for the Holocaust', does not do justice to the breadth of material covered in this book, including as it does issues of monastic identity, gender and sacred space. For all those who have an interest in expressions of communal Christian life in post-war Europe, as well as those who wish to understand more about Germany's 'wrestling with the past', this book about a remarkable group of Protestant women who came together to live in repentance is essential reading.

Ian M. Randall
Histon near Cambridge, UK

Veränderte Landkarten. Auf dem Weg zu einer polyzentrischen Geschichte des Weltchristentums. Festschrift für Klaus Koschorke zum 65. Geburtstag

Ciprian Burlacioiu and Adrian Hermann (eds)

Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2013; lxi + 414 S., geb., € 98; ISBN 978-3-447-06967-0

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Die Festschrift reflektiert den Umbruch von einer eurozentrischen zu einer globalen und polyzentrischen Kirchengeschichtsschreibung. Sie würdigt damit den Ansatz des Münchener Kirchenhistorikers Klaus Koschorke, der die „Außereuropäische Christentumsgeschichte" zum Hauptthema seiner Forschung gemacht hat. Siebundzwanzig Aufsätze in Deutsch und Englisch beleuchten das Thema in interdisziplinärer Perspektive. Besonderes Interesse gilt dabei dem Aufbruch der Kirchen des Südens und der Bewertung damit verbundener Phänomene in der Spannung zwischen universalen und lokalen theologischen und ethischen Maßstäben.

RÉSUMÉ

Ce *Festschrift* se démarque des études d'histoire de l'Église euro-centriques en abordant l'histoire de l'Église de manière globale et polycentrique. Il prend en compte l'approche de l'historien de l'Église munichois Klaus Koschorke qui s'est principalement consacré à la recherche sur l'histoire du christianisme en dehors de l'Europe. Le sujet est traité en vingt-sept contributions, en allemand et en anglais, dans une perspective interdisciplinaire. Les auteurs s'intéressent particulièrement à l'élan nouveau qui caractérise les Églises des pays du Sud et cherchent à apprécier ce phénomène en rapport avec la tension entre les normes théologiques et éthiques universelles et locales.

SUMMARY

The present *Festschrift* reflects the change from a eurocentric to a polycentric, global church historiography. It recognises the approach of the Munich church historian Klaus Koschorke who chose the "History of extra-European Christianity" as the main topic of his research. Twenty-seven essays in German and English elucidate the subject matter from an inter-disciplinary perspective. The authors' particular interest is focused on the outset of the churches of the South and the evaluation of its consequences in the tension between universal and local theological and ethical norms.

* * * *

Dass „Kirchengeschichte als Missionsgeschichte" gelesen werden kann, hat die gleichnamige Buchreihe von Heinzgünther Frohnes und Hans Werner Gensichen in den 1970er Jahren gezeigt. Der Münchener Kirchengeschichtler Klaus Koschorke, dem die vorliegende Festschrift gewidmet ist, hat diesen Faden in den 1990er Jahren wieder aufgegriffen – allerdings in umgekehrter Perspektive einer Missionsgeschichte als „Außereuropäische Christentumsgeschichte". Dabei geht es Koschorke „weniger [um] die einzelnen westlichen Sendungsveranstaltungen als vielmehr die Geschichte des Christentums im Kontext unterschiedlicher außereuropäischer Gesellschaften und Kulturen" (xviii). Damit stellt sein Ansatz das deutschsprachige Pendent zum Projekt der „Study of Christianity in the Nonwestern World" des Edinburgher Missionshistorikers Andrew F. Walls dar, das dieser bereits in den 1980ern angestoßen hatte. Anregungen für Koschorke kamen sowohl aus der ökumenischen Arbeit von Kirchengeschichtlern aus der Dritten Welt (vgl. den Aufsatz von

Roland Spliesgart zur Kirchengeschichtsschreibung in Lateinamerika in der Festschrift) als auch aus eigenen Erfahrungen als Dozent in Sri Lanka in den 1980er Jahren. Die Wahrnehmung „veränderter Landkarten“ und polyzentrischer Interaktionen bildet seitdem den Mittelpunkt von Koschorkes Forschungen und Veröffentlichungen. Ein Meilenstein war die Herausgabe des kirchengeschichtlichen Quellenbands zur Außereuropäischen Christentumsgeschichte im Jahr 2004. Diese und weitere Hintergründe zu Leben und Werk Koschorkes bietet die Einleitung (xi-xlvii).

Die Festschrift hat drei Teile und enthält 27 in Deutsch und Englisch verfasste Beiträge, die interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf die „veränderte Landkarte“ bieten. Teil I thematisiert „Antike und Frühmittelalter“ und macht deutlich, dass „Polyzentrismus“ bereits ein „Merkmal der frühen Christentums“ war (A.M. Richter), Hippolyt eine räumlich-geographische Dimension der Geschichtsschreibung entwickelte (M. Wallraff) und die Kirchenvisitationen des nestorianischen Patriarchen Mar Aba I. als polyzentrische Aktivität gelesen werden können (C. Rammelt).

Der wesentlich umfangreichere Teil II zu Neuzeit und Moderne beginnt im 17. Jahrhundert mit brasilianischem Katholizismus (J. Meier), katholischer Mission auf den Philippinen (M. Delgado) und gegenseitigen Wahrnehmungen von Protestanten und Orthodoxen in Siebenbürgen (A. Müller) und reicht bis zum kirchlichen Politikverbot für katholische Priester im 20. Jahrhundert (A. Lampe). Dazwischen liegen Studien zu Thomaschristen in Indien (M. Tamcke), Defoes Robinson Crusoe (R. Fox Young), kirchlichen Interaktionen zwischen den Philippinen und Ceylon (A. Hermann) sowie zu Frauen in Westafrika (E.P. Mogase und F. Ludwig) und in Japan (C. Burger). Eine spannende Kontroverse zum „Southern Shift of Christianity“ greift Paul Giffords Studie zu den nigerianischen „Mountain of Fire and Miracles Ministries“ (MFM) auf – die mit 100.000 Gottesdienstbesuchern angeblich größte „single congregation“ in Afrika. Gifford kritisiert die These, dass die wachsende südliche Christenheit biblischer und zukunftsfähiger sei als das liberale westliche Christentum. Für die MFM und ihren Leiter D.K. Olukoya sei das Erreichen irdischen Glücks und der Kampf gegen böse Geister wie sogenannten „marine spirits“ zentral. Neben der Betonung geistlicher Wiedergeburt und einer rigorosen persönlichen Ethik gehöre dazu auch die Umkehrung von Flüchen, die zum Tod des Senders führen sollen („killing the sender“). Gifford sieht darin ein verzaubertes Christentum („enchanted Christianity“), dass sich mit der theologischen und wissenschaftlichen Rationalität der Moderne nicht vereinbaren lasse („unbridgeable“). Das Konzept von „multiple modernities“ lehnt Gifford ab, auch christliche Hoffnungen auf eine „reverse mission“ im Westen hält er für verfehlt.

Solche grundsätzlichen Überlegungen leiten zu den „systematischen und theoretischen Perspektiven“ von Teil III über. Den Auftakt macht die ethnologische Einsicht, dass das Konzept von *einem* globalen Christentum angesichts vielfältiger lokaler Christentumsvarianten diskussionsbedürftig ist (P. J. Bräunlein). Dass diese Vielfalt sich auch in der Kirchengeschichtsschreibung auswirkt, zeigt Andreas Heusser am Beispiel des afrikanischen Theologen und Historikers Ogbu U. Kalu. Heuser entdeckt „eigensinnige“ und widersprüchliche Tendenzen im Werk Kalus, der für eine christozentrische und zugleich politische afrikanische Kirchengeschichtsschreibung plädierte und Konstruktionen vornahm, „die den Quellenbefund überdehnt“ haben. Heuser nimmt diese dennoch ernst: sie regen „einen abermaligen Erzählgang“ an. Elizabeth Koepping warnt davor, in der interkulturellen Kirchengeschichtschreibung einen Kulturbegriff zu übernehmen, der durch die Brille von lokalen Eliten und Mächtigen definiert wird: „the culture … used by those silencing others, is usually that of the particular elite within the institution“ (320). Ein solcher Kulturbegriff verdecke die Spannungen innerhalb von Kulturen und ignoriere unterdrückte Minoritäten oder Frauenrechte. Auch der Systematiker Wolfgang Lienemann wirft der „interkulturellen Theologie“ einen unkritischen Umgang mit kultureller Vielfalt vor. Zwar gelte es in Dogmatik und Ethik eurozentrische Engführungen aufzudecken, wenn jedoch die Suche nach „übergreifenden Standards“ aufgegeben werde (367), drohe das „Ende der Möglichkeit einer theologischen Verständigung“ (363).

Der abschließende Aufsatz des Edinburgher Missionsgeschichtlers Brian Stanley fragt nach der Zukunftsfähigkeit von „mission studies“ im wissenschaftlichen Betrieb. Er erinnert daran, dass die traditionelle Missionsgeschichte („[it] was not necessarily bad or narrowly conceived“) einen wesentlichen Anteil am Aufkommen profanhistorischer regionaler Studien wie der African Studies hatte. Inzwischen seien die Quellen der christlichen Missionsgeschichte längst ein multidisziplinär begehrter Forschungsgegenstand. Die Missiologen selbst würden dabei zur „endangered academic species“ (413) doch sie hätten die Chance, sich in diesem Feld neu zu arrangieren ohne ihren theologisch geprägten Ansatz preiszugeben. Im Unterschied zu Gifford sieht Stanley die „reverse mission“ aus dem Süden als Chance „to explore the new territories of the spiritually frozen northern hemisphere“ (414).

Die vorliegende Festschrift hat spannende und hochkarätige Beiträge versammelt, die relevante Fragen im Zusammenhang der globalen „veränderten Landkarten“ der Kirchengeschichte reflektieren. Dass die Gesamtperspektive des Bands dabei nicht immer so global ist, sondern beispielsweise Nordamerika und oder die afrikanischen Migrationskirchen in Europa ausgeblendet bleiben, wird von den Herausgebern selbstkritisch eingeräumt (xl). In der Bewertung der Phänomene wird mit Recht nach universalen Maßstäben gesucht, dabei zeigt sich jedoch eine gewisse kulturelle Einseitigkeit, die zwar berechtigte kritische Anfragen an Phänomene aus dem globalen Süden stellt, aber zu selektiv bleibt (was Gifford auch einräumt) und die umkehrte Kritik kaum einbezieht. Hier bildet der Beitrag Stanleys eine Ausnahme und Anregung, die Diskussion auf einer breiteren Basis fortzusetzen.

Friedemann Walldorf, Gießen

The Fire that Consumes: A Biblical and Historical Study of the Doctrine of Final Punishment, third edition

Edward William Fudge

Cambridge: Lutterworth Press, 2012; xxiv + 417 pp, pb., £30.50; ISBN 978-0-7188-9270-8

RÉSUMÉ

Cette troisième édition de l'ouvrage de Fudge prend en compte les débats récents à propos de la doctrine de l'enfer et du jugement dernier parmi les évangéliques. Fudge répond aussi à certains de ses critiques. Il argue que la doctrine traditionnelle qui présente l'enfer comme un tourment éternellement conscient n'est pas biblique et défend une doctrine de l'immortalité conditionnelle qu'il distingue de l'annihilationisme. Le livre demeure un ouvrage de référence.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Diese dritte Ausgabe des Buches von Fudge berücksichtigt die neueren Diskussionen unter Evangelikalen über die Lehre von Hölle und jüngstem Gericht. Fudge geht auch auf einige seiner Kritiker ein. Er vertritt den Standpunkt, dass die traditionelle Doktrin von der Hölle als Ort ewiger, bewusster Qual unbiblisch ist und befürwortet stattdessen die Lehre einer bedingten Unsterblichkeit; dies unterscheidet er von einem Annihilationismus [vollständige Vernichtung]. Das Buch ist nach wie vor ein Standardwerk.

SUMMARY

This third edition of Fudge's book takes into account recent discussions relating to the doctrines of hell and final judgement among evangelicals. Fudge also engages with some of his critics. He argues that the traditional doctrine of hell as eternal conscious torment is unbiblical and he instead advocates a doctrine of conditional immortality; this he distinguishes from annihilationism. The book remains a standard text.

*　*　*　*

This is the third edition of Edward Fudge's book, first published in 1982. Since then the discussions relating to the doctrines of hell and final judgement have become much more widespread among evangelicals. In this latest edition much of this recent writing has been incorporated into the argument. Fudge also takes the opportunity to engage with some of his earlier critics, so a new edition is to be welcomed.

The essential argument of the book is that the traditional doctrine of hell as eternal conscious torment does not represent a faithful exposition of Scripture, but rests on non-biblical presuppositions, primarily arising from the Platonic concept of the immortality of the soul. Fudge advocates a doctrine of conditional immortality, a view which has gained ground within recent evangelical scholarship. The author clearly differentiates his view from what is popularly referred to as annihilationism. The problem with this is that it can undermine the clear biblical teaching on final judgement. Fudge clearly articulates a view which gives space for hell as the outworking of God's justice and which would entail final judgement. The final consequence of that judgement would be the withholding of the gift of immortality; the final fate of the wicked is thus destruction. That this position will be familiar to many today is largely down to the way in which Fudge and others have argued the case over recent decades.

The book divides into two sections. The first involves a good deal of serious biblical exegesis, referring to Old and New Testament. Chapters cover the meaning of *aiōnios*, usually translated as eternal, Sheol, and the teaching of Jesus. There is much valuable work here, not least in the discussion about the way in which the adjective 'eternal' is used with reference to the following action. This discussion goes well beyond the debate regarding quality versus quantity and explores the way in which the language is employed.

The second section of the book examines the doctrine of hell as expressed by key figures throughout church history. One of the key intentions is to trace the influence of Platonic thought from the early church through to the Reformers and then into modern fundamentalism. The summaries are well written and offer a clear and concise history of the way in which differing authors express this. The differences between Luther and Calvin, and how this relates to the debates with the emerging Anabaptists, are of particular interest.

This book remains the standard text for anyone wishing to explore this topic from a biblical and historical perspective. From a personal point of view I would like to see more on the way in which literature and art have contributed to the traditional view of hell. There would also be scope for some theological reflection on the concepts of justice and judgement in relation to differing views of time and eternity. It might also have been appropriate to offer some response to the recent appearance of exponents of a form of 'evangelical universalism'. Yet this would perhaps make a lengthy book a little unwieldy.

As a carefully argued account of the doctrine of conditional immortality this is an informative source and is likely to continue to provoke debate. Whatever one's view, there is little doubt that the language of hell and final judgement tends to have fallen from common use in many evangelical churches. It is to be hoped that this book will contribute to a mature reflection on what we believe about the life hereafter, and thus facilitate faithful preaching of the Gospel of hope.

Graham J. Watts, London

Ethik Band 3: Die bessere Gerechtigkeit: spezifisch christliche Ethik

Helmut Burkhardt

Gießen: TVG Brunnen, 2013; 320 pp, Pb, € 29,95, ISBN 978-3-7655-9500-4

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Insgesamt über 1.000 Seiten umfasst das Ethikkompendium von Helmut Burkhardt, das mit dem jetzt erschienenen Band abgeschlossen ist. Burkhardt hat am Theologischen Seminar St. Chrischona bei Basel über viele Jahre hinweg Ethik unterrichtet. Weithin bekannt ist er als Mitherausgeber des „Großen Bibellexikons" und des „Evangelischen Lexikons für Theologie und Gemeinde". In seiner *Ethik* legt er die Summe seiner Forschung und Lehrtätigkeit vor. Wie in den vorangegangenen Bänden wird in gut verständlicher Sprache umfangreiche Sekundärliteratur gesichtet und im Gespräch mit dem ausführlich dargestellten biblischen Zeugnis eine bibeltreue Lösung ethischer Fragen der Gegenwart gesucht. Burkhardt stellt die spezifisch christliche Ethik dar, nachdem er zuerst die Geschichte dieses Themas zusammengefasst hat. Er bündelt die Normen des speziellen christlichen Ethos und gibt einen Überblick über seine Gestaltungsformen in christlicher Arbeit und christlichem Leben als *Koinonia, Leiturgia, Martyria* und *Diakonia*. Burkhardts Werk verdient auch über die Grenzen Deutschlands hinaus Beachtung!

RÉSUMÉ

Ce volume vient achever l'œuvre de Helmut Burkhardt consacrée à l'éthique, en portant l'ensemble des trois volumes à plus de 1 000 pages. Burkhardt a enseigné l'éthique pendant de nombreuses années à la faculté de théologie St Chrischona près de Bâle. Il est déjà connu comme co-éditeur d'un grand dictionnaire biblique (*Grosse Bibellexikon*) et d'un dictionnaire protestant de la théologie et de l'Église (*Evangelische Lexikon für Theologie und Gemeinde*). Dans son *Ethik*, il présente le fruit de ses recherches au cours de son activité d'enseignement. Comme dans les précédents volumes, il porte ici une appréciation dans un langage très accessible sur une vaste littérature de seconde main, en cherchant des réponses conformes à l'Écriture aux questions éthiques contemporaines, sur la base d'une analyse détaillée de l'enseignement biblique. Après avoir commencé par retracer l'histoire du traitement de chaque sujet, Burkhardt en offre un traitement éthique spécifiquement chrétien. Il ordonne l'ensemble des normes d'une éthique spécifiquement chrétienne sous les catégories de koinonia, leitourgia, marturia et diakonia en montrant comment elles sont mises en application dans la vie et l'activité du chrétien. Son œuvre mérite de retenir l'attention bien au-delà du monde germanophone.

SUMMARY

Helmut Burkhardt's compendium on ethics, which has now been completed, comprises more than 1000 pages in total. For many years Burkhardt taught ethics at the Theological Seminary in St. Crischona near Basel and he is well-known as co-editor of the *Große Bibellexikon* and the *Evangelische Lexikon für Theologie und Gemeinde* [Great Bible Dictionary; Dictionary of Protestant Theology and Church]. In his *Ethik* he presents the summary of his research and teaching. As in the preceding volumes he evaluates much of the secondary literature in intelligible language as he seeks biblical answers to contemporary ethical questions through elaborate discussions of the biblical witness. In the present volume, having first outlined the history of the subject, Burkhardt offers a specifically Christian ethics. He sums up the norms of a particularly Christian ethos, presenting an overview of its manifestation in Christian work and life in terms of *koinonia, leitourgia, martyria* and *diakonia*. Burkhardt's oeuvre also deserves attention beyond the German speaking realm!

* * * *

Mit dem vorliegenden dritten Band kommt Helmut Burkhardts umfangreiches Ethik-Kompendium zum Abschluss. Auf 300 Seiten fasst der langjährige Ethik-Dozent am Theologischen Seminar St. Chrischona bei Basel (Schweiz) seine Sicht der spezifisch christlichen Materialethik zusammen. Im ersten Band hatte Burkhardt 1996 die Fundamentalethik unter dem Titel „Einführung in die Ethik / Grund und Norm sittlichen Handelns" behandelt (3. Aufl. 2012, 192 pp.). Der erste Teil des 2. Bandes mit der Materialethik (Religionsethik und Humanethik: Lebensethik, Sozialethik) erschien 2003 (240 pp.). Im zweiten Teilband der Materialethik (2. Aufl. 2008, 336 pp.) folgten die Sexualethik und die Naturethik mit den Themen Wirtschaft, Umwelt und Kultur. Im dritten Band gliedert Burkhardt seine Darstellung der spezifisch christlichen Ethik in drei Teile. Im ersten stellt er die Geschichte des Problems dar; der zweite Teil entfaltet die Normen und der dritte Teil die Felder spezifisch christlicher Ethik.

Burkhardt fasst seine Beobachtungen zur Ethikgeschichte in der Feststellung zusammen, dass die Neuheit des christlichen Lebens in den wichtigen Lehrbüchern zu kurz kommt und bevorzugt eine Ethik mit Allgemeingültigkeitsanspruch vorgetragen wird (16-17, 25-26). Im Gegensatz zu diesem allgemeinen Trend entwickelt Burkhardt im zweiten Teil die Normen spezifisch christlicher Ethik aus einer exegetischen Sichtung des gesamten Neuen Testaments. Dabei werden zum Beispiel bei Behandlung der Sendschreiben der Johannesoffenbarung (115-116) interessante ethische Detailaussagen ins Bewusstsein gerufen. Im Theologiestudium beschäftigt man sich eher mit der Ethik der Bergpredigt oder der Paulusbriefe als mit der gesamten neutestamentlichen Ethik. Natürlich gibt es in der apostolischen Paraklese allgemeinethische Normen (vgl. 70). Aber das christliche Ethos hat besonders durch seinen Grundgedanken der Gottebenbildlichkeit des Menschen und durch die Praxis der Nächstenliebe das allgemeine Ethos nicht nur beeinflusst, sondern tiefgreifend verändert (141-143). Grundnorm der christlichen Lebensführung ist die Liebe (117), die sich Gott und dem Nächsten (auch: Feindes-, Bruderliebe) zuwendet (129-137).

Unter dem Begriff der „Felder" spezifisch christlicher Ethik kommt Burkhardt auf die Tätigkeiten und die Lebensgestaltung, in denen sich christliches Leben ausdrückt, zu sprechen. Leitbegriffe sind ausgehend von der Zusammenfassung in Apostelgeschichte 2,42 Gemeinschaft, Gebet, Zeugnis und Dienst (*koinoonia, leitourgia, martyria* und *diakonia*). Die Gestalt, die christliches Leben und Glauben gewinnt, wird oft nur in der Ekklesiologie und der Praktischen Theologie behandelt. Burkhardt verankert dagegen die Themen kirchlicher und innerkirchlicher Lebensformen, der Frömmigkeit und des Gebets, der Mission, der Lehre, des Zeugnisses und der Diakonie im Rahmen der Ethik. Ohne diese konkreten Ausdrucksformen christlicher Existenz in dieser Welt würde die Ethik in einem luftleeren Raum erörtert; christliches Leben wäre eine ortlose und leiblose Schimäre.

Unter dem Thema „Christliche Gemeinschaft" (*koinoonia*) stellt Burkhardt nicht nur Volkskirche und Freikirche als „Geschichtliche Grundgestalten christlicher Gemeinschaft" dar, sondern auch innerkirchliche Gemeinschaften und Kommunitäten mit einem Überblick zur Geschichte der Diakonissenhäuser (179-180). In diesem Kapitel vermisst der Rezensent weitere kirchliche Grundformen, die neben der deutschen Sonderentwicklung „Volkskirche" fast nie gesehen werden, aber weltweit und auch in Europa existieren: Hauskirchen, völlig unabhängige und betont staats- und kirchenkritische Einzelgemeinden, verfolgte Märtyrerkirchen und auch *Mainstream-Denominations*, die zwischen Frei- und Staatskirchen stehen (zum Martyrium vgl. jedoch 277–283).

Kapitel III.2 über das Gebet (*leitourgia*) fällt besonders als gelungene Abhandlung über dieses wichtige Thema auf. Der Abschnitt über die christliche Lehre arbeitet gut zeitgenössische Vorurteile gegenüber der Lehre auf.

Helmut Burkhardts letzter Ethik-Teilband schließt das Gesamtwerk in würdiger Weise ab. Besonders konservative und evangelikale Sekundärliteratur zu den Themen wird extensiv eingearbeitet bzw. es wird darauf verwiesen. Die Darstellung ist bedächtig, überlegt, sprachlich präzise und gut verständlich, sowie nie ausufernd-redundant. Der Umfang der einzelnen Teile im Ganzen ist angemessen, so dass der Leser *nicht* den Eindruck hat (wie bei manchen Büchern anderer Autoren), dass Vorarbeiten mit der *copy and paste*-Funktion übernommen wurden. Am Schluss bleibt der Wunsch, das Werk möge bald in einer einbändigen Ausgabe – vielleicht in seinen ersten Teilen sogar aktualisiert – erscheinen. Es könnte ein Standard-Kompendium für alle Theologischen Seminare werden!

Jochen Eber
Mannheim, Deutschland

In Defence of War
Nigel Biggar

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014; 361 pp., £25, hb., ISBN 978-0-19-967261-5

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

In dieser letzten Apologie einer Theorie des gerechten Krieges bietet Nigel Biggar (Oxford) eine klare, mutige Präsentation der klassischen Theorie eines ‚gerechtfertigten Krieges'. Im Verlauf von sieben kurzen Aufsätzen diskutiert er die Hauptpunkte dieser Theorie und gibt pädagogische Beispiele hierfür. In seinem Werk zeigt sich Biggar rational unflexibel in der Bewertung der Opposition gegenüber einer Theorie des gerechten Krieges, die sowohl von einem christlichen Pazifismus als auch einem modernen Emotionalismus herkommt.

SUMMARY

In this latest defence of just-war theory, Nigel Biggar (Oxford) provides a clear and courageous presentation of the classical theory of 'justified war'. In the course of seven short essays, he discusses the main tenets of just-war theory while providing pedagogical examples. In this work, Biggar is uncompromisingly rational in his evaluation of the opposition to just-war theory which comes from both Christian pacifism and modern emotionalism.

RÉSUMÉ

Dans cette récente défense de la théorie de la guerre juste, Nigel Biggar offre une présentation claire et courageuse de la « guerre justifiée ». Au cours de sept brefs essais, il aborde les points principaux de la théorie tout en donnant des exemples pédagogiques. Dans cet ouvrage, Biggar est rationnellement inflexible dans son évaluation des critiques venant tout aussi bien du pacifisme chrétien que de l'émotionnalisme moderne.

* * * *

Il paraît aujourd'hui plutôt téméraire de défendre la théorie de la guerre « justifiée ». C'est pourtant le choix remarquable de Nigel Biggar, professeur de théologie morale et pastorale à l'université d'Oxford (Christ Church) et directeur du McDonald Centre for Theology, Ethics and Public Life. Ce choix à lui seul fait de cet ouvrage une publication sortant des sentiers battus. Il est en effet beaucoup plus théologiquement correct de se faire le porte-parole d'un relatif pacifisme plutôt que de la guerre juste ! De plus, le lecteur qui se lancerait dans la lecture des sept chapitres de ce livre en pensant y trouver une introduction à la théorie de la guerre juste serait rapidement déçu. L'ouvrage en question se propose plutôt d'aborder des points fondamentaux de la théorie classique en sept essais.

Le premier essai porte sur une contestation de la posture pacifiste commune que Biggar rencontre chez Stanley Hauerwas, John Yoder et Richard Hays. Il y critique certaines postures et approximations herméneutiques communes à ces trois auteurs. En particulier, il remet en cause l'assimilation de la condamnation de la violence dans le Nouveau Testament à une condamnation générique, et non spécifique, de la violence.

Le deuxième essai revient sur la possibilité de considérer que l'amour a une place dans le contexte de la violence justifiée. Pour Biggar, même si ce point de vue est contre-intuitif, la violence peut être qualifiée, motivée par le pardon. En effet, « Le pardon, bien compris, inclut l'expression proportionnée du ressentiment et de la rétribution » (72).

Biggar établit ensuite, dans son troisième chapitre, un lien direct entre la théorie thomiste de la guerre juste et le « principe du double effet » (inspiré de Thomas d'Aquin, *Summa Theologica*, II-II, Quae. 64, Art. 7). Ainsi, il est possible d'avoir l'intention de quelque chose, sans avoir l'intention (vouloir) de son effet ou de sa conséquence.

Après avoir traité de ce critère d'intentionnalité, Biggar considère celui de la proportionnalité dans son quatrième essai. Pour ce faire, il incarne son exposé dans le contexte de la bataille de la Somme. Dans ce chapitre, le lecteur sera en particulier invité à comprendre les personnes impliquées dans le processus de décision, ainsi qu'à mettre en question le présupposé selon lequel le nombre de victimes suffirait à ôter sa crédibilité à l'engagement lui-même.

Le cinquième essai, d'abord plus difficile, traite de la critique de la guerre juste produite par David Rodin. La complexité du chapitre ne permet pas de rendre compte de cette critique. Nous noterons simplement que Biggar défend ici la position selon laquelle la guerre juste est essentiellement une réponse punitive à une injustice et qu'elle constitue donc un exercice de justice (212).

L'avant dernier essai revient sur un domaine plus connu en prenant comme cas d'étude l'engagement au Kosovo et sa justification humanitaire. Ici, Biggar met en évidence les conflits d'interprétation de la loi internationale, entre « textualistes » et « contextualistes ». Son analyse montre que nous nous trouvons là face à des problèmes herméneutiques similaires à ceux que l'on rencontre dans l'interprétation biblique. Le chemin ouvert par Biggar est donc similaire à certaines approches herméneutiques et il milite ainsi pour une non séparation entre textes et contextes, ainsi que pour une meilleure prise en compte des intentions et attentes de l'auteur des lois internationales.

Enfin, le septième chapitre pose la question des critères permettant de juger de la légitimité, de la droiture et de la justification d'un engagement militaire. Le cas utilisé ici est l'invasion controversée de l'Iraq en 2003. L'auteur, qui ne cède décidément pas à l'émotionnalisme, se sert de cet exemple pour affirmer que les critères servant à discerner si une « guerre est juste » n'ont pas tous le même poids (322) et ne devraient pas être considérés ainsi.

L'un des grands mérites de cet ouvrage est sa pédagogie. L'auteur prend soin d'expliquer par de nombreux exemples la rationalité de ses arguments. Cet ouvrage est ainsi remarquable par sa volonté de revenir sur une théorie théologique trop souvent considérée comme inacceptable et par l'expertise théologique et éthique de l'auteur – qui se double d'une connaissance en histoire militaire dont ses critiques bénéficieraient eux aussi.

Un point critique serait sa propension à utiliser un cadre interprétatif thomiste. Cela conduit à une construction théologico-éthique hétéroclite. Cela ne signifie pas que l'ensemble souffre d'incohérences rédhibitoires, mais qu'il exige une cohérence d'ensemble que la théologie non thomiste, en particulier évangélique, n'a pas encore atteint. Nous pourrions aussi regretter que l'argumentation de Biggar efface parfois la différence entre l'autorité de la révélation spéciale et celle de la révélation générale, et qu'il s'appuie trop sur notre expérience du monde. En raison de cet appel à l'expérience, son argumentation pourrait souffrir d'un certain relativisme. Cependant, il fait peu de doutes que cet ouvrage demeurera, dans les années à venir, une référence pour la défense de la « guerre justifiée ».

Yannick Imbert
Aix-en-Provence, France

From the editor

1. Readers are advised that the website has been renewed; see www.paternosterperiodicals.co.uk/european-journal-of-theology. The website contains a featured author and a blog.
2. Readers are also advised that *EJT* is available electronically as well as in printed format; see above for details.
3. God willing, the next FEET conference will be held in Lutherstadt Wittenberg on the theme of the contemporary relevance of the Reformation. The dates are 26-30 August 2016.

Instructions to Authors of Articles

The following are brief instructions but intending authors are encouraged to write to the Editor Rev. Dr Pieter Lalleman, Spurgeon's College, South Norwood Hill, London SE25 6DJ, UK, email: p.lalleman@spurgeons.ac.uk. All such material will be subject to peer-review before acceptance. Referees may recommend alterations (full details from the Publishers and Editors upon application).

Submission of Manuscript. Contributions are welcome in French, German or English; contributions in other languages (especially Spanish and Russian) will be considered for occasional publication.

Abstract. All final copy must be accompanied by a summary of approximately ten per-cent of the wordage.

Author Affiliations. A suitable note of the author's position, in no more than 25 words, should be included at the end of the manuscript.

Instructions to Book Reviewers

Full instructions to reviewers will be included together with each book sent out for review. Book reviews are normally solicited by the Reviews Editor. We are grateful for information regarding books which readers consider should be reviewed in the journal.

* * * *

Directives pour les auteurs

Les remarques suivantes sont de brèves directives et il est conseillé aux auteurs intéressés d'écrire au rédacteur Rev. Dr Pieter Lalleman, Spurgeon's College, South Norwood Hill, London SE25 6DJ, UK, email: p.lalleman@spurgeons.ac.uk. On emploiera normalement des guillemets simples. Tous les textes feront l'objet d'un examen par nos conseillers qui peuvent recommander des changements. (tous renseignements à ce sujet seront fournis par les éditeurs et rédacteurs sur simple demande).

Soumission de manuscrits. Des textes en français, allemand ou anglais sont acceptés ; des contributions en d'autres langues, en particulier l'espagnol ou le russe, seront acceptées de temps à autre.

Résumé. Toute copie définitive doit être produite avec un résumé d'une longeur d'environ dix pour cent du texte.

Notes sur l'auteur. Un bref commentaire sur la situation de l'auteur ne comprenant pas plus de 25 mots doit figurer en fin de manuscrit.

Consignes pour les recensions

Des instructions détaillées seront envoyées aux auteurs avec chaque ouvrage à considérer. Les recensions de livres sont normalement sollicitées par le rédacteur chargé des recensions. Cependant, nous aimerions aussi recevoir de nos lecteurs des propositions d'ouvrages susceptibles d'etre recensés dans cette publication.

* * * *

Hinweise für Autoren

Die folgen Hinweise dienen Autoren als Richtlinien. Artikel sind bei Rev. Dr Pieter Lalleman, Spurgeon's College, South Norwood Hill, London SE25 6DJ, UK, email: p.lalleman@spurgeons.ac.uk einzureichen. Alle Artikel werden redaktionell durchgesehen und gegebenenfalls mit der Bitte um Überarbeitung zurückgegeben. Nähere Einzelheiten beim Herausgeber.

Sprachen. Die Beiträge sollen in Französisch, Deutsch oder Englisch verfaßt sein. Artikel in anderen Sprachen, vor allem in Russisch oder Spanisch, können gelegentlich auch übernommen werden.

Zusammenfassung. Allen Artikeln muß für den Druck eine Zusammenfassung beigelegt werden (etwa zehn Prozent des Wortumfangs).

Zur Person des Autors. Eine Notiz zur derzeitigen Tätigkeit des Autors sollte am Ende des Manuskripts stehen, nicht mehr als 25 Wörter.

Hinweise für Buchrezensenten

Eine Anleitung für Buchbesprechungen wird mit jedem zur Rezension vorgesehenen Buch zugesandt. Rezensionen erfolgen normalerweise auf Anfrage der Redaktion. Anregungen von Lesern hinsichtlich Büchern, für die sie eine Besprechung als wichtig erachten, werden dankbar angenommen.

* * * *

Abstracts / Indexing: Resumés / Zusammenfassung / Indexierung: This Journal is abstracted in / Les articles de notre journal sont résumés dans / Dieses Journal wird zusammenfasst in: Religious and Theological Abstracts, 121 South College Street (PO Box 215) Myerstown, PA 17067, USA. It is also included in / Ils sont également répertoriés dans / Es ist auch enthalten in: ATLA Religion Database, published by the American Theological Library Association, 300 S. Wacker Dr., Suite 2100, Chicago IL 60606 USA, E-mail: atla@atla.com Website: http://www.atla.com/

It is also included in / Ils sont également repertories dans / Es ist auch enthalten in SciVerse Scopus, Elsevier's abstract and citation database of peer-reviewed literature.

Microform / Microfiche / Mikrofiche: This journal is available on Microform from / On peut obtenir les articles de ce journal sur microfiche en s'adressant à / Dieses Journal ist erhältlich auf Mikrofiche von: UMI, 300, North Zeeb Road, PO Box 1346, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346, USA

Contents / Table des matières / Inhalt

Articles / Articles / Artikel

Book Reviews / Recensions / Buchbesprechungen

0960-2720(201510)24:2;1-4

Paternoster: thinking faith

ISSN 0960-2720

EJT (2015) 24:2, 101–211